Dear Commissioner Roache:

Neighborhood Policing: A Plan of Action for the Boston Police Department provides a framework, schedule, and list of tasks for converting all operations of the BPD to the practice of Neighborhood Policing, while meeting the basic need of the citizens of Boston for reliable, rapid response to emergency calls for service.

The intent and primary focus of the plan is to identify the internal actions that must be taken to better position the Department to work in partnership with the neighborhoods of the City of Boston. Crucial to the success of this effort is development of police officers as society's leading problem solvers in the drive to free every neighborhood from crime, disorder, and fear. Consequently, this Plan of Action focuses on readying the Department's infrastructure to support a fully functional partnership with citizens who are determined to strengthen the communities where they live and work.

The next twelve months are the period of transition. During this period the organization's needs (defined in this report) for equipment, technology, and training will be addressed. The BPD's structure will be reorganized both to decentralize decision making and to ensure new standards of accountability. A systematic, integrated partnership between the public, police, and other agencies will be developed through a planning process that will select and rank problems to be solved, prevent new problems from arising, and define measures for success. And Neighborhood Policing will begin to be implemented in and around a number of neighborhood business districts around the city. All the tasks that must be performed in the next year will require a highly cooperative and collaborative relationship with our unions, the academic institutions in and around Boston, and the private and public sector.

Full implementation of the new policing strategy will depend on hiring enough officers to staff all the beats and sectors that will be delineated in the next four months by Area and District Commanders working with the citizens they serve.

Neighborhood Policing: A Plan of Action for the Boston Police Department is the result of a thorough self-assessment conducted by task forces comprised of officers representing our major unions, the Boston Management Consortium, other outside consultants and academic experts, and by officers from every rank and most major units. A representative sample of these (26%) participated in the Department-wide, anonymous, voluntary survey sent to every sworn member of the BPD.

We found great strengths — particularly in the BPD's long tradition of neighborhood service, its successful experiences with a variety of neighborhood-oriented programs, its wide network of community contacts, and the dedication of its personnel. The Plan of Action builds on these strengths.

Raymond L. Flynn, Mayor
We also found deficits — in equipment, technology, training, and a disparity between the readiness of officers to embrace the tenets of Neighborhood Policing and their perception that the media and the residents of the city do not understand or appreciate their efforts. The Plan of Action describes how these problems will be addressed.

As you know, the most serious obstacle confronting full implementation of Neighborhood Policing in Boston is the current inability of the city to hire more police officers to meet citizen demands and expectations. Nevertheless, we will press forward aggressively and on all fronts to transform the basic operations of the Department to support Neighborhood Policing while we implement it wherever staffing allows.

Neighborhood Policing is an idea whose time has come. Boston is very strongly positioned to be one of the first cities in the nation to redeem its potential. By 1995, when the Department moves into its new $51-million, state-of-the-art headquarters, we hope to have fully implemented and staffed this initiative.

Sincerely,

William J. Bratton
Superintendent-in-Chief
NEIGHBORHOOD POLICING

A PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

Raymond L. Flynn
Mayor

Francis M. Roache
Police Commissioner

SEPTEMBER 1992
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The Values of the Boston Police Department

I. Guarantee the constitutional rights of all citizens.

II. Maintain the highest standards of honesty and integrity.

III. Promote the professionalism of Boston Police personnel.

IV. Enhance the working relationship between the Department and the neighborhoods.

V. Improve the quality of life in our neighborhoods.
The Goal:

Building Neighborhoods Without Fear

The Vision

In January 1984, in his first inaugural address, Mayor Raymond L. Flynn described his fundamental mandate as "apportion[ing] our common wealth and vitality fairly and humanely for the betterment of our common good.... It is the mark of Boston's greatness that the hopes which unite us are much stronger than the fears that divide us."

The "hopes which unite us" are the energy and sustenance of Neighborhood Policing.

What is its effect?

Neighborhoods that are good and decent places to live, work, and raise families.

Citizens confident in their ability that, working with police, they can secure their own futures.

Police officers trained and equipped to carry out their innate determination to protect the right of every well-intentioned citizen of any age and background to contribute to society and prosper.

The Hard Realities

Success will be measured by outcomes, not just police activities (response times, etc.).

These measures will be defined by police and citizens working together in each neighborhood and may include things like

- the real rate of crime, as defined by victimization studies;
- the appearance of each neighborhood (charting progress against abandoned cars, lots, and buildings);
- the number of families who commit to live and work in an area;
- the number of citizens who provide ongoing assistance and support to police;
- the rising level of customer satisfaction expressed toward police by the citizens of Boston; and
- the rising level of job satisfaction expressed toward their work by police officers.

A safe and secure city will emerge only from building neighborhoods without fear.

At first, the crime rate may rise due to increased complaints from citizens. But over time, the galvanized partnership of the public and police will make crime fall.
Neighborhood Policing

"There's only one way to deal with the prejudices of the past — communication. But communication that is more than talk, communication that gets people with different pasts and different agendas to really understand each other and then to act on that understanding."

— Deahdra Butter-Henderson
Coordinator
Codman Square
Neighborhood Council

The Method

Decentralization of resources and decision making is the core management approach. It is the centerpiece of the Boston Police Department's repositioning strategy.

Decentralization will make the police officer at the delivery point of service and problem solving the front rank of the organization, not the lowest rank.

Decentralization will require a predictable and stringent process of citizens and police working together to
- identify and prioritize problems;
- design the strategy for aggressively attacking one problem at a time;
- inventory and amass the resources needed to resolve it;
- apply the strategy with discipline and determination until it works or until failure convinces all concerned that another approach must be taken; and then
- try again until success is achieved.

The Reason for Hope

It can be done. Boston has proven it.

Crime, violence, and disorder can be reduced—even in high-crime neighborhoods — when:

• Citizens recognize that policing cannot be done by the police alone.
  "Police know they are supported by the public they serve and have the tools to do their job.

• Public and private agencies recognize and shoulder their own responsibilities to help.

In many parts of the nation, people have answered the problems of rising crime, declining schools, and growing disorder by fleeing them. First, by staying inside their homes. Then, by abandoning their neighborhoods and cities.

Yet, for decades, the people of Boston have demonstrated a commitment to their neighborhoods. They have proven that individual programs undertaken with community groups, police, and other agencies can reduce crime.

Now they are poised to prove that through systematic and concerted action the very conditions that give rise to crime — physical and social disorder, indeed fear itself— can be lastingly removed from all the neighborhoods where they live and work and raise their families.

What is required for success is sufficient resources, appropriate skills, and persistent determination.
Chapter One

Executive Summary

The Opportunity

Between 1960 and 1990, violent crime in the United States grew 14 times faster than the population. Yet, in city after city, where relatively few people were actually the victims of crime, it was fear of crime and of general social decline that drove middle class people from their homes in the urban centers to what they regarded as the safer havens of the suburbs. Between 1960 and 1980, the number of people residing in the nation’s 20 largest cities declined by more than 12%.

While the City of Boston was no exception to these general trends, three differences are worth noting.

• Between 1960 and 1980, violent crime in Boston grew twice as fast as the national average, and the city’s population shrank at about twice the rate of decline of the 20 largest cities.
• Between 1980 and 1990, violent crime across the nation rose four times faster than in Boston, and Boston’s population actually grew (while the population of most other older, major urban areas in the country’s northeastern quadrant continued to fall). During the same period, Boston became one of three cities in the country to have more jobs than residents.
• Since 1990, violent crime in Boston has declined — and declined more dramatically than in any other major city in the United States.

The strategy for enlisting police in the work of turning such positive signs into reliable features of daily life is known. In many cities across the country, it is called Community Policing. In Boston, because of the uniquely strong identities of the geographical areas that comprise the city, this strategy will be known as Neighborhood Policing.

Its goal is to build neighborhoods without fear.

For it is fear, even more than the actual incidence of crime, that destroys the confidence of people in their neighborhoods and causes them to abandon hope of rooting their future in a particular place.
Fear

The effects of fear on the individual have long been documented by psychologists. Fear leads first to caution, then to hesitation, and eventually, if still unresolved, to depression or flight. However, if the person finds that he or she can control the traumatizing event and keep it from happening again, fear is reduced and may disappear altogether.

Exploration of the effects of fear on cities and the neighborhoods that comprise them began only recently. Twenty-five years ago A.D. Biderman and his associates (Report on a Pilot Study in the District of Columbia on Victimization and Attitudes Toward Law Enforcement, U.S. Government Printing Office, 3967) discovered the link between disorder and fear by surveying citizens in Washington, D.C. Twelve years later Nathan Glazer (Public Interest, Winter 1979) pointed out that the then-intractable problem of graffiti on subway cars in New York City sent a message to riders, city residents, and visitors that the transit system itself may be out of control, vulnerable to mechanical failures as well as criminal activity, if something as minor as spray paint on train bodies could not be stopped.

Then, in 1982, James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling (Atlantic Monthly, March 1982) argued that disorderly behavior as well as deteriorated conditions in the physical environment increase fear among citizens, drive them from areas where danger seems to lurk, and engenders a spiral of worsening disorder and serious crime itself.

In other words, fear begets more of the concrete conditions that cause fear. Fear, therefore, is what must be quelled by all the citizens, businesses, and public agencies of Boston joined in a partnership with their police officers.

The success of programs in Boston and several other cities around the country has proven that Neighborhood Policing is the way this can be done.

Definition

Neighborhood Policing is the operating strategy and style of policing in which police officers and the department they represent create a partnership with citizens and all relevant public and private agencies to identify, aggressively attack, and successfully solve problems that are engendering crime, disorder, and fear. As these conditions are removed, police, other agencies, and the public work together to prevent new problems from arising and becoming serious.

Operating Principles

Neighborhood Policing consists of three key elements or operating principles.

1. Partnership: Neither police, prosecutors, judges, nor jailers can individually reduce crime. Nor can they together solve the crime problem without the active help of other public and private organizations and of the citizens who live in the communities affected by crime.

2. Problem Solving: Rapid response to emergency calls for service must be handled well. But in a city where 60% of the calls come from 10% of the locations, it is clear that the causes of these repeated calls for police assistance must be addressed. They cannot be treated, as they have been in the past, as isolated incidents.

3. Prevention: As is true in the case of disease, it is far better to prevent a crime than it is to seek redress after its occurrence.

Activating these three principles throughout the BPD depends on recognizing police officers as society’s most important generalists. By virtue of their training, equipment, and desire to be of service, Boston police officers are the city’s best hope for leading and catalyzing change that will safeguard the economic and social strength of the neighborhoods. And the impact of their efforts will, over time, be measurable.
Instead of using only traditional measures which are designed to track police activities (response times, etc.), Neighborhood Policing will quantify results that correlate to actual improvement in the quality of life of each neighborhood.

Boston has already demonstrated that application of the three principles of Neighborhood Policing can achieve real results.

In Partnership with Citizens, Applying the Problem-Solving Method, Police Are Preventing Crime in Boston

In June 1989, at a time when violent, drug-related crime was mounting in Boston, Mayor Raymond L. Flynn provided a case study in the problem solving approach by assembling representatives of all the relevant federal, state, county, and city agencies to participate in a Criminal Justice Summit. That initial meeting and the aggressive work that ensued resulted in an orchestrated program of directed indictments, asset seizure, judicial enforcement of the Bartley-Fox Gun Control Law, and concentration on the gang-violence problem by the Boston Police Department.

