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Program Focus

Closing the Market

*Controlling the Drug Trade
in Tampa, Florida*



Controlling the Drug Trade in Tampa, Florida

by David M. Kennedy

In the last years of the 1980's, drug dealers worked the streets of Tampa, Florida, pretty much as they pleased. Dealers congregated, sometimes by the dozen, on sidewalks, at intersections, in vacant lots, parks, and empty buildings. Drive-by customers flocked so heavily to some spots that neighborhood streets were choked to a standstill.

Too many neighborhoods in our Nation are not livable because street-level drug dealers have taken over entire communities. Fear has replaced laughter on our city streets as people huddle in their homes, too afraid to take a walk or allow their children to play in a park.

Unfortunately, at the local level, traditional approaches to drug enforcement have not effected significant change. The crack trade has not ended with arrests of mid- and high-level cocaine traffickers or interstate drug interdiction. All too often when officers have arrested local crack dealers, new dealers have taken their place on the streets, and seasoned dealers have simply relocated.

In the late 1980's, Tampa faced this all-too-familiar scenario. It seemed everyone had lost faith in the police department—even the police themselves. But a group of officers developed an unusual approach to street drug dealing and in the process

may have revolutionized the way other cities deal with drugs.,,

Called QUAD, or Quick Uniform Attack on Drugs, this program has emphasized community cooperation and neighborhood cleanup. Armed with beepers, officers responded immediately to every community complaint, often using tactics to inconvenience drug dealers rather than jail them. And new city ordinances passed by the council supported this ingenious effort.

The strategy worked. Within 1 year the drug trade was driven indoors, and a sense of normalcy on the streets of Tampa was restored. This *Program Focus* tells the story of Tampa's QUAD program—the uphill battle that officers faced, the techniques they used to enlist community help, and the strategies they found to be effective. This case study has important lessons, which may help other cities.

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Dealers fought over prime turf, scrapped in the street to be the first to buyers' cars, blocked traffic, and rode pickups' running boards to hawk their goods. Long-time residents in some parts of the city felt like their neighborhoods were coming apart at the seams.

"I would get four or five phone calls a day from people who were just terrified," says Linda Hope, head of a civic association in a middle-class section of town called Sulphur Springs. "People would say, 'I don't want to drive down the street.' If you drove by, they'd try to flag you down; you'd have to wait at the corner behind cars while they got through with dealing. It was like scraping a raw nerve, it just made people crazy. It was more than just the business trade. It was grandmothers whose daughters wouldn't bring the grandchildren over to visit. The very essence of community life was endangered."

Tampa police were equally frustrated. They made thousands of drug arrests every year without, as far as they could tell, making the slightest dent in the problem. Crime and the police workload soared; public confidence in the police plummeted.

A year into the 1990's, all that was over. One was hard pressed to find any open-air dealing at all, and the heavy concentrations of sellers and crowds of buyers were gone altogether. For perhaps the first time in any crack-plagued American city, Tampa's police had figured out how to suppress street dealing almost entirely. Their answer was QUAD—for Quick Uni-

form Attack on Drugs—an unusual and innovative combination of traditional, problemsolving, and community policing approaches.

QUAD was not designed to stop Tampa's drug trade, incarcerate dealers, seize drugs and assets, or any of the other traditional goals of narcotics enforcement. It was designed solely to restore public order and community safety by suppressing street drug markets. The results were all the police had hoped. Afflicted neighborhoods improved and even recovered, reported crime and calls for police service declined markedly, and the police department's reputation seemed restored. All with remarkable speed, given the scale of the original problem.

The ideas behind QUAD may well represent a fundamental step forward in drug policy and operations. They embody both the insight that shutting down street drug sales is a worthy end in itself and a set of tactics to fit that goal. Tampa's experience with QUAD contains important lessons about the strategic value of disrupting drug markets, about the merits of shaping those markets into different forms, about how to build effective police-community partnerships against the drug trade, and about the crime-control value of street drug enforcement. Tampa's experience also raises certain questions about the best way to organize and administer QUAD-type street-level drug operations. This *Program Focus* explores that experience, those lessons, and those issues.

Tampa's Drug Problem

Crack hit Tampa in 1985, roughly the same time the drug made its first major appearance in a number of other eastern-seaboard cities. It wrought, as far as the police were concerned, immediate and dire ill. Tampa is a city of 280,000 on central Florida's gulf coast, adjacent to St. Petersburg and the center of a metropolitan area of over 2 million. It had, prior to 1985, what the police viewed as ordinary and manageable crime problems, with very little in the way of overt public drug dealing. Crack changed all that very quickly. Tampa suddenly had a major street drug-dealing problem.

"Prior to 1985," a department report says, "Tampa's drug trafficking was generally thought to be 'behind the scenes.' It was indoors, in out-of-the-way places, in bars, poolrooms, and private homes."¹ Not anymore. Starting primarily in the city's several lower income, predominantly black sections, police say, and eventually spreading—though less heavily—into many more prosperous neighborhoods, streetside markets catering to drive-by consumers proliferated wildly. Buyers were of all ages and races and came from all parts of town and the surrounding areas. Dealers were largely young and black. Some set up couches, brought out coolers of drinks, lit fires in barrels in cool weather, left their empty bottles and cans and food wrappers where they fell. "It's obvious where these guys sell," says Capt. John Sollazzo, "just by the litter, even when they're not there."² Many swapped crack for jewelry, appliances,

and sex. Turf fights over prime locations were common, as was the brandishing and use of often high-powered weapons. When the department took a rough inventory of these "dope holes," as they came to be called locally, in 1989 as part of the leadup to QUAD, it counted 61 (some large areas flooded with dealers were counted as one site; if each active corner and lot had been counted separately, as the department later took to doing, the number would have been considerably higher).³

Reported crime surged: from 11,736 index crimes per 100,000 residents (33,959 index crimes total) in 1984 to 16,481 index crimes per 100,000 residents (48,294 total) in 1986." Nobody could prove that crack was responsible, but the police harbored no doubts whatsoever. Maj. Bert Hatcher, in charge of the department's tactical division, heard so much about the drug from prisoners in 1985 that he had 4 months' worth of robbery arrestees interviewed and discovered that some 85 percent had committed their crimes either under the influence of crack or in order to buy more. Sgt. J.L. Counsman, then a patrol sergeant, saw what he calls a "terrific increase" in street crime and burglaries. The department, roughly 750 sworn officers, "was completely overwhelmed," he says. "Working 10 to 11 hour shifts, holding lots of calls, no time at all to do directed patrol and our traditional proactive work." When he switched into detectives, it was the same story: The city was hit with a sudden wave of housebreaks and construction site burglaries aimed not just at ordinary valuables but at new targets like wiring, pipe, and raw metal stock.

