
SITUATING CRIME PREVENTION: MODELS, METHODS AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

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Abstract: This paper provides a commentary on the politics surrounding different crime prevention models and methods. It argues that conflating particular models with particular methods can unnecessarily undermine the acceptance of certain approaches as being appropriate "crime prevention" interventions. The paper presents three abstract models of crime prevention—conservative, liberal and radical—and discusses how diverse methods can be separated from these models, and need to be examined, understood, and used in broader political context.

The aim of this paper is to explore different models of crime prevention as a means to highlight important theoretical and political issues that too often remain submerged in "practical" discussions of the merits or otherwise of particular strategies and techniques. It will be demonstrated that "crime prevention" in general is not a uniform or homogeneous area of conceptual development and policy orientation. Rather, ingrained in the very process of designing crime prevention strategies are certain core assumptions and political choices. Acknowledgement of these is essential if we are to make sense of existing and potential conflicts within the field, and evaluate the impact of particular approaches as adopted by criminal justice authorities.

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MODELS OF CRIME PREVENTION

Crime prevention is contentious. Different people have different conceptions as to what it ought to refer, and different agendas in terms of the kinds of organisational and philosophical objectives they are trying to meet. To appreciate the nature of these differences it is useful to consider three abstract models of crime prevention (see Figure 1). Each model identifies the key focus and concepts of a particular approach, preferred strategies of intervention, dominant conception of "crime," the role of the "community" as part of the crime prevention effort, and relationship to "law-and-order" strategies. In devising these models I have drawn upon the work of Iadicola (1986), McNamara (1992), and Cunneen and White (1995), and have concentrated mainly on those community-based strategies that attempt to stop offending behaviour before it occurs.

The models presented below are "ideal types" in the sense of being one-sided and exaggerated examples of broad outlooks on crime prevention (see Freund, 1969). They are, nevertheless, based upon actual cases and real programs. As is always the case with ideal types, however, the substantive work of specific writers or the insights provided in particular approaches (e.g., crime prevention through environmental design, situational prevention) do not necessarily conform in their entirety to one or another of the abstract models. In practice, few researchers and criminal justice officials restrict their attention to just one particular model or perspective, but instead draw upon a wide range of ideas and practices associated with the different models. The models are useful in that they do reflect broad tendencies at the practical and policy level, and they alert us to significant strengths and weaknesses in existing strategies.

In addition to allowing us to distill certain key elements of crime prevention that are evident in existing field-based approaches, the models also highlight the *political differences* within criminology and the criminal justice system. As such, the models are sometimes drawn upon, implicitly or explicitly, as a rationale for accepting or rejecting particular methods or techniques associated with crime prevention. In other words, the models themselves (regardless of theoretical efficacy or explanatory power) can be used *ideologically* to create boundaries between and around particular intervention techniques and philosophical legitimacies. A conservative thus may reject certain methods because of their presumed association with liberal or radical styles of crime prevention. Conversely,

a radical may reject other techniques simply on the grounds that they appear to form an essential part of the conservative approach.

These are important issues, for it could well be argued that this *conflation of theoretical model with practical method* is potentially damaging in a number of ways. First, from an analytical perspective, it means that the contextual nature of community crime prevention gets lost in terms of specific ideological content or political connotation. We are presented with a scenario that says this model and this technique are necessarily conservative, liberal or radical—regardless of human intent, local conditions, history of an area or population group, or general political-economic circumstances.

Second, such a conflation can have particular consequences in relation to the politics of crime prevention generally. For example, such rigid and sharp distinctions between perspectives (and related methods of primary choice) can provide easy ground for the general retreat from discussions of ideology and values by those who see themselves first and foremost as "neutral," "scientific" and "professional" in their crime prevention endeavours. Indeed, there appears to be a tendency in much conventional crime prevention discourse to, in effect, exclude discussion or acknowledgement of the politics of crime prevention altogether (e.g., see Clarke, 1992; and, for further comment, Sutton, this volume).

On the other hand, where ideological and political difference is more overtly addressed, there may be an inclination to create a dichotomy between approaches—such as crime prevention versus social development. While the differences here are explicitly recognised and dealt with, the end result may substantially be the same as those cases where the political implications of one's crime prevention approach are not formally acknowledged. Thus, theoretical demarcations of this nature can cloud over the issue of choice of methods. This occurs when particular methods are associated in simplistic and narrow fashion with specific political stances, and excluded on the basis of their tie to a particular ideological framework (e.g., see Coventry et al., 1992).