In early 1990, more than 150 community residents, city officials, and community-development professionals met at St. John’s Seminary to design a systematic community response. The City of Boston's Safe Neighborhoods Plan was the result. The plan recommended that:
- law-enforcement resources be concentrated on areas where problems are greatest;
- economic-development activities be focused on high-crime, high-unemployment neighborhoods; and
- personal and family responsibility be encouraged through a host of grass-roots, neighborhood-based programs.

The BPD responded by focusing district patrol efforts on high-impact areas and by creating a new unit, the Anti-Gang Violence Unit, to deal with the gang-related homicides and assaults.

One result, thus far, of the criminal-justice component of the Safe Neighborhoods Plan is that 545 violent individuals are now behind bars. More importantly, the overall impact of the program has been dramatic. Among the nation's 25 largest cities in 1991, Boston had the largest decrease in violent crime and the second largest decrease in homicide. These positive trends are continuing in 1992.

This success was achieved mainly through the extraordinary efforts of many individual officers, several specialized police units, prosecutors, community groups, individual citizens, and city agencies working together closely and consistently.

Yet this success will not be sustained unless the public and the major institutions of society commit to making such extraordinary efforts the routine daily practice of all police and many citizens in most communities.

In Boston, individual programs (like Street Workers and Neighborhood Crime Watch) and individual BPD units (like the Anti-Gang Violence Unit) have demonstrated that the basic tenets of Neighborhood Policing are effective.

In other cities during the past 20 years, various studies and individual police programs have proven several other things relevant to the emergent policing style:
- Random motorized patrol produces no measurable results; therefore, merely reactive responses to calls for service are a luxury no city can afford.
- There is a strong statistical correlation among crime, fear, and disorder.
- People who have a vested interest in the communities where they live can be organized to help police attack and remove the conditions that give rise to crime, fear, and disorder.

Hoping to capitalize on these findings, urban areas around the country have tried to turn promising individual community-policing programs into agency-wide policy and practice. As yet, however, no major city has fully succeeded.
Neighborhood Policing has always been the basic mission of the Boston Police Department. Now it is being asked to apply the Mayor's problem-solving method.

The BPD has never fully recovered from the busing crisis and the layoffs that followed soon after.

Why No Major City Has Fully Implemented Neighborhood Policing

There are several reasons.

- The command-and-control model of traditional policing cannot by its nature easily give birth to a style of policing that stresses initiative over obedience, promotes intimacy rather than detachment, and measures quality-of-life impact rather than just police activity and efficiency.
- The crime-fighting image of traditional policing (as opposed to the crime-preventing model of community policing) remains the image most police officers aspire to embody.
- The requirements of the organizational-change process are not generally understood.
- Fiscal constraints prevent cities from meeting the need for additional personnel.
- Comprehensive community involvement has not occurred.

A Tradition of Service is the Foundation for Change

Since its founding in 1854 the Boston Police Department, the oldest municipal police agency in the country, has arguably been the proudest. Despite its earlier history of being used by one social class to control another, of its members being fired en masse for political reasons, and of falling into its own problems with corruption, the BPD has always been strongly rooted in the neighborhoods.

From the start, service has been its basic mission.

It is not surprising that its Community Disorders Unit, created in 1978, is a national model in showing how to secure fair and decent treatment for all citizens, no matter what their race, creed, or sexual orientation.

Nor is it surprising that, since its inception in 1985, the Neighborhood Crime Watch Program has helped found and/or sustain more than 600 groups, which are credited by the commander of the Drug Unit with initiating 95% of the cases made against street-level drug dealers.

Nor is it surprising that police managers and officers find ways to drive down the amount of time it takes to reach victims in distress, even when Department dispatching systems have not been optimal for the purpose.

But Basic Systems Still Must Be Rebuilt

Since 1984, the Department has been an organization in recovery from the stresses of the busing crisis in the 1970s and the deprivations of the early 1980s. Closed district stations have been reopened or rebuilt. The ranks decimated by layoffs and attrition have been replenished. Civil-service tests, long abandoned, have been reinstated. Minority promotions have multiplied fifteen-fold.

Still, as the self-assessment conducted as part of the planning process for this Plan of Action revealed, some of the basic systems of the BPD require continuing work and reinvestment — particularly in the areas of equipment, technology, and training. Replacing once-neglected public infrastructure takes much more time and costs much more money than any short-term funding cuts could ever have saved.

Recent Studies of the Department

During the last several years, three major studies of the Boston Police Department have been commissioned by the city:

The Schwartz Commission reviewed the investigative practices of the Department and recommended tightening of procedures and improved training.

The Hennessey Commission reviewed BPD search procedures and made parallel recommendations.
The St. Clair Committee reviewed the management practices of the agency and recommended a "thorough self-assessment," development of a comprehensive plan of action to chart the transition to community policing, extensively revised and intensified training, improved supervision, purchase and installation of up-to-date management information systems and information processing technologies, effective strategic planning, reformed internal-affairs procedures, and an open process of receiving and reviewing citizen complaints.

As part of the effort to develop this plan, all three reports were extensively reviewed and, where appropriate, their findings and recommendations have been included.

The Self-Assessment

Neighborhood Policing is a fundamentally decentralized approach to providing police services. By working with neighborhood groups and citizens to identify, aggressively attack, and effectively remove problems that are increasing crime and fear, this philosophy puts police officers at the forefront of Department efforts. It makes patrol officers the most important people in the organization, not the least. And it marshals resources accordingly — constructing other units to support officers in their work rather than vice versa.

Decentralization, therefore, was at the heart of all efforts undertaken during the past six months to examine the service demands, resources, and readiness of personnel to make the change to Neighborhood Policing. These efforts included:

- Ad-hoc and standing problem-solving committees, with members from every level of the organization and all its unions, inventoried the current state of and made recommendations about equipment and facilities, information technology, and uniforms.
- Task forces were convened in Areas B and C to solicit recommendations on how to convert the basic operations of the BPD to the practices of Neighborhood Policing.
- Faculty from area universities and outside consultants worked with Department personnel to assess and revise training programs needed for supervisors and captains newly promoted in spring 1992.
- A Department-wide, voluntary, anonymous written survey was sent to officers of every rank and unit, soliciting their views of the subjects being examined by the task forces and problem-solving committees. (520 officers replied, for a response rate of 26%)
- A staff analysis of rapid-response and personnel-assignment data was conducted, and work began on development of a computerized patrol-deployment model that would secure sufficient resources for making emergency responses while specifying the exact staffing needs for full implementation of Neighborhood Policing.

Major Findings of the Self-Assessment

Potentially, the officers of the BPD are very positively oriented to the principles of Neighborhood Policing.

- A combined majority of members of the Department believe that community-oriented policing, crime prevention, or public-order maintenance would be a more effective strategy than responding to 9-1-1 calls or arresting offenders.
- Nine-tenths of the members of the Department believe that police are more effective if they make a "major effort to learn about the things that concern the people on their beat or sector."
- An equally high percentage feel that "Police should make frequent informal contact with the people on their beat."

Boston police officers want to reach out to the community, but they feel misunderstood by the media and the public.
The self-assessment revealed shortfalls in training, technology, and equipment.

But the officers of the BPD do not believe that the media and the public understand the problems of police officers and support them in their efforts.

- 92% do not agree with the statement, "Media coverage of the Department helps police officers do their job."
- 87% agree with the statement, "Citizens don’t understand the problems of the police."
- 58% disagree with the statement, "The relationship between the police and the people of Boston is very good."

Members of the Department pointed out shortfalls in training, particularly in certain areas necessary for Neighborhood Policing (i.e., crime prevention, cultural diversity, problem solving, conflict resolution).

Similarly, officers reported limited availability of important equipment.

The greatest need identified by the problem-solving committees was in the area of technological equipment.

At a time when computerization of other police agencies around the country gave them access to large databases on crimes and offenders, the BPD was still recovering from the ravages of the busing crisis and the city’s response to Proposition 2 1/2. For many years the Department has been deprived of one of the most fundamental tools of modern law enforcement.

Detectives have kept case records by hand, sometimes in shoe boxes. Mug shot, arrest, and booking data have also been filed by hand and could not be easily cross-referenced. The antiquated computer-aided dispatch system had no way of informing officers about a shooting that may have happened on a recent day at an address to which a new unit was being sent.

Today, the BPD’s critical needs for a linked system of personal computers, modern computer-aided dispatch, and state-of-the-art Suspect Identification and Imaging Network are being met, as a result of the decision to commit a significant proportion of the city’s limited funds to meeting the organization’s last essential infrastructure need.

Resource Limitations

City revenues declined by 3.6% in FY 1992 and are projected to decline again this year. Budget constraints have made it impossible to hire any new police officers since January 1991. In addition, vehicle purchases designed to keep the fleet on a schedule of normal replacement and cyclical repair have been delayed for at least eighteen months.

City revenue levels are controlled by two factors — the national recession and the policies set by the Governor and Legislature of Massachusetts. Since the city cannot enact new revenue sources on its own, it must depend on the state’s recognition of its own responsibility to share in the support of the municipalities whose revenues it controls.

For the better part of a decade this responsibility was borne by the state. When the state fell upon hard fiscal times and reduced its aid by $80 million, the City of Boston willingly shared the burden and cut its budget accordingly. Now that Massachusetts intends to increase its spending next year by as much as $600 million, its responsibilities to the city that is the economic engine of the state cannot be ignored.

Even with critically reduced resources, the Mayor and City Council allocated enough operating funds to provide $2.1 million in vitally needed technological equipment for the Boston Police Department. This investment will help secure efficient police responses to basic calls for service while potentially freeing personnel for the less routinized, more complex tasks of Neighborhood Policing.
The Stages of Change

Chapter Six presents the transition to Neighborhood Policing in three levels of simultaneous effort.

Level I: Securing Basic Service

This section describes the steps that are being taken to continue to ensure the ability of the BPD to make rapid responses to all emergency calls for service in a skillful, timely, and professional manner, while better managing non-emergency 9-1-1 calls by redirecting them immediately to appropriate units and agencies. Filling critical gaps in equipment and supervisory training are addressed here.

Level II: Leveraging the investment in Technology

The Department's basic needs for computerization are largely being addressed in the current budget year. This section describes the impact on service delivery and on overall agency capability of technological investments that will be coming on line during the next two years. The crucial event, upon which full use of all computerized equipment depends, is installation of the new $4-million computer-aided-dispatch system. This should occur by September 1993.

Other investments in a new suspect-identification and imaging network, a linked system of personal computers, and a case-management system for detectives will compensate for the legacy of deficits left over from the late 1970s and early 1980s, while positioning the Department to take advantage of new technologies that will come on line during the next several years.

Level III: Implementing Neighborhood Policing

This section describes the nature and timing of the 25 tasks that must be performed, and the resources that must be assembled, to enable the BPD to convert its core operations to the practice of Neighborhood Policing. These tasks will fall in four areas:

- Local strategies must be devised by police and citizens working with all relevant agencies at the district and neighborhood levels. These strategies must have the effect of concretizing the process of forming working partnerships; identifying, ranking, and solving problems; and preventing new problems from arising in each area so that citizens will feel safe as well as be safe where they live and work.

- Current resources and functions within the BPD must be fully assessed and reorganized to reach the goals of Neighborhood Policing. The extent of necessary additional resources must also be precisely ascertained. A preliminary analysis of requests by area and district commanders indicates that approximately 300 more police officers may be needed for full implementation of Neighborhood Policing in every area of the city. This figure will be defined more exactly as new beat and sector boundaries are designed by January 1993.