"People were tearing houses and bridges apart for scrap," he says. "It was all going to feed their drug habits, at least that's what we thought."⁵

The city's residents, by all accounts, were outraged. Cheryl Franklin, a black single mother, lived in a low-income apartment complex whose common space and adjacent park had been taken over by a huge group of dealers which numbered, she says, sometimes up to 60 at a time. "Every day, it was Vietnam," she says. "I've never been to Vietnam, but if it was worse than this, I don't want to go, you know? Just drive-through drug service, anything you wanted, it was there. We had people in the park, bad drug deals going down. But it wasn't even just the drugs; it was the things that they did to get their drugs. You had tricking going on out here and in the parking lot; there were a lot of little nasty things going on, seriously."

Even in parts of the city where the dealing had not spread, the effects were felt. "We had the drug dealing problem, which was primarily going on in inner-city black neighborhoods," says Tampa Mayor Sandy Freedman, "but the victims of burglaries and robberies and thefts were all over the city and they were clamoring for something to be done. . . . The residents were irate."

The police, by their own account, were not set up to deal with the problem. "You've got your inside dopers and your outside dopers, and the outside dopers, as I see it, have been neglected," says Captain Sollazzo. Tampa had an active narcotics division

that pursued, in the main, the "inside dopers"—serious mid- and upper echelon traffickers. It mounted large-scale, long-term investigations, often in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, aimed at major seizures of drugs, money, and other assets. It was neither inclined nor organized to pursue—by its lights—hundreds of penny-ante street dealers. These were left to the patrol force, which was not particularly well-equipped either. Patrol officers often knew perfectly well who was dealing where, but cases were not necessarily easy to make. Dealers posted lookouts to warn of marked cars, hid their stashes off their persons, sometimes paid juveniles to carry freshly sold dope to cars. Ordinary street officers had neither the authorization nor—as the department's call load spiraled up—the time to work plainclothes buy-bust operations. Street dealers, in consequence, were largely free from significant police attention.

Task Force Approach. The Tampa Police Department, as would perhaps most departments facing a similar predicament, assigned a number of officers to special duty on an anti-street dealing task force. It made thousands of arrests, without, by any account, improving the situation. "It was strictly an enforcement effort, strictly statistics," Sollazzo says. The task force would typically shut down one spot, only to find the same dealers in business around the corner shortly afterward or dispersed to several new locations. Following them to their new haunts often meant that they simply

went back to work in the original location. "It was all short term," Sollazzo says. "The problem in fact escalated and spread throughout the community." The task force apparently made things hot enough in predominantly black neighborhoods that dealers, for the first time, moved heavily into more affluent white parts of town. This was what brought crack to the streets of Sulphur Springs, whereas dealing had been restricted previously to a small black section called Spring Hill Park. Police attention, says civic association leader Linda Hope, "scattered the dealing through the whole neighborhood. It was just like a shotgun, all over the Springs." The dealers soon discovered that they were scarcely more vulnerable in their new spots than they had been in the old ones.

This inability to handle Tampa's crack problem was enormously frustrating to the police. "I guess I was obsessed," says Bob Smith, Tampa's public safety administrator, who oversees both the police and fire departments. "Every single day I'd ride the streets and look at different drug holes and contact the vice squad, or call the district to send somebody in uniform out to just get them off the corner. It was just total disorganization; we were just making it up as we went along. We never had anything like this before, never had a plan to deal with it. You begin to question your own ability; you say, 'maybe we can't lick this, maybe this is bigger than our police department.' Then you start blaming other people: the prisons, the families. Those were the kinds of things that were going on in my mind. I was just totally perplexed."

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The same was true in the ranks. Department morale slipped, anger built, and as top department and city officials demanded action, a certain recklessness was increasingly inviting. "You can only go out to these corners—10, 15, 20 real scum hanging there, people can't walk or drive by, they're calling the women names, dropping garbage all over the place—so many times and have them say '——you' to you," says one Tampa officer. "You can't make a case. You don't have the drugs. You saw them pass something into a car but you can't swear what it was, and you've got all these dirtbags saying, '——you leave.' Well, we just started saying, 'No.——you. You're leaving.' And we'd move them on. Nobody got hit, nobody got hurt, but we made sure that corner got cleaned up. It was the only way to protect the people who lived around there. And I'd go home at night and I'd think to myself, is this legal? Answer was, probably not. But we didn't ask anybody, we just did it. And I didn't lose any sleep over it."

Not even such genteel strong-arm tactics made much of a dent in the problem. "We had neighborhood people who would have hung me in effigy," says Mayor Freedman, "and the rest of us [in city government] would have been lined up in the trees alongside, they were so frustrated." In 1988 the mayor launched a crackdown on abandoned houses being used as drug bazaars, burning down 54 in one weekend. The move seemed popular, but failed to stanch the flow of drugs. Police, from Smith on down through the ranks, are united in believing that they had lost the city's confidence.

They seem correct. Cherryl Franklin recalls with indignation a police captain telling her to buy private security if she wanted her area cleaned up. Linda Hope says she actually had a dream late in 1988 or early in 1989 that Tampa's citizens had gathered outside a huge glass building full of police, and the police were looking through the walls, offering to help, but refusing to come out or let the people in. By mid-1991, Hope had grown philosophical about this stage in Tampa's trials. "The police were trying to figure what to do; they didn't know what to do then," she says. At the time, though, she was furious. "They're the cops, they're supposed to know, they get all the big salaries," she says. "That's what their job is."

Designing QUAD

Linda Hope was right: The Tampa Police Department hadn't known what to do. It was not alone in this. Traditional enforcement strategies have shown little success against street cocaine markets. Operations aimed at high-level traffickers show no sign of interrupting street-level drug supplies; one searches in vain for accounts of street markets affected to any significant degree by major drug prosecutions. Interdiction shows no more promise; street dealers' access to cocaine appears to be largely unaffected by seizing drugs at the border or on their way to market. Street-level enforcement as normally practiced, whether by patrol officers as part of their regular duties or through episodic task force-style crackdowns, is costly, not easily combined with regular patrol, generally fails to take dealers off

the streets for long, does nothing to prevent the entry of new dealers into the business, and frequently simply displaces dealers or the market to a new location (and that often only temporarily).⁶ Crackdowns, in particular, are often seen within police circles as a temporary expedient: useful for assuaging the community, but ineffective long term, and rife with civil liberties problems.

