

METROPOLITAN POLICE  
MANAGEMENT SERVICES DEPARTMENT  
The Problem Oriented Approach  
Four Pilot Studies

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THE PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH  
FOUR CASE STUDIES

## 9. DISCUSSION

- 9.1 The first requirement of this research was to discover whether Goldstein's work could be replicated at divisional level in the MPD. The free use of his quotes has deliberately been used as an indication of how often a finding of this project could be reflected in a Goldstein result. There were many more, both simple and subtle findings which could be found in the Goldstein reports and it can be said that, by any standards, his research has proved accurate when tested in this country. His thesis was also found to contain a number of theories which could be found, in part, in proposals such as The Systems Approach (3), and The New Rational Manager (4). Other proposals could be considered as standard 'scientific method'<sup>1</sup> or 'practitioner research', but it is the determination to translate these theories into effective action that makes the work attractive to police.
- 9.2 A problem oriented approach does offer a fresh approach to the endless demands on police and brings with it the essence of current thinking on applied research, problem solving, multi-agency approach and 'bottom up' planning. It will, however, be difficult to introduce and maintain in an organisation which operates with any sort of precision. All the traditional questions were asked at the start of the pilot studies - How long will it take? How many people? What do you think will be found? What recommendations are likely? These are all complete unknowns in a problem solving process, and the absence of a clear, lock-stepping plan produces obvious signs of discomfort in police personnel.

Goldstein:-

"If a police agency with the initiative to undertake substantive research was pressed to adhere to a lock-step form of inquiry and to a rigid time schedule similar to that commonly outlined in other types of research proposals, a substantial sacrifice in the quality of the end product would be made at the outset. Given the lack of experience in conducting such inquiries, our explorations taught us that it is simply not possible to anticipate how

by Chief Superintendents to take a key position in problem solving. There is the assumption that their role is the constant sorting, checking and supervision of daily but absolutely essential work. It was the Superintendent who was often found to be the key rank in the process. He had the ability to authorise or facilitate non-standard activities and position himself between the day to day work of Chief Inspectors and the longer term considerations of the Chief Superintendent. If a divisional management team was to be stabilised, it was most likely to involve his post because it made management sense to give him such a task.

9.5 Whatever the Chief Superintendents in this study thought of their status in the organisation, they were all seen to be building teams and dismantling them. This was not just to reflect their own priorities but also to manoeuvre their resources around the constraints imposed by higher management levels. In comparison with the Madison Police Chief, the Chief Superintendents had so few degrees of freedom that they could well be considered impotent. A combined effort by a Superintendent and PCs to Inspectors which could result in novel activities will, therefore, not always be attractive to a Chief Superintendent who sees himself as far less independent than the organisation assumes. What starts to emerge is that real, localised, specific and radical problem solving may be accepted and perhaps even understood in inverse ratio to the line management level in the organisation. It certainly could be said from this study that if there was to be direct criticism of, or interference with the project it was most likely to come from line management levels above that of Chief Superintendent.

9.6 The problem oriented approach has emerged as being in tune with the aspirations of many working officers, and with the current ideas of policing at the local level. Its ambiguity, lack of lock-step construction and task orientation, may put it out of tune with traditional police organisations and their management roles. The adoption of the approach is likely to improve police effectiveness on the ground, give management new authority and confidence in their knowledge of their own problems, and involve the community and other agencies in radical initiatives; but the organisation as a whole can be out of step in terms of attitudes, skills, and work capacity to

support even such attractive goals. In such circumstances, the process cannot be implemented by edict:-

Goldstein:-

"What is needed is not a single decision implementing a specific programme or a single memorandum, announcing a unique way of running the organisation. The concept represents a new way of looking at the process of improving police functioning. It is a way of thinking about the police and their function that, carried out over an extended period, would be reflected in all that the administrator does: In the relationship with personnel, in the priorities he sets in his own work schedule, in what he focuses on in addressing community groups, in the choice of training curriculums, and in the questions raised with local and state legislators. Once introduced, this orientation would affect subordinates, gradually filter through the rest of the organisation, and reach other administrators and agencies as well."

(1) p.257

- 9.7 The implementation of the process in a police department requires the recognition of the strengths and weaknesses in that particular Force and the decision to exploit what is best as well as to taking action in those areas which are the main stumbling blocks. The conclusion of this study is, therefore, a listing of the advantages already present in the Metropolitan Police; the obstacles to the adoption of the problem oriented approach; and proposals for any implementation.

best to proceed until one becomes involved in the inquiry. We recognize this presents a dilemma because it requires not only that police administrators commit themselves to what many will consider a novel and perhaps even extravagant endeavour, but also that they tolerate a high degree of ambiguity and uncertainty as the effort proceeds. These conditions represent the antithesis of the clock-like precision that characterizes routine aspects of police operations. They are, moreover, extraordinarily difficult to maintain in an organization subjected to public pressures to ensure that every dollar spent on personnel goes into what the public conceives to be a direct response to the immediate threat of crime."

(2) Vol.IV p.35

- 9.3 This ambiguous and uncertain process can find acceptance with officers at working level. The provision of high powered diagnostic tools, the encouragement of free wheeling discussion and the legitimising of procedures that cannot be found 'in the book' are all attractive measures. The organisation is seen to be clearly working for their personal and local benefit, and their skills and knowledge are being exploited to the full. Goldstein warned that Madison police officers might be atypical and although the idea could only be supported by a flimsy knowledge of other US police forces, there does seem reason to believe that working officers in the Metropolitan Police might, in general, be more receptive to the approach than some of their American colleagues.
- 9.4 The acceptance of a problem oriented approach by working officers may, almost perversely, make management's problem more difficult. It is a process which is firmly rooted in an organisational culture of 'task' (5) and its management requires attitudes and skills which are not in line with the traditional 'role' structure of the police. For example, a Chief Inspector, whether Operations, Administration or CID, is fully committed to the procedures which keep the organisation running. His day is an endless string of problems, and it was noted during this project that Chief Inspectors were never tasked

## 10. CONCLUSIONS

10.1 If the problem oriented approach is accepted as a process which will improve the police service, then the Metropolitan Police has a number of characteristics which will make its adoption easier.

10.1.1 The process reinforces the current strategies of local, effective, multi-agency initiatives.

10.1.2 The planning process has already legitimised the use of resources for a similar activity\* \_\_\_\_\_

10.1.3 The process is likely to be popular with officers at the working level.

10.1.4 Diagnostic, training and computer skills and resources can be found from within the Force.

10.2 These advantages could easily be reinforced by forming a diagnostic/facilitating team with the ability of Goldstein's and by making it available to divisional commanders. The team would need the level of skills described by Goldstein, and would have to be based in a high level research environment. At present, MSD is the only section of the Metropolitan Police which could support such a team, and the formation of that team would represent the only major cost of deciding to encourage a problem oriented approach. The current review of management training and the imminent supply of new computer packages are both in line with the process, and these resources would not need more investment than that already planned. The provision of a central facility for literature and data searching would complete the package.

10.3 The Metropolitan Police has a number of characteristics which will make adoption difficult.

10.3.1 The process may be seen as being in opposition to the centralised policy making which is likely to dominate a Force as large as the Metropolitan Police.

- 10.3.2 The organisational structure, and its expectations of management may be in conflict with local problem solving.
- 10.3.3 A Chief Superintendent's degrees of freedom are likely to be insufficient to support radical initiatives.
- 10.3.4 Some outside agencies in London may be so similar in size and construction as to suffer the same inhibiting characteristics.
- 10.3.5 As the result of rapid personnel movements, the divisional management team is so unstable as to defeat long term problem solving.
- 10.3.6 Management communications are designed by 'line' or 'territory'<sup>1</sup> - not by problem.
- 10.3.7 The Metropolitan Police has a full work load, and it cannot take on the process as an addition to its everyday work.
- 10.A Nearly all of these characteristics are already the subject of Commissioner's Action Plans, and little can usefully be said before the publication of other research papers. The last three items do, however, need emphasising.
- 10.4.1 The instability of the divisional management must be reversed by personnel control and/or minimised by the operation of a crime/problem team. In other words, when a problem is identified, officers must also be identified who have suitable expectations of tenure in post.
- 10.4.2 A communication mechanism, such as the seminar, must be established so that a divisional management can have the time and opportunity to meet with others who share the same specific problem.
- 10.4.3 Problem solving takes time and understanding. If it is to succeed it must replace some of the workload of the Force. This means that some of the duties which are considered as



planning, supervision, record keeping and inspection will have to give way. This will involve effort and the acceptance and management of risk.

Sir John Hoskyns (former Head of the No.10 Policy Unit):-

"The most difficult objection to answer is, paradoxically, the least substantial. 'Few people would disagree with your analysis. But where are your prescriptions?' This familiar (establishment) response to any attempt to grapple with fundamental problems stems from a combination of two things: first, unfamiliarity with 'structured problem solving'<sup>1</sup>, to use the jargon; and second, a sense of impotence which eventually takes over the minds of people whose life experience is that 'nothing works'".

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APPENDIX 'A'<sup>1</sup> . . . . . (i) - Civ)

APPENDIX 'B'<sup>1</sup> \_\_\_\_\_ (v) - (viii)

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OXFORD STREET VICTIMS

1. Victim

A victim for the purposes of this study is anyone who loses valuable personal property, or has it stolen from them in Oxford Street and surrounding streets. Property recovered intact or not 'valuable' i.e. spectacles and gloves, has not been included.

2. Methodology

Documentary analysis of crime and lost property books at Marylebone and West End Central police stations. Analysis of property lost books at Selfridges and Marks & Spencer.

Postal questionnaires to all victims in the police records for the four weeks:-

30th October to 5th November 1983  
13th November to 19th November 1983  
27th November to 3rd December 1983  
11th December to 17th December 1983

Questionnaires posted:- 599  
    <sup>11</sup> returned:- 263 (44%)  
    " analysed:- 250 (150 (DM), 100 (CD))

3. Analysis Summary

40% of accepted crime book entries, and over 50% of lost property entries at Marylebone (DM) refer to victims as defined in this study. Eight out of ten are women, and most live in London postal districts (61%) and the Home Counties (21%).

The patterns of loss are not the same on North and South of Oxford Street. The CD victim will typically be aged between 18 and 44, is

twice as likely to work in the area as the DM victim, and the loss is mostly likely to occur between 1pm and 4pm. Three quarters of the victims will be in a shop at the time, and it is likely to happen on any day except Monday.

The DM victim is likely to be an older, and less frequent visitor and the recognised danger days of Thursday and Saturday are much more significant than at CD. The times of losses are not bunched, but are evenly spread over 11am to 7pm, and more (81%) will be in shops.

Selfridges property lost and stolen book contained 40% more victim entries than police books, even though every loser is given printed instructions and a map showing the police station.

Marks & Spencer has no such instruction leaflet, and its property lost records showed treble the entries known to police. It would be reasonable to assume that there are twice as many victims in shops as are known to police.

