Crime against retail and manufacturing premises: findings from the 1994 Commercial Victimisation Survey

Home Office Research Study 146

	
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Crime against retail and manufacturing premises: findings from the 1994 Commercial Victimisation Survey

by Catriona Mirriees-Black and Alec Ross

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Foreword

This report presents the findings of a commercial victimisation survey conducted by the Home Office in 1994. It directly measured the experience of crime among retailers and manufacturers in 1993, and included crimes that were not reported to the police. The survey was the first of its kind by the Home Office and an important concern was to assess the feasibility and usefulness of using a survey to measure crime against the commercial sector.

Crime imposes a significant financial and human cost on businesses. The findings show that retail and manufacturing premises suffer high levels of victimisation relative to domestic premises. The proportion of incidents of commercial crime reported to the police is, though, generally greater than for household crimes, where comparisons can be made.

The work reported here is supported by the Retail Action Group which is a subgroup of the National Board for Crime Prevention, which is one strand of the Home Office's current initiatives in respect of crime against the commercial sector.

ROGER TARLING Head of Research and Planning Unit

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The British survey was undertaken by the British Market Research Bureau (BMRB). Particular thanks are due to Jenny Turtle, Ian Wright, Bruce Hayward and Frank Bethel. A number of other people also contributed to the British survey including Phil Edwards who is seconded from Dixons to the Home Office, Professor Shapland of Sheffield University and John Burrows and Martin Speed from the British Retail Consortium Retail Crime Initiative.

We are grateful for the support of the CBI, the Risk and Security Management Forum and the British Retail Consortium.

Finally, many thanks to all those who gave up their time to be interviewed for the survey.

CATRIONA MIRRLEES-BLACK ALEC ROSS

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Summary

This paper presents the findings from the first national victimisation survey of retail and manufacturing premises. Information was collected from some 3,000 retailers and manufacturers about their experiences of crime during 1993. The survey also asked about the costs of crime; what, if any, security measures were in place; sources of crime prevention advice; and contacts with the police.

Victim surveys which ask directly about experiences of crime can give a more complete picture of the extent of crime than police figures – at least for those crime types measured. This is partly because not all crimes are reported to the police and partly because not all those reported are recorded by them, or necessarily recorded in a consistent manner over time. Also, most types of crime against business cannot be distinguished from crimes against private households and/or other non-domestic premises in police figures.

Crime as a concern

- Crime was cited as a fairly or very serious problem by 44 per cent of retail premises. Concern was greatest in the North, Yorkshire and Humberside, Wales and Greater London. Premises situated in outdoor shopping precincts and in built-up non-residential areas were more concerned than those in other locations.
- Manufacturers were slightly less likely than retailers to see crime as a
 problem in their area (36 per cent) but it was still more often said
 to be a problem than other issues, such as litter or parking. Concern
 was highest in the northern regions, and for those situated in town
 and city centres.

Crime against retail premises

 Nearly 80 per cent of retail premises surveyed had experienced one or more incidents of crime during 1993. It is estimated that there were 8.6 million crimes against retailers in 1993, but most of these were relatively minor. Customer theft was the most common crime: 47 per cent of premises had experienced between them a total of 5.8 million incidents.

- The chances of customer theft were greatest for shops selling alcohol and/or cigarettes. Premises located in outdoor precincts were at particularly high risk.
- A quarter of retailers had been burgled. This was usually only once, but six per cent of victims had suffered four or more burglaries during 1993. Risks were highest in the North, the East and West Midlands and Greater London. They were lowest for premises in East Anglia. Premises selling alcohol, cigarettes and food were at particularly high risk.
- Violent crime was less frequent: four per cent of premises had been robbed and two per cent had incidents of assault in which staff were injured. Assaults and threats aimed at staff where on one was injuredwere more common: 16 per cent of retailers reported such incidents.
- Robbery was concentrated in certain parts of the country, notably the North-West and Greater London. Although premises with more employees were more likely to have been robbed, the chances per employee were disproportionately high in smaller premises.
- A small number of retailers attract a disproportionate amount of crime: three per cent of retailers experienced 59 per cent of all retail crimes.
- Most incidents of burglary and attempted burglary were said to have been reported to the police – at least 80 per cent. Over two-thirds of thefts from vehicles and robberies were reported. Relatively few thefts by customers or employees were reported to the police.
- This survey picked up more incidents of crime than the British Retail Consortium Costs of Crime Survey which was based on questionnaires to head offices. In part this will reflect differences in the samples but is, no doubt, mainly because head offices are not informed about all incidents, particularly the less serious ones.

Crime against manufacturing premises

 Nearly two-thirds (63 per cent) of manufacturers had experienced one or more crimes in 1993, amounting to some 420,000 incidents of crime for the portion of the manufacturing sector covered. On average manufacturers experienced seven times fewer incidents per premises than retailers.

- Vebicle crime was particularly common: a quarter of vehicle owning
 premises had a theft from a vehicle and over one in ten a theft of a
 vehicle. At particularly high risk were large manufacturers located in
 non-residential built up areas, dealing in food, alcohol or cigarettes.
- The chance of a manufacturing premises being burgled was similar to that for retail premises. The larger the premises the higher the risk, regardless of location or type of goods stored or manufactured. Premises in the North-West were at greatest risk and those in East Anglia at lowest risk.
- Manufacturers did not though suffer from the large number of thefts that retailers had experienced. Also their employees were much less likely to be robbed or physically attacked. Both these findings will reflect the relatively limited access for members of the public to manufacturing premises.
- 'Crime concentration' was again marked. For instance, two per cent
 of the manufacturers accounted for a quarter of the burglaries. All
 told, nearly two-thirds of the full crime count against manufacturers
 was against eight per cent of the premises.
- Reporting to the police of burglaries and thefts from vehicles was as high as for retailers but, overall, manufacturers were less likely to report incidents.

Costs of crime

- It was estimated that the total direct gross cost in 1993 of stolen and damaged property was £780 million for the retail industry and £275 million for the manufacturing sector.
- Although manufacturers experienced far fewer of the types of crimes measured by the survey than retailers, the average loss per incident was considerably higher at £690 compared to £95 per incident against retailers.
- For the retail sector, the major costs were customer theft and burglary

 each cost the industry some £200 million per year. A third of the
 costs of crime suffered by the manufacturing sector were due to
 actual and attempted burglaries.

- Vehicle theft was the most expensive crime at an average loss per incident of £3,940 for retailers and £3,980 for manufacturers.
- Losses through crime represented an estimated 0.7 per cent of the 1993 turnover for retailers of £120 billion, and 0.2 per cent of the manufacturing turnover of £130 billion. Of course, the impact of crime on profits is much larger.
- The running costs of security measures varied considerably across premises. The high spenders were paying the salaries of security personnei. The total spending for the retail sector was £260 million, and £180 million for the manufacturing sector.

Commercial and domestic crime compared

- Retailing and manufacturing premises have a much greater chance of falling victim to burglary, vandalism and vehicle crime than domestic premises. The risk of burglary for commercial premises was nine times higher than for domestic households, five times higher for vandalism and almost four times higher for vehicle thefts against vehicle owners. However, because there are far more domestic households than commercial premises, the number of incidents of domestic crime is very much higher than the number of commercial crimes.
- Crimes against the commercial sector are more costly on average. For instance, the cost of each incident of burglary was a third larger for commercial premises than for domestic households.
- The indications are that retailers and manufacturers are more likely to report burglary, vandalism and thefts from vehicles to the police than domestic households.

Crime prevention

- Nearly all premises surveyed had some form of security hardware, most commonly a burglar alarm, window protection and/or special security lighting. The more expensive measures such as security guards outside of business hours, CCTV and security response to alarms were rarer.
- The evidence suggests that premises were most vulnerable to burgiary at night and at the weekend - times when they are most likely to be empty. Measures that protect premises at night such as

security patrols and guards responding to alarms are therefore likely to be of value in deterring burglary. Doors were the preferred method of entry for burglars, suggesting some may be put off if doors are better secured.

- Security measures, such as CCTV, burglar alarms, window protection and security lighting, were often installed following victimisation.
 Levels of victimisation were higher amongst those with such measures suggesting that crime prevention measures are installed where they are most needed.
- Four out of five premises had received some advice about crime prevention from outside agencies such as the police (48 per cent), insurance companies (49 per cent) and security specialists (27 per cent). A fifth of smaller premises felt there was no advice available.
 Larger premises were less likely to feel this mainly because they had the resources of head office and/or security personnel to call on.
- A quarter of retail and 12 per cent of manufacturing premises had participated in co-operative crime prevention schemes. The majority of premises were not aware of local schemes, but many (43 per cent of retailers and 45 per cent of manufacturers) claimed they would be interested in participating.
- Although the majority were very or fairly satisfied with the service
 the police provided locally, a not insignificant quarter expressed some
 degree of dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction was greatest for those who
 had been victimised during 1993, mainly because they feit the police
 were not interested in reported crimes, did not catch or prosecute
 offenders, took too long to react to incidents, or did not visibly patrol
 the area.

1 Measuring victimisation of business premises

This report presents the findings from a national victimisation survey of retailers and manufacturers in England and Wales. The survey took place in 1994 and measured experiences of crime during 1993. It is the first such national survey of retailing and manufacturing premises, as opposed to head offices. It also represents a first attempt by the Research and Statistics Department of the Home Office to look more thoroughly at the level of crime against commercial premises in recognition of the fact that police crime figures are of limited value in measuring crime against the commercial sector.

The findings are also important for individual companies. They may well know (or think they know) what their own problems are, but it is important to set these in a national context. Given that there are limits to what the police can do to protect businesses against crime, it is important for businesses themselves to understand the patterns of risk against them. This should help them to take the action necessary to minimise risks. Most businesses are constantly making decisions based on their assumptions about their risks of crime, whether it is the level of customer surveillance they need to mount, which new technologies they should introduce, which security measures to install, or which crime prevention schemes they might participate in. If risks are poorly estimated, businesses may fall to target their protection cost effectively, and make strategic business decisions on the basis of poor information.

Victimisation surveys

Victimisation surveys which ask people directly about their experiences of crime can give a more complete picture of the extent of crime than police figures – at least for those crime types measured. This is partly because not all crimes are reported to the police and partly because not all those reported are recorded by them, or recorded in a consistent manner over time. For this reason, the use of police figures to chart trends in crime over time is also limited. More importantly in the case of business crime, most types of crime targeted at businesses cannot be distinguished in police figures from crimes against private households and/or other non-domestic premises (such as hospitals or schools). Certainly, no comparison can be

made between different business sectors. One exception to this is shop-theft which is a separate category in recorded criminal statistics. Burglary of nondomestic dwellings is also a separate category but will encompass many different types of premises - not just business ones.

In addition to measuring unreported crime and providing trends in crime that are unaffected by police recording practise, victimisation surveys can give other information. They can show the factors that put some targets at greater risk than others; the extent to which crimes are concentrated on the same target (i.e. the extent of repeated victimisation); the nature of incidents; and, victims responses to crime.

The use of surveys to determine levels and trends in crime risks as they affect people in their capacity as private citizens is now widespread. The Home Office itself conducts a regular national victimisation survey of people living in private households in England and Wales (the British Crime Survey, see Mayhew, Ave Maung & Mirriees-Black, 1993 and Mayhew, Mirriees-Black & Ave Maung, 1994). It has also taken part in two rounds of a comparative household survey conducted in a large number of industrialised countries (the International Crime Survey; see van Dijk, Mayhew & Killias, 1990 and van Dijk & Mayhew, 1992). Although household surveys are now common, both at the local level and nationally, surveys of other targets of crime are relatively rare. The commercial sector has been surveyed by the Dutch (van Dijk & van Soomeron, 1990, 1992) and, in the early 1970s, the National Crime Victimisation Survey of the United States, included measures of burglary against commercial premises and robberies against employees (Reiss, 1986).1

In this country, there have been three recent national commercial victimisation surveys. However, these have only covered the retail sector and have sampled head offices rather than individual outlets (e.g. Burrows & Speed, 1994; Speed et al. 1995 and Bamfield, 1994). Gathering information about crime from a central source such as a head office has two advantages. Firstly, it is probably cheaper and, secondly, some information is only kept and/or collated centrally. The advantage of approaching individual premises is that it provides a more complete count, since not all their experiences will be referred to head office, although for the most serious crimes this is less likely to be the case.' In a premises-based survey it is also more straightforward to determine how many were victimised, and to discover the levels of repeat victimisation. A premisesbased survey is also able to link the factors that put some premises at greater risk of crime than others - such as their exact location, size and opening hours.

This was dropped when it became clear that such incidents were usually reported to the police in the UKA, and that police figures were, therefore, a relatively reliable measure of the extent of these particular types of extent
 Thiston (1967) collected details an every rebbery incident within section in the Lundon Powal Region occurring over a seven-year period from countril records. Not only is it highly likely that more cases will have been notified to central records it is also usualledy that individual premises would have been able to supply this information over such a long period.

Commercial premises have also been the focus of various ad boc studies, some of which have included survey elements. These studies have included the crime problems of building societies and banks (Austin. 1988; Gill & Matthews, 1994), post offices (Ekblom, 1987), hotels (Gill, 1993), and chemists (Laycock, 1984). Different types of commercial crime have also been the focus of research including: fraud (Levi, 1988), violence against employees (Mayhew et al. 1989; Beck et al. 1994; Hibberd & Shapland, 1993), commercial burglary (Walsh, 1986), commercial robbery (Morrison & O'Donnell, 1994), heavy goods vehicle theft (Brown, 1995) and theft by customers (Buckle & Farrington, 1984; Buckle et al., 1992; Burrows & Lewis, 1987; Farrington & Burrows, 1993). The particular risks of specific locations have also been addressed: Phillips & Cochrane (1988) cover crime and nuisance in a large Midlands shopping centre, and Johnston et al (1994), crime on industrial estates. The Home Office Working Group on the Costs of Crime (Home Office, 1988) surveyed commercial business for the first comprehensive look at the costs of crime.

The Commercial Victimisation Survey

For this first national premises-based survey it was decided to draw comparisons between retailing and manufacturing premises. Many other business sectors could have been included and these could be considered for any future surveys.

The survey in England and Wales was conducted as part of a collaborative exercise co-ordinated by The Netherlands Ministry of Justice. The core set of questions concerning the extent and costs of victimisation were identical for all participating countries: The Netherlands, England and Wales, Australia, France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Czech Republic and Hungary. The retailing sector was surveyed in all countries but manufacturers in only some. The size of the samples and the adequacy of the response rate in countries other than The Netherlands and England and Wales, means that reliable comparisons will be hard to draw, but some findings are likely to be available in due course.

Methods

It has only recently become possible to sample business premises in any way other than by walking the streets. The British Telecom Business Database, set up in 1987, offered a better approach. Along with the telephone number of the premises, it records the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and how many people are employed there.

Retail premises were defined for the purposes of this survey as those describing their *main* activity as retailing. These consisted primarily of premises from the BT business database with SIC codes 641 to 656, which cover the retail distribution sector. Only a sub-set of manufacturers was sampled: those with SIC codes 41 to 49 which excludes the manufacture of metals, mineral products, chemicals, engineering and the vehicle industries.

Names of premises managers were obtained from switchboards and the managers were then sem by letter details of the survey and an Experience of Crime sheet which was designed to encourage managers to gather key information prior to the interview.

Interviews were carried out using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) by a market research agency on behalf of the Home Office. The advantage of CATI is that responses are entered directly on to computer in response to computer selected questions. This makes routing – where the subsequent question is dependent on the response to the first question – automatic. As data is entered directly it tends to be 'cleaner' in that it must fall within the acceptable ranges.

The overall response rate was a respectable 67 per cent. Full details of the methodology and reasons for non-response are given in Appendix A.

The sample

Retailers

Full details of the retailers in the survey are given in Appendix A. Of the 1,666 retail premises covered, 1,002 had 10 or less employees and were classified as 'small retailers'. The remaining 664 (11 or more employees) were termed 'large retailers'.

The retail premises were broadly split into non-food retailers (69 per cent), food retailers (27 per cent) and wholesalers/distributors who said they also retailed from the premises (4 per cent). Nine per cent of retailers said they also undertook some manufacturing on the premises.

Retailers sold a number of different types of good. Half the larger premises sold foud and a fifth alcohol, compared to a third and a tenth of the smaller premises. The larger premises were also more likely to sell electrical goods and computer software or high value patented goods such as machine tools. A fifth of small and large retailers sold furniture or clothing, and less than one in ten sold jewellery:

Half the retailers were situated in town or city centres and a further quarter in mainly residential built-up areas outside the centre. Nine per cent were in non-residential areas, another nine per cent in rural areas, and five per cent in non-built-up urban areas. This geographical distribution was similar for the smaller and larger employers. About half the retail premises were situated on main shopping streets. The rest were to be found - in roughly equal proportions - on industrial estates/business parks, indoor shopping centres, outdoor shopping precincts and a few were on non-retail main roads.

Manufacturers

Full details of the manufacturers are given in Appendix A. Manufacturers were defined for the purpose of this survey as premises who stated their main activity was manufacturing, wholesaling (but no retailing) and publishing/printing. Of the 1,259 manufacturing premises, 594 were defined as 'small' (they had 10 or less employees), and 665 as large (11 or more employees).

Manufacturing premises were, unsurprisingly, far less likely to be situated in town or city centres than retailing premises (21 per cent compared to 48 per cent). They were most likely to be found in built-up residential (31 per cent) or non-residential areas (22 per cent); 16 per cent said they were in rural areas.

Compared to retailers, manufacturers tended to be relatively specialist in their product range. Very few said they manufactured, stocked and/or sold more than one type of product. About half did not deal in any of the given list of items; a fifth said furniture or clothing; 16 per cent high value patented goods, computer software or machine tools; nine per cent electronic or electrical goods; and eight per cent food

Many premises carry out more than one function, and this was often the case for manufacturing premises, particularly the smaller outfits. A third of small manufacturers and nearly a quarter of the large ones said they did some type of retailing and/or wholesaling from the premises.

Plan of report

 Chapter 2 looks at the degree to which crime is a concern to retailers and manufacturers.

- Chapter 3 considers the level of crime against retailers and looks at the types of premises that are at particular risk of different types of crime.
- Chapter 4 is concerned with the crime faced by manufacturers and, again, which types of premises are at highest risk.
- Chapter 5 assesses the costs of crime to commercial premises, taking account not only of the direct losses but the costs of crime prevention.
- Chapter 6 draws comparisons between crime against commercial premises and that against domestic premises as measured by the British Crime Survey.
- Chapter 7 describes the extent of crime prevention activity, sources
 of crime prevention advice, and satisfaction with the service received
 from the police.


2 Crime as a concern to retailers and manufacturers

The retailers and manufacturers approached were asked how much of a concern various local problems were for their premises and the immediate area. Crime was more likely to be cited as a fairly or very serious problem (44 per cent of retailers; 36 per cent of manufacturers) than other selected issues such as parking (36 per cent and 23 per cent), litter and graffiti (see Figure 2.1).

Retailers were more troubled by all the various problems which is, no doubt, a reflection of the type of areas in which they tend to be located. Manufacturers were less likely than retailers to see crime as a problem in their area, indeed 27 per cent said it was no problem at all.

Whether or not something is judged to be a 'problem' will depend on the seriousness of its consequences as well as its frequency. This may explain why litter and graffiti score relatively lowly, litter was said to be a problem by 23 per cent of retailers and 18 per cent of manufacturers, and graffiti by nine per cent of retailers and five per cent of manufacturers.