- Managing for performance means that training must be extensive and persistent, inside district commands and at the Police Academy, for officers, civilian employees of the Department, and neighborhood residents. It also means that all recruiting, selection, promotions, and reward systems must be consistent with the goal of reducing crime, disorder, and fear in every neighborhood of the city.

- The basic systems of the BPD for reporting, organizing, and retrieving data and for handling internal communications must also conform to Neighborhood Policing. Everyone within the organization must have ready and rapid access to the information they need to do their jobs effectively.

The first new Neighborhood Police beats will be used to strengthen the economic core of each neighborhood.
In the meantime, the tasks enumerated in Chapter Six will fully prepare the organization for the change, while Neighborhood Policing will be launched wherever staffing levels permit.

By January 1993, at least 50 volunteer Neighborhood Police Officers will be selected, receive 40 hours of special training, and be posted to beats in selected neighborhood business districts around the city.

**Summary**

This plan focuses on the tasks and issues, particularly the internal ones, that need to be addressed during the next twelve to eighteen months to transform the Boston Police Department into an organization that becomes decisively more effective by embracing and representing in all that it does the philosophy of Neighborhood Policing.

It is a philosophy that, like all community policing initiatives nationwide, must be custom-designed to reflect the unique social and geographical characteristics of the city that the BPD polices, while maintaining an alert flexibility that ensures rapid action on any newly emergent problems in the neighborhoods of Boston.

Hallmarks of these efforts will be decentralization of decision making to the level where service is delivered and accountability must be exacted, and empowerment of police officers to identify problems and act in partnership with neighborhood residents.

Successes will be the foundation for future action. Ideas, concepts, and programs found to be ineffective or a hindrance to partnership between police and the neighborhoods will be rapidly discarded.

Necessary throughout, however, is recognition that the infrastructure of a police department is its equipment, facilities, training, and — preeminently — its personnel. When this infrastructure is neglected, it is damaged in the same way all public infrastructure suffers the corrosive effects of disrepair. As the busing crisis and subsequent layoffs have shown in the BPD, the costs and difficulties of restoration are that much greater when it is a largely human infrastructure that must be rebuilt.
Chapter Two

History-

Stress and Deprivation

It is generally recognized that Boston's busing crisis in the mid 1970s tore at the social fabric of the city. Less widely understood is the lasting damage inflicted on the Boston Police Department by the relentless, long-term stress the organization and its members were forced to endure.

As a result of the busing crisis, the basic systems and practices of the BPD were severely strained.

• *Time-honored rituals of discipline suffered:* long hours spent together engendered familiarity up and down the ranks, eroding the once strong control of superior officers.

• *Training was neglected:* there was neither time nor sufficient numbers of officers to spare from pressing duties.

• *Overtime became a staple of daily existence:* it fatigued officers, caused them to be dependent on higher income levels, and undermined the central importance of the daily tour of duty.

• *Intimate relations with many of the city's neighborhoods were shattered.*

At a time when the Department was charged, day in and day out, with protecting the city's children and calming its citizens, things like roll-call inspections, record keeping, and in-service training could seem expendable. Nevertheless, the organization was simultaneously pressing forward with changes that would institutionalize the rapid-response model of traditional policing. Among these were the installation of the Department's first CAD (computer-aided dispatch) system in 1976 and promotion of 9-1-1 as the primary way to reach police.

During this period other departments around the country were securing and extending their own technological improvements. They were purchasing computer equipment that provided access to a variety of databases on warrants, offenders, and crime patterns. Not only did the Boston Police Department not receive these things during this time, it suffered an even more serious blow.
In response to Proposition 2 ½ in 1981, police service to the city was cut dramatically by the city's furlough of hundreds of officers, and the closure of five neighborhood stations. Officers from Academy classes going back to 1970 were selected for the layoff. To them and even to the others who were allowed to continue working, the covenant of mutual responsibility between the members of the Department and the city it served was damaged. As Malcolm Sparrow, a former London police inspector now at Harvard’s Kennedy School, has said, the unpredictability of daily police work requires an unusually high degree of job security. When that security is lacking — in fact, in perception, or in memory — it can have a profoundly demoralizing effect on police.

One would have expected the consequences of the city's decision to lay off police officers to have been doubly demoralizing, because the memory of the strike of 1919 had not faded in institutional memory. It is useful briefly to recount the circumstances.

Years after the BPD had secured a reputation for professionalism unexcelled by any other police agency in the English-speaking world, its members tried during a period of steep inflation to negotiate for better wages and work conditions. A new police commissioner was hired who prohibited any attempt to organize and suspended 19 leaders of the movement. The vast majority of officers walked out and were summarily fired. Urban riots ensued, causing the deaths of 7 people and the injuries of 167 more. Many citizens came to support Governor Calvin Coolidge's dictum, "There is no right to strike against the public safety anytime, anywhere."

The ranks of the BPD have long been filled with men and women whose relatives have served in the Department before them. Many have heard vivid tales of what had happened three or four generations before. But whatever their feelings about the layoffs of 1981, Boston police officers did not stop doing their duty. With fewer than 1,600 officers left in the Department, the arrest rate remained high.

The Flynn administration has:
- Reopened and rebuilt five district stations
- Restored the ranks decimated by layoffs and attrition (hiring 849 officers since 1985)
- Restored the vehicle fleet to a state of good repair and placed it on a schedule of cyclical maintenance and replacement
- Reinstituted civil-service tests for promotion after a nearly decade-long hiatus, resulting in promotion of 90% of the Department's civil-service supervisors and 96% of its civil-service captains
- Increased minority composition of the sworn ranks from 15% to 25%, and of the supervisory staff from less than 1% to more than 15% to better reflect the city and diversity
- Acted to remove corruption from the Department

During the past eight years, the Flynn administration has been rebuilding the institutional infrastructure damaged or lost since the busing crisis. During this period of time, the organization has made great strides toward recovery and revitalization. But, like any other long-neglected piece of public infrastructure, its injuries cannot all be easily seen much less quickly redressed.

Significant resources have gone toward meeting the basic needs of a police department that must, at a minimum, provide its citizens with rapid and routine response. During the same period, national urban problems — and the crime and disorder that have fanned public fear — have worsened and grown more complex.

By ordering the BPD to become fully community-oriented in its operating style as rapidly as possible, the Mayor of Boston is asking the police department to become a full-fledged partner in the administration's relentless and innovative drive to support the city's neighborhoods. Although the Department has always been service-oriented — and, perhaps, never more so than during the tenure of Commissioner Roache — it is being asked to become in addition a problem-solving catalyst in every neighborhood of the city when it again faces seriously constricted resources.

And this is occurring at a time when the Department has not yet fully recovered from its earlier deprivations.
Chapter Three

Current Condition

Meeting Changing Demand

In light of recent developments, it is a significant irony that, in the 1970s, at the urging of the leading police theoreticians and practitioners of the day, the Boston Police Department shifted its dominant strategy from neighborhood-based foot patrol to 9-1-1-centered, motorized rapid response. This would have the effect, it was promised, of cutting crime, saving money, and reducing opportunities for police corruption.

As in the police departments of other major urban areas across the nation, specialized units proliferated to handle particular problems (such as domestic violence, drug control, sexual assault, senior response). This occurred despite the fact that many of these problems are a matter of daily, even hourly contact for most working police officers.

The chart below indicates that 9-1-1 demand quickly burgeoned.

Before prescribing the exact steps for changing the operating style and philosophy of the Boston Police Department to Neighborhood Policing, it is important to review the state of the organization’s resources, capabilities, performance, and practices.
Since these data were collected, the number of officers has continued to decline at the rate of six per month, due mainly to retirement.

As noted in Figure 1, calls for service, while shifting sharply in 1980 (a peak) and 1982 (a dip), generally have increased over the years from approximately 425,000 in 1975 to 669,000 in 1991 — an increase of almost a third in 16 years — even though the number of emergency (Priority One) calls has been stable and remained a relatively small fraction of total demand.

In the meantime, overall staffing levels have not kept pace. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the number of sworn officers dropped sharply during the early 1980s and only recently has been able to return to the levels of the late 1970s.

Note, however, that while serious crime levels have remained relatively stable or declined slightly over virtually the same period, the number of police officers committed to neighborhood stations has risen steadily since 1985 (Figure 3).
Nevertheless, the amount of time officers have free for the partnership-building, problem-solving tasks of Neighborhood Policing has remained well below the target level of 50% which policing experts agree is essential. (Traditionally, this time has been known as "free patrol time.")

The time available for Neighborhood Policing in Boston is even smaller than this chart indicates. Not counted against time available is most of the hours spent by Boston police officers backing each other up and making traffic stops — activities which officers feel it better not to report to central dispatch so as to save radio air space for more important calls. And since these data were collected, continuing retirements have cut the number of officers at the rate of six per month.

Five factors determine the overall patrol staffing level a police department needs to do its job:

1. the absolute number of officers available for patrol (not assigned to specialized units);
2. the time it takes to handle the current level of dispatched calls;
3. absentee rates caused by leave of all kinds, including vacation, sick, personal, holiday, court, and training leave;
4. the size of the geographical area and conditions of the streets to be covered;
5. the definition of department mission (simple response to calls for service requires one staffing level, Neighborhood Policing another).

The computerized resource analysis of how these factors will determine the Neighborhood Policing staffing needs of the Boston Police Department started in June. Its progress has been slowed by the need to collect and reconstruct data by hand, which is tallied differently and stored separately in each district.

In May the commanders of the five major police areas into which the City of Boston is divided examined the calls for service, crime rates, and quality-of-life issues affecting their neighborhoods. A preliminary analysis of their efforts indicates that they would need approximately 300 additional officers to extend
Neighborhood Policing

The infrastructure of an organization consists of its buildings and equipment, technological capabilities, training practices, and its personnel.

The principles and practice of Neighborhood Policing throughout their commands. Although this number will be defined more precisely as sector and beat boundaries are designed in concert with community residents, it is clear that the needs and expectations of Boston's neighborhoods will require more officers.

Structure of the Organization

Additional personnel is not the only new demand made by Neighborhood Policing on the Boston Police Department. The structure of the organization must be reconfigured both to correct old problems and to support the demands of the new policing strategy. The Boston Police Department's chain of command has been undermined over a long period by

- the blurred distinctions among ranks bred by the stresses and long hours of the busing crisis;
- the fifteen-year hiatus in the promotion of civil-service captains;
- the ten-year hiatus (prior to Commissioner Roache's administration) in civil-service exams for supervisors (sergeants and lieutenants);
- the separation of supervisors from subordinates in Patrol caused by the rotating tours of supervisors and the fixed tours of police officers, and resultant lack of accountability and reliable performance-evaluation systems; and
- the widespread use of provisional supervisors at various periods during the last 15 years.

As indicated below, these conditions have resulted, among other things, in police officers saying that they receive less information about department policies from their supervisors than from any other source. Yet experts from widely different schools of management have long regarded front-line supervisors as the key to organizational responsiveness and change.

The other key structural issue has to do with the role of captains.

The promotion in April of 25 captains was the first appointment of civil-service captains in 15 years. At the time such promotions ceased, area commanders were given many of the responsibilities of district commanders (positions traditionally held by captains). This command structure was reinforced in 1980 when deputy superintendents were assigned to each area and again in 1981 when five neighborhood stations were closed.

