The Make-It-Count Scheme: A Partnership Response to Begging in Stoke-on-Trent City Centre

by Inspector Nigel Manning
Staffordshire (UK) Police Department

During the early part of 1999 there was a notable increase in the numbers of street beggars operating in the Stoke-on-Trent City Centre area.

The Staffordshire Police Department (SPD) was, at that time, undergoing major restructuring and reorganization to change its policing style to a more locally based, problem-solving approach. The department created a Local Policing Unit (LPU) that solely delivered policing services to the City Centre area. This project was the first significant problem that this unit tackled using a problem-solving approach. Street begging was highlighted as a problem requiring attention in mid-March 1999, and the unit commenced operation on April 12, 1999.

Scanning

The problems being caused by the increase in beggars was identified through:

♦ an increase in calls for service to the SPD regarding beggars' behavior in the City Centre area to the SPD, despite officers' having inadequate legislation to support any meaningful action to alleviate the behavior causing the complaints;
♦ a high number of complaints from customers of City Centre businesses;
♦ numerous complaints from banks that lone women were afraid to use ATMs, particularly during the evenings, because of the presence of beggars—banks reported reductions in use of the machines most targeted by beggars;
♦ letters of complaint written by members of the public appearing in the local evening paper, which, at one stage, caused a high level of media and public interest in the issue for several weeks;
♦ concerns expressed by potential investors in the area to City Centre Management and other key strategic figures regarding the negative image large numbers of beggars gave to the City Centre; and
♦ pressure from the City Centre Management Partnership Group for the SPD to address the issue.

During this period, unit members noted that other criminals were being attracted into the City Centre because it appeared to be neglected, and levels of retail crime became significantly worse than they had been in previous years. The crime levels and negative image risked impact on potential new investment being worked on at that time, and the LPU's credibility was at risk because the level of crime had increased at the same time that the unit had started working in the area.

The LPU thought structured problem solving, or problem-oriented policing, was a model that could work in this situation, even though the circumstances were difficult. The unit agreed that it should help develop a solution to the problem, but strongly resisted the suggestion that this was a 'policing' or single agency issue. This issue could only be solved through partnerships with various community stakeholders.

Once we made the decision to address the problem, the unit called a small "scoping" meeting between the LPU Commander, the City Centre Manager and the coordinator of a homeless outreach team that covered the area. During this meeting, the group identified some key elements of the problem and our likely responses, as well as the participants of a possible action group that could provide insight or resources to address the problem. These participants included the following people:

♦ the City Centre LPU Commander;
♦ a City Centre business representative—the manager of Marks & Spencer, a local store;
♦ the Action Line coordinator at Radio Stoke;
♦ the City Centre Manager;
♦ the rough-sleepers project coordinator, who handles work with the homeless population;

See Count on page 6
Count from page 5

- a local nurse practitioner who works with homeless people;
- the Local Authority Community Safety Coordinator; and
- a Partnerships Inspector—the Local Authority liaison officer.

Analysis

The group used a range of "soft" and "hard" data to define and help us understand the problem. We generated several hypotheses from our definition of the problem and then used several methods of analysis to test our thinking and shape our response.

We conducted several analyses. First, the unit conducted an initial analysis of Police Command & Control data to identify "hot spot" areas. This analysis was time-consuming and of limited value—many crimes were under-reported, and the computer system in place at Command & Control at that time was unwieldy. That system was upgraded in September 1999.

We also conducted a street survey identifying locations and times of day beggars operated in the City Centre. LPU members in conjunction with the Local Authority CCTV conducted the survey over the course of a week, mapped the findings and shared them with the steering group who confirmed and validated the report. As part of this exercise they also identified the individuals who were begging and passed those details on to the rough-sleepers team to carry out further research into their background. This linked locations and offenders in a way that had not previously occurred, and provided a basis upon which other work could be conducted and developed.