Figure 2.1
Proportion of premises seeing local problems as fairly or very serious



Teenagers hanging around were said to be a problem by 14 per cent of manufacturers and 27 per cent of retailers. Presumably, even if they are present, they are not seen as a problem if they do not form a threatening and deterring presence to employees and customers. The presence of teenagers has, though, been linked with crime against commercial premises elsewhere (Johnston et al 1994; Walker 1994).

Children damaging things was judged to be a problem in their area by 16 per cent of retailers and 12 per cent of manufacturers, although we cannot be sure they knew children were really the culprits.

Regional variations

Retailers

Not surprisingly there were area differences. For instance, parking was a considerable problem for retailers in the Greater London area. Litter seemed to be a particular irritation for traders in the North and Wales but was hardly mentioned by those in the South East and South West of the country. Those in the North, Yorkshire & Humberside, Wales and Greater London were most likely to say crime was a particular problem in their locality (Table 2.1). In East Anglia, on the other hand, 28 per cent of retail premises said that crime was no problem at all.

Table 2.1
Variations in perception of crime as a problem by retailers and manufacturers, by type of area

	Reig	ilers	Manuk	синен	Uncelplated N		
	Ruirly/very serious problem	Stight/ no problem	Reiriy/rery serious problem	Slight/ no problem	Retallers	Mann- Jacksons	
	*	%	%	*			
North	56	44	44	5 6	133	79	
Whics	48	52	34	66	97	52	
Greater London	46	54	40	60	179	140	
North West	41	59	36	64	16"	176	
Yorkshire/Humberside	49	51	44	56	171	140	
South West	38	62	34	66	164	121	
West Midlands	44	56	43	57	ודן	128	
South East	42	58	27	73	361	242	
East Midlands	39	61	43	57	147	16	
East Anglia	32	68	21	79	8	c	
All areas	43	57	36	64	1,660	1,254	
Nones							

¹ Source, 1994 CVS. Welshied date.

Manufacturers

As with retailers, concern about crime was high amongst manufacturers in the North and Yorkshire & Humberside and lowest in East Anglia, where half the premises said it was no problem at all (Table 2.1). It was also above average concern in the West Midlands. Premises in Greater London were actually more concerned about parking provision than crime (43 per cent), and almost as concerned about litter (38 per cent).

Locational Variations

Retailers

Retailers in built-up residential areas were most likely to complain about graffiti, children damaging things, litter and teenagers hanging around; 42 per cent thought crime a problem.' Those in town and city centres scored high on concern about parking facilities and crime (47 per cent). Concern about crime was particularly high, though, for premises in built-up non-residential areas at 49 per cent. In general, rural premises were least likely to perceive problems in their area, including crime (28 per cent) (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Variations in perception of crime as a problem by retailers and manufacturers, by type of area

	Reta	ilers	Manufi	cturers	Conceledated X	
	Fabity/very Strious Problem	Slight/ no problem	Fizirly/tery serious problem	RO	Beladers	Man- Justiniery
	*	%	%	%		
Town/city centre	47	53	43	57	809	257
Built-up residential	42	58	36	64	-626	349
Built-up non-residential	49	51	40	60	149	295
Not built-up urban	43	57	39	61	~5	-4
Rural	28	72	21	79	144	176
Other	37	63	41	59	55	61
All areas	43	57	36	64	1,660	1,254

Notes

There were also some variations by exactly where premises were located (Table 2.3). Those in *indoor shopping centres* were rarely concerned

¹ Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted date.

I Respondents were asked to closely the type of area in which they were located. Bulli-up residential areas' would be true and close content areas' would be town and close content areas' would be town and close content areas' which towns are closes within towns or cities. An example of a 'not bulli-up arban area' would be an industrial or retail park on a town outsiden.

about litter, graffiti or children damaging things - no doubt due to the cleaning and security facilities that are generally on hand. Concern about crime was generally lower than in other locations (39 per cent saying it was a serious or fairly serious problem). Indoor shopping centres do. however, seem to attract loitering teenagers, and parking was often felt to be a problem.

In contrast, premises in outdoor shopping precincts were particularly likely to say that litter and graffiti were a problem, as well as tecnagers hanging around and children damaging things. They were also particularly likely to say that crime was a problem (48 per cent).

Manufacturers

Concern about crime was high for manufacturing premises in town and city centres (43 per cent) but it was nearly matched by their concern about parking arrangements (42 per cent). Manufacturers in rural areas were least likely to worry about any of the listed issues, but a fifth did say they were fairly or very concerned about crime (Table 2.2).

Concern about crime was also particularly high for manufacturing premises situated on streets (40 per cent), but those on Industrial estates - the most common location - were also above average at 38 per cent (Table 2.3). Manufacturers in serviced premises were the least concerned about crime (22 per cent), perhaps because of the location of their premises within a larger building or the crime prevention facilities laid on.

Table 2.3 Variations in perception of crime as a problem by retailers and manufacturers, by type of location

Reta	ilers	_Manufa	CUITE	L'autophine N	
Ruirly/cery serious problem	Sitght/ no problem	Fairty/very serious problem	Stigbt/ no problem	ByteBerr	Mayur Jachuren
*	*	<u> </u>	*		
46	54	38	62	129	648
39	61	_	-	96	4
48	52	-	-	175	16
45	55	40	60	789	151
42	58	41	59	99	~
36	64	29	71	2~1	35"
43	57	36	64	1,649	1,255
	Pairty/very serious problem % -16 39 48 45 42 36	## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ##	Fairly/very: Stight Fairly/very: serious mo problem mo problem mo problem mo problem	Fairly/very Sitgbt Fairly/very Sitgbt Serious Problem Problem	Pairity/very Sitght Pairity/very Sitght Patellers

^{-&#}x27; auticates top few in sample to give extraste Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

Conclusion

In sum, then, crime is a major concern to a significant minority of retailers and manufacturers, and is more often felt to be a particular local problem than other concerns such as parking provision, litter and loltering youths.

Chapters 3 and 4 consider the extent to which concern about crime is justified for retailers and manufacturers respectively.



3 Crime against retailers

This chapter considers the extent of crime against retailers in 1993. It starts with an overview of the types of crime retailers experience and the proportion who had been victims during 1993. It then looks at what types of premises are at greatest risk of burglary, theft by customers and robbery. It goes on to describe the extent to which some premises are repeatedly victimised. Estimates are given of the total number of crimes experienced by the retail sector in 1993, and the proportion of these reported to the police. Some comparisons are drawn with the findings of the British Retail Consortium Costs of Crime Survey.

What proportion of retailers were victims of crime in 1993?

Nearly 80 per cent of the retail premises surveyed had experienced one or more of the fifteen types of crimes included in this survey. Of these, a third had experienced only one type of crime, and a half of these only once, but many had experienced several different crimes, often on several occasions. Figure 3.1 shows that the most commonly experienced crime was theft by customers (47 per cent of retailers had experienced this at least once, whatever other victimisations they may have had). After this, burglary – defined as someone gaining entry to the premises with the intention of committing theft whether or not they actually stole something – was most common (24 per cent of premises), then thefts from vehicles (23 per cent of vehicle owners), and some type of criminal damage (22 per cent). Over a fifth had an attempted burglary, where an attempt to gain access had failed. Full details are in Table B3.1, Appendix B.

Respondents were asked whether or not they had fallen victim to each crime to their knowledge. Many crimes will go undetected at the time and the cause of some losses will never be known. The burden of proof required to count an incident of customer theft, say, could range from apprehending a culprit to noticing stock missing from display shelves after a day's trading. Different premises will, no doubt, have applied different

This figure may seem low but is not surprising. Some resulters have a very specialist set of contomers, deal in beam with no appeal to the average third or sell goods over a counter.

criteria. However, the survey also asked about thefts where the respondent was unable to establish who had committed them. These are described as unattributable thefts in Figure 3.1. Fourteen per cent of retailers had such thefts. In total, 54 per cent of retail premises had experienced some type of theft, whether by a customer, employee, outsider or someone unknown (unattributable theft).

Figure 3.1
Proportion of retailers victimised in 1993



Fraud is even less likely to be noticed when it occurs. The estimates for employee fraud (at two per cent for small retailers) and fraud by outsiders (21 per cent of all retailers) are, therefore, probably underestimates.

Bribery and the extorting of money are relatively rare: three per cent of larger retailers and two per cent of the smaller ones reported such incidents had occurred in 1993. This most commonly involved actual or attempted bribery of company employees. There were also a few cases of threats of product contamination. While these figures are relatively low, rather more retailers than those victimised – seven per cent – felt such acts were very or fairly common in their line of business.

Which retailers are most at risk of crime?

One would not expect retailers to face equal risks of victimisation. Some will be in worse areas, some in better. Some will sell things that are more attractive to offenders; some will have particular environmental features of layout and access which make them more attractive targets. Not all risk-related factors can be measured in a survey. For instance, it is hard to take account of such things as whether there is a convenient back alley, whether late night pedestrian traffic is high, or whether the display of goods in the shop invites offenders in. The analysis reported here can, though, take account of such things as what part of the country the premises was in, where it was located (in broad terms), what it sold (again in broad terms), how many employees it had, and how long it was open to the public each day

In considering risk-related factors, one has also to take into account the fact that they might overlap. For instance, shops that sell alcohol may be at greater risk of robbery but they also tend to stay open later and be located in residential areas. Are all these factors independently increasing the chance of victimisation or are they inter-related? The way to take into account the inter-relationship of factors is through multivariate analysis. What this does is to assess the importance of any one particular factor independent of any relationship it might have to another. The variations in risk of burglary, theft by customers, and robbery are discussed below.

Burglary

The goods that retailers stock, and hence what is on offer to potential thieves, is related to the risk of victimisation, as well as size and location: a small corner convenience store is a very different proposition for thieves than a large supermarket on a commercial estate.

Tables 3.1a and 3.1b show the proportion of premises of different types burgled during 1993. Table 3.1a shows that small retailers selling alcohol and/or cigarettes had a higher chance of being burgled (28 per cent) than average (22 per cent). Of these particular small retailers, those situated in outdoor precincts and non-shopping streets were more at risk still (35 per cent had been burgled). Small food retailers in indoor shopping precincts had yet a higher risk still (46 per cent), though the highest risks of all were among premises selling high value electrical/patented goods in outdoor precincts (55 per cent were burgled in 1993).

Table 3.1 a Proportion of small retailers (i to 10 employees) victims of burglary in 1993, by product sold and location

Victims of burgiary:	Continero estate	ici indoor sbopping cutter	Outdoor precinct		Other street	Ofber location	AH
	- -	%	%	*	*	%	*
Pood	17	#6	32	28	30	23	27
Alcohol and/or cigaretr	es 10	-	35	<i>30</i>	35	25	28
High value electrical/ patented goods	18	_	55	16	-	26	24
Furniture/clothing	15	18	25	20	-	23	20
jewellery/precious me	ei –	-	-	14	-	-	19
None of the above	26	17	14	22	19	13	20
AII	21	23	27	22	24	20	22

- Italic emboblened figures are the per cent or more above the average figure for all premites.
 "I indicates that less than can premites of this type were in the survey so exclusives will be unseliable.
 Products sold are not enclusive, so premites selling more dum one of the based items will appear more than once to
- Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

Table 3.1b shows that the risks for larger retailers were much greater. 36 per cent had been burgled, compared to 22 per cent of small retailers. Risks for larger retailers on commercial estates and non-shopping streets were particubarly high.

Table 3.1b Proportion of large retailers (i i + employees) victims of burglary in 1993, by product sold and location

		ial huloor			Othur	Other	A
of burgiary:	edalc	skupping centre	jrecinci	gtroci	street	location	
	*	*	%	%	*	*	*
Food.	43	27	38	33	35	30	34
Alcohol and/or cigarett	es 31	-	55	37	23	34	38
High value electrical/ patented goods	45	_	57	25	-	9	34
Furniture/clothing	48	15	18	41	-	35	36
jewellery/precious me	al –	-	-	38	-	_	29
None of the above	47	-	-	50	46	35	44
للم	43	23	35	36	46	29	36

- عاظعها عدان
- Source: 1994 CVS. Weletzerl data.

The risks of burgiary given in these tables show, then, that what retailers sell, where they are located, and how large they are, are all important. That larger employers are at greater risk of burgiary will reflect their greater physical size and hence – no doubt – the amount of stock available. (Table B3.2, Appendix B shows the variation in risk by number of employees.)

Surprisingly, retailers who have longer opening hours are also at slightly higher risk of burglary (see Table B3.3, Appendix B). One might have thought that if there were staff present for longer hours the likelihood of burglary would be reduced. Probably, then, it is the case that shops which stay open longer are more attractive to offenders for other reasons. For instance, they could be easier to get to (they are more likely to be in residential areas) and the Items they stock could be more desirable.

There are also clear regional differences in the risk of burglary (Table B3.4, Appendix B). Premises in the North, the East and West Midlands and Greater London were most likely to have been burgled, and those in East Anglia, the least. This pattern of risk is very similar to that for household burglary (Mayhew, Mirrices-Black & Ave Maung, 1994).

Multivariate analysis showed that the three most independently predictive risk factors for burglary were being a larger employer, being situated in the northern regions of the country and being located away from the centres of towns. The goods that were stocked were not independently predictive for burglary against retailers, when taking other factors into account.

Thefts by customers

Thefts by customers are extremely common, but like burglary they are more common in some parts of the country than others. Over half the retailers in the South West, the North, the West Midlands and Greater London had one or more incidents of customer theft during 1993 (see Table B3.4, Appendix B).

A number of factors were related to higher risks of customer theft. Particularly vulnerable were shops selling alcohol and/or cigarettes (Table 3.2a and Table 3.2b). All the larger retailers that sold these and were located in outdoor precincts said they had at least one theft by a customer during 1993. Premises on commercial estates were below average risk (except those selling alcohol/cigarettes). As teenagers are mainly responsible for customer theft (Farrington & Burrows, 1993), commercial estates, which are more difficult to get to without a car may be more protected from young people.

² The pattern of increasing risk for burginy by tocerasing number of employees, followed by a doup for the largest postulates in very similar to that for floor men.

Multivariate analysis indicated that the factors that were independently predictive of thefts by customers were selling tobacco or alcohol, being a large employer, being situated in an outdoor shopping precinct and not being located on an industrial estate.

Table 3.2a
Proportion of small retailers (!-!0 employees) victims of customer theft in 1993, by product sold and location

Victinus of customer theft:	Commerci estate			Soopping street	Other street	Other location	All
	*	*	*	%	%	%	*
Food	-10	54	55	47	80	45	-18
Alcohol and/or cigarett	es 67	-	75	68	73	60	67
High value electrical/ patented goods	32	_	82	56	-	53	54
Furniture/clothing	35	59	71	50	-	46	52
Jewellery/precious me	al –	-	-	53	-	-	46
None of the above	19	50	50	-40	47	16	36
All	30	53	58	46	55	36	45

Naver

- 1. Italic embolicated figures are five per cent or more above the average figure for all pormises.
- indicates that less than ten premises of this type were in the survey so extendes will be unreliable.
 Products sold are me exclusive so premises selling more than once of the listed items will appear more than once in
- Products sold are not exclusive so premises relling more than one of the lated items will appear more than once in
 the table
- 4 Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

Table 3.2b
Proportion of large retailers (11+ employees) victims of customer theft in 1993, by product sold and location

Victims	Commerci	Commercial Indexe		Shopping	Other	Other	AR
of customer tbeft:	estate	sbopping centre	precinct	sired	street	iucation	
	%	*	*	*	%	%	%
Food	56	64	91	69	50	80	72
Alcohol and/or cigare	ites 92	-	100	78	64	83	84
High value electrical/ patented goods	63	_	100	61	_	46	61
Furniture/clothing	66	65	88	76	-	68	72
jewellery/precious m	etal -	-	-	75	-	_	72
None of the above	7	-	-	59	-	29	33
AII	45	64	87	65	56	5"	62

Notes

- 1 Italic embulcional figures are the per cost or more above the average figure for all premises.
- 2. '- Indicates that less than ten premises of this type were in the survey so estimates will be unrefable.
- Products sold are not exchange, so premises seiting more than one of the listed home will appear more than under in
 the table.
- 4 Source 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

Robbery

Robbery is theft or attempted theft using force or the threat of force. Risks were relatively low overall: four per cent of small retailers and seven per cent of large retailers had one or more actual or attempted robberies during 1993. Robberies involving weapons were less common: 0.7 per cent of premises had an armed robbery and one per cent had been robbed by an offender with a knife. Robberies where employees were injured were fairly rare: 15 per cent of robberies resulted in injury to staff.

Table 3.3a Proportion of small retailers (I-I0 employees) victims of robbery in 1993, by product sold and location

Victims (of robberg:		ial indoor abopping centre			Otbur street	Other location	AII
	76	*	%	%	*	*	%
Food	0	0	5	5	10	5	5
Alcohol and/or etgarett	es 0	-	15	9	10	8	8
High value electrical/ patented goods	0	-	0	0	_	0	0
Furniture/clothing	0	6	0	2	-	3	3
Jewellery/precious met	2 -	-	-	3	-	-	1
None of the above	3	0	0	5	0	2	3
AII	ì	2	3	4	7	3	4

Although robbery is relatively uncommon, there were still clear regional differences. Premises in the North West and Greater London were at greatest risk, with nine per cent and eight per cent respectively robbed during 1993 (Table B3.4, Appendix B).

The chances of being robbed were extremely high for some of the larger premises. Of those selling food and/or alcohol and cigarettes situated on commercial estates over a quarter had a robbery during 1993 (Table 3.3b). For the smaller premises, risks were highest for shops selling alcohol or cigarettes (eight per cent had been robbed in 1993). Risks also tended to be higher for those located on streets away from main shopping areas (seven per cent) (Table 3.3a).

Table embeldenet figures are five per cens or more above the average figure for all premises.

- 'authories that less than tes poemies of this type were in the survey so entimates will be unreliable.

Products sold are not enclusive, so premises safing more than one of the fixed items will appear more than once in عليان عن

Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

Multivariate analysis indicates that the following factors are independently predictive of a greater risk of a premises experiencing a robbery; selling tobacco or alcohol, being a large employer and being situated in an outdoor shopping precinct.

Table 3.3b Proportion of large retailers (II+ employees) victims of robbery In 1993, by product sold and location

Victims of robbery:	Commerci estate	iai indoor abupping centre			Othur street	Other location	AH
*	%	%	%	*	%	*	%
Food	25	18	11	6	0	4	9
Alcohol and/or eigaret	tes <i>31</i>	-	15	10	0	5	12
High value electrical/ patented goods	8	_	7	9	-	0	7
Furniture/clothing	10	5	35	7	-	0	9
Jewellery/precious me	tal -	-	-	10	-	-	8
None of the above	3	-	_	3	0	0	4
All	7	14	16	6	0	2	7

- 1 Natic embuddened figures are the per cent or more above the average figure for all premises.
 2. '-' indicates that less than ten premises of this type were in the survey so extenses will be nareliable.
 3. Products sold are not exclusive, so premises selling more than use of the land items will appear more than uses in the table
- Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted date

Although the risk of robbery increases the larger the number of employees, the chances of any individual employee being on the receiving end of a robbery are disproportionably high for those in the smaller establishments (Table 3.4). On the other hand, in larger premises the number of employees who are likely to be affected - directly or indirectly - by a robbery will be greater.