#### 4. Extrapolation

The analysis and questionnaire results, if worked up to annual figures, would produce 12,700 victims a year at DM and 5,900 at CD. A total of 11,500 would be women inside shops i.e. 228 victims every shopping week.

## DATA SUMMARY

### Victims as % of Police records over the 4 weeks

	DM	CD
Major Crime	40%	15%
Beat Crime	39%	40%
Property Lost	53%	44%

### Victims by Age Group %

	DM	CD
Under 18	3	2
18 - 24	25	32
25 - 34	21	26
35 - 44	18	20
45 - 54	11	4
55 - 64	13	9
65 &. over	10	6

### Victims by Sex %

At any location:-	77 female
Inside shops:-!	+90 female

### Victims by Location %

	DM	CD
Inside shops	81	72
Street	10	18
Bus/Tube	5	6
Work/Hotel	3	4

### Frequency of Visit (%)

	DM	CD
Daily work	14	28
Weekly	20	16
Monthly	30	26
Yearly	38	30

### Day of Loss %

	DM	CD
Monday	11	7
Tuesday	10	15
Wednesday	15	17
Thursday	29	21
Friday	12	16
Saturday	22	23

### Time of Loss %

	DM	CD
Before 10	0	2
10 - 11	3	3
11 - 12	7	9
12 - 1	9	7
1 - 2	14	25
2 - 3	13	20
3 - 4	11	14
4 - 5	17	7
5 - 6	12	6
6 - 7	8	5
After 7	5	2

## QUESTIONNAIRE ADDRESSES

		Male	Female	Total
LONDON	W	40	72	112
	SW	16	61	77
	SE	11	28	39
	N	8	31	39
	NW	11	57	68
	E	5	26	31
ESSEX		3	31	34
KENT		8	26	34
SURREY		7	19	26
MIDDLESEX		3	17	20
HERTS		3	13	16
SUSSEX		5	5	10

NO OTHER COUNTY TOTALLED MORE THAN 6

## ADDITIONAL RESPONDENT INFORMATION

105 of 250 respondents were accompanied by another person or persons. Elderly victims were typically accompanied by sons and daughters, young mothers by children, and local workers by friends from the office.

Of every 100 victims, 55 will arrive by Underground, 17 by bus, 11 by walking and 9 by car or taxi.

PROSTITUTION - BEDFORD HILL

1. Bedford Hill

The Bedford Hill area has been a pitch for prostitutes for as long as anyone can remember. It is possible that this tradition began with the combination of tram routes and open spaces which heavily influenced turn of the century development of transport and housing south of the river Thames.

2. Methodology

Literature search and documentary analysis of police records. Samples by street observation and elapsed time video recording. Short interviews with court staff, police officers and prostitutes.

3. Analysis Summary

170 different prostitutes operated in the area in 1983 and they were likely to be arrested three times during that year if they were persistent. They will say they wanted to avoid the 'arab trade'<sup>1</sup> in central London, which they find more demanding, time consuming and 'uncomfortable' than the reliable clientele in Bedford Hill. In sexual terms, they are probably prudish and do not want to provide the fantasy, bondage or exotica of the West End trade. Some younger prostitutes will also take on some club and agency work in the evening, but are still searching for uncomplicated, undemanding men.

There have always been more men in cars who want prostitutes than there are women who are willing, and Bedford Hill is therefore a sellers' market where customers can outnumber the suppliers by as much as ten to one. If other car beat prostitutes come under pressure, they are tempted to move to Bedford Hill. The very high number of potential customers in the area can accelerate the 'market place'<sup>1</sup> activity at a rate which catches everyone by surprise.

A third of the customers live within two miles of Bedford Hill. The next highest proportion come from the Croydon, Wallington, Mitcham area, followed by a group from Battersea, Clapham, Camberwell and the Elephant and Castle. The whole of the rest of London only accounts for 11% of these men, and the Home Counties and the rest of England provide similar proportions. The two car routes from the Oval through Clapham Common to Balham High Road and Mitcham, and from Brixton Hill through Streatham High Road to Croydon can be used to define the major catchment area for the kerb crawlers of Bedford Hill.



DATA SUMMARY

Kerb crawlers by location, sample size 155

Within 2 miles of Bedford Hill	33%
Croydon, Wallington, Mitcham, Sutton, Thornton Heath, SE25	19%
Clapham, Battersea, Elephant & Castle, Camberwell, Kennington, Peckham	14%
All other London postal districts	11%
Home Counties	11%
Rest of U K	10%

Prostitutes processed through 'WD'

1983 - 171 prostitutes

Arrests:	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
	10	69	68	45	28	51	47	50	69	66	94	39

1984 - 70 prostitutes

Arrests:	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>
	84	60

## MARKET FORCES

The price of a prostitute in Bedford Hill is £10 in a car or £25 indoors - hers or the customer's premises or a rented lock-up garage. As a group of suppliers, the prostitutes have determined what price customers are willing to pay for their services in that area, and they operate as a price fixing cartel. South Western Magistrates' Court will fine them £25 or less (63%) or £50 or less (21%). Most of the remainder will be conditionally discharged (13%). The fines are not punitive, but are geared to a capacity to pay - they are therefore a tax which operates on the P.A.Y.E. principle.

The easiest, cheapest and in the short term, most effective way of disturbing this model is for Police to constantly arrest prostitutes. Their activities are public as opposed to the hidden character of most other crimes, and they are easier to catch and convict than customers - who in any case outnumber them by a huge proportion.

Any longer term solutions would have to involve the media, the residents, Social Services, the Courts and DHSS in trying to remove prostitutes from a market place which, once entered, turns out to be a 'good life'<sup>1</sup> trap for the prostitutes, their ponces and their children.

VEHICLE CRIME WEST HAM

Data Summary - 1983

1728 crimes included in this analysis.

46% of crimes were unauthorised taking/theft of  
(Home Office Classification)

36% of crimes were theft from  
(Home Office Classification)

81% of all offences occurred on the street

40% of all offences occurred outside the victim's home

11% of all offences occurred in car parks

54% of crimes concerned Fords

40% of crimes concerned Ford Cortinas and Escorts

31% of vehicles suffering theft from had radios or cassette players stolen

53% of vehicles had no apparent damage

Of those vehicles that went missing (i.e. moved):-

31% were never recovered

- of those 74% were valued under £1000

Of the vehicles that were recovered:-

74% were found within one week and

41% reappeared on KW or KF

KW + KF

1983

CIRCUMSTANCES OF CRIME

<u>Day of the week</u>	No.cr.reps	%	% adj. for unknowns
Sunday	187	10.8	
Monday	197	11.4	
Tuesday	219	12.7	
Wednesday	181	10.5	
Thursday	201	11.6	
Friday	220	12.7	
Saturday	216	12.5	
Unknown	306	17.7	

<u>Month</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>
February	236	13.7
May	267	15.5
August	269	15.6
October	300	17.4
November	377	21.8
December	278	16.1

<u>Premises</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>% adj. for unknowns</u>
Street	1401	81.1	
Garage	23	1.3	
Yard	36	2.1	
Forecourt	41	2.4	
Car Park	190	11.0	
Driveway	11	0.6	
Garden	9	0.5	
Depot	7	0.4	
Unknown	10	0.6	

1983

Vehicle MAKE and MODEL unknown = 193

			Percentage of Make	Percentage of Whole
1. (07) FORD	: Model Unknown	= 23	= 2.79%	= 1.51%
	08) Cortina	= 379	= 46.00%	= 24.89%
	09) Escort	= 224	= 27.18%	= 14.71%
	12) Granada	= 67	= 8.13%	= 4.40%
	04) Capri	= 65	= 7.89%	= 4.27%
	25) Transit	= 39	= 4.73%	= 2.56%
	60) Fiesta	= 17	= 2.06%	= 1.12%
	6) Consul	= 5	= 0.61%	= 0.33%
	7) Corsair	= 5	= 0.61%	= 0.33%
				= 824
				54.1%
2. (36) BRITISH	: Model Unknown	= 4		
LEYLAND	19) Mini/Metro	= 69		
				= 73
				4.79%
3. (5) DATSUN	: Model Unknown	= 50		
	55) 120Y	= 7		
	58) 100	= 3		
	62) 160J	= 3		
	86) 120	= 2		
	38) 140Y	= 1		
	54) 1300	= 1		
	82) Cherry	= 1		
				= 68
				4.46%

4. (01) AUSTIN : Model Unknown = 7  
 16) Maxi = 8  
 53) 1100 = 8  
 54) 1300 = 7  
 22) Princess = 6  
 61) Allegro = 14  
 35) Cambridge = 1  
 51) 250 = 1  
 56) 1000 = 1  
 59) 1800 = 1  
 68) 1600 = 1

= 55  
 3.61%

5. (19) VAUXHALL : Model Unknown = 8  
 40) Viva = 16  
 75) Cavalier = 13  
 05) Chevette = 6  
 97) Astra = 4  
 07) Corsair = 1  
 57) 2000 = 1  
 98) Carlton = 1

= 50  
 3.28%

6. (11) MORRIS : Model Unknown = 5  
 15) Marina = 26  
 54) 1300 = 4  
 53) 1100 = 3  
 56) 1000 = 1  
 80) Ital = 1

= 40  
 2-63%

7. (18) TRIUMPH : Model Unknown = 10  
 72) Dolomite = 7  
 54) 1300 = 4  
 57) 2000 = 4  
 24) Spitfire = 3  
 43) TR7 = 3  
 70) Bonneville = 3  
 77) Vitesse = 2  
 28) Herald = 1  
 30) 125 = 1  
 78) Stag = 1

= 39  
 2-56%

8. (41) HONDA : Model Unknown = 17  
 30) 125 = 1  
 33) 90 = 4  
 48) 125 = 1  
 51) 250 = 6  
 58) 100 = 1  
 71) Civic = 2

= 32  
 2-1%

9. (04) BMW : Model Unknown = 25  
 57) 2000 = 1

= 26

10. (20) VOLKSWAGEN : Model Unknown = 15  
 11) Golf = 6  
 73) Beetle = 3  
 23) Scirocco = 1

= 25

11. (08) HILLMAN	: Model Unknown	=	1	
	03) Avenger	=	9	
	13) Hunter	=	7	
	21) Minx	=	5	
	14) Imp	=	2	
				= 24
12. (15) ROVER	: Model Unknown	=	21	
	57) 200	=	2	
				= 23
13. (03) BEDFORD	: Model Unknown	=	20	
				= 20
14. (44) TOYOTA	: Model Unknown	=	12	
	95) Cresida	=	4	
	94) Corolla	=	2	
	92) Corona	=	1	
				= 19
15. (14) RENAULT	: Model Unknown	=	11	
	45) Fuego	=	2	
	88) 16	=	2	
	50) 17	=	1	
	58) 100	=	1	
	59) 1800	=	1	
				= 18
16. (21) VOLVO	: Model Unknown	=	17	
				= 17
17. (40) YAMAHA	<sup>m</sup> Model Unknown	=	9	
	51) 250	=	2	
	30) 125	=	1	
	33) 90	=	1	
	48) 125	=	1	
				= 14



