School Impact Project 2000—Dorchester High School

By the Boston Police Department

by Jim Jordan and Hemali Gunaratne

The Boston Police Department, led by supervisors and officers in the department's Schools Unit, collaborated with faculty, teachers, students and other stakeholders to develop a systematic approach to restore order and safety in the city's most troubled schools. The School Impact Project grew out of a crisis in the city's most troubled school, Dorchester High School. For several years, criminal incidents in public schools were kept from the attention of Boston police. Eventually, the problems inside Dorchester High flared out of the control of teachers, students and administrators. A desperate headmaster bucked convention and reached out to the department's small Schools Unit.

SCANNING

School violence came to the attention of police when the problems facing one particular high school, Dorchester High, reached crisis levels during the 1999–2000 academic year. While streets were now safer, in large part due to the earlier successes of collaborative intervention strategies such as Operation Ceasefire, the violence seemed to be persisting in the schools, with Dorchester High School now openly becoming an unsafe place for students.

Dorchester High, in fact, had been experiencing violence and criminal activity within its walls for many years. Violence and lack of control at Dorchester High had been a recurring theme, but it was obscured by a School Department reluctant to admit the severity of the problem. For more than two years, the school received resources and funds from the School Department in an attempt to improve the learning environment and regain control. Despite these efforts, the violence and lack of control only continued with the ever-prominent threat of shutdown. By early 2000, Dorchester High faced a spate of severe violent incidents that threatened the safety of students and staff. Given their seriousness, these incidents were increasingly coming to the attention of the Boston Police Department. The situation by late 1999 reached a crisis point that forced school administrators to admit and accept the problem, and prompted the call for focused police intervention.

The scan showed the incidents to be typically gang- and drug-related, with students being stabbed and shot at, in and out of school. School Safety Police Officers, a non-BPD patrol force hired by Boston Public Schools, were also being seriously attacked. The violent incidents led to calls by community leaders to shut down Dorchester High. The level of fear among the students was extremely high, exacerbated by the breakdown in basic order. One student described the situation: "It's scary here. School should be a safe place and its not here. I'm nervous."

Some of the specific incidents that triggered the call for immediate intervention included the following:

10/11/1999—A School Safety Police Officer is assaulted by a student and suffers serious head injury.
10/21/99—A student is stabbed outside the school during dismissal.
10/3/99—A student is shot while entering school in the morning. Victim is also in possession of a firearm.
217/10/00—A student is pistol whipped inside the school.

Students themselves perceived that gang activity and drug dealing were commonplace. At this point the level of fear among students and faculty was higher than ever.

ANALYSIS

Dorchester High Headmaster Robert Belle, his staff, and members from Superintendent of Schools Tom Payzant's staff, met with Sergeant Detective Paul Fitzgerald, the Boston Police School Police Unit Coordinator and other Boston Police officials and agreed that the school administration would work with the Boston Police to assess the problem and implement a plan immediately. An Intervention Team was convened whose members were identified by Boston Police and School Administrators as being the primary stakeholders in the school.
School Violence from Page 4

The school administration, in addition to the school administration, consisted of representatives from:

- Boston Police School Police Unit,
- BPS School Safety officers, Boston Municipal Police, MBTA Police
- Dorchester High School Faculty
- Probation Officers
- Department of Youth Services
- Boston Street Workers Program
- Local faith-based organization members
- Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office
- Youth Service Providers Network (Boston police social workers).

The Intervention Team began by analyzing the incidents and underlying problems at the school. Most of the analysis revolved around criminal incident reports by all the relevant parties closest to the problem and problem-students.

Boston Police Department’s Office of Research and Evaluation collated the data on the incidents at Dorchester High between October 1999 and January 2000. The results were as follows:

- Recovered Weapons: 38
- False Fire Alarms: 28
- Robbery: 13
- Assault and Battery: 25

The time frame for analysis was expedited given that Dorchester High School was in serious trouble. Having a history of collaboration and partnership, the Boston Police were able to call relevant partners to the table and be confident that they would respond to the problem immediately. Therefore, the discussion was open and candid allowing a focused analysis of the problem in a timely manner.

