



Problem Solving Policing

Project Team October 1997

PROBLEM SOLVING POLICING

REPORT OF FINDINGS OF PROJECT TEAM

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The project team acknowledges the efforts of all of those both within and outside Merseyside Police who have assisted in the preparation of this report. The frank and honest views expressed by all those consulted have resulted in a realistic and feasible proposal. Thanks are particularly due to the officers of those forces visited, who willingly gave their time to discuss the merits and problems of the problem solving approach in their forces.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This project arises out of one of the recommendations of the strategic debrief team, following Operation Pivot, that the force should adopt a "Problem Oriented Policing" or Problem Solving (PS) approach. This policing approach focuses on solving the underlying causes of problems as well as dealing with the symptoms of those problems, and embraces the concept of partnership working. It can also be seen to be the final step in making Merseyside Police a more customer focused and effective organisation; a process which started in 1993.

In addition to providing better service delivery to the diverse communities in the force area, this approach has been shown to make more effective use of police resources. It is likely that impending legislation will also require all police forces to adopt the principle of multi agency partnership working more widely and PS provides a vehicle for this to happen.

The project team, established in July, had the brief "to define and develop a problem solving approach and systems to all aspects of policing which create a safer Merseyside " and to report its' findings by the end of October. As such, the team was to consider **what** the force needed to do to enable it to take on problem solving policing.

The team began by carrying out a detailed review of other forces who have adopted PS, in an attempt to identify good practice and issues which have emerged in the operation of PS, from which lessons could be learnt. This was supplemented by a lengthy and comprehensive internal consultation phase. The views of a wide range of officers and staff of Merseyside Police were canvassed through a combination of interviews and focus groups. Relevant internal structures and systems were also reviewed. The recommendations, which have resulted, outline what Merseyside police needs to do, as an organisation, to position itself to take on a Problem Solving approach to policing.

This report recommends that Merseyside Police should adopt problem solving policing as a force wide philosophy, within which all activity can be incorporated. Tactics such as intelligence led policing, repeat victimisation and zero tolerance should all fit under the over-arching problem solving philosophy. The Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment (SARA) model should underpin the problem solving process. The report further recommends that the force should plan to commence the phased implementation of problem solving from April 1998.

To enable the force to take on problem solving effectively, however, change is required in a number of areas within the organisation.

• *Structure and organisation.* This report recommends a number of structural changes to the force, the most significant of which is the merging of Crime Management Unit, non-urgent Call handling facilities and Intelligence Unit to create an integrated Incident Management Unit (IMU) in each Area. Such a unit will facilitate the early identification of problems and the development of appropriate responses.

- *Systems and processes.* The report recommends a number of modifications to current force practices and processes to facilitate effective problem solving. In particular it proposes the creation of problem solving reference manuals, suggests that appropriate communication processes should be established and that new performance measures should be created to reflect the requirements of problem solving policing. The report also suggests that the Co-ordinators have a significant part to play in promoting problem solving and that their role should be modified to reflect this.
- *Information technology.* The central role of timely, relevant and accurate information in problem solving was quickly established. Consequently, the effectiveness of those systems providing the information has a major impact on the adoption of problem solving. The report recommends significant changes to the current force IT facilities in the medium to long term, notably the adoption of data warehousing which will facilitate multi-system access from a single terminal. Such a system has been demonstrated in a problem solving context in another force, with considerable effect.
- *Human Resources.* The adoption of problem solving will have a considerable impact on a number of human resource issues, such as recruitment, selection and performance review. If it is to be adopted effectively, however, the project team recommends a comprehensive training programme which will require all members of the force to receive some guidance and instruction in the concepts of problem solving and how it will affect their method of working. The development of appropriate skills profiles will underpin the training requirement and a problem solving competency should be incorporated into the performance review process.
- *Marketing*. The report recognises the need to publicise the problem solving approach both within and outside the force and recommends the establishment of an internal and external marketing strategy in relation to problem solving. This should cover the period prior to and following the implementation of the approach and may involve the use of external PR consultants.

The estimated costs to bring about the recommended changes are in the order of $\pounds 1.5$ million excluding costs of a new Command and Control system. However, much of this is either opportunity cost or relates to funds already committed. The amount of "new spend" excluding IT, is approximately $\pounds 200,000$ and the "new spend" on other IT (not including Command and Control) is estimated to be $\pounds 350,000$.

Finally, if the decision is taken to implement problem solving across the force, it is recommended that a dedicated implementation team be established to manage the process.

The adoption of problem solving as an "umbrella" philosophy represents a more fundamental approach to problem solving than that seen in any other force in the country. As such, the Merseyside approach will be closer to the model of problem solving envisaged by its' "creator", Professor Herman Goldstein, than that adopted in other forces and could become the model approach for all other forces in the future.

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Problem solving definitions

1. Problem solving should be adopted by Merseyside Police as an "umbrella" philosophy under which all activities, operational, non-operational and support, can fit. (Section 6.1).

2 . The aims of Problem Solving Policing in Merseyside are: To deliver a more effective service at a local level. To make best use of available resources. To use partnerships effectively, where appropriate, to solve problems. To tackle the causes as well as the symptoms of crime, disorder and community safety problems. To engender good community relations. To provide valued internal support to all of our staff (Section 6.1)

- 3. Problem solving must be woven throughout and overtly referred to in the Force Corporate Strategy document (Section 6.1)
- 4. The SARA model should be adopted as the basis for *all* problem solving work.(Section 6.1)

Structure and organisation

- 5. Incident Management Units (1MU) should be established in each Area to filter incoming messages, manage slow tracking and reduce deployment to incidents, and to facilitate the identification of problems, including repeat incidents. (Section 6.2.1)
- 6. The Area Intelligence Unit should be incorporated into the IMU. (Section 6.2.1)
- 7. Each Area should *have* a *minimum* of one dedicated analyst in its' IMU. This will require *the* creation of six additional analysts' posts. (Section 6.2.1)
- 8. An appropriate tasking/co-ordinating/control structure should be put in place by Areas to ensure that suitable responses to problems are developed and that such responses are managed. (Section 6.2.1)
- 9. While it may not be appropriate in all Areas, we strongly recommend a geographical base for problem solving. (Section 6.2.1)
- 10. An Inspector, at District level, should work in the Chief Executive's office of the associated local authority, to act as a central liaison point between the authority and *the police. Responsibilities* for this post *will include sponsorship, funding generation and the co-ordination of communication* between all levels of both organisations. (Section 6.2.2)

- 11. At force level there should be a central reference point for other agencies such as the Benefits Agency, Customs and Excise. This will ensure that a standard response is given and a continuity of approach, where problems cover more than one Area. (Section 6.2.3)
- 12. A senior analyst (probably from FIB) should sit on the Operational Review team, to identify long-term causes of short-term critical incidents and in so doing, facilitate the appropriate response. This analyst should have clearly defined terms of reference, which focus on underlying causes and not short-term threat assessment. (Section 6.2.3)
- 13 Tenure should be reviewed again, in the light of its, impact on problem solving and the establishment of partnership working. (Section 6.2.4)

Systems and processes

- 14 The PAT model should be adopted as a standard method of analysing crime and incident problems. (Section 6.3.1)
- 15 A problem solving Reference Manual together with a laminated Aide Memoire should be produced and distributed to all members of the force. (Section 6.3.1)
- 16 There should be *no* formal definition of what constitutes a problem. Areas and departments must identify, agree and prioritise problems within the context of their own environments. (Section 6.3.1)
- 17 All Areas and support departments should develop appropriate briefing and debriefing structures, which will facilitate the effective adoption of problem solving. (Section 6.3.2)
- 18 The Communications manager in each Area should ensure that the problem solving process is being incorporated into briefings and debriefings and to evaluate the effectiveness of briefing and debriefing structures. (Section 6.3.2)
- 19 An internal directory/digest should be produced which contains details of the roles and responsibilities of all parts of the force (including all support services). (Section 6.3.2)
- 20 A series of problem solving performance measures should be developed which should be of a more qualitative nature. These will supplement those performance measures used in force performance reviews. (Section 6.3.3)
- 21 Quarterly performance reviews should consider emerging and resolved problems, which have been dealt with through a problem solving approach, at an Area level. (Section 6.3.3)

- 22 Co-ordinators should adopt a more supportive, constructively critical role with respect to the adoption of problem solving. Part of this role should be to promulgate good problem solving practice throughout the force. The Co-ordinators written terms of reference must take into account changes in their role, with respect to problem solving.(Section 6.3.3)
- 23 Each Area should develop a formal process to monitor the progress of problem solving. Those responsible for assessing and planning responses must be accountable for their progress. (Section 6.3.3)
- 24 The strategic planning processes need to be amended so that they reflect the problem solving philosophy of the force. The Force Strategic Planning Handbook should be amended to reflect problem solving at all levels, particularly to help determine goals and to reflect a high degree of flexibility in the unit level process (Section 6.3.4)
- 25 The strategic planning department should review the extent to which the SARA process informs the planning process at a "macro" level. (Section 6.3.4)
- 26 In liaison with other agencies, a digest should be produced which outlines the roles and responsibilities of other agencies (including the police and voluntary groups) in the area. (Section 6.3.5)
- 27 Each Area should establish the appropriate meetings structure to facilitate continued contact with representatives of other agencies, at all levels. (Section 6.3.5)
- All new police trainees and staff should spend some time in other agencies (even if only one day) to increase awareness of their work and their operating practices. (Section 6.3.5)
- 29 ACPO officers must be aware that they have a significant part to play in problem solving at a regional and national level, by bringing problems to the attention of the appropriate authorities, which cannot be addressed at a force level. (Section 6.3.6)

Information technology (IT)

- 30 In the long-term, to support effective problem solving, the force IT facilities need to move to incorporate the following:
 - Single data entry
 - Multi system access from a single screen
 - Data warehousing
 - Force wide, windows based networked systems.(Section 6.4.1)
- 31 The force should pursue the option of developing a data warehouse system utilising ORACLE as a base system, as soon as is practicable. (Section 6.4.1)

- **32** The force should pursue the option of downloading and distributing **Command** and Control data, in the short term to support more effective **problem** identification and analysis.(Section 6.4.1)
- 33 There must be sufficient adequate terminals to enable all officers to access the system(s) when and where they need to. Appropriate access controls should be established to facilitate this. (Section 6.4.2)
- 34 The force should procure a computerised diary system to assist in time and resource management in relation to problem solving. (Section 6.4.3)
- 35 One of the core objectives of the proposed Management Information System must be to support the problem solving process.(Section 6.4.3)

Human Resources

- 36 A visible Human Resources strategy for the force must support and embrace a problem solving philosophy. (Section 6.5.1)
- 37 Definitions should be established for the required skill levels for problem solving for every role in the force. (Section 6.5.2)
- 38 There should be a specific problem solving competency, which must form part of the core competencies (Section 6.5.2)
- 39 An integrated and comprehensive problem solving training programme needs to be developed, once the problem solving skills profiles have been identified and agreed. (Section 6.5.3)
- 40 The implementation team should work closely with the Training department to develop suitable training, built upon the draft programme already produced. (Section 6.5.3)

Marketing

- 41 There must be an effective internal marketing strategy for problem solving both prior to and after implementation (Section 6.6.1)
- 42 There must be visible and strong ACPO commitment to problem solving at all times. (Section 6.6.1)
- 43 There must be an effective external marketing strategy for problem solving both prior to and after implementation (Section 6.6.2)

Implementation

- 44 We recommend that the force adopt the phased implementation option and plan to commence the adoption of problem solving from April 1998. (Section 6.7.5)
- 45 We further recommend that the implementation of problem solving should be managed by a dedicated force implementation team (Section 6.7.5)

Evaluation

- 46 The measures to be used to assess the impact of problem solving should be identified and agreed prior to the implementation of problem solving. The infrastructures to gather, analyse and interpret the appropriate information should also be established at this time. (Section 6.8)
- 47 Baseline data should be produced for the selected impact measures, prior to the implementation of problem solving. (Section 6.8)

1. BACKGROUND

Following the publication of the report "Developing an Empowered Organisation" in July 1993, Merseyside Police embarked on a change programme from 1994 onwards. Since that time, policing has developed from a reactive, command and control incident led style to one whose focus has become more community based, more problem/cause oriented with an enhanced intelligence capability. This switch in emphasis was designed to enable local Commanders to deliver policing services to local communities, supported by the strategic centre.

The force has also continued to restructure by reducing the number of areas and to promote self sufficiency aligned with accountability, at area level.

Despite these changes, resource deployment is still perceived to be fragmented and compartmentalised in many cases, and there is no overall concept of policing which brings together the essential elements of response, targeting, community focus, problem analysis, proactivity and partnership.

Following the murder of David Ungi in 1995 and the subsequent increase in the criminal use of firearms in Merseyside, a strategic approach was adopted to combat these crimes, through Operation Pivot. Using this operation as their base, the strategic debrief team assessed the short and long term strategic implications of problems facing Merseyside Police and made recommendations for improvement.

One of their recommendations was that the force should consider adopting "Problem Oriented Policing" (POP) to provide a holistic approach to the policing of Merseyside. Originating in the USA in 1979, through the work of Professor Herman Goldstein, POP focuses on trying to solve problems the public bring to the police, or which the police themselves identify, rather than merely responding to incidents. Goldstein's view is that the major task of administration is to create the right conditions and provide resources to allow the police on the ground to undertake this work.

This type of policing model can be a vehicle to address repeat victimisation, provide an enhanced quality of service and focuses on substantive problems. It also facilitates the effective management of demand on police resources. The overall demands have increased since 1993 and yet in the same period, the force has lost 433 police posts.

The mobilisation of the community is the key feature of this approach and partnerships lie at the heart of developing positive solutions to problems facing both the community and the police.

Report of findings

A direct result of Pivot was that Merseyside Police was forced to look more at root causes than symptoms of problems. As a result, some projects have started to move towards a more problem solving approach, such as call handling, CPA, shift review, intelligence units, proactive teams and greater use of inter agency partnerships.

A philosophy of policing has been determined by Merseyside Police but not tightly defined. There are various strands of POP type approaches but they have not been brought together into an integrated problem solving approach. Additionally, structures and processes have not been developed to specifically support a problem solving approach across the force. The development of POP/PS type approaches has therefore, until now been largely unstructured with no common direction.

The adoption of POP/PS was a clear recommendation of the report "Merseyside Police: A changing world", completed in April 1997 by the Arkle organisation. As such, POP/PS can be seen as "tying the knot". It is the means by which the provisions of the 1993 report, referred to earlier, can be embraced across the whole force. That report outlined **what** the force needed to do to become a more effective, customer focused organisation; POP/PS suggests **how** the force can do so. It is the final piece in the jigsaw of the change process, which the force embarked upon almost five years ago.

To consider how a POP or Problem Solving (PS) policing style might be adopted across Merseyside Police, a project team was established, with the following aim:

"To define and develop a problem solving approach and systems to all aspects of policing which create a safer Merseyside "

In its' deliberations, the team were required to deliver the following outcomes:

- A clearly defined philosophy of problem oriented policing.
- Clearly defined systems and structures supportive of that approach
- A clear definition of the skills required to deliver this policing style and consequent training needs
- A costed implementation plan
- A publication, or part of a Home Office Police Research Group (PRG) report which provides an overview of PS on Merseyside.

This report outlines the findings of the project team.

2. METHODOLOGY

The focus for this work was on the what rather than the how. As such, it assesses what Merseyside Police need to do, from a structure and systems point of view, to move towards the effective force wide adoption of PS.