Unit members conducted face-to-face interviews with local business operators (retail, service businesses and banks) affected by the problem. This confirmed that we had accurately identified the views of local businesses during our scanning stage, but importantly bought us time, goodwill and helped involve our biggest critics at an early stage in shaping our understanding and our response.

We also conducted interviews with members of the public who were seen giving money to beggars, generated discussions through local BBC radio and monitored the flow of letters on the subject in the local newspaper. This partly confirmed our previous understanding, but additionally highlighted the public’s goodwill and willingness to help people in trouble. It was important that we acknowledge members of the public’s confusion and frustration over the issue many wanted to do something to help, but did not know what the "best thing" to do was. More than half the people we spoke to did not make any link between giving money to beggars and the beggars using the money to buy drugs.

The rough-sleepers team used interviews and surveys work to establish the true nature of the people begging in the City Centre and of homeless people more generally in our area. The results of this work confirmed our belief that all the identified beggars at that time were drug addicts with high heroin habits and some with crack addiction problems.

Ten regular beggars were identified initially as a result of our survey. Two of the women who were begging were also identified as working as prostitutes in the area, depending on how successful their begging efforts had been during the day. More than 60 percent of the beggars were "failed" shoplifters who were well known by many of the stores in the City Centre and were banned from most of the larger ones.

Begging provided the main source of finance for this group of people with which to purchase drugs. It was not uncommon for them to earn £50 (Approximately $74 US) during a good day. Homelessness was an issue for around 30 percent of the beggars within the City Centre who were actually sleeping in the bus station or car parking areas. Most of the remainder were technically NFA though, living in squats on the outskirts of the City Centre or temporarily with "friends," but likely to spend some time sleeping rough occasionally. One was living in a hostel and one had a permanent address.

Habitual beggars had identified "turf" that they protected. Begging did levy taxes on each other, and were occasionally violent toward each other and the street drinkers with whom they sometimes associated. We identified low self-esteem as a significant issue and many of the beggars did not access support offered by the rough-sleepers team because they had sustainable income for drugs through begging.

Just fewer than 50 percent of the home- less people in the area and all of the beg- gars in the City Centre originated from the region. This varied greatly from national statistics that show a much lower proportion of people around the country are actually from the areas they found themselves homeless in.

We conducted architectural site surveys of the identified areas the beggars were using to recognize common factors and develop location-based responses with more certainty. The survey confirmed our understanding of location-based issues that impacted on the problem. Its results highlighted the positive aspects of the locations that the beggars had selected that also made them attractive for other legitimate uses.

Our analysis indicated that begging was a growing problem. We identified that unless there were some intervention, the situation would worsen—not only in relation to begging, but also in other areas due to the "broken windows" aspects associated with this problem.

Gaps in our analysis included impact on the amount of traffic into stores and banks and what effect that traffic level had on profits, but we could not obtain this data because it was so sensitive. Managers shared broad indicators—up or down—with us as background information, but as this could not be obtained in any objective and reliable way it was felt we could not rely on that information.

Following the analysis it was decided that we could set the following objectives for our project. We would

- significantly reduce the number of on-street beggars operating within

See Count on page 7
the City Centre area from the first three months recorded figures following the launch of our project. (We did not make this specific in terms of a number—we felt that we should ultimately have no beggars operating in the City Centre, but we weren’t confident this was an achievable target.);

4 divert those people habitually begging towards more healthy lifestyles by having them access support at the drop-in center;

♦ raise public awareness of the issues of homelessness and begging; and

♦ raise funds to provide further support to homeless charities and projects and reduce the public funding of beggars’ drug habits.

Response

It was decided that a broad-based, holistic strategy would be most effective given the complex nature of the problem we intended to address. We did not wish to merely displace the problem or change the behavior toward another unlawful one. While the main priority was reducing the problem, we also wanted to provide an exit strategy for people involved in begging, should they choose to take it.

