



# ***Making Time***

**Creating and sustaining an environment  
to enable Problem Solving in Policing**

## **The Tilley Award 2004**

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## ***Making Time: Creating and sustaining an environment to enable Problem Oriented Policing***

### **Summary**

Over the last four years, using a Problem Solving approach, Merseyside Police have massively reduced overtime costs, increased front line staffing and enabled an environment where Officers can work to reduce crime and disorder, without having to constantly react to calls for service.

In 1999, Merseyside Police were faced with the consequences of several years of reduction in staffing, combined with an increase in calls for service demand and a perception that Response policing had become so reactive there was little time for any "problem oriented Policing".

In 2001, the Force introduced the concept of Neighbourhood Policing to the Merseyside Area, taking Officers and staff from the traditional reactive role and giving them responsibility for delivery of "Problem Solving Policing" at local, Neighbourhood, levels.

The perception subsequently arose both amongst customers and staff that this radical approach - using long-term problem-solving strategies, instead of the "quick fix" of reactive policing alone - was not delivering. Staffing levels appeared lower than expected, overtime costs were prohibitive and in many BCU's the availability of Response staff was being compromised by the need to service those Neighbourhood calls that should have been serviced by the Neighbourhoods themselves.

The Merseyside Police Work Scheduling Unit were tasked with identifying where the blockages were, and, using the SARA approach, to resolve those blockages to deliver a better service. The SARA concentrated on Resource Management, particularly as resolving the costs of overtime and the issues around staffing were critical to the success of Neighbourhood Policing - effectively by managing working time to be flexible, but also manage demands.

A Scan identified the following blockages:

- 1) Inadequate initial staffing compounded by the lack of local support for the Resource Managers;
- 2) Lack of use of variable shifts to meet local needs
- 3) The poor uptake of the Computer Aided Resource Management System (CARMS)
- 4) High costs of overtime to supplement local operations and initiatives

Analysis was able to show that many systems and processes already existed, but that these had not been implemented as fully as might have been expected. A response was therefore put into place to enable Neighbourhood Policing through better management of resources – particularly staff time.

There are now 21% more Constables on Uniform Patrol and at the same time overtime has dropped by as much as 56%. The environment now exists where staff time is targeted to reduce reactive policing and enable an intelligence-led problem solving approach. This has occurred at the same time as savings of £3,000,000 – thus paying for itself many times over.

## ***Making Time: Creating and sustaining an environment to enable Problem Oriented Policing***

*"Time is the scarcest resource and unless it is managed nothing else can be managed".*

P.F. Drucker

### *Introduction*

In 1999, Merseyside Police were faced with the consequences of several years of reduction in staffing, combined with an increase in demand and a perception that Response policing had become so reactive there was little time for any problem solving.

An "holistic" approach to the issue of staff time was implemented, intended to make best use of available resources to deliver an efficient and effective service, whilst introducing "best practice" in the management of staff working time.

This approach included not only an entirely new way of developing duty rosters (incorporating variable shifts), but also a network of trained Resource Managers supporting each BCU Command Team, themselves supported by CARMS - the Computer Aided Resource Management System. A further innovation was the provision of a written Resource Allocation Plan for uniform Officers in each BCU, designed to identify and maintain safe staffing levels and to manage demand.

In 2001, the Force introduced the concept of Neighbourhood Policing to the Merseyside Area, taking Officers and staff from the traditional reactive role and giving them responsibility for delivery of "Problem Solving Policing" at local, Neighbourhood, levels. The Response function remained as a "true" emergency service, dealing with urgent and high priority calls and the bulk of night work. The Resource Allocation Plan was used to distribute staff having identified peak times for Response duty times. Neighbourhood Officers were encouraged to develop their own duty rosters to best meet the needs of their Neighbourhood.

### *The Problem*

Almost immediately, the perception arose both amongst customers and staff that this radical approach - using long-term strategies, instead of the "quick (and constantly repeated) fix" of reactive policing alone, was not delivering. Staffing levels appeared lower than expected, overtime costs were prohibitive and in many BCU's the availability of Response staff was being compromised by the need to service those Neighbourhood calls that were non-urgent and should have been serviced by the Neighbourhoods themselves.

### *Identifying the Blockages*

The Merseyside Police Audit and Inspection Department was tasked with identifying where the blockages were, and using the SARA approach, was to resolve those blockages to deliver a better, more cost-effective and targeted service.

A series of audits, supported by structured interviews of both Resource Managers and Command Teams were carried out, identifying the blockages and probing any potential responses.

Four major issues were identified;

- 1) Inadequate initial staffing compounded by the lack of local support for the Resource Managers; they were not allowed role exclusivity and were often viewed as a blockage themselves, owing to their legal obligations in highlighting Health and Safety laws relating to working time and their role in monitoring excessive overtime use;
- 2) Lack of use of variable shifts to meet local needs, compounded by the consequent low staffing levels at peak times;
- 3) The poor uptake of the CARMS system: although Response were generally compliant in updating the system, many Neighbourhoods were not and many Command Teams failed to lead by example.