To carry out this work, a small project team were established, comprising a Superintendent, a Detective Inspector, a Sergeant and a Constable, assisted by an external consultant. Home Office PRG resources were also used periodically to offer advice, as appropriate.

The work was:

- External fact finding
- Internal consultation
- Review of Merseyside Police systems
- Gap analysis
- Preparation and production of report

2.1 External fact finding

It was recognised that several forces in England and Wales have already professed to have adopted a PS approach to policing in their areas. It was felt that an early part of the work should be to look at how these forces have approached PS, how they brought about any required structural and system changes, what problems they have encountered in the operation of PS and how they have overcome them (if at all).

As a result, 7 forces were visited, listed in Appendix A with the dates of the visits. A pro forma was developed to provide some structure to the visits and a copy is found in Appendix B.

2.2 Internal consultation

The fundamental focus of the work, however, had to be within Merseyside Police and a wide ranging consultation process was carried out to identify the extent of PS currently taking place within the force and issues which might mitigate against the effective adoption of PS across the whole force. The consultation process was, essentially, built around the following three elements.

2,2.1 Board interviews

All members of the board were interviewed individually to assess their views in relation to PS but from a strategic standpoint and a pro forma was again used to structure each session. (See Appendix B).

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2.2,2 Co-ordinators interviews

Two of the force co-ordinators were interviewed to identify how they perceived that problem solving would affect their role.

2.2.3 Operational manager interviews

All Area Commanders, heads of relevant departments (for example, traffic, OSD) and other appropriate individuals were individually interviewed to assess their views of PS from an operational management perspective. The pro forma used to structure the interviews is found in Appendix B.

2.2.4 Non-operational manager interviews

A wide variety of non-operational managers were interviewed, including the heads and other staff in the following departments:

- Strategy and Planning
- Human Resources
- Finance and Administration
- IT
- IS Projects
- Management Development and Training
- Communications
- Vehicle fleet
- Purchasing and supply

2.2.5 In-force project teams

As a project team, we were aware of a number of other in-force projects, which might affect and be affected by our project, in its deliberations. Discussions were, therefore, held with representatives of the following project teams:

- Shift review team
- Role of Inspector review
- IT scoping study
- Recognition and reward project
- Multi agency approach to organised and serious crime project
- Force structure review team

2.2.6 Staff Associations

Discussions were also held with representatives of the two main staff associations, the Police Federation and UNISON.

2.2.7 Focus Groups

A series of focus groups were held with a cross section of officers, traffic wardens and civilian staff to assess the views of "front line" operational and support staff with respect to PS. During these sessions, participants were initially invited to identify the issues, which they felt existed in relation to the effective adoption of PS.

In syndicate groups, they then considered these issues in greater detail before reporting their deliberations, including possible solutions, to the full group for wider discussion. A focus group was held for each police District, though one District requested an additional focus group, therefore a total of 6 were held. A list of groups and dates is found in Appendix A.

An additional focus group was held for representatives of all of the Local Authorities in the Merseyside area, which was opened by ACC Mr. Paul Acres. This enabled the views of the major "partners" in Merseyside to be assessed in relation to PS, to identify good practice and to recognise those issues which might prevent them from working more closely with the police.

This comprehensive approach enabled all levels of the organisation to be consulted, that is, operational, operational management and support and strategic management. It should be noted that all of those consulted, by whatever means, offered honest and frank responses to all questions. In so doing, they have all helped to shape a realistic and feasible set of recommendations.

It should also be noted that the overwhelming view was supportive of a move towards a Problem Solving style of policing. Both staff associations echoed this positive view, though there was a degree of scepticism that the resources necessary to support a move to a problem solving approach would be forthcoming.

2.3 Preparation and production of the final report

Following the internal and external data gathering process, the project team held a two-day workshop to consider all of the information gathered. At this workshop, the team also agreed a series of recommendations, which would help to position Merseyside police to adopt PS effectively.

Report of findings

3. OTHER FORCE FACT FINDING

Following the fact finding process in other forces a large number of points were identified. These are now summarised in bullet point form, below.

3.1 Generalpoints

- Most POP/PS schemes observed are still in the very early stages of implementation.
- All POP/PS seen are applied, primarily, to local community based issues. As such, it is focused on the "front end" delivery of community policing services at a local level, though some forces do plan to "migrate" PS across the whole organisation. None have yet adopted the view of PS as an umbrella policing philosophy under which everything fits.
- All forces see POP/PS as a long term approach
- A variety of models are used to underpin the POP/PS. For example, the PROVE and PRINCE models found in private industry. Also used in a number of forces is the 10 point plan model developed by Geoff Berry and promulgated in a Home Office paper in 1992. This mode!, originally devised as a method for managing crime prevention initiatives, expands on the SARA process breaking the four stages of SARA into ten sub stages. While it has been proven to work (indeed it is currently in use in St. Helens) the model has been perceived by some to be too complicated for relatively small focused initiatives, though it does work well for larger projects.
- The SARA model of PS (Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment) is predominant.
- There appears to be little consistency with regard to the extent and thoroughness of the scanning process. There is little prioritisation of problems and as a result, there is a tendency to return to a more reactive approach.
- A visible and strong ACPO commitment is seen to be crucial to the effective adoption of PS.
- To succeed, line managers need to be committed to PS and drive it along.
- There is little evidence, with the exception of one force, of the application of PS to force wide problems.

3.2 Structure and organisation

- Most POP/PS schemes are geographically based. This is seen as important in establishing ownership of the problems and responsibility for their solution.
- Coterminous boundaries with local authorities are preferable.
- There is evidence of tension between response teams (C&C, mobile patrols etc.) and community based teams. There appears to be little integration of the two approaches, the status of the community officer is problematic and cultural problems are evident.
- The assignment of officers to beats, with clear geographic responsibility appears to be good practice.
- POP/PS requires flexible shifts, which enable demand and resources to be matched throughout a 24-hour period.

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- Communications and briefings structures appear to be variable.
- Public Service Desks (PSD) have been identified as good practice, feeding the Intelligence Unit directly.
- Trained civilian analysts are deployed in the Intelligence Unit which appear to work best at BCU level.
- In some forces, Inspectors/Sergeants are actively involved with the local authority in POP/PS work, with some seconded to the Chief Executive's office. Strong communication links have been established as a result.
- Where there is direct access to appropriate individuals in the local authority, problem solving is simplified, at least at an operational level.

3.3 The operation of POP/PS

• The impact and success of POP/PS appears to be variable but limited.

- There is a clear lack of objectives for POP/PS both locally and at a force level
- Problem identification is sometimes carried out in an intelligence unity at a local level, but the impact of such units is limited by inappropriate or insufficient equipment/skills and infrastructures.
- Scanning is not always *true* scanning, with SARA being applied to *perceived* problems.
- Co-ordination and prioritisation of problems takes place at supervisory levels within BCUs
- There is evidence that the mechanisms for identifying problems at a forcewide level are lacking
- Though SARA is the accepted model, there appear to be variations in formats, controls and management of the SARA process.
- Detailed analyses appear more common for crime related problems
- Feedback, monitoring and progress chasing procedures appear limited and in some cases non-existent.
- There is a tendency towards directed patrol and reactivity as a "first" resort, rather than this just being one of a number of responses to a problem
- There were some tasking and co-ordinating meetings, but their timing structure and scope were varied and focused on crime.
- There appears to be no clear method of sanction and reward built into the POP/PS process

<u>3.4 Partnerships</u>

- There is an observed need for multi agency co-operation at three levels:
 - * Strategic (Executive)
 - * Managerial (BCU Commander level)
 - * Operational (Front line officer)
- The co-ordination between levels is not clearly evident
- The involvement of other agencies, not just local authorities, is not always clear
- The sharing of information between agencies is clearly problematic. There is also a fear that the requirements of the Data Protection Act might be contravened if certain data was shared.

3.5 Management information and IT

- An effective management information system is seen as essential to the effective operation of POP/PS
- Most management information systems seen were under developed.
- Data warehousing facilities are seen as essential
- In some cases, data is downloaded daily into the data warehouse from the source systems, though no force visited has on-line warehousing facilities.
- Appropriate data interrogation facilities in the base systems do not appear to be present. Interrogation front-ends have been added to existing systems in some cases, for example, mapping.
- Those using geographical information systems have all experienced problems in trying to identify and record the exact location of incidents.
- The effective use of information is generally left to the analyst, with limited access by operational officers. In some cases, access is exclusive to the analysts.
- Several forces suggest that a diary system would be invaluable to support the effective operation of POP/PS

• The incorporation of a duty roster system is also seen as valuable

- Problems are encountered with data accuracy and integrity and those providing the source data need to be aware of the importance of its' accuracy and timeliness.
- The development of appropriate IT and information support to POP/PS is hampered by the historic lack of an IT and Information Strategy. Consequently, piecemeal systems have developed in an unstructured way, in most cases.
- Effective POP/PS requires strong IT support.

3.6 Communications

• Communication of POP/PS is primarily at the launch/implementation stage.

- There is little evidence of ongoing communication of POP/PS once it is up and running.
- A networked IT system assists effective communication of POP/PS
- There appears to be a problem of balancing internal and external communication processes
- The objectives of communication appear to be confused and unclear.

<u>3.7 Training and recruitment</u>

- Training in POP/PS is patchy and frequently unstructured.
- Any POP/PS training is focused on service delivery in all but one force observed.
- There is no continuation or refresher training in POP/PS. Any training carried out is "one-off' implementation training only.
- POP/PS does not appear to be taken account of in recruitment/selection processes except in one force.

Report of findings

3.8 Evaluation

- There are no clear objectives for POP/PS and therefore it is difficult to evaluate the schemes.
- Evaluation is inconsistent. Where it is done, it is built mainly around simplistic input measures such as the number of SARAs completed or resolved.
- There appears to be little qualitative evaluation looking at the impact of POP/PS on public perceptions etc.
- There appears to be a trend of building POP/PS into performance review through a COMPSTAT type approach.
- POP/PS is incorporated into personal performance review in one force only.

<u>3.9 Examples of good practice</u>

Whilst there are a number of issues surrounding the adoption of POP/PS in other forces, there are also many examples of good practice in the operation of POP/PS. The potential benefits of POP/PS can be demonstrated to be considerable from these examples.

3.9.1 Youths causing annoyance

In one force visited, the police were being called frequently to deal with a problem of youths causing annoyance (YCA) outside an off licence. A close examination of the environment revealed that opposite the off licence was a bus stop with a large area for buses to pull off the road. By the bus stop was a grassy bank and next to the off licence was a car park for a number of shops. It was clear that the problem stemmed from youths congregating on the grassy bank, drinking alcohol purchased from the off licence. Many of them had cars which they parked in the bus lay by and which they sometimes drove, at high speed, around the car park.

Once the problem and its causes had been identified, the police and the local authority put a number of measures in place.

- A number of rose beds were planted on the grassy bank, by the local authority. This prevented gangs of youths from gathering on the bank and even added to the appearance of the area.
- Parking regulations were enforced rigorously and without exception, in the bus lay by. Everyone parking in the lay by during the evening was given a fixed penalty ticket.
- The off licence owner was warned about the sale of alcohol to those not old enough to purchase it and that any such action would lead to prosecution.
- The local authority took steps to prevent access to the car park when the shops were closed.

This package of measures, prepared and implemented by the police and the local authority, primarily addressed the causes of the problem. They very quickly removed the problem altogether and in so doing removed the source of a large number of demands on police time. The removal of the problem also meant that an effective service had been provided to the residents of the area who had continually complained about the gangs of youths over many months.

3.9.2 Car crime

In another force visited, a persistent problem of car crime in a supermarket car park was identified. This was tackled by the police in partnership with the store. Staff collecting trolleys now wear bright coats with "security guard" plainly marked on the back. In addition, the council has been persuaded to cut back bushes around the car park to improve natural surveillance. After only two months car crime on the car park had been reduced by 50 per cent. The savings of police time and the improved quality of service from this example are clear.

3.9.3 Calls to a Hospital

A scan of incidents in one force found that over a three month period 113 calls had been received from a local hospital. Further analysis revealed that 103 of these originated from the psychiatric wards and that 54 of these had been made by one patient. Prior to the analysis, neither the police nor the hospital had been aware of the scale of the problem. Further investigation revealed that the source of the calls was a call box, to which the patients had open access. Tighter control of access to the call box removed this problem at a stroke. This was a simple and effective way of dealing with this problem, which hitherto had a considerable impact on police time and resources.

3.9.4 Calls from the elderly

One PC reviewed the frequency of calls from an elderly gentleman living on her beat, since she had often had to follow up his requests for the police to visit. This revealed no fewer than 20 calls (and 20 visits) in the previous four months. In each case, the man had simply wanted a chat because he was lonely. The PC was aware that the man was a war veteran and she contacted the British Legion who provided both a television set and other help for the man. Again, a simple example of working in partnership with other agencies to address the causes of a problem.

3.9.5 Recruitment strategy

There is a tendency to see POP/PS as something, which can apply, only in an operational context. There are many examples, however, of POP/PS being applied to non-operational problems.

One force was concerned that the interest being shown in it by a number of high quality potential recruits did not appear to be reflected in actual applications to join the force. This "problem" was therefore analysed and two interesting factors emerged.

- The distribution of information about the force and application forms, following the initial enquiry, was slow; sometimes a number of weeks after the enquiry. This resulted in some potential recruits receiving their information from other forces more promptly, which in turn resulted in them applying to these other forces.
- The material itself was felt to be dowdy and not in keeping with the modern image, which the force was keen to portray.

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• When application forms had been received there were no clear criteria by which to judge them. The selection of interviewees from the paper sift was effectively an arbitrary process. This again led to the loss of potential high calibre recruits to other forces.

The response was to establish criteria for the paper sift process and to put in place procedures which would ensure that information and application forms were posted within 24 hours of the initial enquiry. The material and forms were also made more visually attractive.

The initial result appears to be far more high quality potential recruits now applying to join the force than previously.

These examples show that POP/PS can apply equally to operational and nonoperational problems. The potential of the approach, in terms of saving police time and resources while providing a better service to the public is also clearly demonstrated.

A number of other examples of POP/PS are found in Section 6.1 below.

4. INTERNAL CONSULTATION

The extensive internal consultation process has identified that there are already many examples of effective problem solving approaches to policing Merseyside. For example, Operation Crystal in the City and Kirkdale Area and Townsafe in Birkenhead. It is clear, however, that the adoption of problem solving approaches is variable across the force area. This is best illustrated by considering the current extent of PS activity in the force from four perspectives:

- The accepted view of PS
- The current structure and how it caters for PS
- Problem identification
- Extent of partnership working

4.1 The accepted view of PS

In line with the view expressed by officers from other forces, where PS activity is taking place within Merseyside Police, it appears to be focused on the delivery of community policing services at a local level.

At an operational level, some officers appear to be using a problem solving approach and yet do not recognise it as such. Many of these are Community Beat Officers (CBO) who feel that they are only doing what they have always done at a community level. It is stressed, however, that this is not common to all Areas in the force.

At a strategic level, there is a view that whilst PS can and should focus on the delivery of local policing services, the approach can apply to all areas of the force, both operational and non-operational. The consensus view at this level is very much that PS should form an "umbrella" philosophy for Merseyside Police, which underpins all of the activities of the organisation.

It should be noted that the overwhelming majority of officers and staff who were consulted were strongly supportive of the force wide adoption of a PS approach to policing. Almost without exception, across all locations and levels, officers and staff felt that it would enable a more effective and efficient service to be delivered, provided that the appropriate infrastructures, systems and processes were put in place.