But happily, there are indications that not all street-level police responses need be a waste of time and energy. To these, late in 1988, turned a Tampa Police Department planning group consisting of Smith, Chief of Police Austin McLane, Deputy Chief of Police Tom DePolis, and Maj. Bert Hatcher, by then head of the tactical division. They were trying to come up with a fresh approach, driven in more or less equal parts by frustration over their lack of success to date and by a need to do something high profile in the face of what was felt to be a swelling chorus of public dissatisfaction. "We had reached the point," says Smith, "where we had to do something dramatic."

The group was particularly drawn to two sets of ideas. One had to do with analyses of apparently *successful* police crackdowns against street drug markets, primarily a massive heroin and cocaine market in New York City's Lower East Side and a much smaller one in Lynn, Massachusetts.⁷ In each instance, intensive long-term street drug enforcement resulted in an apparently lasting suppression of street dealing. The results could not be explained simply by arrest and incarceration.

tion rates (though at least the former was very high in each instance); there is no reason to believe that either the Lynn or the New York City police put all their potential heroin dealers in prison and kept them there. One explanation was that the heavy enforcement so disrupted the markets—taking "market" here in both the geographic and the *economic* sense—that the drug trade was no longer sustainable.

For street drug trade to perpetuate itself, buyers must have a reasonable expectation of making safe connections; dealers must have a reasonable expectation of making both safe and profitable connections. Intensive enforcement decreases the ease, security, and profitability of the street trade. It drives dealers into less visible and obvious locations, making them harder for buyers to find. Buyers and dealers who do connect become less willing to trade freely, as the risk of arrest for each transaction increases. Arrests take dealers off the street for some length of time, reducing their productivity, and reduce profits by causing the loss of drugs and money. Each buyer and dealer deterred or arrested means that more police resources can be focused on those who remain. At some point the game is no longer worth the candle and the market dries up.^B The key to crackdowns, on this analysis, is to maintain a level of effort great enough, for long enough, to cause this "tipping." The Lynn and New York City experiences suggest that the crime control benefits can be considerable and that displacement is perhaps not as inevitable as is often supposed.⁹

The other major set of promising approaches to fighting street drug markets is drawn from community and problemsolving policing theory and experience, which suggest that fresh preventive approaches may succeed where ordinary law enforcement cannot. One basic notion in these policing strategies is the "broken windows" idea that disorder and other unpleasant conditions—abandoned buildings, bad lighting, other criminal activity, a cowed community—may facilitate drug dealing and other crime and that those conditions can be addressed through nontraditional police tactics.¹⁰ Another basic notion is that the public and other government agencies can be useful police partners if the right working relationships can be established.¹¹ Application of these ideas in Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and elsewhere has shown that they can be effective against street drug markets.¹² In Houston, Texas, a monthlong preventive operation aimed at closing a large open-air cocaine market by cleaning up the blighted area and preventing easy contact between dealers and buyers was so successful that the market was eliminated without a single narcotics arrest being made.¹³

Formulating the Plan. Smith, Hatcher, and the rest of the Tampa planning group were convinced from the outset that enforcement as such had and would continue to fail: The department had made more than 12,000 drug arrests in the last 3 years, to minimal effect.¹⁴ They held out some hope, though, for market disruption and community policing. The group took as its task designing a way to bring market disruption and com-

munity partnerships to bear against a large, geographically dispersed drug market. They wanted to crack down, more or less simultaneously, on all of Tampa's drug holes. The objective, the group decided, would be to make it "very difficult for dealers to make sales and for buyers to 'score.'"¹⁵

Much of the rest of the plan followed fairly directly from that key strategic decision. If police were going to crack down on the current street-selling sites, they knew that they had to have a way to identify new sites resulting from the inevitable displacement. One way to accomplish that was to promote surveillance by residents, which meant that the public needed a way to cooperate with the police without exposure to retribution. The group was inclined to accept the "broken windows" link between disorder and crime and thus believed that municipal help with physical problems in drug-dealing areas would be useful. The group wanted, for public relations purposes, the new operation to be clearly identifiable, high profile, and very responsive to the public. Finally, the group had a clear and, for the police, somewhat unusual way to measure progress: by the *absence* of street drug sales and community complaints about the drug trade. Unlike Tampa's first crackdown, this one would not be measured by arrests and drug seizures. Only quiet streets and resident satisfaction would count. (See exhibit 1 for the department's list of key QUAD program elements.)

Smith and the planning group decided early on to give a special unit primary responsibility for the crackdown.

"This was a bigger problem than uniformed patrol could handle," Smith says. "There was no way that they had the intelligence resources or could devote the full time that it took to bring it under control." Using volunteers from the rest of the force, they created four 10-person teams, each made up of a sergeant, a corporal, and eight officers (including a K-9 officer). Tampa's active street-selling locations were inventoried, and the city divided into four areas so that each had a more or less even share of the 61 sites identified (nearly half the city—the wealthier half—fell into one area).¹⁶ One "QUAD Squad"—the name was originally simply short for "quadrant"; the "Quick Uniformed Attack on Drugs" came later—team was assigned to each area. The teams were originally under Hatcher's direction; after QUAD had been running for about 9 months, they were put under a lieutenant in the tactical division's special enforcement bureau.

Selecting Strategy and Tactics. The QUAD team's job was to do anything it legally could to make dealers' and buyers' lives miserable and improve public confidence in the police. Dealers were to be dissuaded by heavy enforcement: use of on-site arrests for dealing, public drinking, and similar infractions; short-term undercover work and buy-busts; and confidential informants. The QUAD teams thought that the resulting displacement might even work in their favor, since dealers might not feel as safe or work as readily in new locations, especially if the police were able to keep moving them around. A city code enforcement officer was detailed to the squad to

Exhibit 1

QUAD's Key Elements

1. A citywide strategy.
2. A long-term commitment to the plan.
3. Allocation of adequate resources.
4. Solicitation and maintenance of citizen involvement.
5. A method to communicate with individual citizens without exposing them to retaliation.
6. Immediate or guaranteed response to every citizen's complaint.
7. Involvement of officers from each division or bureau of the police department, rather than just a specialized unit.
8. Involvement of other city departments in support of the police department.
9. A system to assure constant monitoring of conditions prevailing throughout the city.
10. Active media involvement to enhance public education and support.