Today a revitalized, highly trained, and committed corps of captains stands ready to help area commanders in transforming the traditional role of police from being call responders to being problem solvers.

State of the Infrastructure

Facilities and Equipment

As part of the process of developing this plan, two efforts were undertaken to assess facilities and equipment: a condition inventory and a Department-wide, written survey of sworn personnel.

In April 1992 the inventory of all BPD facilities and equipment was conducted under the direction of a departmental committee chaired by Superintendent Joseph V. Saia, Jr., Chief, Bureau of Administrative Services. Members of this committee included representatives from all Department unions. They examined the law-enforcement equipment (e.g., cruisers and radios) that is generally understood to be critical to police work, as well as the office and maintenance equipment which, though equally important, receives less attention from oversight bodies and the public.

Personnel in all the commands of the organization examined 17,365 pieces of equipment in the three categories listed below and classified each item as "good," "fair," or "poor."
Law Enforcement and Specialized Equipment

9,440 items (including vehicles, portable/mobile radios, mobile data terminals (MDTs), radar equipment, mounted unit equipment, and crime lab and ballistics, etc.) were surveyed. 360 items were classified as poor, for an overall rating of 4% poor.

In general, the committee found that upgrades and expansion of existing equipment in most categories would take care of any deficits identified.

Office and Support Equipment

7,700 items (including desks, chairs, typewriters, personal computers, telephones, etc.) were surveyed. 3,220 items were classified as poor, for an overall rating of 42% poor.

Examples of these range from personal computers, which lack sufficient memory to store required data or the capability of being connected to other computers in the department, to chairs, some of which are in such disrepair that no one can use them for their designed purpose.

Maintenance Equipment

225 items (including vehicle maintenance equipment, ladders, buffers, vacuum cleaners, and floor scrubbers, etc.) were surveyed. 41 items were classified as poor, for an overall rating of 18% poor.

The committee recommended upgrades especially in housekeeping and automotive repair equipment.

Pertinent results of the Department-wide survey, which asked questions about the condition and availability of 20 separate equipment items, follow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Results: Equipment</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participants were asked whether ten items are available &quot;often,&quot; &quot;somewhat often,&quot; &quot;occasionally,&quot; or &quot;never&quot; in the places where they work.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cited as most commonly available (&quot;often&quot; or &quot;somewhat often&quot;) were:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department forms</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typewriters and/or word-processing equipment</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latex gloves (for searching suspects)</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cited as least available (&quot;occasionally&quot; or &quot;never&quot;) were:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flares</td>
<td>89.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouth shields</td>
<td>87.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire extinguishers</td>
<td>86.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slim jims</td>
<td>83.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polaroid cameras and film for ID/crime scene</td>
<td>78.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computers and MDTs</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime-scene tape</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants were also asked whether ten items are &quot;highly adequate,&quot; &quot;somewhat adequate,&quot; &quot;somewhat inadequate,&quot; or &quot;highly inadequate&quot; in the places where they work.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cited as being in the best condition (&quot;highly adequate&quot; or &quot;somewhat adequate&quot;) were:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephones</td>
<td>69.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockers</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toilets</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desks</td>
<td>54.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cited as being in the worst condition (&quot;somewhat inadequate&quot; or &quot;highly inadequate&quot;) were:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview areas</td>
<td>67.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workout equipment</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workout areas</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Showers</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairs</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding cells</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Committee members inventoried all computerized and scientific equipment and reported on the following:

- **Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD)**
  
  CAD is the system used to track the location of response units on the streets, assign them to calls they can reach most rapidly, and measure the time it takes to arrive at and handle each job. Boston's CAD system, installed in 1976, is slow, limited in storage capability, and too inflexible to manage the system of prioritizing calls required by Neighborhood Policing.

  It also does not let supervisors and officers know about previous occurrences at a given address. For example, police units headed to a particular location now have no way of knowing about a shooting that occurred there even two nights before. The current CAD also cannot generate reports that would enable detectives or police officers to conduct sophisticated crime analysis. Nor can it be linked to mobile data terminals in supervisors' cruisers, which would enable them to track activity in their sectors while they are on patrol.

- **Basic Computerization**
  
  A modern police department must have access to a variety of federal, state, and city databases to track warrants, offenders, outstanding cases, probation, corrections, etc., while providing the capability of doing crime and trend analysis by geographical area. However, two Boston police districts have no computers or word processors, while the other eight districts have only one, and none of these machines are linked. Incident reports are usually written by hand, with identical information (i.e., the suspect's name, description, address, offense, etc.) being copied over and over.

- **Detective Case Management**
  
  Currently there is no computerized system linking evidence, fingerprints, mug shots, trial dates, and disposition of cases. In some cases, detectives input information in personal computers which they have purchased themselves. In other cases, they maintain hand files. In all cases, this information is not linked between district commands.

- **Suspect Identification and Imaging Network**
  
  Mug shot, arrest, and booking data are currently maintained by hand and in unlinked files around the police districts. The ID aspect of the booking process currently consumes an estimated 36,000 work hours a year, in part because of the time it takes to transport suspects to a single, centralized location.

- **Mobile Data Terminals**
  
  Mobile Data Terminals (MDTs) are computer terminals installed in police cruisers, which now enable officers to check for stolen vehicles and warrants outstanding inside the city without having to call the central operations operator and wait for that information. MDTs in Boston cannot now be used, as they are in other cities, for receiving dispatches, enabling field supervisors to monitor activity by all units in their sectors, or for downloading incident reports directly to district computers, which would save both time and paperwork in the individual commands. Only 60 out of the approximately 350 cruisers in use in the police districts now have MDTs.
Training

In most major urban police departments training usually consists of:

- **Recruit Training**— provided to candidates for police-officer status in a classroom setting. In Boston, recruit training is given over a six-month period and covers the basic courses in law, social science, and police science necessary to qualify successful applicants for serving as Boston police officers.

- **Promotional Training**— of two varieties, this includes preparation for civil-service tests to be given at scheduled times and instruction of those selected for promotion in skills necessary for assuming their new responsibilities.

- **In-Service Training**— required by statute, given annually in a classroom setting, to all sworn members of the service to keep current their knowledge of law and procedure as well as to update their policing skills in such things as investigations, crime-scene control, etc. In Massachusetts, in-service training of 40 hours’ duration is required of all police officers once a year.

- **In-District Training**— a supplement to in-service training, provided in the commands where officers work, this includes individual or group instruction by videotape and/or a trainer in such things as computer usage and general policing skills.

- **Specialized Training**— given either as in-service or in-district, or both, to cover topics like infectious diseases and domestic violence.

Since 1970, the Boston Police Academy has trained 1,854 officers and graduated 29 classes ranging in size from 29 to 169.

Recruit training consists of a total of 960 hours of instruction in Patrol Procedures and Techniques, Providing Service and Rendering Assistance (including Domestic Violence and Victimology), Applying and Enforcing the Law (including Massachusetts Law, Warrant Process, Civil Rights Laws), Investigations, Courtroom Presentation and Preparation (including Court Procedure and Arrest Processing), Record Keeping, Physical Skills, and individual treatment of topics ranging from Abnormal Psychology to Crime Prevention and Hostage Negotiation.


Supervisors received most of the above-named courses as well as Disciplinary Procedures and License Premises training.

In the spring Department-wide survey, all sworn BPD personnel were given the opportunity to evaluate the adequacy of training in 23 separate areas. The findings indicate that existing in-service training has not yet been able to convey to most officers the skills required for Neighborhood Policing.

Internal Communications

Department personnel were also asked about internal channels of communication. Asked where they “get most information about Department news, including policies, procedures, and programs,” respondents to the recent Department survey say:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rumors</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peers</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department publications, written orders</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The swing shifts of supervisors prevent regular contact with police officers, who work fixed hours. This is clearly damaging communication and supervision.
The commitment to duty among average officers and supervisors has kept arrests high, even when the number of officers has declined.

As asked about the value of such information sources ("very helpful," "helpful," "not very helpful," or "not helpful at all"), the respondents highly approve of the utility of all information sources except two:

- 74.6% say the media is "not very helpful" or "not helpful at all."
- 73.6% say rumors are "not very helpful" or "not helpful at all."

The fact that less than 20% of respondents indicate that they rely on official Department sources for most of their information apparently leads to some confusion about the organization's vision for the future, mission, and values.

Nearly three-quarters (73.4%) disagree with the statement, "I clearly understand the Department's vision for the future." A similar number (69.6%) disagree that "I clearly understand the Department's mission." And nearly three-fifths (57.6%) disagree that "I clearly understand the Department's values." Since the Police Commissioner has spoken repeatedly of the department's values and discussed them personally with the 767 officers hired since 1985 who remain on the job, it is clear that other organizational resources must be marshaled to reinforce his message.

**SURVEY RESULTS:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers' Understanding of Current Department Philosophy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responding to 9-1-1 calls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-oriented policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public order maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arresting offenders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Culture of the Organization

*Pride in being a Boston officer is extremely high, and largely unquestioned, among all groups. Nearly 76% of respondents to the Department-wide survey say they "agree" or "strongly agree" with the statement, "If they had it to do all over again, most members of this department would choose to be a Boston police officer."

The service ethic has been deeply instilled in the Department due to its history and roots in Boston neighborhoods. This ethic has been strongly reinforced by the Mayor's and the Police Commissioner's manifest commitment to neighborhood residents and businesses, and by the selection of area and some unit commanders who work strenuously to carry out this commitment on a day-to-day basis.

Nevertheless, the interactive dynamic of the Department's culture has been affected by the broken trust implied by layoffs, heavy work demands outside the normal tour of duty, and suspension for more than a decade of civil-service promotional opportunity.

The result is an individual, somewhat self-protective orientation that makes some members of the Department feel that, while devotion to duty is basic, they ultimately must fend for themselves. This atmosphere has promoted entrepreneurialism among some

- reactive performance of duty (especially with regard to calls for service) among the majority
- compliance among the rest

The entrepreneurialism has produced excellent results in some of the specialized units (such as Anti-Gang Violence, Sexual Assault, Asian Task Force, and the Community Disorders units) where the mission has been propelled by the highest levels of the Department, and where workload can be managed by strong and purposeful supervisors. The commitment to duty among average officers and supervisors has kept arrest rates
stable and other areas of police activity high (even when the layoffs of 1981 drastically reduced the strength of the Department).

Concern for one's family on the part of Department members may be increased when details and overtime are declining at the same time that the city has no funds to offer raises in salary. A feeling of solitariness may be exacerbated by uncertain reward-and-promotion criteria in an organization that has been prevented by agreement from using meaningful performance evaluations, and by frustration with career goals caused by the long hiatus in promotional exams.

Choosing from a list of 14 values, participants in the Department-wide survey were asked to rank at least seven values that are “most important” to them. The following is the cumulative percentage of respondents who rank each value among their top seven.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Ranking</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Family Security (taking care of loved ones)</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Self-respect (self-esteem)</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Happiness (being content)</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Comfortable Life (a prosperous life)</td>
<td>59.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Community Security (freedom from crime, drugs)</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>A Sense of Accomplishment (lasting contribution)</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Leisure (an enjoyable life away from work)</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Freedom (independence, free choice)</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Peer Acceptance (respect of co-workers)</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Equality (equal opportunity for all)</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Upward Mobility (promotion, personal progress)</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Social Recognition (respect, admiration from supervisors, friends, or neighbors)</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Excitement (a challenging, active life)</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Physical Courage (standing up to threats to oneself or others)</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not surprisingly, the four highest, and five of the top seven, values of Department members are focused on the well-being of one's own family and self. However, as will be discussed in the next chapter, it is a highly positive sign for the introduction of Neighborhood Policing as the basic operating philosophy of the BPD that Community Security and A Sense of Accomplishment are relatively highly ranked and closely associated.