There was a similar pattern for non-injury assaults and threats but risks of assault with injury were broadly similar between small and large premises (Table 3.4)."

Premises with longer opening hours were more likely to have been robbed but multivariate analysis suggests that opening hours per se do not seem to increase the risk of robbery when other factors are taken into account.

These findings may also reflect different levels of knowledge about less serious lacklesss among the respondents to the survey those from the larger premines may be less likely to know about such lacidents.

There is deed for some crustica here, however along the number of rubbury victims in the example is small.

Table 3.4
Number of incidents of robbery and assaults/threats per 1,000 retail employees, by number of employees

	Robbery	Assault/tbreat no injury	Assault uith injury
1 to 10 employees	11.3	195.9	4.2
11 + employees	6.6	87.3	6.5
All	8.5	131 1	5.6

Notes

Multiple victimisation

Many retail premises experienced more than one crime in a year: a third of those who had been victimised had been victimised ten or more times in 1993. Frauds by outsiders or thefts by employees were often experienced more than once by victims. Burglaries and thefts from vehicles, on the other hand, were less likely to be repeated. Not surprisingly, the most repeated offence for retailers was theft by customers where a third of victimised premises (34 per cent) had ten or more incidents.

Because some retailers were victimised a number of times in 1993, a few premises experienced a large proportion of all the crimes counted by the survey (Table 3.5 shows some of the picture; a fuller one is in Table B3.5, Appendix B):

- Thefts by customers were particularly concentrated: three per cent of the whole sample of retailers accounted for 69 per cent of the incidents measured.
- Two per cent of retail premises suffered a quarter of the burgisries in 1993.
- Two per cent of the sample (whether vehicle owners or not) experienced 58 per cent of the thefts from vehicles.
- All told, 59 per cent of the full crime count was against three per cent of the retailing premises.

Identifying these high-risk businesses clearly promises a great deal if effective crime prevention initiatives could be successfully targeted on, or adopted by them.

The mid-point of response exceptrics was misen as the number of employees for premises with more than ten employees.

^{2.} Source 1994 CVS. Weighted date.

Table 3.5 Numbers of incidents of selected crimes for victimised retailing bremises in 1993

Number of incidents.		Proportion of respondents	Proportion of victims %	Proportion of incidents %
Burglary	0	76	-	-
(with entry)	1	15	62	34
	2-3	8	32	41
	4+	2	6	25
Thefts from	0	88		
vehicles	1	7	59	20
	2-3	3	28	22
	4+	2	13	58 -
Thefts by	0	59	-	
Customers	1	7	17	<1
	2- 9	20	49	4
	10-49	7	17	7
	50- 99	3	6	7
	100-299	2	4	13
	300+	3	7	69
Thefts by	0	93		
employees	1	4	51	4
	2-3	2	25	5
	4+	2	24	91
Fraud by	0	80		
outsiders	1	6	31	6
	2-3	7	35	16
	4+	7	34	77
All crime	0 -	22		
	1	15	19	T
	2-9	3 7	47	6
	10 -i9	17	21	12
	50-9 9	3	4	7
	100-299	3	4	16
	500+	' 3	4	59

3. Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

How many crimes does it add up to?

By taking the risks of crime identified in the survey, and accounting for repeat victimisation, it is possible to generate an estimate of the number of criminal incidents against retail premises in England and Wales as a whole. (The average number of incidents per premises is given in Table B3.6. Appendix B.) The average number of each type of crime per premises was

Unweighted framber of victims: Burgisty = 419, thefts from vehicles = 221, thefts by contenters = 60%, thefts by engineers = 175, franci by outsiders = 596, all crime = 1,369.
Cages where standar of incidents figures were not given were entered as zero incidents in this table

multiplied by the number of retailers in the British Telecom Business Database with the SIC codes sampled. These were 223,316 small retailers and 29,349 large retailers. Doing this suggests that retailers experienced about 8.6 million incidents of crime in 1993, of which 5.8 million were thefts by customers and a further 1.2 million were unattributable thefts.

Table 3.6 shows the estimated number of incidents against retail premises in 1993 for all the categories of crime measured in the survey.

Table 3.6 Number of incidents against retailing premises in 1993

	Number	*
Burghries (with entry)	108,000	1
Attempted burglaries	126,000	t
Vandalism	219,000	3
Theft of vehicles	19,000	<1
Theft from vehicles	89,000	1
Then by customers	5,7 ⁷⁷ ,000	67
Theft by employees	234,000	3
Theft by outsiders	157,000	2
Thefts by unknown persons	1.155,000	13
Fraud by employees	62,000	1
Fraud by outsiders	257,000	3
Robbery	21,000	<1
Non-injury assaults & threats	326,000	4
Assaults with injury	14,000	<1
Bribery & extortion	26,000	<1
Ali crimes	8,591,000	100

How many incidents are reported?

Retail managers were asked whether they had reported to the police all, most, some, or none of the crimes they had experienced during 1993. An estimate of the proportion of incidents actually reported was derived from this (see Figure 3.2 and Table B3.7, Appendix B).

Figures are enterated by applying total number of retailing peculars in the ST data base at the time of the survey (252,665) to the survey extinates of the sverage number of incidents per presides.

Figures do not sum to total due to rounding. Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted data


The question was whether "all, most, some or no incidents" were reported it was assumed that "most" = "5 per cent and 'sume' = 25 per cent of incidents.

At least 80 per cent of incidents of burglary, including attempts, were reported to the police. This high rate may be because of the requirement to tell the police about an incident for insurance purposes. Two-thirds of thefts from vehicles, were reported."

Robberies were generally reported to the police, particularly by smaller retailers (overall an estimated 80 per cent)." However, 12 per cent of victimised premises said they had not reported any of the robberies they had experienced.

Estimated reporting levels were higher for smaller retailers for burglary (96 per cent), robbery (80 per cent), theft from vehicles (76 per cent) and vandalism (63 per cent). It may be that the financial loss incurred from these crimes is a greater proportion of profits than for larger premises. Higher reporting may also reflect a greater awareness of crime by personnel in smaller shops.

Figure 3.2
Proportion of incidents reported to police by retailers, 1993



⁶ Reporting of theft of vehicles was not mixed as the evidence from the British Come Survey suggests that menty all these are reported. That is in part for instance purposes but stated, because owners expect the police to be able to help in tracking down staten vehicles. Two-thirds of retail premises that had a vehicle states but got some, or all, of their vehicles back.

⁷ Respondents were not asked what proportion of menular/durate were reported.

Reporting levels were very low for thefts by customers and thefts by employees, although they were higher for larger premises than smaller ones: smaller premises reported an estimated 14 per cent of customer thefts whereas larger premises reported 36 per cent. The main reasons given by retailers for not reporting thefts by customers were that they were not serious enough, the police could not do anything or that there was not enough evidence (Table 3.7). In addition, the low reporting levels may reflect the difficulty in identifying a suspect for many of these incidents.

Thefts by employees were slightly more likely to be reported than thefts by customers: 18 per cent of those against small premises were reported and 45 per cent of those against the larger ones. It is arguable that incidents identified as employee thefts in the survey will more often be those where the culprit was known than was the case for incidents of customer theft. If this is so, the general similarity in the proportion of incidents reported probably reflects a far greater proportion of apprehended customers being referred to the police than apprehended employees.

Table 3.7 Reasons for retail premises not reporting incidents in 1993 to the police

	Thest by customers	Theft by employees
		
Too trivial	42	13
Police couldn't do anything	26	16
Police wouldn't be interested.	13	3
Internal matter	11	33
No evidence/proof	21	19
Too much trouble	7	7
Not company policy	1	6
Fear of reprisal	1	2
No insurance claim involved	I	2
Other'	7	8
Unweighted N	471	108

TO Other responses included for ensumer theft were: four of negative publicity, the guads where recovered, the culprit being too young or too old or it just depended on the decumutances. Other responses included for employee theft were: fear of negative publicity, employee uncled or had left, or thought of as internal mintake.

Figures do not soon to 100 per cent because of multiple response.

Base = one or more incidents of each crime type not reported to the p-time

Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

Comparison with the Retail Crime Costs 1993/1994 Survey of the British Retail Consortium

Previous national surveys of crimes against retailers have sampled business rather than premises. For instance, one recent survey covered 18,669 outlets with 297 questionnaires to head offices (Bamfield, 1994). The British Retail Consortium have also conducted two head office surveys (Burrows & Speed 1994; Speed et al 1995). Each survey covered about 400 businesses which together accounted for 53,000 outlets."

Because there are advantages to each method, together the findings of the BRC and CVS give us our most complete picture of crime against the retail sector." The findings on risks of crime are given here, those on the costs of crime in Chapter 5.

The main advantage of the BRC approach is that it covers such a large number of outlets (indirectly) that it is able to present risks by type of retail sector Also, head offices will in many cases have better information than individual premises on costs of crime, other losses and the costs of crime prevention measures. Many premises in the CVS were unable even to give their annual turnover and there were a lot of missing responses on shrinkage estimates, presumably because this information is only held centrally, or not at all by the smaller premises.

A disadvantage of the BRC approach, though, is that not all crimes are reported to head office by individual premises, especially those involving smaller losses. Asking premises directly about their experiences is, therefore, likely to give a better picture of actual crime levels – so long as accurate records are kept. Details of the nature of incidents are also unlikely to be kept centrally in all cases and even if such details have not been recorded anywhere they may well be remembered by premises managers.

In a premises-based survey it is also more straightforward to determine how many premises were victimised, and to discover the levels of repeat victimisation. A premises-based survey will also be able to link the factors that put some premises at greater risk of crime than others – such as their exact location, size and opening hours.

⁸ In effect this means that the single premises independent is lately to be reverely underexpresented in the BRC sample. The CVI sample on the other hand was intended to be representative of all setail premises.

⁹ When making comparisons between the two surveys a number of differences need to be borne in mind the samples on which they are based differ (see founder 40); the BBC covers the financial year rather than the calcular year; the BBC was a self-completion questionness; the CVS a telephone interview; the BBC had fewer questionness completed with an unknown response rate; and the BBC covers the whole of the UK whereas the CVS covers only lingland and Wales

¹⁰ Some heat offices will only be able to provide a total count of crime across all their outlets and will be orable, to theretake what proportion of their were victims.

As would be predicted, the CVS picked up far more incidents of crime than the BRC survey (see Table 3.8). It recorded a third again as many completed burglaries but over twice as many attempted burglaries and nearly three times as many vandalisms. This tends to confirm the hypothesis that the less serious crimes - such as attempted burglary and vandalism - are less likely to be reported to head office.

The most striking difference is in the number of vehicle crimes measured by the two surveys. Ten times as many incidents were found in the CVS. The BRC suggest that their relatively low figure for vehicle crime may be due to the practice - increasingly common amongst large retail groups - of contracting out transportation services to independent carriers. Thefts of and from carriers vehicles may be reported by the branches of large retail groups (especially if the vehicles carry the livery of the retail concern), but will be counted as a loss to the carrier in the BRC estimates. Some of the difference is also likely to be explained by the tighter definition of a commercial vehicle used by the BRC. The CVS is likely to have collected details of more crimes against company passenger vehicles than the BRC.

Table 3.8 Comparison of Home Office and BRC survey: number of incidents per 100 retail premises

	Home Office 1993	BRC 1993/1994
Burglery		
- completed	43	33
- attempted	50	20
Vehicle crime (all premises)	42	4
Criminal damage (+arson)	87	29
Customer theft	2,286	1.600/5,100'
Robbery	8	3
Any incklent in survey	3,400	1,800

DRC survey covers Great Britain. CVS covers only England and Wales.

ed or clearly entablished to have taken place. The second figure The first figure refers to incidents that were witnessed or clearly established to have take is the extense derived from allocating a portion of unexplained losses to customer theft.
 Sources: 1994 CVI. Weighted data. BBC 1993/1994 (Speed et al., 1995).



4 Crime against manufacturers

This chapter considers the extent of crime against manufacturing premises in 1993. It looks first at the proportion of premises victimised and the extent of repeat victimisation. It then considers in further detail risks of burglary, vandalism and vehicle crime. Estimates are given of the total number of crimes experienced by the manufacturing sector in 1993, and the proportion of these reported to the police.

What proportion of manufacturers were victims of crime in 1993?

Nearly two-thirds (63 per cent) of the manufacturing premises surveyed had experienced one or more crimes in 1993. This was lower than the 80 per cent of retailers victimised. Two-fifths of victims had experienced only one type of crime, and a quarter had only been victimised once during the year. As Figure 4.1 shows the most commonly experienced offences were thefts from vehicles (25 per cent of vehicle owning premises), burglary (24 per cent), attempted burglary (18 per cent) and vandalism (16 per cent). Further details are in Table B3.1, Appendix B. More of the larger manufacturing premises – with eleven or more employees – had been victimised than the smaller ones (83 per cent compared to 57 per cent).


The chances of being burgled were the same for manufacturing premises as for retail ones (24 per cent). The risks of vehicle crime were also very similar. But manufacturers were far *less* likely to have been robbed than retailers (0.6 per cent versus four per cent). Also, they were less likely to have had staff assaulted or threatened (six per cent versus 17 per cent of retailers). No doubt this is because outsiders were less likely to have access to the premises.

The risks of outsider fraud (at 17 per cent) and employee fraud (at one per cent) are both likely to be underestimates as fraud is a difficult crime to detect and may not always be noticed when it occurs.

¹ Industries covered by this survey west food and drink manufacturing, the testile industry, magafacturing of igather goods, footwear and clothing, timber and wooden furniture, paper, printing and politiking, rabber and plante processing. The array do not cover the manufacture of moral goods, mineral products, chemicals, engineering, vehicles industries or the construction industry.

² Half as many small contributorers suffered escents and threats but their risks per employer were fifteen times higher.

Figure 4.1
Proportion of manufacturers victimised in 1993



The risks of bribery and extortion were low for both sectors and, like retailers, manufacturers thought that bribery and extortion were uncommon in their line of business. Of the 33 manufacturers who reported having experienced something of this type (two per cent of the total) seventeen said it had involved bribing, or attempting to bribe employees; five said it was actual or attempted extortion; two said protection payment; two reported threats of product contamination; two premises said that public officials had been involved in these activities. From some of the responses, though, it was clear that one person's definition of bribery and extortion was another's definition of acceptable competitive business practice.

Which manufacturers are most at risk of crime?

Manufacturers have a different crime profile to retailers in that they do not suffer from the large number of customer thefts and are much less likely to suffer attacks – whether for theft or not – against their staff. It is difficult to pinpoint the factors that put premises at risk of these rarer crimes. The discussion below, therefore, considers only the prevalent crimes of burglary, vandalism and vehicle crime.

The same caveats apply as for retail premises when specifying the factors that put some premises at greater risk than others. Many factors are related to each other. If manufacturers of particular goods tend to be located in a specific location, it is difficult to say whether it is the goods or the location that is important in predicting their risk. Multivariate analysis gives some indication of which factors are independently predictive.

Burglary

Manufacturers were as likely to have been burgled as retailers, which is perhaps surprising as the potential gains are more visible to offenders in retailing premises. We can only hypothesise then as to why this is the case. It may be that manufacturing premises are more vulnerable due to their locations. Their design, too, may allow burglars to work with reduced chance of being seen by passers-by. In some cases it may be difficult for guards or police to respond to alarms quickly enough. Also, some premises may be attractive due to the stock stored which may hold greater value in its original packaging.

The larger the premises the higher the risk, regardless of location or type of goods stored or manufactured (Table 4.1). This may be because larger premises have more stock available to steal or that they are in buildings more vulnerable to attack: half of the larger premises said they were located in a business park or similar compared to a third of the smaller premises. At particularly high risk were large manufacturers in residential areas dealing in food, alcohol and/or eightestes - half had been burgled at least once in 1993.

The regional variation was somewhat different to that for retailers. Manufacturing premises in the North West were at highest risk and those in East Anglia were at lowest risk. Unlike retail premises, manufacturers in the Greater London area were below average risk (Table B4.2, Appendix B).

Multivariate analysis indicates that, as with retailers, premises in the northern regions were more likely to be burgled as were larger employers. Being situated in non-industrial areas such as shopping centres and main roads was also independently predictive of being burgled.

The discussion here considers risk mainly by clausitying manufacturers according to goods deak to and lucusion. Birk can also be considered by the exact nature of the activity they undertake. Promines involved in arbeinning and distribution were as genuer that of vehicle crimer 1-1 per cent of owners had had a vehicle stolen, and 35 per cent of owners had had a vehicle stolen, and 35 per cent assumbling stolen from a vehicle This could well be because loads were particularly amarches for offenders or perhaps because there was more vehicle movement. Birks of violent crime (subberg, assumes and that and perhaps because there was more vehicle movement. Birks of violent crime (subberg, assumes and bublishing (" per cent) This is perhaps because on average there was greater access by the public. Table 84 1 in Appendix B shows details of risk vehicloss.

Table 4.1 Proportion of manufacturing premises burgled in 1993, by goods madelstockedisold and location

Percentage premises burgled:	tourn or city centre	Residentic buiti-up ared	i Non- residentia buili-up area	Not Swill-up urban arta	Runai arta	Elenchero	All
	%	*	%	*	%	%	%
Food/alcohol/d	garettes						
Small	_	27	-	-	_	_	17
Large	41	52	49	10	32	-	41
High value /elec	ctrical						
Small	19	21	13	_	22	-	16
Large	33	42	44	-	50	-	39
Other							
Small	26	24	16	29	9	29	21
Large	40	35	36	52	28	17	36
All Small	24	23	17	25	9	21	20
All Large	38	38	40	41	32	21	37

- lutht emboldened figures are tive par cent or more above the everage figure for all previous. -- Indicanes less than 10 premiers of this type were in the survey so extraors will be unartiable Produces sold see not enclusive, so premiers setting more than one of the lasted types of trems will appear more than once in the table
- Source 1994 CVS. Weighted James.

Vandalism

Vandalism was defined as deliberate damage, including arson, to any part of the buildings, equipment, stock and/or company vehicles based at the premises. It therefore encompasses relatively minor incidents as well as potentially the complete destruction of the premises by fire, Losses per incident ranged from virtually nothing to £150,000.

As with burglary, larger premises were at far greater risk; a third reported some type of deliberate damage, compared to just a tenth of the smaller premises (Table 4.2). Risks were greatest for premises in residential and nonbuilt-up urban areas, no doubt because the younger offenders involved are unlikely to go out of their way to commit this type of crime.

The risks of vandalism were fairly evenly spread across the country, though risks were particularly low in East Anglia where just four per cent of premises had been vandalised in 1993. Risks for premises in the North, Yorkshire and Humberside, North-West and the East Midlands were above average (see Table B4.2, Appendix B).

Multivariate analysis confirms that being situated in residential areas increases the chance of being vandalised as does being a larger employer, being in the northern regions and dealing in or storing alcohol or tobacco.