Source: Tampa Police Department

organize the physical cleanup of dope holes, speed the condemnation and wrecking of abandoned buildings, and the like.

Buyers were to be directly dissuaded by mounting "reverse stings" in which officers posing as dealers sold drugs and then arrested the buyers; under Florida State law, buyers' vehicles could also be seized. Buyers were to be indirectly dissuaded by making it harder to find dealers: displacement, again, working in the police's favor.

Winning Community Support. The department planned to reinforce its work by actively encouraging media coverage, especially of enforcement against buyers. "When I came on here" at about the time QUAD got under way, says Steve Cole, who handles public relations for the depart-

ment, "the complaint was all about perception: They think we're not doing anything. And I said, that's going to change. They're going to think we're *everywhere*. Nobody is going to buy crack anywhere in Tampa without thinking we're looking over their shoulder." Cole worked hard to win QUAD frequent media coverage, especially television coverage, which the department considered essential to the strategy's success.

Links with the public were to be handled according to two principles: responsiveness and confidentiality. Responsiveness had to do primarily with repairing the department's tattered reputation. All complaints having to do with street dealing were to be routed to QUAD; and Smith, as top policymaker, and Hatcher, as QUAD'S effective commanding officer, made

very clear that *every* complaint was to be attended to. In each instance some visible action was to be taken, even if it meant, for instance, tending to a relatively minor problem in the evening, when the police presence would be noticed, and neglecting a more serious early-morning problem. The department's concern for visibility also led the planning team to impose a 1-day limit on QUAD's undercover work. Smith wanted QUAD officers to be out on the streets in uniform, not working undercover a week at a time. Each QUAD unit had a designated "sister squad" in narcotics to handle more sustained undercover work.

Confidentiality had to do with satisfying the department's need for street-level intelligence, which it considered crucial to the success of the operation. The department wanted all the information the public was willing to pass on, and it did not want to inhibit people by insisting that names and addresses be given, that they be willing to appear in court, or that they be exposed by sending officers to their doors. The department was particularly eager to have the public help identify dealers and new street-dealing spots. "Once they're setting up in a new neighborhood, we feel like it gives us an advantage," says Hatcher. "They're hungry now, they want to make sales. They're a little more eager, not as cautious. We need the public to tell us where they're at before they get entrenched. And we told people, 'For God's sake, if you see it, don't wait till it becomes a real problem. Call us right away, even if you

got a doubt. Call us and let us be the judge.'"

To make secure contact as easy as possible, each QUAD officer was issued a digital beeper; the numbers were distributed at neighborhood watch and community meetings, which QUAD officers attended routinely, and published in department pamphlets. People were told to call whenever and however often they wanted and assured that the police would do absolutely nothing to compromise their safety; callers didn't even have to give their names. "We promised them total anonymity," Hatcher says. "We will call you on the phone, and we'll use the information you have to try to do something, but if you don't want to get involved, if you don't want to go to court, you don't have to. I promise you we will not come to your house. If it ever boils down to a judge saying, 'Well, the only way this case can proceed is, you have to bring forth the person who gave you this information,' we promise that we will dismiss the charges. It's not worth it. We will not expose you." QUAD officers and Smith took particular pride in having stuck to this pledge; to their knowledge QUAD never compromised any of their allies in the community.

The department knew that at best—if QUAD worked, if the market were disrupted, if the public signed up, if the dealers were driven off the corners—the most that would happen to the drug trade per se would be that it moved indoors. That seemed, nonetheless, a worthy goal. It would bring with it a huge improvement in the

quality of life in afflicted areas. It seemed likely to cut down on violent battles over turf and on the sex trade and related crime and disorder associated with the worst street locations. Many in the department suspected that it would also cut down on drug use, particularly new drug use. "A lot of people aren't willing to actually get out of their cars and go into some stranger's house, or walk through the projects, or something like that to buy the drug," Hatcher says. "I think when you eliminate the drive-by trade, you eliminate a lot—maybe the biggest part—of the retail market." That, though, was a dream—possibly a fantasy—for the future. When QUAD was formally launched in February 1989, Tampa was still awash in street sales, and it was not at all clear things would get better anytime soon.


QUAD in Action

The density of the street trade made dealers and buyers alike ripe for the picking in QUAD's early days. Some of its first operations, massive reverse stings against buyers, were limited only by QUAD's ability to process arrestees. "We had it down to a science," says Hatcher. The squad, operating as one unit on these occasions, would set up a mobile command post—a large motor home complete with stenographer, property room, and vehicle-processing room—a few blocks from a heavy dealing location. The real dealers would soon leave, but drive-through buyers had no way of knowing the game had changed. One set of officers posed as dealers, another videotaped the transaction from under cover, another swooped in to

arrest buyers and seize vehicles. "The buy would go down, the bust team would come in and arrest them and haul them off, pick up the tape and evidence; the secretary would be back there at the command post typing up the report, another guy would be processing the evidence, another would be interviewing the prisoner, another processing the car," says Hatcher. "End of the day we'd have what looked like a parking lot full of cars."

A typical one-shift operation netted 30 to 45 people and almost as many vehicles (most vehicles were returned to their owners for a negotiated price; one unfortunate buyer lost and bought back his panel truck 3 separate times). The public, by all accounts, just loved this kind of thing. "They started doing the buyer knockdowns and people started to have a little bit of hope," Linda Hope says. Her Sulphur Springs group sent cheering sections to the command post to provide coffee, sandwiches, and moral support when QUAD was in the neighborhood.

The department took pains to give the media easy access to the reverse stings. "We were on the tube all the time," says Hatcher. "It seemed like we really started to have an impact then: We were telling them, hey, that \$20 rock may cost you a \$20,000 car." For whatever reason, the impact of the stings was considerable. "Twenty-ninth and Lake was bad, extremely bad, probably the worst intersection in the city," says QUAD officer M.B. Hopper. "It was just unreal. When we first started doing reverses, we'd go out and arrest 30 people in a night. Then, all of a sudden, it just dropped



off, went down to three, four arrests a night. The bottom just dropped out; people quit buying."