The politics of crime prevention is of crucial concern in terms of the means and goals that we adopt in making the world a safer and better place. Accordingly, how we construe crime prevention politics has significant ramifications for how we ultimately intervene at a practical level. But for the moment, let us turn to a brief examination of three crime prevention models. The models have been devised to reflect the major political divisions within criminological theory generally (see White and Haines,

1996), and are based upon previous reviews of concrete programs, practices and strategies in the crime prevention field (see Iadicola, 1986; McNamara, 1992; Cunneen and White, 1995).

Figure 1: Models of Crime Prevention

Conservative Model of Crime Prevention	
Key Concept	crime control
Main Strategy	opportunity reduction
Main Crime Focus	conventional "street" crime
Concept of Criminality	rational choice
Crime Response	protection, surveillance
Role of Community	auxilliary to police
Limitations	based on social exclusion, narrow definition of crime
Liberal Model of Crime Prevention	
Key Concept	social problem
Main Strategy	opportunity enhancement
Main Crime Focus	conventional "street" crime
Concept of Criminality	individual or social pathology
Crime Response	correct deficits, improve opportunities
Role of Community	self-help, community development
Limitations	based on limited resources, narrow definition of crime
Radical Model of Crime Prevention	
Key Concept	social justice
Main Strategy	political struggle
Main Crime Focus	crimes of the powerful, conventional "street crime"
Concept of Criminality	marginalisation, social alienation, market competition
Crime Response	social empowerment, reduce inequality
Role of Community	social change agents
Limitations	based on shared consciousness/solidarity, wide definition of crime

Conservative

The traditional or conservative model of crime prevention starts from the premise that the basic issue is one of crime *control*. It is founded upon the notion that the key issue is adherence to the law, and that law enforcement and crime prevention should therefore be directed at addressing potential and current violations of the law. Crime is ultimately seen as a matter of incentives and deterrents. Basically, this model combines elements of classical criminological theory (with an emphasis on voluntarism and personal responsibility) with rational choice theory (which sees human behaviour primarily in terms of calculated perceptions of the costs and benefits of particular courses of action). The solution to crime is to increase the costs and *reduce the opportunities* for the commission of crime, and to increase the likelihood of detection.

In order to reduce opportunity, this perspective is usually linked to measures that are designed, first, to increase *surveillance* in the public domain (e.g., on the street, in the workplace, on public transport) through police patrols, citizen watch committees, closed-circuit cameras and confidential hotlines; and, second, to build better *protection* into existing and new buildings, major complexes and residential areas through innovative design techniques, target hardening, and private security agencies.

The model generally does not rest upon a sophisticated notion regarding the causes of crime (particularly with respect to specific patterns of criminality associated with particular social groups). Rather, it abstractly assumes that crime is a matter of choice and opportunity, and therefore open for anyone to pursue given the right circumstances. Most of the model's practical application is in the areas of *conventional crime* or "street crime," and workplace crime involving low-level theft, pilfering and passing on of confidential information. Issues relating to corporate crime would revolve around the actions of particular individuals, not the overall context and activities of business generally.

Traditional crime control measures rely upon members of the community playing an *auxiliary role* in support of official law enforcement agencies. The "community" ought to be part of the eyes and ears of the police, and merely assist their crime control efforts. Citizen participation is channelled through official committees (such as police-community consultative committees, neighbourhood watch committees, etc.) that are,

and under this model ought to be, predominantly police-led and that reflect a crime control agenda.

The limitations of this model are, first, the narrow definition of crime and criminality that ignores the material differences in a situation that may influence individual and group behaviour; and, second, its reinforcement of a general climate of fear of crime and suspicion of others, thus fragmenting communities. In particular, such an approach tends to be based upon *social exclusion* insofar as it privileges those who have the means to buy protection and surveillance, and to target those who do not.

Politically, such a model tends to be complementary to the "law-and-order" enforcement agenda, with an emphasis on maintenance of public order and protection of private property, and a perception that criminality is at least in part due to lack of individual self-control and lack of respect for authority. The "broken windows" argument proposed by Wilson and Kelling (1982) in the U.S., which deals with issues of suppressing symptoms of disorder and cycles of urban decline, provides an example of an approach that is redolent with the ideas of the conservative model of crime prevention. This type of approach can readily justify selective attention on certain types of behaviour and activity, and on particular population groups. The emphasis is on control and exclusion.