<u>4.2 Current structure and PS</u>

From an operational perspective, the extent to which PS is catered for appears to be primarily through CBO teams, which vary from a Sergeant and 7 PC's (for example Walton, Knowsley North), to a Sergeant and 10 PC's (for example, South Liverpool). These teams engage in activity which appears to be most closely aligned to the definition of PS. Even between the Areas though there is considerable variety in the CBO teams. Some have geographical responsibility, some do not; some seem to be prone to abstraction for other duties (for example football duties, dockers dispute), others do not. They also appear to have a variety of titles, for example, Community Task Team (Wallasey & Hoylake), Community Action Team (Southport).

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As a variation to this structure. South Liverpool supplement their CBO team with a proactive CID and uniform team, working flexible shifts to focus on primarily *crime* problems, though they are now beginning to look at non-crime issues. For example they are looking at the problem of youths causing annoyance by targeting "ringleaders".

In addition, Wavertree and Riverside have established an Area Support Group with no specific geographical responsibility but who focus on problem oriented activity in relation to community issues. Birkenhead have established a similar Area Support Team (though they appear to be focused on the problem of drug dealing). They have also established a "Townsafe" team to focus on problems specific to the Birkenhead town centre area. This high profile initiative has received much publicity and appears to be very well received by the local traders and resident population.

Those operational units, which adopt more of a PS approach, therefore, show a considerable variety in structure across Areas. There is clearly no standard framework for the adoption of PS activity at an operational level. This reflects the variation in how PS is perceived and how it can operate at an operational level.

Support groups such as Headquarters Departments, the Traffic Department and Operational Support Division (OSD) are again not structured specifically to cater for PS, though it is clear that they can (and do) adopt PS relatively easily under their current structure.

<u>4.3 Problem identification</u>

Problem identification is clearly at the heart of problem solving. It is self evident that one needs to know what problems exist before one can attempt to solve them. It was felt that an appreciation of the current extent of PS adoption could be gained by looking at how Areas identify problems at present. This exercise would also indicate the nature any changes required at an operational level in order to facilitate the force wide adoption of PS.

Again, a wide variety of approaches were observed between Areas in how they identify and prioritise problems. While a number of Areas have adopted *Tasking and Co-ordinating* groups, with a brief to identify problems in their Areas, prioritise the problems and task individuals or teams to address the problems.

There is, however, considerable variation even between these groups. Some meet weekly, others monthly; some focus on purely crime problems, others on all problems; some look more at tasking than co-ordinating, some are chaired by the Crime manager, others by the Intelligence Unit Sergeant. There is, therefore, no common tasking and co-ordinating model across the force. Some have limited problem identification processes in place, but they are variable. This report proposes a structure, which will standardise tasking and co-ordinating processes and embrace the principles of PS.

Common to almost all of the existing tasking and co-ordinating groups is the lack of feedback and management of the process. Once problems are identified, there appears to be little monitoring of progress in dealing with the problems.

Other Areas are less structured in how they identify problems, from the development of target packages by the Intelligence Unit, to daily debriefs, to acting on issues identified by the public and community forums.

Common to all is the central role of the Intelligence Unit in identifying problems, as might be expected.

Reflecting the variable views of PS and the variation in structure, it is perhaps not surprising to note the diversity in approaches to problem identification and prioritisation.

4.4 Extent of partnership working

All Areas appear to have embraced the concept of partnership working. The idea of tackling problems in association with other agencies and groups outside the police service is not a new one and it is encouraging to note that all Areas can demonstrate the presence of effective partnerships. There are, though, considerable differences in the extent of partnership development and the nature of those partnerships, between Areas.

All appear to have established links with the local authority covering their Area, though some have done little to develop their list of active partners. Others have been far more dynamic in developing partnerships with such groups as SRB programmes, local traders groups and Chambers of Commerce, Youth Partnerships and community groups. Several of the Areas have recognised that working in partnership with other agencies can unlock additional funding for specific initiatives and are actively pursuing partnership development as a strategy.

The clear message from the internal consultation process is that much PS work is already taking place but the lack of any structure or framework for such work means that it is variable in the extent of its' adoption and impact. As noted above, there was huge support for the adoption of PS across the force. All those consulted, however, recognised that a considerable number of issues needed to be dealt with before the force could move to a PS approach. Primarily addressing structures, systems and processes, these issues are now summarised in bullet point format.

It is stressed that these are the opinions expressed by those in the focus groups and by those interviewed.

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4.5 Perceived issues to be addressed to facilitate the adoption of PS

4.5.1 Culture and motivation

- To adopt PS across the force, there will be a need to overcome preconceptions, resistance to change and fear of the unknown. There is a lack of understanding, by some, of what PS is all about. It is the perception of others that problem solving has been going on for years; it is nothing new and we all problem solve in our everyday roles. There may therefore be apathy and lack of interest towards PS, either through fear or a belief that it is nothing new.
- Some believe that any PS approach merely displaces problems and as such it makes little impact on the overall performance of the force. This will increase resistance to its' adoption.
- There is a perception, in some, that the change process will mitigate against the effective adoption of PS. Whilst some believe that organisational inertia, "nothing ever changes" will prevent PS from being taken on, others feel that there is too much change in the force. As such, PS will be viewed as just another management "fad". As "thisyears' model" its' place will be taken next year by some other concept or approach. This will lead to a reluctance to commit fully to PS as "it will all change again next year anyway".
- Low morale in some is leading to apathy, with many officers coming in to do their 8 hours and go home. They are unlikely to give their full commitment to such approaches as PS.
- A number of those consulted suggested that the consultation process was just lip service and that the decision had already been taken to move to a PS approach, despite what might come out of the process? The project team strenuously denied this on several occasions but the feeling lingers in some and this may again mitigate against the effective adoption of PS.
- Concerns were expressed with regard to any reward/recognition systems which might be put in place (if any) to encourage people to take on PS ? Many felt that some form of recognition system (if not reward) would help in the adoption of PS, though there was little consensus as to nature of the recognition.
- Similarly many were interested to know what might happen if people do not or do not want to take on PS . As part of this discussion, some officers suggested that discipline and supervision standards had dropped. They felt that slippage in standards had come about through the changing roles of Sergeants and Inspectors. It was further argued that tighter supervision would assist in the effective adoption of PS.
- Many officers felt that PS included an element of risk taking, but that there was a "blame culture" in some Areas. Consequently, the fear of "getting it wrong" would prevent people from taking risks and limit the effective adoption of PS.

4.5.2 Information

• When information/intelligence is fed into the system there appears to be little or no feedback to tell officers what happened as a result. A lot of information goes in with very little feedback, which discourages the supply of information. As the

effectiveness of PS rests on good quality information, any means of improving the quality of information going into any system, should be encouraged.

- There was a recognition that the quality control processes/vetting on the data that the intelligence cell uses are variable. As a result, the quality of some of the information in force wide systems was felt to be questionable.
- The availability of 65 types of MIS report from the Command and Control system, can (and does) lead to confusion and information overload. There is so much to chose from that some officers and staff are not sure which is the best/most appropriate source.

4.5.3 Information technology

- There was unanimous agreement that as the main provider of much of the forces information, the appropriate IT systems were crucial to the effective adoption of PS across the force.
- There was general agreement that the interrogation of current force systems is almost impossible in any structured way. Whilst the systems in themselves may be adequate, the interrogation facilities are not.
- Multiple systems, many of which are incompatible, prevent any meaningful data interrogation and analysis from taking place. They lead to duplication of effort and difficulty in identifying the appropriate data source
- The Force Intelligence System is accepted as an effective data processing system, but is not perceived to be user friendly enough for intelligence searches.
- ICJS is perceived as a laborious, time consuming system with the printouts which are produced not providing necessary information in a usable format.
- There is some confusion about what Command & Control can do and provide.
- Some feel that there has been insufficient consultation with respect to systems and what is needed.
- System operators (indeed many officers and staff) are not sufficiently aware of what systems there are, what they can provide and how they operate.
- Locally based systems miss incidents which take place on neighbouring areas
- IT support is perceived to be poor, especially repair of equipment and dealing with software problems. Time delays in responding were felt to be an issue.
- Many feel that the lack of an IT strategy (or visible one) is leading to the duplication of multiple, incompatible systems.
- Some Areas have experienced data input problems. There are time delays in getting some of the information into the systems which has led, to a lack of timely, relevant and up to date information in the systems.
- System access was also perceived as a major issue. Those who need to use the system to carry out data searches are often restricted in their ability to do so.

4.5.4 Internal communications and co-ordination

- At the heart of PS is the view of a shared approach to problems through partnerships (both external and internal). Communications issues will prevent the establishment of such shared approaches and restrict the adoption of PS.
- There is a perceived lack of communication between uniform & CID

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- Generally, units within the same Area are not talking to each other and there also appears to be a communications breakdown between managers and individuals in some Areas. This problem appears to extend to inter departmental and Area/department communication.
- Districts/Areas are not perceived to be unified in purpose, through poor communication.
- Areas are perceived to be insular and parochial in outlook
- There are problems with shift to shift communication and split site communication
- A view expressed by some was that officers, worrying too much about personal performance reviews, are holding onto information instead of sharing it with colleagues. If they received credit for "a result" which arose out of the information this may help break this issue down.
- It is perceived by many that there is little or no shared intelligence on non crime issues.
- Many feel that there are too many meetings.

4.5.5 Management support and commitment

- A clear message from the consultation process was that unless all levels of management are committed to PS and give it their full support, it will not be adopted effectively.
- There is a perceived lack of management stability, which is having an unsettling effect. At lower levels this is probably brought about by the force reorganisation, but the movement of Area Commanders in particular is having a major impact on morale and motivation.
- There is also a real concern about the lack of stability at ACPO level. Lack of a stable environment will inhibit the development of PS.
- There is a major concern with the uniform Inspector role. It appears that there is much confusion over their role, both by many of the Inspectors' themselves and by rank and file officers.
- There are unrealistic expectations from senior managers about what can and should be done. There are also different perceptions of what is important between management and other officers. There will need to be a clear view of PS to ensure that all are clear about what is expected of them and what can be achieved.
- There is felt to be little consultation. Lower ranking officers have an understanding of what is required but feel that their views are rarely taken into account. This is particularly felt to be the case with Area Commanders and with Unit Level Workshops,
- Some feel that there is a lack of understanding of what PS is all about, by some managers.
- There is also a view that perhaps not every rank in the force is committed to PS.
- Some feel that senior management are divorced and unapproachable/never seen. This is balanced by some senior managers who question their need to be seen at all times. This may highlight unrealistic expectations and a lack of appreciation of the changing role of senior managers, by rank and file officers and staff.
- ACPO & co-ordinators visits are often perceived to be not supportive. Under PS, both ACPO and the co-ordinators could help to support and assist in its¹ adoption.

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• Support departments are not believed to be supporting the operational officers and staff. Bureaucratic infrastructures are getting in the way of providing resources. Also, many are only open Monday to Friday, 9-5, and this causes problems outside these officers. As PS requires a flexible approach, the support structures should also be equally flexible.

4.5.6 Training and skills

- It was unanimously held that there is a need to know and develop the skills required to operate PS at all levels.
- Taking on PS will require widespread training in the new approaches across the whole of the force and all ranks.
- Many feel that the pressure on resources often means that officers and staff either cannot attend, or have to leave part way through. For training to be effective time to attend the whole course, MUST be found.
- Several question whether management views PS as important enough to warrant allocating sufficient time and money to carry out the training.
- IT training is perceived as poor and the level of support from the training centre is poor.
- There is general resistance to "self teach" packages in relation to IT training, which are generally perceived to be ineffective. Officers and staff want classroom taught approaches for PS training.
- Given that any training in PS will be force wide, there are concerns from some regarding who will pay for it (central training budget, or Areas making some contribution ?).
- Some view PS as "common sense" and, therefore, difficult to train. Is may be more appropriate to hold awareness sessions and guidance rather than structured training.


4.5.7 Resources

- Some feel that the impact of secondments/football/docks/leave etc. means that it is very difficult to maintain Area strength. Those who are left are so busy responding that they don't have time to "problem solve".
- There is perceived to be a considerable amount of funding available to the force (e.g. Europe, SRB) which the force have perhaps not exploited as much as they should have done. Some feel that such funding may be able to support the development of partnership working and PS.
- There is a view that there is not enough or inappropriate equipment to enable problems to be identified and solutions put together and delivered. This is particularly the case with IT.
- There is also a view that financial restrictions are inhibiting the identification of problems and development of appropriate solutions. In addition, devolved budgeting is not perceived to have happened and this will prevent PS from being taken on fully.
- Limited resources are felt to be affecting the performance of individuals and their ability to do the job. This increased pressure is leading to welfare issues such as

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sickness. They feel under pressure now, so PS is seen as something which will just add to it.

- There appear to be major problems with the incorporation of civilian staff, traffic wardens and specials into an all-embracing PS approach. For example, Traffic Wardens are on the Command & Control and yet rarely appear to be used as a support resource.
- There is also a perceived lack of integration of police personnel, outside agencies and support staff
- It is recognised, primarily by managers, that the current shift system does not lend itself to PS.

•/. 5.8 Public expectations and image

- It is perceived that the change to PS will have a significant impact on the kind of service provided to the public, which may conflict with their expectations. The public have an expectation (perhaps unrealistic) that they will receive a police response when they want one and of the appropriate type. Under PS this may have to change. The public may not get an officer responding in person on the same day, or even at all. They may be asked to gather further information about the problem (such as YCA) and contact the police again in a few days. They may also be told that the police will look into the problem, but that it may not result in the immediate deployment of an officer. This message will clearly need to be sold very carefully.
- There are doubts whether the current force PR structure can cope with selling the PS idea to the public.

4.5.9 Problem identification and prioritisation

- Many feel that there is a danger that real problems or concerns may be overlooked and not addressed if scanning and analysis is inappropriate.
- There was much confusion regarding the prioritisation process.
- Concerns were expressed about how local needs are reconciled with national needs and how priorities are set between the two.

4.5.10 Other agency co-operation

- Some are concerned about the ability of other agencies to assist in PS; partnership working may be low on their priority list. Other agencies are very likely to have different priorities and may not respond as quickly as perhaps the police require/expect.
- There is a lack of understanding by the police of the function of other agencies, their availability of resources and the constraints on their methods of working.
- There is confiision in identifying which agency can help with what.
- There is similar confusion in identifying the appropriate point of contact in each relevant agency
- There is mutual suspicion between the police and some agencies (traditional barriers/culture)
- Data Protection issues are a concern with respect to the sharing of information.

4.5.11 Performance Management

- KPIs are perceived to be out of line with the requirements of PS. If what gets measured gets done, this will prevent the effective adoption of PS. For example, the detection of crime focuses very clearly upon dealing with the symptoms of a problem. PS, in dealing with root causes of problems, focuses primarily on the reduction *of all problems*, including crime. It also seeks to provide a better quality of service to the public. These factors are not necessarily reflected in current KPIs , which could be perceived as conflicting with the aims of PS. It is noted, however, that proposals for new Key Objectives and associated KPIs do appear to be moving towards a recognition of the different requirements of PS. A recent report from HMIC "Winning the Race", also states that Pi's need to move to a more qualitative base.
- There is a view that the force is driven by statistics and not "true" results.
- There is felt to be too much emphasis on crime as a performance measure because qualitative measures are difficult to establish and assess. Force Pi's are, however, recognised as flexible and it is noted that the force has committed to reducing Burglaries as a priority above improving the detection rate.
- PS needs to be reflected in personal performance reviews as well as at Area/Force level.