Dealers, while always warier than buyers, were relatively easy to arrest in the early days as well. QUAD officers initially used, for the most part, standard enforcement techniques, making plainclothes buys (often while driving cars seized in the stings), setting up observation posts for on sight arrests, using confidential informants to make buys and then taking out arrest warrants. The street sellers quickly became much more cautious. "They're real careful now; they're much, much, much more careful," says Hopper. "If they have the slightest hint or the slightest feeling, they're not going to sell to you." That made arrests harder, but the police took it as a good sign, since genuine

buyers were presumably equally inconvenienced.

New tactics developed to replace the old. Some officers took to dressing in camouflage and sneaking up on dealers through vacant yards and drainage ditches; some used decoys like "stalled" cars to give them excuses to linger near dealers; one officer borrowed a wheelchair from a local hospital and wheeled himself all over his area one night, buying dope from overly secure, and ultimately very unhappy, street vendors.

Some of the new tactics had nothing to do with arrest at all. One favorite activity was simply to make it unappealing to do business. QUAD officers sometimes parked marked cars at each end of a dealing area and strolled around in uniform: No one was busted, but no one made any

money either. "People just start disappearing," Hopper says. One officer shut down an intransigent group of dealers who had set up, complete with lawn chairs, near a public housing project by showing up one day with his own lawn chair and keeping them company for his whole shift.

QUAD officers got in the habit of driving marked cars by dope holes every time they were on their way to anywhere else, sometimes taking a few minutes to make repeated passes, or waiting half an hour for dealers to resume business and then coming back. They took particular delight in making dealers physically uncomfortable: hauling away chairs and couches that dealers had set up on street corners, confiscating coolers of beer and wine, having the city trim trees and shrubs that provided shade from the hot Florida sun. The attention alone was sometimes enough to shut a spot down. And the city streamlined both its civil abatement and code enforcement procedures. The first allowed it to close businesses—chiefly bars, convenience stores, and the like—that were fronts for or catered to drug dealing, the second to speed up the condemnation and razing of substandard, often abandoned structures that had become havens for street dealers. By the fall of 1991, acting on leads from QUAD, the city had leveled over 100 buildings.

Community Support

Much to the surprise of many QUAD line officers, there was broad support from Tampa's public, and people did pass along useful information. Partici-

pation and support from white and more affluent neighborhoods had never been in doubt. Even before QUAD got under way, Linda Hope's association had compiled a complete, written analysis of where and when drugs were being dealt in Sulphur Springs, and as far as it could tell, by whom, and turned it over to an astonished police department. The flow of information continued with the new beeper links to QUAD. "One of the gals one time called and said, 'I did it,'" says Hope. "Did what? She goes, 'I called, a guy is dealing across the street and I've had it and I called and I got somebody and I said, Listen, he's out there now, and he's wearing this and he's wearing that, and he's got the dope in this pocket, and I'm going to stay on the line until somebody comes and arrests him.' And somebody did."

The support of the poorer black community had not been so certain. "It's always been," says officer Hopper, "you go to a scene, in the poorer parts of town, you try to get information, and you don't get the information. Nobody's seen anything. Nobody knows what happened; nobody knows how this guy got shot or got hurt or who sold the dope or whatever it may be. So when I first started [QUAD], I'm thinking, we're swimming uphill here. These people aren't going to help us at all. And it was just the way I thought; it was a very hard swim to begin with. But then, once they started to get a little confidence in what QUAD was doing, and started reading articles about it, and the news media started helping with showing the stuff we're doing out there, more and more people came along into the program.

Even if it was just to pick up the phone and call your beeper number and say, there's dope dealers here."

QUAD'S officers thought that the anonymity afforded by their beepers was crucial to recruiting allies. "Providing beepers gave people the perfect opportunity," says Hopper. "I don't know why anybody didn't think of it before, because it's so obvious. Just call the beeper; I don't even need to know your name. Just give me a description of the guy and the corner he's standing on and I'll do what I can for you. The beepers have worked really, really well."

This seemed particularly important in Tampa's black community. "Black people, especially, only want to call anonymously," says QUAD Sgt. J.L. Counsman. "I want to tell you about my problem, but please don't send a car to my house.' We say, that's fine, we just want the information; just tell me over the phone." This new, positive contact with even the most embattled parts of the black community changed some officers' views considerably. "You get this 'us and them' attitude, and I've been as guilty of it as anybody else," says Hopper. "This kind of takes away from that. It kind of sheds new light on the way you look at things as a policeman." Abe Brown, a black minister active in community anti-drug organizing, agrees. "There was a bad feeling from the police department toward the black community, and from the black community toward the police department," he says. "It went both ways. Both sides are turning around now."

In an unexpected twist, QUAD'S beepers turned out to facilitate an unusual and highly effective tactic for impeding dealers' cash flow. Street dealers typically keep relatively small stashes of drugs on their persons in case they're arrested or ripped off, replenishing their supply as required from a larger supply hidden somewhere nearby. Residents watching a drug hole from—say, a nearby house—could often tell that drugs were probably hidden in a particular tree or a certain patch of tall grass. After the dealer had been in business for a while, QUAD officers started getting phone calls, sometimes anonymous, passing that information on. If officers didn't have the time or the inclination to make a proper arrest (which involved making a buy personally or through an informant, or getting close enough to actually see drugs change hands), they could simply go to the tree and take the crack. Officers report that this happened quite often. K-9 officers and their dogs sometimes were able to do much the same thing without public input. For whatever reason, the department's contacts in the Tampa drug trade reported that about 6 months after QUAD began, street dealers stopped being able to get crack on credit, which had been a common practice until then. Street dealing in Tampa had become a pay-as-you-go business.

Help From City Statutes. The department and the city developed several new statutory tools to help QUAD'S operations. One was a new city ordinance, based on an existing city antiprostitution law called "Manifesting For the Purpose of Selling Illegal

Drugs." It applied to known drug sellers or users and to people in known drug-dealing locations and made it a crime if such a person "repeatedly beckons to, stops, attempts to stop or engage in conversation with passersby," or "repeatedly passes to or receives from passersby" drugs or drug-related materials. The department took pains, it says, to use the law sparingly for fear of perceptions of abuse: Departmental policy authorized its application only for serious problem areas where other methods were unproductive, and then only by specially trained officers. The ordinance survived several court challenges during QUAD'S first 2 1/2 years.