18. (13) PEUGOT	: Model Unknown	=	7	
	49) 305	=	3	
	52) 304	=	3	
				= 13
19. (06) FIAT	: Model Unknown	=	9	
	18) Mirafiore	=	2	
	46) Argenta	=	1	
	64) 128	=	1	
				= 13
20. (10) MERCEDES	: Model Unknown	=	11	
	57) 2000	=	1	
				= 12
21. (57) CHRYSLER	* Model Unknown	=	1	
	01) Alpine	=	9	
	03) Avenger	=	1	
				= 11
22. (12) MGB	: Model Unknown	=	4	
	42) Roadster	=	5	
	53) 1100	=	1	
				= 10
23. (09) JAGUAR	: Model Unknown	=	3	
	63) XJ6	=	5	
	59) 1800	=	1	
				= 9
24. (02) AUDI	: Model Unknown	=	6	
	58) 100	=	2	
	84) 80	=	1	
				= 9
25. (50) SUZUKI	: Model Unknown	=	7	
	51) 250	=	1	
	53) 1100	=	1	
				= 9

26. (55) WOLSEY	: Model Unknown = 6	= 6
27. (45) KAWASAKI	: Model Unknown = 4	
30) 125	= 1	= 5
28. (56) HUMBER	: Model Unknown = 0	
29) Sceptre	= 4	= 4
29. (71) NORTON	: Model Unknown = 2	
34) 929	= 1	
54) 1300	= 1	= 4
30. (22) CITROEN	: Model Unknown = 3	
79) Diane	= 1	= 4
31. (24) OPEL	: Model Unknown = 2	
76) Record	= 1	= 3
32. (17) TALBOT	: Model Unknown = 3	= 3
33. (51) RELIANT	: Model Unknown = 1	
47) Robin	= 1	
96) Scimitar	= 1	= 3
34. (33) LANCIA	: Model Unknown = 1	
67) Beta	= 1	
68) 1600	= 1	= 3
35. (54) DAIMLER	: Model Unknown = 1	
87) Sovereign	= 2	= 3

36. (27) DODGE	: Model Unknown = 1		
	58) 100 = 1		
		=	2
37. (30) COMMER	: Model Unknown = 1		
		=	1
38. (37) ALFA ROMEO			
	: Model Unknown = 1	=	1
39. (42) MOTOG	: Model Unknown = 1	=	1
40. (43) VESPA	: Model Unknown = 1	=	1
41. (53) JENSON	: Model Unknown = 1	=	1
42. (23) SKODA	: Model Unknown = 1	=	1
43. (05) SIMCA	: Model Unknown = 1	=	1
44. (26) RILEY	: Model Unknown = 0		
	44) Kestrel = 1		
		=	1
45. (28) HARLEY DAVIDSON			
	: Model Unknown = 1	=	1
46. (29) LADA	: Model Unknown = 1	=	1
47. (16) SAAB	• Model Unknown = 1	=	1
<b>MULTIPLE CRIME</b>			
99. (99)	:	= 19	= 19

1983 KW + KF

ALL CRIMES - MAKE OF CAR

<u>Make</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>
Ford	822	47.93
Austin	109	6.36
Datsun	68	3.97
Vauxnall	53	3.09
Morris	44	2.57
Triumph	39	2.27
Honda	32	1.86
Volkswagen	28	1.63
Hillman	24	1.40
BMW	26	1.52
Rover	23	1.34
Bedford	20	1.17
Renault	19	1.11
Volvo	17	0.99
Leyland	15	0.87
Toyota	15	0.87
Yamaha	14	0.82
Peugot	13	0.76
Fiat	13	0.76
Mercedes	12	0.70
Jaguar	10	0.58
Chrysler	10	0.58
Suzuki	9	0.53
Audi	9	0.53
MGB	7	0.41
Wolsey	6	0.35
Kawasaki	5	0.29

1983 KW + KF

MAKE AND MODEL (ALL CRIMES)

<u>Fords</u>	<u>Total = 822</u>	
	<u>Fret</u>	<u>%</u>
Cortina	379	46.11
Escort	224	27.25
Granada	66	8.03
Capri	65	7.91
Transit	39	4.74
Fiesta	16	1.95
Consul	5	0.61
Corsair	5	0.61
<b>Other</b>	3	0.36
Unknown	20	2.43

1983 KW + KF

<u>Type - Vehicle</u>	<u>Fr&amp;G</u>	<u>%</u>
Saloon/Coupe	674	39.0
Estate	100	5.8
Hatchback	10	0.6
Trailer	3	0.2
Lorry	26	1.5
Sports/car	12	0.7
Motorcycle	69	4.0
Van	116	6.7
Soft Top	4	0.2
Taxi	9	0.5
Plant	4	0.1
Milk Float	9	0.5
Bus	2	0.1
Dormobile	-	-
Minibus	2	0.1
Multiple Crime	19	1.1
Unknown	669	38.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>1728</b>	<b>100.0</b>

1983 KW + KF

AGES - VEHICLES

	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>
OLD 'A'	1	0.1
'B'	3	0.2
•C	8	0.5
'D'	15	0.9
'E'	16	0.9
•F <sup>1</sup>	41	2.4
•G'	59	3.5
•H <sup>1</sup>	65	3.8
'J'	68	4.0
•K'	97	5.7
'L'	134	7.9
•M <sup>1</sup>	115	6.8
•N <sup>1</sup>	109	6.4
'P'	101	6.0
•R'	113	6.7
'S'	147	8.7
'T'	135	7.9
•V <sup>1</sup>	124	7.3
•W	74	4.4
•X <sup>1</sup>	71	4.2
'Y'	79	4.7
NEW 'A'	12	0.7
Other (foreign)	11	0.7
Unknown	73	4.3
Pre 'A' reg	4	0.2
Multiple Crime	19	1.1

1983 KW + KE

<u>Crime Classifications</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>
Unauthorised taking	480	27.8
Theft of MV	315	18.3
Theft from MV	623	36.1
Criminal Damage	226	13.1
Attempted theft of	15	0.9
No crime	32	1.9
Attempted theft from	26	1.5
Interference with	9	0.5
Theft elsewhere	-	-



1983 KW + KF

THE CRIME ITSELF

<u>Property Stolen</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>% adj. for 'nothings'<sup>1</sup></u>
Nothing	852	49	
( Radio/Cassette player	274	16	
In ( Speakers	111	6	
Car ( CB rig	17	.1	
( Cassettes	56	3	
( Other	40	2	
( Wheels	51	3	
( Battery	63	4	
Car ( Engine Parts	29	2	
Parts ( Number Plates	18	1	
C Tools	96	6	
( Spare Wheels	36	2	
( Other	152	9	
( Handbag	18	1	
( Briefcase	32	2	
Other ( Driving			
Contents ( Documents	66	4	
( Cash/Chequebk	70	4	
( Other	221	13	

1983 KW + KF

VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN

	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>% adj. for unknown + none</u>
No property stolen	961	55.6	
Property stolen:-			
Value unknown	67	3.9	
Nominal	54	3.1	
- £10	59	3.4	
£11 - £50	186	10.6	
£51 - £100	169	9.8	
£101 - £300	158	9.1	
£301 - £500	30	1.7	
£501 - £1000	22	1.3	
£1001 +	22	1.3	

VEHICLE STOLEN/BROKEN INTO OUTSIDE VICTIM'S HOME?

	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>% adj. for unknown</u>
No	1033	59.8	
Yes	686	39.7	
Unknown	8	0.5	

1983 KW + KF

THE CRIME ITSELF

<u>Damage Incurred</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>% adj. for none</u>
None	909	53	
Door lock	12	1	
Column lock	9	1	
Window/quarter lights	287	17	
Roof slashed/dmgd	10	1	
Slashed tyres	22	1	
Body or lights	133	8	
Write off	38	2	
Fire damage	10	1	
Totally burnt out	33	2	
Other	181	10	

1983 KW + KF

THE CRIME ITSELF

<u>Where Found</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>% adj.</u>
Still not found	256	14.82	
N/A (Theft from/Crind)	893	51.71	
KW	133	7.70	23.0
KA	2	0.12	
KB	14	0.81	
KD	4	0.23	
KE	26	1.51	
<b>KF</b>	106	6.14	18.3
KG	6	0.35	
KL	3	0.17	
KN	5	0.29	
KO	55	3.18	9.5
JA	1	0.06	
<b>JB</b>	6	0.35	
<b>3C</b>	3	0.17	
<b>3H</b>	3	0.17	
JI	8	0.46	
JL	19	1.10	3.3
JN	2	0.12	
JO	1	0.06	
JW	8	0.46	
GD	3	0.17	
GH	14	0.81	
GN	1	0.06	
HA	1	0.06	
HB	8	0.46	
HD	8	0.46	
HH	31	1.80	5.4
HW	3	0.17	

cont... <u>Where Found</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>% adj.</u>
RD	1	0.06	
RE	1	0.06	
RW	1	0.06	
YT	3	0.17	
YD	1	0.06	
PP	1	0.06	
PK	1	0.06	
PR	1	0.06	
NI	2	0.12	
ND	1	0.06	
BH	1	0.06	
BC	1	0.06	
WA	3	0.17	
WW	2	0.12	
DM, MM, FD, VS, ST, CV	7	0.42	
Out of MPD	13	0.78	
Location not known	65	3.76	11.2
	<u>1728</u>		

Outside MPD

Bishops Stortford	1	0.06	
Brentwood	1	0.06	
Basildon	2	0.12	
Devon	2	0.12	
Harlow	1	0.06	
Harwich	1	0.06	
Northants	1	0.06	
On gar	2	0.12	
Southend	2	0.12	

1983 KW + KF

THE CRIME ITSELF

<u>Vehicle used in another crime?</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>% adj.</u>
No/Unknown	931	54.0	
Yes	12	0.7	
Not relevant (theft from)	781	45.3	
 <u>Vehicle Re-Stolen?</u>			
No	932	54.1	
Yes	9	0.5	
Not relevant (t.f.)	783	45.5	
 <u>How long vehicle missing?</u>			
Still not found	258	15.0	
Within 24 hours	237	13.7	
Within 1 week	186	10.8	
Within 1 month	110	6.4	
Within 3 months	31	1.8	
Over 3 months	9	0.5	
N/A (theft from etc.)	894	51.8	<u>% adj. for N/A</u>

1983 KW + KF

VICTIMS OF CRIME

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>
Male	1432	82.9
Female	277	16.0
Unknown	19	1.1

<u>Age</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>% adj. for unknown</u>
16-20	129	7.5	
21-25	319	18.5	
26-35	487	28.2	
36-50	373	21.6	
51-65	104	6.0	
66+	23	1.3	
Unknown	293	16.7	

<u>Identity code</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>% adj. for unknown</u>
1	1115	64.5	
2	27	1.6	
3	139	8.0	
4	349	20.2	
5	9	0.5	
6	1	0.1	
Unknown	88	5.1	

1983 KW + KF  
PERSONS SUSPECTED/ARRESTED

<u>Was anyone suspected/ arrested?</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>
No	1658	95.9
Yes - suspected	24	1.4
Yes - arrested	46	2.7

Sex Persons suspected/arrested?