The remaining values in rank order are:

8 Freedom (independence, free choice) 36.3%
9 Peer Acceptance (respect of co-workers) 35.4%
10 Equality (equal opportunity for all) 32.7%
11 Upward Mobility (promotion, personal progress) 30.2%
12 Social Recognition (respect, admiration from supervisors, friends, or neighbors) 29.2%
13 Excitement (a challenging, active life) 21.5%
14 Physical Courage (standing up to threats to oneself or others) 14.8%
The extremely deep pride in the corps, the service tradition and commitment of the organization, and the relatively homogeneous orientation of Department members can be effectively built upon to develop a new, redirected common sense of purpose and perspective.

As in many police organizations, this is not a culture that can automatically or easily be inspired to undertake a new, highly committed mission that requires cross-functional, team-based, results-focused problem-solving activity. Still, the extremely deep pride in the corps, the commitment and concern for family and community, the service tradition and commitment of the organization, the service orientation and problem-solving methods of the leadership now in place, and the relatively homogeneous orientation of Department members (among whom internal concerns and values priorities are widely shared) can be effectively built upon to develop a new, redirected common sense of purpose and perspective.
Chapter Four

Strengths

As stated in Chapter One, Neighborhood Policing is the operating strategy and style of policing in which police officers and the department they represent create a partnership with citizens and all relevant public and private agencies to identify, attack, and successfully resolve local problems that are engendering crime, fear of crime, and disorder. As the conditions that can cause people and businesses to leave the neighborhoods where they reside are removed, police and the public work together to prevent new problems from arising and becoming serious.

Both the City of Boston and its police department are strongly positioned to emerge as one of the first in the nation to fully implement Neighborhood Policing. This prospect is due to the strengths that reside in

- the City, its 16 major neighborhoods, and their residents;
- the Boston Police Department and its tradition of neighborhood service; and
- the men and women of the BPD.

The City and its 16 Neighborhoods

Less than two years ago, in a report on the economic prospects of the city commissioned by the Boston Redevelopment Authority, Dr. James M. Howell, the former chief economist for the region's largest bank, proclaimed the City of Boston one of the few "knowledge-based" cities in the world — positioned for strong and steady growth in the decade of the 1990s and beyond.

He argued that the traditional cost-based analysis of economic factors is less important in assessing the competitiveness of a regional economy than is "the ability of an area to innovate and to transform the stream of innovation into jobs and income growth." In those respects, Boston is positioned to succeed — and succeed spectacularly well.

The decline of Boston as a center of manufacturing and trade started in the 1930s. The city suffered helplessly from the symptoms of this decline, losing both jobs and population, until the 1970s when its transformation into a center of the new service economy, which would drive the nation's growth in the 1980s, began.
Boston is today one of only three major cities in the country with more jobs than people.

Today the city contributes to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:
- 9.5% of its population
- 16.6% of its jobs
- 22% of its tax revenues
- 24% of its gross state product

Boston is today one of only three major cities in the country with more jobs than people. More than two-fifths of these jobs are in the services sector, with health and education providing some 107,000 of them. During the decade of the 1980s, average household income in Boston grew by a third. The city's growth in personal income outpaced the state's, which itself was second in the nation for the period. The poverty rate declined in the city as a whole and in thirteen out of the sixteen neighborhoods, while the percentage of the population with four or more years of college increased by 50%.

The city's economic position is sustained and nurtured by several factors. The Boston area's stream of innovation in biotechnology and other health-related services, computer services including software development, business services and asset management flows from an infrastructure of 65 colleges and universities in the metropolitan area and 31 hospitals (including 9 of the nation's 11 foremost recipients of federal research funds) inside the city limits. These industries generate jobs (requiring various levels of skill) in the city's core financial, accounting, legal, and communications businesses.

Boston's other great asset is its neighborhoods. Defined by boundaries that emerged during three and a half centuries of settlement and commitment, preserved by a public transportation system that maintains Boston as a walk-around city, the sixteen major neighborhoods that comprise the city are as distinct in character as they are similar in their determination to survive and prosper.

During the past eight years, large direct and indirect investment has been made in the lifeblood of the city, its neighborhoods. Economic development activities have concentrated on neighborhood business districts, connected business-based apprenticeship programs with community organizations, linked city-job creation activities with job-training programs, generated thousands of summer jobs through the Boston Private Industry Council, and taught building trades skills to teenagers. Moreover, the city's complex, uniquely vibrant array of community organizations has helped the police reduce crimes of violence in high-impact neighborhoods and cut the city's homicide rate to its lowest level in two decades.

Still important work remains to be done.

At the end of a period in which the Flynn administration helped bring a record number of housing starts to the neighborhoods of the city, the census indicates that the housing stock is static or in decline in certain areas: Central and Maverick Squares; Hyde Square and the Mission Hill Housing Developments; Franklin Field North and Egleston Square; Uphams Corner; the Ashmont Station area, Bowdoin North, Mt. Bowdoin, Codman Square, Fields Corner West, and Meetinghouse Hill; Franklin Field South and Wellington Hill.

But in all cases these neighborhoods can be enhanced to provide secure, decent places for Boston families to live and work. As one police executive said, "If we cut down Part I crime, but people are still afraid to let their children out of the house at night, we've failed."
The Boston Police Department and its Tradition of Neighborhood Service

Throughout its history — during its century-long oversight by the Commonwealth as well as its more recent period as an agency of the City — the Boston Police Department has always been rooted in the neighborhoods it serves. In the last seventeen years, the BPD has experimented with a number of innovative ways of serving these communities better.

Team Policing

In 1976, the BPD started one of the nation’s first team-policing programs — linking citizens with police — in the city’s housing developments, as well as a full-fledged program in Charlestown which emphasized full-time assignment of officers to specific beats. The team-policing program still operates, although at a scaled-down level, in several housing developments.

Neighborhood Oriented Policing Program

In 1977 the Department, in partnership with the Boston Fenway Program, a consortium of institutions in the Back Bay, South End, and Fenway neighborhoods (an area covered by Police District Four) inaugurated one of the nation’s first district-wide community-oriented policing programs. Volunteer officers worked specific beats which were designed to reflect actual neighborhood boundaries rather than the traditional design of sectors based on calls for service. Five neighborhood panels were eventually created by the police; some of these are still in existence.

The program, which served as a prototype in 1980 for a planned Department-wide initiative just prior to the Proposition 2 1/2 cuts, eventually succumbed to the inability to modify the Department’s CAD 9-1-1 response system to allow for beat integrity.

Community Disorders Unit

In 1978, the BPD created the Community Disorders Unit and established stringent procedures for dealing with violations of the civil rights of Boston citizens. The goal of the unit is to help every citizen in Boston feel safe in their homes, on the streets, in their places of work and worship — free from criminal activity targeted against them due to their race, creed, color* or sexual orientation.

Once the unit receives notice of any such possible violation, its detectives interview everyone with even remote knowledge of the incident. Witnesses and victims ride along with detectives to recreate the circumstances of the event, are shown photo arrays, and are given a hot-line number for individualized rapid response in case another incident occurs. Once complaints are filed and arrests are made, the unit helps victims through the court system. Even after cases are completed, the unit continues surveillance in the neighborhood areas where the original problem arose.

Started initially as a two-person unit, the unit now consists of two detective supervisors, one patrol supervisor, nine officers and detectives, and four interpreters fluent in a variety of foreign languages. Boston’s Community Disorders Unit is a national model copied by other departments throughout the country.

Bureau of Neighborhood Services and the Neighborhood Crime Watch Program

Although block watch groups have long been organized on an ad-hoc basis in communities large and small across the country, the Boston Police Department started its own drive to support such groups with creation by Commissioner Roache of the Neighborhood Crime Watch program in 1985 and appointment of Chris Hayes as its director. Since that time, more than 600 such groups have formed to deal with transitory or more lasting conditions. Some continue to provide important information and auxiliary surveillance to police officers. Like the strong community organizations working in every neighborhood of the city, this network of volunteers demonstrates the viability of one key aspect of Neighborhood Policing — citizen responsibility. Without the active help of citizens on every block of every neighborhood, police can do no more than react to crimes already committed.
In 1985, as a way of improving coordinated BPD response to the organizational and activist assets contained in the neighborhoods, Commissioner Roache combined all the community policing efforts of the Boston Police Department into a single structure, called the Bureau of Neighborhood Services, and placed a Superintendent in charge of its operation. He reorganized the bureau in 1988, calling it the Bureau of Special Operations, to assist in integration of Boston's public housing. In 1992 he abolished the bureau in preparation for the commitment of the entire department to Neighborhood Policing.

**Anti-Gang Violence Unit**

The history and highly successful impact of this unit has been discussed at length in Chapter One. It is important to note, however, that this unit has brought to full fruition the elements of Neighborhood Policing (Partnership, Problem Solving, Prevention) as well as a new activist role for police in a way suggested by the earlier and sometimes concurrent efforts of the other units described above.

The task now before the Department is to take the best features of these programs and units and incorporate them into the Neighborhood Policing initiative. As Katherine Mainzer, Executive Director of Citizens For Safety, said, "Citizens and police need to view each other as assets, not adversaries."

**The Men and Women of the BPD**

Members of the service say the philosophy they feel would be most effective for the Boston Police Department is:

- Community-oriented policing 24.2%
- Crime prevention 16.5%
- Public order maintenance 11.2%
- Arresting offenders 8.8%
- Responding to 9-1-1 calls 7.5%

These data indicate that members of the service are potentially favorably disposed to the principles of Neighborhood Policing. "Responding to 9-1-1 calls" is favored least by those having an opinion, while several of the main aspects of Neighborhood Policing are recommended by a combined majority (51.9%) of the officers.

Even more strongly, the survey indicates that members of the Department are very positively oriented to the public (and to the style of Neighborhood Policing). That is, they believe in the crime-reducing utility of getting closer to citizens.

- 90% "agree" or "strongly agree" that "Police officers are more effective if they make a major effort to learn about the things that concern the people on their beat or sector."
- 91% "agree" or "strongly agree" that "Police should make frequent informal contact with the people on their beat."
- 64% "agree" or "strongly agree" that "An officer on foot can develop a greater awareness of citizen expectations of the police than might be learned in a squad car."

The challenge is to provide the leadership, philosophical orientation, training, and technology to redirect this positive outlook in a way that motivates all personnel while reassuring Boston's diverse communities and constituencies that they are irreplaceable partners in the effort.
Chapter Five

Obstacles

The obstacles to implementing Neighborhood Policing in Boston include:
- tightly limited resources, and the declining number of police officers;
- the culturally inward focus of personnel, abetted by their feeling of being unappreciated by the public;
- the perceived lack of an accountable chain-of-command structure, undermined by an array of historical circumstances;
- the perceived lack of a standard, predictable process of merit to fill the superior ranks of the organization (which the promotional exams this fall are designed to put in place);
- the lack of a perceived crisis around which to rally and motivate committed action;
- the presence of unresolved racial attitudes that exist inside the Department as in other sectors of society; and
- inappropriate use of the emergency 9-1-1 system.