QUAD officers took the idea a step further by printing up an orange adhesive poster that cited the law and said in heavy black letters:

**WARNING
HIGH DRUG ACTIVITY AREA**

**Persons observed loitering
for the purpose of engaging
in illegal drug activity
are subject to Tampa
Police Department Officers
questioning and arrest.**

City of Tampa Code section 24-43

These were posted liberally in and around active dope holes. (Some time after the worst of Tampa's problem was behind it, these posters still dotted many sections of town, in varying degrees of legibility, leaving a kind of sedimentary history of the street drug trade.) They served several purposes: They arguably did something to deter dealers and buyers; they let local residents know QUAD was on the case; and dealers often ripped them down as fast as they went up, at which point QUAD could arrest them for littering.

Department and city lawyers also developed a form that business and property owners could sign, empowering police officers to prevent trespass on their premises. Without the form, using trespass law to move dealers off a privately owned vacant lot, the parking lot of a closed business, or even the yard of a vacant house meant, in each instance, tracking down the owner and obtaining a complaint. With the form signed, police could simply get on with it. Business people and absentee landlords, by department report, particularly liked the option, and their premises too were liberally blazoned with posters—these fluorescent green—announcing the department's power to act.

All these different tactics added up to quite a rich menu for QUAD to choose from, depending on the particular problems it faced in different areas. "All the things we've done," says QUAD Lt. Steve Hogue, "the buy-busts, the reverse stings, the sitting in lawn chairs, search warrants, tearing down houses—I'm sure it's all been discounted, there aren't very many

brand new ideas, I don't have some crystal ball up here—but what it amounts to is basically applying all of those different things. And each area may be different. You go to one area and the answer is trimming the trees back so there isn't so much shade, or maybe the answer is just cutting the grass, or maybe the problem is when he throws his dope down we can never find it because the place is like a landfill, so we have to get the sanitation department to come clean it up for us. Or maybe we just go in and make arrests; maybe we use a very traditional approach. Each situation comes up different. We do whatever it takes to instill the community with confidence and get the job done."

Impact

By the summer of 1989, 6 months or so after QUAD hit the streets, the police and the public began to feel that they were winning. Cheryl Franklin, who desperately wanted her building and park cleaned up, was an early and eager volunteer and made liberal use of her beeper numbers. As far as she knows, she was the only one in the area to take that risk, but that turned out to be enough. "Within 2 or 3 weeks I had seen results," she says. "Right after we had our first meeting, they came out the next couple days. The way they worked: I just sit in the backyard, drink a glass of lemonade and watch 'em. It was nice. They'd drive up from different directions and swoop down on the park and they just sort of corralled everybody out there, take pictures, take names and what they called intelligence, come out with the dogs, let the dogs sniff around for

awhile. I thought it was effective just because it showed some concentrated police effort. Whereas before the QUAD Squad, they were used to seeing a squad car, maybe two; they'd see that blue and white and start running through the project... . The way QUAD just came down on them, it was nice."

Dealers in her area started working nights, and QUAD—guided and goaded by Franklin's calls—followed them. They started working exclusively within the complex, and QUAD followed them there. Inside of 6 months the area was the next best thing to clean. "There are still some days now when you can come through and I'll see one," she says. "It's because I know them. You, or just an observer, just coming through here, would think it's clean. And it is clean, for the most part. I can do things now that I've never done; I can go outside, and sit outside, and the kids can use the park."

It was the same in Sulphur Springs. "It was probably within a couple of months that you could see a real difference," says Linda Hope. Within 6 months to a year, Sulphur Springs had returned almost to its precrack self. Obvious street dealing had stopped entirely. Where dealers were once so bold as to stop cars in the street and hitch rides on pickup trucks, even Hope with her sharp eyes and vast local intelligence network could only find one or two instances of even semipublic dealing. "A couple of months ago, up there on Eskimo just north of Yukon, there was a guy standing in the yard, and there was some-

body in a little shed out back," she says. "And then over on 17th Street, there was a door cracked in a duplex, and there's a guy there with a red hat that we'd seen over on the other side of the neighborhood. So it's just little things like that. The average person wouldn't have seen it."

Things had gone pretty much as Smith and his planning team had hoped. Displacement had occurred. In the first year, 80 new dealing locations were added to the original QUAD list of 61 (some of those new spots, the department says, would have been on the original list had it known about them at the beginning).¹⁷ The department's own surveillance and the public's help evidently did an adequate job of keeping QUAD current on where dealing was occurring. Enforcement had been heavy: In its first year, QUAD arrested 2,472 people and charged them with 4,342 offenses; patrol officers arrested another 2,522 people for narcotics offenses over the same time.¹⁸

Something new had clearly happened, however. Those figures were not that much higher than those of the previous, largely ineffectual enforcement efforts of the pre-QUAD years, and there was no way that QUAD'S 41 officers could come close to maintaining a constant presence, much less constant enforcement, at all 141 spots (much less the infinitude of potential sites). Nonetheless, the street drug trade was all but dead. By the department's accounting, only 9 of the 141 dealing locations were active in March 1990; by the fall of 1991, the count had eased up to 15, mostly in housing projects ("our nemesis," says

Lieutenant Hogue).¹⁹ "I wouldn't say we've solved the problem, because it would come back if we stopped," says Captain Sollazzo. "But we're on top of it." The department was convinced that any slackening of pressure would see the dealers return, and both old and new spots episodically showed small-scale activity that QUAD did its best—mostly successfully—to shut down promptly. For the most part, though, outside of this continuing "maintenance" work, the battle seemed won. "I see QUAD as having done a tremendous job helping us clean up the drug problem, all over town," says black activist Abe Brown.

Somewhere along the line, as the department had hoped, buying and selling drugs on Tampa's streets had stopped being an attractive proposition. Nobody could tell which elements mattered the most to QUAD'S success—the pressure on consumers, the forced displacement of dealers, the sheer volume of arrests, the artful market disruption, the "broken windows" work, or the various markers that the public and police tolerance for the drug trade had ended. But successful it certainly seemed to have been. "I can't remember," says Mayor Freedman, "the last time I heard a complaint about drug dealing."