Liberal

The mainstream, or liberal, approach to crime prevention views crime as a *social problem* linked to particular individual deficits and group disadvantages. It is based upon the idea that people, rather than crime control, should be the starting point for change, and that reform is needed at the level of individual and collective circumstance. In essence, this perspective views the issue as one of *opportunity enhancement* for those people who have been in some way divorced from adequate or appropriate work and school opportunities.

The main focus in this perspective is on "at-risk" individuals and groups who exhibit some sign of propensity to engage in conventional crime. After identifying those people who have or are most likely to engage in this sort of crime, the strategy is to intervene to correct the *pathology* at the heart of the problem. This may be directed at fixing personal defects (e.g., dealing with drug addiction) and/or attempting to introduce pro-

grams that tap into problems affecting a whole community of people (e.g., an intensive literacy program for non-English-speaking migrants).

This model borrows from theories such as biological and psychological explanations (generally oriented toward attributes of the individual), strain theory (with an emphasis on the disjuncture between cultural goals and structural means to attain these), labelling theory (where positive self-esteem is linked to personal resources and the nature of state intervention in one's life), and some (later) forms of left realism (which emphasise multi-agency approaches at a local level). The difference between the criminal and the non-criminal is one dictated by biological, psychological and social circumstance.

Improving opportunity for individuals and groups means early intervention and concerted efforts to get communities to use their own resources to improve social and economic conditions. The "community" is seen as a resource in its own right, and the idea is to *mobilise community members* in a range of self-help measures such as volunteer sports programs, social groups, camps, leisure activities and so on. This may require the assistance of professional community workers, specially trained police officers and social workers, and financial aid in the form of short-term government grants for training or recreation projects. As such, the approach endorses a *community development* perspective with respect to the issue of crime prevention—one which rests upon multi-agency cooperation and the sharing of ideas and resources.

The limitations of this model are, first, that it tends to deal only with conventional crime, and, second, that it does not question the reasons why there is inequality to begin with, and why some people are especially disadvantaged under the present social system. More fundamentally, this approach tends to be restricted solely to *local initiatives*, and thus is severely limited in accessing the material resources necessary to transform the life chances and opportunities of people and communities.

Politically, the model tends to run counter to or to challenge many aspects of the law-and-order response to crime and crime control. It is proactive in nature, and operationally oriented toward *problem-solving* rather than dealing with the specific instances of crime per se. The work of Coventry et al. (1992) in Australia, which deals with issues of youth crime prevention, constitutes an approach that basically encapsulates many of the ideas of the liberal model. Here the emphasis is on providing "developmental" types of program for young people, and openly acknowledging the problems of "disadvantage" in designing any type of state or

non-government intervention in the lives of the young. The approach is oriented toward institutional reform and better resource allocation.

Radical

The radical, or conflict, model of crime prevention sees law and order as an arena of *political struggle*. Crime and criminality is historically and socially constructed, and is best understood as reflecting structural social divisions and inequalities. It is most closely associated with Marxist criminological theory (which sees class analysis as central to an understanding of crime under capitalism), feminist criminological theory (with gender relations and power differentials the major focus), and critical criminology (referring here to perspectives that examine the oppression and marginalisation of groups on the basis of class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and race). The key concept is that of fundamental social change, which should be directed at enhancing the material well-being, social rights and decision-making power of the majority in society.

The biggest crime is seen to be that of economic *inequality* and social and economic *marginalisation*. These are seen to affect specific categories of women, ethnic minority groups and the working class in particularly negative and entrenched ways, and to fundamentally shape the social patterns of criminality, the interventions of the criminal justice system, and the processes associated with victimisation. Both conventional crime and crimes of the powerful are seen to stem from entrenched power relations favouring those who own and control the means of production and thus the overall allocation of community resources. Rather than focusing on aspects of crime control, or individual or group adjustment to existing structural conditions, this model favours an approach that challenges the basis of marginalisation, social alienation and market-driven competition.

The goal is one of *socialjustice*, the linchpin to addressing many of the problems associated with street crime, corporate crime and crimes of the state. Socialjustice in this context refers to achieving structural changes in the organisation of basic social institutions and in the allocation of community resources. Rather than studying social problems in terms of their impact on specific individuals (e.g., the "poor" as a focus for research or programme development), this model examines the relationship between groups (e.g., the rich and the poor) and attempts to address the

structural imbalances and inequalities that give rise to the problem (e.g., of poverty) in the first place.

