



# Home Office

## Crime Reduction & Community Safety Group

### Tilley Awards 2008 Application form

Please ensure that you have read the guidance before completing this form. **By making an application to the awards, entrants are agreeing to abide by the conditions laid out in the guidance.** Please complete the following form in full, within the stated word limit and ensuring the file size is no more than 1MB. Failure to do so will result in your entry being rejected from the competition.

Completed application forms should be e-mailed to [tilleyawards08@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:tilleyawards08@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk).

All entries must be received by noon on **Friday 25<sup>th</sup> April 2008**. No entries will be accepted after this time/date. Any queries on the application process should be directed to Alex Blackwell on 0207 035 4811 or [alex.blackwell@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:alex.blackwell@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk).

#### Section A: Application basics

1. Title of the project: **Operation Wilt**

2. Key issue that the project is addressing e.g. Alcohol related violence:

'Criminal Damage and Anti-Social Behaviour during Ramadan.'

#### Author contact details

3. Name of application author:

**Chief Inspector Mick Hanks**

4. Organisation submitting the application: West Yorkshire Police – Bradford North Division

5. Full postal address:

West Yorkshire Police  
Airedale and North Bradford Division.  
Airedale House,  
Royd Ings Avenue  
Keighley  
BD21 4BY

6. Email address:

[michael.hanks@westyorkshire.pnn.police.uk](mailto:michael.hanks@westyorkshire.pnn.police.uk)

7. Telephone number:

(01535) 617018. Mobile 07799 583269

**Secondary project contact details**

8. Name of secondary contact involved in the project:  
**Inspector Kash Singh**

9. Secondary contact email address:  
[kashmir.singh@westyorkshire.pnn.police.uk](mailto:kashmir.singh@westyorkshire.pnn.police.uk)

10. Secondary contact telephone number: 07766 758916

**Endorsing representative contact details**

11. Name of endorsing senior representative from lead organisation:  
**Chief Superintendent Allan Doherty**

12. Endorsing representative's email address:  
[allan.doherty@westyorkshire.pnn.police.uk](mailto:allan.doherty@westyorkshire.pnn.police.uk)

13. For all entries from England & Wales please state which Government Office or Welsh Assembly Government covers your area e.g. GO East Midlands:  
**G.O. Yorkshire and Humber (GOYH)**

**14. Please mark this box with an X to indicate that all organisations involved in the project have been notified of this entry (this is to prevent duplicate entries of the same project): X**

**Section B: Summary of application - In no more than 400 words use this space to provide a summary of your project under the stated headings (see guidance for more information).**

Bradford is a city often beset by adverse publicity in respect of community and race relations. Operation Wilt is an example of what can be achieved when Police and local communities work together in trust and confidence.

**Scanning:**

Whilst reviewing PSA1 performance, Bradford North Police identified a significant increase in incidents of criminal damage and anti-social behaviour during October 2006, corresponding with the month of Ramadan.

A NIM problem profile identified that the increase in incidents was most pronounced in the predominantly Asian/Muslim communities of Manningham, Heaton and Girdlington, with inferences that the increase was linked to Ramadan.

Officers acknowledged that the key to tackling these issues was within the community itself.

**Analysis:**

Whilst no specific victim group was identified, it was apparent that the highest proportion of offenders were teenage Asian males, with the majority of offences committed during the evening time.

The division engaged with local communities, via the Council of Mosques, who highlighted the following potential contributory factors:

- The hot-spots were close to local Mosques.
- Many young people were not attending prayers or having attended, absented themselves.
- Due to prayer times, the young people wouldn't venture far from their local Mosque.
- Due to adults observing prayers, young people had anonymity.

**Response:**

Operation Wilt aimed to reduce criminal damage and anti-social behaviour by 30% during Ramadan 2007 against 2006, by engaging local communities to:

- Divert young people from offending.
- Educate communities regarding the issues.
- Prevent incidents by removing anonymity of would be offenders.
- Enforce the law with local community support.

Community support was secured via Mosque committees, for the following actions:

- Mosque briefings by officers to over 11000 people.
- Joint Police/Community patrols took place every evening during Ramadan involving Mosque representatives, reducing the anonymity felt by would-be offenders.
- Community door supervision at Mosques during prayers.
- Where necessary, joint home visits made by police and community representatives informing parents of their child's activities.
- Local young people attended an event/meal hosted by the police, where they highlighted their needs.
- Partnership funding enabled a series of activities for young people to take place.
- Media campaign.