Table 4.2 Proportion of manufacturing premises vandalised in 1993, by goods made/stocked/sold and location

Percentage premises vandalised:	Toym or city centre	Residential built-up i area	Non- residential bull-up area	Not bulli-up urban araa	Runal area	Elsenbere	AR
	%	*	%	%	*	%	%
Food/alcohol/cl	gerettes						
Small	_	45	-	-	-	_	23
Large	35	48	33	40	16	-	34
High value /elec	trical						
Small	15	9	13	-	11	_	12
Large	33	42	29	-	20	-	33
Other							
Small	11	17	11	10	4	10	11
Large	25	33	25	24	23	50	26
All Small	11	17	71	18	- 5	11	12
All large	27	3 6	27	30	21	32	29

- ed figures are five per cept or more above the average figure for all prevaises. While 10 perulaes of this type were in the survey so estimates will be turneliable.
- -' indicates less than 10 premises of this type were in the survey so esti
- Products sold are not exclusive, so premises selling more than one of the listed types of items will appear more than once in the listed types of items will appear more than once in the table
- Source 1994 CVS, Weighted date.

Vehicle crime

In 1993, 31 per cent of vehicle-owning manufacturing premises had been the victim of either a theft of a vehicle (12 per cent) or from a vehicle (25 per cent). Larger premises were far more at risk: half had had some sort of vehicle crime, compared to only a quarter of smaller manufacturers with vehicles (Table 4.3).

Location is unlikely to be a very useful predictor of vehicle crime since it could well occur away from the immediate vicinity of the premises. Some incklents may have been in the local area though, and certainly risks were lower for premises situated in rural areas (Table 4.3). Risks did not vary much by type of product made, stocked or sold, although as with retailers premises dealing with food, alcohol and cigarettes were more often tamets. At particularly high risk were large manufacturers making, stocking or selling food, alcohol or cigarettes located in built up areas; two-thirds had suffered at least one vehicle crime.

Again, risks varied by region with premises in the East Midlands and Greater London area the most likely to have had a vehicle crime (Table B4.2, Appendix B).

Multivariate analysis showed that being a larger employer and being situated on a commercial or industrial estate each independently increased the chance of vehicle crime for manufacturers.

Table 4.3 Proportion of manufacturing premises experiencing vehicle crime in 1993, by what madelstockedisold and location

Percentage premises with theft of/from relide	Journ or . city centre	Pesidentk built-up area	nesidentia buili-up arca	Not i built-up urben arta	Rund arta	Eleverbere	All
	*	76	%	*	%	*	%
Food/alcohol/cig	arettes						
Small	_	30	-	-	-	-	29
Large	50	62	67	50	43	-	56
High value /elect	rical						
Small	<i>3</i> 7	25	20	-	6	-	22
Large	50	58	51	-	50		53
Other							
Small	22	23	24	40	1-	50	24
Large	45	49	51	48	44	50	48
All Small	25	24	23	38	15	39	24
All Large	47	51	53	51	45	-€~	50

- listic embablenci figures are five per cent or mote above the average figure for all premises.

 indicates fear than 10 premises of this type were in the survey so estimates will be unreliable.
- Right are for vehicle owners only
- Products sold are not exclusive, so premises selling more than one of the listed types of stems will appear more than once in the table
- once in the table. Source 1994 CVS, Weighted date.

Multiple victimisation

As with retailers, many manufacturing premises experienced more than one crime in a year: two-fifths of those who had been victimised (41 per cent) had been victimised four or more times in 1993.

- Two-fifths of premises (39 per cent) that had a burglary during 1993 had two or three burgiaries. Seven per cent had four or more.
- · A fifth of premises that had been victims of fraud by outsiders had four or more such incidents.
- · The majority of those vandalised had suffered two or more such incldents.

Because some manufacturers were victimised a number of times in 1993, a few premises experienced a large proportion of all the crimes counted by the survey (Table 4.4 shows some of the picture, a fuller one is in Table B4.5, Appendix B):

- Two per cent of the whole sample of manufacturers accounted for a quarter of the burglaries measured
- Three per cent of manufacturers had half the incidents of vandalism.
- · Half of the incidents of thefts from vehicles were against three per cent of manufacturers.

Overall, the extent of repeated victimisation was lower for manufacturers compared to retailers. This was principally because manufacturers do not suffer from thefts by customers in the way that shops do:

 All told, nearly two-thirds (63 per cent) of the full crime count was against eight per cent of the premises.

Table 4.4 Number of incidents of selected crimes for victimised manufacturing bremises, 1993

Number of incidents		Proportion of respondents %	Proportion of victims %	Proportion of incidents %
Burglary	0	76		-
(with entry)	1	13	54	29
_	2-3	9	39	45
	4+	2	-	26
Vandalism		84	-	-
	1	6	40	13
	2-3	7	43	34
	4+	3	17	52
Thefts from	0	81	-	-
vehicles	1	11	55	22
	2-3	6	30	27
	4+	3	15	51
Fraud by	0	83	-	-
outsiders	1	6	37	8
	2-3	7	44	21
	4+	3	19	71
All crime	0	37	-	-
	1	16	26	4
	2-3	21	33	11
	4-9	18	29	22
	10+	8	12	63

Unweighted number of victims: Burgiary = 363, vandsitsm = 268, theft from vehicles = 325. franci by considers a 196, all erine = 895
2. Cases where number of incidents figures v
5. Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

of west not given were entered as sero locklents in Jijis pible.

How many crimes does it add up to?

Again, estimates from the survey can be grossed up by applying the average number of incidents of crime identified by the survey per premises (see Table 83.6, Appendix B) to the total population of manufacturers (Table 4.5). The average number of each type of crime per premises was multiplied by the number of manufacturers in the BT database with the SIC codes sampled. These were 67,782 small manufacturers and 20,089 large manufacturers.

Thus, the number of incidents against manufacturing premises totalled 420,000. This is far lower than the total of 8.6 million for retailers. On average manufacturers experienced seven times fewer incidents per premises than retailers. This is in part because there are roughly only a third as many such premises in this survey, but mainly because manufacturers are not vulnerable to customer theft in the sense of 'shoplifting'. Even so, the numerically greatest incidents against manufacturers did involve thefts by outsiders, who will have been customers in some cases.

Table 4.5
Number of incidents against manufacturing premises in 1993

	Number	*
lurgiaries (with entry)	40,000	10
tempted burglaries	29,000	7
ndelism.	42,000	10
eft of vehicles	13,000	3
eft from vehicles	44.000	11
eft by employees	29,000	7
ft by outsiders	104,000	25
ft by unknown persons	17,000	4
ni by employees	2,000	1
id by outsiders	74,000	18
obery	1,000	<1
aults & threats (no injury)	16,000	4
anna wath jojury	1,000	<1
bery & extortion	6,000	1
crimes	420,000	100

Notes

¹ Pigures are entirented by applying total number of manufacturing presides in the BT data have at the time of the survey (5°,5°1) to the survey estimates of the average monther of inclutous per premises.

^{2.} Figures do not sees to total due to rounding.


^{5.} Source: 1994 CVS, Weighted data.

There were relatively few threats of or actual incidents of violence directed at employees - whether from other employees or outsiders. Incidents rarely involved violence that resulted in injury. In total just 1,000 incidents against manufacturers resulted in injury to staff in 1993, though we do not know how serious the injuries were.*

How many incidents are reported to the police?

As with retailers, most incidents of burglary (92 per cent), and thefts from vehicles (73 per cent) are reported to the police, although, overall, levels of reporting were lower for manufacturers (see Table B3.7, Appendix B and Figure 4.2). 1.0

Figure 4.2 Proportion of incidents reported to police by manufacturers, 1993



Manufacturers were particularly unlikely to report incidents of theft by employees, although this is based on a small number of incidents. The main reasons for not reporting these few cases were: the incident was not serious enough; the police would not have been able to do anything about it; it was

This amounts to six incidents of amount resulting in injury for every 10,000 manufacturing employees.

The question asked whether all, most, some or mose of the incidents were reported to the police Estimates have

been derived from mounting that 'most' was 79 per cent and 'nome' was 25 per cent.
Respondents were not raised whether they had reported thefts of vehicles his known that there are generally reported to the police, partly because of insurance requirements, but makely because there is a high chance of the website being recovered. Nearly revolutels of mounfacturing premises that had had one vehicle theft in 1995 said it had been recovered.

not appropriate to involve the police in an internal matter, fear of negative publicity; and lack of evidence Only four in ten of the very small number (21) of incidents of robbery picked up by the survey were brought to the attention of the police.

5 Costs of crime

How much is crime costing the retailing and manufacturing sectors?

The total cost of crime to the retail industry, as estimated from the survey, was £780 million. The cost to the manufacturing sector was somewhat lower, at about \$275 million, reflecting the fact there were three times fewer manufacturing premises than retailers in this survey. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 (see next page) show the contribution of each crime type to these totals. These costs do not include spending on crime prevention - which is discussed later - or compensation from insurance or indirect losses resulting, for instance, through lost orders.

For the retail sector, the major costs are customer theft and burglaries. Each cost the industry some £200 million a year. Thefts of and from vehicles total \$96 million, and criminal damage \$83 million. The remaining quarter of total costs is made up of other thefts and frauds.

A third of the direct costs of victimisation against manufacturers are due to completed and attempted burglaries (£103 million in 1993). Vehicle crime at £64 million and various types of fraud at £71 million together make up most of the remaining direct costs of crime to manufacturers.

The national turnover for retailers is of the order of £120 billion,2 and for manufacturers, around £130 billion.5 Thus, losses through crime represent an estimated 0.7 per cent of retail turnover, and 0.2 per cent of manufacturing turnover. Of course, though, losses through crime come directly off profits and will amount to a larger proportion of these.

As well as the direct costs of crime for businesses, there may also be indirect losses such as lost orders or customers, delayed deliveries, disturbance to production and so on. This survey cannot provide details of these costs in 1993.4

See Appendix A fur details of the population of business premises covered in this survey Source: Control Senistical Office, 1994s.

Source: Central Statistical Office, 1994b, Figure given is that for total sales and work done for a comparable subset of actualing premises, but covering Great Pressin. Along black means that only a subset of victims were mixed about holizant cross. Of those saleed, about a tidad

A rectanical labels means that only a se said they had incurred this type of loss in 1995.

Figure 5.1 Costs of crime to retailers 1993 (£ millions)





Figure 5.2 Costs of crime to manufacturers 1993 (£ millions)



Which are the most costly incidents of crime?

Vehicle theft was the most expensive crime: each incident of rebicle tibest cost retailers an average of £3,940 and manufacturers £3,980. Over the course of 1993 these amounted to a total average loss per victimised premises of £5,680 for retailers and £6,060 for manufacturers (Table 5.1).

Each incident of burglary where an offender got into the premises (whether or not anything was stolen) cost retailers an average of £1,660 and manufac-

turers an average £2,420. Over the course of a year, and taking repeated victimisation into account, these amounted to total average losses of £2,980 and £4,610 for each burgled retailing and manufacturing premises respectively. For the most heavily victimised, total losses could be considerably more.

At the other end of the scale, each incident of customer theft cost retailers an average of £35. As these incidents are common, over the year they amounted to a total average loss of £1,700 per victimised premises which is equivalent to £800 for every retail premises.

The average losses for *robbery* mask large differences between the costs to smaller and larger establishments. Small retailers lost an average of £740 per robbery incident, amounting to an average loss for victims of £1,050 each in 1993. Larger retailers suffered considerably greater average losses of £1,970 per incident – amounting to £9,540 per victim in 1993. Although robbery against manufacturers is relatively rare, the indications are that those against small manufacturers were of very low cost, whereas those against the larger ones cost an average of £4,240 each.

A full breakdown of costs by crime type is given in Table B5.1, Appendix B.

Table 5.1
Average cost of selected crimes, 1993

	Retailers £	Nanufacturers £	
Burglary (with entry)			
Per incklent	1,660	2,420	
Per year (victims)	2,980	4,610	
Theft of vehicle			
Per incident	3,9 1 0	3,980	
Per year (victims)	5,690	6,060	
Customer theft			
Per incident	35	-	
Per year (victims)	1,700	-	
Robbery			
Per Incident	1,310	1,290	
Per year (victims)	2,760	3,310	
All crime			
Per incident	95	690	
Per year (victims)	3,930	4,970	

Notes: 1 Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

Who loses most through crime?

Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 show the variations in average annual losses for different types of premises, whether victimised or not.

Table 5.2 Average yearly costs of crime for all small employers in the retailing sector, whether victimised or not

Average (cost £	Commercial estate	-	Outdour precinct	Shopping street	Other street	Other location	AH
Food	1,260	1,460	7,300	I,150	1,630	2,120	2,010
Alcohol/tobaccu	1,520	-	13,100	1,490	1,320	2,160	2,730
High value electrical/ patented goods	2, 85 0	_	4,980	1,490	-	2,480	2,250
Furniture/clothing	4,370	1,640	1,050	1,550	-	3,610	2,040
brecions metal Jeweijery/	_	_	_	1,160	-	_	1,880
None of the above	2,810	1.320	1,260	1,490	1,090	1,030	1,500
All	2,740	1,410	3,960	1,390	1,140	2,050	1,850

Amongst the smaller retailers, average losses were highest for shops selling alcohol or tobacco, particularly those situated in outdoor precincts. The average cost of crime per premises was also high for shops selling high-value electrical or patented goods - no doubt reflecting the relatively high value of goods lost.

Table 5.3 Average yearly costs of crime for all large employers in the retailing sector, whether victimised or not

Average cost £	Commercial estate		Outdoor preciset		Other	Other location	All
Foud	28,460	20,930	11,590	7,820	3,350	6,150	10,750
Akrohul/tobacco	-	-	11,030	8,019	4,810	7,870	12,890
High value electrica patented goods	l/ 19,7 4 0	-	14,540	12,430	-	11,040	14,800
Purniture/clothing	24,820	5,080	15,890	18,800	-	13,430	16,290
Jewellery/ precious metal	_	-	-	11,120	_	_	7,370
None of the above	18,210	-	-	10,010	18,870	55,160	17,780
All	19,020	14,700	9,880	9,830	11,480	12,710	12,450

Dashes indicate unvesphed a jess than 10 cases. Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

Darbes indicate unweighted a loss than 10 cases. Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

The average loss per large retailer was far higher at £12,450 compared to that of £1,850 for small retailers. Premises situated on commercial estates suffered the greatest losses: an average of £19,020 per year.

Table 5.4 Average yearly costs of crime for all premises in the manufacturing sector, whether victimised or not

Average cost £	or		residenti	Not lai buill-up	Rund area	Elenebei	ne All
	cth;	ana	bu/II-u				
	селіле		area	area			
Pood/alcohol/cit	gerettes or t	obacco					
Small	-	2,040	-	-	-	-	1,530
Large	4,930	7,690	29,570	14,080	7,630	-	14,040
High value elect	rical/patent	ed good	5				
Small	1,220	1,010	1,240	-	930	-	1,250
Large	3,810	5,290	23,280	-	8,990	-	10,430
Other goods							
للحص	1,550	2,190	1,630	3,450	1,280	2,730	1,870
Large	9,930	5,100	7.450	7,590	4.180	3,860	6,600
All goods							
Small	1,430	1,980	1,560	4,050	1,200	2,110	1,740
Large	7,830	5,410	11,370	8,480	6,070	5.170	7,730

larger manufacturing premises also lose more per year through crime than their smaller counterparts, but the discrepancy is not so great: £7,730 compared to £1,740. Losses were greatest for those situated in non-residential built-up areas, particularly those dealing in food, alcohol or tobacco.

Shrinkage

Shrinkage is a commonly used term amongst businesses to refer to all losses incurred from stock, whether by misaccounting, spoiled goods or crime. In practice, different establishments will have different accounting procedures. Many will not include detected crimes in their shrinkage figures. Another problem for a premises-based survey such as this is that shrinkage information may only be kept centrally, and if local outlets are kept aware of the level of shrinkage it will often be expressed as a proportion of turnover rather than as an absolute figure.

Although respondents to the survey were asked to include crime costs in their estimates of shrinkage many patently did not. For instance, for all sectors other than large retailers, losses through crime actually exceeded the

Darbes indicate unweighted n lets than 10 cases. Source: 1994 CV3, Weighted data.

total figure estimated to have been lost through crime *and* other shrinkage. For this reason the findings are not given here. Suffice to say that it is probable that some of the costs of crime are not counted in the 'direct' costs of crime quoted here.

Comparison with the Retail Crime Costs 1993/1994 Survey of the British Retail Consortium

The extent to which the findings of the BRC survey can be compared with those of the CVS was discussed in Chapter 3. While it was concluded that the CVS was a better source of information on risks of crime, the BRC survey provides more complete data on the costs of crime.

The BRC survey estimated a total cost of crime to the retail sector for the financial year 1993/1994 of £2,149 million. Why is this figure so much greater than the £780 million estimated by the CVS? The main reason is that the BRC successfully measured shrinkage and considered it justified to apportion £1,207 million of this to customer theft and employee theft. The BRC was also able to measure consequential or indirect loss through crime, which amounted to £42 million. Finally, the BRC survey included Northern Ireland and Scotland and the effect of the former can be seen in the inclusion of £226 million of costs due to terrorism.

When all these differences are accounted for the BRC survey actually gives a lower estimate of the *direct* costs of crimes to retailers (loss of goods and damage to goods and premises as a result of witness incidents) of £687 million (Table 5.5). This is mainly because the CVS picked up more incidents of vehicle crime (for reasons discussed in Chapter 3).

How much is spent on preventing crime

The annual running costs of security measures, such as security personnel costs and the maintenance charges for alarms and other security equipment, varied considerably between premises from nothing at all to £400,000. The average for retail premises was £1,040 and for manufacturing £2,070. Premises spending the most tended to have guards on the premises during the day. Those with night guards, caretakers, receptionists and guards to respond to alarms also had high costs.

Storeen per cost of pressions could not give entitates of the running costs of their security measures. This was a particular problem for larger retailent 28 per cost of respondents could not give a figure.

Table 5.5

Comparison of Home Office and BRC survey: costs of retail crime

	Home Office 1993 militons	BRC 1993/1994 millions
Recorded customer theft	£203	£201
Burglary (excluding consequentia	l loss) &205	£210
Criminal damage and arson	£83	£104
Vehicle crime	£96	£10
Faud	£57	£32
Employee theft	\$22	£20
Other theft	£87	893
Robbery & till snatches	£28	£13
Total direct gross loss	£780	£68.
Consequential losses	Not reliably measured	£42
Recovered goods	Not separately identified	-£13
Shrinkage apportioned to customer theft	Not included	£548
Shrinkage apportioned to employee theft	Not included	£659
Terrocism	Probably not included though some may have been included under criminal damage	£226
Total net cost		£ 2,1- £ 9

Notes

Amongst small retailers (Table B5.2, Appendix B), spending was highest for premises in indoor shopping centres (an average of £2,190). Those dealing in jewellery and/or precious metals also spent above average (£970), as did those selling alcohol and/or cigarettes (£740).

Spending on crime prevention was much greater for *larger retailers* at an average of £5,620 (Table B5.3, Appendix B). Again, average spending was highest for premises selling alcohol or cigarettes and jewellery or precious metals. Premises in indoor shopping centres, on commercial estates, and in outdoor precincts all tended to spend above average. The higher crime prevention spending among larger premises will, in part, reflect their higher risks of victimisation and their higher losses per incident.

The DRC survey covers Great Briefs, including Northern Ireland and Scotland. The CVS survey covers only England
and Titles.

^{2.} Sources: 1994 CVS. Weighted date. RBC 1993/1994 (Speed et al., 1997)

As with retailers, there were considerable differences between manufacturers in crime prevention spending (Table B5.4, Appendix B). On average large manufacturers spent £8,030 in 1993 but those selling food, alcohol and/or cigarettes spent an average of £20,550. Smaller manufacturing premises on the other hand spent an average of just £430. The highest spenders of these were located in non-residential areas.