Male	86	5.0
Female	6	0.4
Unknown	1636	95.7

Identity Code Sus/Arr

1	26	1.5
2	2	0.1
3	14	0.8
4	12	0.7
5	-	-
6	-	-
Mixture	3	0.2
Unknown	1671	96.7

Age

Unknown	1672	96.8
Under 14	2	0.1
14-16	14	0.8
17-21	22	1.3
22-26	5	0.3
27-34	7	0.4
35-44	2	0.1
45+	1	0.1
Mixture under 14-26	2	0.1
Mixture 27-45+	1	0.1



1983 KW + KF

Previous criminal record

	<u>Fre</u>	<u>%</u>
No	1025	59.4
Yes	26	1.5
Unknown	675	39.1

Where suspected/  
arrested live?

E....	41	85 (i.e. E. London Postal District see below)
Essex	5	10
Kent	1	2
No Fixed Address	1	2

Breakdown

Unknown	1679	97.2
E	3	0.2
E1	1	0.1
E4	1	0.1
E6	3	0.2
E7	12	0.7
E11	1	0.1
E12	9	0.5
E13	1	0.1
E14	1	0.1
E15	7	0.4
E16	1	0.1
E17	1	0.1
Essex	5	0.3
Kent	1	0.1
Barking	1	0.1
NFA	1	0.1

TIMES - ALL CRIMES - POSSIBILITIES

	1982	1983
00	453	893
01	443	858
02	432	847
03	419	834
04	409	825
05	402	814
06	395	789
07	380	741
08	357	692
09	331	595
10	293	498
11	273	436
12	271	419
13	265	406
14	257	414
15	254	417
16	268	439
17	272	456
18	294	492
19	311	564
20	330	641
21	383	742
22	436	862
23	467	924
TOTAL	883	1728

6pm to Bam	#	14 hours	(58.33% of Day)
	#		73.84 of Crime
9pm to Bam	=	11 hours	(45.83% of Day)
	#		62.96% of Crime
11pm to Bam	=	9 hours	(37.50% of Day)
	#		52.68% of Crime

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## SUMMARY

The proposal by Professor Goldstein of Wisconsin University that a 'Problem Oriented Approach'<sup>1</sup> by Police would improve their effectiveness has been tested at Divisional level in the Metropolitan Police. His research was replicated in four pilot studies, and found to be valid at almost every point.

A problem oriented approach does offer to improve police performance, but its unstructured nature makes it difficult to manage and maintain. The Metropolitan Police does, however, have advantages in training, computer facilities and research resources which could support the process without undue cost.

The present structure of the Metropolitan Police is probably out of step with the approach, and its adoption would involve risk taking and the abandonment of some of the traditional expectations of line managers. The 'Problem Oriented Approach' is more a matter of attitude than skill, and is an idea which would have to be progressively assimilated rather than being imposed.

THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT HAVE BEEN GIVEN A RESTRICTED CIRCULATION AND ARE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART WITHOUT THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR, MANAGEMENT SERVICES DEPARTMENT.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The objective of CAP 2/5/84 was to evaluate the feasibility of adopting the 'Problem Oriented Approach' in the Metropolitan Police. Elements of this task were to implement and evaluate four pilot schemes and report on their implications for operations, training, resources, research and management if such an approach was to be adopted Forcewide.

1.2 Professor Goldstein suggested in 1979 (1) that the police service is particularly susceptible to a bureaucratic preoccupation with running its organisation. The police seemed to have reached a plateau at which the highest objective is administrative competence, and they were reluctant to get involved in a concern for the effectiveness of the end product of their efforts. He proposed that a systematic "problem solving" approach would offer a method for achieving better effectiveness as opposed to merely demonstrating efficient activities. His work came at a time when some police managers were starting to debate this "means over end" problem, and his idea was taken up by the US National Institute of Justice as a project for evaluation in the city of Madison, Wisconsin.

1.3 Goldstein's description of the police dilemma was certainly recognisable:-

"A police force may have carried out most, if not all, of the numerous recommendations for strengthening an organisation, and may enjoy a national reputation for its efficiency - its high standard of personnel selection and training - and its application of modern technology to operations. Nevertheless, the community apparently continues to have the same problems.."

(1) p.240

1.4 Police Forces in the US and the UK had been through a phase of putting their house in order. The weeding out of corruption, the use of new management skills, wholesale revision of training and the use

of high technology in communications and computer systems were all essential if Forces were to be capable of operating as credible organisations in the 1980s and beyond. But the problems did not seem to get better and the community, through local and national government, started to ask searching questions about value for money at the same time as researchers were raising doubts as to the real quality of the service which was being given.

- 1.5 The police can now find themselves in the unenviable position of being confused as to what more is expected of them when they apparently only have time to take palliative measures against intractable problems. The preoccupation with incidents rather than their cause, procedures rather than their purpose and the general lack of real interest in substantive matters can be reflected not only in the police service to its community but also in its narrow definition of its own accountability.

Goldstein:-

"A police administrator worries about matters such as his employees' speed in responding to calls; their use of force; their courtesy in relating to the public; their integrity; and the manner in which they use their time. These are the matters about which complaints are likely to be filed and for which the administrator is likely to be held accountable. It should not be surprising, therefore, that one of the highest priorities of a police administrator is to get his house in order. This is no small undertaking ... ensuring that employees do what they are supposed to do can be a totally consuming job."

(2) Vol.1 p.22

A Chief Superintendent on division, like Goldstein's police administrator, is required to "ensure employees do what they are supposed to do." He is also required to prepare for contingencies, and plan his resources to deal with community and organisational demands to cope with incidents.



- 1.6 The daily responses by his men to these wide ranging incidents and the way they affect the quality of community life gives officers unique insights into them; but police are only expected to minimise the disturbance caused by these incidents without either considering their cause or handing over this wealth of knowledge to anyone else who might be dealing with them as behavioural problems. Their daily contact with drunks and prostitutes, for example, will not necessarily be seen as a useful contribution to the problems of drunkenness and prostitution. The fact that the police perceptions of these problems have seldom been exposed to others also means that they have not been properly tested.
- 1.7 These police perceptions will be a mixture of myth with experience, prejudice with practice and assumption with fact. One of the few valid ways for them to be tested would be to use the kind of research resources which traditionally have themselves concentrated on incident/response techniques. Ambitious and highly publicised projects such as the Kansas City patrol project (1976), the Rand study of detectives (1976) and the Newark study of foot patrols (1981) needed tremendous research effort, but still only raised questions about the value of police activity in relation to incidents rather than the problems which generated them in the first place. Traditional research has also been limited by the way in which statistics are prepared. The mass of raw data collected by police is usually required for the global description and analysis of problems rather than a rigorous examination of local anti-social behaviour. Detailed 'crime'<sup>1</sup> data, like the knowledge of the operational policemen, is lost in the process of amalgamation into a broad description of a problem and the stereotyped response to it.
- 1.8 In essence, Goldstein is saying that traditional research produces simple prescriptive solutions which are implemented by bureaucratic procedural rules. The result is that effective problem solving is overwhelmed by apparently efficient activity. Researchers of organisational behaviour would regard this as self-evident in any complex structure, but Goldstein managed to move from the theoretical model to the real one of the Madison Police Department, Wisconsin. Its Chief, David Couper, had to take three essential decisions - first, agree that Goldstein's description was valid; second,

admit that it was probably true for his police department; third, do something about it. That he took these decisions resulted in research projects in Madison, the publication of the results (2), and the proposal that Goldstein's "Problem Oriented Approach" could be used in the Metropolitan Police.

## 2. THE PILOT STUDIES

- 2.1 Professor Goldstein discussed his research with senior staff of the Metropolitan Police, and two officers visited Madison to assess the potential of his technique. As a result, the Deputy Commissioner tasked MSD to co-ordinate a minimum of four pilot studies. A steering group was formed and negotiations on the choice of suitable locations began in November, 1983.
- 2.2 The City of Madison has a population of 117,000 which is served by about 300 police officers - it is therefore roughly the size of one Metropolitan Police Division. Any useful comparisons with the American model could only be made if the research was conducted at this level in the force, and this would also prevent the sort of global approach which must be avoided if the technique is to have any impact. This use of population/manpower as the key requirement could not, however, eliminate other differences between the Madison and the Metropolitan environments.
- 2.3 Some of these differences could be designed out. For example, the highest reported motor vehicle crime for 3 Area is on Dagenham Division, but West Ham is much more recognisable as one community within obvious geographical limits. The following differences could not be avoided in this way, but they were only seen as having an impact on solutions, rather than the process of finding them.
- 2.3.1 Some public service personnel in Madison are employees of the same Chief Executive as the Police Chief. They meet on a regular professional basis without having to make a specific decision to do so through a "multiagency" mechanism.
- 2.3.2 The people of Madison are regarded as affluent, liberal and more highly sensitised to public service affairs than the general population of London.

- 2.3.3 Chief Couper is also regarded as liberal, and would be able to suggest more radical solutions than might be considered practical by a Divisional Chief Superintendent. (Couper led a Peace march through the streets of Madison in order to show that he believed in Peace, and to reduce any tensions the march might have caused).
- 2.4 Goldstein himself warns that even in US terms, Madison and its Police Chief might be atypical, and the following differences can neither be minimised nor disregarded.
- 2.4.1 The Madison Police Department is not directly answerable to any professional, State or Federal Authority.
- 2.4.2 Chief Couper directs a department of the size of a Metropolitan Division, but there is no police officer senior to him.
- 2.4.3 Goldstein and Chief Couper are long standing friends and their rapport means that the philosophy of problem solving is agreed between them.

These major differences needed not just to be recognised, but to be deliberately tested at the pilot stage. To test (a) and (b) the problems to be tackled in the Metropolitan Police not only needed to be substantial, but also to differ in local, force and national implications. To test (c) it would be necessary that Chief Superintendents should not be 'selected'<sup>1</sup>. Their reactions could not possibly be in the Couper mould, and any forcewide adoption of the process would depend on their differences - not their selected similarities.

- 2.5 The requirement to design the pilots to test these factors meant that problem selection took longer than would be necessary for normal use of the problem oriented approach. Those helping to select their own problems were unaware of the constraints of both the experiment and Goldstein's requirements, and there was no time to provide learning opportunities to all those involved who might be interested.