**Assessment:**

Operation Wilt achieved the following:

- Criminal damage reduced by 30%
- ASB reduced by 37%
- Partnership funding secured for sustainable youth work and facilities.

However, the intangible results have probably been the biggest success:

- Community ownership of local issues.
- Active community participation.
- Improved Police/community relationships, helping to manage and minimise community tensions.
- Increased sustainable youth provision.
- Increased attendance at Mosques.

**State number of words: 400 (excluding headings and bullets)**

**Section C: Description of project** - Describe the project in no more than 4,000 words. Please refer to the full guidance for more information on what the description should cover, in particular section 12.

### Operation Wilt – Bradford North and Council of Mosques

#### Context

*“The Bradford District in West Yorkshire is one of the best known multi-cultural centres in Britain and represents a unique challenge to race relations.*

*The District was once blessed with economic wealth and prosperity, but with the demise of the wool industry and the decline in manufacturing, the district has seen a slide in its fortunes. It has struggled to redefine itself as a modern, 21st century, competitive, multi-cultural area and has lost its spirit of community togetherness.*

*As a result, the Bradford District has witnessed growing divisions among its population along race, ethnic, religious and social class lines—and now finds itself in the grip of FEAR.... **Fear of talking about problems openly; Fear of challenging wrong-doing for fear of being labelled racist; Fear of confronting gang culture, the illegal drugs trade and the growing racial intolerance, harassment and abuse that exists...**”*

(“Community Pride Not Prejudice – Making Diversity Work in Bradford” – Lord Herman Ousley 2001)

The above words of Lord Ousley were delivered in July 2001, as part of the Bradford Race Review.

It was on 7<sup>th</sup> July 2001, that Bradford played host to one of the worst disorders seen on the UK mainland.

An estimated 1000 young men, mostly Asian, participated in prolonged disorder against the Police resulting in £7.5 million worth of damage to property, leaving over 320 police officers injured.

The post incident enquiry resulted in 297 arrests and 200 prison sentences, totalling 604 years. The vast majority of those sentenced being young Asian males from the Bradford District.

The sentences dispensed to the young Asian males were perceived by many in the local community to be unjust, raising wider questions about ‘Institutional Racism’ within the Criminal Justice System. Relationships between the police and local communities in the aftermath remained very tense, with an atmosphere of mistrust.

As a consequence of the Riot, there was intense scrutiny on the city and its race and community relations. Reports by Ted Cante and John Denham for the first time brought to the public consciousness the phrase ‘Community Cohesion’, and presented the Authorities and local communities with major challenges.

Policing in the area has been carried out in a sensitive but positive manner, providing high standards expected by society, whilst embracing and acknowledging cultural and religious sensitivities. However, the spectre of the 2001 disorder has been ever present, with a common desire that there should be no repetition.

This context shaped the ‘Responses’ to the problems addressed by Operation Wilt.

**Scanning:**

Whilst reviewing Divisional PSA1 performance, Bradford North Police identified a significant increase in incidents of criminal damage and anti-social behaviour during October 2006, against previous and subsequent months.

It was identified that the Holy Month of Ramadan in 2006 was observed between 22<sup>nd</sup> September and 22<sup>nd</sup> October, and the increase appeared to correspond with this.

The division, whilst keen to avoid repetition of the increases in 2007, were alive to the obvious implications that linking the increase in reported incidents to the observance of a Holy period could have upon community relations.

In the first instance a Problem Profile was commissioned, which highlighted the following:

**Criminal Damage**

	21/08/06 to 21/09/06	Ramadan 22/09/06 to 22/10/06	23/10/06 to 23/11/06
<b>Total Offences</b>	362	471	453

**Anti-Social Behaviour**

	21/08/06 to 21/09/06	Ramadan 22/09/06 to 22/10/06	23/10/06 to 23/11/06
<b>ASB calls</b>	1201	1411	1069

As can be seen, the period during Ramadan saw more reported offences of Criminal Damage than the following month which incorporated Halloween, Mischief Night and Bonfire Night. This was contrary to that which would normally be observed.