Although QUAD had been designed to bring the streets back under control rather than to fight drugs and crime as such, there were gratifying signs on those fronts as well. Demand expanded at DACCO, the city's main drug treatment program, though large waiting lists make it impossible to say how just how much. Tampa's reported

index crimes per 100,000 residents fell from 17,264.0 in 1987 to 15,659.7 in 1989—not as low as precrack levels, but progress nonetheless.²¹ The downward movement ran counter to trends both statewide—Florida's index crimes per 100,000 residents grew from 8,503.2 in 1987 to 8,804.5 in 1989—and in neighboring St. Petersburg, where the measure rose from 10,748.4 in 1987 to 12,689.1 in 1989.²¹ Any effect on calls for police service is hard to figure, since Tampa went to a 911 system for the first time late in 1988, but calls did decrease—from 606,755 to 549,402—between 1989 and 1990.²² Drive-by shootings and similar violence associated with turf battles for street-dealing territory had stopped almost entirely. Homicides the department classified as drug-related fell by 50 percent between 1988 and 1989—from 16 to 8—then down to 7 in 1990."

Lessons Learned

QUAD raises the welcome prospect that street drug sales can be dealt with, even in large, geographically dispersed markets. The common inability to jail street dealers for long stretches and to prevent enforcement from causing displacement need not be seen as insurmountable obstacles to effective suppression of street dealing. QUAD seems to bear out the theses that attacking the *market* in which drug sales take place is a powerful strategy, that attacking disorder is at the very least a powerful supporting tactic, that suppressing street drug sales is a productive crime control strategy, and that close working partnerships with the public are both possible and produc-

tive. Tampa's use of beepers represents a significant innovation for the field, both as a tool for building links to the community in troubled areas and as a way to facilitate partnerships against mutable and geographically widespread problems. It also raises the possibility that confidentiality may be a key police tool in promoting community responses to crime and order problems, a notion applicable to a wide variety of issues other than drug dealing.

It is worth noting that the Tampa police make no claim to have reduced drug use significantly in the city. For the most part, they suspect, dealing has moved off the street and indoors, primarily in the black community. It stands to reason that many casual and first-time users, particularly whites, would find it difficult to learn of the new sites and that many who could will choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity.²⁴ Drugs, however, are still being sold in Tampa, and further inroads against drug-related crime and order problems, and other important drug-related issues such as crack babies and AIDS, require additional and different solutions. This is not to slight QUAD's accomplishment. QUAD'S very success, however, underscores the fact that drugs as such, and drug-related street crime and disorder problems, need to be addressed through distinct—if mutually reinforcing—responses.

Two years into the QUAD operation, the Tampa police were themselves suffering to some extent from conflating the fight against street drug dealing with a fight against drugs as

such. By mid-1991, QUAD, as noted, had largely accomplished its original goal of suppressing the street trade and quelling the disorder associated with it. QUAD itself, however, at least in the lower ranks, had never entirely embraced the formal view that it was, at bottom, a safe-streets squad rather than a drug squad. As the streets quieted down, QUAD increasingly began to function as a kind of lower tier narcotics unit, following the small-scale drug trade into the homes and project apartments where it had been forced by the pressure outside.

What this meant, in practice, was that QUAD was serving a lot of warrants—and kicking down some doors—in the black parts of town. This may or may not have been a good idea, but it certainly represented a new phase in the operation. It is likely that the crime and order benefits of heavy enforcement will differ, depending on whether the drug trade is private and hidden from public view or is public and overt. It is possible that community reaction to large numbers of forced police entries into residences will differ from community reaction to enforcement against street dealing or that the new phase will demand a new community relations strategy.

The department was in a difficult position, however, having won its first round against the street dealers. Having decided to set QUAD up as a separate unit, it was now faced with the problem of keeping it busy. Disbanding it seemed impossible, since "maintenance" seemed necessary to prevent the resurgence of street sales. Maintenance work was not demanding

enough, though. QUAD needed more to do, and chasing drug sales, wherever they might be, seemed the obvious answer. It may not have been. Public Safety Administrator Smith thought that public housing projects and certain neighborhoods might benefit more from a broad community policing approach addressing a range of local problems rather than drug dealing alone. Neither QUAD, however, nor at least for the moment any other part of the department, saw that as its job (though QUAD had at least taken a few tentative steps in this direction, working with residents in Sulphur Springs and elsewhere to mount big neighborhood cleanups and with Abe Brown to support anti-drug street corner pickets).

The situation represented a classic problem in police administration: Should one set up a special unit to do a special job or try somehow to integrate it with the patrol force? Special units bring energy and focus to a task, and then pose problems once the task is accomplished or changes form. On the other hand, the patrol force is large and at least potentially flexible, but difficult to focus on jobs that interfere with answering calls for service.²⁵ Departments seeking to emulate Tampa's success may want to devote some thought to ways of integrating QUAD's insights about market suppression, order maintenance, and community mobilization into patrol operations, or alternatively, ways of managing a special unit once it has been successful in the field.

Notes

1. Smith, Robert L., Tom DePolis, Bert Hatcher, and John Cuesta, "Tampa, Florida: One City's Successful Drug Enforcement Initiative" (Tampa: Tampa Police Department, April 27, 1990), p. 2.
2. All quotes and information cited in this paper, unless otherwise noted, are drawn from interviews and field research conducted by the author in Tampa, Florida, in May 1991.
3. Smith et al., p. 8.
4. Calculated from Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Crime in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: 1985 and 1987 volumes). See also n. 19 *infra*.
5. The case for a link between crack markets and crime is strengthened by anecdotal evidence from Tampa, Houston, and other cities that street crack dealers are willing to barter drugs for stolen goods and credit cards. It is not necessarily the case, however, that even successful street drug enforcement will bring crime control benefits in train; as Mark Kleiman notes, the tendency of enforcement to drive up the price of heroin and increase addicts' criminal activity led to the conventional police wisdom that "the drug squad makes work for the robbery squad." Cocaine users may not be addicted, or so seriously addicted, as heroin users, and thus more likely to curtail use as their sources constrict. Alternatively, evidence that the "broken windows" hypothesis is correct and that stemming public disorder is an effective crime-control strategy may mean that quelling the disorder associated with street cocaine dealing brings important crime-control benefits in its wake. On "broken windows," see Skogan, Wesley, *Disorder and Decline: The Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods* (New York: Free Press, 1990).
6. Another issue frequently cited by police managers is the potential for corruption of patrol officers. This seems overdone; if anything, corruption is likely to be less of an issue for uniformed officers working in public against obvious, minor dealers than it is for plainclothes officers working behind the scenes against traffickers with both resources and anonymity.