The sharing of information among the Intervention Team, on the actual students involved in the majority of incidents at the school, revealed that many of the agencies involved, in their various capacities were already working with the same group of kids. Whether it was as the police officer, probation officer, or DYS caseworkers, the main troublemakers were known by multiple agencies. The Intervention Team's analysis found that it was the small group of disruptive students who were creating the majority of the school's problems.

Specifically, the Intervention Team found that Dorchester High had a large number of students who were on probation and who, as a condition of their probation, had to attend school. A high percentage of DYS recently-released youth sent to Dorchester High were considered violent and dangerous. In October 2000, an estimated 85 students were on court-ordered probation or in the custody of DYS.

Intervention team discussions also revealed that those students on probation, though very disruptive and disrespectful to police and teachers, avoided their probation officers as any violations (suspected violation allows immediate search/drug test) would revoke their liberty and send them to prison. This is certainly a more severe outcome than the often long and drawn out school administration hearing process. Therefore, a significant role for probation and DYS supervisors was identified for this initiative.

A major problem identified by the Intervention Team was a total lack of adherence to school rules. The Intervention Team found that Dorchester High had a strict code of conduct that had been completely disregarded over the previous few years. The team then decided that the project would ultimately aim to restore the rules of the school and enforce the entire code of conduct, and thereby regain control to maintain a safe environment for learning. The appearance of the school and the tardiness of students also had to be turned around to show a respect for the school and its rules. Along the lines of George Kelling’s "Broken Windows" theory, the buildings were cleaned and the smaller rules enforced to send a clear message that the administration intended to maintain order.

As far as academic achievement was concerned, Dorchester High was faring poorly. Only 1 percent of 11th graders at Dorchester High were found to be proficient on citywide grade level math tests. Only 30 9th-graders chose to attend the school in 1997—the city’s most underserved high school, with the majority of enrolled students not wanting to be there. With the focus on trying to maintain minimum levels of discipline, teachers had difficulty in ensuring that learning was occurring. Moreover, in 1999 Dorchester High School lost its accreditation. Further Intervention Team discussions focusing on faculty and school administration found that principals often have difficulty in expelling youth immediately. This made the exercise of discipline more difficult and therefore less effective. Teachers also reported a sense of secondary victimization because of the lack of support from school administration.

RESPONSE

As a result of the analysis of the problems and students of Dorchester High, the agencies that were a part of the Intervention Team discussed what each agency could contribute in an effort to create a safe environment, and to maintain that commitment throughout the school year. They also reached out to other agencies identified as being able to contribute strongly to the Intervention Plan. The main goals of the Intervention Team were 1) to create a safe school environment; 2) to enforce the school rules as outlined in the school code of conduct; and 3) to maintain that safe environment for learning.

The Intervention Team not only collaborated with other law enforcement agencies but also partnered closely with community groups who had already been working with students at Dorchester High. Open partnership with the community was key to not only providing credibility to the initiative but also to the successful operation of the initiative. The Boston Ten Point Coalition has a strong standing in the communities in which most Dorchester High students reside. The clergy have influence among both parents and students, therefore their decision to stand by law enforcement as well as actively participate in the initiative provided a certain community credibility to it. Likewise, the Streetworkers group who work with at-risk youth on the streets also are the most likely to gain stu-
School Violence from Page 5

dent trust and respect. This also helped the initiative to succeed. The following agencies and community groups, in addition to the Intervention Team, committed to a collaborative effort in achieving the outlined goals by contributing to the action plan in a specific capacity.