A further breakdown of the incidents was carried out which highlighted the areas which had highest reporting levels. These are shown in the tables below:

**Criminal Damage**

21/08/06 to 21/09/06		Ramadan 22/09/06 to 22/10/06		23/10/06 to 23/11/06	
District	No	District	No	District	No
Allerton	37	Manningham	49	Allerton	41
Manningham	35	Heaton	42	Manningham	35
Heaton	22	Girlington	39	Heaton	30
Girlington	20	Allerton	35	Girlington	25
Idle	20	Bradford Moor/ Thornbury	21	Ecclehill	24

**Anti-Social Behaviour**

21/08/06 to 21/09/06		Ramadan 22/09/06 to 22/10/06		23/10/06 to 23/11/06	
District	No	District	No	District	No
Manningham	117	Manningham	165	Girlington	81
Girlington	88	Heaton	100	Heaton	76
Heaton	80	Girlington	94	Manningham	73
Allerton	71	Allerton	89	Allerton	65
Bradford Moor/ Thornbury	52	Ecclehill	64	Ecclehill	56

It was noted that the areas which had seen the most significant number of offences were the Manningham, Girdlington and Heaton areas, and unusually the Bradford Moor area. These are all areas with a high proportion of Asian / Muslim residents which tended to support the supposition that the increase in incidents was somehow related to conditions affecting the local Asian community.

Officers acknowledged that the key to tackling these issues was within the community itself, and took steps to make contact with local community stakeholders to share the issues with them and to seek further assistance in interpreting the reasons behind the figures.

### **Analysis:**

Prior to approaching community stakeholders, the Police conducted further analysis around the available data, both statistically and from officer observations.

### **Localities:**

The main areas of concern highlighted by the analysis were:

- Manningham
- Heaton
- Girdlington

These are all adjoining areas within the Bradford North Division, with high Asian / Muslim population, and previously the scene of substantial public order issues.

### **Modus Operandi:**

#### **Damage Offences:**

Although a significant number of offences were reported there were several notable MOs which were prevalent. These were as follows:

##### Damage to Motor Vehicles:

- Objects thrown at passing vehicles. These appeared to be random in their selection of victims.
- Parked vehicles attacked by groups of young people, resulting in smashed windscreens and dented or scratched body work.

##### Damage to Premises:

- Bricks thrown through:
  - House windows and doors.
  - Shop windows and doors.

##### Other:

- Smashed bus shelters and telephone kiosks.
- Shotgun discharged at door.

### **Anti-Social Behaviour Incidents:**

The following are examples of the most prevalent ASB calls reported to the police in those areas


##### Gangs of Asians youths:

- Being abusive and threatening others, including shop staff.
- Throwing items at passing vehicles including a fire engine.
- Throwing fireworks at passing vehicles.
- Throwing fireworks in the street and a shop.
- Fighting with other groups.
- Attacking individuals.
- Putting fireworks in post boxes.
- Lighting fires near to houses.
- Putting fireworks in bins.

### **Peak Times:**

All Days of the week. The peak times for the incidents were: 1700hrs x 2300hrs, with the highest concentration between 1900hrs and 2130hrs.

The map below clearly highlights the geographical hot-spots identified by the Police Analysis.



**Map showing the problem districts of Manningham, Girlington & Heaton during Ramadan.**

As can be observed by the analysis above, the incidents reported had a very confrontational element to them, and in many cases were entirely random, particularly in the cases where missiles were thrown at passing vehicles.

Consultation with the Fire Service locally also identified that the above areas were their ‘Hot-spots’ for calls for service.

**Victims:**

Analysis of the complainants for the criminal damage identified no specific profile in terms of age or gender.

Upon reviewing the ethnicity of the victims (where stated), the following was discovered:

White European	59%
Asian	34%
African Caribbean	6%

Although the resident ‘white’ population of the area accounted for approximately 38% of the population, the number of white complainants amounted to 59%, indicating disproportionality.

Whilst not dismissing the race perspective altogether, there was no direct evidence to support a racially aggravated ‘tag’, and no offences were reported as perceived Racially Motivated Incidents (MacPherson Rec. 16). In addition, there had been no other tension indicators identified at that time by either the Police or community contacts.