4) Substantial amounts of overtime in the evening (including cancelled rest days, especially at weekends) being used to supplement local operations, events and even predicted problem-solving initiatives.

The response was equally four-fold.

1) Resource Managers were given role exclusivity, supported by Policy from the Centre, supporting Command Teams in their obligations in respect of working time and Health and Safety. Training was given Forcewide to all supervisors to assist them in their role including seminars and handbooks on the management of staff time.

2) Areas were given accurate data relating to their peaks in demand and subsequently Resource Allocation Plans were created by the Resource Managers to ensure an appropriate distribution of staff to manage that demand – the Plans were improved to include Neighbourhood, Response and CID staff (effectively the “front-line” staff). The relatively low numbers of Neighbourhood Constables needed to answer calls for service were then predictable and they could be put in place, freeing up the rest of their colleagues to concentrate on the reduction of crime and disorder without being concerned with non-urgent calls for service.

3) CARMS compliance was made a competency for the threshold payment to Police supervisors. Centrally produced CARMS reports were also included in BCU inspections, supporting Area Commanders by identifying potential savings and improvements in efficiency and supporting supervisors by challenging errors in the organisation of working time and the application of Police Regulations, Police Staff Conditions of Service and the Working Time Regulations.

4) Areas were monitored on their use of variable shifts and cancelled rest days - the inference being that a shift moved to finish later but start earlier would more effectively match resources to demand and reduce overtime expenditure. The monitoring of rest days cancelled at cost would show forward planning (or lack of it) and also drastically reduce casual overtime.

#### *The Investigation*

A seminar was held for Resource Managers using Problem Solving Techniques to identify the blockages to their influence in the BCU's. This was held in late 2002. There were several questions asked:

- Where are we now - what is the current position in relation to resource management in the Force and how does that allow us to meet the objectives of Problem Oriented Neighbourhood Policing and thus enable the reduction of crime and disorder?
- Where do we want to be - how do we identify when we have achieved effective resource management?
- How do we get there - what activities need to be undertaken by way of response to achieve the objective?

The answers given by the Resource Managers were challenging but not insurmountable:

1. Although in 2001 the Force had systems and structures in place to enable good Resource Management, there had been slow take-up in many BCU's and the importance of recording working time accurately was not then fully appreciated. The whereabouts of staff, the nature of their deployments and the reasons behind any overtime or duties worked were not always entirely clear. Furthermore, many duties worked may not have been appropriate to the circumstances. Consequently low staffing had become an issue at times of peak demand and this had drawn Officers away from Problem-Solving approaches to Neighbourhood issues, instead directing their efforts towards, effectively, reactive policing. Many Neighbourhood Inspectors, seeing the Neighbourhood function compromised by reactive Policing, were

perceived as (understandably) "protective" towards their staff, leading to conflict between the need to deploy to calls for service and the need to "problem-solve" Neighbourhood issues.

2. It was agreed that there were several available performance indicators that would assist in identifying that the Force had achieved more effective resource management;
  - an increase in staffing for front line duties, especially on Neighbourhoods
  - a substantial reduction in cancelled rest days, particularly those cancelled at cost (less than five days notice incurs double time overtime, 5 - 14 days notice incurs time-and-a-half, 15 or more merely means the day is re-rostered).
  - a reduction in deviations incurred under the VSA to meet demand - it was anticipated that although there should still be deviations, these should reduce gradually as core shifts were moved around to better fit identified demand. The stability in duty rosters would also have a positive knock-on effect on staff welfare and reduce casual overtime.
  - an increase in Constables available for patrol - especially the maintenance of appropriate staffing levels at peak demand times
  - greater efficiency in dealing with calls for service - greater availability and therefore targetted responses, to free up other officers to deal with Neighbourhood issues.
  - more efficient duty rostering, ensuring legality, appropriateness and pertinence.
3. It was clear that the Resource Managers needed role exclusivity - they found it excessively difficult to balance other work with what was always designed to be a full-time role. In addition, they needed the support of the Area Command Teams in the production, roll-out and maintenance of their Resource Allocation Plans. They requested direct support from ACPO level to support their role and to assist in giving a clear "steer" in relation to the use of CARMS. They stated it was essential that Areas were monitored for compliance, as it was clear that the strategic view held by Command Teams often did not hold sufficient detail relating to local custom and practice.

#### *Computer Aided Resource Management - Only Part of the Solution*

It was anticipated that the use of CARMS - the computer aided resource management system - would enable the accurate monitoring of compliance with the new system. Full compliance would allow constant monitoring to ensure that not only staff time was being used efficiently and cost-effectively, but also that staff welfare and the legal obligations of the employer were not being compromised.

However, CARMS alone is merely a tool to enable staff and managers. It was essential that training was given to those practitioners "on the ground" to allow managers to concentrate on leadership, secure in the knowledge of the parameters within which they and their staff worked.

To this end, a manual of guidance, supported by a series of seminars detailing the provisions of the Variable Shift Agreement, the function of the Resource Allocation Plan and the legal grounds for using CARMS, was produced. Equally, senior managers, from Chief Inspector upwards, were given similar, but more strategically based, training, along with support in developing their own Area responses to Neighbourhood staffing.

