
REDUCING PUB HOPPING AND RELATED CRIME

by

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Abstract: *The central business district of a service city often provides entertainment for the whole region, which may result in high rates of drunkenness, assault, vandalism and burglary. Such was the case for Geelong, the second largest city in the state of Victoria, Australia. Groups of youths would "pub hop" among numerous establishments serving liquor within the central business district. This led to fights, intimidation and a variety of crime and incivility. In 1989-90, together with the Liquor Commission and hotel licensees (publicans), the police led a cooperative effort — the Accord — to stop pub hopping. The Accord required cover charges to enter after 11:00 p.m., and removed exemptions for young women who were used to lure crowds of young men. The Accord prohibited unlimited reentry when a cover was paid, thus discouraging movement among establishments. It banned special promotional prices for alcoholic drinks, including "happy hours." Police patrolled and enforced pro-*

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insions against underage drinkers and drinking in the streets, not to increase arrests but rather in the spirit of "problem-oriented" policing. The Accord made serving policies universal in order to discourage those who were under age or already drunk from moving about in search of a weak link. The initiative was apparently followed by a major decline in pub hopping, along with a relative reduction in serious assault rates.

INTRODUCTION

Many experts are convinced that situational factors play an important role in the relationship between alcohol use and crime (see Felson et al., 1986; Lasley, 1989.) As noted by Tomsen et al. (1991):

"Aggression studies...have come to reject the notion that it is merely the pharmacological effects of alcohol that result in aggressive behavior... Situational factors such as an all-male setting, group drinking and stressful surroundings are now considered important..." (p. 179).

For a significant group of crimes, alcohol probably makes its greatest contribution via drinking in public places (see Stockwell, this volume). Public drinking is a social problem spanning nations and even continents. The presence of bars, taverns and hotels that serve alcohol is part of the problem. For example, an Australian study of assault and break-ins in Waverley, near Sydney (Devery, 1992), found that blocks containing such establishments have 25 times their share of assaults relative to blocks containing none. Brantingham and Brantingham (1981) report that proximity to "tough" bars in a Canadian town is an excellent predictor of crime against property and businesses. In the U.S., both Roncek and Maier (1991) and Roncek and Pravatiner (1989) showed that blocks containing a bar or tavern were significantly more at risk of property crime. A link between alcohol-outlet density and assaultive violence is also reported by Scribner et al.,(1995), while Homel and Clarke (1994) offer a substantial literature review on alcohol policy and violence linked to drinking places.

Barrooms are often at the center of the public drunkenness problem (see Homel and Tomsen, 1991). They generate crime not

only on streets and in nearby areas, but also within the premises themselves (see Graham, 1980; Sacco and Kennedy, 1994). Barrooms have been the focus of study by Tomsen et al. (1991), whose work considered drinking establishments in Sydney, AUS. Starting in April 1989, small groups of observers made field visits to different pubs, clubs and nightclubs. Although it was a small-scale study, the researchers were able to measure several situational aspects of public drinking places, including patron type, social atmosphere, drinking behavior and staff behavior. Typical patrons were young, working-class males. Male groups tended to produce conflicts more readily than female groups, especially when clusters of males were strangers to one another. A "rough" atmosphere, however, was not as good a predictor of violence as had been expected. When patron movement, bumping and shoving were low, there was usually minimal aggression and violence. Entertained crowds were less bored and drank at a slower pace. On the other hand, large crowds lacking seating tended to feel discomfort that led to problems. Patrons tended to relieve discomfort by drinking more, with aggressive reactions following. These problems were enhanced by barroom designs that caused patrons to bump into one other.

Continuing research by Homel and associates in Surfers' Paradise, a resort area south of Brisbane, yields similar findings (see Homel and colleagues, this volume). This study also indicates that it is possible to reduce barroom violence by modifying conditions in licensed premises. Of particular relevance to the current paper, Surfers' Paradise is also characterized by many establishments in relatively close proximity, producing great potential for street conflicts as groups move among drinking establishments.

This paper investigates a crime problem for which public drinking is an important component. In so doing, it describes efforts at situational prevention in the central business district of the City of Geelong, located on the Victorian coastline southwest of Melbourne. With a population of approximately 200,000, the City of Greater Geelong is the largest in Victoria outside Melbourne. Major industries in the region include wool, poultry, horticulture and wine. Greater Geelong has a young population, with 61.4% below 40 years of age; 15% are aged 20 to 29 years. (City of Greater Geelong, 1994a; City of Greater Geelong, 1994b).