The random element mentioned above, together with the offences being on arterial routes to and from the city centre would provide a higher proportion of white European road users travelling through the areas to/from the suburbs.

This, together with the fact that during prayer times, the number of available Asian victims was severely reduced provided some indication as to why there would be such a disparity.

**Offenders:**

As can be seen from the summary of incidents above, where offenders were identified, the predominant descriptions were of Asian males in their teens.

Officers on patrol reported sightings of large groups of local youths congregating and running away on Police arrival. This caused difficulties in identifying offenders and subsequently in terms of arrests.

Perhaps the profile of the offenders is unsurprising, taking into account the demographics of the areas in which the offences were taking place. Census data indicates that 'Non-white' residents accounted for over 62%, of which the majority were of Asian origin.

**Community Analysis:**

The picture was now becoming clearer regarding the nature and location of the incidents, together with an indication as to the profile of the offenders involved. The problem however remained as to the sensitivities around raising the issue that the Police were concerned about an element of criminality potentially linked to Ramadan.

The picture of Police and community relations in Bradford in 2007 is completely different to Bradford in 2001 commented upon by Lord Ousley. Although not perfect, local officers felt comfortable enough with their community partners to approach them about this matter.

Although the Police were in possession of a vast amount of data and information, they recognised that without engaging with community stakeholders, and seeking their perspective of the data, any response would be flawed, as the underlying causes for the increased incidents would remain locked within the community.

A much respected representative of the Council for Mosques, Mr Ghulam Rasool, was contacted by the division, and asked to assist in addressing the apparent issues. It was felt that the Mosques were the most appropriate starting point for any community analysis, and in the area covered by the initial analysis, there are in the region of 20 Mosques.

A meeting was convened, attended by representatives from 12 of the local Mosques together with officers from Bradford North Division.

The Police analysis was shared with all attendees, and an open discussion took place regarding the data, and considered opinions were given regarding the likely causes. The following is a summary of the outcomes of the meeting:

- Mosque representatives were pleased that the Police had raised this matter, and some expressed concerns of their own. They offered a relatively simple but insightful observation as to what may have contributed to the increase.
- Initially the stakeholders were alerted to the issues by the local Neighbourhood Policing Team and they were motivated to help by the fact that their community were both victims and offenders.
- They believed that a significant feature surrounded the issue of prayer time during Ramadan. Whilst the majority of the adult community were engaged in prayers, leaders felt that many young people either did not attend Mosque in the first instance, or having attended, were then able to absent themselves from the building.
- Once away from the Mosque, young people would feel a sense of anonymity due to the lack of a local adult presence in the area.
- Attendees viewed the 'hot-spot map' (above) and immediately identified that many of the local Mosques had spheres of influence in and around the clusters of incidents.
- That the location of the Mosques were relevant, as the young people only had a limited time frame to absent themselves from the Mosque, and as such would not travel far.

- The Mosque representatives, whilst keen to work to prevent their young people being involved in anti-social behaviour, also saw opportunities to encourage better attendance at Mosques throughout this operation.
- Attendees and Police also looked wider than the areas of Manningham, Heaton and Girdlington, to the area of Bradford Moor and Thornbury, which has a similar demographic profile. This area had featured in the 'top 5' damage hot-spots' during Ramadan 2006, which was unusual for that area. Any response to the problem would need to include this area too.

## **Response:**

In devising the response to the problem, the Police were guided by the suggestions and recommendations of their community partners. It was agreed that a range of measures were necessary to address the matters raised, and that one single tactical option alone would not be sufficient.

The Community representatives expressed concern that increased police visibility on its own may be seen as confrontational, and wished to avoid this.

They requested that a more preventative approach be used, and that the support of the wider community was essential to ensure success.

The response set out in **Operation WILT**; aimed to:

- Reduce recorded offences of criminal damage during **Ramadan 2007** by 30% based upon 2006/07 outturns.
- Reduce calls for service regarding damage and anti-social behaviour incidents during **Ramadan 2007** by 30% based upon 2006/07 calls for service.