As a starting point, we decided to examine national good practices to see how other towns and cities had addressed what we knew to be a growing national problem. Unfortunately, and perhaps surprisingly, we did not find a solution or strategy that we could readily implement to address our problem. Through the Association of Town Centre Management however, we did learn about the "Make-It-Count" program that operated in Winchester for a couple of years and that sought to divert public donations from street beggars toward charity. We examined their program and thought it ideal to fulfill much of our strategy.

It did not, however, address the issues of targeting support and enforcement for those individuals involved in habitual begging, nor the issues of addressing some of the location issues we had identified through our analysis.

As part of our response to target support and enforcement for habitual beggars, we used part of our original research and created files for each of the beggars identified. We established an information exchange protocol between the LPU and the Potteries Housing Association, which manages the outreach workers, including the rough-sleeper team and drop-in center. We began to share information about the behavior of the beggars and challenge them in a coordinated way. Unfortunately, due to the loss of the coordinator as a result of funding cuts, the further development of the approach toward introducing shared multi-agency negotiated care plans to each individual was not realized. These plans remain on hold at the present time, but will be attempted if we have a significant return of beggars back into the area.

We targeted businesses that had experienced most of the problems associated with the beggars, provided them with more information about the law and developed a "professional witness" pro-forma statement, which they could use to record any problems prior to contacting the police.

We targeted certain beggars who had consistently refused support from the outreach team for enforcement, but also referred them toward the drop-in center and push them to seek help away from begging in the City Centre.

We highlighted some of the locations used as begging turfs to the Local Authority Markets Inspector (who is responsible for street trading in the City Centre) and we began to identify and zone them as either busking/street entertainment locations, or street trading locations.

We identified all areas around ATMs as zero-tolerance zones for begging and policed this firmly and consistently. We communicated this to all of the beggars via the outreach team and our personal contact with them.

Following a fairly lengthy period we had spent looking for appropriate collection boxes, our City Centre Manager organized and developed the more public elements of the scheme towards an official launch in November 1999. We launched with a coordinated marketing and information campaign complete with radio, TV and newspaper coverage during a week of action. Large posters highlighting the presence of collecting boxes and telling the public that "begging is not the answer" were placed around the City Centre in advertising panels and on litter bins.

As we got to know some of the beggars, we developed more individual strategies. For example, the group working on the project gave one of the young female beggars access to a clarinet and music lessons. Once she had reached an acceptable standard, she auditioned for and was given a permit to work in the City Centre as a street entertainer or busker—she no longer had to beg for income.

Once the income of the beggars in the City Centre had started to significantly drop due to members of the public donating money though the charity boxes, some of the beggars began to access support: for their addictions and accessed the drop-in center more regularly.

The next stage in this process, the development of a fast-track drug rehabilitation arrangement, is currently on going.

We favored this kind of holistic strategy for several reasons:

♦ We felt that it would deliver "best value" in the long term.

♦ We felt that a single agency response was not appropriate, and would be very limited in its success.

♦ We felt it was a more socially and morally acceptable course of action than enforcement campaigns that would tend to split public support either for or against beggars and mask some of the real issues.

♦ We felt that specific targeted and tailored support was essential due to
the diverse range of problems and needs of the "offending" group. The ownership and involvement of the people at the center of the project—the beggars themselves—was seen as being critical if longer term resolution was to be achieved.

We sought to gain ownership of the response both within and outside the force by involving people on the front line in shaping the project; by showing that an improvement in the problem on-street could be achieved; by creating opportunities for positive media coverage; by displaying strong leadership and committing to addressing the problem at a local level; and by celebrating and promoting success, but being honest and objective enough to admit when we got things wrong and improve them.

We encountered the following difficulties during the development and introduction of the strategy.

♦ We lost momentum after about three months of really good progress and seemed to stagnate for a couple of months waiting for other people to get back to us with updates. We eventually took the initiative and kick-started things again by making our own arrangements.