The main strategies favoured by this model therefore include action to *reduce inequality* through such measures as redistribution of community resources and reallocation of wealth (e.g., via taxation and nationalisation), and to encourage *social empowerment* by democratising all facets of community life (e.g., in the workplace, at the local neighbourhood level, in the household), including areas such as policing and crime prevention. Addressing the specific problem of crime means actively intervening on wider issues of political and economic importance, as well as organising community members to exercise control over their safety and well-being at the local level. This includes action being taken on issues such as pollution; inadequate public transport, housing, or educational facilities; sexual harassment; racist violence; and problems related to conventional crime and antisocial behaviour. Community members are seen as crucial agents of social change in their own right.

The limitations of this model are, first, that there invariably is resistance to any strategy that challenges the status quo (including that exerted by state officials such as the police), and, second, communities are often fractured ideologically into many different groups that do not share the same beliefs and attitudes about social justice or the same perceptions regarding appropriate crime prevention strategies. *Shared consciousness and group solidarity* do not preexist; they must be forged in struggle and are part of a difficult and long-term political process.

Politically, the model is in opposition to the law-and-order approach. It sees the logic of crime control as one essentially directed at containing the effects of economic crisis and differences in social power, rather than dealing with the generative causes of crime under capitalism. Furthermore, any enhancement of the power of the state (via, for example, greater police powers) is seen as problematic insofar as the state itself is implicated in the maintenance of the status quo. Nevertheless, the precise role of the state is, arguably, seen to be open to contestation and change.

An example of work that reflects many of the ideas contained in the radical model is that of Sim et al. (1987) in Britain, which summaries the practical interventions of critical criminologists in areas such as prison abolition, police issues, racism, women's struggles and the struggles in Northern Ireland. Crime prevention in this instance refers to confronting and dealing with the crimes of the powerful (e.g., abusive and skewed use of state power, the actions of the capitalist class, white racism) through a

variety of action campaigns. Key issues in this instance are consciousness-raising, collective mobilisation and critique of the status quo.

THEORY, POLITICS AND PRACTICES

The foregoing models present in abstract form three broad perspectives on crime prevention. We can distinguish these specific theoretical models from particular crime prevention techniques and practices, which may or may not pertain to each model. To put it simply, while a wide range of specific crime prevention methods can be identified (see, for example, Clarke, 1992), these methods are not in and of themselves necessarily linked to any of the particular models presented above. This has a number of implications, particularly with respect to how we think about crime prevention both generally and with regard to the importance of the context within which particular methods are actually adopted.

Rather than simply responding to crime after the fact, recent attention to crime prevention has focused on specific ways in which to modify the physical and social environment. Changes to the *physical environment* have included such measures as:

- better streetscape and building design;
- improved lighting in public spaces;
- use of close-circuit TVs, remote sensors, and electronic keycards;
- installation of deadlocks and alarms;
- design and location of parking areas;
- rapid cleaning of graffiti;
- property marking and identification; and
- traffic calming and creation of green belts.

Attempts have also been made to extend the range of *surveillance* of local neighbourhood activities, involving such measures as:

- establishment of Neighbourhood Watch committees;
- reintroduction of police beat patrols in inner-city areas;
- encouragement of "natural surveillance" through residential planning;
- employment of private security guards in residences and businesses;
- use of "information officers" on buses and trains;

- monitoring of factory/business pollution by environmental action groups;
- anti-racist/anti-fascist organisations; and
- community watch committees to prevent police harassment.

In addition, attempts have been directed at enhancing *citizen participation* programs that are not crime-centered per se. These would include, for example:

- sports and recreation programs;
- community clean-up campaigns designed to make a local environment more attractive and conducive to positive social life;
- provision of alcohol and substance abuse health and counselling services;
- needle exchange programs and AIDS counseling;
- employment of youth and community workers to provide a range of health, welfare, and leisure services;
- local employment initiatives, usually funded by short-term government grants; and
- campaigns against poverty and unemployment.