Consultation between Police, Mosque Leaders, Bradford Council, Extended Schools, Bradford Youth Development Partnership and Fire Service resulted in agreed actions falling into four main types of Response:

- Prevention
- Education
- Diversion
- Enforcement

Particular emphasis was placed on the Prevention and Education strands.

The following provides a summary of each strand:

### **Prevention:**

#### **Joint Community Patrols:**

The most visible representation of Operation Wilt were joint community patrols, between local Mosque representatives and PCSOs from the local Neighbourhood Policing Teams. This was the main focus of the media campaign.

The sight of joint patrols set a clear message that this community was taking personal ownership of the problem.

This option aimed to reduce the anonymity highlighted during the 'Analysis' stage. It was felt by the Mosque representatives that any groups of young people congregating would more easily be identified by them, and therefore less likely to commit offences.

Volunteers were highlighted by respective Mosque committees, and formed the corner stone of the Operation.

Formal risk assessments were undertaken for each person participating, and no direct health and safety issues were identified.

A months patrolling was a big commitment for Mosque staff, taking them away from prayers. This meant that on some days they were unable to assist. On these occasions, Police took video footage of any offenders and where required, this was shown to Mosque members to identify youths. Although potentially inflammatory this was conducted some way into the month, when the operation had been accepted by local people. It was a considered risk which provoked little or no response.



**Officers on patrol with Mosque representatives**

### **Joint Home Visits**

Joint home visits were made by police and community representatives informing parents of their child's activities. These arose as a consequence of the joint patrols, where individuals had been identified.

There were 60 home visits made, with no repeat visits being required.

These visits reduced the number of youths on the streets with parents taking responsibility for ensuring they knew where their children were.

### **Mosque Door Supervision**

In order to attempt to combat the issue of young people leaving Mosques during prayers unbeknown to their parents, Mosque committees introduced door supervision to monitor access and egress from the building. This again reduced anonymity.

## **Education**

### **Mosque Briefings**

To secure wider community support in advance of Ramadan, local Police Inspectors attended at Mosques addressing in the region of 11000 people, explaining the issues and encouraging members to take responsibility for their young people.

These were supported by the Mosque committees, and received positive feedback about their value and effectiveness.

### **Media Campaign**

A carefully co-ordinated media campaign was undertaken with three main aims:

- To inform local people of what they were likely to witness in their neighbourhood.
- To secure support.
- To assist the local Muslim communities to promote themselves in the wider arena.

The operation was widely reported locally, nationally and internationally, through newspapers, radio, TV and the intranet.

### **Community Action Days**

The West Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service, Bradford Council and the NPT organised two days of action involving the provision of fire safety and crime prevention advice to local youths.

Bradford Council patrolled the streets and organised to clean up any areas where there was a concentration of rubbish in order to prevent unnecessary fires.

## **Diversion**

A good deal of the detail above appears to be actively targeting young people in quite a forceful manner. It was however clearly necessary not only to limit the opportunity for criminality, but to explore the causes of the offending.

There were interesting debates regarding the subject of diversionary activities for young people. Whilst finding activities to engage young people was very attractive to the Police and other partners, it was not wholly supported by the Mosques committees.

In reality they wished that their young people were more actively engaged in the Mosque at Ramadan, rather than for example playing sport. It was agreed that the longer term issues regarding youth provision were equally important and needed to be addressed.

### **Young Persons Meal**

Prior to the commencement of Operation Wilt, approximately 100 young people identified by officers as at risk of offending, were invited to an event / meal hosted by the police and the Mosques. They were addressed by the NPT Inspector who highlighted his concerns from a Police perspective.

Young people were encouraged to voice their needs and concerns, with many expressing the need for increased youth provision in the area.

The event allowed the Police and partners to better understand the issues faced by younger community members, and to build a rapport and some familiarity.

### **Partnership Activities**

Following feedback from young people partnership funding was secured enabling a series of activities for young people to take place, including a provision for football activities every Friday evening for a 12 month period. This funding was secured by Extended Schools through the West Yorkshire Police Community trust fund.

This complimented other extensive youth activity in the locality.

## **Enforcement**

Although a range of measures were put in place to prevent anti-social behaviour, there was clearly the need for the police to have an enforcement capability to address those who still wished to offend.