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5. OPTIONS FOR CHANGE

Following the fact finding and consultation processes, it is clear that Merseyside Police needs to change in several areas to accommodate a shift to a force wide PS approach to policing Merseyside. Change needs to occur in five broad areas, namely:

- Structure and organisation
- Systems and processes
- Information technology
- Human resources
- Marketing

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In addition, there needs to be a clear view about what PS is and what its' aims are. The force also faces a number of choices or options for action regarding how it should adopt a PS approach and even whether it should do so.

Detailed recommendations outlined in Section 6 below outline the scale and nature of the changes required.

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6. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

<u>6.1 Problem Solving — a definition</u>

As noted in Section 1, Goldstein, the "father" of Problem Oriented Policing, states that the purpose of the police is best served by creating the conditions and providing the resources to allow problem solving, that is, solving the *underlying* problems, to take place routinely. He further contends that the *whole* service needs to be problem focused, servicing the officers who know the underlying issues and are in touch with the community.

We would strongly support Goldstein's view, and suggest that the concept of problem solving should be applied across *all* areas of the force and all aspects of the organisation. Any issue, operational or non-operational, can be viewed from a Problem Solving (PS) perspective.

Recommendation 1: Problem Solving should be adopted by Mersey side Police as an ''umbrella'' philosophy under which all activities, operational, non-operational and support, can fit

As such, problem solving is not a tactic, but embraces the whole ethos of policing in Merseyside. Such approaches as zero tolerance, proactive policing, intelligence led policing and repeat victimisation are, therefore, acceptable tactics within an overarching problem solving strategy. A definition for PS in Merseyside is that

"Problem solving is a system to identify and tackle the causes of any policing problem"


To support the acceptance of this philosophy and to improve understanding with regard to the role of and need for problem solving we believe that clear aims need to be set.

Recommendation 2: The Aims of Problem Solving Policing in Merseyside are:

To deliver a more effective service at a local level. To make best use of available resources To use partnerships effectively, where appropriate, to solve problems. To tackle the causes as well as the symptoms of crime, disorder and community safety problems. To engender good community relations To provide valued internal support to all of our staff.

As PS is to be a driving philosophy for the force, it must be reflected in the Corporate Strategy document.

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Recommendation 3 PS must be woven **throughout and overtly referred to in the** Force Corporate Strategy **document.**

It is the responsibility of Strategy and Planning to agree the location and wording for such references to PS.

We recognise that it is simple to state that PS should be adopted but that structures and frameworks need to be provided to support its' adoption. As noted in Section 3.1, there are a number of models in existence, which fulfil this purpose, though one model appears to be predominant. The SARA model appears to be the most widely utilised technique and one which is respected for its' effectiveness and simplicity. It is simple to use, easy to remember and has been proven to work in a number of police forces. It can also be applied universally to operational and non-operational problems, whatever the size. This is where it offers benefits, particularly over the 10 point plan model, which is more suited to larger problems. The SARA model consists of a fourstage approach to PS, namely:

- Scanning identifying problems by reviewing a wide range of data and information sources, and applying basic knowledge and skills.
- Analysis using knowledge and skills, research and IT to identify common characteristics and underlying causes with respect to the problems identified.
- Response developing suitable action to address the problem causes, bringing in colleagues from other internal departments and/or external agencies to assist, where appropriate,
- Assessment reviewing the problem to assess whether or not the solution was successful and to take note of any lessons learned from the process.

A model for a SARA form is found in Appendix C. Two examples will illustrate how the process works in practice.

Within Merseyside, a scan and analysis (S & A) of late night assaults in the city centre revealed a high proportion of incidents which used bottles or glasses as weapons. This not only resulted in high demands on police time but also put added pressure on medical agencies, such as ambulance service, paramedics and hospitals. The response (R) was to liase with the pubs and clubs in the area to prevent bottles being passed to customers and to reinforce the need for control by the licensees. One brewery even replaced glasses in their pubs with plastic containers, which could not be used in an assault. The Assessment (A) of the problem reveals a dramatic reduction in the number of assaults in the city centre at night and the, almost complete, removal of the "glassing" assault problem.

A scan (S) in another force revealed an emerging and worrying trend of indecent exposure to schoolchildren. Analysis (A) of the problem revealed that most incidents were focused in and around one particular school. Further analysis showed that there was open access to the school grounds and that there were a large number of trees and bushes in which the offender could hide before committing offences. The response (R), in liaison with the local authority, was to prevent public access and to cut down and trim bushes and trees. Parents were also asked to be vigilant when taking their children to and collecting them from school. As a result of these actions the problem at this school was completely removed and the offender ultimately apprehended.

In another force, a scan of administrative procedures revealed a problem with the late delivery of photocopying paper to the force print room. This resulted in delays in the printing of documents and the need to go and buy small quantities of paper (one or two boxes) for urgent print jobs (at additional cost). Further analysis revealed to great surprise, that this problem had been experienced for nearly two years and that the same supplier had been used because "they always used them". No contract existed between the supplier and the force. The response was to issue a tender for the supply of photocopying paper to the force, which included provisions in relation to the delivery of orders and the right to nullify any contract if delivery standards were not met. As a result, the force negotiated a contract with a new supplier and the problem was removed.

Recommendation 4: The SARA model should be adopted as the basis for *all* Problem Solving work.

6.2 Structure and organisation

6,2.1 Problem solving at an Area level


Our research has clearly demonstrated the wide variety of structures in Areas and the differing approaches to PS both internally and in other forces. We strongly believe that in order to adopt PS effectively, there needs to be commonality of structure between areas. This will not only improve co-ordination between Areas, but will ensure that the appropriate structures are in place to enable problems to be quickly identified.

Problem solving is also concerned with providing a more appropriate service to community and members of the public. We therefore feel that a common structure will facilitate this aspect of PS.

Recommendation 5: Incident Management Units (1MU) should be established in each Area to filter incoming messages, manage slowtracking and reduce deployment to incidents, and to facilitate the identification of problems, including repeat incidents.

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Figure 6.1 reveals the proposed structure for the Incident Management Unit. This is not a new structure, but effectively enhances the functions of the current Crime Management Unit to deal with all incidents, crime and non-crime, including non-urgent call handling facilities.

The principle is that all messages, calls to the police, correspondence, complaints, items raised through community consultation, in fact, anything which requires the police to respond in some way, will be graded and directed through the IMU. Callers via the switchboard, for non-urgent cases would be passed directly to the appropriate IMU, after a short interrogation by the operator.

Emergency 999 calls will continue to be received by the District Communication Centre (DCC) who will deploy resources to urgent cases. In the case of non-urgent calls, a log will be created and forwarded to the IMU for further action.

The IMU staff will then respond accordingly, raising command and control logs where appropriate. Responses might include:

- the deployment of resources by slow tracking, or via the DCC
- resolution of the issue by phone
- a request to the caller to provide further information, perhaps by keeping a log of events etc.
- re-direction of the issue to another, more appropriate agency or organisation.
- raising and allocating crime reports
- providing management information, as appropriate

Under PS it is not enough to say that a particular issue which someone has raised is not a police problem. If someone has contacted the police with a problem, then it *is* a police problem and must be dealt with appropriately. In effect, the IMU role will be, not only to manage the call in the most appropriate way, but to "filter out" at an early stage, much of the work that does not require an immediate response (slow tracking) or a police response at all. They will also apply a consistent approach to the process by which we deal with information.

The type of incidents, which can effectively be handled by the IMU, without deploying a police resource, might include:

- crime cases currently handled by CMU's
- general nuisances (noise, litter, pollution, abuse, bad behaviour etc.)
- abandoned vehicles
- counterfeit currency
- found and lost property
- incidents involving animals
- certain traffic matters
- suspicious incidents

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One of the forces visited, which has established IMU's, has achieved **substantial** reductions in deployment of officers (as much as 50%) to **non-urgent incidents**, creating opportunities to deploy the officers in a proactive and problem **solving way**.

The creation of IMU's is fundamental to assist the problem solving **process**. Channelling all calls and correspondence through one location ensures that **accurate** scanning can take place, patterns of incidents can be identified and analysed. **Indeed**, many of the services requested by callers to the police station can, and **should**, **be** handled by an IMU facility. Careful consideration should be given to the siting of IMU's to avoid unnecessary duplication of work. It is strongly recommended, however, that they should be established at Area, rather than District, level to promote and facilitate the sense of local ownership/local knowledge of problems, so fundamental to the success of problem solving.

It is not envisaged that all problem identification will occur in the IMU, but that they will inevitably identify repeat calls etc. They should work closely with the intelligence unit (See Recommendation 5 below), where scanning and analysis will also be taking place, to ensure integration of purpose.

The creation of IMU's will obviously have staffing implications if they are to be effective. Whilst the exact numbers of staff required will be determined by individual Areas according to local needs, it is envisaged that there can be redeployment of some existing DCC staff to the IMU's to assist the process.

The DCC will be focused on the deployment of resources to those incidents, which require the attendance of a police resource at the scene, and the co-ordination of all radio traffic.

The IMU concept is consistent with current thinking in the force as it embraces:


- increased use of intelligence
- increased use of targeting
- increased use of "hotspot" identification
- better call handling

A number of different approaches are emerging in Areas but in a fragmented and unstructured way. The IMU model will enable a standard approach to be adopted.

Recommendation 6: The Area intelligence unit should be incorporated into the IMU.

Figure 6.2 shows that all information received by the controllers in the IMU should be forwarded to the Intelligence Unit staff. This will enable them to begin to carry out initial scanning and analysis of the information received, as part of the SARA process, outlined above.

Fig 6.2



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The resourcing of the Intelligence Unit is critical to the success of the PS approach in an operational context. Staff, with the relevant skills and knowledge to scan and analyse problems, must be in place. To this end, we recommend the following.

Recommendation 7: Each Area should have a minimum of one dedicated analyst in its' IMU. This will require the creation of six additional analysts' posts.

These analysts should be *incident* analysts, which will require them to consider all incidents and not just crime and crime based incidents. It is proposed that the Detective Sergeant currently responsible for each Area Intelligence Unit, continue with that responsibility and that the Area Crime Prevention Officer also be sited in this unit.

This structure will support the identification and analysis of problems and it will be the responsibility of the Intelligence Unit within the IMU to prepare packages of information which others will assess for action.

It is stressed that the analysis phase does not cease when an officer receives a package. In consultation with the intelligence unit and others, it is likely that the officer will still need to carry out further analysis before identifying the appropriate response. For example, on receiving a package of information an officer may need to visit the scene of a problem in order to gain a greater understanding. The example of the youths causing annoyance, referred to in Section 3.9.1 is a clear example of this. The package on information would indicate the extent of the YCA problem. Only by visiting the scene could the officer analyse the environmental causes of the problem such as, the bus lay by, the grassy bank and the open car park.

In terms of generating the appropriate response to problems, we are conscious of the current variety of tasking mechanisms on Areas. To cater for this variety and to minimise the extent of disruption, we recommend the following.

Recommendation 8: An appropriate tasking/co-ordinating/control structure should be put in place by Areas to ensure that suitable responses to problems are developed and that such responses are managed.

Figure 6.2 shows four possible options for this tasking co-ordinating role. The problem analysis packages identified could be passed to the following for prioritisation, allocation and management:

- Geographically based Area Inspector
- Key Service Area Inspector
- Tasking & Co-ordinating Group
- An identified individual or team

Whichever option is chosen it will be the role of the tasking/co-ordinating group or individual to ensure that a thorough assessment and analysis of the whole problem is conducted, in consultation with the recipient of the problem. The tasking/co-ordinating group will then ensure that appropriate responses are prepared to the

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problems and that such responses are managed accordingly. Through this approach the Response and Assessment elements of the SARA model can be incorporated.

Common practice in other forces indicates that a geographical base for PS policing is the most effective structure. This is believed to foster a strong sense of ownership, which is essential to PS. We, again, recognise the diversity in structures across Merseyside police and the authority of Area Commanders to structure their Areas as they see fit, within broad guidelines. We do feel it to be appropriate, however, to make a recommendation in this respect.

Recommendation 9: While it may not be appropriate in all Areas, we strongly recommend a geographical base for problem solving.

Allied to this, it is practice in some forces to align Special constables to specific beats, giving them geographic responsibility, promoting ownership of problems and helping to foster a problem solving approach. This idea, whilst not a formal recommendation, might be worthy of further consideration by Area Commanders.

Throughout this report we have stressed that PS can apply equally to operational and non-operational problems. Figure 6.3 shows how PS and the SARA process may be applied to any support service within the organisation, either at Headquarters or on Areas.


It is not envisaged that any one individual will necessarily have sole responsibility for the scanning and analysis but that departments will have their own methods for problem identification, either by groups or individuals. The identification of a problem will result in the commencement of a SARA form, an example of which is found in Appendix C. By "raising a SARA", the problem will be fed into the tasking and co-ordinating processes of the department.

It is suggested that support service departments do not **have** to form a tasking and coordinating group. They will have their own meeting structures already in place and these meetings may be able to incorporate a PS tasking and co-ordinating role.

It is also recognised that EFQM is a mechanism for the identification of nonoperational problems, which can be progressed via the SARA process at both headquarters and on Areas.

6.2.2 Problem solving at a District level

It is self-evident that close liaison between the police and local authority which covers their Area is fundamental to effective PS. There are numerous examples of situations where this is the case, both within and outside the force. It is also clear that effective partnership working arises out of close and continued working between agencies. While some Areas have grasped this concept others have not embraced it perhaps as fully as they should.



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We recognise that Merseyside Police districts are now coterminous with the five local authority District Councils in the Merseyside area. To facilitate the closer working of the police and the local authorities, we recommend the following.

Recommendation 10 An Inspector, at District level, should work in the Chief Executive's office of the associated local authority, to act as a central liaison point between the authority and the police. Responsibilities for this post will include sponsorship, funding generation and the co-ordination of communication between all levels of both organisations.

This recommendation conflicts with the views of other working groups in the force, but we feel that the scope and responsibility of the role justifies the rank. This is especially so in the light of likely provisions in impending crime and disorder legislation. The role requires a manager, not a supervisor and someone with appropriate authority to influence decision making.

The focus group held with local authority representatives also indicated that such a move would be looked on most positively by the local authorities and strongly supported by them. This role would be crucial to the effective adoption of partnership working under PS, as the local authority are clearly the most appropriate and active partner in helping to identify and deal with underlying causes of crime and disorder problems

Several of the forces visited have already allocated Inspector's to similar roles.

6.2.3 **Problem** solving at a force level

The central role of the Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB) in identifying problems at a force level is recognised, as is the presence of a series of strategic partnerships with other agencies. There are, however, a number of changes which could be made to the existing structure and which will facilitate the adoption of effective PS at a force wide level.

The focus of the FIB on force wide problems is, as might be expected, primarily on crime issues. The consultation process has identified, however, that force wide problems exist of a different nature and that perhaps at a force level, the underlying causes of problems are perhaps, not always addressed.

Recommendation 11 At force level there should be a central reference point for other agencies such as the Benefits Agency, Customs and Excise. This will ensure that a standard response is given and a continuity of approach where problems cover more than one Area.

Problems identified by the agencies referred to above, have sometimes not been pursued as vigorously as they might, due to the lack of a central liaison point. This person will provide such a point and enable a number of non-crime problems to be addressed more effectively.

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We would stress that we do not suggest that a new post should be created but that an existing post, probably within FIB, should take on this additional responsibility.