Limited Resources

By the end of this year, there will be about 1,930 officers of all ranks serving the City of Boston. This is the lowest number since 1986 and, as indicated in Chapter Three, is approximately 300 short of the number that preliminary analyses indicate will be needed to fully implement Neighborhood Policing.

Moreover, if city revenues do not improve, the repair, replacement, and expansion of essential facilities and equipment — including vehicles, radios, and furnishings — will be threatened.

Cultural Focus and the Sense of Being Unappreciated

There are strong indications that members of the Department feel misunderstood and unappreciated by the media and the public.
There are strong indications that members of the Department feel misunderstood and unappreciated by the media and the public.

The Boston Police Department's chain of command has been undermined over a long period.

Promotional exams must be recognized as fair to everyone.

- 92% "disagree" or "strongly disagree" with the statement, "Media coverage of the Department helps police officers do their job."
- 87% "agree" or "strongly agree" with the statement, "Citizens don't understand the problems of the police."
- 87% "agree" or "strongly agree" with the statement, "Police officers rarely receive praise for the work they do." This would appear to have more (though not exclusively) to do with the public than with supervisors, since 42% of police officer respondents say they have received "positive feedback" from a Department supervisor or leader during the past month.
- 58% "disagree" or "strongly disagree" with the statement, "The relationship between the police and the people of Boston is very good."

Accountability and the Chain of Command

As indicated in Chapter Four, the Boston Police Department's chain of command has been undermined over a long period by

- the familiarity between ranks bred by the stresses and long hours of the busing crisis;
- the fifteen-year hiatus in the presence of civil-service captains;
- the ten-year hiatus (prior to Commissioner Roache's administration) in civil service exams for supervisors (sergeants and lieutenants);
- the separation of supervisors from subordinates in Patrol caused by the rotating tours of the former; and
- the use of provisional supervisors at various periods during the last 15 years.

Creating a Clear Meritocracy

During the past 22 years, the ranks of the Boston Police Department have gone from being almost exclusively white and male to having a diversity that more closely approximates the population of the city they serve. And, during the past seven years, rapid and dramatic progress has also been made in bringing the supervisory ranks into a closer match with the diversity of Boston.

Unfortunately, while the state, city, and BPD personnel offices struggled with creating a testing system which the courts would not rule was biased against minorities, some officers came to believe that promotion was based less on merit than on personal favoritism. The structure of the promotional exams that began in September can correct this impression by putting in place a testing system that better approximates the real-world skills of police supervision and thereby creates a system for recognition of merit that will be seen as fair to everyone.

The fall promotional exams consist of four parts: 1) a written Massachusetts exam on police management will count as 20% of the grade; 2) a written Boston Police Department exam on BPD rules and procedures, 20%; 3) a listing of prior training and experience required by Massachusetts, 20%; and 4) a structured BPD oral board, 40%.

Lack of a Perceived Crisis

Researchers in the dynamics of organizational change generally agree that groups change the way individuals do — only when they have to. And nothing forces change like a crisis.
Private corporations are forced to change when a market shift threatens their continued existence. Public institutions are forced to change by their leaders' recognition that similar threats in the economic or political environment are at work.

Yet the Boston Police Department is not an organization that perceives itself in acute crisis. Unlike police in some other cities, Boston police officers and supervisors believe that they are having a real and positive impact on the city they serve. They know that crime and the problems associated with it may not be as serious as in other, more notoriously dangerous urban areas, but they also recognize that Boston and several of its neighborhoods are not immune to the pestilence of drugs and violence that have overtaken other areas of the country. Although they feel a lack of support from the media and the public, they do not seem to regard this as something that will or can change.

The crisis of the Boston Police Department, ironically, is its unique opportunity. Unlike perhaps any other major city in the nation, the BPD is strongly positioned to act against the perils, the very real crisis, of modern urban America by

- its tradition of service;
- its successful application of the principles of Neighborhood Policing by several of its specialized units working effectively with patrol officers and the public; and
- its recent gains in reducing homicide.

The BPD must now build working partnerships with citizens that will both be effective and make officers recognize the support the public feels for their best efforts.

Unresolved Racial Attitudes Throughout Society

Several times since Mayor Flynn took office in 1984, the Boston media have remarked upon the reduction in racial tension in the city. Yet whatever progress has been made by the city working in partnership with the neighborhoods, as the Mayor always says, is never enough. Bias and racial prejudice have been conditioned deeply into everyone, and their undoing requires both persistent and skillful effort. Securing behavioral conformity to prohibitions against overtly abusive actions, while essential, is not sufficient.

Nonverbal behavior, extensive social research has shown, communicates. Body language, subtle facial expressions, and other nonverbal acts have impact on the people who witness them and feel their effects. As society's front-line defenders of constitutional rights, police can have more impact than anyone — for good or ill — on citizens they are asked to serve or even to apprehend.

According to the recent Department-wide survey, nearly two-thirds (65.8%) of the respondents believe members of the BPD are "better at relating to other persons of different races than is true of the general public." Yet nearly three-fifths (59.0%) of the respondents agree that "people of one race or ethnic background generally have distrust and disrespect for other racial or ethnic groups." There are some indications that segments of the community in Boston think this statement is true of police as well.

Focus groups conducted by the St. Clair Committee and, more recently, by the Boston Foundation found that low-income, non-white ethnic people reported problems of this kind with police officers. This is consistent with other such findings around the country.

It is an issue that can and must be addressed in Boston. Intensive training, at the Academy and in the district stations themselves, will now begin to work on the attitudes that unconsciously shape nonverbal behavior, to help personnel interact with all citizens in the most respectful, effective way.
Chapter Six

The Stages of Change

Conversion of the operating style of the Boston Police Department to Neighborhood Policing will occur systematically, in three levels of simultaneous effort. Level One will secure the ability of the Department to respond to emergency as well as routine calls for service. Level Two will leverage the significant investment now being made in technology to increase the crime-fighting efficiency of the BPD while giving the organization the sophisticated tools it needs to undertake Neighborhood Policing. Level Three will transform the operations, training, recruitment, and other management systems of the agency to enable it, with additional police resources, to fully implement Neighborhood Policing.

LEVEL ONE: SECURING BASIC SERVICE

Municipal police agencies are the course of both first and last resort in dealing with the most pressing emergencies individual people ever face. No matter what else they may do, police officers must be equipped, trained, and organized to handle emergency calls, to reach rapidly all locations where persons or property are being threatened and to intervene effectively. They must also be available to handle other calls for service that occur after a criminal occurrence and to pursue offenders until they are caught.

A. Providing Rapid Response to Emergency Calls for Service

As indicated by Figure 5, the rapid-response units of the BPD have been generally improving in their ability to reach Priority One call locations, which are those places where a crime in progress is threatening persons or property, or other circumstances are threatening loss of life or severe injury.
Since June, the Operations Division of the BPD nearly doubled the number of calls it handles monthly over the phone, saving about 800 police hours in each four-week period.

Improved response time is the result of the vigilance, determination, and courage of Boston police officers, who may be counted among those unique human beings who run toward trouble and not away from it, wherever and whenever it shows itself. Improved response time has also been achieved, in part, through the program of cyclical maintenance and replacement of police cruisers put in place in 1987 and through improved dispatching management. For example, in June 1992, the Operations Division of the BPD stepped up its call-screening program to reduce the number of calls that must be answered by police units. Since June, it has nearly doubled the number of calls it handles over the phone, saving about 800 hours in police time each month by alleviating the need to send a cruiser in response.

New systems for dealing with non-emergency calls will be described in Phase II.

B. Equipment

The significant lack of available funds will restrict the BPD’s ability to respond to the needs identified by the Department-wide survey and the condition inventory. Nevertheless, the following initiatives will be undertaken.

- **New Vehicles**

  This fiscal year the Department will take delivery of a custom-designed $70,000 crime-lab van that will be used at major crime scenes as well as a $200,000 mobile command bus that will be equipped with all appropriate equipment to serve as a fully functional field headquarters.

  Three prototype patrol-supervisor vehicles will be available in October 1992 for testing by district patrol supervisors. As funds become available, all districts will receive sufficient vehicles to allow assignment by shift to increase accountability. Based on the recommendations of the Equipment and Facilities Task Force, each prototype vehicle will be equipped with roof-mounted flood lights and the following items:

  - First aid kit
  - Fire extinguisher
  - Crime-scene tape
  - Polaroid camera and film
  - Measuring tape
  - Flares and reflectors
  - Slim jim
  - Evidence bags
  - Wrecking bar
  - Bolt cutters
  - Side-wire cutter
  - Flex cuffs and cutters to remove cuffs
  - Storage box
  - Supply of BPD forms and graph paper
  - Megaphone
  - Binoculars
  - Rechargeable light box
By October 1, an ample inventory of latex gloves and mouth shields will be available in all district stations and distributed as needed by supervisors.

- **Firearms**
  
  No matter is of more concern to police officers and citizens alike than the use of deadly force. To minimize the chance that innocent bystanders will fall victim to errant shots fired on those rare occasions when police must use their firearms, officers must have the most accurate weapon possible. The remaining 10% of sworn personnel who do not have 9mm semi-automatic Glock Glocks will be trained in the use of the firearm and receive it during the current fiscal year.

- **Radios**
  
  Police officers must remain in contact with one another at all times, able to defuse potentially dangerous situations by getting and providing assistance rapidly. This is especially important when officers are on foot, separated by some distance from the nearest cruiser. More than 500 new Sabre radios which are currently being distributed will guarantee reliable, powerful communications capability to the officers and detectives who have received them. However, 850 officers are still in need of these new radios. Funds are not available this year for full conversion.

- **Uniforms**

  Uniforms are one of the most basic work items for police officers. Whether an officer exposed to the elements throughout a tour is warm in winter, dry in rain, and sufficiently cool in summer will affect his or her ability to perform. A large majority of participants in the Department-wide survey said that changes in several uniform items are "very important" or "somewhat important." In response, thus far, the Department has approved specifications for a new waterproof, Gore-Tex lightweight jacket; a new waist-length waterproof winter jacket; and a new waterproof, knee-length "blizzard coat" layered with Thinsulate. Since there are not sufficient funds to issue these jackets to all personnel, their use is optional at the present time. The Department's committee on uniforms continues to review other items for possible adoption.

**C. Decentralization and the Drive to Control Costs**

As part of the decentralization process, for the first time in many years, Area Commanders will receive line-item authority over allocation of their area's overtime budget and some equipment purchases by January. This will help control overtime expenses while assuring adequate police presence at large public events.

As will be discussed in Level Three: Implementing Neighborhood Policing, the principle of decentralization will be built upon to adapt the exact shape of Neighborhood Policing in Boston to each individual area, district, sector, and beat.

**D. Training**

In conjunction with the promotion by the Police Commissioner in spring 1992 of 85 sergeants, 6 lieutenants, and 25 captains, the Department provided the most extensive executive and supervisory training in the agency's history. The lieutenants attended a three-week course which included policing as well as supervisory instruction, at the Babson College New England Institute of Law Enforcement Management. The sergeants attended a three-week course provided by the Police Academy and the Boston Management Consortium. And the captains attended a three-week course provided by the Police Academy, the Boston Management Consortium, Harvard and Northeastern universities. Two captains were joined by two area commanders and two civilian members of the Department in a week-long session training at Michigan State University's National Center for Community Policing.
LEVEL TWO: Enabling police to be more productive and effective.