♦ In an effort to displace begging, we introduced some street entertainment into one of the best begging turfs without having launched the public education element of the scheme or really taken the initiative and established control over the beggars on the street. As a result, a particular beggar "taxed" a young female mime artist because she was working on what he saw as his turf. This highlighted the importance of integrating strategies.

♦ We lost a key person, Gary Thomas, who was the rough-sleepers project coordinator. His funding ran out unexpectedly and this caused some of the ongoing work and development to be halted.

We encountered the following difficulties during the development and introduction of the strategy.

♦ We encountered the following difficulties during the development and introduction of the strategy.

♦ We encountered the following difficulties during the development and introduction of the strategy.

assessment

As part of our ongoing monitoring of the project on the numbers of beggars on the street (which was the primary objective of the scheme), we carried out the following to support meaningful evaluation of the project:

♦ Fortnightly "on-street" spot checks by our City Centre Manager continued after the launch of the scheme.

♦ The steering committee met periodically to monitor progress and amend the plans or strategy as the need arose.

♦ We identified a formal review date.

♦ We organized a survey of businesses and the public, and decided not to hold the survey close to one of the planned publicity weeks when the large display posters were promoting the scheme throughout the City Centre area—we wanted to obtain more accurate data from the surveyed people.

Our evaluation has shown a reduction from an average of six on-street beggars to an average of less than one over the six months since the introduction of the project.

The target homeless group uses the drop-in center more than 30 percent more often since November 1999 than they did before. However, 60 percent of our core of habitual beggars actually moved on and now beg and base themselves in other towns. There were also numerous improvements and additional measures introduced during this period by the managers of the drop-in center, and so this increase in usage might not be directly linked to the scheme as an outcome at this time.

We have identified some additional work to test our hypothesis that beggars have displaced because they wanted to continue with their current lifestyle in a different location, rather than access available support and make changes to how they lived. This additional work will also involve "tracking" our identified on-street beggars since the start of the work last year to see where and how they have moved on, so we can identify why this occurred and refine our strategy accordingly.

We ran two surveys involving both City Centre businesses and visitors to the City Centre, and identified several trends. Members of the public shopping in the City Centre were far more aware of the existence of the scheme than managers and workers employed in the shops and businesses in the City Centre and were more certain of an improvement. Of the public surveyed, 92 percent had heard of the scheme. However, only 64 percent of businesses had heard of the scheme. Ninety-four percent of the public had noted some or vast improvement, while 48 percent of the business had noted some or vast improvement.

Among those businesses surveyed, those who were directly affected (located) in the area of on-street begging previously were significantly more aware of the scheme, saw a vast improvement and felt the scheme to be successful. Those businesses who had not were less certain of the scheme’s success and felt that the situation was mostly the same, and a few worse.

We are projecting an annual income of between £3,000-5,000 (Approximately $4,225-$7,400 US) from the collecting boxes, though this depends on how effectively we promote the scheme during peak periods such as Christmas. This is lower than the income Winchester receives (approximately £14,000, or $20,700 US per year), but they have a higher volume of tourists visiting their city. We will carry out additional work during the year to establish this with more certainty to amend our strategy accordingly.

The members of the steering group were involved in the evaluation, and examined the range of data together to validate the results. We will continue to monitor the project through biweekly head counts and further survey work.

Future developments from this project will include support for some much longer-term work on preventative strategies based upon research currently being undertaken by the drop-in center team.
U.S. Police Fellowships Available to Pursue Research in the U.K.

The Fulbright U.S. Police Fellowships are designed to enable active domestic police officers and administrators to extend their professional experience by conducting research into an aspect of policing. Applicants are invited to conduct research within any of the subjects outlined in the 'Hot Topics' list (Note: the subjects outlined are to be taken as rough guides: the titles are suggestive rather than prescriptive). Applicants are free to suggest alternative areas of research, but must justify their validity within the framework of U.S.-U.K. cooperation.