Operation Pivot gave rise to the Operational Review Team, who have the brief to address short-term critical incidents. We suggest that PS can also have a role to play within this team and make the following recommendation.

Recommendation 12 A senior analyst (probably from FIB) should sit on the Operational Review team to identify long-term causes of short-term critical incidents and in so doing, facilitate the appropriate response. This analyst should have clearly defined terms of reference, which focus on underlying causes and not short-term threat assessment.

We strongly support the work of the Operational Review team and the need to be able to respond quickly to critical incidents. We also feel, however, that patterns and underlying causes *might* be present in some of these incidents and that an analyst may be able to identify such patterns. We do not suggest that a new post be created, rather that the role of an existing FIB analyst be expanded to take this work into account.

We also recognise the work of the project looking at developing a multi agency approach to organised and serious crime. We, like they, have identified a gap with respect to the investigation of cross border crime and associated problems. The project manager is addressing this issue within his project report and will take account of the need to incorporate PS, in his deliberations.

6.2.4 General structural issues

Tenure is a significant issue, which has been widely identified, both inside and outside the organisation, as a major potential blockage to effective problem solving. It is the impact of tenure on continuity and trust between the police and other agencies, which is the main source of problems The movement of Area Commanders was particularly highlighted by the local authority focus group as a major obstacle to the establishment of firm working relationships. There was a view that such relationships were established only for the Area Commander to move on, necessitating the establishment of similar links with a new individual. This was seen as a time consuming exercise, which greatly inhibited the development of partnerships.

Tenure was also felt to affect the continuity of relationships at lower levels, however, between community officers and community groups.

While we recognise that tenure has been the subject of several reviews in the last eighteen months, we still recommend the following.

Recommendation 13 Tenure should be reviewed again, in the light of its' impact on problem solving and the establishment of partnership working.

6.3 Systems and processes

6.3.1 Problem solving processes

As noted above, we recommend the adoption of the SARA model to underpin the problem solving process. In relation to crime and incident issues we note that several forces also use the Problem Analysis Triangle (PAT) referred to in the Home Office publication on Problem Oriented Policing.




Figure 6.3 The Problem Analysis Triangle

Figure 6.3 shows this model, which assists in the analysis phase of the SARA structure and suggests that crime and incident problems can be considered from three dimensions, namely:

- Features of the caller/victim
- Features of the location
- Features of the offender/source of the problem

From an operational perspective, this model is again simple to use and has proven to be of value in other forces.

Recommendation 14 The PAT model should be adopted as a standard method of analysing crime and incident problems.

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The consultation process has identified some confusion about what PS is and how it can work. We are anxious that such confusion should be addressed and advice offered to all staff and officers with regard to queries about PS.

Recommendation 15 A Problem Solving Reference Manual together with a laminated Aide Memoire should be produced and distributed to all members of the force.

Similar in structure to the Aide Memoire for Senior Investigating Officers, produced by the Home Office, this document will consist of a series of checklists and examples of good PS practice, probably in a ring binder. The Reference Manual will offer simple, easy to follow advice and help to promulgate effective problem solving working. It is envisaged that it will cover such areas as establishing partnerships, working in partnership with other agencies and problem scanning and analysis techniques. The laminated Aide Memoire will incorporate simple PS principles such as how to use the SARA and PAT models.

Particular concern was expressed during the consultation phase about the impact of devolved financial management and the levels of financial authority. We would suggest that the Reference Manual should also include simple and clear guidelines with regard to financial management and financial authority across the force. For effective problem solving, there may be a need for officers at all levels to spend small amounts of money to deal with problems. If this can be done, without going through a lengthy bureaucratic process, then problems can and will be solved more quickly.

Several forces have developed a definition of what constitutes a problem. Tailored more to those forces who view PS as primarily a front end strategy aimed at the community, the PS approach is only "triggered" when a particular problem meets the agreed definition or criteria.

We believe that this approach conflicts with the view of PS as an umbrella philosophy as expounded in Recommendation 1. Under that definition, any crime, incident, event or situation can constitute a problem. In addition, the development of a cross force definition of "a problem" prevents a flexible approach to PS and conflicts with the local accountable empowerment of Area Commanders. For these reasons, we recommend the following.

Recommendation 16 There should be *no* formal definition of what constitutes a problem. Areas and departments must identify, agree and prioritise problems within the context of their own environments.

6.3.2 Communication processes

Internal communication was clearly identified as a major issue throughout the consultation phase. Effective PS rests on a shared approach to problems, which in turn rests upon effective communication between all parts of the force.

We, again, recognise the authority of Area Commanders in developing their own systems and structures but we would strongly recommend the following.

Recommendation 17 AH Areas and support departments should develop appropriate briefing *and* debriefing structures which will facilitate the effective adoption of PS.

The Reference Manual, referred to above, may include examples of briefing structures to support PS.

The Audit Commission publication, "*Tackling Patrol Effectively*" provides a clear and lucid summary of ways in which briefings and debriefings can be improved and it is commended as a means of supporting the above recommendation.

It is possible to weave the SARA process into the briefings process, for example:

- Briefings can be used to help identify problems (Scan)
- Briefings can help to analyse identified problems (Analyse)
- Briefings can help to establish an appropriate course of action or strategy (Response)
- Briefings can be used to disseminate good practice (Assess)

In this way briefings can become more participative and help to promote team approaches to problems.

Recommendation 18 The Communications manager in each Area should ensure that the PS process is being incorporated into briefings and debriefings and to evaluate the effectiveness of briefing and debriefing structures.

A major finding from the consultation process is also that many officers and staff are unaware of the work of other departments and areas of the force. Knowledge of this is vital if effective solutions are to be found to identified problem. Internal partnerships can be just as effective, if not more so, than external partnerships.

Recommendation 19 An internal directory/digest should be produced which contains details of the roles and responsibilities of all parts of the force (including all support services).

This directory, fully indexed, will include all contact points and phone numbers and could replace the existing internal phone directory. Available in hard copy manual form (possibly ring binder) it should be distributed throughout the force and accessible to every member of the force, both police and civilian. It should be updated

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at six monthly intervals and steps should be taken to ultimately put it on networked IT systems, though in the short term, it could be produced in disk form.

6.3.3 Performance management

Both internal and external fact finding revealed a consensus view that the current performance measures did not adequately take into account PS work. There is a suggestion that the Government is now starting to recognise this fact and the recent proposed Key Objectives for 1998/99 begin to take account of a shift to a more PS type approach. Despite this, however, steps can be taken in force to take account of the different focus of PS work.

Recommendation 20 A series of problem solving performance measures should be developed which should be of a more qualitative nature. These will supplement those performance measures used in force performance reviews.

In this way, performance reviews will also take into account the extent and quality of PS work by Areas and departments, in addition to the more traditional measures of crime reduction and detection.

Some forces have recognised that in the short term at least; a switch to a PS approach may cause a reduction in the detection rate. This should recover in the long term, however, as PS removes the causes of the crime and by dealing more effectively with problems, creates more time to investigate crimes more fully. We would also recommend the following.

Recommendation 21 Quarterly performance reviews should consider emerging and resolved problems which have been dealt with through a problem solving approach, at an Area level.

The performance review process should also reflect the empowerment skills in supervisors and managers. PS at a local level is very much about giving ownership of problems to individuals. The success of PS at that level will reflect the skills of the supervisors/managers in empowering officers and staff to do so.

The role of the co-ordinators in the performance review process is recognised. Clearly, they can play a major part in the effective adoption of PS by Areas. Thames Valley has established a "Problem Solving Consultancy" unit, officers from which travel around the force, offering advice and assistance in the adoption and utilisation of PS. Whilst we stop short of recommending this approach, we do suggest that the role of the Co-ordinator could be modified to take some account of this type of approach.

Recommendation 22 Co-ordinators should adopt more supportive, a constructively critical role with respect to the adoption of problem solving. Part of this role should be to promulgate good problem solving practice throughout the force. The Co-ordinators written terms of reference must take into account changes in their role, with respect to problem solving.

This role will not only include the incorporation of PS into the performance review process, as noted above, but also the promotion of PS good practice and constructive assistance, where appropriate.

With regard to performance management at a local level, the structure proposed in section 6.2 above, provides for the monitoring and management of performance in relation to progressing problem solving activity. Without being too prescriptive, we would recommend the following.

Recommendation 23 Each Area should develop a formal process to monitor the progress of problem solving. Those responsible for assessing and planning responses must be accountable for their progress.

Allied to the performance management issue is the question of reward and recognition for "good" PS work. This subject was aired widely during the internal consultation phase. There was broad agreement with the idea of recognition but less so for reward or the type of recognition. We are aware of an in-force rewards and recognition team and have already discussed the concept of PS. They have agreed that they must take account of the findings outlined in this report and take due account of PS work in its' deliberations, if PS is adopted by the force.

6.3.4 Planning Processes

We have reviewed the current force planning processes in depth and have concluded that they are not entirely consistent with the principles of PS. Indeed, the Local Policing Plan should be developed through a largely PS approach. Problem solving should be woven throughout the whole planning process

It has been noted, however, that some Areas appear reluctant to deviate from the provisions of their plans. Whilst effective scanning should produce a list of identified problems for inclusion in the plan, many may be "solved" during the year and others will arise during the year. A greater degree of flexibility will therefore need to be utilised by those concerned with the development of Area plans. This includes Unit level workshops.

Recommendation 24 The strategic planning processes need to be amended so that they reflect the PS philosophy of the force. The Force Strategic Planning Handbook should be amended to reflect PS at all levels, particularly to help determine goals and to reflect a high degree of flexibility in the unit level process.

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While the planning process is largely, though not wholly, consistent with PS; the way in which it is used, in some cases is not. The quarterly reviews by the Co-ordinators could be used to amend goals and development plans in the light of changing priorities and solved/emergent problems.

At a "macro" level however, it is questionable whether or not true PS takes place, particularly in relation to the Key Service Areas. (KSA). While elements of the stages of SARA appear to be present, it is not clear whether true scanning, analysis, response and assessment takes place.

Recommendation 25 The strategic planning department should review the extent to which the SARA process informs the planning process at a "macro" level.

6.3.5 Other agency co-operation

Another clear message from internal consultation and discussions with other agencies is that many organisations are unclear about the work of other agencies and groups. A clear view about their work will again facilitate more effective partnership working and the speedier resolution of problems.

Recommendation 26 In liaison with other agencies, a digest should be produced which outlines the roles and responsibilities of other agencies (including the police and voluntary groups) in the area.

Similar to the internal directory/digest, this volume should contain contact points and numbers in all other agencies. It should be distributed around and freely accessible in all agencies active in the community safety arena. Decisions will need to be taken with regard to those agencies which should be included in the volume and who should take overall responsibility for its' preparation and distribution.

To ensure that appropriate contact is established and maintained with agencies, but without being too prescriptive, we would also recommend the following.

Recommendation 27 Each Area should establish the appropriate meetings structure to facilitate continued contact with representatives of other agencies, at all levels.

This will, to some extent, counter the problems created by the force tenure policy as referred to earlier. By having a formal meeting and/or communication structure in place, the impact of a change in officer will be reduced. The presence of a central liaison point at District level as recommended above, will also help to facilitate the development of strong partnership links. The Reference Manual referred to above should also contain guidelines on the development of meeting structures and examples of good practice.

These meetings might also address the issue of information sharing. The establishment of standards and protocols for information exchange will enhance the development of effective partnerships. Such discussions can also consider the impact of the Data Protection Act on the exchange of information.

To facilitate an appreciation of the work of other agencies as soon as possible, we recommend the following.

Recommendation 28 All new police trainees and staff should spend some time in other agencies (even if only one day) to increase the awareness of their work and their operating practices.

Consideration could also be given to the development of reciprocal arrangements with agencies to allow their staff to spend some time in police stations.

6.3.6 General points

We recognise the existence of the current in force shift review project team and we have discussed our respective work. Good practice from other forces suggests that a flexible shift system is the most appropriate for effective problem solving. The shift review team has agreed to take account of the impact of PS on traditional shift systems and area structures in their deliberations, if PS is adopted across the force.

The shift review team recommendations were based upon a sound analysis of the present demand profile and their assumption is that resources would need to be deployed to match their demands.

Under a problem solving method of policing, it is our belief that the demands can be reduced by a combination of slow-tracking, tackling repeat calls and tackling the root causes of problems. We would agree that the peak demand times for service may not alter in the short term, but the level and timing of police deployments, in terms of response, could alter significantly.

Therefore, a shift system should allow for problem solving with more continuity and flexibility.

Finally, it is recognised that certain problems cannot be dealt with at an Area or even a Force level. For example, certain drug problems may only be able to be addressed through the development of the appropriate legislation. This should not deter the identification and notification of such problems to ACPO for further consideration and referral to the appropriate national bodies.

Recommendation 29 ACPO officers must be aware that they have a significant part to play in PS at a regional and national level, by bringing problems to the attention of the appropriate authorities, which cannot be addressed at a force level.

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6.4 Information Technology (IT)

6.4.1 Data analysis capability

The impact of IT on the effective adoption of PS is widely recognised. A major objective of IT in the force should, therefore, be to support the PS philosophy of the force. The shortfalls of the current in force IT capability have already been clearly referred to in Section 4. All current systems are geared to crime analysis with no provision for command and control generated data.

To embark on any meaningful analysis relating to PS, the ICJS system has to be "fused" with the Command and Control system and effectively "faced" with an effective data interrogation and analysis tool. The capture of data from those systems into an analysis tool requires that the download of such data is automatic, thus eliminating the need for local manual input and current "double-keying".

Recommendation 30 In the long term, to support effective problem solving, the force IT facilities need to move to incorporate the following:

- * Single data entry
- * Multi system access from a single screen
- * Data warehousing
- * Force wide, windows based networked systems.

The priority is progression to a data warehouse. In principle, this is an information server, which draws selected data from a variety of systems and presents a single front end to the user. Incorporated into many such warehouse systems are interrogation tools and the concept has been successfiilly adopted in a problem solving context by Cleveland. A more detailed description of the Cleveland system is found in Appendix D.

The ORACLE database tool can support a data warehouse facility and a number of data interrogation tools are available for use with that software. Use of ORACLE in this way presents two options.

- The software can be used on current systems for interrogation purposes only. Whilst this will improve analytical capability, a slowing down will occur of these systems as the processing of the interrogations is carried out by the main system holding the data. This is likely to lead to unacceptable delays in computer response and processing time.
- The establishment of a comprehensive data warehouse, which will download selected data from a number of source systems, for interrogation and analysis. This approach has no processing overhead and hence no impact on the performance of the base systems. We would suggest that the data warehouse incorporate data from the following sources as a minimum:
 - * Force Intelligence system
 - * Command and Control
 - * Integrated Criminal justice system
 - * Warrants database
 - * Firearms database

* RTA database

The benefits of using ORACLE as the base system for the warehouse are that ORACLE as a product is already well established in Merseyside and support skills are readily available. It also provides a migration platform for future system developments, such as Command and Control.

Recommendation 31 The force should pursue the option of developing a data warehouse system utilising ORACLE as a base system, as soon as is practicable.

Provided that suitable resources are available, it is anticipated that this system *could* be in place and operational within a matter of months. In the short term, however, there lies the possibility to download data from Command and Control to a CD-ROM. This in turn can be dispatched to Areas for subsequent analysis. The analysis tool would be an access application, entitled MERCC and ICJS data can be recorded and despatched using a similar method. By adopting this approach, both crime *and* incident data can be analysed which will facilitate the identification of problems from a wider perspective.