This included a visible presence on the streets and the proactive challenge of would-be offenders. In total there were 407 Stop and Account, 68 Stop and Search engagements, with 34 arrests being made for damage offences.

Officers reported back that due to the other interventions in the area, there was very little in the way of confrontation.

**Assessment:**

The overall assessment is that Operation Wilt:

(a). Was successful in contributing to the desired reductions for the period in which it operated, although not eliminating the problem entirely.

One will see that against the stated objectives of Operation Wilt it was an apparent success. However, a note of caution must be added to properly capture the extent of that success, as it would be easy to misrepresent the final outcomes.

In simple terms, the operation was introduced to reduce crime and anti-social behaviour during Ramadan 2007. This is a simple aspiration and one would think that measurement of this would also be simple.

However, Ramadan is a moving feast observed at a slightly different time every year. This means that seasonality of crime and incidents also plays out alongside this. Therefore any steps to measure effectiveness of any operation involving a period such as Ramadan cannot be looked at in isolation.

The greatest influencing factor during Ramadan 2006 (22/9/06 – 22/10/06) was its proximity to the traditional Halloween, Mischief Night and Bonfire Night periods, which one would expect would have a significant impact upon incident levels, particularly in communities with a higher proportion of young people, (as is the case in the areas involved – approx 33% under 18 years).

Ramadan in 2007 was observed slightly earlier (12/9/07 -12/10/07), and as such the influence of the run up to Bonfire Night etc, may be seen to be less influential and as such the instances may be expected to be lower, therefore allowing the police to claim greater influence than is actually the case.

The table below shows a direct comparison between Ramadan 2006 and 2007, together with the reductions, for the division as a whole:

	<b>Ramadan 2006</b>	<b>Ramadan 2007</b>	<b>Difference</b>
<b>Damage</b>	471	297	37% Reduction
<b>ASB</b>	1411	839	41% Reduction

The following table highlights the comparison between Ramadan 2006 and Ramadan 2007, in the areas targeted by Operation Wilt alone:

	<b>Ramadan 2006</b>	<b>Ramadan 2007</b>	<b>Difference</b>
<b>Damage</b>	151	84	45% Reduction
<b>ASB</b>	409	179	57% Reduction

Taking into account the seasonal influences as outlined above, a more balanced assessment of the outcomes is highlighted in the table below for the Operation Wilt areas. This shows a 3 month spread including both Ramadan and Bonfire Night periods in both years.

	<b>21/8/06 – 23/11/06 (Ramadan 22/9-22/10)</b>	<b>11/8/07 – 13/11/07 (Ramadan 12/9-12/10)</b>	<b>Difference</b>
<b>Damage</b>	358	251	30% Reduction
<b>ASB</b>	1038	659	37% Reduction

It is therefore submitted that the true statistical outcomes of Operation Wilt, show a 30% reduction in Criminal Damage and a 37% reduction in Anti-Social Behaviour in 2007 against 2006.

A review of overall divisional performance during the period of Operation Wilt was undertaken, and no displacement of offences was found to have occurred.

(b). Highlighted an approach which could be undertaken for other community based problems.

Some of the tactical interventions used during Operation Wilt, for example the joint patrols, Mosque briefings and home visits, are options which could be repeated during future operations. However, it is acknowledged that the use of such as the joint patrols is particularly labour intensive on the part of the community representatives, and as such would need to be used sparingly in appropriate circumstances only.

The reliance upon the educational and preventative elements was particularly well received, and was seen as less confrontational than more traditional methods of policing.

(c). Enhanced police / community networks, which help to manage and minimise community tensions.

Although Operation Wilt aimed to reduce damage and anti-social behaviour during Ramadan 2007, it is felt that the consequential effects have been far more important.

The level of engagement between the police and the local Mosques was seen at an unprecedented level, with active participation by the local community. Mosque representatives gave their time, approximately three hours per evening over a twenty-eight day period.

As a result of the dialogue and the joint working, new relationships and understandings have been formed, and existing relationships enhanced. This is particularly important in the arena of police relations with Muslim communities, when considering the intense scrutiny such communities have under over recent years and the history of the area in which this has been achieved.

The benefits of Operation Wilt have already been evident since Ramadan, where the contacts that have been established were utilised. This was evident following the murder of Benazir Bhutto, when, due to the location of both the Pakistani Peoples Party HQ and the Pakistani Consulate in the division, tensions may have been expected.