- Boston Police School Police Unit Coordinator – Sgt. Det. Paul Fitzgerald
- Boston Public Schools School Safety Police
- Boston Police Department's Youth Violence Strike Force
- Boston Police Department District 3
- MBTA Police
- Boston Police Department District 11
- Boston Municipal Police
- Suffolk County District Attorneys Office
- Dorchester, High School Administration and Faculty
- Boston Ten Point Coalition
- Youth Service Providers Network
- Boston Streetworkers
- Department of Youth Services
- Dorchester Court Probation

Once the plan was established and agency and community roles identified, Headmaster Belle announced the new initiative that was underway. Members of the various agencies led by Sgt. Fitzgerald also addressed the entire student body with a unified message of non-tolerance towards violence and disruption, with a strong message on consequences. Each agency presented to the students their role in the initiative. The faculty were also asked to play a significant role in supporting the plan. Once Dorchester High was restored to a safe environment, more of the enforcement activity would be handed over to faculty from police. Implementation of the Intervention plan began in February 2000, and is detailed below.

Create a Safe Environment

A sense of immediacy surrounding the entire initiative resulted in identifying a need for increased police presence to ensure safety of students and staff. The installation of metal detectors was also implemented to stop the entry of weapons of any kind into the school.

Coordinated and Increased Police Presence—The number of BPS School Safety Police was increased with an extra officer being assigned to Dorchester. High, as well as an increase in the BPS School Safety Police Sergeant’s time spent on Dorchester High. BPS also added a para-professional to the front door for additional security and for operation of metal detectors. The Boston Police Youth Violence Strike Force (YVSF) concentrated their patrols in and around the Dorchester High School area. They also decided to conduct periodic visits to the high school throughout the day to confer with the BPS School Safety Police officers to assess the day-to-day climate of the school. This allowed for any problems that arose to be dealt with immediately. These Detectives would therefore work closely with district-level detectives in the Dorchester High area in any of their school-related investigations. A coordinated police response also made sure a visible uniformed presence was at the school daily and that transportation routes, including bus and train stations were patrolled during dismissal times. Boston Municipal Police also offered to provide a visible presence at a playground across from the school. Officers would be at the field at the beginning and end of each school day.

Other Enforcement Activity—A Boston Police K-9 unit would also conduct random certified sweeps of the school for drugs. School administrators would also conduct random locker searches aimed at removing any possibility of hidden firearms. School Administration required all staff and students to wear identification cards, and all guests had to be signed in with identification. A dress code was also instituted, that would not allow the wearing of certain colors that were perceived to be gang-affiliated.

Installation of Metal Detectors—Due to the number of incidents involving weapons at the school, the Intervention Team tried to ensure weapons were not brought into the school. In order to do this, the school administration agreed to allow the installation of metal detectors at the front door of Dorchester High School. Hand-held metal detectors were also brought in for use by school administrators.

Immediate Consequences

Identification of Problem Students and Immediate Expulsions—Headmaster Belle and his staff identified the students that they knew to be most disruptive at the school and take steps necessary to either remove them from the school or gain their full cooperation in adhering to the rules of the school set by the school's code of conduct. Belle and his staff worked closely with the police in enforcing all school rules in order to send a clear message of not allowing disruptive students to encroach on the learning environment of other students.

Fast Track Prosecution—Suffolk County District Attorney's Office established a School Violence Prosecutor as well as a Juvenile Rapid Indictment Prosecutor to focus on cases arising from Dorchester High as part of the initiative, and to ensure the validity of consequences to students who engage in violence.

DY S and Probation Presence—Dorchester Court Probation agreed to assign several probation officers to this initiative, both Adult and Juvenile, which results in a probation officer being in the school all day every day. The officers have with them a list of their probationers that are students at the school and check up with them throughout the day. Department of Youth Services assigned a caseworker to Dorchester High School, from their facility (Angel Street) that oversees the students at the High School. The caseworkers attend school at certain critical times during the school day.