Public drinking in Australia has some important features that contribute to crime problems. Not all of these features are found together in other nations, so we list them and offer a brief expla-

nation. First, although there are several types of liquor licenses, as Table 1 indicates, the central business district overrepresents certain types. Specifically, hotels, bars and clubs ("taverns" in American parlance) provide an atmosphere oriented toward alcohol and entertainment.

Second, many of these places are very large in size. As Table 2 indicates, one bar holds 900 patrons and seven hold 500 or more customers. In Central Geelong, 14 major hotels and bars serve more than 6,400 patrons in all. Third, these bars often draw patrons from a very narrow age range (18-30 years). This means that large crowds of youths are frequently drawn together within the central business district. Fourth, much of the drinking occurs outside, including between and among cars and pubs.¹ This spreads the control problem over more space and puts roving bands of drinkers into contact with one another, as well as with various crime targets. It also allows older patrons to pass drinks on to younger ones (i.e., those under age 18).

Fifth, these bars have very late hours, a few opening 24 hours or well into the next day (e.g., 7 a.m.), and have different closing times. Thus the social control problem spreads over time as well as downtown space. Sixth, individuals frequently drink in groups in which persons take turns buying drinks for all the others. This practice is known as "shouting," and each turn is known as a "shout." One of the consequences of the shout is to encourage many drinkers to drink more than they otherwise would (see Jackson, 1994). Thus, a group of four enters a bar, and each has to buy a round and drink four drinks. If the group goes to another bar, the cycle is completed one more time, resulting in a lot of intoxicated people moving among bars.²

BACKGROUND TO THE GEELONG ACCORD

In Victoria and throughout Australia, pressure on resources has led police to seek creative solutions to pub hopping and crime, and to think about prevention issues. One approach is to make cooperative agreements addressing problems of violence in and near licensed premises. These agreements focus on management, promotional practices, security, staff responsibilities, underage drinking, as well as service and entertainment policies that have an impact upon crime.

Table 1: Distribution of Liquor Licenses According to License Type, Greater Geelong District, Geelong Sub-District, and Geelong Central Business District, 1994

License type	Location of Licenses		
	Geelong Area ^a	Geelong ^b	Geelong CBD ^c
Full-license club ^d	39	22	3
Restricted club ^e	79	39	0
Licensed restaurants ^f	88	57	28
Public houses (hotels & bars) ^g	66	48	21
Packaged liquor	41	29	5
TOTAL^h	313	195	57

Source: Liquor Licensing Commission

- (a) This consists of the "K" District, Number 1 Division, including Anglesea, Birregurra, Drysdale, Geelong, Lome, Ocean Grove, Portarlington, Queenscliff, Torquay and Winchelsea.
- (b) This consists of the Geelong Sub-District.
- (c) Central Business District, bounded by Latrobe Terrace, McKillop Street, Belerine Street and Corio Bay Foreshore.
- (d) Full club licenses, allowing sale to members of the club for consumption and off premises, and to guests or authorized gaming visitors for consumption on premises.
- (e) Limited licenses add terms and conditions specified by the commission, for example, a specific occasion or activity.
- (f) These on-premises licenses are for restaurants and entertainment.
- (g) Includes General License Classes 1 and 2. Both allow selling liquor for consumption on the premises. The first also allows selling for consumption off the premises. Examples of the first are hotels and bars. Note that the word "hotel" in much of Australia refers to places that serve liquor rather than those that offer lodging.
- (h) Excluded are: (1) on-premises licenses that are for business or facilities primarily providing conferences, sporting events, cultural or educational programs, catering, tourist or other activities approved by the Minister; (2) annual limited licenses; (3) "Bring Your Own" (BYO) permits; (4) producer's or distributor's licenses; (5) residential licenses; (6) vigneron's licenses; and (7) Class 2 general licenses (hotels and public houses). In all, the table omits 139 licenses for the Geelong area; 74 for Geelong; and 30 for the Geelong CBD.