2.6 Each of the four chosen projects displayed a substantial problem of behaviour which could be examined in the Divisional context. They display a cross section of local/force/national implications, and they were not selected because of any particular skills or experience of the Chief Superintendents. The problems selected were:-

- 1 Area Asian gangs. Southall (XS)
- 2 Area Shopper victims in Oxford Street. Marylebone (DM)
- 4 Area Prostitutes in Bedford Hill. Tooting (WD)
- 3 Area Motor vehicle crime. West Ham (KW)

### 3. RESEARCH DESIGN

- 3.1 Goldstein's approach was copied by first recruiting a three person team with as many similarities as possible to his own. His expectation that this would need "a level of expertise and substantive knowledge well beyond that to be found in a police agency" would be true for a city of the size of Madison, or for the similar sized Metropolitan Division, but the MPO as a whole was able to use its own personnel.
- 3.2 The advantages which Goldstein proposed for such an internal unit were found to be true. The use of experienced police and civil staff practitioners shortened the time needed to access people and data. There was an advantage in credibility over total outsiders. The realities of police working, and its practical, organisational and political limitations were known to the team. The requirement for independence from line management was satisfied by operating in MSD. This location also provided a pool of easily accessible professionals with the mixture of expertise which Goldstein would have found on his university campus. The technical resources required for computer analysis and any other training, communications or similar professional support could also be found within the MPO. The only skill to be purchased from an outside consultant involved the expertise of Mr Barry Poyner in situational crime prevention techniques.
- 3.3 The size of the Metropolitan Police thus enabled an internal team to be found for this study but there were some rigorous membership requirements which Goldstein had found essential.

Goldstein:-

"We knew, at the outset of the project, that we brought an unusual blend of experience and knowledge to the effort. What we learned was that we had to depend more heavily on this experience and knowledge than we had anticipated ..."

What Goldstein's team lacked in practitioner experience it made up for with recognised academic qualifications and a thorough working knowledge of a wide range of statistical and social science research methodologies. His research saw this technical skill as vital, and the project team had therefore to contain as high a level of similar qualifications and experience as possible.

Goldstein:-

"We used elementary statistical procedures, small samples and anecdotal evidence. But we now realise that, in order to limit ourselves in this fashion and still obtain useful, valid data, we had to depend on a level of technical expertise that is not apparent on reading (our reports). For example, our willingness to 'live with'<sup>1</sup> small samples is based on a combination of sophisticated methodological rationales ..."

(2) Vol.IV p.143

3.4 Once selected, the project team conducted the research through the three stages to be found in Goldstein's work.

#### 3.4.1 **PROBLEM DEFINITION**

A description of the problem in all its dimensions, not just as a breach of the law, or something to which the police have to respond. The perceptions of the public, other agencies and the police as to what and whose behaviour needs to be modified, and in what way so as to demonstrate that the problem has been reduced. A description of the current procedures, and the possible frustration at the lack of success. This stage is also used to introduce the project to the police and others who might be involved in subsequent steps.

#### 3.4.2 **PROBLEM DIAGNOSIS**

The taking apart of the description, and the rigorous examination of the real size and nature of the problem. The use of any methodology which seems appropriate -

whatever its original discipline. The tapping of any information source, within or outside the police service. The analysis of data from current records and the design of new collection techniques. The systematic production of a valid and accurate picture of the problem, and the provision of performance indicators that might be used in the future. This stage needs the high levels of technical competence that Goldstein required of his team.

### 3.4.3 ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

The sharing of the diagnosis with all those who suffer some aspect of the problem. The uninhibited search by them all for preventive strategies. The police taking on a proactive role in generating discussion with the community and other agencies. The implementation and trial of fresh solutions on a mulU agency basis, and the testing of them against the performance indicators.

- 3.5 Goldstein's assertion that these processes are quite different from usual police activities also needed to be tested. The reduction of street crime in Ridley Road Market (GA) was regarded as a good example of traditional methods at work, and there was a suggestion that MPD officers already "problem solve" without it being labelled as such. A study of this problem was therefore used as a control sample which could be compared with the four pilot studies. The differences between the control study and the pilots, and the differences between the pilots themselves could thus be used to evaluate the process. Whatever was discovered during the experiments was tested to find if Goldstein had either found or predicted the same results. The conclusion would then be a statement as to whether his research findings could be replicated and whether his proposals are both valid and feasible in the MPD.



#### 4. CONTROL STUDY

4.1 It was known before 1982 that although Ridley Road Market and its surroundings only constitute 10% of the geographical area of Dalston (GA), its level of street crime was disproportionately high. The police, the residents and the market traders shared a concern about these offences (mostly committed by young blacks), and their impact on the trade and quality of life in the area. All this was taking place in an area where the local authority is hostile, and one in which any racial incident can result in high profile publicity or public disorder.

4.2 In 1982, the Chief Superintendent had already started a chain of events which were designed to meet his objectives for the market area:-

- (i) Forge closer links with the community of the area, thereby increasing co-operation and confidence.
- (ii) Raise the level of security and feeling of safety in the area for residents.
- (iii) Reduce vehicle traffic.
- (iv) Identify and arrest persons responsible for street crimes.
- (v) Reduce the level of reported crime by 10% as measured against 1982.

4.3 These objectives needed the identification and selection of people who had experience or skills to contribute, and the Chief Superintendent's task was classic team building. This was not just picking skilled men, but also radical arrangements of staff at Dalston (the Dalston unit), the appointment of a second Market Beat Officer, the tasking of the C.L.O., and the deployment of the Divisional Robbery Squad. The Market Association and its traders were part of the effort, and even anti-police activists in the council were seen in their homes as opposed to having official and hopelessly politicised discussions. In

mid 1983, the 3 Area I & S Unit mounted a full scale operation which resulted in 34 arrests and 45 charges.

- 4.4 The list of objectives makes it clear that this was not just regarded as a 'crime' problem, and there had been obvious elements of problem solving technique when defining it, and when searching for alternative solutions. Goldstein recognises this finding:-

'The crime oriented planning, implementation and evaluation process (employed in all eight cities) had many of the elements one would want to include in a problem oriented approach to improving police service.'

CD p. 224

These apparent elements of problem orientation to the Ridley Road operations needed to have their success tested.

- 4.5 One MSD team member interviewed current management and staff at Stoke Newington and Dalston, and found a widely held view that market crime had been reduced, and that all objectives had been met. Interviews with the Market Traders' Association, the market Beat Officer and street duty men disclosed an obvious degree of success with the first four objectives. There were firm links with the community and traders. There was co-operation and confidence between them, and an enhanced feeling of safety and confidence by residents. The market was tidier, the pavements were less cluttered, and it had better organised traffic. A good number of thieves had been arrested and convicted. All these real, attractive, and important successes were also assumed to have resulted in a substantial reduction in crime. An examination of police records does not support this view.
- 4.6 Street crime is commonly defined as pickpocketing and 'mugging'; but there are victims who will, quite properly, be entered in the beat crime and property lost books. Although legal definitions create these different records, the victims are in no doubt that they are such, and police are aware of the dangers of merely counting the number of book entries that appear to have the classification under

review. A count was therefore made by scrutiny of every major crime, beat crime and property lost entry for the market area in the first three months of the years 1983 and 1984. These three monthly periods were 'brackets' round the nine months of high activity in 1983, and should have shown a 'before and after'<sup>1</sup> effect.

	Major	Beat	Lost	Total
1st quarter 1983	51	22	32	105
1st quarter 1984	51	53	34	138

MSD staff abstracted these figures and the book entries were therefore given to the GN research team for double checking. A re-examination by experienced officers produced the same results, and prompted some additional measurements. Whatever further measurements were made, there still appeared to be little to show a significant reduction in recorded crime and loss over any period where it might have been expected.

- 4.7 Police had apparently shown ability in recruiting and using peoples skills, and had promoted a great deal of commonsense activity. More important was their undoubted success in achieving the essential but unmeasured objectives directed at relationships with the public, and community well being. The difficulty remains that any analysis of available records demonstrates a degree of 'failure' in reducing crime - the very thing on which street officers and their management might be judged. It is just such frustration which traditionally draws comment on the 'lies of statistics', 'falseness of figures' and 'the books don't tell the real story'<sup>1</sup>. The use of standard police records as the only source of problem information is seen by Goldstein as not just inadequate, but one of the key issues which differentiates 'crime' oriented activity from the 'problem\*.

Goldstein:-

"While police business is often (further) subdivided by means of the labels tied to the criminal code, such as robbery, burglary, and theft, these are not adequate, for several reasons."

4.8 One of his reasons is that their use implies that the police role is restricted to the arrest and prosecution of offenders, and this preconditions any thinking. A second reason is that merely describing problems as 'criminal'<sup>1</sup> or 'non criminal' disguises what is really disturbing the community, and may deny police the opportunity to take some other kind of action. Most important, their use masks different forms of behaviour by both criminals and victims. The absence of a detailed breakdown leaves police struggling to justify themselves, even though they are sure they are being effective.

Goldstein:-

"The vulnerability of the department to criticism for not having dealt more aggressively with aggravated cases has dampened support . . . . . even though alternatives still appear to represent the more intelligent response."

CD P. 247

4.9 The Ridley Road study indicated that another police dilemma is similar in the US and the UK.

Goldstein:-

"Many of the problems coming to the attention of the Police become their responsibility because no other means has been found to solve them. It follows that expecting the Police to solve or eliminate them is expecting too much."

(a) P. 243

4.10 More importantly, some of the particular differences between "crime" and "problem" oriented approaches had also been confirmed as characteristics shared by Police departments.

4.10.1 Police procedures of plan-implement-evaluate contain some elements of a problem solving approach.

4.10.2 Police records are seldom in a useful format for problem solving.

- 4.10.3 Police records seldom contain sufficient detail to be useful in problem solving.
  - 4.10.4 Numerical targets (i.e. 10% reduction) make assumptions about the scale and nature of the problem. They are seldom, if ever, achievable.
  - 4.10.5 The Police can be left trying to justify themselves even when making intelligent responses to a problem.
- 4.11 The control study had shown that a Metropolitan Police division is sufficiently similar in its tasking and behaviour as to be comparable for the purposes of this research to Madison. The pilot studies could therefore be undertaken as an application of Goldstein's problem oriented approach to police departments with sufficiently similar starting points to that used by him.