Applicants must be currently employed by a police force, be recommended by supervisory staff within the department in which they work and hold a position of responsibility at the level of sworn sergeant or above, including civilian staff. Candidates must develop a substantive project and demonstrate that participation in the program will produce benefits of significance for the larger law enforcement community in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Recipients of the award are expected to arrange their own affiliation with a suitable U.K. higher education host and have links with U.K. police forces appropriate to the area of research in place prior to the commencement of the grant period. Recipients of the award should arrange to have their home department's financial support, and must undertake to conduct research in the U.K., within their chosen subject, between September 2002 and April 2003. Grants are for a minimum of three months.

General areas of research that are encouraged include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Forecasting Methods for Police Forces (economics, demographics, and others);
- Borderless Policing;
- impact of Police on Quality of Life;
- Police Accountability;
- Programs to Curb the Career Criminal;
- Performance Measurement for Police;
- Public Order;
- Policing and Use of Tax Money (Value Assessment);
- Relation of Mental Health to Crime;
- Repeat Victimization;
- Programs to Prevent Street Crimes;
- Specific Crime Interventions;
- Police and their Relation to the Homeless;
- Handling and Prevention of Abuse Crimes in the Family (spousal, child, elder abuse); and
- Education Factors and Crime (patterns and trends).

For additional application information, see the special instruction for police applicants on the CIES Website (www.cies.org) or contact the CIES program officer Karen Adams at kadams@cies.iie.org for a paper copy.

Helping from page 3

Personnel in the public information or victim services units who receive calls from victims about media interviews are instructed to offer assistance such as being present' during the interview or offering a venue in a police facility to hold the interview. Those personnel also give advice about measures to protect identity and other requests the individual can appropriately make of an interviewer.

It has been our position that this service is of far more help to victims and the department than the informal method of a detective saying, "Don't talk to the press!" Victim interviews under the right circumstances can be highly beneficial, both to the victims themselves and to the investigating law enforcement agency, because such interviews draw attention to the crime and help develop additional information. Many of the journalists now reluctantly agree that the way our department is implementing the program is not unreasonable, but continue to express concern that other agencies may utilize the approach to choke off media access to victims. SPJ has produced a card for reporters to use, emphasizing the importance of crime news to the community and promising sensitivity to the victims. We find this perfectly appropriate.

Any law enforcement agency wishing to take an approach similar to ours would be well advised to do so in consultation with both local victims' advocate groups and news media. This has the potential to result in constructive discussions regarding the respective positions of law enforcement, victims and the media.

Warren R. Carmichael has directed the public information office of the Fairfax County Police Department since 1979. He served for seven years as the chairman of the Metropolitan Washington Public Safety News Media Relations Council, which meets monthly to provide a forum for free and frank airing of differences and communication between representatives of the news media and public safety agencies.
Chief of Police, Dartmouth, Massachusetts—After 17 years, the Town of Dartmouth’s Chief of Police has retired. The town is conducting a search for a new chief. This picturesque seacoast community is located in Southeastern Massachusetts on Buzzards Bay. The town has a land area of 62 square miles and a population of 30,000. We are a progressive community whose priorities are preservation of our natural resources, managed growth and continuous improvement of the region. We are proud of our heritage of multicultural diversity. We offer the highest quality of municipal services in the region, an excellent school system and the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth is part of our community.

The Chief of Police will be responsible for the operation and administration of a full-service police department, consisting of 62 fulltime sworn officers, 19 part-time sworn officers, 14 fulltime civilian clerical/dispatch support staff and 10 part-time seasonal traffic supervisors; an operating budget of $4.1 million. We are proud of our heritage of multicultural diversity. We offer the highest quality of municipal services in the region, an excellent school system and the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth is part of our community. The town is conducting a search for a new chief. This picturesque seacoast community is located in Southeastern Massachusetts on Buzzards Bay. The town has a land area of 62 square miles and a population of 30,000. We are a progressive community whose priorities are preservation of our natural resources, managed growth and continuous improvement of the region. We are proud of our heritage of multicultural diversity. We offer the highest quality of municipal services in the region, an excellent school system and the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth is part of our community.