In addition, it is feasible to download data from both systems to a mapping system for further analysis, though this will require calibration of the geocoding methods between both systems.

Recommendation 32 The force should pursue the option of downloading and distributing Command and Control data, in the short term to support more effective problem identification and analysis.

We have recognised the work taking place nationally through the NSPIS and NMIS teams. We have discussed their plans and believe that while development work continues to progress, the amount of slippage already encountered means that the force will not be able to take advantage of any appropriate modules for some years to come. In other words, the timescales for NSPIS and NMIS are not compatible with the timescales for system development in Merseyside, to support PS.

As a result, we believe that the force should actively consider the procurement of a new Command and control system which will make a major contribution to PS. Our preliminary research has identified the Intergraph system as worthy of consideration, for the following reasons:

- It is an off the shelf package already in use in a number of forces.
- It will support the downloading of data into a data warehouse
- It is capable of identifying repeat incidents and has officer safety functions built into it
- It can be supplemented by effective front end, data interrogation tools.

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We have strong reservations regarding the progress of NSPIS/NMIS and we feel that it could be many years before any modules developed under their auspices, are available.

6.4.2 System access

The interrogation of any systems, either "fused" under data warehousing, or downloaded CD-ROM data, should not be confined to the sole use of specialist analysts. Whilst there is a clear and recognised need for such individuals, the value and credibility of the system will be greatly enhanced by access to the systems by all personnel. Access control protocols can ensure that officers and staff only have access to that data which they need to see, but it should be possible for all officers and staff to be able to interrogate crime and incident data from a PS perspective.

Recommendation 33 There must be sufficient adequate terminals to enable all officers to access the system(s) when and where they need to. Appropriate access controls should be established to facilitate this.

6.4.3 Other systems

The flexible working required by PS means that tight time management is crucial by all staff and officers. Many forces have espoused the benefits of a force wide computerised diary and planning system to assist in this regard.

Recommendation 34 The force should procure a computerised diary system to assist in time and resource management in relation to problem solving.

It is recognised that this is also being considered by the shift review and the formal detailed recommendation for such a system is likely to emerge from this project team. We would give our full support to such a recommendation.

Consideration will also need to be given to the development of appropriate PS administration systems, probably by using existing IT desktop facilities. These will help to manage the SARA process and check on the progress of responses to problems.

It is recognised that the force requires a Management Information System and that a project has been initiated to consider the feasibility of such a system. This must not be viewed in isolation.

Recommendation 35 One of the core objectives of the proposed Management Information System must be to support the problem solving process.

6.5 Human Resources

6.5.1 Human Resources strategy

The 1997 Corporate Strategy Document, in setting out how the Vision of Merseyside Police would be achieved, stated that a problem solving approach and systems would be developed to prevent crime and policing problems. This was largely in response to recommendations of the Strategic Debrief Team, and more indirectly to the highlighting of problem solving as good practice by the Audit Commission, although other influences also had effect.

As noted throughout this report, the main thrust of problem solving is the accurate identification of problems, an analysis of the underlying causes, and the formulation of effective responses. Goldstein states that the purpose of the Police is best served by creating the conditions and providing the resources to allow problem solving to take place routinely. He contends that the *whole* service needs to be problem focused, servicing the officers who know the underlying issues and are in touch with the community. The solving of problems, therefore, is not merely of concern to operational officers dealing directly with crime and disorder. It must also be applied internally so that effective support is provided to service deliverers, enabling them to provide the highest possible quality of service to the people of Merseyside.

If problem solving is to become a core philosophy of the force, practised at all levels and within all roles, then it requires the support of the Human Resources Directorate. Tf the cultural resistance to problem solving experienced by other force and highlighted by our own internal consultations, is to be avoided or overcome, then total and explicit support for the problem solving ethos must be continuously expressed across the organisation.

Recommendation 36 A visible Human Resources strategy for the force must support and embrace a problem solving philosophy.

We believe that this can be provided through the incorporation of the following points in the HR strategy for the force.

- The provision of problem solving training as part of the core training programme, with all staff and employees receiving input.
- An emphasis on problem solving within Performance Review.
- The development of a specific problem solving competency within Competence Profiling.
- An emphasis on problem solving skills in the recruitment, selection and promotion processes.
- The support of an effective rewards and recognition system

In discussion with staff of the HR department, there is a broad commitment to incorporate such issues, if PS is adopted across the force.

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6.5.2 Performance review and competence profiling

It could be argued that problem solving skills are already required to be evidenced as part of the performance review process, for instance, under 'innovation and creativity' which requires the identification of problems and the formulation of working solutions. However, there are strong arguments for the creation of a separate problem solving competence.

If problem solving is to become a core philosophy of the force, practised at all levels and within all roles, then it requires the support of the appraisal system in a specific and measurable manner. Non-specific skills appraisal creates the very real possibility, as evidenced in other forces, of the problem solving message being diluted or 'lost'. The cultural resistance to problem solving experienced elsewhere suggests that the total and explicit support of the problem solving ethos must be expressed continuously, across the organisation. Performance Review is the ideal tool for this. Not only can it provide an annual 'health-check' for problem solving skills which can inform training, it is also used in promotion and selection processes and therefore the inclusion of and emphasis on problem solving provides both carrot and stick to individual performance.

Further, the competencies are being extended into the recruitment process, so problem solving skills will need to be evidenced to ensure employment.

Recommendation 37 Definitions should be established for the required skill levels for problem solving for every role in the force.

It is suggested that the core skills for problem solving are:

- Ability to apply knowledge to identify problems
- Ability to analyse underlying causes of problems
- Ability to develop workable solutions to problems
- Ability to utilise colleagues / other agencies to develop solutions
- Ability to take responsibility for dealing with problems
- Ability to assess solutions and learn from experience

The Guidance Notes for competence profiling show that skills related to problem solving are exhibited within a number of the current competencies. For instance:

Flexibility: I

- Level 4 Will carry out associated roles as required
- Level 5 Will help colleagues when required

Level 7 -

Adjusts their working arrangements to meet changing needs

Provides suggestions to assist effectiveness / efficiency

Innovation & Creativ	vity: Referring procedure	largely to a s	methods	of work,	systems	&
Level		tions to probl consibility for	•			
Level	4 - Identifies Realises it Takes pos	Identifies a problem or area for improvement Realises its implications for the future Takes positive steps to rectify the situation or resolve the difficulty		lve		
Level :	Acts on id	medium term lentified probl working solu	lems		sful	

Planning & organising:

Level 3 -	Successfully plans projects or operations as required
	Meets goals which have been set
Level 4 -	Assists others with their planning

Application of Professional Knowledge;

Level 3 -	Has & can apply professional knowledge relevant to the	
	role	
Level 5 - H	as a wide range of professional knowledge and applies	
this to the benefit of the organisation		

Application of Procedure:

Level 4 -	Is aware of a wide range of organisational procedures required to carry out their role Uses their knowledge to enhance the role
Level 5 -	Knows a wide range of organisational procedures Puts their knowledge into practice for the benefit of the organisation

Handling:	Is able to interpret information		
Level 3 -	Is objective in their interpretation of information		
	Having recorded information takes the appropriate action		
Level 4 -	Realises the implications of information and takes appropriate action		

These are just some of the competence statements which relate to problem solving. In relation to the ability to utilise colleagues and external agencies in solving problems, the competencies of Relationships with Customers, Relationships with Peers, Relationships with Managers, Relationships with Subordinates, Oral Communication and Listening Skills all have relevance.

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Information

Recommendation 38 There should be a specific problem solving competency, which must form part of the core competencies.

It was initially intended that the new competence be devised by the Project Team, with definition statements, to be added to the Performance Review system. Whilst it is still strongly advised that this be undertaken prior to implementation, the Team consider that Organisation Development, who are responsible for the current review of Competence Profiling, would be a more appropriate for this task. Firstly, it is within their sphere of responsibility and expertise, and secondly it is considered that a problem solving competence could best be developed through the amalgamation or rationalisation of existing competencies.

In any case, if problem solving is to succeed as an ethos, then Organisation Development and Management Development & Training must be wholly committed to and involved in the creation of an integrated approach, of which competence profiling is only a part.

6.5.3 Training

As part of the internal consultation process, we held lengthy discussions with the head of management Development and Training. As a result, a number of modules in relation to problem solving training for the force were developed for further consideration. Whilst this undoubtedly helped to clarify our thinking, with respect to training, it was felt that without a clear view of the problem solving skills, it would be difficult to identify any detailed training programme.

Recommendation 39 An integrated and comprehensive problem solving training programme needs to be developed, once the problem solving skills profiles have been identified and agreed.

The draft programme prepared by the head of Management Development and Training will undoubtedly help in the preparation of the formal training and a summary of this draft programme is found in Appendix E.

In our deliberations, we developed a series of minimum requirements for any PS training, arising out of the comments of all officers and staff consulted. The draft training package meets and even exceeds the requirements of the project team in the following respects:

- The programme is integrated and comprehensive
- Every member of the force, including ACPO, will receive at least a one day training package, which appears to address the core skills and allow for instruction in the SARA and PAT models. It is classroom based *and* is supplemented by an open and distance learning package delivered with the support of Area/Dept supervision

- Additional training is provided for civilian managers, Sergeants and Inspectors
- Area Commanders will be joined by other senior managers in problem solving training
- Learning outcomes have been built into the package which exceed those proposed by the project team
- A module involving other agencies in problem solving has been devised, aimed at strategic and operational managers in partner agencies as well as representatives from other external bodies with relationships to the police. Whilst 'case studies' are not mentioned, illustrations of good practice will be included
- Appropriate quality assurance processes have been devised, covering *all* modules
- Problem solving has been made part of core training

The team recommendations (or parts of) which the programme does not yet address are:

- Specialist roles have not been catered for within the programme, though the apparently comprehensive nature of the package may negate the need for specific specialist training.
- Training for Area Commanders does not have learning outcomes relating to problem solving in the planning process or to resource deployment, although these could possibly be built into 'understanding of principles and systems', and 'consideration of their strategic leadership role'
- It is questionable whether the 'Problem Solving & Partnerships' module meets the team's intentions for/oiirf training. However, it may well be sufficient to meet the needs of problem solving for the immediate future and could be developed upon the following if research dictated.
- Deadlines for training delivery are not included. Until a decision is made on how and when problem solving is to be implemented, the team cannot inform the training centre of necessary deadlines. However, the proposed District/Dept based delivery of the programme, related to receptivity, is likely to be sympathetic to phased implementation.
- Many of those consulted indicated a preference for training prior to implementation rather than post implementation. A phased implementation may be able to accommodate this request.

These issues have now been raised with the head of Training and is subject to further discussion, pending the decision to proceed with PS. The programme has been costed out by the training centre, in conjunction with the other core modules and details are found in Section 7 below. This includes the assistance of an external consultant in the development of the training programme.

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Recommendation 40 The implementation team should work closely with the Training department to develop suitable training, built upon the draft programme already produced.

6.6 Marketing

6.6.1 Internal marketing

A number of potential cultural blockages have clearly been identified which may prevent the effective adoption of PS. To help counter these blockages, we recommend the foilowing.

Recommendation 41 There must be an effective internal marketing strategy for problem solving both prior to and after implementation.

The exact nature of this strategy can be agreed between the implementation team and the force PR department. Doubts were expressed by some about the ability of the PR department but we feel that they must be consulted throughout this process. Consideration might be given to the use of external PR experts to assist in this process, if it is felt to be appropriate.

A clear issue arising out of the consultation process has been the level of ACPO and senior officer commitment to PS. If such commitment can be clearly demonstrated then this may help to build support for and commitment to PS, throughout the force.

Recommendation 42 There must be visible and strong ACPO commitment to problem solving at all times.

Such support can be demonstrated in a number of ways such as, the opening of *alt* problem solving training programmes by an ACPO member, enquiring about the use of PS and how they can help to improve the conditions for effective PS working, during visits to Areas.

It is also suggested that by making this report freely available, once it has been reviewed by the board, will help to show an open and clear commitment. Decisions taken, with respect to the recommendations outlined in this report should also be publicised across the force, together with the reasons for the decision. This will clearly and visibly demonstrate that the consultation process has been taken fully into account and that decisions, in respect of recommendations, have been taken for valid reasons.

6.6.2 External marketing

It has been widely recognised internally and externally, that PS has a major impact on public expectations and as such its launch must be handled carefully, from an external perspective. There must, therefore, be careful external marketing of the problem solving approach on a continued and consistent basis.

Recommendation 43 There must be an effective external marketing strategy for problem solving both prior to and after implementation.

The exact nature of this strategy can be agreed between the implementation team and the force PR department. Consideration might be given to the use of external PR experts to assist in this process, if it is felt to be appropriate.

Such a strategy must ensure that the public and diverse communities of Merseyside are fully aware of the reasons for and impact of problem solving. It is expected that full use will be made of *all* sections of the local and regional media in pursuing this strategy.

A simple means of supplementing this message is to clarify how people can contact the force by phone. The current one line entries in the telephone directory could be replaced by a full page entry for Merseyside Police, similar to those provided by the utilities. In addition to clearly outlining the appropriate phone numbers, this page will also explain the circumstances in which the public should call 999 and those in which they should call other numbers. In so doing, it may help to begin the message filtering process discussed in relation to the proposed PSD. It also provides an opportunity to market the force and promote the problem solving philosophy.

6.7 Implementation

The first decision that needs to be taken is whether or not the force should move to a PS approach. It has already been clearly identified that much work needs to be done if the force is to do so. A decision to implement will undoubtedly involve some disruption and will incur some costs. At a time when many officers feel sensitive to further change following the reorganisation, it may be decided to defer or postpone the decision to adopt PS.

6.7.1 Do not adopt PS

A decision not to adopt PS will, however, prevent the implementation of a method of policing which, "in the long term" will enable a more effective service to be delivered to the diverse communities of Merseyside. In addition, the impending Crime and Disorder legislation is likely to strongly favour the development of partnerships between the police and other agencies in order take a shared approach to "solving problems". Partnership working is, by definition, strongly associated with a PS approach by a number of agencies, including the police. Failure to adopt a PS approach in the next twelve to eighteen months may bring the force into conflict with new legislation.

6.7.2 Pilot scheme and evaluation

If it is decided to move ahead with the adoption of PS across the force, several options present themselves with regard to implementation. If it is felt appropriate to move ahead cautiously, then a pilot scheme could be adopted in one or two Areas and

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perhaps a Headquarters Department. Following evaluation, modifications may be made to the approach, which can then be "rolled out" across the Force.

Whilst this approach minimises disruption and ensures that, as far as possible, the most appropriate model for PS working in Merseyside is "rolled out", it does mean that it may be several years before the force can be said to have fully embraced PS. This may be unacceptable both internally and externally and if the Government do promote a partnership approach to crime and disorder problems, they are likely to develop a series of Key Performance Indicators in this area. Failure to adopt PS fully may cause the force to fail to achieve any such performance targets.

6.73 Phased implementation

By adopting a phased implementation programme the force can ensure that the approach can be introduced steadily across the force and make appropriate modifications as the programme progresses. This approach may minimise disruption, but will again mean that it may be a number of months, and possibly up to two years, before PS was fully adopted.

6.7.4 "Big-bang" force wide implementation

If it was felt that time delays in the force wide adoption of the approach were unacceptable, then one option is to consider a total force wide implementation on a given date. This would mean that all Areas and support departments and units would be adopting a common approach. The "big-bang" launch would also provide a major opportunity to market the approach externally.