Prevention Activity

Outreach and Service Provision to Students at School—The clergy group, Boston Ten Point Coalition had for months before been a visible presence at the school, and had instituted after-school programs for at-risk youth at Dorchester High School. Boston Ten Point committed to the new initiative by continuing to reach out to disruptive youth as well as support law

See School Violence on Page 7
School Violence from Page 6

enforcement and high school administration efforts to enforce rules and maintain safety, as well as participate in home-visits to students.

The Boston Police program known as the Youth Service Providers Network (YSPN), a network of social workers in police districts, assigned a full-time supervisory-level social worker from the YSPN program to work in partnership with the Headmaster in providing service referrals and counseling to problematic students at the school.

The Boston Streetworkers program works with at-risk youth on the streets, and as part of this intervention initiative, assigned a street worker to Dorchester High full-time during school hours. The streetworker coordinated with the various agencies that had committed resources to the school to work with the identified students. Streetworkers have a certain "street" credibility with the youth, that other partners lack, and therefore have an "in" with the students.

Home Visits—On Thursday evenings, members of the Boston Ten Point Coalition, partnered with Youth Violence Strike Force Officers, BPS School Safety Police personnel, probation officers, and streetworkers for visits to the homes of problem students attending Dorchester High. The visits were done in groups of three with their purpose being to share information with the parents of the student about gangs, youth violence, and overall issues facing youth in the city.

Building Maintenance—Maintaining the school premises and buildings including the removal of any graffiti was also a priority.

Interagency Communication and Coordination

Boston Police School Police Coordinator § Office This office served as the strategic command center for the initiative. It was to be the repository for all the information and intelligence gathered during the operation. Sergeant Detective Paul Fitzgerald, acting as the overall commander for the intervention, and point of contact for all Intervention Team members and other agencies involved, was responsible for coordinating team meetings and collecting information received from partner agencies. Sgt. Fitzgerald also forwarded his reports of activity within the school to the Office of the Police Commissioner as well as Boston Police Intelligence Unit to allow the coordinated response from police. Sgt. Fitzgerald also worked closely with Robert Belle of Dorchester High in identifying problem students and organizing home visits.

ASSESSMENT

The results of the initiative became apparent very soon after the intervention strategies were put in place at Dorchester High School. Over the following weeks, the school saw dramatic results. As each week passed, the school began enforcing an additional rule that was stated in the code of conduct. For example, the "no hat policy" and "no Walkman policy," as well as rules on tardiness were phased in. As the weeks went by, the teachers and school administrators became more confident in enforcing rules knowing they had full support through direct response as needed from School Safety Police, the school principal and Boston Police. Also, administrators were actually effecting expedient expulsions when students committed offenses allowing expulsion.

Most assessments were made through discussions with students, teachers, school administrators and School Safety Police. Also, incident reports were collected and analyzed by the Boston Police Department’s Office of Research and Evaluation. They compared numbers of incidents prior to the initiative with those after. The results were dramatic. The total number of incidents at the school dropped from 104 four months prior to implementation to just 14 incidents four months after the initiative—an 86.5 percent decrease in incidents.

Interview-style discussions with students and teachers overwhelmingly showed a reduction of fear. They reported feeling safer and their levels of fear decreased significantly. Students also felt better about being at school.

The most difficulty was experienced at the onset of intervention when the strategy had to be developed and tightened as gaps were exposed through which students could slip. For example, placement of metal detectors at the front doors did not account for students attempting to carry weapons through the side doors.

The other significant measure of success was the relationship established between the schools and Boston Police. Prior to this intervention, there was a reluctance on the part of the schools to utilize official police intervention. With the current existing relationship, any violence that occurs will draw immediate and coordinated responses, not only from police but also from community organizations. The Boston Police, from its past successes can bring to the table myriad partners, both from the community and other law enforcement agencies who are instrumental to successful intervention.

With the success at Dorchester High, the Boston Police School Safety Unit have coordinated with other Boston Public Schools to establish similar initiatives. They are more open to admitting to problems within the schools and partnering with police to develop similar successful intervention and prevention strategies to keep their schools safe.