The total running costs per year of crime prevention measures amounted to £260 million for the retail sector, and £180 million for the manufacturing sector covered here. (Chapter 7 gives further details of crime prevention measures.)

To what extent is spending on crime prevention related to the losses premises suffer through crime?

Assuming that small and large employers have assessed their costs equally well (larger premises may have better records), larger premises take more expensive action to prevent crime relative to their losses due to crime. Average annual crime prevention costs in 1993 for small retailers, at £500, were just over a quarter as big as the losses they suffered through crime (£1,850). With larger retailers this rose to 45 per cent (£5,620 cf. £12,450). Small manufacturers' security costs were on average a quarter of their losses through crime (£430 cf. £1,740) whilst larger manufacturers' security costs were, if anything, greater than their losses through crime (£8,030 cf. £7,730).

There may be an economy of scale where larger employers have a more coherent crime prevention strategy and are more able to divert resources towards it: they may have higher costs due to security staff who also fulfil other functions (e.g. receptionist or gatekeeper). Unfortunately, it is not possible to assess here if the higher spending on security is simply a result of greater victimisation (although this is likely), or whether the higher spending on particular measures is effective in reducing victimisation.

The costs of crime prevention relative to annual crime losses varied according to location, as can be seen in Figures 5.3 to 5.6. There were quite marked variations in relative costs for retailers trading in different locations and this was particularly so among smaller retailers. For instance, security costs for those in outdoor shopping precincts were only nine per cent of losses, whereas small retailers in indoor shopping centres spent more on security than they lost through crime.

⁶ The samples used to exicultize the two figures differed at many premates were traible to give one data. The court of crime do not include losses through lost orders or contoment, delayed deliveries, disturbance to production and so

Figure 5.3

Comparing costs of crime and costs of security measures for all small retailers




Figure 5.4
Comparing costs of crime and costs of security measures for all large retailers




Figure 5.5
Comparing costs of crime and costs of security measures for all small manufacturers





Figure 5.6

Comparing costs of crime and costs of security measures for all large manufacturers



Are premises covered by insurance?

Perhaps one reason why crime against business has attracted less concern in the past than it descrives is the belief that commercial premises can afford to insure themselves against risk. Certainly most of the premises surveyed were insured against losses incurred through burglary (Table 5.5). Three-quarters were totally covered and a fifth could recover part of the costs. Insurance coverage was slightly lower for vehicle crime, although again the majority did expect to recover at least some of the costs. Surprisingly, there was little difference between the larger and smaller premises. It may be that while some smaller premises felt unable to afford cover, for some larger premises insurance did not make financial sense as they would cover their own losses."

Table 5.5 Insurance coverage of premises

	All retailers %	All manufacturers
Burglery		
Fully covered	74	72
Partly covered	20	20
No insurance	6	8
Unweighted N	1,394	1,180
Theft of/from vehicle (owners)		
Fully covered	68	68
Partly covered	22	23
No insurance	10	9
Uaweighted N	801	1,006

Amongst the uninsured, the most common reason given was that insurance was too expensive (Table 5.6). A tenth of retailers and just under a fifth of manufacturers said they did not have cover because they had been refused it. Similar proportions felt their property was at minimal risk of crime Levels of insurance coverage amongst victims was similar to non-victims, although they were more likely to say they were only partly covered – perhaps as a consequence of not having had claims met in full.

There were 2"2 retail and "9 manufacturing premises that did not know whether they were instood or not on burging."

There were 69 result and 65 resonance unique parameters who owned vehicles but did not know. If they were injured or one

^{3.} Source: 1994 CVS, Weighted data.

Some vehicles may also have been insured by the leading company.

Table 5.6
Reasons for not being Insured against loss or damage

Proportion of non-insured premises that gave this reason:	Retailers %	Mannfacturers %	
Too expensive to insure/can't afford it	60	5"	
Don't think property is at risk	9	18	
Refused insurance by insurance company	9	16	
Don't have anything worth insuring	5	10	
Haven't got around to arranging/renewing	5	0	
Can't be buthered	4	3	
Company policy/head office decision	4	1	
Other	15	10	
Unweighted good N	72	76	

Mones:

¹ Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

6 Commercial and domestic crime compared

Some comparisons can be drawn between the risks of crime faced by private householders and those faced by retail and manufacturing premises by drawing on results from the present survey (CVS) and those of the British Crime Survey (BCS), which measures private householders' experiences of crime (Mayhew et al, 1994). The respective costs of crime, and the response of householders and these types of commercial premises in terms of reporting to the police can also be compared.

These comparisons, though, can only be taken so far. Only certain types of crime can be compared across the two surveys, the best ones being burglary, attempted burglary, vandalism and vehicle crime. Other types of crime are either not covered by both surveys, or are not relevant to the respective set of potential victims. For instance, pickpocketing and other theft from the person is only measured in the BCS, while employee and customer crimes are only covered by the CVS. Robbery is covered by the CVS and BCS, but a number of technical measurement issues preclude any straightforward comparison

Also, differences in methodology need to be borne in mind. In the BCS, face-to-face interviews are conducted with respondents in their own home. In the CVS interviews were by telephone mainly because it was felt that business managers were likely to be more comfortable talking on the phone and even prefer the relative speed and flexibility of such an approach. Methodological tests of responses to face-to-face as against telephone interviews do not, on the whole, show large differences in the nature of responses although some differences cannot be ruled out (van Dijk et al, 1990).

How do the risks of crime compare?

Table 6.1 shows three sets of figures. The first is the proportion of households and commercial premises which were victimised once or more in

¹ The effects of other differences are kard to meets. In the BCS a more detailed act of screening questions are mixed to elicit the victimization count. This will prompt messory better and lead to a higher count of crime. At the sense time, there is more effort made in the BCS than the CVS to thus includes correctly within the survey year, and to rule out includes which do not meet criteria of criminal victimisation. This will lead - relatively to the CVS - to a lower count of crime.

1993. The second is the number of incidents per 100 respective targets, bearing in mind that some households and some premises were victimised more than once. The third set of figures is the grossed up number of crimes estimated to have occurred in 1993. For domestic crime, the 'target' for burglary is the home; for vehicle crime the target is any private vehicle owned by the household. For commercial crime, the target for burglary is any of the buildings making up the premises surveyed; for vehicle crime the target is any vehicle owned or leased by the company that is used by people on the premises.

Table 6.1

Comparison of business and domestic risks of crime, 1993

	Percentage pictime Nannfacturers		incidents per 100 tarnets		Number of <u>crimes (000s)</u> Nanufacturers				
			Manufacturers						
	Retail	Ţ	Dumestic	Retall	Į	Domestic	Detail	Ţ	Domestic
Burglary with entry	24	24	4	-43	45	5	108	40	1,004
Attempted burgiary	22	18	3	50	33	4	136	29	748
Vandalism	22	16	9	87	48	16	219	42	3,378
Theft of vehicle (owners)	10	12	3	14	18	4	19	13	541
Theft from vehicles (owners)	23	25	12	68	63	17	89	44	2,546

Notes

The chance of a retail or manufacturing premises being burgled was six times higher than that for a domestic premises. There were nine times as many incidents per 100 targets, which indicates that repeated victimisation was much higher for commercial premises. These marked differences in *risk* have important implications for crime prevention, which are taken up in the next chapter. At the same time, they need to be set in the context of the total number of burglaries which occur. Thus, because there are so many more domestic households than there are commercial premises of the type covered in this survey, domestic burglaries in number account for nearly nine out of ten of the total number of burglaries counted by the two surveys.

A similar pattern is seen for the other types of crime that can be compared in this way. For instance, there were four times as many thefts of vehicles per

Sources: 1994 BCS (N=14,520; 1994 CVS (N=1,666 readlers; 1.259 manufacturess)

² See Appendix A for details of the population of business premites covered to this survey.

hundred commercial owners of vehicles in 1993 as for domestic owners. However, there were only an estimated 19,000 thefts of retail vehicles and 13,000 thefts of manufacturing vehicles in 1993 compared to the 541,000 thefts of domestic vehicles.

Retailers and manufacturers were twice as likely to have their premises vandalised in some way and had almost five times as many incidents per 100 targets as domestic targets. This again indicates a higher level of repeat victimisation for commercial premises.

How do the costs of crime compare?

Not only are risks against commercial premises higher than those for private households, but the crimes they experience are more costly (Table 6.2). Costs include the value of the money or goods stolen and the cost of any damage caused whether or not anything was recovered but do not include crime prevention costs or indirect losses resulting through, for instance, lost orders or, in the case of the BCS, time off work.

Table 6.2 Costs of crime: average per incident, and total cost in 1993

		Average gross loss			Total gross loss (£ sulfilose)			
	Retall	Manufacturen	Dumastic	Rotell	Manufacture	rs Domestic		
Burglary with entry	1.660	2,420	1,570	179	96	1,415		
Attempted burglary	200	230	110	26	7	87		
Vandalism	380	540	120	63	14	405		
Theft of vehicles	3,940	3,980	1,560	73	50	75 7		
Theft from vehicles	250	300	270	22	15	679		

The cost of each incident of burglary with entry was a third larger for commercial premises than for domestic households. Each burglary with entry cost manufacturers three-quarters more than a domestic burglary. As before, these costs need to be set in the context of the total costs of crime. Thus, because there are so many more domestic households than there are commercial premises of the type covered in this survey, domestic burglary costs account for five-sixths of the total costs counted by the two surveys.

Cost of theft of vehicles includes: non-recovered vehicles, damage to recovered vehicles and the cost of stolen

Vanishing come include the costs of vanishing against premises and vehicles.
 Sources: 1994 GVS and 1994 BCI, Weighted data.

The relative costs per incident of attempted burglary and vandalism show even greater differences. Attempted burglaries against commercial premises cost on average almost double that of domestic attempted burglaries. Similarly vandalism against retailers and manufacturers cost three times that for an incident against a private household.

Commercial premises have greater risks of vehicle theft than domestic households partly because they have more vehicles. Even so, the average loss per incident of vehicle theft is still two and a half times greater than for domestic vehicle thefts. The greater losses may be due to commercial vehicles being fairly new or more expensive in the first place. The average loss per incident of theft from a vehicle is very similar for both commercial and non-commercial vehicles.

Who is more likely to report crimes to the police?

Although levels of reporting could only be estimated from the CVS, the indications are that retailers and manufacturers were more likely to report burglary, vandalism and thefts from vehicles than private households (Table 6.3).

Table 6.3 A comparison of the proportion of commercial and domestic victimisations reported to the bolice, 1993

% incidents reported	Retailers	Manufacturers	Domestic buusebolds/ individuals		
	*	%	%		
Burglery with entry	94	92	83		
Attempted burglary	80	53	49		
Vandalism	58	42	27		
Theft from vehicle (owners)	69	73	50		
All crimes	26	60	41		

All crimes for the CVI includes all crimes with a reporting question. Le burgiery with entry, attempted burgiery, vandalism, theft from vehicle, customer theft, employees theft, fraud by employees (small employees only) and rabbery. Theft of vehicles was included in the calculation where it was assumed that all includents of vehicle theft were reported. For the BCS a victories burgiery with entry, accorpted burgiery, vanishiem, their from and of vehicles (including artempts), bicycle theft, wounding, robbery and their from the person, other butnetsold their, muce attrict and other personal theft.

Proportion of CV5 crimes reported is estimated, a
 Sources: 1994 CV5 and 1994 BCS. Weighted chin. ated, to that most exported = "5 per cent and some = 25 per cent.

Because theirs of vehicles are nearly always reported to the police by dungetic households, buildess premises were not miled whether they had reported this type of incident.

It may be that crimes in which property is stolen or damaged are more often drawn to the attention of the police by commercial premises because they are more likely to be covered, at least in part, by insurance: reporting to the police is usually seen by victims as a requirement for making an insurance claim. In addition, they also tend to involve greater financial loss and there may well be administrative requirements on businesses to report certain types of crime. However, the crimes that are unique to commercial premises, such as customer and employee theft, are relatively *unlikely* to be reported. Taking account of this indicates that the majority of crimes against retail premises go unreported. Overall, retailers reported an estimated 26 per cent of known incidents to the police, and manufacturers 60 per cent. This compares with 41 per cent of all crimes measured by the BCS against householders being reported.


Why are there differences in risk?

These findings show that the risks of victimisation and multiple victimisation faced by commercial premises are considerably higher than for domestic households. Also, the cost of each incident of crime is higher for commercial premises. The principle reason must be that these premises have more goods or money to offer a potential offender than the average household: on average, they will be larger premises containing larger quantities of goods and they are likely to have larger amounts of cash on the premises.

Other factors relating to commercial premises are also relevant. For instance, an offender may have knowledge of the types of goods held in particular premises; the goods will be new and in their original packaging allowing them to be sold more easily; and an offender may have better information about the best time to commit an offence (for instance, knowing when premises will be empty). Retailing premises have a particular problem because their shop design encourages easy access to goods and, compared to manufacturers, the goods on sale are more likely appeal to an offender. The area where a premises is located is also important, particularly to burglaries: offenders may have less chance of being observed or apprehended outside business hours in a commercial or shopping area. Also relevant to premises at higher risk of crime may be the fact that offenders care less about the consequences of their actions for businesses than they do for domestic households.

⁴ Nearly all commercial premises (95 per cent) said they were insured, at least to part, against burgiary compared to 82 per cent of dismestic premises.

⁵ The law reporting level for retailing premises is principally due to the large numbers of customer thefts that are not reported. When customer thefts are not eiten into account retailers reported an entireted 60 per cent of incluents.



7 Preventing business crime

Chapters 3 and 4 outlined some of the factors that put some commercial premises at greater risk than others. Here we consider what businesses can do to protect themselves more against crime. To ensure that actions will be effective, it is important to identify *when* premises are most likely to be targeted and *how*. The Commercial Victimisation Survey (CVS) can only collect such information at a relatively general level: ideally such information should be collected routinely by individual premises. Methods of doing so have been suggested elsewhere (Ekblom, 1988; Burrows, 1988; CBI/Crime Concern, 1990).

The CVS collected some details of the last incident of burglary and robbery that premises had experienced.

Burglary

Not surprisingly, burglaries occurred mainly out of normal business hours - predominantly at night. More than half were thought to have happened between midnight and 6am (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2 on next page). Risks were also slightly higher at the weekend, and lower in the first days of the week. Smaller premises were at slightly greater risk during the week relative to larger ones.

There were usually no staff on the premises at the time, although this was less often the case for the larger manufacturers, where a fifth had staff at work - probably reflecting longer working hours. The presence of security staff is no firm deterrent: four per cent of larger retailers and six per cent of larger manufacturers said there had been security staff on the premises at the time of the last incident.

The finalings do not necessarily accumately represent the picture for all crimes of this type. This is partly because the pursers may be different for those that more than one incident to talk about, and partly because in some cases it will be the most recommended than the most recent incident which was actually described. Details of 624 burstaties and 94 rebiteries were collected.

Figure 7. I Time of day of last burglary: retailers





Figure 7. i Time of day of last burglary: manufacturers



How do burgiars get in?

Burgiars most often used doors to gain entry (Figure 7.3). Altogether half the burgiars had entered through a door and half of these by forcing the locks. Breaking through doors or side panels was also common. This suggests that premises at particular risk of burgiary should ensure that doors are as secure as possible. However, even security doors are not totally effective: one in ten burgiars had entered through a metal door or security shutter fitted to a door. In some manufacturing premises burgiars had entered through unlocked doors, but this is as likely to point to the infeasibility of keeping doors locked all the time as to lax security.




Figure 7.3

Method of entry in burglary

Note: Figures du not sum to 100 m there was more than one method of entry for some bragiaries.

Breaking windows was also a common method of entry. A quarter of the retailers who were burgled, and a fifth of the manufacturers had entries this way. Half of entries through windows into retailers were through shop window fronts.

Using vehicles to gain access (ram raids) was relatively rare (two per cent of burglaries), and more often aimed at doors and shutters than windows. The larger retailers, who perhaps have larger more vulnerable shop fronts, were the most likely to suffer ram raids (three per cent of burglaries).

Larger premises were more likely to report access through perimeter fencing, no doubt because they are more likely to have such protection and to keep products outside. Fifteen per cent of burglars had gained access in some way other than through a door, security shutter window, or perimeter fence.

Preventive measures

As most incidents occur when there are no staff on the premises, preventing burglary will involve installing hardware which will deter offenders from attempting to gain entry, will restrict the chance of them being successful, or if this falls, make the removal of goods difficult. The various measures that businesses can adopt to tackle burglary are discussed in the Home Office guide to preventing burglary (Home Office, 1995b).

Security hardware was common amongst the premises surveyed: 72 per cent of retailers, and 59 per cent of manufacturers had a burglar alarm; and 60

per cent of each had some form of window protection such as bars or grilles (Table 7.1). Security lighting was common amongst the larger premises, perhaps because they are more likely to have outdoor areas to illuminate. This can be useful where offenders' activities are likely to be visible, but may just assist burglars in remoter locations: when there are few people around lighting may actually help burglars to see what they are doing.

As burglaries tend to occur at night, employing caretakers and security guards may well be cost-effective for some premises. An alternative is to arrange for a response to an alarm by the police or private security firm. A fifth of retailers and manufacturers said they had such an arrangement in place.

Table 7.1
Proportion of business with selected security measures in place, 1993

		Retailers			Manukacturers		
	All	Small	Large	All	Small	Large	
	*	%	%	%	%	%	
Borgiar Jarm	72	70	89	59	54	79	
%Indow protection	61	61	60	60	60	62	
instructions to employees on handling incidents	58	55	83	32	28	44	
Security lighting	42	39	67	50	45	66	
New employees asked about criminal record	44	40	73	35	30	52	
Valuable equipment marked with identification code	l 21	20	34	29	28	33	
Security guards attend premises if alarm triggered	22	20	38	21	16	38	
Entry control (c.g. reception during business hours	ist) 13	11	27	36	27	67	
Closed choult TV	20	18	36	8	6	15	
Ceretaker/security guard outside business bours	13	12	17	18	17	25	
Security patrol during business hours	8	7	20	7	5	11	
None of the above	5	6	< 1	5	6	1	
Unweighted N	1,656	944	662	1,251	589	662	

¹ Source 1994 CVS. Weighted date.


Robbery

Nearly half the retailers (44 per cent) said that nothing was stolen in the last robbery they had experienced. When something was stolen, it was more often goods than cash. Cash was taken in a quarter of all robberies and in four out of ten successful ones.

When do robberles occur?

Saturday is the peak day, with a quarter of robberies taking place then.⁴ Nearly half of all robbery incidents took place in the afternoon, but a third took place after 6pm and overnight confirming that premises that are open to the public late are at particular risk (Figure 7.4).

Figure 7.4
Time of day of robbery: retailers



How do robbers operate?

Most robbers seem to work alone (41 per cent of incidents) or in pairs (41 per cent). Larger retailers, though, were often attacked by larger gangs (29 per cent of 'last' robberies involved three or more offenders). Robbers are predominantly male, though six per cent were female and eight per cent in mixed sex groups. In small retail premises, the shopkeeper was often alone at the time of the robbery (42 per cent). In larger retailers this was rarely the case as there were usually at least five other people around including staff and customers (73 per cent). Eleven per cent of incidents involved the use

² The survey measured too few rubberies against metrolecturing premises to produce reliable figures.