Table 2: Description of Fourteen Major Hotels and Clubs in or Proximate to the Geelong Central Business District

Hotel or Club	Opened Until	Persons Permitted
Lyric Night Club	5 a.m.	900
Golf View Hotel	3 a.m.	760
Platinum Night Club	7 a.m.	633
Preston Hotel (Rebar N'Club)	24 hours	588
Waurt Ponds Hotel	3 a.m.	500
Bay International Hotel	1 a.m.	500
Eureka Hotel	3 a.m.	500
Geelong Hotel	3 a.m.	482
Ocean Child Hotel	3 a.m.	300
Grovedale Hotel	3 a.m.	300
Zulu Dance Bar	7 a.m.	280
Argyle Hotel	1 a.m.	260
Queens Head Hotel	3 a.m.	250
Lord of the Isles Hotel	3 a.m.	200
Total		6,453 persons

Source: Vin McDermott, Regional Manager, Liquor Licensing Commission of Victoria, Barwon-South Western Office, Geelong.

The first of these various agreements arose in Melbourne, the largest city in Victoria, through the efforts of the Victorian Community Council Against Violence (CCAV). Formed in 1989, the CCAV recognized that (1) a variety of strategies — immediate and long-term — were required to address violence, and (2) such strategies should be specific to the problems faced by each locality. In 1990, the CCAV put forth 21 recommendations, including

creation of the "West End Forum" to deal with violence in Melbourne's late-night entertainment district (CCAV, 1990).

Satisfied with the positive contribution of the forum, the CCAV recommended that similar programs be instituted elsewhere to reduce crime in entertainment areas. Geelong's numerous licensed premises and associated violence drew attention to it as an appropriate city for a similar program (see James et al., 1993). On June 5, 1990, the Barwon Police Community Consultative Committee (PCCC), covering Geelong and the surrounding area, hosted a forum of hotel licensees, police, and other interested community groups and individuals to discuss violence in and around licensed premises. The forum enabled the community to discuss alcohol and violence issues with the publicans. Speakers at the forum included members of the CCAV, a representative of the Australian Hoteliers Association (AHA) and local licensee and a Geelong nightclub security manager. One outcome was a "Venues against Violence" strategy (the "Accord") in Geelong, modeled after the West End Forum.⁵ This experience informed further development, including the 1991 Code of Practice and the 1993 Accord, to be described below.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM

Geelong's general problem was "bar hopping." Clusters of young people, mostly male and largely intoxicated, moved by car and on foot among clubs and cars within the central business district (CBD). This general problem had at least four components:

- (1) underage drinking,
- (2) additional drinking by those already drunk,
- (3) drinking outside, and
- (4) moving outside while drunk.

In Geelong, youths would often participate in the following sequence of activity, or something approximating it:

- (1) drive to a packaged liquor outlet to purchase beer,
- (2) park within the CBD and drink inside the car for an initial effect,
- (3) go into the nearest bar to take advantage of "specials" (such as happy hour prices),

- (4) move around the CBD by foot or car in search of other bars with "specials" and
- (5) go back to the car and drink more beer, using the empties as missiles to throw at people or property.

The idea was to provide specials to young women in order to attract more men to the bar. Establishments requiring cover charges allowed unlimited re-entries, making it easy for customers to hunt from bar to bar for excitement, specials, girls, and non-enforcement of liquor laws.

The net effect was that intoxicated youths would be on the streets and in cars, bar hopping and creating a variety of police problems. These included property crimes and violent crimes, as well as crimes of public order. The property crimes comprised vandalism, thefts, and burglaries against local businesses; the violent crimes, fights inside and outside bars, with other youths, publicans, and police, and occasional attacks on other citizens. Disorder crimes included public drunkenness, urinating in the streets, making loud noises, intimidating others, and driving under the influence of alcohol within the CBD and on the way home. Police regularly arrested 15 to 20 public drunks every Friday and Saturday night, and, in general, crime rates in the CBD were unacceptably high.

THE PUBLICAN'S ROLE IN GENERATING THE PROBLEM

Many of the problems in Geelong were created in part by the publicans themselves. In many cases, very drunk people were served more drinks when they should have been refused service. Happy hours and other "specials" encouraged heavy drinking, and unlimited reentries after cover charges were paid enhanced the movement of intoxicated groups.

The CBD was becoming increasingly dangerous. More problems were occurring inside and outside bars. Meanwhile, the recession was reducing business and intensifying competition. It appeared that the publicans in the CBD were caught in a vicious cycle in which each individual business needed to behave irresponsibly in order to compete, while together they were threatening the very source of their income. If this continued, the CBD would become so dangerous that even young customers would stop frequenting it (see Felson, 1983, on how crime can grow to destroy an ecological niche for business). Moreover, the danger to

employees was beginning to reach an intolerable level, while the costs of promotions (e.g., free drinks) were hard to sustain.