Prior to this initiative the Boston Police Unit devoted to schools was limited to one detective and one officer. Now, the School Police Unit of the Boston Police Department has grown to a force of 10 full-time officers. The overall success of the initiative can be summed up through a statement by the Superintendent of Schools: "Safety is no longer a concern at Dorchester High."

Jim Jordan is the Director of the Office of Strategic Planning & Resource Development (OSPRD) at the Boston Police Department. For more information he can be reached via email at: JordanJ. bpd@ci. boston. ma. us. Hemal i Gunaratne is a Policy Analyst for OSPRD.
Drug Policy from Page 3

CTAC and TTP. Technology can play a dramatic role in combating drug-related crime. ONDCP’s Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC) is the federal government’s drug-control technology research and development organization. It identifies short-, medium-, and long-term scientific and technological needs of drug enforcement agencies—including surveillance; tracking; electronic support measures; communications; data fusion; and chemical, biological, and radiological detection. It also works with the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) to apply technology and expand the effectiveness or availability of drug-treatment research.

CTAC’s Technology Transfer Program (TTP) delivers the fruits of this labor to local law enforcement agencies that are often too budget-constrained to afford them on their own. As of April 1, 2002, the TTP will have provided more than 3500 local and state law enforcement agencies in all 50 states with one or more pieces of advanced drug crime fighting technology and the training needed to integrate it into the department’s daily operations. Some of CTAC’s 18 overt and covert devices and systems directly reduce risk for officers fighting drug crime, like the thermal imaging night sight that lets cops see suspects hiding, or dealing, behind bushes in total darkness.

With the TTP, it is now possible for local law enforcement agencies to have the same tools used by the DEA, FBI and the U.S. Customs Service with no cost to the receiving agency. These include Mini-Buster contraband detectors, digital wiretap, wireless interoperability, video stabilization systems, and night vision, plus a collection of covert devices and systems we never discuss in any detail outside the law enforcement community. The TTP recently solved an incompatible radio problem for the Metro Denver Drug Task Force by providing them with a Wireless Communications Interoperability System. Now federal, state and local officers can easily communicate with one another on the radio where in the past it was impossible without each officer possessing a portable radio, for every agency he or she might need assistance from. This is a great example of a simple solution making an immediate impact at the local level.

Money Laundering. One of the most effective ways to combat drug-trafficking organizations is to attack their ability to launder the money made from their nefarious activities. Collaborative efforts like the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) must play a leading role in helping federal, state and local law enforcement uncover the financial crimes of drug traffickers. The Treasury Department, as part of the National Money Laundering Strategy, has intensified the efforts of High Intensity Money Laundering and Related Financial Crimes Areas (HIFCAs), jointly managed with the Department of Justice. Federal law enforcement and regulatory efforts will focus on major money-laundering enterprises in these areas.

OCDETF. The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program was created in 1982 to focus resources on dismantling and disrupting major drug-trafficking organizations and their money-laundering operations. Today, the Justice Department component of OCDETF has matured into a nationwide structure of task forces—including federal prosecutors and federal, state and local law enforcement agents—in nine regions receiving a total of $338.6 million in fiscal year 2002, and focusing entirely on drug law enforcement. Yet over the past several years, only one in 1.0 OCDETF investigations has included a financial investigation, and only 21 percent of these investigations have reached the leadership level of drug organizations, according to Justice Department figures. The Attorney General has refocused the OCDETF program to ensure that law enforcement efforts are directed at the most significant drug-trafficking organizations responsible for distributing most of the drugs in the United States. Under the OCDETF program, law enforcement will strategically identify the most sophisticated trafficking organizations, eliminate their leadership, take down their transportation and distribution operations, and dismantle their financial infrastructure. The effectiveness of the OCDETF program will be measured by its impact in reducing the supply of drugs in the United States.