The Chief of Police will be responsible for the operation and administration of a full-service police department, consisting of 62 fulltime sworn officers, 19 part-time sworn officers, 14 fulltime civilian clerical/dispatch support staff and 10 part-time seasonal traffic supervisors; an operating budget of $4.1 million. The successful candidate will be an outstanding law enforcement professional with highly developed interpersonal and communication skills, experienced in contemporary management and possess a proven track record of accomplishments demonstrating exceptional leadership and vision in community policing. The chief will report directly to the Town’s Select Board.

We require a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice or in other areas relevant to the job requirements or equivalent combination of education and supervisory experience; master’s degree desirable. Graduation from a police academy recognized by the Massachusetts Criminal Justice Training Council required and other executive-level training (e.g. FBI Academy) advantageous. Ten years of progressively responsible law enforcement experience with a minimum of five years of management experience. Candidate must possess a combination of experience and knowledge in all areas of law enforcement operations and administration commensurate with a similarly sized agency and/or community.

Successful candidate will be selected based upon the above and other specified requirements including ability to perform essential job functions and satisfactory completion of a full assessment center process. Must be a resident of Dartmouth or a contiguous community within first six months, and a Town resident by no later than the end of three years. Salary is $85,000 with additional salary incentives available, dependent upon education levels achieved, along with a competitive benefits package.

Submit 10 copies of your letter of interest and resume (3 to 5 typewritten pages) by no later than close of business on January 5, 2001 to Police Chief Search and Screen Committee, c/o Office of the Select Board, Dartmouth Town Hall, Room 303, 400 Slocum Road, Dartmouth, MA 02747. Email inquiries to darts b@town. dartmouth.ma.us. Please indicate if your response should remain confidential.

Visit our web site at http://www.town.dartmouth.ma.us or contact us at (508) 999-0713 for information about this community or for more details about this position. (EOE/ADA)

Police Chief, Concord, North Carolina—Rapidly growing city in the Charlotte, NC, region (population 50,000+) seeks police chief to perform complex managerial and administrative work directing the functions of the police department. Current police chief is becoming the city staff attorney.

Requires education and experience equivalent to graduation from an accredited college or university with major course work in criminal justice, police science or related field, postgraduate work and extensive managerial experience in local government law enforcement.

Requires a person with a focus on community- and problem-oriented policing, teamwork, customer service, community partnerships and high ethical standards.

Salary range is $57,207 to $89,379 DOQ. Send resume and salary history by January 5, 2001 to Human Resources Director, P.O. Box 308, Concord, NC 28026.

Chief of Police, Paducah, Kentucky—Paducah, KY, population 27,000, seeks proven, experienced police professional with significant and progressive management experience in all phases of municipal police work to lead a department of 70 sworn officers (81 authorized), 13 fulltime and 11 part-time civilian employees with a $5.8 million budget in service to a multicultural regional commercial and medical center.

Strong leadership, management and communication skills essential. Bachelor’s degree highly desirable; related graduate degree a plus. Appointment made by mayor and city commissioner. Mutually agreeable contract with appointee desired. Position reports to city manager. Experience in a diverse community and/or police department important. Starting salary is $65,000, but that is negotiable based on experience and qualifications.

Apply at once to the city’s recruitment consultant: The PAR Group—Paul A. Reaume, Ltd., 100 N. Waukegan Road, Suite 200, Lake Bluff, IL 60044-1694. 8471234-0005, Fax 8471234-8309. Email pargroup@interaccess.com

The city of Paducah is an Equal Opportunity Employer. Women and minorities are encouraged to apply.