My thanks to Robert Trojanowicz, director of the School of Justice at Michigan State University, for this point.

7. Kleiman, Mark A.R., "Crackdowns: The Effects of Intensive Enforcement on Retail Heroin Dealing," in Chaiken, Marcia R. (ed.), *Street-Level Drug Enforcement: Examining the Issues* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, September 1988), p. 15. See also Kleiman, Mark A.R., and Kerry D. Smith, "State and Local Drug Enforcement: In Search of a Strategy," in Tonry, Michael, and James Q. Wilson (eds.), *Drugs and Crime* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). The following discussion of drug markets draws heavily from these papers.

8. For a more complete economic analysis of important constituents of drug markets, see Kleiman, Mark A.R., and Rebecca M. Young, "The Factors of Production in Retail Drug Dealing," chapter 3, in *Modelling Drug Markets*, unpublished report to the National Institute of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University J.F. Kennedy School of Government, June 30, 1991).

9. This analysis is not universally accepted. For a critique, see Barnett, Arnold, "Drug Crackdowns and Crime Rates," in Chaiken, *Street-Level Drug Enforcement*, pp. 35-42.

10. Wilson, James Q., and George L. Kelling, "Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows," *Atlantic Monthly* (March 1982), pp. 29-38.

U. A large literature has accumulated on the relationship between crime and order and on policing strategies designed to link police with others in the coproduction of public safety. On crime and order, see, for instance, Skogan, *Disorder and Decline*; on policing strategies, see Goldstein, Herman, *Problem-Oriented Policing* (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1990) and Sparrow, Malcolm K., Mark H. Moore, and David M. Kennedy, *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

12. On Los Angeles' Community Mobilization Project, which took on a neighborhood-scale cocaine market, see Kennedy, David M., "Neighborhood Policing in Los Angeles," Kennedy School of Government Case Program, C16-87-717.0, 1987. On Washington, D.C., see Simon, Harvey, "The Orange Hats of Fairlawn: A Washington, D.C., Neighborhood Battles Drugs," Kennedy School of Government Case Program, C16-91-1034.0, 1991. For a sampling of anti-drug (and other) partnerships from New York City, see "CPOP: Community Policing in Practice" (New York City: Vera Institute of Justice, October 1988).

13. On Link Valley, see Kennedy, David M., "Fighting the Drug Trade in Link Valley," Kennedy School of Government Case Program, C16-90-935.0, 1990.

14. Smith et al., p. 4.

15. "QUICK UNIFORM ATTACK ON DRUGS (Q.U.A.D)" Tampa Police Department, nd, p. 4.

16. This was not a formal survey; narcotics officers simply cruised the city for one night shift and made a list.

17. Smith et al., p. 12.

18. Ibid., p. 13.

19. Lt. Steve Hogue, telephone interview, October 1991.

20. Assessing QUAD's impact is complicated by the fact that the department hired an additional 101 officers in May 1989, bringing its strength to 853 sworn. It seems unlikely, for three reasons, that the department's increased strength was responsible for much of the effect attributed to QUAD. First, much of the increase was used to refill patrol positions left empty or vacant when QUAD was formed, serving to bring the department's production of patrol activities back up to the pre-QUAD baseline from the lower level of QUAD's first several months. Second, most of the remaining new strength was used to form housing projects.

Insofar as the teams were able to suppress drug sales in those projects, as they likely did to some extent, one would expect the street crack trade to be displaced elsewhere, making QUAD's job harder rather than easier. Finally, the department and residents saw marked, citywide improvements in street conditions both before and in the first months after the new officers came on. In the first case, the new patrol strength could not have mattered; in the second, it is not likely to have made much of a contribution very quickly, particularly since the department had it focused on call-response rather than narcotics or crime prevention duties. In the longer run, the new strength may have helped; both Tampa's pre-QUAD experience, and policing's general experience, with the inefficacy of ordinary patrol activities against street drug sales suggest that the contribution would not have been large.

21. Tampa's rates for the relevant period were 11,736.1 index crimes per 100,000 in 1984; 14,641.8 in 1985; 16,841.0 in 1986; 17,264.0 in 1987; 15,659.7 in 1989; and 15,949.1 in 1990. (Calculated from *Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 1985-1991* volumes.) Florida's rates were 6,821.2 index crimes per 100,000 in 1984; 7,574.2 in 1985; 8,228.4 in 1986; 8,503.2 in 1987; 8,804.5 in 1989; and 8,810.8 in 1990. (Calculated from *Crime in the United States*.) St. Petersburg's rates were 7,341 in 1984; 8,456.1 in 1985; 9,455.1 in 1986; 10,748.4 in 1987; 12,689.1 in 1989; and 12,289 in 1990. (Calculated from *Crime in the United States*.) In each case reporting changes make accurate figures for 1988 unavailable.

22. Tampa Police Department, "Annual Report 1990," communications section. Attachment.

23. This movement was more in line with statewide trends, which saw drug-related homicides falling precipitately between 1987 and 1990. Statewide drug-related homicides were 112 in 1985, 114 in 1986, 137 in 1987, 119 in 1989, and 85 in 1990. Accurate figures for 1988 are not available. Linda Booz, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, telephone conversation, April 1, 1992.

24. The notion that many crack users are episodic consumers, and thus relatively easily deterred, is bolstered by police observation of housing project drug markets in Los Angeles, where drive-through crack purchasers, who may or may not ever return, are considered fair game for ripoff artists, while dealers put heroin buyers—steady long-term customers—off limits. My thanks to Los Angeles police officer Joe Walker for this point.

25. For a discussion of attempts to deal with these issues, see Sparrow et al., *Beyond 911*, pp. 114-118 and chapter 8, and Kennedy, David M., *The Strategic Management of Police Resources* (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, *Perspectives on Policing* series, forthcoming).

About This Study

David M. Kennedy is a research fellow at the Research Center of Criminal Justice Policy and Management, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He is the co-author, with Malcolm K. Sparrow and Mark H. Moore, of *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing* (Basic Books, 1990).

The field research for this article was performed during a weeklong site visit in May 1991. The author interviewed Tampa city officials, Tampa Police Department personnel, and city residents and observed former and current drug-trafficking sites. Statistical information was collected from the Tampa Police Department, the State of Florida, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This study is part of the author's continuing work in community policing and the support of troubled communities.

Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the researchers and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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