Perceptions of Fairness. A major obstacle to our efforts against drugs in recent years has been an erosion in some sectors of the public that our drug laws are fair and are enforced in an equitable manner. Law enforcement has been the target of a campaign that derides its work as sending users and low-level dealers to prison with sentences that are excessively harsh. But most data, including the most current information on federal convictions, argue otherwise.

According to the United States Sentencing Commission, the median quan-See Drug Policy on Page 9
Drug Policy from Page 8

The relevant figures for heroin and marijuana are 512 grams and 56,110 grams respectively, enough, in either case, for tens of thousands of doses. The notion that the federal criminal justice system is causing the arrest of legions of small-time drug offenders is thus revealed to be unsupportable, as is the claim that federal law enforcement agencies are busily locking up individuals for possession of, as opposed to trafficking in, illegal drugs. In fiscal year 2000, the most recent year for which we have data, there were just 232 federal possession convictions for cocaine, marijuana and heroin combined.

The sentencing structure has fostered among some a perception of racial injustice within the criminal justice system. Clearly, the government must create and administer laws in a fair and equitable fashion. But it is equally important that the public perceive that the government is doing so because if some believe that a law discriminates against a certain population, it hinders the ability of the government to enforce that law for the benefit of all in society. This Administration is committed to working with all interested parties to ensure that our criminal justice system is both fair and perceived as fair.

Drug Courts. The Drug Court program is helping us achieve this goal. Drug courts use the coercive power of the judicial branch to force abstinence and alter behavior through a combination of escalating sanctions, mandatory drug testing, treatment, and effective aftercare programs. Some 782 drug courts now operate in 49 states and more are scheduled to come on-line. This program represents one of the most promising innovations in recent memory. Intrusive and carefully modulated programs like drug courts are often the only way to free a drug user from the grip of addiction. This form of compassionate coercion will help reduce the demand for drugs in our neighborhoods. It allows drug users to clean up their act without incarceration—if they can stay with the program and avoid falling back into the habit.

The federal government will be undertaking a longitudinal review of selected drug court programs to determine the long-term effects of drug court participation.

Conclusion

While law enforcement works to get drugs off the streets, lock up the criminals who prey on our communities, and get small-time users into treatment through the compassionate coercion of our justice system, ONDCP will push to make the drug problem smaller, and treatment and prevention will be critical to our efforts. The importance of treatment in the drug control equation was highlighted by President Bush’s call for increasing drug treatment funding by $1.6 billion over the next five years—money ONDCP will make sure is spent on treatment programs that work. Our prevention programs, including the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, are bringing fresh, hard-hitting anti-drug messages to America’s youth. Our campaign linking the drug trade to terror that we recently launched during the Super Bowl has tested among parents and youth as the most powerful prevention message we have unveiled to date. In addition, we are continuing to foster and reinvigorate community coalitions, corporations, and faith-based organizations in their efforts to prevent drug use and give assistance to those seeking to get off drugs.

At the unveiling of our National Drug Control Strategy at the White House in February, President Bush remarked: “We understand we can’t [achieve our goals] alone here in Washington. That’s why we recognize the true strength of the country is our people. And we know there are thousands of parents, thousands of educators, thousands of community activists, and law enforcement officials, all anxious to come together to achieve this strategy.” The President and ONDCP recognize the importance of supplying you, the ground-level implementers, with the best possible tools, analysis and support. We can and will make progress against illegal drug use. Working together, we will make our neighborhoods safer and our future more secure.

John P. Walters is Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. He will also be speaking at the 2002 Annual Meeting in Phoenix, Ariz.
EMPLOYMENT LISTINGS

Police Chief
United States Capitol Police
Created by Congress in 1828, the original duty of the United States Capitol Police (USCP) was to provide security for the United States Capitol Building. The mission has expanded to provide the Congressional community and its visitors with the highest quality of a full range of police services. These services are provided through the use of a variety of specialty support units, a network of foot and vehicular patrols, and fixed posts. Today’s USCP Officers have the primary responsibility for protecting life and property, preventing, detecting, and investigating criminal acts, and enforcing traffic regulations throughout the 276-acre Capitol complex that includes 19 buildings, 20,000 employees, parks and thoroughfares. Additionally, the protection of Members of Congress is expanded by statute to the entire United States.