³ Based on incidents for which the day of the week was recalled

of a firearm and 17 per cent the use of a knife. The proportion of incidents in which a weapon was used was greater for small premises.

Preventing robbery

The various measures that businesses can adopt to prevent robbery and lessen its impact are covered in a recent Home Office publication (Home Office, 1995a). As well as installing appropriate hardware such as safes and CCTV, training staff to deal with incidents is felt to be important. Vigilant staff may deter robbers and will be able to provide more accurate information to the police. Training should also reduce the likelihood of staff being injured. The larger retailers were far more likely to say they had put such training in place: 83 per cent compared to 55 per cent of the small retailers.

What type of premises have what measures?

Larger premises, whether retailing or manufacturing, were more likely to have most of the security measures asked about. Manufacturers were more likely than retailers to have security lighting (50 per cent compared with 42 per cent of retailers), valuable equipment marked with identification (29 per cent compared with 21 per cent of retailers), some form of entry control during business hours (36 per cent compared with 13 per cent of retailers), and caretakers or security guards at night (18 per cent compared with 13 per cent of retailers). Table 7.1 shows details.

Coverage of premises by CCTV is currently relatively limited: a fifth of small remilers and a third of larger retailers said they had CCTV and the figures were lower for manufacturers. However, some premises may also benefit from CCTV installed on streets by local authorities.

The majority of shops in *indoor shopping centres* were protected by day and night security guards, no doubt because they were contributing to a scheme for all the premises in their centre (Table B7.1, Appendix B). CCTV was also relatively common in these premises (37 per cent), although again this may have been communal in some cases. They were also most likely to have instructed their staff on dealing with incidents (81 per cent) and checked the criminal records of staff (60 per cent).

Alarms were most often found protecting retail premises on *industrial/commercial estates* (80 per cent of such premises), and these retailers were also more likely than average to use security lighting, and employ guards at night time.

Amongst manufacturers, those in *urban*, *but not built-up areas* outside town centres were most likely to use some form of entry control during business hours and guards outside these hours (Table B7.2, Appendix B). Premises in *non-residential built-up areas* were also more likely than average to use some form of entry control during business hours, burglar alarms, a system where security guards attend premises if an alarm is triggered or CCTV systems. Premises in these areas also had the highest use of window protection.

Manufacturing premises located in the centre of towns or cities were the least likely to use security lighting or window protection but were more likely than average to have CCTV systems and to mark valuable equipment with an identification code. Those in runal areas were the least likely to use many of the crime prevention measures asked about, although, they were more likely than average to use security lighting and guards outside business hours.

Are crime prevention measures well targeted?

Given the costs of installing most crime prevention measures and the uneven distribution of crime risks, it will make better sense for some premises rather than others to take precautions. Premises that were victims in 1993 were far more likely to have one or more of the listed crime prevention measures: only three per cent of retailers that had been burgled had none of the measures, compared to 11 per cent of non-victims (see Table 7.2 over page). Presence of these measures was more related to burglary than the other types of crime but this reflects the fact that most of the measures asked about would be aimed at preventing burglary.

CCTV is relatively expensive to install, and can involve staff costs if cameras are to be monitored. Clearly, then, it is best implemented in premises with a known crime problem. This certainly seemed to be the case for retailers: a quarter of burglary victims had CCTV, and a fifth of those who had suffered some other type of crime; the figure among non-victims was considerably lower at one in ten. There has been a recent proliferation in the use of CCTV as a means of deterring a variety of different types of crime. When installed internally it can be used to detect robbery, customer and even employee theft. Certain types of system will record entry by burglars. Goombridge & Murji (1994) discuss the importance of defining the purpose of installing CCTV. Edwards & Tilley (1994) have produced a guide to best practice, which discusses the various types of CCTV available and how to make best use of systems. To justify the costs involved, businesses will need to be assured of the effectiveness of CCTV. This has recently been assessed by the Home Office Police Research Group (Brown, forthcoming; see also Tilley, 1993a).

Table 7.2 Proportion of victims and non victims with selected security measures in place, 1993

		Retailers			lantifacti	urens
Percentage of premises with security measure	All burgiary	Any other crime	No crime	All burglary	Any other crime	No Crime
<u></u>	75	%	%	%	%	%
Burglar alarm	79	75	54	64	63	52
Window protection	67	59	52	66	60	57
Instructions to employees on handling incidents	67	60	39	39	35	25
Security lighting	48	40	3 7	52	49	48
New employees asked about criminal record	51	45	31	38	39	28
Valuable equipment market with kientification code	d 25	21	16	34	29	25
Security guards attend premises if alarm triggered	25	23	15	23	21	19
Entry control (e.g. reception during business hours	nia) 14	13	12	40	42	29
Closed circuit TV	27	19	10	8	8	7
Carctaker/security guard outside business hours	9	16	13	18	21	17
Security patrols during business hours	7	10	7	6	8	6
None of the above	3	5	11	3	3	8
Unweighted N	670	715	271	484	403	364

Source 1994 CV3. Weighted data

As the survey may have been measuring some crimes that occurred before security measures were installed the fact that victims were more likely to have crime prevention measures does not, then, necessarily mean that they had failed. In any case, no security measure is likely to be totally effective. Their effectiveness is more likely to be seen in reducing frequency of victimisation and the impact or seriousness of crime when it does occur.

Certainly, security hardware (e.g. closed-circuit television or window protection) was often said to have been installed following victimisation -

no doubt because the cost and inconvenience involved was thought more justifiable. Measures involving staff were less often linked to victimisation. This is perhaps because they were not purely for crime prevention purposes, or are more likely to be carried out as a matter of course (Table 7.3).

Table 7.3
Proportion of crime prevention measures introduced mainly as a result of their company's own experience of crime

Proportion of prumises with these measures:	Retail premises	Manufacturing premises
	%	*
OCTV	51	40
window protection	41	38
Burgiar alarm	35	40
Security lighting	30	34
instructions to employees	30	27
Squipment marking	23	22
Guards respond to slarm	23	25
Day guards	22	20
Ask new employees about criminal record	18	12
Caretaker/night guards	14	18
Gatekeeper/Receptionist	12	14
Unweighted N	1,596	1,208

None

1. Source: 1994 CVS Weighted Date.

Sources of advice about crime prevention

Although there are a number of sources of general advice concerning crime prevention (e.g. Home Office 1995a, 1995b), the most useful guidance is likely to be directed at individual premises.

Four out of five premises had received such individual advice about crime prevention at some time, but larger premises were particularly likely to have done so. This is in part because they will have the resources of head office and/or security personnel to call on: more than half of the large retailers had benefitted from this. In general, though, outside agencies such as the police (48 per cent), insurance companies (49 per cent) and security specialists (27 per cent) are the main sources of advice (see Table 7.4).

Table 7.4
Sources of security advice

Received security	Ret	ailers	Vanu	facturers
advice from:	Small	Large	Small	Large
	%	*	%	*
Police	47	65	38	60
Іпяцалсе сопіралу	45	45	57	6~
Security firm	25	39	24	42
Managers from HQ	18	52	6	16
Own security officer	7	28	5	16
Own managers	6	24	5	20
Other source	5	4	5	6
'No one gives advice'	21	6	21	8
Unweighted N	991	654	589	661

Notes:

Co-operative action

There are various schemes concerned with getting businesses to work together to prevent crime. These range from the sharing of information on current patterns of crime, to ring-around systems whereby individual premises alert the next premises in the communication chain to the presence of offenders operating. Other co-operative action might involve the sharing of security patrols.

Table 7.5

Participation and interest in co-operative action against crime

		Retuiler			Manufacturers		
	All	Small	Large	AII	Small	Large	
	%	*	*	*	*	*	
Have participated	24	22	36	12	11	12	
Interested in participating	43	43	38	45	44	51	
Not Interested	28	29	21	38	-f0	32	
Dog't know	6	6	5	5	5	6	
Unweighted N	1,665	1,001	664	1,259	594	665	

Notes:

Retailers were far more likely to know of such schemes (see Table B7.3, Appendix B). A quarter had participated, or were participating, in some type of co-operative action compared to 12 per cent of manufacturing premises.

¹ Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted date.

Rigures do not sum to 100 due to rounding.

^{2.} Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted thus.

Involvement was greatest amongst the larger retailers (Table 7.5). Amongst those who were not already in local schemes, interest was high: of all those sampled – whether they were aware of local schemes or not - 43 per cent of retailers and 45 per cent of manufacturers claimed they would be interested in participating.

For premises that are clustered together, co-operative action can make very good economic sense. Not only are the costs to each premises of measures, such as night-time security patrols and CCTV, reduced but knowledge of specific risks and effective crime prevention strategies can be shared

Satisfaction with police

The police can be a particularly useful source of crime prevention advice, not least because they are in a position to know about local crime problems and make some judgement about the relative effectiveness of different crime prevention measures.

As seen above, many premises had received crime prevention advice from the police at some time, but this will often have been in the immediate aftermath of an incident. A quarter of retail premises said they had some contact with the police *apart* from reporting crime, though far fewer manufacturing premises had (16 per cent).

Levels of satisfaction with the way the police dealt with local crime problems are shown in Figures 7.5 and 7.6 (see next page). The picture was fairly similar for retail and manufacturing premises. The majority of retailers (58 per cent) said they were very or fairly satisfied. The proportion of manufacturers was slightly lower at 52 per cent as more expressed a neutral opinion, no doubt reflecting their lower level of police contact. Satisfaction was highest in East Anglia, Greater London and low in the South West (Table 87.4, Appendix B). It was somewhat lower, though, for retailers than manufacturers in Wales (47 per cent of retailers, 54 per cent of manufacturers) and higher for retailers than manufacturers in the North West (62 per cent and 50 per cent) and the South East (60 per cent compared to 48 per cent).

Although the majority of the sample were very or fairly satisfied and a further fifth did not feel strongly either way, a not insignificant quarter of those surveyed expressed some degree of dissatisfaction. These premises tended to feel that the police were not interested in reported crimes, did not apprehend and/or prosecute the culprits, took too long to respond to inci-

dents, or did not visibly patrol the area. Many suggested that there were not enough police and/or that they were under-resourced (Table 7.6).

It is not surprising, then, that victims of crime tended to express more dissatisfaction with the police response to local crime problems. A third of burgled retailers said they were fairly or very dissatisfied, compared to a fifth of those who had only been victims of some other type of crime, and 14 per cent of non victims. There was a very similar pattern amongst manufacturers (Table 7.7).

Figure 7.5
Satisfaction with police: retailers




Figure 7.5
Satisfaction with police: manufacturers




Table 7.6 Reasons for dissatisfaction with police

Percentage of all	Retailing 3	lougheturing	
dissatisfied premises	premises	premises	
	*	*	
Not interested in reported crimes	33	38	
Do not exten or prosecute offenders	28	28	
Take too long to react to incidents	30	23	
Police not seen in srea	25	25	
Not enough police/police undermanned/not enough resources	23	22	
Give little information on reported crimes	13	17	
Other	9	6	
No day-to-day contact with police	6	8	
Do not react to starms going off	3	3	
Unweighted N	375	288	

1 Source 1994 CVS, Weighted Date.

Table 7.7 Satisfaction with the police by victimisation

		Retailer		Manufacturers		
	All burglary	Any other crime	No crime	All burglary	Any other crime	No crime
	36	*	%	%	%	%
Very/fairly satisfied	53	61	61	47	51	57
Neutral	14	18	25	17	25	29
Pairly/very dissuisfied	34	21	14	36	24	14
Unweighted N	665	709	258	482	384	337

Burgiary includes attempted hundry
 Source 1994 CV3. Weighted data.

The way forward

Although the police undoubtedly have a role to play in preventing business crime, the business sector itself must accept the major responsibility. Undoubtedly some types of security measures are very commonly adopted, whilst others - such as those aimed at providing night-time security, for instance - are less utilised. Many of these measures will result in financial cost but where action is targeted on premises with specific crime problems, the savings are likely to exceed the costs. Some measures, such as working co-operatively against crime with other local businesses, will either involve minimal cost or ensure that resources are distributed effectively such as in the sharing of security patrols. The various issues for preventing retail crime are explored fully in Shapland (1995). The National Board for Crime Prevention, convened by the Home Office, has recently published guides for retailers on preventing burglary and robbery (Home Office, 1995a, 1995b). Further titles will follow. Other useful publications include a guide on the use of CCTV (Edwards & Tilley, 1994).

New retail and manufacturing sites are constantly being developed and redeveloped. The opportunities for applying the lessons of crime prevention design are arguably greater than for domestic premises. There are actions that individual business premises can take against crime, and the pay-offs are likely to be great considering the substantial financial and human costs resulting from crime.

Appendix A. Methodology

The sample was selected from the British Telecom Business Database. This is a computerised version of the business telephone directories which list all establishments with a business telephone line, together with the number of staff employed and Standard Industrial Classification code (1980 revision).

The retailing premises were sampled on the basis of SIC codes 641 to 656 which cover most retail distribution: newsagents, off-licenses, chemists, food, clothing, footwear, textiles, hardware, garages, filling stations, bookshops and other non-food and mixed retailing. Wholesale distribution as a main activity was not covered. The number of premises in the BT Business Database with these SIC codes was 223,316 premises with one to ten employees and 29,349 premises with eleven or more employees.

The manufacturing premises were sampled on the basis of SIC codes 41 to 49. The codes cover a division of the manufacturing sector classed as 'other manufacturing'. These premises include food and drink manufacturing, the textile industry, manufacturing of leather goods, footwear and clothing, timber and wooden furniture, paper, printing and publishing, rubber and plastic processing. The survey did not cover the manufacture of metal goods, mineral products, chemicals, engineering, vehicles industries or the construction industry. The number of premises in the BT Business Database with these SIC codes was 67,782 premises with one to ten employees and 29,349 premises with eleven or more employees.

Establishments were selected alphabetically by business name. This was stratified within employee size band (1 to 10 employees and 11 or more) and within Standard Industrial Classification code. Selections were made by BT at equal intervals within each of the four cells, providing an initial sample of 9,000.

The initial sample of business premises was first contacted by telephone and switchboard staff were asked the name of the manager. In cases where the manager responsible for the premises was not based there, the interviewer recorded his or her address and telephone number. Of the initial sample, 6,602 were contacted to achieve the target of 5,000 successful screenings.

Once screening was complete, all respondents were sent a copy of a letter from the Home Office outlining the nature of the survey and requesting

co-operation. They were also sent a personalised letter from BMRB explaining how to complete the form, and an *Experience of Crime sheet* which was designed to encourage respondents to gather key information prior to the main telephone interview.

Members of the British Retail Consortium were also sent a letter explaining the purpose and nature of the survey, and requesting their co-operation. Subsequent to this letter, several large retail establishments contacted BMRB about the survey. One declined to take part. For those who were concerned about their branches being able to supply the detailed information requested, it was agreed that Head Office would complete the Experience of Crime sheet and forward it to the premises being interviewed.

The main stage telephone survey was carried out using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing by interviewers from BMRB's telephone unit.

A target of 3,000 interviews was set with quotas applied to ensure an even distribution between the four sample cells. Table A1 shows the reasons for non-response for the sample issued for the main stage survey. There were, in addition, 118 refusuals prior to this at the screening stage.

Table A l
Response rate for main stage survey

	_	·		_	
		Reto	ıllers	Manuk	cturing
	Total	1-10	11+	1-10	<i>11</i> +
		employees	employees	employees	employees
Issued sample	4,999	1,251	1,247	1,249	1,252
- premises started after Jan '93	64	29	15	14	6
- out of quota	418	103	7	246	62
- other ineligible	24	3	10	1	10
Out of scope	506	135	32	26 1	78
Total in scope	4,493	1,116	1,215	988	1,174
- respondent refused	604	153	165	127	159
- Head Office refused	205	63	38	37	67
- unavailable during field work	221	-16	97	26	50
- caliback	36	5	16	6	9
– no reply	11	I	7	-	3
- number unobtainable/moved	-18	12	4	11	21
- engaged after 10+ calls	341	78	131	28	104
Full interviews'	3,027	756	757	753	761
Response Rate %	67	68	62	76	65

Notes

Source BSGRB International, 1994

The quoins were set and filled according to the ST database second of the activity of the premises. The spin activity as given by the premises themselves during the interview dictated which sector group respondents were maigned to for equivale.

In cases where screened respondents were not contacted during the main stage of fieldwork because sample quotas had been filled, a letter from the Home Office was sent thanking them for their co-operation and informing them that their assistance was no longer required.

The quotas for the field work were set and filled using the information from the British Telecom Business Database on main activity of the business and number of employees. The information on activity and employee numbers given by the respondents during the interview was that used for the analysis. The following sections describe these retailing and manufacturing samples.

Retailing sample

Retailers were defined for the purposes of this survey as premises that stated their main activity was retailing and those that said their main function was wholesale/distribution who said they also did retailing. Of the 1,666 retailing premises 1,002 were defined as small (they had ten employees or less) and 664 as large (eleven or more employees).

Nearly a quarter of the sample had started trading from their premises between 1990 and 1992. Just under half had started during the 1980s. Only one in ten had been in business at that premises since before 1960. Many of the retail premises contacted said that they were part of a business that had one or more other premises (45 per cent), most commonly other shops in the same chain (31 per cent of retailers).

A third of premises taking part in the survey were located in the South East—and a third of these were in the Greater London area. Ten per cent of the sample was to be found in each of the following regions: Yorkshire & Humberside; East Midlands; the South West; West Midlands and the North West. Five per cent were in East Anglia, and six per cent in Wales. The distribution of premises between the two samples (small and large retailers) was very similar.

Half the retailers were situated in town or city centres and a further quarter in mainly residential built-up areas outside the centre. Nine per cent were in non-residential areas, another nine per cent in rural areas, and five per cent in non-built-up urban areas. This geographical distribution was similar for the smaller and larger employers. Half the smaller retailers were in premises on main shopping streets, and although this was also the main location for the

Nucrees cares were encluded from the analysis because these was no information on their number of employees.

On the basis of respondents description of their main activity a further 85 cases were excluded from the analysis as not being resulters or manufacturers.

larger retailers (43 per cent) the latter were more likely than smaller retailers to be found on industrial estates/business parks (12 per cent as against five per cent), indoor shopping centres (seven per cent as against five per cent) outdoor shopping precincts (12 per cent as against 10 per cent) and non-retail main roads (five per cent as against two per cent).

The retail premises interviewed were broadly split into non-food retailers (69 per cent), food retailers (27 per cent) and wholesalers/distributors who also said they retailed from the premises (four per cent). Nine per cent of retailers said they also undertook some manufacturing on the premises.

Within these broad categories retailers sold a number of different types of goods. Retailers were asked whether they sold a number of items that were expected to make a premises at particular risk of crime. The larger premises were more likely to sell these: 29 per cent of larger premises sold three or more of the listed high-risk items, compared to 11 per cent of the smaller retailers. Half of the sample of larger retailers sold food and a fifth alcohol, compared to a third and a tenth of the smaller premises. The larger premises were also more likely to sell electrical goods (19 per cent as against seven per cent), and computer software/high value patented goods such as machine tools (17 per cent as against seven per cent). A fifth of each type described themselves as selling furniture or clothing, and less than one in ten jewellery. Thirty per cent of small retailers and 16 per cent of the larger retailers did not sell any of the above.