The contacts which have been established quickly allayed any fears that may have existed around community tensions, enabling the police and Local Authority to make informed decisions about matters affecting their communities.

At the conclusion of the operation, Divisional Commander's awards were presented to 11 of the community volunteers by Chief Superintendent Doherty, at a divisional awards evening, attended by the media.

The reality of policing within inner city Bradford makes it inevitable that future issues affecting community tensions will emerge, and will need to be jointly managed between the police and local communities.

(d). Contributed towards the improvement of activities for young people in the area.

The engagement event with young people, hosted by the police with the support of the Mosques has provided some longer term Police / youth based activities: These include:

- Friday night football: Up to 60 young men every Friday evening continuing throughout 2008.
- A PCSO has been trained in football coaching and is involved in the sessions, allowing the Police to maintain a link with the local young people and to incorporate a respect programme.
- The Police, in conjunction with Extended Schools are in the process of applying for further funding to replicate the model in elsewhere.
- The relationship between Extended Schools and the Police has developed further diversionary activities, including a five-week Hip, Hop and Rap workshop, targeting a group of ten young people who were continuously causing anti-social behaviour.

**State number of words used: 3995 (Excluding Bullet Points)**

**Section D: Endorsement by Senior Representative - Please insert letter from endorsing representative, this will not count towards your word or 1MB size limit restrictions.**

Our ref:

17 April 2008

Ms Alex Blackwell,  
Home Office,  
Effective Practice and Communication Team,  
4th Floor Fry Building (SE Quarter),  
2 Marsham Street,  
LONDON SW1P 4DF

Dear Ms Blackwell

**OPERATION WILT - TILLEY ENTRY (T08 - 51)**

As the Divisional Commander for the then Bradford North Police Division, it gives me great pleasure to endorse the Tilley Award nomination for Operation Wilt.

The operation to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour issues within Muslim communities during the Ramadan period is an excellent example of what can be achieved when the police and local communities work closely together in a spirit of trust and confidence. It is also great testimony to the great strides that have been made in Police and community relations in Bradford since the dark days of 2001, which saw the division play host to large scale urban disorder.

The decision to approach the local communities for their help in tackling such a sensitive issue was one which I had great confidence in making, due to the excellent relationship between my officers and the local Muslim communities. I was particularly impressed by the instant support for the police from the Council of Mosques, and the various Mosque Committees who supported the initiative.

There is little doubt, that without the involvement of the local community, this venture would have had great difficulty in succeeding. In particular, the work of the Mosque volunteers, who gave their time freely in support of the operation is worthy of further note. I was particularly pleased to be able to award 11 volunteers with 'Divisional Commanders Certificates of Merit' at our Divisional Awards event in March 2008, recognising their support and efforts.

I also wish to acknowledge the support provided by the Local Authority and the West Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service for their role in this initiative, in support of the development of facilities for young people in the area.

In conclusion, I reiterate my wholehearted support for the attached submission, and look forward to learning of its progress in due course.

Yours sincerely,

Allan J Doherty  
Chief Superintendent  
Divisional Commander

### **Checklist for Applicants:**

1. Have you read the process and application form guidance?
2. Have you completed all four sections of the application form in full including the endorsement from a senior representative?
3. Have you checked that your entry addresses all aspects of the judging criteria?
4. Have you advised all partner agencies that you are submitting an entry for your project?
5. Have you adhered to the formatting requirements within the guidance?
6. Have you checked whether there are any reasons why your project should **not** be publicised to other police forces, partner agencies and the general public e.g. civil or criminal proceedings pending in relation to your project?
7. Have you inserted your project name as a footer note on the application form? Go to View-Header and Footer to add it.
8. Have you saved you application form as a word document and entitled your message '**Tilley 08 entry (followed by project name in brackets)**' before emailing it?

Once you are satisfied that you have completed your application form in full please email it to [Tilleyawards08@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:Tilleyawards08@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk). One hard copy must also be posted to Alex Blackwell at Home Office, Effective Practice & Communication Team, 4th Floor, Fry Building (SE Quarter), 2 Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4DF and be received by 25<sup>th</sup> April 2008.