## 5. ASIAN GANGS. SOUTHALL

- 5.1 It has long been suspected that intra racial violence in the Southall area is damaging the community, and perhaps is as sinister as highly publicised inter racial incidents. The symptomatic assaults, property attacks and intimidations only tended to surface as apparently unconnected incidents, but in Spring 1983 there was a series of assaults and reprisals which focused attention on Asian gang activities. The Detective Chief Inspector proposed a full enquiry into this violence, and his suggestion was supported by the Chief Superintendent. It was clear, by the Autumn of 1983, that CID manpower was at full stretch to deal with the two main gangs - The 'Holy Smokes' and the 'Tooti Nung'.
- 5.2 The main problem now confronting the police was a total ignorance of Asian gangs. Although resources were now available to link a number of violent offenders, and minimise the language, racial and legal difficulties inherent in such prosecutions, there was no understanding of the behaviour of the subculture. It was at this stage that the problem oriented approach was decided upon, and the move from 'incident oriented' to 'crime oriented'<sup>1</sup> which had already taken place provided a perfect changeover point.
- 5.3 A literature search was conducted by a well qualified officer of the PCSG; he provided a selective reading list, and a series of abstracts which were supplied to the Southall officers. None of the writings mentioned gangs of interest, but there was a valuable description of Southall's population and of work that had been undertaken to study the Asian youth in its secondary schools who would now be old enough to be in the gangs. Although the specific problem had not been illuminated the search had undoubtedly provided the Chief Superintendent and his officers with the sort of knowledge that could make them more effective when dealing with the Asian community and its general problems. The importance of a good literature search is recognised by Goldstein - and so is one of its possible consequences.

Goidstein:-

"High priority is attached to quickly assessing the accumulated literature on the problem under examination. Such an assessment could lead to a conclusion that hardly anything has been done with regard to the problem....."

(2) Vol.1, p.90

- 5.4 Although this is seen as an essential step, Goldstein also warns of investing too much time in ploughing through results, and it was only in this pilot study that the literature search was a full scale exercise. It was only in this study, therefore, that any conclusions could be drawn about the facilities Hkley to be available for such searches in the future. Even if conducted by skilled personnel, there is a limit to the resources that can be provided by the Commissioner's Library. The Police College and other specialist libraries are not accessible by computer in the way provided by some universities. There are current moves by the Metropolitan Police, the Home Office and the Police College to improve information handling for research purposes but there needs to be a more cohesive approach if the requirements of the problem solving approach are to be properly serviced.
- 5.5 The Southall problem now appeared as something in which police would have to take the initiative in finding even the simplest information about its scale and nature. Discussions with established community leaders only revealed the sort of embarrassment often felt by elders when a small group of their young is behaving disgracefully. All that was known was that there were masses of 'case papers' held by police, and the suspicion that other agencies such as H.M. Immigration and Special Branch might have similar incident reports. There was also a growing conviction that these gangs had connections in other cities with Asian communities, and that both criminal and political elements might have roots in India.
- 5.6 The search for a diagnostic tool was unexpectedly short, when it was realised that the ANACAPA technique was originally designed for the examination of the gang infrastructure. The Chief Superintendent agreed to three of his staff, (including the office manager of the

gang enquiries) to be taught the method. Training was provided by CI(I) and the subsequent use of this method became part of an existing MSD project to assess ANACAPA.

5.7 The result of the officers' work was to disclose exactly the sort of information which might be expected from rigorous diagnosis.

5.7.1 An indication of where there are information gaps, and therefore those areas which need more investigation.

5.7.2 The confirmation of some of the preconceptions held before the enquiry. The gang members did have connections with illegal immigration and drugs.

5.7.3 The unexpected. The gangs were involved in ritual rape offences. This finding had implications for the whole Asian community, and a new behavioural aspect had been disclosed. The known rape of a single girl makes her unmarriageable, and although a few reported rapes could now be linked to gang activity there was obviously a more serious problem of those incidents which were never reported to police.

5.8 The next stage would be to share this information with the community and with other agencies who might have a part of the same problem, but by the time the team were ready with a digest of their analysis the trials of the gang members had begun. To publish the detail of their findings could be a godsend to the defence and seen as likely to prejudice Judge or jury. A decision was therefore taken not to disclose it at this stage. The knowledge obtained from the literature search and the diagnosis was, however, to be used to pave the way for a whole series of initiatives with the community.

5.8.1 The ANACAPA results will be sanitised by the removal of names, and used as the basis of presentations to the community, both directly and through the media.

5.8.2 Other agencies, including the Home Office and community relations councils have been told the general results, and will be invited to join discussions.



5.8.3 The community leaders, the magistrates, the local authority members and all those with a legitimate interest in the Southall community have been told that discussions will take place after the trials.

5.8.4 Community members and others who might help fill some of the information gaps have been approached and are becoming involved in a fresh two-way exchange of views and 'intelligence'.

5.9 The Southall investigation has now reached the stage of a major link in the problem solving method.

"The concept calls for the police to assume a more proactive role in sharing their knowledge about substantive problems and, based on much more careful and thoughtful inquiry than has ever been undertaken in the past, in offering proposals by which the community might more effectively deal with such problems in future."

2. Vol.1, p.106

5.10 The Southall environment was so ideal for the problem oriented approach, that it might possibly be that the approach will never be repeated with such apparent ease. The same middle and senior police management were in post throughout; the management style was participative; the diagnostic tool was designed for police use; involved officers could be quickly taught to use it; discussing problems with other agencies and the community is an essential and established procedure in the division; the problem had never been tackled by anyone, and there was therefore no interference (well intentioned or not) from anyone outside the division and its officers. Many of these elements can be found in traditional police activity, but the key to shifting a 'crime oriented'<sup>1</sup> approach to 'problem oriented'<sup>1</sup> was the provision of diagnostic methods which reduced a tangle of data into simply understood and easily communicated knowledge. This isolation of orie"fac£oT took place in an environment where all other variables had been eliminated before the experiment began, and although it was certainly not in the research design, it

was a happy accident which achieved a whole series of Goldstein's proposals.

"The concept presses for moving from the common perception of police work as responding to an endless array of individual incidents to the grouping of incidents (because of their similarity, location, or the event to which they are tied) so that they can be addressed in a more generic way as problems.

The concept calls for isolating, with a degree of specificity that is sufficient to separate it from the mass of police business, each problem selected for examination.

The concept calls for careful review of all relevant studies of the problem, whether conducted by academics, government agencies, community organisations, or other police agencies.

The concept recognises the importance of systematic inquiry as one of the first steps that must be taken in developing a greater concern for substantive matters.

The concept carries a commitment to develop a more rigorous form of inquiry that values preciseness and accuracy.

The concept places high priority on the development of an in-house capacity to make penetrating inquiries into substantive problems - inquiries that produce easily communicated and operationally relevant end products; that are not costly to conduct; and that ideally can be staffed by present personnel with minimum training and support.

The concept attaches a high value to mining and sifting both the data in police files and the experience of police personnel, recognising that the rich insights that can be acquired from these sources are not often tapped."

(2) Vol.IV pp.103 et seq.

#### 5.11 Summary

There may be rare occasions when nearly all the prerequisites of a problem oriented approach are satisfied at divisional level. The problem is so local as to be unique: management is operating in the participative mode: multi-agency approaches have already been established. The only catalysts needed for a problem solving approach were the provision of effective diagnostic tools and the capacity to train local officers in their use.

## 6. SHOPPER VICTIMS IN OXFORD STREET

6.1 Unlike the problem, in important respects novel, at Southall, the ease with which shoppers become victims in Oxford Street is a traditional crime specific task at Marylebone and West End Central police stations. A Chief Inspector at Marylebone was given the job of highlighting it as a problem which might be susceptible to situational crime prevention and his report pointed out that victims of crime in the Oxford Street area spent much more of their time inside shops than on the pavement. If this was true, then police activity in public places might be displacing thieves from the streets into shops where the public is more vulnerable.

6.2 Traditional methods of tackling theft from the person and theft from unattended shopping bags were also becoming more difficult. The abolition of C8 Pickpocket Squad and the recent centralisation of divisional crime squads to district meant that young, untrained T.D.C.s were more likely to be dealing with offenders. With the acceptance that Police do not patrol private premises, there now seemed to be fewer and fewer ways of successfully dealing with something whose scale was certainly suspected but never accurately measured. There is, perhaps, the unspoken assumption that the police will never have the resources to deal with such a problem, but only make as many good arrests as possible.

Goldstein:-

"We found that the number of drinking drivers was vastly disproportionate to the capacity of the police under the best of circumstances, to deal with them; that the MPD was already arresting a relatively large number of persons; and that the capacity of the criminal justice system to handle more cases and to do so effectively was severely limited."

(2) Vol.IV p.163

6.3 The nature and size of the shopper victim problem was therefore suspected and partly documented when the shift to a problem

oriented approach was proposed, and the chosen diagnostic tools were a postal questionnaire to the victims and document searches/ interviews with Selfridges and Marks and Spencer. The results would be compared with the major, beat crime and property lost records at Marylebone and West End Central police stations. Victim definition, methodology and data summary are shown at Appendix \*A'.

- 6.4 The analysis disclosed that 40% of accepted crime book entries, and over 50% of lost property entries at Marylebone probably refer to Oxford Street crime victims. Eight out of ten are women, and most live in London and the Home Counties. There were variations between North and South Oxford Street, but over three quarters of these offences were committed inside shops. A victim might or might not report the loss to police as well as the shop, and the real victim rate is at least double and probably treble that in police records.
- 6.5 The first result of the diagnosis was the bringing into the open of a problem which would now be seen as so large (probably 40 offences a day inside shops) that police resources alone could not possibly cope. Not only that, the offences were where police did not patrol, and shops spent their resources (not unreasonably) in protecting their goods from thieves who preyed on them rather than in protecting their customers. It could be said that shoppers in Oxford Street were well protected in the street, but were instantly abandoned by police as soon as they stepped inside a shop. The fact that store detectives and crime squad officers had a good operational rapport, and that police did operate inside shops was a good example of the way that police respond in a practical way, rather than being dictated to by 'policy'.

Goldstein:-

"It is well established that the nature of the police function is such that police are pressed into adopting practices that have an aura of impropriety or illegality about them. The police, for example, improvise their response to many incidents; take various short cuts;.....

6.6 There will be problems in the MPD which are of such 3 scale that neither traditional methods nor police improvisation will solve them. Exposure of these problems will bring with it the admission that there will never be enough police resources to cope with them.

6.7 The continuity of police management which had been enjoyed at Southall was not to be repeated at Marylebone, and by the time the diagnosis was available there had been a complete changeover of Chief Superintendent, Superintendent and Chief Inspectors. Not even the Chief Inspector who had written the first appraisal was now on the division, and the first major difference between Madison and an MPD division was now obvious. The effect was to stun the problem solving process. Any new management would be unfamiliar not only with the problem, but with the whole thinking process which had produced the diagnosis. Goldstein had already found it difficult to communicate novel research results to police, particularly when quantitative.

Goldstein:-

"In subsequent reflections, we concluded that communicating to the police the results of research on substantive problems was more complex than we had assumed".

(2) Vol.IV p.20

6.8 This would be true for police management or operational officers, but the lack of continuity in a management team reinforces the 'us and them\*' relationship. Participative management styles are difficult to develop in such an environment, and the MSD research team members were sometimes in danger of becoming surrogate managers just by being there, and having the continuity of problem knowledge that could prompt useful discussion with operational men.

6.9 The short life of some divisional management teams in the MPD is a serious obstacle to a problem oriented approach.

6.10 New managements, quite properly, choose new teams of their own and in the mid-stream of problem solving this means that the process may need to be started all over again. It is only now that a suitable

forum for the next stage has been found at Marylebone - a crime management committee.