Currently the USCP has an authorized strength of 1,481 positions (1,374 officers) funded by both the House and the Senate. In the aftermath of September 11th, the USCP has been authorized an additional 195 positions and expects an additional increase of over 300 positions in the near future. Additional funding has been approved for a new command center and headquarters, a new training academy, an expanded vehicle fleet and canine unit, pay increases for officers, as well as other upgrades.

The Chief of Police is appointed by and reports to the Capitol Police Board comprised of the Sergeant at Arms, House of Representatives; the Sergeant at Arms, Senate; and the Architect of the Capitol. The department’s FY2002 budget is $128M. The chief will be responsible for the development and implementation of emergency operations plans to include: enforcing the Capitol security perimeter plan; training and equipping a response unit for current threats; installing technology measures to screen visitors to the Capitol and all seven congressional office buildings; and securing communications and computer networks systems. The ideal candidate will have at least ten years of progressively responsible law enforcement management experience in an agency of at least 800 sworn personnel. Requirements include a proven track record of success in police management, leadership and employee development. Candidates must have police management training and possess a bachelor’s degree (advanced degree preferred) or have equivalent work-related experience. Candidates should have experience or knowledge of security and/or protective operations. Candidates must be able to effectively communicate and work collaboratively with various groups including Members of Congress, the police board, department members and other law enforcement agencies. Candidates should have a working knowledge and demonstrated ability in the areas of labor relations, budget preparation and presentation, resource management, and strategic planning.

Salary range is in the $140’s. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) (www.PoliceForum.org) is assisting the Capitol Police Board with the selection process. For consideration, send a resume and one-page cover letter summarizing your interest and qualifications and the names of five work-related references by April 12, 2002 to:

Police Executive Research Forum
USCP Search
1 120 Connecticut Ave., NW
Suite 930
Washington, DC 20036

Deputy Police Chief
City of Tallahassee, Florida
Tallahassee (population 154,000) serves as Florida’s State Capital and is home to Florida State University, Florida A&M University and Tallahassee Community College. Located in Florida’s northern panhandle just 20 miles from the Gulf of Mexico, the area is known as “The Other Florida” for its rolling hills, canopied streets and temperate, four-season climate. As the seat of state government, Tallahassee enjoys a stable economy and was recently rated one of the ten most affordable places to live in the country. Tallahassee has experienced steady economic growth in the areas of commercial development and in both public and private construction.

The police department is nationally accredited and has 342 sworn officers and 243 civilian employees. The budget is $33M. The department is strongly committed to community policing and is well respected for its professionalism. The deputy chief will assist in the development and implementation of long-range goals and will provide leadership and management direction to a department experiencing rapid, dynamic growth.

The ideal candidate will have command-level experience and training in a similarly sized agency, and the ability to educate, persuade and work collaboratively with various groups including department managers, other law enforcement agencies and community leaders. The successful applicant will need to incorporate the values of diverse individuals and groups into a fair and equitable method of management. Candidates should have a record of excellence and ethical leadership working with both labor organizations and the community.

Requirements include a bachelor’s degree and eight years of progressively responsible sworn law enforcement experience with four years as a law enforcement supervisor or an equivalent combination of training and experience. Command-level experience, a master’s degree and advanced police management/leadership training are preferred. Finalists may be subject to physical and psychological

See Employment on Page 11
For consideration, send a resume and one-page letter summarizing your interest and qualifications and a list of five references by May 15 to:

**Police Executive Research Forum**
Tallahassee Search
1120 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 930
Washington, DC 20036

Position open until filled. All applicant materials are subject to public records disclosure. The City of Tallahassee is an EOE.