The present concern is not with whether such techniques and practices are "successful," although to evaluate this we would need to know more about the specific implementation and outcomes of particular tactics, campaigns and programs in selected locales. Instead, the crucial point to be made about crime prevention is that it is not, nor has it ever been, politically neutral. That is, the wide variety of techniques, practices and policies encompassed under the broad crime prevention umbrella have differential social impacts. How certain measures affect different groups of people depends very much on how they are implemented and on the political basis for their particular implementation.

For example, as discussed in depth elsewhere (see White and Sutton, 1995) the development of some types of "situational prevention" responses overwhelmingly reflects the social interests and financial capacities of the economically well-off in the community. Located within a generally conservative model of crime prevention, the adoption of some types of protective and surveillance measures serves to reinforce the crime control agenda of the right-wing law-and-order lobby, and to orient programs and policing strategies toward containment objectives rather than dealing with the wider conditions that generate crime. Particular kinds of crimes are

targeted over others (e.g., commercial property theft), and the intention is to create a hostile environment for certain categories of people (e.g., unemployed young people who do not have the financial capacity to purchase goods and services). Economic and social exclusivity is built into such crime prevention strategies.

On the other hand, liberal or radical models of crime prevention may draw upon similar types of techniques and practices, but the objectives and context greatly alter the meaning and consequences for the people involved (for a similar discussion, see Sutton, this volume). An organised street presence, for example, may be essential to ensure freedom from sexual harassment, racist attacks or police violence. In this process the use of video cameras, recording devices, street lighting, self-defence training and community action groups may bear a structural similarity to traditional law enforcement and crime prevention strategies, although the *social content of the practices* is of course very different. Here the concern is with the social empowerment of more powerless and vulnerable groups, and their active engagement in controlling their social landscapes directly.

Generally speaking, however, environment modification techniques as informed by opportunity reduction theory tend to predominate and have the most official and private-sector legitimacy in the crime prevention area. While ostensibly neutral in design, such techniques can have major consequences with regard to particular groups of people—usually the more marginalised such as the poor, the unemployed, indigenous people and young people. Often the intention of such approaches is to not only reduce the opportunities for crime (a technical objective), but to actually reduce the very presence and visibility of such groups in particular public spaces (a social and political objective). This is apparent, for example, in the use of police or private-security response teams to clear "undesirables" from affluent suburbs and commercial business premises.

For an exemplary exception to this kind of exclusionary approach, but one that shares many of its practical environmental modification concerns, we can refer to recent work that uses opportunity-reduction techniques to control drinking-related behaviour. For example, Homel and his colleagues (this volume) have been developing an intervention strategy aimed at reducing alcohol-related violence by changing the management methods of nightclubs. At one level, the approach can be seen as opportunity-reducing, since it lowers mass intoxication and improves informed regulation of licensees. At another level, however, it is clearly designed to

increase and enhance the participation of young people, but in a safer environment. It thus has an inclusive, rather than exclusive, orientation.

Perspectives other than the conservative framework of crime prevention explicitly recognise and acknowledge the social nature of state and community intervention surrounding crime issues. For example, mainstream or liberal conceptions of crime prevention speak of deemphasising so-called "troublesome behaviour," and accentuating the positive and creative potential in people (Coventry et al., 1992). Crime prevention is thus linked to strategies of social development, that, in turn, require improvements in local material resources and capital infrastructures (e.g., schools, hospitals, public transport, job creation). Attempts are made to reduce the propensity to commit crime by enhancing the position of certain individuals and groups as participants in public life, users of public spaces and legitimate claimants on public resources. In some state jurisdictions, this has occasionally or periodically emerged as the favoured form of crime response (rather than a crime control focus). It is also linked to so-called "safer community" types of projects often coordinated by local councils.

In practical terms, both the liberal and radical perspectives agree that there needs to be a shift in thinking about crime prevention from being mainly about control and surveillance to crime prevention as supportive and developmental. Such a perspective can inform action taken on *specific issues*, as well as standing as a more *general principle of intervention*.

To illustrate the differences wrought in practice by application of principles derived from the different models of crime prevention, we can take the example of shopping centre security. A shopping centre today is much more than simply a gathering point for buyers and sellers of consumer items; it is an important point of social contact and social life for many different groups. In our hypothetical example, the problem is one of persistent vandalism and shoplifting. The solutions to this problem will vary, depending upon the political perspective of the crime prevention expert:

- The *conservative* focus on opportunity reduction will translate into an increase in the number of security guards and in investment in security tags for merchandise, possibly restricting public transport to ensure a more affluent customer and a stepped-up use of spy cameras and store detectives.