With such an option, however, there is likely to be massive disruption. In addition, most of the costs of implementation will be borne at one time placing a severe burden on the force finances. It is also unlikely that all of the measures required to support the effective adoption of PS can be put in place in time for a launch during 1998.

6.7.5 Timing

In addition to the appropriate option for implementation, there is clearly a series of options in relation to the timing of the implementation. It would seem prudent for such a fundamental re-focusing of the force that any implementation plans should be aligned with the fiscal year. As outlined, below, the adoption of PS will have considerable financial implications. The implementation costs should be woven into the forces annual spending plans.

As a result, the force, we believe, faces a simple choice of adoption in April 1998 or April 1999. An early adoption will, effectively, rule-out a "big-bang" launch but support the other options outlined above. A later adoption will support all options but mean that the dates for full force wide adoption under a phased or pilot implementation will be further delayed.

Whichever option is chosen, all of the recommendations remain valid but the timing of their adoption is variable between options. It is, however, crucial that suitable IT

and training is in place prior to the implementation of PS. Failure to do so could have a negative impact on the credibility of PS which might in turn cause it be viewed as 1998's"fad".

Recommendation 44 We recommend that the force adopt the phased implementation option and plan to commence the adoption of PS from April 1998.

Recommendation 45 We further recommend that the implementation of PS should be managed by a dedicated *force* implementation team.

6.8 Evaluation

It is clear that the force needs to be able to evaluate the PS approach. If it is not shown to be effective then decisions may need to be taken regarding modifications to the approach. Any evaluation needs to consider two aspects of PS:

- Impact did the PS approach solve the problem and are the public pleased with the service they are receiving?
- Process did the force processes for PS work effectively?

The performance management processes outlined in Section 6.3.3 address the issue of process evaluation. There is a need, therefore, to establish processes, which will evaluate the impact of PS. The Audit Commission paper *"Tackling Patrol Effectively"* considers how forces can evaluate PS approaches.

It suggests a list of possible measures by which the impact of PS can be assessed. It also suggests that baselines or benchmarks need to be established for the chosen measures, prior to the implementation of PS against which progress can be gauged, post implementation.

The Audit Commission suggests that the impact of PS might be measured by a number of indicators, including:

- Calls for service dropping
- Fewer officers on response duties
- Fewer repeat calls
- Under graded response, a lower percentage of calls being graded "emergency"
- Reduction in repeat offending
- The establishment of effective partnerships with agencies and other groups effectiveness measured by the setting and achievement of objectives.
- Greater public support for a PS style of policing
- A reduction in the fear of crime
- Increases in officer satisfaction
- Evidence of innovation in strategy formulation
- The presence of a flexible shift system to support PS

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Others are offered and the list of potential measures is not exhaustive. We would recommend the following.

Recommendation 46 The measures to be used to assess the impact of PS should be identified and agreed prior to the implementation of PS. The infrastructures to gather, analyse and interpret the appropriate information should also be established at this time.

Recommendation 47 Baseline data should be produced for the selected impact measures, prior to the implementation of PS.

Timescales for the review of impact measures will need to be agreed but annual reviews are probably the most appropriate. PS could be built into the annual customer perception survey on both a force basis and Area by Area. This would enable some of the customer focused, qualitative data to be gathered.

7. COSTS OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Outlined below are estimates of the costs of adopting the recommendations made in this report. It is recognised that some of these costs are "opportunity costs" and relate to the reallocation of resources. In addition, the funds for some of these costs are already committed and hence the money will be spent whether the recommendations are accepted or not. The total value of "new spend" in relation to the recommendations is considerably lower, therefore, than the total cost of the recommendations.

At the end of each section, an indication is given of the amount of "new spend" for the items described in that section.

7.1 Manuals and directories

Estimated total cost of manuals and directories -	£ 24	4,525
Design and type setting	£	300
Laminated aide-memoire 6000 copies	£	700
Production of reference manual (personal issue) 6000 copies x $\pounds 3.40$	£ 20),400
Production of enhanced telephone directories 500 copies x £6.25	£ 3	,125

This is all new spend.

7.2 Additional Analyst Requirements

7.2.1 Equipment	
PC Terminal	£ 12,600
Add hardware	£ 3,500
Wiring	£ 1,400
12 Notebooks / LIC	£ 19,250

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	Sub-total	£ 46,590
12 training expenses		£ 2,000
12 training (free with each licence)		-
ANACAPA		£ 4,900
Force Intelligence System (3 days)		£ 2,940
7.2.2 Training		

The cost of some of the hardware may be reduced by the availability of equipment currently held by the force. However, it is assumed that such "spare" resources are not available and that the equipment and training for the analysts will require "new spend".

7.2.3 Staff costs

Salary per annum scale E	x 1	£15,540 to £18,375
	x 6	£108,780 to £128,625

Estimated total cost of additional analysts - £165,000

All of this is "new spend"

7.3 Problem Solving Implementation Team

Costs are based on a phased implementation, with the team commencing work in January 1998. The team will facilitate the introduction of 'Incident Management Units', co-ordinate staffing, training and the provision of IT. requirements. It will also act as a consultancy during problem solving implementation across the force, represent Merseyside at quarterly Home Office Problem Solving Conferences and review and evaluate progress in August / September 1998.

7.3.1 Additional Revenue Costs.

1.	Travelling expenses				
	In force (car allowances) 8,000 miles x43.8p		£3,504		
	Outside Force	e (public transport)		£2,000	
2.	Accommoda	tion and Subsistence		£2,000	
3.	Stationery an	nd Printing (additional to that listed above)		£ 100	
	~ • •	,	Total	£7,604	
7.3.2	Opportunity C	Costs			
Superi Inspec Sergea Consta	ant	36 weeks at £1,368 36 weeks at £982 36 weeks at £809 36 weeks at £679		£ 49,248 £ 35,352 £ 29,124 £ 24,444	
		Total		£ 138,168	
7.3.3	External cons	ultant			
22 days @ £250 per day, plus travelling expenses £ 6,000					
Estimated total costs of implementation team - £ 151,772					
Some £138,000 of the total costs are opponunity costs for the implementation team. The amount of "new spend" is therefore only approximately £13,600.					
<u>7.4 Trainine Costs</u>					
'Solving problems and Developing Greater effectiveness' All Police and Civilian Staff = 5866 x 2 days £593,873					
'Leadership and Quality Control in Problem Solving'Civilian Supervisors, Sergeants and Inspectors1043staffx2days£105,593					
Problem Solving - Improving Area and Departmental					

Problem Solving - Improving Area and Departmental Performance - Senior Police and Civilian Managers 88 x 1 day £ 4,454

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Merseyside Police: Problem Solving Policing Project Team Problem Solving and partnerships - strategic and £ 3,459 operational managers - Inter-agency 64 x 1 day Additional training for specialists; call-handling, analysts and ACPO. 200 staff days £10,000 Estimated total cost of training -£ 717,379 Some of the cost of training is opportunity cost but the programme does rely on some external trainers and external accommodation. The remainder of the cost relates to the preparation and delivery of the training by internal and external providers. This amount of money is already present in the core training budget and is hence not "new spend". However, acceptance of the recommendations will require a re-allocation of the training budget A failure to re-allocate will mean that this training can only be underpinned by "new spend". 7.5 Information technology 7.5.1 Short term Purchase of CD writer and software in relation to download from Command and Control. £5,000 This is new spend. 7.5.2 Data warehouse Information server using ORACLE base. Installation plus configuration £200,000 Additional licence £1,000 per user x 50 users £ 50,000 Interrogation tools licence \pounds 1,000 per user x 50 users £ 50,000 Terminal cost £1,000x50 50,000 £ Sub-total £ 350,000

This is new spend.

7.5.3 Network

It is recognised that a SARA network is desirable. The force has proposed that Windows NT will be the vehicle for future network development and it is perceived that a suitable SARA recording system can be networked within this system at an estimated cost of £ 100,000. This is a force wide system which will be paid for from other sources and therefore does not represent "new spend" for problem solving.

7.5.4 Command and Control

If it is decided to pursue a new Command and Control system as a means of supporting problem solving we would estimate a total procurement cost of approximately \pounds 2.2 million. Again, this is a force wide system, which does not represent "new spend" for problem solving.


In summary, the total costs of the recommendations (excluding IT) are approximately $\pounds 1.1$ million. However, much of this cost is either already committed or opportunity cost. As a result, the estimated "new spend" required to adopt the recommendations of the report is $\pounds 202,000$ of which $\pounds 165,000$ relates to the creation of six new analysts posts.

Estimated total IT costs, excluding network costs and a new Command and Control system are £355,000.

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APPENDIX A

A summary of forces visited and consultations carried out.



FORCE VISITS

- Surrey
- Northumbria
- Cleveland
- Thames Valley
- West Mercia
- Leicestershire
- West Midlands

INTERNAL CONSULTATION

The following individuals and departments were consulted.

- All board members
- Two Force Co-ordinators
- All Area Commanders
- Force Intelligence Bureau
- Training
- IS Systems
- Major Crime Unit
- 0.S.D
- Traffic
- Crime strategy
- Community Affairs
- Strategy and planning
- Resource planning
- Police Federation
- Unison

- Communications
- Operational Review team
- IT Scoping study
- Shift review team
- Role of Inspector Review
- Recognition and reward project
- Multi agency approach to organised and serious crime project
- Force structure review team


OTHER CONSULTATION

- Safer Merseyside Partnership
- Government Office for Merseyside
- MSPIS
- NMIS
- Professor Nick Tilley
- Home Office, Police Research Group

FOCUS GROUPS

٠	Wirral -	10/9/97
10	Sefton & Crosby -	11/9/97
٠	St. Helens and Knowsley -	16/9/97
٠	Liverpool South -	24/9/97
i e	Liverpool North -	25/0/97
٠	Liverpool South (2) -	2/10/97

Local Authority Focus group - 3/10/97



APPENDIX B

Pro forma used in the corisultation process

POLICY GROUP INTERVIEWS

Objectives of the Interviews

- To further the consultation process by giving members of the Policy Group an opportunity to contribute to the implementation of POP in Merseyside.
- To identify the issues which will need to be addressed if POP is to implemented across Merseyside.
- To gather information regarding the current situation in relation to problem solving activity and the issues identified.

There will be total anonymity in the reporting of the points raised in the interviews. No comments will be ascribed to individuals or groups; no reference will be made in the final report, to the source of any issues which may arise.

Issues to cover

Current situation

- What is your understanding of a problem solving approach to Policing ?
- What is your understanding of the extent of adoption of problem solving across the Force.
- How do you presently identify Force wide problems and set priorities ?
- How is partnership/multi agency working incorporated into the Policing across the Force?

Potential impact of a Problem Solving approach

- What impact do you think an approach which puts more emphasis on problem solving will have on operations and methods of working across the Force ?
- Which of the following do you feel will need to change if a problem solving approach is to be fully adopted across the Force ?
 - * Methods of working
 - * IT and management information
 - * Culture of officers
 - * Structure and organisation
 - * Internal communications
 - * Training
 - * Recruitment
 - * Management skills
 - * Devolution of decision making powers
 - * Financial control processes

* Any other issue not listed.

Why will they need to change and how ?

• Are there any other issues which you feel should be taken into account when implementing a problem solving approach ?

AREA COMMANDER INTERVIEWS

Objectives of the Interviews

- To further the consultation process by giving Area Commanders an opportunity to contribute to the implementation of POP in Merseyside.
- To identify the issues which will need to be addressed if POP is to implemented across Merseyside.
- To gather information regarding the current situation in relation to problem solving activity and the issues identified.

There will be total anonymity in the reporting of the points raised in the interviews. No comments will be ascribed to individuals or groups; no reference will be made in the final report, to the source of any issues which may arise.

Issues to cover

Current situation

- What is your current approach to Policing your area ?
- How do you presently identify problems on the Area and set priorities ?
- How is partnership/multi agency working incorporated into the Policing of the area?
- Can you give examples of problem solving approaches in your Area ?
- If you have any examples, were they effective or not in dealing with the identified problem(s).
- If you have such examples, were any issues identified which made the use of the approach difficult, if any ?
- How is problem solving and the possible contribution of other agencies in helping solve those problems, incorporated into your Local Policing Plan ?

Potential impact of a Problem Solving approach

- What impact do you think an approach which puts more emphasis on problem solving will have on operations and methods of working in your area ?
- Which of the following do you feel will need to change if a problem solving approach is to be fully adopted in your Area (if not adopted already) and across the Force ?
 - * IT and management information
 - * Culture of officers
 - * Structure and organisation
 - * Internal communications
 - * Training
 - * Recruitment

- * Management skills
- * Devolution of decision making powers
- * Financial control processes
- * Any other issue not listed.

Why will they need to change and how ?

• Are there any other issues which you feel should be taken into account when implementing^ a problem solving approach ?

MERSEYSIDE POLICE P.O.P. PROJECT

SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PRO-FORMA

Issues to probe in the interviews with officers and support staff from other Forces are as follows.

1. Background

- What are the stated objectives for POP at a Force and/or local level ?
- What is the geographical base for POP in the Force e.g. Force wide, Urban/Rural, Divisional/Area ?
- Is POP applied to all problems or some ?
- If some, what are the selection criteria ?
- Is **POP** seen as a long term (strategic) or short term (tactical) approach ?
- How does the POP approach dovetail with the more mainstream (reactive style) policing in the Force ?

2. Structure and Organisation

2.1 Force level

- Who has responsibility for POP at a.Force level ?
- How does the operational structure take account of the needs of POP ?
- How is senior officer commitment embodied in the approach ?

2.2. Local level

- Who has responsibility for POP at a local level ?
- How does the operational structure take account of the needs of POP ? e.g. are there POP teams at a local level ?
- How is senior officer commitment embodied in the approach ?
- To what extent is decision making devolved to a local level ? i.e. to what extent does the structure support the empowerment of officers at a local level ?

2.3 Partnership working

- Is there a multi agency controlling/co-ordinating group and what role does it have ?
- Is there a partnership co-ordinator (project champion) for POP, in Force ?
- How is mulli agency co-ordination achieved at a local/operational level ?
- How is other agency commitment to the POP approach developed and maintained ?

3. The operation of POP

3.1 Problem identification

- How are problems identified ?
- Who identifies them ?
- How are they brought to the notice of other agencies ?
- How is it decided, which problems are to be addressed ?

3.2 Development of initiatives

- How are initiatives developed ?
- Who develops them ?
- Who implements them ?
- Who co-ordinates them ?
- How is the work allocated/divided up between the agencies ?

3.3 Evaluation of initiatives

- How do you evaluate the initiatives under POP and how can you tell whether or not initiatives are working ?
- How often do you evaluate initiatives ?
- How are the results of the evaluation fed back into the process to enable any required "corrective action" to take place ?
- How and how often are evaluation results disseminated and who are they disseminated to ?
- Who carries out the evaluation and disseminates the results ?

4. Management Information (MIS)

4.1 Current structures

- What is the current state of Management Information in the Force ?
- What is the role of IT in providing this information ?
- What is the structure for MIS provision at a Force and local level, including staff support ?
- What are the processes for sharing information with other agencies ?

4.2 MIS to support POP

- What MIS is provided to support the POP approach ?
- Who is it provided to ?
- How is it provided ?
- How often is it provided ?
- : Who provides it ?

- Can the receiver request additional/non standard information and MIS reports and what are the processes for doing so?
- Can the receiver request that information to be provided in specific formats (e.g.graphics) and what are the processes for doing so?