THE CORE POLICY

In 1993, the police cooperated with the Liquor Licensing Commission and the publicans to develop a policy: the Accord. Its focus was the movement of patrons among bars and cars. It sought to reduce the mass of intoxicated people circulating within the CBD. The Accord attempted to reduce overall alcohol consumption as well as to contain that consumption within safer settings. Arrests and prosecutions were not the main tool of this form of social control. Rather, the initiative was a form of containment, not seeking to ban alcohol consumption but rather to minimize its harm.

The heart of the policy in Geelong consisted of two provisions:⁴

- (1) cover charges to *enter* bars after 11 p.m. (if they have live entertainment after 1:00 a.m.)
- (2) denial of free reentry for those who had *exited*.

These provisions were designed to make bar hopping costly, and to encourage customers to remain inside. Cover charges were applied equally to everybody, including attractive young women.

A second set of policy provisions would contribute to the same goal, while also reducing excessive drinking. These were:

- (3) no free drinks,
- (4) limitations on promotions,⁵
- (5) no extended happy hours and
- (6) uniform minimum price per drink (based on AHA standard).

Free drinks were denied not only to get people to drink less, but also to remove any incentive to pub hop in search of these drinks or the women most likely to receive them. The absence of promotions (such as two drinks for one) would reduce the incentive to drink excessively. Although happy hours after work (e.g., 5:00 to 7:00 p.m.) continued in Geelong, the new provision prevented extending these to later hours. This was intended to reduce overall levels of drunkenness, but could also reduce the incentive to leave a bar when a happy hour ended to go to another where it was still in progress.

The sixth provision (which did not appear in the written Accord) is especially interesting. Higher price per drink alone would serve to reduce alcohol consumption and hence the level of drunkenness. More relevant to the current paper is the uniformity in minimum drink price within the CBD and over the evening, reducing the incentive to bar hop in search of a better price. Agreements by businesses to fix prices is illegal in many countries, including Australia under the Trade Practices Act. However, the fixed price was the minimum allowable, and prices were still free to go above the minimum. The involvement of police, the Liquor Licensing Commission and the presence of an overall public interest can be taken into account in deciding whether such pricing is legal. More uniform pricing not only serves to prevent bar hopping and concomitant problems, but offers a major incentive for publicans to join in and support the policy.

SUPPLEMENTARY POLICY

Participants supplemented the Accord with additional law enforcement principally designed not to arrest people but to reduce bar hopping. These significant police activities included:

- (7) enforcing bylaws against drinking or possession of open liquor containers on the streets,
- (8) seizing faked, altered, or borrowed ID cards misused by young people and
- (9) issuing summons for use of illegal ID cards.

The planners anticipated that laws against drinking on the streets would be easier to enforce in combination with the other policies. Attempts to arrest large crowds of youths might have provoked a riot. However, it is not so difficult to enforce such laws against smaller numbers. Seizing ID cards helped reduce problems on the night of seizure and on future nights, with such efforts are normally directed toward one person at a time. Underage drinking was also reduced in the long term by contacting illegal card users, and requesting their presence at the police station to discuss the matter and then a written apology. When learner-driving permits (non-photographic identification, available at age 17 years and 9 months) were used for illegal entry to bars, the police would contact the state licensing authority requesting that the permit not be reissued.

In addition, the policy encouraged using photographic identification (Government Proof-of-Age cards for those 18 years and over) to thwart underage entry and drinking at licensed premises. The Co-ordinating Council on Control of Liquor Abuse (CCCLA) recommended changes in the Liquor Control Act to clearly define proof-of-age requirements, and to include offenses for use or abetting the use of fraudulent identification (CCCLA, 1993). It also recommended that Proof-of-Age cards be reissued only once, to prevent abuse of the system. None of these supplementary policies were designed to arrest youths, but rather to talk to them or otherwise discourage their continued illegal entry into bars.

There was also a concern about the large number of underage youths clustered outside bars, some of whom managed to enter or to have drinks passed to them by those who entered, legally or not. The CCCLA determined that quality entertainment and alcohol are the main factors attracting these underage persons. Although the policy did not intend to provide them with the latter, it did consider that teenagers need some place to go for entertainment and social life. For this reason, the following provision was added:

- (10) alcohol-free entertainment provided for underage youths on selected licensed premises.