**Police Chief University Park, Md.**

University Park (population 2,300) is situated adjacent to the southern edge of the University of Maryland about three miles south of the Capitol beltway and four miles from Washington, DC. Featured as one of the "Best Places to Live" in the Washington Metropolitan area by Washingtonian Magazine (March 2000), this residential community consists of 950 single-family homes and offers its residents the best of small town living and urban amenities.

The community has a highly educated population that demand quality municipal services. Preserving the character and charm of the community is a priority among residents and elected officials. The town maintains its own park and recreational facilities, is home to an excellent elementary school, and provides its own police and sanitation services. Through local organizations, residents participate in many town-wide events contributing to a sense of community pride. University Park offers a high quality of life within an easy commuting distance to employment centers in the metropolitan area because of its close proximity to several Metro and MARC stations and major roadways.

University Park has enjoyed stable town and police administration—the police chief is retiring after nine years as chief. Under the town’s mayor—council form of government, the police chief is appointed by and reports to the mayor. The police department’s 8 sworn officers provide a range of law enforcement services. The department has a budget of $470,000. PERF recently completed a police department review that outlines a plan to provide a stronger emphasis on community policing practices.

Requirements include a Bachelor’s degree and increasingly responsible law enforcement experience including • at least three years of senior supervisory-level responsibility, or an equivalent combination of education and experience. A Master’s degree and advanced police management/leadership training are preferred. The successful candidate will demonstrate a solid record of implementing a community policing focus to police operations and improving organizational performance. The chief must reside within the general area in order to provide a regular management presence within the department.

Salary in the low to mid-$60s. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) (www.policeforum.org), is assisting the Town with the selection process. There is additional information on the Town at www.upmd.org where you will find related links.

To apply, send a one-page letter summarizing your interest and qualifications along with: your resume and a list of five professional references by April 30, 2002 to:

**Police Executive Research Forum**
Attention: University Park Search
1 120 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 930
Washington, DC 20036

The Town of University Park is an Equal Opportunity Employer.

---

**Chief of Police Richmond, Virginia**

Reporting to the City Manager, the Chief of Police serves a vibrant city—the capital of Virginia—with a diverse urban population of approximately 200,000. Richmond has a strong history of community involvement in government affairs, including all aspects of policing. The police department has 798 employees, which includes 656 sworn officers.

The new Chief of Police will be expected to maintain current initiatives and provide visionary leadership while expanding an aggressive community policing commitment; maintaining state-of-the art technical expertise and resources; enhancing a variety of laudable customer service initiatives; and growing the existing collaborative relationships with local and regional state, local and federal law enforcement partners. The successful candidate will have a minimum of 7 to 10 years of increasingly responsible senior-level law enforcement executive experience in a large, diverse urban municipal police organization and a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice or related field. Virginia State licensure and certifications will be required. Individuals with relevant experience and strong documented records of success in reducing crime in an urban environment, generating strong community involvement and leading regional law enforcement collaborative efforts are encouraged to apply. Salary is negotiable including a competitively attractive executive benefits package. Position will remain open until filled. This is an unclassified position. Candidate must establish residency with 12 months of employment.

Interested candidates should submit a letter of interest and resume to:

Richmond Chief of Police Search
PSComm, LLC
Suite 900
One Church Street
Rockville, Maryland 20850
The Police Executive Research Forum is a nonprofit association of progressive police professionals dedicated to improving services to all our communities.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

President: Robert K. Olson, Chief
Minneapolis Police Department

V President: Lorne C. Kramer, Chief
Colorado Springs Police Department

Treasurer: Edward Flynn, Chief
Arlington County Police Department

Secretary: Bernard Melekian, Chief
Pasadena Police Department

At-Large: Paul Evans, Commissioner
Boston Police Department

At-Large: David Bejarano, Chief
San Diego Police Department

At-Large: Jerry Oliver, Chief
Detroit Police Department

Ex-Officio: Barbara McDonald, Deputy Superintendent
Chicago Police Department

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Chuck Wexler