- 6.11 The committee at Marylebone is chaired by the Superintendent and meets every two or three weeks. It is arranged so that there are always representatives from reliefs as well as the obvious CID, CPO, Beat Crime officer memberships. Officers from West End Central also attend and one other member has been recruited as a researcher. Similar committees have been set up in parts of the MPD and are now being considered as a feature of the 'force wide integrated intelligence system'<sup>1</sup>. The continuity of management and operational officers that such a committee offers was seen as an attractive arrangement for crime specific problem solving. Whatever is developed on these lines might offer a clear problem solving role for the Superintendent, and a more proactive function for all officers whose day to day work is crime orientated.
- 6.12 Members of the Marylebone committee are now preparing to share the Oxford Street diagnosis with the security staff and management of large Oxford Street stores. Senior management has paved their way by high level talks with stores and the Oxford Street Association. Radical suggestions on joint police/store solutions are now being openly discussed, and the real crime levels are being reflected in the decision to make accurate book entries.
- 6.13 Goldstein had found that the diagnosis had to be credible to operational officers, but his work was done in a stable police department. Diagnosis in this Force has also to be credible to management, and if the post holders constantly change there will be a tendency to

"view (quantitative data) with suspicion, as reflecting a simplistic statement of complex problems, because they feel that numbers alone cannot possibly convey the subtleties surrounding individual cases and the intricate social phenomena that affect both the problem and the police handling of the problem."

#### 6.14 Summary

An honest and detailed diagnosis may reveal that some problems are so large as to be beyond the resources of any single agency. If police management in such circumstances is ever to be believed, then it must be able to speak authoritatively. A serious obstacle to subsequent problem solving is the constantly changing personnel in a divisional management team. Either this instability must be reduced, or an arrangement made to compensate for the lack of continuity in management's problem awareness.



## 7. PROSTITUTES IN BEDFORD HILL

- 7.1 In early 1983, probably as the result of displacement from areas of high police activity, swarms of prostitutes moved on to traditional but quiet beats surrounding Bedford Hill, Balham. The residents reacted sharply, and the Chief Superintendent at Tooting found himself under fierce community and political pressures to do something.
- 7.2 His first reaction was to form a team with an experienced sergeant, and have the prostitutes arrested. There were now so many women standing in cackling groups that this step was essential to restore the rule of law and give him some breathing space.
- 7.3 By late 1983, there had been a great deal of police activity. As in Ridley Road Market, this had not just been the arrest of offenders. There had been constant meetings with residents, communications with MPs, press and TV interviews, and tactical and legal skirmishes with prostitutes and their customers. The shift from incident to crime specific activity produced obvious results and the prostitute population was significantly reduced. Manpower could now be tasked to deal with the kerb crawling customers.
- 7.4 The 'problem' was now beginning to surface. What would happen if all this police activity was removed? Would Bedford Hill again become the reception area for prostitutes who had been displaced from similar operations? The risk of damage to police/community relations could be enormous, but the only way to avoid that risk would be the continued use of a disproportionate number of skilled men on a 'minor' criminal activity.
- 7.5 On the day that MSD started to discuss the problem with him, the Chief Superintendent received an order from New Scotland Yard, through Area and his Commander, that he was no longer to arrest kerb crawlers but would in future use the specimen summons supplied. This order was unexpected, and the summons wording was such as to make it inappropriate for use in Bedford Hill. The Chief Superintendent's shift from prostitute to customer had now been halted - his officers could neither arrest nor summons them. The

order not only brought operations to a halt, it eliminated any interest in the result of a test case against an arrested kerb crawler which would be heard in the local Court the following week.

- 7.6 It was five days before the Chief Superintendent and his Commander were able to question this order, and discuss its inappropriate nature. They then discovered that the summons wording had been written by solicitors on the understanding that police use WPCs as decoys. This is against Metropolitan Police policy, and the prohibition had been emphasised in the same order. In subsequent meetings the Chief Superintendent was also advised not to have direct discussions on these matters with the Clerk to his local Magistrates<sup>1</sup> Court. In the circumstances he could be forgiven for thinking that the MSD use of phrases like 'participative management<sup>1</sup>', 'consultation<sup>1</sup>' and 'multiagency approach<sup>1</sup>' was now heaping insults on his injury.
- 7.7 Unlike Chief Couper, the Chief Superintendent at Tooting has two layers of territorial management above him and a variety of controls exercised over him by HQ Departments. With the recognition that there is always the need for some overall policy making in the MPD comes the realisation that this can lead to detailed orders as to what his men can or cannot do at street level. He has lost one of his 'degrees of freedom<sup>1</sup>', and this will be more likely to happen when his problem has come to public notice. In the environment of the MPD, the disclosure of a possible problem is likely to reduce the authority of a Chief Superintendent to make any decisions concerning it.
- 7.8 The diagnosis of the residual prostitute/customer situation was undertaken by sample counting in the streets, elapsed time video recording, and unstructured interviews with police, prostitutes and court staff. Analysis and data summaries are at Appendix 'B'.
- 7.9 As with previous diagnoses, there were the three classic results:-
- 7.9.1 An indication of where there are information gaps - in this case the attitudes of the kerb crawlers.
- 7.9.2 The confirmation of preconceptions held before enquiry. There was now a hard core of about 170 prostitutes in the

area. They charged £10 in a car or £25 indoors and only provided simple as opposed to exotic service.

7.9.3 The unexpected. Kerb crawlers outnumbered the prostitutes by at least ten to one. Nearly all lived in South West London, and a third lived within 2 miles of Bedford Hill.

7.10 One of the fifteen minute 'head counts'<sup>1</sup> on a specific street corner provided a performance indicator which remained unexpectedly stable over a six month period. A typical result was:-

Prostitutes	Male Pedestrians	Female Pedestrians	Kerb Crawlers
2	6	2	30

The police count of kerb crawlers was independently checked by an MSD civil staff member, whose results tallied within one or two of the police count. This quarter hour count, to be made on the same day of the week, at the same place, in dry weather has now been adopted as an indicator for future reference. It also continues to confirm the enormous imbalance between buyers and sellers.

7.11 The summons wording was revised as the result of the Chief Superintendent's representations and maximum publicity for kerb crawlers could now be obtained by arranging for all such summonses to be heard on the same day at the local Court. There was, however, a feeling that this population of 'buyers' could be put off in a simpler way. The Sergeant in charge of the prostitution squad started to trace their car numbers and operate what amounted to an adult cautioning scheme - another example of street duty improvisation.

7.12 The awareness of the huge kerb crawler population was now being supplemented by these cautioning interviews which were being conducted by asking the 'offenders' to come to Tooting Police Station. The customers turned out to be isolates by nature, and were unaware of their activities being observed by anyone. This also meant that they did not recognise each other either, and what the police did to one was not necessarily known to others. Unlike the

prostitute subculture, the kerb crawlers were individuals who did not behave as a group but a large number of individuals. What also became evident was that those who were now aware that they were observed and observable did not return to Bedford Hill. Only four of the first 80 interviewees had been subsequently detected in the area.

7.13 The time had come to share this information with other agencies, but before the first meeting there was a change of Chief Superintendent, Superintendent, and interviewing Sergeant. The braking effect was obvious, and Divisional instability had again been highlighted as an obstacle to problem solving.

7.14 The first two approaches to outside agencies produced quite different responses. Wandsworth Council had already considered the provision of a 'street' social worker in Bedford Hill, and a letter from the Superintendent to suggest a key worker for Police resulted in a first meeting. The woman social worker had previous experience of working with prostitutes as a Probation Officer, and she was given the police diagnosis and a description of the problem oriented process- Her reaction, (and that of her colleagues before the meeting) was not far short of amazement that the police should be actively seeking the help of other agencies and were willing to "think laterally" about a problem.

7.15 In contrast, the same approach to the Clerk of South Western Magistrates Court produced a letter in reply;

"...I have discussed the Chief Superintendent's suggestion about the 'Think Tank' with the Principal Chief Clerk of this service. It is not thought proper for any member of the Court's staff to be associated with the proposal".

Why it should not be 'proper' for Court staff of a local Court to discuss a common problem with local police is not clear, but the reaction was a reflection of the warning given to the Chief Superintendent at the outset. Such isolation would not appear in Madison, (nor one suspects in a provincial English city) but in the MPD there may be suspicion of, or resistance to police openly discussing substantive problems with some agencies.

Goldstein:-

"... given the constraints under which we have placed the police in this country, it seems somewhat anomalous - perhaps even threatening to some - that the police take a more active role in attempting to address substantive problems so that the problems are handled more effectively."

(2) Vol.II P.85

- 7.16 Other agencies are now being approached, and the Probation Service will certainly participate. It has been realised that current police interviews with kerb crawlers are more like counselling than cautioning, and the skills of social workers and probation officers, supported by police power might be combined in a much more effective way than just arresting them. Similarly the community representatives, and the politicians are now likely to be faced with well informed but radical solutions from a combination of professional agencies.
- 7.17 The pulling together of the outside agencies and the acceptance of the sergeant's improvised procedure disclosed the discomfort of police officers and their management when employed in activities that are neither authorised by law nor written in police procedures. There was the almost conspiratorial whisper of 'of course I know we don't have the power or authority to do this". Problem solving does not ask management to decide whether police have the power or the authority, but rather whether an action is ethical and is likely to be effective. This is much more demanding, and is an indication of what will be required of Chief Superintendents in a problem oriented environment. There is little or no requirement for them to be trained in the mechanics of problem solving, but demands will be made for actions to be personally legitimised where neither the law nor General Orders gives any guidance.

Goldstein:-

"When pressed beyond (the) superficial level, administrators are likely to describe the police response to a given problem in terms that meet public expectations, legal standards, and formal guidelines".

(2) Vol.11 p.65

"(This) concept is most directly concerned with the effectiveness of the police in dealing with substantive problems; with the quality of the police response to these problems".

(2) Vol.11 p.102

7.18 This study also demonstrated the danger of treating a general problem as if it is always the same wherever and whenever it appears. The Tooting problem may well occur elsewhere, and there might be lessons to be learned, but 'prostitution' was now seen to be so specific to its market place as to need a careful study in each environment.

Goldstein:-

"It seems desirable, at least initially in the development of a problem-solving approach to improved policing, to press for as detailed a breakdown of problems as possible. In addition to distinguishing different forms of behaviour and the apparent motivation, as in the case of incidents commonly grouped under the heading of 'arson'<sup>1</sup>, it is helpful to be much more precise regarding locale and time of day, the type of people involved, and the type of people victimised. Different combinations of these variables may present different problems, posing different policy questions and calling for radically different solutions."

(1) p.246

7.19 Also revealed was the absence of a mechanism for police management to discuss their common operational problems. Meetings generated by 'A' Department displayed not just the differences in the prostitution problems of individual divisions but also the usefulness of providing a forum in which divisional managers can talk freely to each other about shared experiences.