These blue-light discos offered legal "nightclub" entertainment for those underage. Finally, the policy included:

- (11) calling taxis or friends for rides home.
- (12) uniform adherence to liquor laws by service personnel.

By arranging rides home, publicans could help keep intoxicated persons off the streets. Responsible service of alcohol includes requiring photo identification (to verify age) and refusing service to those already intoxicated. However, these rules are readily evaded when patrons can go from pub to pub in search of a weak spot, contributing to pub hopping by youths and those heavily intoxicated. When the service rules are enforced *uniformly* (e.g., all patrons in all pubs are required to have photo identification cards and no intoxicated persons are served in any pub), the result is to enhance prevention.

In sum, Geelong formulated a 12-point policy for preventing bar hopping, and reducing violence and other crime in and around licensed premises.⁶ However, the policy was not presented in this order or even with this number of provisions. The planners

added some other provisions (not mentioned here) to gain support and facilitate implementation.

IMPLEMENTING THE ACCORD

The police, the Liquor Licensing Commission and all of the publicans in the area cooperated in supporting the Geelong Accord. The police organized and led the process, presenting the policy to publicans in a non-authoritarian manner. However, the police and the Liquor Licensing Commission maintained a "hidden stick" — the ability to investigate and ultimately close down businesses. Moreover, regular reviews of licenses by police and decisions of the Commission could deny publicans changes they might seek. The policy included several "carrots," such as higher prices and the money to be made from cover charges, as well as reduced dangers of assault and property damage. Built into implementation were continuing meetings and consultations via the Best Practices Committee. Finally, the police offered assistance in smoothing out problems such as a shortage of late-night taxis.

There was a determined effort to bring publicans into the process. The one or two who did not attend the first meeting quickly joined that process after the others had agreed to it. Nonetheless, police continued to watch to make sure that pubs were complying and spoke to the owners if they were not.

Initially, licensees were concerned with the changes the Accord would force upon them. They feared that new practices would drive away customers and cause the pubs to lose money. Some were concerned about how to compete under the Accord. However, licensees were well aware that assaults and other criminal activity in the entertainment zone were also a threat to their business and made implementation of the Accord vital.

After the introduction of the Accord, the police sources indicated a 100% increase in door takings at nightclubs, and a 160% increase in overall revenue during the first 12 months. This increase was probably the result of denying free entry or reentry, adding cover charges after 11 p.m., ending specials and setting minimum prices for drinks at AHA levels.

RESULTS

More is known about the process of the Accord than about its results, for which there are both "soft" and "hard" data. On the

soft side, those concerned with the problem observed major improvements, including declines in crime and damage within the CBD. The police reported that young people were going home earlier and problems were far fewer. The crowds of intoxicated youths moving about the CBD were no longer evident in such numbers. This does not mean that nobody got drunk or that crime vanished, but it did indicate that drunken groups of youths were less likely to form at night in the CBD. The soft data indicate that young people were still attracted to Geelong but apparently did not get in as much trouble while there.

The hard data were unfortunately not for all offenses and not focused upon the CBD. These data include comparisons of serious assault rates per 100,000 population for Greater Geelong and for the metropolitan area of six other relatively large Victorian cities (Warrnambool, Mildura, Ballarat, Bendigo, Wangaratta and Morwell). The Greater Geelong area includes the Geelong K district, with 16 smaller towns or police subdistricts, and townships within 100 kilometers or so of Geelong itself. Similar metropolitan data are combined for the six other cities to produce a mean rate, which is taken as a baseline for comparing Greater Geelong's rates. Data applying exclusively to crime within the CBD are lacking. However, the Geelong problem was largely centralized within the CBD, so that any major improvement there should show up strongly in the Greater Geelong serious assault rates.

The rates are presented in Table 3 for each of five "seasons," beginning with 1988-89 and ending with 1992-93. During these periods the rate for the other cities went upward, except for 1989-90. The rate for Greater Geelong went down the season the Accord was implemented, and continued to decline over the next few years. A slight rise in Greater Geelong's 1991-92 rate was offset by a continued decline in 1992-93.