During the coming year, intensive training in four areas will be conducted to compensate for all deficits identified in the Department-wide survey and in a review of training records. These will include in-service, in-district, executive/supervisory, and computer and information-system training. These will be described more fully in the section, Level Three: Implementing Neighborhood Policing.

LEVEL TWO: LEVERAGING THE INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY

The city is committing $2.1 million in operating funds this year for computerized equipment. These funds will provide the Boston Police Department with the technological equipment every modern police agency needs, enable it to handle the intricate management systems required by Neighborhood Policing, and give it the hardware necessary to utilize evolving federal and state law-enforcement databases in the years to come.

Most important, it is expected that this equipment combined with better management will save 92,000 hours of police work annually to equal 11,500 tours of duty. Officers and detectives throughout the agency will be freed from time-consuming, sometimes haphazard methods of record-keeping to perform basic police work far more efficiently as well as to undertake the complex duties of Neighborhood Policing.

A. Computer Aided Dispatch

The new Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system, to be installed by Labor Day 1993 at a cost of $4 million in capital funds, will be the pivotal event in the Department's transition to Neighborhood Policing. Without it, the agency can do little more than simply respond to its calls for service. With it, the BPD can maintain beat integrity, manage its calls, route them to appropriate units for timely action, analyze them for common problems to be resolved (reducing if not eliminating the causes of later calls from the same sources), and link them to computerized lists of outstanding warrants, domestic-violence court orders, and other potentially life-saving automated data.

The CAD system will deliver these benefits:

- The BPD will be able to automatically sort calls for service into nine categories (instead of the current maximum of four). Rather than always sending uniformed officers to take all reports, no matter what the complaint or issue, the Department will be able to refer calls to the most appropriate unit right away. For example, detectives would receive instant notification of a reported burglary. If the intruder has left the scene, they would be able to follow up directly, rather than waiting for an available uniformed officer to get there first.

- The computer, and not the dispatcher, will keep track of the exact location of every police cruiser on the streets and match them instantly to the locations they can reach most quickly. Beat integrity will normally be maintained.

- Repeated calls to the same address will automatically be flagged. Officers will know, for example, about previous violent encounters at the location they will be entering. Addresses sending repeated false alarms can be monitored, censured, and even prosecuted. This feature alone could save another 13,000 work hours.

- Supervisors in cruisers on the streets will receive continuous notice on their Mobile Data Terminals (MDTs) of the nature and status of activity in their sectors. Supervisors will be able to help keep officers within their own beats and sectors more of the time.

- For non-Priority One calls, the computer will enable 9-1-1 operators to tell citizens exactly when to expect a visit from officers or detectives.
Suspect Identification and Imaging Network

The new $600,000 Suspect Identification and Imaging Network (ID system) will be delivered shortly. Developed largely by NeXT Computers, the brainchild of Apple Computer's co-founder Steve Jobs, it will pioneer state-of-the-art police ID processing. A suspect's photo, fingerprints, handwriting, and voice samples will be stored with his or her printed records. Monitors will allow high-resolution depiction of suspect's pictures for quick and easy review by witnesses and police alike.

The new ID system will immediately end the Department's antiquated practice of sorting suspect-identification data by hand and, once it is fully installed, will save 36,000 police hours devoted to transporting suspects from outlying areas to one, central ID center (at District 4 in the South End).

The new state-of-the-art system will
- maintain and make instantly retrievable all arrest and booking data, digital mug shots, fingerprints, voice and handwriting samples;
- support satellite booking sites, obviating the need (where funds are available) to transport prisoners out of the district stations to a central location; initially satellite sites will be installed in two districts;
- enable Boston to transmit crime-scene photos to state and federal agencies once they place their own files in a digitized computer format; and
- maintain data that can be combined with CAD, warrants, and other computerized information to serve as the core investigative tool of Boston's first case-management system for detectives.

The most difficult pending task, once the new ID system is in place, will be scanning and inputting more than 500,000 records into the system. It is estimated that this will require the labor of six people, working seven days a week for four months.

While funding has not yet been identified for installation of ID satellite capabilities in Boston's eight remaining police districts, the purchase has now made been of the hardware the agency needs to computerize and automate all its office-based operations.

C. A Linked System of Personal Computers

Presently, 150 personal computers are being purchased (at an approximate cost of $500,000). More than half of these will be placed in the ten police district offices and will be connected by Local Area Networks (LANs) with a high-speed central switching machine (or server) for each. These will enable the entire department to take advantage of databases created or improved recently by the BPD and Boston MIS for warrants, missing persons, license permits, motor-vehicle and boat registrations, tips received by the Drug Control Unit, stolen firearms and other items. For the first time in Department history, for example, District Commanders will be able to review and distribute to their roll calls computerized lists of criminal and problem activity in their commands generated by the new CAD system.

The Department's main computer link to the outside world is now a new AS/400 system, which replaced an antiquated IBM System 38 machine in the basement of Headquarters. Once the other equipment has been installed, the AS/400 will open all city, state, and federal databases to every major command and unit in the Boston Police Department.

D. Case Management

As soon as the exact specifications on the new CAD system are made available by the winning bidder (bids are now being solicited), work can begin on tailoring a new software package to meet the case-management needs of Boston detectives. For the first time,
commanders, detectives, and officers alike will have the tools to perform sophisticated crime analysis and mount tactical operations and systematic problem solving in response.

E. Mobile Data Terminals

The technology of Mobile Data Terminals is changing rapidly. Consequently, the Department is initiating a pilot project in Area C that will test the feasibility of using portable IBM notebook computers in cruisers. These hand-held devices should be capable of retrieving all information the current MDTs are now able to obtain, translating handwritten input, and transmitting incident reports to district-station printers for processing. Once the specifications on the most durable, labor-saving, and cost-effective device are developed, funding will be sought for purchase of enough devices for the approximately 350 marked and 200 unmarked cruisers now in street service.

Modernizing the technological capabilities of the Boston Police Department will give it the tools it needs to do basic police and investigative work professionally and efficiently. It will also provide a solid foundation for the full implementation of Neighborhood Policing.

LEVEL THREE: IMPLEMENTING NEIGHBORHOOD POLICING

The fundamental management principle of Neighborhood Policing is decentralization — putting decision-making power and problem-solving strength right where it is needed, at the grassroots, door-to-door, neighborhood level. The steps that must be taken, however, to reach that goal are not as simple as the placement of officers in radio-equipped cruisers and telling them to go where they are told as rapidly as possible.

Modernizing the operations and essential management systems of the Boston Police Department to fully implement Neighborhood Policing requires simultaneous execution of 25 tasks grouped in four areas: 1) Precise, localized strategies for implementing Neighborhood Policing in each District must be finalized; 2) Resources must be assessed and redeployed; 3) Practices that are key to performance must be revised; and 4) Systems that hinder or help officers on the front line of service delivery and problem solving must be adjusted.

As these tasks are carried out, and a systematic partnership between police and the public is built, officers will experience the very real support of citizens for their efforts.

A. Local Strategies

Boston’s ten police districts must develop strategies that, as enough police officers become available, will quickly make Neighborhood Policing real and concrete in every community of the city and move the Boston Police Department into the position of being the city’s lead agency in protecting every neighborhood by working to eliminate or reduce every source of fear.

Task 1: Development of District Neighborhood Policing Plans

Each strategy must be developed in concert with the residents of each district and include

- Boundaries for beats, which are to be overseen by at least one police officer, and for sectors, which, consisting of more than one beat, are to be overseen by at least one sergeant.
- An inventory of all community-based groups and publicly funded programs that exist within each beat and sector boundary.
- A list of quantifiable quality-of-life conditions (such as abandoned cars or buildings, Uttered lots, etc.) that are most important to measuring progress in each beat must be developed.
- A roster of volunteer police officers will be actively recruited for service as Neighborhood Policing beat officers.
A Plan of Action for the Boston Police Department

- A proposed schedule of meetings to solicit community input (especially through existing organizations) on local problems within each beat where an officer has volunteered.

- A process for objectively defining and ranking local problems giving rise to crime, disorder, and fear. This process must include a simple survey questionnaire (or propose an equally reliable substitute).

- The same process must be used to track and measure customer (public) satisfaction with police within each beat boundary.

- A process for marshaling resources inside and outside the BPD to attack the first problem selected for resolution within the beat.

- A system for reporting on activities and progress in attacking the first problem. This must include an easily produced newsletter (or substitute) and distribution plan for reporting once a month to all residents within each beat.

Responsibility: Chief, Bureau of Field Services
Area and District Commanders

Completion: June 1993

Task 2: Assign Voluntary Neighborhood Police Officers
At least 50 volunteer officers will be selected for duty in some of the newly defined beats around the city, including as a first priority many of the city's business districts. After receiving 40 hours of training in such skill areas as problem solving, community surveys, community organizing, cultural diversity, they will implement the steps prescribed in the District Neighborhood Policing Plans.

Responsibility: District Commanders
Commanding Officer, Police Academy

Completion: January 1993

B. Analysis of Deployment and Functions

Matching resources to demand is the basic business of any organization, public or private. A fundamental shift in operating strategy requires no less than a top-to-bottom resource review. This will fall into four areas: 1) Determination of Patrol needs ranging from provision of basic service to full implementation of Neighborhood Policing; 2) Definition of rank functions; 3) Evaluation of all specialized units to examine the degree to which they could support Neighborhood Policing; and 4) Auditing of all civilian positions to quantify their contributions to the Department's redirection.

Task 3: Patrol Deployment Analysis

The computerized analysis of officer availability, demand for service, and geographical area to be covered will be completed to determine the staffing needs of both the basic, response-driven model of traditional policing and the new demands of an agency primarily devoted to the problem-solving, fear-reducing purposes of Neighborhood Policing.

Responsibility: Director, Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Development

Completion: January 1993

Task 4: Rank Function and Job Analysis

Shifting the fundamental mission of the Boston Police Department necessitates a reexamination of each rank function and a redefinition of duties. This is especially timely due to the promotion in April of the first civil-service captains in 15 years and the largest number of civil-service supervisors in history. In general terms, it is clear that:

A computerized analysis will be completed to determine exact staffing needs.

Shifting the fundamental mission of the Boston Police Department necessitates a reexamination of each rank function and a redefinition of duties.
A fundamental shift in operating strategy requires no less than a top-to-bottom resource review.

• **Area Commanders** may attend the meetings with citizens at which beat problems are defined and ranked. In addition, they may be responsible for obtaining the resources outside their commands to assist police officers in resolving each problem.

• **Captains** may be the chief strategists in helping supervisors, police officers, other agencies, and neighborhood residents plan their systematic programs to reduce and remove the problems chosen by the consensus-defining process spelled out in their District Neighborhood Policing Plans.

• **Lieutenants and Sergeants** may be the chief tacticians in conveying daily guidance, skills enhancement, trouble shooting, and inspirational leadership for police officers as they work in the midst of their daily emergency-response tasks to reduce and remove the problems chosen by the consensus defining process spelled out in their District Neighborhood Policing Plans.

• **Detectives** may need to adjust their roles to meet the emerging, complex needs of Neighborhood Policing.

• **Police Officers**, in any event, must come to be seen by the Department, other agencies (public and private), and the general public as society's chief problem solvers whose fundamental role is to identify, reduce, and remove the conditions that are giving rise to fear in the neighborhoods where they are assigned.