4.3 Source data and data analysis

- What is the source of the data which is compiled to produce the MIS ?
- What structures and processes are in place to bring that data together to produce the MIS ?
- What are the quality checks on the source data ?

5. Communications

• How is POP communicated throughout the Force ?

• What communication strategies have been adopted to ensure that all officers and support staff are aware of POP and how it impacts their job ?

• How are developments in POP communicated throughout the Force ?

6. Training & Recruitment

6.1 Individual skills

- How do you identify what skills are required to enable officers and other staff to adopt POP successfully ?
- How do you identify individual training needs with respect to POP ?

6.2 Training

- What training programmes are in place to equip officers and staff with the skills to enable them to make the most of POP ?
- Who is trained and what are the criteria for selection ?
- How are they trained ? e.g. course, distance learning, course structures and content?
- When are they trained ?
- How long are they trained ?
- Who carries out the training ?
- Is there refresher training ?
- Where are they trained ? e.g. in Force, outside ?
- Do other agencies take part in the same training ?

6.3 Recruitment

• How ate. the requirements of POP reflected in the recruitment processes ?

7. Evaluation & Performance

- How do you measure the impact of POP ? i.e. does it work ?
- Does it have more or less of an impact than expected ?
- Where_andhow does-iLworJcwell?
- Where and how does it not work so well ?
- How do you incorporate the findings, of any evaluation to ensure that the approach can be improved ?
- WhaL processes are in place to assess the performance of individual officers with respect to POP ?

8. General points

- How did you counter the traditional culture of the police service which, favours a more "reactive" style of policing, and engender a positive attitude towards POP ?
- How do you dovetail the objectives, of POP with the National Key Objectives and Key Performance Indicators ?
- If you could implement POP again what would you do differently either at the planning or implementation phases ?
- -- What difference has POP madeJ?
- What do the public think of the POP approach ?
- What other relevant points should be taken account of in implementing POP ?.

APPENDIX C


A model SARA form

	signed by	by the Central POP Group)			
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WHAT ALERTED YOU TO THE PROBLEM?	plea	ase.tick the relevant box(es) and complete the text where requested:			
Central POP Group/Monthly beat hand-out		Please enclose any information or advice you received			
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		Central POP Group			
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RESULT

To include Performance Indicators:

(1) Numher of persons arrested

(2) Number of persons charged and number of charges

(3) Number of offences detected

(4) Value of property recovered

(5) Intelligence gained (attach C44 Log)

(6) Number of informants recruited

(7) Number of staff-hours used

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APPENDIX D



and the

In late 1994 the force recognised that in order for scarce resources to be used more efficiently and effectively, they had to move to a position where we could work "smarter" as opposed to following the conventional pattern of having resources working ever harder.

At the same time, they were receiving indications from a variety of sources, that issues, such as repeat victimisation, quality of life issues and the better management of crime were coming to the fore. It was decided to use their geo-coded crime and incident data to help them progress the issues.

The plan was to consider crime analysis, then incident analysis and find a system which would allow them to fuse both together. This was felt to be of great importance as police forces had traditionally separated crimes and incidents, responding to the former with the CID and the latter with uniformed officers. A holistic approach would serve the public better.

It was planned to use this holistic approach as a platform to service long-term quality of life problems which had traditionally been low priority. From all of this, evolved three inter-related projects:

- Crime and Incident Pattern Analysis (CIPAS)
- Problem Oriented policing (POP)
- Psychological Offender Profiling.


C.I.P.A.S

Although data was collected on crimes and incidents, no package was available which allowed the vast amounts of data to be accessed and linked within the same system at the same time. Furthermore, outputs needed to be displayed in a variety of formats, including reports, network analysis, mapped backgrounds etc. In addition, PACE 1 stop check data needed to be available on the system for linking.

From a pilot site on one of the Districts, using the generic "Harlequin Watson" interrogation tools, the present CIPAS system was developed. On a daily basis, all crime and incident data is downloaded together with the last 40 days PACE data. This is added to a central system which consists of a folly relational database.


Each of the police Districts has a CIPAS site which connects via an ODBC link to a central server. Each CIPAS site is resourced by an analyst.

Through one terminal, therefore, access can be gained to timely and up to date crime, incident and intelligence data.



APPENDIX E

A draft problem solving training programme



Solving Problems & Developing Greater Effectiveness

Targeted at all staff & employees, this is learning centre based lasting for 2 days. The learning outcomes being :

- Greater understanding of the principles of the problem solving approach
- Understanding of why team working and, where relevant, working in partnership with other agencies are vital to the problem solving approach
- Understanding of the core elements of the analytical systems adopted for problem solving by Merseyside Police
- To have applied these principles and systems in problem solving exercises
- To have critically examined their performance
- To have been introduced to the problem solving learning pack and considered the exercises contained within it

Delivery will be on a District & Departmental basis, and will be integrated with delivery of Investigative Interviewing and EO & Race Relations modules. Training will reach 96 officers per week of training delivery.

Solving Problems & Developing Greater Effectiveness - Learning Pack & Workplace Exercises

This is open and distance learning, supported by workplace supervisors and supplements the previous module. The module contains 16 hours of focused work in self-learning learning groups, and the rate of throughput will be an Area/Dept responsibility. The learning outcomes are :

- To have improved understanding of the principles and systems of the problem solving approach
- To have used the working pack as a learning reference
- To have applied problem solving principles and systems, as a learning group, to an area/dept problem
- Debriefing and evaluation of the group's approach to the problem with the support of a workplace supervisor
- Consideration of the future applications of the problem solving approach

Leadership & Quality Control in Problem Solving

Targeted at Sergeants, Inspectors and civilian supervisors, this is a 2 day, learning centre based module. The learning outcomes are :

- To have a greater understanding of principles of effective communication when working with a group
- To have considered their role as leaders in the development of effective problem solving approaches
- To have a greater understanding of the applications of the learning pack and workplace exercises
- To have a greater understanding of monitoring techniques which may be applied to problem solving

• To have become more able to provide constructive evaluative feedback

This module is supplementary to 'Solving Problems & Delivering Greater Effectiveness', and will be delivered on a District & Dept basis with a throughput of 96 per week of training delivery. It will be integrated with delivery of the other core modules.

Problem Solving - Improving Area & Departmental Performance

This is targeted at Area Commanders, Admin Managers, Crime and Ops Managers, and Dept Heads. It is a 1 day, learning centre based module supported by a learning pack. The learning outcomes are :

- Greater understanding of the principles and systems which support the problem solving adopted by Merseyside Police
- To have considered their role as a strategic leader in the development of a problem solving focus within their Areas and Depts
- To have evaluated, with colleagues, opportunities and scope of the problem solving approach
- To have considered illustrations of good practice

Delivery will be structured to enable a staged attendance of members of all command teams, avoiding impairment of resilience. There will be 32 per group.

Problem Solving and Partnerships

Aimed at Strategic and Operational Managers in Partner Agencies and Potential Partner Agencies, Co-ordinators from the Safer Cities Initiative and Representatives from Drug Action Teams and Charitable Bodies with a Responsibility for Problems with Causal Connections to Criminal Behaviour. A one day, learning centre based module having 4 trainers, an external academic commentator and a Merseyside ACPO representative. The learning outcomes are :

- To have a greater understanding of the principles and systems which support the problem solving adopted by Merseyside Police
- To have considered their role as a strategic/operational leader in the development of a shared problem solving focus amongst Merseyside's public agencies & bodies
- To have evaluated, with colleagues, opportunities and scope of the problem solving approach
- To have considered illustrations of good practice

This module will be delivered on a Merseyside basis to inform the external policy community and develop within it external strategic/operational support for the adoption of the problem solving approach.


It should be noted that Dr Cooper has included support of problem solving within other core modules. For instance, 'Working For and With Communities' promotes multi-agency and community group working; and 'Effective Monitoring & Analysis' (for Insp's and equivalent civilians) promotes better understanding, use and monitoring of both qualitative and quantitative performance indicators.

It is proposed that the Core Training Programme be delivered on a prioritised basis. In order to best achieve organisational development, the training centre has developed a scale of receptivity with areas and depts identified on the basis of openness to change and development. In prioritising training delivery, functional need will be taken into account but only in conjunction with receptivity and the potential to contribute to organisational change. The training centre has also targeted 'opinion makers' who can support 'learning'.

All modules within the core training programme will be subject of validation, evaluation and performance indicators. The training centre intend to validate the attainment of learning outcomes, obtain user comments, hold focus groups 3 and 6 months after completion of delivery to areas/depts, hold individual interviews, and analyse PT's to evaluate the possibility of causal relationships with the programme.

APPENDIX E

Analysis of costs of training programme



Programme Details

Programme Area Supporting Strategic Change

Programme Title

Programme of Training and Development to Strengthen the Application and Development of Problem Solving Policing as a Central Tool of Merseyside Police

Programme Objectives

- To strengthen the capacity of police officers and civilian staff in Merseyside Police to adopt, develop, and apply problem solving techniques and skills.
- To develop an awareness in senior police managers of the operational and strategic relevance of the problem solving approach.
- To develop and promote best practice in problem solving amongst existing and potential partner agencies.

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<u>Module Titles, Target Group* Learning Group Size.</u> <u>Delivery Method.</u>, Duration, and Learning Outcomes:

<u>Title</u>: <u>'Solving Problems and Developing Greater</u> <u>Effectiveness</u>¹

<u>Target Group</u>: All Merseyside Police Officers and Civilian Staff.

Learning Group Size: 16

<u>Delivery Method:</u> Learning Centre Based, Trainer Led (2 Trainers), Information Sessions, Exercises, and Group Discussion.

Duration: 2 Days

<u>Learning Outcomes</u>: At the completion of the module the participant will:

(a) have a greater understanding of the principles of the problem solving approach,

(b) understand why team working and, where relevant, working in partnership with other agencies are vital to the problem solving approach,

(c) understand the core elements of the analytical systems adopted for problem solving by Merseyside Police,

(d) have applied these principles and systems in problem solving exercises,

(e) have critically evaluated their performance, and,(f) have been introduced to the problem solving learning pack and considered the exercises contained within it.

Proposed Delivery Pattern

The module will be delivered on a district and

 departmental basis, and with 6 dedicated trainers will complete 6 modules in one week of delivery. Throughput of participants will therefore be 96 each week of delivery. Delivery will be integrated on a district basis with delivery of Investigative Interviewing and Equal Opportunity and Community and Race Relations modules. Completion of Target Group Delivery:

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Title: <u>'Solving Problems and Developing Greater</u> Effectiveness - Learning Pack and Workplace Exercises'

Target Group: All Merseyside Police officers and civilian staff.

Learning Group Size: Not Applicable

<u>Delivery Method:</u> Open and distance learning focused upon area and departmental crime problems, self-learning groups supported by workplace supervisors.

<u>Duration</u>: 16 hours focused work in self-learning learning groups.

<u>Learning Outcomes</u>: At the completion of the module the participant will:

(a) have improved (through application and use of the pack) his/her understanding of the principles and systems of the problem solving approach,

(b) have used the learning pack as a working reference,(b) have applied problem solving principles and systems, as a learning group, to an area or departmental problem,(c) debriefed and evaluated the group's approach to the problem with the support of a workplace supervisor, and,(d) have considered future applications of the problem solving approach.

Proposed Delivery Pattern

The module will be applicable for police officers and civilian staff who have completed 'Solving Problems and Developing Greater Effectiveness¹ and who are able to be supported by supervisors who have completed 'Leadership and Quality Control in Problem Solving*. The rate of

throughput is an area/departmental responsibility - who will also be concerned to use the module as an effective response to local issues and problems.

It is anticipated that delivery will be integrated on a district basis with delivery of Investigative Interviewing and Equal Opportunity and Community and Race Relations modules. Completion of Target Group Delivery:

No Cost for this module (except opportunity cost.)

Title: 'Leadership and Quality Control in Problem Solving'

<u>Target Group</u>: Civilian Supervisors, Sergeants and Inspectors.

Learning Group Size: 16

<u>Delivery Method:</u> Learning Centre Based, Trainer Led (2 Trainers), Information Sessions, Exercises, and Group Discussion.

Duration: 2 Days

Learning Outcomes: At the completion of the module the participant will:

(a) have a greater understanding of principles of effective communication when working with a group,

(b) have considered his/her role as a leader in the

development of effective problem solving approaches,

(c) have a greater understanding of the applications of the learning pack and workplace exercises,

(d) have a greater understanding of monitoring techniques which may be applied to problem solving, and,(e) have become more able to provide constructive

evaluative feedback.

(Learning Pre-requisite: 'Completion of Solving Problems and Delivering Greater Effectiveness'.)

Proposed Delivery Pattern

The module will be delivered on a district and departmental basis, and with 6 dedicated trainers wiU complete 6 modules in one week of delivery. Throughput of participants will therefore be 96 each week of delivery. Delivery will be integrated on a district basis with delivery

of Investigative Interviewing and Equal Opportunity and Community and Race Relations modules.



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<u>Title: 'Problem Solving - Improving Area and</u> <u>Departmental Performance</u>

Target Group: Area Commanders, Administration

Managers, Crime Managers, Operations Managers, and Departmental Heads.

Learning Group Size: 32

<u>Delivery Method:</u> Learning Centre Based, Trainer Led (4 Trainers and External Academic Commentator),

Information Sessions, Exercises, and Group Discussion. (Supported by Learning Pack).

Duration: 1 Day

Learning Outcomes: At the completion of the module the participant will:

(a) have a greater understanding of principles and systems which support the problem solving adopted by Merseyside Police,

(b) have considered his/her role as a strategic leader in the development of a problem solving focus within their areas and departments,

(c) evaluated, with colleagues, opportunities and scope of the problem solving approach, and,

(d) have considered illustrations of best practice.

Proposed Delivery Pattern

The module will be delivered on a Force wide basis to develop knowledge of, and strategic support for, the adoption of the problem solving approach by practitioners and supervisors. Throughput of participants will be 32 for

each module delivered.

Delivery will be integrated on a district basis with delivery of Investigative Interviewing and Equal Opportunity and Community and Race Relations modules.

Completion of Target Group Delivery:

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Title: **'Problem Solving' and Partnerships**¹

<u>Target Group</u>: Strategic and Operational Managers in Partner Agencies and Potential Partner Agencies, Coordinators from the 'Safer Cities Initiative', and Representatives from Drug Action Teams, and Charitable Bodies with a Responsibility for Problems with Causal Connections to Criminal Behaviour.

Learning Group Size: 32

<u>Delivery Method:</u> Learning Centre Based, Trainer Led (4 Trainers, External Academic Commentator, and an ACPO Rank Officer of Merseyside Police), Lectures, Information Sessions, Exercises, and Group Discussion. (Supported by Information Pack).

Duration: 1 Day

<u>Learning Outcomes:</u> At the completion of the module the participant will:

(a) have a greater understanding of principles and systems which support the problem solving adopted by Merseyside Police,

(b) have considered his/her role as a strategic or

operational leader in the development of a shared problem solving focus amongst Merseyside's public agencies and bodies,

(c) have evaluated, with colleagues, opportunities and scope of the problem solving approach, and,

(d) have considered illustrations of best practice.

Proposed Delivery Pattern

The module will be delivered on a Merseyside basis in order to inform the external policy community and to develop within it external strategic and operational support for the adoption of the problem solving approach.

Throughput of participants will be 32 for each module delivered.

Delivery will be integrated on a Force wide basis with delivery of Investigative Interviewing and Equal Opportunity and Community and Race Relations modules.

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