Trinity College Associate Director of Campus Safety, Hartford, Connecticut—Trinity College seeks a professional for the position of Associate Director of Campus Safety. Located in the city of Hartford, Connecticut, Trinity College is a four-year liberal arts institu-
tion serving approximately 1,900 students and encompassing 100-acres with 63 campus buildings. The Office of Campus Safety includes 27 staff and 30 student workers.

Reporting to the Director of Campus Safety, the Associate Director is responsible for the administrative operations of the office. Responsibilities include the effective scheduling and managing of officers and work shifts, supervision of student workers, dispatch and communications, management of a centralized records and reporting system, including reporting as stipulated by the Cleary Act, and support for payroll and budgeting. The Associate Director will serve in the Director’s absence, work closely with faculty, students, staff, and parents, and provide leadership in issues of officer training, service to the community, and campus safety.

The successful candidate for this position will possess a bachelor’s degree with extensive experience in the administration and operational oversight of a campus safety or community-policing program. Strong supervisory and administrative experience including familiarity with computer applications that support internal and external reporting, excellent public relations skills, and a knowledge of current issues in law enforcement, public safety, and student development are necessary. The ability to work collaboratively and an understanding of the service role of campus safety are important contributing factors in the selection of the Associate Director.

Review of applications will begin immediately and will continue until the position is filled. A resume, with an accompanying cover letter, may be submitted by email attachment to mail@spelmanandjohnson.com, on-line at www.spelmanandjohnson.com, or mailed to The Spelman & Johnson Group, Trinity—Campus Safety (PERF), Ellen Heffernan, Managing Vice President, 38 Mulberry Street, Box 304, Leeds, MA 01053, Phone: 413-584-7089. Visit Trinity’s website at http://www.trincoll.edu

Trinity College is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employer. Women and minorities are encouraged to apply. Applicants with disabilities should request any needed accommodation in order to participate in the application process.

Join us for one of the most exciting meetings of the new millennium.

The Police Executive Research Forum’s 2001 Annual Meeting:
25th Anniversary Celebration

April 4-7, 2001
The Westin River North
320 North Dearborn, Chicago
Mark your calendar and prepare to join us.

Ways to Contribute to Subject to Debate

Help PERF continue to make Subject to Debate a vehicle for the latest issues in progressive policing. PERF members and readers are once again reminded to send articles and items of interest for PERF to consider publishing in this newsletter. PERF welcomes the following submissions:

♦ Original Articles. Articles should be relatively short (800—1,200 words) and focus on a current issue of interest for progressive police professionals. PERF seeks articles that give a fresh perspective on these issues, and that offer practical, sound ideas for police professionals to institute in their own agencies. Articles will be reviewed for content, interest to PERF readers and writing quality.

♦ Reader Responses. Send in responses to articles that have appeared. Let your voice be heard on these important issues. These articles should be from 200—500 words in length.

♦ Bulletin Board Items. Send in notices of upcoming conferences, new publications or other short information items to be shared in the Bulletin Board section.

♦ Employment Opportunities. PERF will publish employment advertisements that are relevant for PERF members. These advertisements are published free of charge as a service to members.

Send submissions to Eugenia Gravely by email at egravely@policeforum.org or by fax to 202/466-7826. Deadline for the next month’s issue is the 15th of the previous month. For example, the deadline for the June issue is May 15.
The Police Executive Research Forum is a national professional association of law enforcement professionals dedicated to improving police services to our communities.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

- PRESIDENT: Robert Olson
- V PRESIDENT: Lorne C. Kramer
- TREASURER: Edward Flynn
- SECRETARY: Dean Esserman
- AT-LARGE: John Timoney
- AT-LARGE: Paul Evans
- AT-LARGE: Vacant
- EX-OFFICIO: Michael Berkley

EXECUTE DIRECTIONS


For information on Verizon Wireless’ products and services, visit them on the web at www.VerizonWireless.com

For information on Motorola’s products and services, visit them on the web at www.Motorola.com