Larger retailers tended to stay open longer than the smaller premises, although 14 per cent of both types were usually open to the public for more than 12 hours a day.

A fifth of retailers were unable to state the floor area of the working accommodation of their premises, but of those that could 52 per cent said it was less than 100 square metres, and a further 32 per cent between 100 and 500 square metres. Number of staff did not always equate with floor area – seven per cent of those with 10 or less employees said they had more than 1000 square metres of working accommodation. Larger premises were most likely to have between 100 and 500 square metres (40 per cent).

Just one in ten of the smaller retailers had only one person working there. A third had two or three employees. Amongst the larger stores the majority (83 per cent) employed less than 50 staff, although three per cent said they had more than 250.

In smaller premises it was usually the manager or owner of the business that was interviewed. In the larger retailers it was more often the premises manager. Some interviews (16 per cent) were conducted with other personnel such as security or finance officers.

Manufacturing sample

Manufacturers were defined for the purpose of this survey as premises who stated their main activity was manufacturing, wholesaling (but no retailing) and publishing/printing. Of the 1,259 manufacturing premises, 594 were defined as small (they had ten or less employees), and 665 as large (eleven or more employees). There were very similar proportions of small and large premises for the manufacturers, premises involved in wholesaling/distribution, and the printers/publishers.

The manufacturing premises were based in all parts of the country, but as with retailers a third were situated in the South East – a third of this subset were in the Greater London area. Larger manufacturers were more likely to be in the East Midlands and the North West, whereas more of the smaller premises were in the South East and East Anglia.

A third of the smaller manufacturing premises had started up during the early 1990s, and a half during the 1980s. This was in contrast to the larger premises, a fifth of which had been working at that premises before the 1960s.

Manufacturing premises were, unsurprisingly, far less likely to be situated in town or city centres than retailing premises (21 per cent compared to 48 per cent), and more likely to be found in built-up residential (31 per cent) or non-residential areas (22 per cent); 16 per cent described their position as rural. In addition, about a half of the manufacturing premises (48 per cent) were located on industrial estates, business parks or out-of-town commercial areas. Manufacturers tended to occupy larger premises than retailers: 27 per cent covered more than five hundred square metres in comparison with 16 per cent of retailers.

Compared to retailers, manufacturers tended to be relatively specialist in their product range. Very few (9 per cent) specified making/selling more than one type of product. About half did not sell, store or manufacture any of the given list of items. Of those that did, 19 per cent sold, stored or manufactured furniture or clothing; 16 per cent high value patented goods, computer software or machine tools; nine per cent electronic or electrical goods; and eight per cent food. Many premises carry out more than one function, and this was often the case for manufacturing premises, particularly the smaller outfits: 35 per cent of small manufacturers and 23 per cent of large manufacturers said they did some type of retailing and/or wholesale trade.³

² This exclusion wholesalers/distributors who also did some resulting. These cases were moved to the result excepte

Interviews were most likely to be conducted with owners and managers (76 per cent). The premises interviewed was usually the only premises of the business (79 per cent).

Appendix B. Supplementary tables

Table B3.1 , Risks of victimisation: percentage of establishments victimised once or more

•			Retail			Manudactu	rbie
	All			4	1-10	77+	
	tebilebases		anphysas	employees		employmen	anglejse
	%	%	%	%	96	%	%
Property crime							
Burglary	24	24	22	36	24	20	37
Attempted burgiary	21	22	21	28	18	16	25
All burglery	36	36	35	49	33	29	47
Vandalism	20	22	20	36	16	12	30
Theft of vehicle				-			•
– ali premises	6	5	4	11	9	6	23
- owners only	11	10	8	20	12	7	25
Theft from vehicle						_	
- all premises	14	12	11	17	20	15	37
- owners only	24	23	22	33	25	19	40
Theft by customers	47	47	45	62	12/4	17/2	n/a
Theft by employees	7	8	6	19	5	3	13
Theft by outsiders	7	7	7	12	8	6	12
Theft by persons unknow	m 12	14	12	25	6	4	14
Fraud by employees	2	2	• 2		ī	· ī	-
Fraud by outsiders	20	21	19	33	17	18	15
Any property crime	74	78	76	93	63	57	82
Violent crime							
Robbert	3	4	4	7	1	<1	2
All sessuits and threats	15	17	15	33	6	5	11
Assaults with injury	2	2	2	8	ĭ	í	4
Any violent crime	17	20	18	36	7	5	12
Bribery and extortion	2	2	2	3	2	1	4
Any crime	75	79	77	93	63	57	85
Unweighted N	2,925	1,666	1,002	664	1,259	594	665

Notes

Only recalled were mixed about theft by conformers

^{2.} The questions on that by analogues excluded enablishments with one employee

The questions on friend by singleyous excluded establishments with one employee. An oversight meant that establishments with one than the enablescent were also excluded.

^{4.} Source: 1994 CVS, Welstred date.

Table B3.2 Proportion of retail premises victimised in 1993, by number of employees

	Burgiary	Customer theft	Robbery	Unweighted N
	*	%	%	
1 to 3	18	38	3	430
4 to 6	23	48	5	347
7 to 10	29	55	3	225
11 to 19	33	61	5	298
20 to 49	38	57	6	254
50 to 250	46	72	13	92
251 to 1000+	20	84	15	20
AIL	24	47	4	1,666

Table B3.3 Percentage of retail premises victimised in 1993, by opening hours

	Burglary	Customer ibeft	Robbery	Unitelabled N
	%	%	%	
Hours open to public on ave	rage weekday:			
One to eight hours	22	44	3	569
Nine to twelve hours	26	51	4	654
More than twelve hours	31	56	9_	194

Table B3.4 Regional variations in the proportion of retail premises victimised, 1993

	Burglary	Customer theft	Robbery	Unweighted N
	*	*	%	
North	37	55	6	114
East Midlands	31	48	1	147
West Midlands	28	51	2	171
Greater London	26	51	8	160
Yorkshire & Humberside	26	45	4	171
South West	23	56	4	184
North West	22	4 7	9	169
Which	21	48	3	97
South Fast	18	41	3	366
Hast Anglis	14	34	<1	87
All regions	2 i	_ 47 _	4	1,666

Notes: 1. Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

es: Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted date.

Source: 1994 CVS, Welghred data.

Table B3.5 Numbers of incidents of selected crimes for victimised retailing premises in 1993

Number of neldents:		Proportion of respondents	Proportion of pictimus %	Proportion of incidents
tughry	0	76	-	-
with entry)	1	15	62	34
	2-3	8	32	41
	4+	2	6	25
ttempted	0	78	-	-
urgiery	1	12	55	24
	2-3	8	37	38
	4+	3		36
andalken.	0	78	-	-
	1	10	-47	12
	2-3	7	31	16
	4+	5	22	70
helts of	0	95	-	-
ebides	1	4	76	53
	2-3	<u>I</u>	21	37
	4+	<1	3	10
hefts from	0	88		_=
chides	1	7	59	20
	2-3	3	28	22
	4+	2	13	58
bets by	0	59	-	
ostomens	1	7	17	< <u>1</u>
	2-9	20	49	4
	10-49	7	17	7
	50-99	3	6	.7
	100-299	2	4	13
<u></u>	300+	3	7	69
helts by	0	94	_=	=
utsiders	ī	5	51	6
	2-3	2	29	8
	4+	1	19	86
hefts by	0	95	_=	-
enployees	1	4	51	4
	2-3	2	25	.5
	4+	2	24	91
carcributable	0	88		=
heilu	1_	3 3	24	1
	2-3	3	27	2
	4+	6	49	97
raud by	ō	80	-	
unders	1.	<u>6</u>	31	.6
	2-3	7	35 36	16
	4+	7	34	77
obbery	0	96		
	1_	3	71	34
	2-3	1	22	24 49
	4+	<1	7	43
amulis and	ō	83	_=	
vents	Ĭ _	5 7	28	.4
	2-3	7	39	12
	4+	6	53	84
li crime	0	22		=
	1	15	1 <u>9</u>	1
	2-9	<u>37</u>	₩.	6
	10 -49	17	21	12
	50 -99	3 3	4	.7
	100-299 300+	3 3	4	16
	ment and a second		4	59

¹ Unweighted number of victime: Burginry = 459, amenapted burginry = 394, wastellam = 436, thefts of vehicles = 115, thefts from vehicles = 221, thefts by customers = 665, thefts by outsiders = 150, thefts by employees = 175, untershutable thefts = 232, fraud by outsiders = 356, rothery = 82, assoults and throws = 560, all crime = 1,369.

2. Cases where number of incidents figures were not given were entered as zero incidents in this table.

3. Source: 1994 CVS, Weighted data.

Table B3.6 Rates of victimisation. Mean number of incidents per one hundred premises

			Retail	7		Manufactu	rine
	AB	All	1-10	<i>11</i> +	AB	1-10	11+
	وبالمناطقة	entr	employe	ar amployees		emphyses	coupleyca
-	×	%	*	*	%	%	*
Property crime							
Burghry	43	43	35	102	45	35	79
Attempted burglary	46	50	47	71	33	25	60
All burglery	89	93	82	173	78	60	139
Vandalism	77	87	73	193	48	32	102
Theft of vehicle							
– ali premises	9	7	6	21	14	7	38
- owners only	15	14	11	40	18	10	41
Theft from vehicle						•	
- all premises	39	35	26	108	50	25	134
- owners only	66	68	49	207	63	33	146
Theft by customers	1,696	2,286	1,885	5,343	n/a	n/a	n/a
Theft by employees	77	93	93	92	33	18	84
Theft by outsiders	77	62	35	266	119	142	41
Theft by persons unkno	wn 344	457	181	2,559	20	10	55
Fraud by employees	19	25	28	_	2	3	
Fraud by outsiders	97	102	73	319	84	78	105
All property crime	2,525	3,247	2,481	9.075	449	375	698
Violent crime							
Robbery	7	8	5	33	1	1	2
Assents with injury	4	6	2	33	1	1	4
Assaults without injury	100	129	88	441	18	16	17
Assents and thrests	105	135	90	474	19	18	21
All violent crime	111	143	95	508	21	20	23
Bribery and extortion	9	10	7	34	7	3	20
All crime	2,646	3,400	2,583	9,617	477	399	741
Unweighted N	2,925	1,666	1,002	664	1,259	594	665

The questions on *shipt by existomens* were only asked of numbers. Some cases were coded as setaling on main activ-by after the laterview was completed. Thus they were routed past this question at the time of interview. An error on the questions on *frame by employmen meta*st that establishments with more than less corployees were

As error on the questions on fraud by a

Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

Table B3.7 Proportion of incidents reported to the police

	-		Retail			Manufactu	ring
	AB	All	1-10	7/+	AZ	1-10	71+
	erseb#den	gradiji Gradiji	employee	e ampiejwa	•	emphyseus	amployees
Burglary	95	94	96	87	92	90	94
Unweighted N Locidents	1,751	1,021	349	672	750	209	521
Attempted burglary	75	80	79	82	55	48	60
Unweighted N Incidents	1,473	7933	470	463	540	144	39 6
Vandalism	55	58	65	44	42	37	48
Unweighted N Incidents	2,857	1,977	718	1,259	860	191	669
Theft from vehicle	70	69	76	58	73	70	75
Unweighted N Incidents	1,904	887	201	686	1,017	146	871
Theft by customers	20	20	14	36			•
Unweighted N Incidents	43,007	43,007	15,089	27,918			
Theft by employees	20	21	18	45	10	4	13
Unweighted N Incidents	2,062	1,458	898	560	604	94	510
Robbery	64	66	80	49	42	33	67
Unweighted N Incidents	295	274	51	225	21	9	12

In order to calculate the proportion of incidents reported the reporting variable was recoded: Le all-100%, mosta-75%, some-25% and name-0% reported.

The soul number of incidents are for those cases that have a valid source to the reporting questions and to the number of incidents question.

The questions on flagt by customers were only mixed of retailers. Some cases were coded as retailing on main activity after the inserview was completed. Thus they were round past this question at the time of interview. The questions on flagt by ampliquest excluded establishments with one employee.

Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

Table B4. I Prevalence risks of victimisation, by the main activity of manufacturers

	Pure manufacturing	Wholesaling/ distribution	Printers/ publishing
	%	%	%
Property crime			
Burgkery	23	23	25
Amempted burglary	18	22	15
All burglary	34	34	32
Vandalism	14	26	15
Theft of vehicle			
- all cases	9	12	8
- owners only	12 (708)	14 (155)	10 (206)
Theft from vehicle			
– ali cases	19	31	16
- owners only	23 (708)	35 (155)	21 (206)
Theft by employees	6	6	3
Theft by outsiders	8	12	5
Their by persons unknown	7	7	5
Fraud by employees	1 (384)	1 (80)	2 (130)
Fraud by outsiders	18	12	16
Total	62	74	59
Violent crime			
Robbery	1	1	1
Assaults and threats	5	8	7
Total	6	9	7
Bribery and exportion	2	2	1
All offences	62	74	59
Unweighted N (unless stated otherwise)	834	167	258

Togs of a robbite and shift from a rebicle where only the 'owness' responses have been counted have their bases shown in bestiens.

2. An error on the questions on frame by employees means that qualifichancess with more than orn employees were excluded. The bases for this question are shown in brackets.

3. Source. 1994 CVE. Weighted data.

Table B4.2 Proportion of manufacturing premises victimised in 1993, by standard region

Percentage victimised	Burglar)	Vizndalism	Vebicle crime	Unprelighted N
-	*	*	*	
North	22	22	24	59
Yorkshire/Humberside	27	21	31	141
East Mkliands	26	18	40	167
East Anglia	10	4	14	47
South East	18	16	30	245
Greater London	19	15	38	141
South West	24	12	27	123
Wales	28	12	27	52
West Midlands	28	13	30	120
North West	35	20	31	158
All regions	24	16	31	1,259

vehicle crime is based on vehicle owners only. Unweighted N = 1069. Source: 1994 CVS. Weighted docs.

Table B4.3 Proportion of manufacturers victimised in 1993, by number of

Percentage victimised	Burglary	Vandalism	Vebicle crime Unweighted !		
	%	*	%		
1 to 3	20	8	16	264	
4 to 6	20	12	27	177	
7 to 10	19	20	32	153	
11 to 19	32	27	42	183	
20 to 49	39	27	47	265	
50 to 250	40	33	60	179	
251 to 1000+	29	42	57	38	
All	24	16	31	1,259	

Table B4.4 Percentage of manufacturers victimised in 1993, by opening hours

	Burglary	Vandalism	Vahicle crime Unweights		
	*	×	*		
Hours staff worked at premi	ses on average w	eekday:			
One to eight hours	23	14	22	237	
Nine to twelve hours	24	12	31	289	
More than twelve hours	31	28	49	164	

Questions about which crime were only saled of those primines with vehicles. Unweighted N = 1069, forece, 1994 CVE. Weighted data.

Questions about vehicle crime were only asked of those promises with vehicles. Unweighted N = 592.
 Source 1994 CVS. Velighted data.

Table B4.5 Numbers of incidents of selected crimes for victimised manufacturing premises, 1993

iumber of ncidents:		Proportion of respondents %	Proportion of victims	Proportion oj incidents %
lunghry	0	76	-	-
with cauty)	1	13	54	29
•-	2-3	9	39	45
	4+	2	7	26
ttempted	0	82	-	-
urghry	1	10	59 33	32
	2-3	6	33	39 29
	4+	2	9	29
endaltem.	0	84	.=	- -
	1	6	40	13
	2-3	7	43	34
	4+	3	17	52
helts of	0	91	_	-
ebicies	I.	7	70	46
	2 -3	2	25	36
	4+	1	5	17
belts from	0	88	-	-
chicles	1	7	59	20
	2-3	3	28	22 58
	4+	2	13	
betts by	0	95	-	
uttiders	1	4	50 27	3 4
	2-3 4+	2 2	27 23	93
-4-1-				
befu by	0	95	40	-
mployees	1 2-5	2 2	40 57	13
	2-5 4+	í	37 24	80
nattriburable	- 4+	94		
reta Naturioncapie	1	3	50	16
(ME), Laf	2-3	2	29	22
	4+	ī	21	62
stud by	0	83		
muci by utsidens	i	• •	- 37	8
	2-3	7	37 44	21
	4+	ś	19	71
enults and	- 7.	94		
	ĭ	7	70	22
	2-3	i	íš	11
	4	i	15	67
Il crime	- i	37		
n cana	ĭ	16	26	4
	2-3	21	53	11
	4-9	īĖ	29	22
	10+	ä	12	63

None:

1. Unweighted number of victime: Burginry = 363, strempted hunginry = 255, vapidation = 266, theft of vehicles = 180, theft from vehicles = 325, thefts by outsiders = 113, thefts by employees = 96, manufactable theft = 110, fixed by outsiders = 150, name and thesa; = 99, all crime = 889.

2. Cases where number of incidents figures were not given were entered as zero incidents in this table.

3. Source: 1994 CVS. Velighted data.

Table B5.1 Mean cost per victimised establishment and mean cost per incident (Including establishments where there was no loss)

	All establishments		All retai	All netail		Retail 1-10 enthloyees	
	£ establishments	£ incidents	£ establisbments	£ Incidents	£ calabilabments	£ incidents	
Property crime							
Burglary	5,400	1,860	2,980	1,660	2,530	1,610	
Attempted burgisry	450	210	460	200	410	190	
All burglary	2,530	1,010	2,220	870	1,870	790	
Vandelism.	1,400	370	1,500	380	1,430	390	
Theft of vehicle	5,830	3,950	5,680	5.940	3,300	2,590	
Thefr from vehicle	740	270	730	250	570	250	
Theft by customers	1,700	40	1,700	40	720	20	
Theft by employees	1,280	120	1,130	90	1,120	80	
Theft by outsiders	850	80	780	90	290	50	
Theft by persons unknown	1,910	70	2,090	60	520	40	
Fraud by employees	1,830	170	1,880	160	1,880	160	
Fraud by outsiders	1,740	350	900	180	780	200	
Total	4,060	120	3,820	90	2,390	70	
Violent crime							
Robbery	2,780	1,310	2,760	1,310	1,050	740	
Total costs for all crimes	4,160	120	3,930	90	2,420	70	
Total (excluding fraud by emp	loyees)4,140	120	3,680	90	2,360	70	

An error on the questions on fraul by employees meant that establishments with more than sen employees were excluded.

'-' Indicates too few cases to extensite.

Source: 1994 CVS, weighted data.