Goldstein:-

"The concept calls for developing a network through which police agencies engaged in substantive enquiry can exchange information on the results of their substantive inquiries; share their experiences in developing the inquiry process; and, in general, more efficiently learn from each other."

(2) Vol.1 p.107

## 7.20 Summary

High profile problems will attract the attention of management levels above division, and Chief Superintendents' degrees of freedom to deal with them will be eroded. This may encourage an assumption by management that any activity must be either authorised by law or specified by New Scotland Yard. The labelling of problems as if they are identical wherever they surface is contrary to and destructive of a problem oriented approach. Some agencies may find it 'improper'<sup>1</sup> to accept the police as a proactive organisation in problem solving; others may find it novel and attractive. A mechanism is required for Chief Superintendents to meet together and discuss specific mutual problems.

## 8. MOTOR VEHICLE CRIME, WEST HAM

- 8.1 Surveys of motor vehicle crime tend to find a relatively low degree of interest from the public and an almost indifferent response from the police. The reporting rate of theft/damage to vehicles (about 30%) and the clear up rates for these crimes (often under 10%) underline these attitudes.
- 8.2 The Chief Superintendent at West Ham knew that his Division had the second highest motor vehicle crime rate in 3 Area, and his attitude was not in line with what appeared to be the general public/police perceptions- He would say that if 'being caught' as opposed to being prosecuted and sentenced is the most effective deterrent, then arguably there were generations of young criminals in West Ham who were getting away with 90% of their crimes. By the time they graduated to crime against houses and commercial premises they would be pre-conditioned to the idea that crime does pay. Secondly, they would now be capable of using stolen cars as a simple tool for use in more serious crime. If these proposals were valid, then a 'crime specific'<sup>1</sup> activity against motor vehicle crime in West Ham should eventually produce effects on crime in general.
- 8.3 The forming of a squad was not therefore just an unthinking reaction - any more than those decisions concerning Ridley Road or Bedford Hill. Not only was it a carefully thought out strategy against all crime, it was also integrated into the local training needs. Newly recruited crime squad officers were usually unfamiliar with crime arrests, interrogations, case papers and court procedures. Motor vehicle crime arrests are an ideal training ground. They are rarely dealt with on indictment and pleas of guilty are common, but good interrogations can produce other offences or the disclosure of more serious crimes. Aspirants for the CID were therefore first trained and tested on the motor vehicle crime squad.
- 8.4 All objectives were met when it became obvious that motor vehicle crime clear up rates had improved to an extent that was statistically significant. The Chief Superintendent then received an order that stopped the employment of squads on Divisions, and his crime and



CID training strategy had both been cut away. Unlike kerb crawling, this problem was not in the public eye, but he, like the Chief Superintendent at Tooting, had lost the 'degree of freedom<sup>1</sup> which allowed him to make decisions about the deployment of his officers. His reaction was to obtain authority for six "community contact officers" - a scheme which he knew would be approved centrally and then to task them to deal with the most prevalent community crime - motor vehicle offences.

- 8.5 Most of the Chief Superintendents involved in this study had now been seen to be spending a good deal of time trying to forge useful and relevant local initiatives out of central policies. If Chief Superintendents are not allowed significant degrees of freedom in the way they run their divisions, then the flexibility which is a key ingredient of problem solving will be denied them.

Goldstein:-

"Now, in reflecting on the experience, we feel that this flexibility emerged as one of the most significant aspects of the project."

(2) Vol.IV p.22

- 8.6 The Chief Superintendent at West Ham was about to retire at the beginning of this study and he wisely handed over the project to the Superintendent and members of the divisional planning team. Management and staff stability at divisional level was therefore pre-arranged, but even here, the team was to lose two inspectors during the period, and changed its function after six months. The unit is now made up of the PC Crime Prevention officer, and a Sergeant with a responsibility for divisional burglary analysis.
- 8.7 The planning team had originally been chosen by the Chief Superintendent as a mixed talent group of a CID Inspector, an ex Traffic Patrol Sergeant and a CPO who was the Federation representative. Their efforts on this project nearly all took place before the formation of crime management committees, but their work was a good example of the advantages to be gained by using a stable, mixed talent team of local street duty officers in practitioner research of this kind. The Goldstein problem solving target of "an

unabashed concern to be practical, to concentrate on improving police service" ((2) Vol.IV P.17) is very attractive to officers who have to deal with the problems on the street, and they see it as a refreshing and invigorating way to work. What they, and their management, often lack is the time to devote to it.

- 8.8 Short term operational demands and tasks that have deadlines will always swamp a problem solving process. The process is neither step by step nor planned in the traditional police manner, and it has to compete with all the other demands. If those demands, short or fixed, have timescales they will take precedence.

Goldstein:-

"Moreover, in every police agency, the tendency is for the latest major case or the latest problem (e.g. a wave of house burglaries) to preoccupy administrators. We found it awkward and at times almost impossible to engage administrators, either individually or as a group, whose agenda was filled with such concerns. . . .and the same problem was experienced closer to the operating level. During our meetings with detective supervisors, they received emergency calls (the regular calls were held) regarding, for example, a crisis in the presentation of evidence to a critical court case (etc, etc)."

(2) Vol.IV p.133

Goldstein's experience in the USA, was true of the Metropolitan Police at divisional level, and his problem solving approach was forced into second or third place by constant day by day, week by week demands on officers and their management-

- 8.9 Even if the time had been available, it was not thought necessary to over burden the officers with diagnostic tasks, particularly as this project was going to need computer assistance from the outset. They were, however, tasked with sufficient data abstraction and record conversion to make them familiar with the work and the data content. They were also supplied with a temporary computer

terminal (printer only) for their own use. The computer facility was a standard package supplied through DCS known as Package 'X'. It fell short of the requirements in user friendliness, user availability and data handling flexibility, but in the time span of this project was the only available service. The likely provision of an SPSS (Statistical Package Social Sciences) or similar package within the next few months and the effective data management contained in the CRIS proposals should provide the Metropolitan Police with an ideal service for divisional problem solving projects in the future. (Gen.Reg. DP9/82/14, and OA4/83/7.)

8.10 The first diagnostic stage in this project was to extract almost every informative entry from over 2000 motor vehicle crime book entries for West Ham Division over the past two years. The Consultant, Barry Poyner, was contacted at this stage and his analysis requirements were included. Previous attempts at local crime analysis of motor vehicle offences had shown the limited value of small numbers, and it had been decided at the outset to deal with a relatively large sample. Data summary, sample features and computer tables are shown at Appendix 'C'.

8.11 The three classic diagnostic results were obtained:-

1. Information gaps.  
No information of the motives or behaviour of offenders or the type of residents at risk.
2. Expected results.  
The Ford models, particularly Cortina and Escort were the commonest vehicles for any crime. (43% of all offences were committed against Fords).
3. Unexpected results.  
30% of taken vehicles were never recovered.

8.12 Two items in the diagnosis prompted immediate operational tasking, and the discussion of possible crime types. Perhaps cars were being 'crushed' and then claimed for on insurance? A proforma was designed for losers which should test this, i.e. was there an MOT

certificate? Who is the insurer? When did their MOT and insurance expire? At least one good arrest of a bogus loser has been made, but it would be overstating the case to say that this research was in any way responsible. What can be said is that the discussions which result from rigorous diagnosis are likely to affect day to day operations on a division. At West Ham these have also included renewed observations on nearby car wrecking yards, the tasking of SPG to a particular car park, and attention to two public house car parks which had not been recognised as danger areas. It has also given impetus to discussions with the local authority on improvements to their multi-storey car park. Good diagnosis is again seen as providing local police management with authoritative information with which to argue its point.

8.13 At this stage, however, the work was still limited to activities, and the information gap remained that of not knowing anything about offenders. The next step was therefore to interview them, and the North Eastern area probation service was approached to see if it could provide 'clients'. The senior officer agreed to help, but preferred that the interviews should be conducted by his probation officers instead of police. This was not seen as an obstacle but as an opportunity to pull the agencies together. (The principal probation officer had mentioned, somewhat wryly, that as neither the Home Office nor the Metropolitan Police had told him about adult cautioning proposals, he had found himself getting information on the off chance from a *PC*)

8.14 Interviews by Probation Officers would mean the design of a questionnaire and sampling frame for them - a mutually beneficial task. It had also become obvious that this problem would now take a longer study, and that it had already consumed most of the pilot scheme resources allocated to it. The interlocking of this study with CAP 3/9/84, the Home Office situational crime prevention work at Basingstoke, and the research techniques of Barry Poyner would mean a much longer timescale. No problem can be given a set time. It is only after preliminary diagnosis that any attempt can be made at planning, and the likely variation is between 3 months and one year.

8.15 A second information gap was the car ownership pattern of the West Ham population. It could not be obtained from PNC or DVLC but advice from B6(4) revealed that the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders has a data copy of DVLC (Jesse names and addresses). The purchase of its analysis for the required postal districts is in hand. This was the second time during this study that private data bases had provided police with useful information, the other being ACORN factor analysis which had originally been purchased for the Special Constabulary recruiting study. Any literature searching facility should ideally have the capacity to disclose computer data bases as well as traditionally published work.

8.16 The West Ham project is currently at the most difficult stage: the getting together of other agencies, the sifting and re-sifting of old and new data, and the attempt to focus on radical ideas. All participants find this process difficult to maintain. Beyond taking obvious short term measures in locations disclosed by crime mapping, there is the suspicion that the biggest section of motor vehicle crime - offences against Fords outside the owner's home - is as intractable as ever. The principle of taking a fresh look at this 'same old' problem is further inhibited by the unfamiliarity of officers with the mechanics of this stage. Interviewing offenders, talking to working probation officers, tackling numerate data and breaking out of traditional prescriptive responses are all matters of fresh attitude rather than skill. Just spending a whole day thinking about and discussing the problem is regarded as near luxury, and "it is this reflective process that is so strikingly different from their daily routine". ((2) Vol.IV p.135).

8.17 It had been assumed that this problem was likely to be suitable for some situational crime prevention strategies, and Mr Barry Poyner was, and still is involved with West Ham officers. This project was not to his design, and it was in some ways unfair to try and marry his ideas and techniques to Goldstein's in a single evaluation experiment. His contribution so far, however, has been to generate exactly the sort of measuring and questioning which stimulates fresh discussion. Now that alternative solutions are being discussed, his ideas bear directly on the West Ham problem, and his continued interest and support are acknowledged.

## 8.18 Summary

As attractive as 'problem solving'<sup>1</sup> may be, neither working officers nor their management find enough time to devote to it. Both are likely to be tasked with activities which have fixed time scales, and these will automatically take precedence over any process that does not. Infringements on a Chief Superintendent's degrees of freedom are again seen as contrary to the flexibility which is an absolute requirement for successful problem solving. Constant encouragement, and the provision of good diagnostic tools can, however, persuade management and working officers that old problems may have new solutions.