The third column of Table 3 is especially illustrative. It gives the ratio of Greater Geelong's serious assault rate to the baseline rates drawn from the six other cities. That ratio was 1.52 in 1988-89, indicating that Greater Geelong's serious assault rate had been 52% higher than the comparison rate. As the Accord was put into place, the ratio declined to 1.0. This means that Geelong's serious assault rate was now the same as the comparison rate. In subsequent seasons there were slight declines, until 1992-93, when Geelong's rate declined to only 63% of the comparison rate. Thus, a city known for its high level of crime had, at least for assaultive violence, witnessed a noteworthy reduction in

that rate. Although there were some increases in the serious assault rates of the six other Victorian cities, these rates did not rise to the 117 serious assaults per 100,000 seen in Geelong in 1988-89. To be sure, these crime rates do not apply strictly to Geelong's CBD, and hence are an imperfect indicator of change. As always, it is difficult to determine cause and effect in these data, but it is at least plausible to argue that the Accord played a role in crime prevention. The fact that these data on serious assault cover an area much larger than Geelong's CBD could be expected to dilute rather than exaggerate the Accord's effect, limited as the latter was to the central part of the city.

MAINTENANCE OF THE ACCORD

The Accord is managed by the Best Practices Committee. After three years of operation, the Geelong Accord continues to have its bimonthly meetings, well attended by representatives of the Liquor Licensing Commission, the Geelong Council, police, licensees, and sometimes other interested parties. These are not basically public meetings, but neither are they entirely closed. The Accord is based on a policy of self-regulation and cooperation between licensees and police. The Best Practices Committee looks at issues from the viewpoint of all interested parties. Our sense is that the police have some extra power in maintaining the Accord, but that they try to be diplomatic and to avoid a heavy-handed approach.

Table 3: Serious Assault Rates Per 100,000 Population, Geelong, Victoria, Australia, Compared to Mean Rates for Six Other Victoria Cities, 1989-1993.

Year	Rate for Geelong (1)	Mean for Six Other Victorian Cities (2)	Ratio of (1) to (2) (3)
1988-89	117	77	1.52
1989-90	73	73	1.00
1990-91	69	87	0.79
1991-92	72	91	0.79
1992-93	64	101	0.63

Note: see text for discussion of data.

Source: Edward, 1994.

CONCLUSIONS

The value of this project is largely contained in its analytic, problem-solving approach. This is why we may view the initiative as an example of problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990). The Accord focused upon the routine activities of getting drunk and how these activities were organized. It drew attention to bar hopping as a major contributor to the problem. This approach made sense for solving the problem at hand, and apparently helped reduce it. At the very least, the Accord's provisions are explicit enough to allow more exacting tests in the future.

In any case, we shall always remember how one senior policeman described this policy effort: "We are engineering the late-night environment." What is perhaps most significant about this is that the police, while not abandoning law enforcement, defined that traditional role as secondary and focused instead upon crime prevention. We might also view this as an excellent example of situational prevention (see Clarke, 1995). It also fits well with larger fields such as the "ecology of aggression" (A. Goldstein, 1994) and environmental criminology (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1991). As our understanding of prevention becomes more focused and localized, the Geelong example and other prevention innovations from Australia will fit into a larger picture.

Some people might claim that this is a negative form of social engineering, since one is trying to get people to do something they would not otherwise do. Before accepting that conclusion, take into account Tremblay's (1986) point that public and private actions may actually design crime into everyday life. Specifically, we should ask ourselves whether previous liquor control policies and business practices had not already engineered a dangerous form of pub hopping and produced in the process crime problems that later required a remedy. Why should we consider drunken pub hopping as a natural human behavior and interference with that as unnatural? Does it make just as much sense to think of this as a case in which prior policies had designed more crime, but new policies removed that design? As long as we are designing public policies, why not design some that are safe rather than dangerous, for those involved in alcohol consumption as well as for the rest of the populace?

NOTES

1. We do not deny that alcohol produces problems in many settings, but we focus on streets and cars in this paper. The point of situational prevention is to slice problems into workable pieces (See Clarke, 1995).
2. A referee of this paper commented that the "shout" is a fairly restricted practice today, not rigidly adhered to by young people.
3. An (A) \$50,000 grant from the Victorian Ministry of Police and Emergency Services to the Barwon PCCC may have played a role, at least indirectly, in subsequent developments.
4. In this paper, we filter the Accord document and discussions through our own analytical perspective and interest in crime prevention. Due to open discussion in an Accord meeting, minimum prices for drinks are treated as policy, even if not part of the written Accord.
5. There remain some ways for some customers to circumvent limitations on promotions with industry cards or special memberships.
6. Two other policies are worth noting: staggered closing times and a cap on new license applications or extensions of hours. Their complex implications merit further analysis.



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