Revision of Rules 103 (for police officers), 104 (for sergeants), 105 (for lieutenants), 106 (for duty supervisors), and 107 (for district and area commanders) must be carried out in close consultation with the unions appropriate to each rank.

**Responsibility:** Chief, Bureau of Administrative Services
Chief, Bureau of Field Services
Chief, Bureau of Investigative Services

**Completion:** March 1993

**Task 5: Specialized Unit Analysis**

The mission, staffing, and output of each specialized unit will be examined to see whether it supports the street-based approach of Neighborhood Policing. Positions that are essential by this criterion, but could be filled equally well by civilians, will be recommended for civilianization. Units that cannot be reconstituted to deliver services crucial to the work of the problem-solving police officers on the streets will be abolished.

**Responsibility:** Chief, Bureau of Administrative Services
Chief, Bureau of Field Services
Chief, Bureau of Investigative Services

**Completion:** January 1993

**Task 6: Civilian Support Staff Analysis**

Computerization and automation of some Department systems may shift: and even reduce the need for support staff. This determination must be made as the ordered computer hardware is installed and software applications are developed. At the same time, the requirements of Neighborhood Policing, to be specified by each Area Commander in his Neighborhood Policing Plan (described below), may put new and even greater demands on the civilians of the Department. Every position must, therefore, be audited to assess its potential concrete contribution to Neighborhood Policing.

**Responsibility:** Chief, Bureau of Administrative Services
Commanding Officer, Operations/MIS

**Completion:** April 1993
C. Managing for Performance

Proper deployment of human resources in a newly modernized, technologically advanced agency will match people to the jobs of Neighborhood Policing in Boston. Enabling them to perform those jobs well requires another set of departmental efforts.

As the Boston Police Department reconstitutes and strengthens its rank structure according to the new definitions and duties spelled out in Task 3, every individual must be given all the skills needed to handle his/her role. They then must be evaluated, rewarded, and promoted in accordance with their ability and demonstrated achievements in carrying out the objectives of Neighborhood Policing. At the same time, the best possible recruits for an organization determined to lead the way in protecting neighborhoods and driving fear from their midst must be actively pursued.

Task 7: InService Training

Between September 21, 1992 and July 3, 1993, all sworn BPD personnel will receive their required basic 40 hours of in-service training. Upgraded courses in Neighborhood Policing will be included in the curriculum.

Responsibility: Commanding Officer, Police Academy
Boston Management Consortium

Completion: July 1993

Task 8: In-District Training

Significant training needs defined by the assessments and survey conducted in spring 1992 cannot be met fully or rapidly enough through in-service training, which is to be provided one week a year for each officer. In-district training must be initiated immediately, using the video hookups that are now in place in every district station but E-18 and D-14 (scheduled to come on line during this fiscal year).

Brief videotaped programs will rapidly convey the skills and reinforce the attitudes essential to successful Neighborhood Policing. These videos will transmit the essential policing skills relevant to Community/Neighborhood Policing and the contextual issues surrounding the change to the new policing style.

Skills videos will be brief enough to be shown at roll calls but powerful enough to hold attention in that situation. Over the course of the year beginning September, 1992, they will cover most of the following topics:

- Crime prevention
- Victimology
- Communication Skills
- Preliminary Investigations
- Crime Scenes
- Latent Prints
- Warrants
- Follow-up Investigations
- Baton Training
- Domestic Violence
- Officer Safety
- Use of Force
- Avoiding Infectious Diseases
- Problem Identification
- Problem Analysis
- Problem Prioritization
- Problem Solving
- Networking
- Innovation/Ingenuity/Risk Taking
- Team Building
- Customer Relations
- Community Organizing
- Assertiveness
- Weapons on the Street
- Effects of Various Drugs

Context Videos will deal with the fundamental issues driving the change to Neighborhood Policing. They will be shown during newly established training sessions in the districts and other office locations. Among the topics to be covered:
A survey of computer literacy and of familiarity with relevant software packages will be conducted. Training will be designed to fill the needs.
Task 12: Neighborhood Civilian Training

The Boston Police Academy will develop a prototype training program that will be made available to community residents in the Department's neighborhood station houses. This training will describe the scope of Neighborhood Policing in Boston, furnish information on BPD rules and procedures, and suggest ways civilians may help reduce usage of 9-1-1 for non-emergency purposes.

Responsibility: Commanding Officer, Police Academy
Boston Management Consortium
Neighborhood Services, City of Boston
Director, Neighborhood Crime Watch Program

Completion of Design; Start of Implementation: April 1993

Task 13: Police Academy Curriculum Advisory Committee

To assist the Department in ensuring that its training practices, policies, procedures, and curriculum advance the purposes of Neighborhood Policing and meet the needs of the diverse neighborhoods of Boston, a standing committee will be established. Membership will include neighborhood residents, academy personnel, criminal-justice experts, and educators.

Responsibility: Chief, Bureau of Administrative Services
Boston Management Consortium
Commanding Officer, Police Academy

Completion (for start-up): November 1992

Task 14: Neighborhood Policing Reward and Promotional System

The entire system of providing assignments, promotions, and awards must be reexamined to determine how it can support the demands, duties, and performance measures of Neighborhood Policing. For example, effective service as a problem-solving, fear-reducing police officer should receive pay-and-rank recognition that does not necessarily remove that officer from continued work in his or her beat. This matter will require discussion and negotiation with the Department's unions.

Responsibility: Chief, Bureau of Field Services
Assisted by Director, Personnel

Completion: March 1993

Task 15: Promotional Testing System

Promotional testing must also reflect the demands, duties, and measures of Neighborhood Policing. While, for example, police officers obviously must show competence in reading and writing, their ability to communicate effectively with community residents may be at least as important. While much work has been done in recent years to improve the fairness of the promotional exams, this work will be expanded to serve the requirements of the new policing philosophy.

Responsibility: Chief, Bureau of Administrative Services
Assisted by Director, Personnel

Completion: March 1993

Task 16: Performance Appraisal

Certain responsibilities that will be common to Neighborhood Policing in Boston will be spelled out in the District Neighborhood Policing Plans (Task 1). Other responsibilities will be defined in the Rank Function and Job Analysis (Task 3). With the help and consultation of all relevant unions to assure conformity to contractual obligations and restrictions, both sets of requirements will be incorporated into new performance-appraisal forms that will be put into use when supervisors work the same hours as their subordinates.
Neighborhood Policing must attract and successfully motivate men and women who want to root out the problems that create crime.

Task 17: Recruitment

Traditional policing attracted some individuals who wanted, perhaps more than other things, to be heroic crime fighters. The appeal of this image, which is constantly reinforced by the media, is one of the main obstacles to implementation of Neighborhood Policing across the nation. Neighborhood Policing must attract and successfully motivate men and women who, while not lacking in physical courage, also want to root out the problems that create crime. The next class of police officers must be selected from an expanded pool of candidates who are the very best potential Neighborhood Police Officers the City of Boston has to offer. Therefore, when money becomes available to hire another class of officers, a public-communications program must be developed to identify candidates from every part of a highly diverse city who fully appreciate and are willing to embrace the values of Neighborhood Policing.

Responsibility: Director, Personnel
Completion: To be determined

Task 18: Selection Procedures

The greater complexity of Neighborhood Policing demands careful selection. Improved procedures must be put in place for background checks and psychological screening of candidates on existing lists, and new admission tests that reflect the demands to be faced by the new Neighborhood Police Officer.

- Background Checks
  Responsibility: Chief, Bureau of Administrative Services
- Psychological Screening
  Responsibility: Chief, Bureau of Administrative Services
- Admission Tests
  Responsibility: Director, Personnel
Completion: To be determined

Task 19: Securing Integrity

The monitoring systems of traditional policing are designed to track the location and activities of police officers. The strategic model of traditional policing (motorized response to 9-1-1 calls) was designed, in part, to keep officers in cars and away from contact with possible sources of corruption. Neighborhood Policing places a greater burden of trust on police officers. While the Department believes that this trust is fully justified, it must also be certain that its monitoring and investigative systems will prevent corruption as well as protect the rights and dignity of individual citizens who come into contact with police.

By creating a new Office of Internal Investigations which reports directly to the Police Commissioner, committing additional personnel and creating a centralized process for investigating and monitoring citizen as well as internally initiated complaints, stipulating that it will complete all investigations within 90 days, creating a Community Appeals Board to hear substantive and procedural appeals of the findings of IAD investigations, providing a separate opportunity for citizens to appeal board decisions, and creating a computer-based "early-intervention system" to identify officers with possible patterns of misconduct, the Office of Internal Investigations has attempted to achieve these goals and will be monitoring progress in the coming months to determine whether they are sufficient.

Responsibility: Chief, Office of Internal Investigations
Completion: Ongoing
D. Systems

The basic departmental systems for organizing, retrieving, and disseminating information must also be reorganized to support the strategy of neighborhood policing.

Task 20: Installation of New ID System

Installation of the new system will proceed in three stages: 1) the main equipment will be placed and made operational in the centralized booking facility at District 4; 2) satellite booking facilities will be installed in Districts 2 and 11; and 3) the 500,000 existing case files will be scanned into the system.

- Centralized Installation
  Responsibility: Commanding Officer, Operations
  Completion: November 1992

- Satellite Installation
  Responsibility: Commanding Officer, Operations
  Completion: January 1993

- Scanning Cases
  Responsibility: Chief, Bureau of Administrative Services
  Completion: January 1993

Task 21: Installation of New Computers and Local Area Networks (LANs)

The new computers will be distributed, installed, and inter-connected with the help of city MIS.

Responsibility: Commanding Officer, Operations
Completion: January 1993

Task 22: Call Management and Information Plan

The nine levels of call response and referral permitted by the new CAD system must be designed to guarantee appropriate short-term service to the public while promoting the longer-term problem solving that will reduce the need for such calls to be made again in the future. In addition, maximum use must be made of the data generation capabilities of the new CAD. For example, at the start of every tour Patrol officers and certain specialized units should receive up-to-the-minute information about recent conditions (incidents, complaints, etc.).

Responsibility: Commanding Officer, Operations
Completion: July 1993

Task 23: Case Management System

The information that will be generated by the new CAD system will provide essential information, updated continuously, for the Detectives' case management system. As soon as the specifications for the new CAD system are fixed by the winning vendor, development of the software systems for case management will begin. Installation of the case management will be coordinated with the CAD.

Responsibility: Chief, Bureau of Investigative Services
Commanding Officer, Operations
Completion: July 1993
Task 24: Paperwork and Forms

All forms must be assessed and revised where necessary according to their current or possible significance in measuring Neighborhood Policing, in strengthening the chain of command, in providing members of the service with essential periodic information (daily, weekly, or monthly), in preventing corruption, or in protecting citizens and officers.

Responsibility: Chief, Bureau of Administrative Services  
Commanding Officer, Operations/MIS

Completion: July 1993

Task 25: Internal Communications

Rapid redesign of the sheets, posters, and publications used for internal communications should unify these items and convey the newness and importance of the Neighborhood Policing mission. This will include Personnel Orders, Training Bulletins, Department Updates, Legal Bulletins, District Operating Procedures, Crime Watch publications, and all other orders and memo sheets. Each piece of communications must work with every other to help carry the organization through the process of change.

Responsibility: Director, Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Development

Completion: December 1992
# The Matrix of Change

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<tr>
<th>Develop Local Strategies</th>
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<td>2 Volunteer Officers</td>
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*where staffing levels permit*