Retail emblo		All manidaci	wing	•	nufficturing 1-10 Manufacturing 11+ amplowers amployees		_
£ establishments	£ incidents	£ establishments	£ Incidents	£ catablishments	£ bucidents	£ catebilishments	£ Incidents
5,060	1,780	4,610	2,420	3,270	1,830	7,020	3,310
750	290	430	230	260	160	800	330
4,170	1,170	3,500	1,500	2,340	1,140	5,920	2,010
1,790	340	1,010	340	700	260	1,440	420
13,100	6,640	6,060	3,980	3,610	2,710	8,080	1 ,810
1,530	240	770	300	700	4 10	860	240
7,220	80						
1,150	230	1,890	300	430	70	2,970	470
2,740	130	1,070	70	520	20	2,020	580
8,120	80	790	250	310	130	1,250	320
		1,490	660	1,490	660		
1,410	150	4.690	940	5,370	750	9,920	1,410
12,690	130	4,940	690	3,070	460	9,280	1,100
9,540	1,970	3,310	1,280	-	-	5,510	4.240
13,400	140	4,970	690	3,070	460	9,380	1,100
13,400	1 4 0	4,950	690	3,040	460	9,380	1,100

Table B5.2 Average annual running costs of security measures for small retail premises

Average cost &	Commercial estate	indogr shopping centre		Stropping street	Other	Other location	All
Food	610		410	410	500	450	440
Alcohol and/or eigarettes	890	_	630	870	520	620	740
High value electrical/ patented goods	980	_	_	340	-	530	610
Furniture/clothing	650	1,220	240	550	-	750	580
jewellery/precious metal	-	_	-	770	-	-	970
None of the above	410	_	400	380	1,180	140	550
All	610	2,190	360	470	720	450	550

Table B5.3 Average annual running costs for security measures for large retailers

Average cost &	Constructed estate	indoor shopping centre		Shopping street	Other street	Other location	ĀĒ
Food	24,870	8,990	10,170	5,070	3,520	4,270	6,220
Alcohol and/or eigarettes	-	-	15,730	3,420	3,880	5,520	8,310
High value electrical/ paterned goods	7,560	_	17,590	5,070	-	7,140	7,120
Furniture/clothing	6,190	11,440	17,680	6,110	-	5,780	7,670
Jewellery/precious metal	-	-	-	7,230	-	-	8,870
None of the above	4,760	-	-	2,510	-	7,030	4,680
AII	9,490	9,830	7,760	3,410	4.370	4,830	5,620

l Unwegined N=847. 2. Source: 1994 CVS, weighted date.

¹ Unweighted N=647.
2. Searce 1994 CVS, weighted data.

Table B5.4 Average annual running costs for security measures for manufacturers

Average cost £	Communicias estate	i indoor shopping centre		Shopping street	Other street	Other location	AR
Food/alcohol/cigarette	\$						
Small	_	550	_	-	_	-	260
Large	31,930	8,410	37,370	29,280	2,130	-	20,550
High value /electrical/ patented goods							
Smell	420	180	560	_	180	-	480
Large	2,060	4,400	18,030	-	-	-	9,900
Other							
Small	290	380	630	1,040	280	490	430
Large	5,050	6,660	6,170	4,260	5,410	1,300	5.740
Other				_			
All Small	310	360	590	970	240	940	430
All Large	7,500	6.410	11,720	10,500	3.930	5.270	8.030

Loweighted. N for roull menufacturers = 361. Unweighted N for large manufacturers = 363. Boucce 1994 CVS. Weighted dam.

Table B7.1 Proportion of retail premises with selected security measures in place, by location, 1993

Percentage premises with measure:	Commercia estate	i hudoor sbopping centre		Shopping street	Other street	Other location
	*	×	%	%	*	%
Burglar Karm	80	80	78	70	68	69
Window protection	61	63	59	60	61	63
Instructions to employees on handling incidents	51	81	70	58	58	50
Security lighting	54	45	33	3 9	46	47
New employees asked about criminal record	49	60	47	44	32	38
Waluable equipment market with identification code	31	24	21	19	25	20
Security guards attend premises if alarm triggered	24	63	21	18	24	19
Entry control (e.g. reception during business hours	st) 28	22	7	10	14	12
Closed chrouit TV	21	37	20	19	23	16
Caretaker/security goard outside business hours	22	5 7	12	7	10	11
Security patrol during business bours	8	67	12	4	0	3
None of the above	2	< 1	6	6	8	5
Unweighted N	805	427	149	76	144	55

Notes: 1. Source 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

Table B7.2 Proportion of manufacturing premises with selected security measures in place, by location, 1993

Percentage premises with measure:	Town/ city centre	Recidential	Bullt-up non- residential	Urban, non bull-up	Rurel	Elsewbere
<u></u>	%	*	%	%	%	%
Burgiar alarm	5 7	66	65	60	43	54
Window protection	57	59	66	69	58	59
Instructions to employees on handling incidents	36	29	35	33	25	46
Security lighting	39	52	49	60	56	54
New employees asked about criminal record	35	31	40	52	29	34
Valuable equipment marked with identification code	32	27	27	36	31	24
Security guards attend premises if alarm triggered	24	18	26	18	14	26
Entry control (e.g. receptionis during business hours	0 35	35	4 2	44	30	38
Closed circuit TV	11	7	10	6	3	5
Caretaker/security guard outskie business hours	15	13	22	31	23	22
Security patrol during business hours	8	5	7	9	3	16
None of the above	6	4	4	1	8	5
Unweighted N	805	427	149	76	144	55

Notes: I Source 1994 CVS. Weighted data.

Table B7.3 Participation and interest in co-operative action against crime

	<u> </u>		Retailers			Manufacturers		
		AH	Small	Large	All	Small	Large	
Knew of local	- participated	24	22	36	12	11	12	
co-operative	- not participated & interested	4	4	5	3	3	3	
action	- not participated & not interested	3	3	3	4	4	3	
Not aware	- Would be interested	38	39	54	43	41	48	
of local	- not interested	25	26	18	34	36	29	
action	- don't know if interested	5	6	5	5	5	6	
Unweighted N	1	,665	1,001	664	1,259	594	665	

Table B7.4 Proportion of premises who were fairly or very satisfied with the way police dealt with crime problems in their area, by region

Percentage very/fairty satisfied	Retailers	Manufactureri		
Bast Anglia	74	67		
Greater London	66	57		
West Midlands	62	52		
North West	62	50		
South Bast	60	46		
North	56	52		
Yorkshire & Humberside	55	51		
East Midlands	52	55		
South West	50	45		
Wiles	47	54		
All regions	58	52		
Unweighted N	979	628		

Figures do not sum to 100 due to rounding. Source: 1994 CVS. Waighted chin.

Source: 1994 CVA Weighted data.

Appendix C. Research implications

This appendix discusses some research issues in relation to using victimisation surveys to measure crime against non-domestic premises – businesses and otherwise. It concludes that

- (i) there is scope for extending the range of crime targets that could be covered by surveys;
- (ii) but that it is unlikely that surveys could cover all the targets of crimes which enter police records;
- (iii) different types of surveys would be needed to address the crime profile of different non-domestic sectors; and
- (iv)surveys of businesses face some problems of adequate coverage.

Sample considerations

Generating a sample of private households, as the British Crime Survey (BCS) does, presents relatively fewer problems. The Postcode Address File (PAF) from which the sample is selected is considered to have very good coverage of private dwellings. PAF cannot be used to select particular types of non-domestic premises so an alternative sample base was used in this study. The British Telecom Business Database – a relatively new development – has the advantage that specific sectors can be selected by the number of employees at a premises, and telephone numbers are immediately available. However, the Business Database has limitations. It only covers BT business telephone subscribers, and excludes those who opt out of being in the Yellow Pages. It also becomes quickly out of date because businesses often open and close and may have high employee turnover. This means that sample characteristics can be out of line with details provided during interviews.

It was not possible to determine what proportion of businesses choose to opt out of Yellow Pages. As most commercial portoless will want to advertise their services it is probably only a small number, at least of retailers.

Address files that cover other individual sectors are available, though the reliability of their coverage is unclear. A bigger problem from the perspective of complete crime counting is the sheer plethora of non-residential targets that might be considered - to name a very small subset: hospitals, hotels, schools, banks, car parks, shipyards, transport firms and government offices.

When deriving population estimates for private households, Census data are available. However, there is no one such complete source for business premises and there may well not be for other non-residential establishments. Instead, there are a variety of sources of information on the size of the retail and manufacturing 'population', each with its own limitations. Some depend, for instance, on VAT returns (thus excluding businesses with small turnover); and each uses slightly different methods for classifying businesses. For the present survey, therefore, the total number of BT business telephone subscribers was taken as the 'population' of premises of the same type as were included in the survey. The BT figures are slightly lower than those from other sources even though the BT figures will double-count some premises with more than one phone line.

In sum, then, the development of postal address darabases have expanded the scope for taking samples of the vast array of non-residential targets of crime. But the best available sampling mechanism - the BT Business Database - is more limited than the means of sampling householders. In terms of business coverage - as here - the result may be the sample of businesses selected is less representative of all retail and manufacturing businesses than a good sample of householders are of all households. Also, the available data for grossing up survey estimates for businesses is on the whole poorer than for households. Taken together, these problems mean that estimates of business crime may have lower validity than can be achieved for household crime.

Measuring crime

A concern in the present survey was to limit the burden on the businesses interviewed. In consequence, it employed a less rigorous methodology than the BCS to reduce the length of the interview. The main difference is that BCS respondents are asked about a variety of different experiences they may have had in the previous year, and these are subsequently coded as crimes by researchers on the basis of detailed information provided during the interview. CVS respondents on the other hand were asked to define for themselves whether the incidents they had experienced were crimes or not. Businesses should, in theory, have a better idea of what constitutes a criminal offence against them, but we have no way of verifying this. The most feasible method of getting information on crime from businesses means,

then, that the extent of detail collected is likely to be less than is the case with the BCS survey of householders. Further work would be needed to test the acceptability to businesses of completing fuller questionnaires.

In other respects, victimisation surveys of businesses share all the limitations of those measuring crime against private households – and surveys of respondents in other non-residential targets would share these too. The limitations are mainly to do with the difficulty of ensuring that samples are representative, the frailty of respondents' memories and their failure to realise an incident is relevant to survey's interests. In addition, though, business surveys have their own problems. One is that the manager of the premises, or whoever he/she nominates to be interviewed, will not always have been at that premises throughout the period asked about, or will not have been informed about all crime against the premises. In this case they will be relying on records (and not all crimes will have been recorded) or the memory of other members of staff (if they consult them). One could, perhaps, restrict the sample to respondents who had personally been at the premises for the full period, but this is likely to exclude premises in large chains that see a rapid movement of staff.

Similar problems of identifying the most appropriate respondent would be likely to occur in surveys of other non-residential targets. A bigger area of work, though, would be in devising questionnaires that were appropriate to each type of respondent. The crime problems faced by banks, schools, the construction industry or estate agents will clearly differ.

Measuring costs

It was seen of some importance in the present survey to measure the costs of crime for businesses. Yet many premises were unable to provide costs of crime or accurate estimates of turnover and/or shrinkage. For many this may be because the information was collated centrally by head office. Others will not have wanted to divulge such information. A survey directed at head office might be thought a better source of cost information. However, the latest British Retail Consortium survey which covers head offices, notes that only half of respondents knew the cost of burgiary repairs and only 29 per cent could estimate consequential losses (Speed et al, 1995). If cost information cannot be gathered adequately even at head office, then premises-based surveys must be the preferred method as they allow much more detailed information on crime risks to be collected.

² Twenty-seven per corr of premises which were part of a company with other premises had missing whose on security; costs compared with only seven per case of single premises. Statistage was not used in the survey however. The great surjectly of all those whisting values on statistage compared to only tax per cert of single premises. The great surjectly of all those whisting values were vigon't known't subset than 'refused', suggesting that some businesses with makipie premises only have cost influenceion swillable at their main premises/head office.

The BCS has also shown the difficulties that householders have in accurately costing the burden of victimisation on them. With business crime, however, there is arguably a sharper need for good cost information. Survey experience to date suggests several hurdles to overcome.

Sample size

The 1994 CVS covered 3,000 premises, compared to the 14,500 private households interviewed for the 1994 BCS. The difference in part reflects the different number of targets involved (there are many more households than retailers and manufacturers). Also, the larger sample size for the BCS is necessary to provide reliable estimates of the rarer crimes. Crime against commercial premises is more prevalent so sample size is not such an issue in this regard. However, small samples limit the degree to which the risks for particular types of target can be identified, especially given the wide range of different types of commercial premises. The implication of this is that if good estimates of the full range of business crime are needed larger samples than the current one will be required.

Is crime measurement best done locally?

As with domestic crime, business crime risks are not evenly spread across the country. Certain areas, locations and types of business are at greater risk of some types of crime than others. In recent years, there have been a proliferation of small-scale commercial victimisation surveys to gather information on patterns of risks to inform crime prevention strategies (e.g. Redbridge Crime Audit, 1993; Staffordshire University, 1995; and Shapland et al, 1995). Tilley (1993b) also presents findings from local surveys in Deptford, London and two areas of the Wirrall – conducted as part of the Safer Cities programme. These local area surveys are very useful, as long as their methodology is sound. Also, where personal interviewing is used, more localised coverage keeps costs within tighter bounds.

The results of local surveys, though, can be better interpreted against some national benchmark figures. National surveys on a regular footing would also allow trends in crime against different sectors to be monitored. The British Retail Consortium survey has already performed this function for the retail sector. Other business groups, such as The Forum of Private Businesses, are also setting in place regular surveys of their members. These types of survey can be useful for identifying problems specific to certain sectors but again this is dependent on the use of sound methodology.

To allow comparisons across local areas, there would be benefit in having a standardised questionnaire and methods of survey administration standardised also. Better still would be if this standardised instrument was also used for national benchmark purposes. However, realistically, this is unlikely to come about. Local researchers usually want to 'do their own thing' and are reluctant to accept the survey decisions that other people have made. Moreover, ensuring survey administration is kept the same – even if a common questionnaire is used – is in practice difficult, especially given differences in survey company methods, expertise and equipment (not all for instance are set up for Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing interviews)

Surveys apart, there is value in individual premises recording details of the incidents they experience – even if they choose not to report them to the police. Improving recording of crime could well be an important part of targeting effective crime prevention strategies. The CBI/Crime Concern report Managing the Business Risk (1990) proposed that businesses conduct their own crime audits, by assigning a senior manager to the task, carefully defining what is meant by crime, and recording information in such a way as to establish crime patterns (for instance, targets and procedures at particular risk). It is unclear how much progress has been made. An issue for those interested in crime measurement is how far businesses will keep the information they collect to themselves.

Conclusion

It is now well-established that police statistics provide an incomplete count of crime. Rourinely collated police information is also of limited use in identifying targets of crime and what it is that leads to marked differences in victimisation risks. Victim surveys have filled an important gap here, especially in relation to householders. The current survey of retailers and manufacturers illustrates the value of the information that can be obtained for non-domestic targets, and there is undoubtedly scope for surveys of other sectors whether this be the leisure industry (covered in the Dutch CVS), farming (covered in the Australian CVS), hospitals, or whatever. It would be unrealistic, however, to think that surveys could cover all the targets which produce the crimes which enter police records. There would simply need to be too many.

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Publications

List of Research and Planning Unit Publications

The Research and Planning Unit (previously the Research Unit) has been publishing its work since 1955, and a list of reports for the last three years is provided below. A full list of publications is available on request from the Research and Planning Unit.

Home Office Research Studies (HORS)

- 125. Magistrates' court or Crown Court? Mode of trial decisions and sentencing. Carol Hedderman and David Moxon. 1992. vii + 53pp. (0 11 341036 0).
- 126. Developments in the use of compensation orders in magistrates' courts since October 1988. David Moxon, John Martin Corkery and Carol Hedderman. 1992. x + 48pp. (0 11 341042 5).
- 127. A comparative study of firefighting arrangements in Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. John Graham, Simon Field, Roger Tarling and Heather Wilkinson. 1992. x + 57pp. (0 11 341043 3).
- 128. The National Prison Survey 1991: main findings. Roy Walmsley, Liz Howard and Sheila White. 1992. xiv + 82pp. (0 11 341051 4).
- 129. Changing the Code: police detention under the revised PACE Codes of Practice. David Brown, Tom Ellis and Karen Larcombe. 1992. viii + 122pp. (0 11 341052 2).
- 130. Car theft the offender's perspective. Roy Light, Claire Nee and Helen Ingham. 1993. x + 89pp. (0 11 341069 7).
- 131. Housing, Community and Crime: The Impact of the Priority Estates Project. Janet Foster and Timothy Hope with assistance from Lizanne Dowds and Mike Sutton. 1993. xi + 118pp. (0 11 341078 6).

- 132. The 1992 British Crime Survey. Pat Mayhew, Natalic Aye Maung and Catrlona Mirrices-Black. 1993. xiii + 206pp. (0 11 341094 8).
- 133. Intensive Probation in England and Wales: an evaluation. George Mair, Charles Lloyd, Claire Nee and Rae Sibbett. 1994. xiv + 143pp. (0 11 341114 6).
- 134. Contacts between Police and Public: findings from the 1992 British Crime Survey. Wesley G Skogan. 1995. ix + 93pp. (0 11 341115 4).
- 135. Policing low-level disorder: Police use of Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. David Brown and Tom Ellis. 1994. ix + 69op. (0 11 341116 2).
- 136. Explaining reconviction rates: A critical analysis. Charles Lloyd, George Mair and Mike Hough. 1995. xiv + 103pp. (0 11 341117 0).
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- 139. Policing domestic violence in the 1990s. Sharon Grace. 1995. x + 74pp. (0 11 341140 5).
- 140. Young people, victimisation and the police: British Crime Survey findings on experiences and attitudes of 12 to 15 year olds. Natalie Aye Maung. xii + 140pp. (Not yet published)
- 141. The Settlement of refugees in Britain. Jenny Carey-Wood, Karen Duke, Valerie Karn and Tony Marshall. 1995. xii + 133pp. (0 11 341145 6).
- 142. Vletnamese Refugees since 1982. Karen Duke and Tony Marshall. 1995. x + 62pp. (0 11 341147 2).
- 143. The Parish Special Constables Scheme. Peter Southgate, Tom Bucke and Carole Byron. 1995. x + 59pp. (1 85893 458 3).
- 144. Measuring the Satisfaction of the Courts with the Probation Service. Chris May. 1995. x + 76pp. (1 85893 483 4).

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- 66. Juveniles sentenced for serious offences: a comparison of regimes in Young Offender Institutions and Local Authority Community Homes. John Ditchfield and Liza Catan. 1992.
- 67. The management and deployment of police armed response vehicles. Peter Southgate, 1992.
- 68. Using psychometric personality tests in the selection of firearms officers. Catriona Mirrices-Black. 1992.
- Bail information schemes: practice and effect. Charles Lloyd. 1992.
- Crack and cocaine in England and Wales. Joy Mott (editor).
 1992.
- Rape: from recording to conviction. Sharon Grace, Charles Lloyd and Lorna J. F. Smith. 1992.
- 72. The National Probation Survey 1990. Chris May. 1993.
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 Carol Hedderman. 1993.
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 John Burrows, Paul Henderson and Patricia Morgan. 1995.
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- A survey of the prisoner escort and custody service provided by Group 4 and by Securicor Custodial Services. Diane Caddle. 1995.

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- Surveying crime: findings from the 1992 British Crime Survey.
 Pat Mayhew and Natalie Aye Maung. 1992.
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- Intensive Probation in England and Wales: an evaluation.
 George Mair, Charles Lloyd, Claire Nee and Rae Sibbett. 1995.
- The settlement of refugees in Britain. Jenny Carey-Wood, Karen Duke, Valerie Karn and Tony Marshall. 1995.
- 17. Young people, victimisation and the police: British Crime Survey findings on experiences and attitudes of 12 to 15 year olds. Natalic Aye Maung. (Not yet published)
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The Research Bulletin is published twice each year and contains short articles on recent research. Research Bulletin No. 37 was published recently.

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Psychiatric Assessment at the Magistrates' Court. Philip Joseph. 1992.

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Analysing Offending. Data, Models and Interpretations. Roger Tarling. 1993. viil + 203pp. (0 11 341080 8).

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