- The *liberal* focus on opportunity enhancement might lead to the employment of youth and community workers within the shopping centre complex, the setting up of counseling and welfare services, and media campaigns designed to make people feel part of the "community" and to take pride in their shopping centre.
- The *radical* focus on social empowerment could see community action taken to contest the power of private owners and shopping centre managers to dictate the overall use and availability of the public space in the centre without consultation and direct community decision-making involvement.

We also need to be aware of how different perspectives, especially at points where there is an overlapping political agenda, can in fact *reinforce each other* at a practical level. A crime prevention concern to eliminate graffiti may attempt to reduce opportunity completely (via spray-proof paint-resistant surfaces), but not really get to the nub of the issue or the conditions that generate such activity. This more conservative crime-control type of approach, used in conjunction with efforts to displace random graffiti toward more structured graffiti projects (favoured by liberal "diversion" models), might well achieve a modicum of success. In this case, however, the focus on conventional crime, and thus fairly conventional crime prevention, does not preclude a radical social dimension. For instance, the channeling of graffiti work into projects such as painting bus shelters may have an additional function or consequence of combatting racism in a local area. That is, work done by local groups will often be protected by those groups, thus preventing racist and other anti-social slogans from being posted in these particular public places.

At this point, it needs to be emphasised as well that crime prevention operates at several *different levels of practical action*, from individual case measures through to political campaigns. These are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, efforts to enhance the well-being of specific communities and interest groups requires analysis of different levels of intervention (immediate and long-term; local, national, and international), and the adoption of a range of techniques, political alliances, and organisational methods.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The intention of this paper has been to raise questions regarding the theoretical underpinnings and political orientations of much of what is accepted as "crime prevention" today. My focus has not been on explicating specific programs or working through particular concrete examples. Rather, the concern has been to comment generally on the ways in which adherence to certain ideological frameworks can be linked to both theoretical closure and the adoption of exclusionary practices. Contrary to this, it has been argued that the adoption of selected techniques, practices and methods does not make a particular program inherently good (or bad), or a success (or failure), or that the choice and use of these can somehow be separated from wider political issues.

The definition, orientation and strategic objectives of different crime prevention models is inherently and intractably political. Acknowledgement of the existence of competing perspectives (conservative, liberal and radical), and consequently diverse forms of intervention (some of which are mutually exclusive, others that reinforce each other), is important in sensitising us to the politics of our own practice, and in exposing the vested interests behind specific modes of crime prevention. Difficulties arise, however, when we unnecessarily conflate model with method, and fail to appreciate the contextual nature of practical crime prevention measures.

The impetus for this discussion came from the ways in which some of my students had responded to lectures on the different crime prevention models. Specifically, several were under the misapprehension that to be liberal or radical they could not refer to or use, for example, target hardening or other situational prevention measures. In other words, the model was to dominate the method. Against this narrow view, and also counter to the opposing idea that somehow practical projects can proceed without reference to the core ideas contained within the models, this paper has attempted to establish that crime prevention is first and foremost a *political process*. The manner in which particular programs or methods are constructed and used in practice always has important social and political implications.

Bearing this in mind, it is also important to have a vision of what we do that goes beyond that of "crime prevention" per se. That is, we need to continually assess the effects and implications of the different models and methods on the overall character of social life, and on the well-being of

specific groups and communities. Stopping crime is always a possible project (at least theoretically) if only we had enough resources, tools and powers. But do we really want to create a kind of "surveillance state"—where we are all free from crime, but prisoners to our own security systems?

Crime prevention measures can and should have consequences that are oriented normatively, empirically and strategically toward creating a better society for all. In the light of increasingly rabid law-and-order discourse, and the tacit and express support for the crime control agenda by more conservative crime prevention practitioners, the task ahead for liberal and radical criminologists is to continue the fight against punitive, coercive forms of crime response. In doing so, there is a need to challenge the logic of conservatism, to build alliances between like-minded people and practitioners at an individual and organisational level, and to develop transitional strategies that incorporate any method of crime prevention that enhances and empowers people at local and regional levels.

To be clear about where we are going, we need to be certain about where we stand in the here and now. By separating out different political perspectives on crime prevention, and distinguishing these from the variety of specific methods and techniques available in this area, we are better able to situate the limits and possibilities of crime prevention as we head into the twenty-first century.

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