The Work Scheduling staff of the Area Support and Co-ordination Unit centrally audited Areas on their approach to Resource Allocation. It quickly became apparent that many of the duty rosters worked by Neighbourhood Officers were rigid, inflexible, and failed to meet the needs of those Neighbourhoods, especially at times of peak calls for service. Rather than inviting the potential chaos of having hundreds of Constables in Neighbourhoods doing a similar job but working vastly different shifts, a standard three-week flexible duty roster was created by the WSU under the Variable Shift Agreement. This gave some structure to the relatively small teams of Officers, but allowed them to change their duties to meet local needs within a clear set of parameters.

Effectively, the Officers were given a “sliding” shift pattern, where Days could start as early as 07:00 or as late as 11:00, and Lates could start between 12:00 and 18:00. On nine and ten hour shifts this gave immense flexibility between each BCU, but maintained a standard rest day rota which allowed for as many as 66% of total staff to be on duty ( in comparison, a standard 8 hour duty roster would give a maximum of 25% of staff on duty at any time, with no overlaps or flexibility).

Inspectors and Sergeants at Neighbourhood level, confident that emergency calls would be covered by Response patrols on 24-hour cover, could now concentrate on distributing their own staff within the Neighbourhoods to resolve local issues. Supported by the Resource Allocation Plan – which indicated the optimal level of staffing to meet the other (relatively low, but still significant) call-related demands in the Neighbourhood - they could vary shifts to address issues highlighted through local intelligence.

As a direct consequence of these variations and improvements in efficiency, overtime costs were reduced and the Police presence in Neighbourhoods was increased.

Furthermore, because of the improved approach to duty rostering, not only did staff have relatively predictable schedules, they also saw a huge reduction in short-notice cancelled rest days. This meant that the warning of any disruption to their rest days was received much earlier, thus supporting their welfare.

The Audits went further than merely examining the duty rosters, however. The intention of the ASCU audits and inspections is to identify and disseminate best practice across BCU's. Areas were monitored on their own stated staffing levels at different times of day. These staffing levels were often a measure of how well Crime and Disorder was likely to be dealt with. Take, for example, how one BCU locally resolved drink-related disorder in Liverpool City Centre using this approach.

Essentially, with the need to constantly service such offences *and* provide a high visibility reassurance patrol in the city centre Neighbourhoods, the Command Team faced a difficult balance in prioritising tasks. Because of the past difficulties in resourcing enough Constables to be on duty to meet the demand, the imbalance between the number and nature of drink-related offences was disproportionate to the structure of the problems on the City Centre Neighbourhoods. The need to resolve such offences from existing establishment threatened to skew local Officers' ability to meet other demands – especially those on the Neighbourhood that required attention at times other than the peaks for drink-related disorder. (They may have had to concentrate on the drink-related offences to the detriment of the other needs of the Neighbourhood).

A team was constructed of 10 volunteers who would *only ever* work during those peak times – a “fixed shift” always covering the early hours of Saturday and Sunday morning (their rest days were always Sunday, Monday and Tuesday). Had the ten been posted to each of the five Response sections, this would have meant an increase of only one or two Constables on the Late shift each Friday and Saturday (20%). Instead, bearing in mind abstractions accounted for about a third of staff, there were almost always seven “extra” Constables on duty in the Neighbourhood with the sole focus on crime and disorder. This innovative approach allowed the Neighbourhood Constables to attend to other issues in a more proportionate manner.

Eventually, as the use of the resource management structure meant that staffing increased in the Neighbourhoods and more effective means of managing staff time became the norm, the need for a dedicated team reduced. There were more Neighbourhood Constables on duty at times of peak demand, meaning that the disproportionate nature of the city centre workload was more effectively distributed.

### *Outcomes*

The Merseyside approach to “making” time to enable an environment whereby problem oriented policing can more effectively reduce crime and disorder has taken many years to fully introduce. It is a fundamental move away from the rigid and inflexible working practices of the nineteenth century, requiring a long-term view. It requires regular audit and support from the centre to ensure that as demands change, so – quickly - do Police practices, to manage those demands.

This approach has turned Merseyside from a fairly typical large urban force into an international leader in the management of working time. The systems and processes that are fundamental to the professionalisation of the management of Police working time have enabled a radical departure from purely reactive Policing. Instead, the Merseyside Force, using the problem-solving approach to critically examine its own flaws, has put in place a structure that enables it to address crime and disorder in a cost-effective and scientific manner.

For the people of Merseyside this means that their local Police are exactly that, cost-effective and scientific: available at times of peak demand in greater numbers than ever before, doing more work, resolving problems, in their Neighbourhoods more visibly and more cheaply.

For the Merseyside Force, this means that they can critically evaluate expense against outcomes. The unique role of the Resource Manager allows Command Teams to know that staff time is being directed at priority issues, without actually costing any more money than perhaps in the past. In fact the whole process has now paid for itself many times over (£3,000,000 savings in duty time alone). Even the essential two-week training course for Resource Managers comes at no cost to Merseyside, being funded by inviting delegates from other organisations for a small fee.

The Officers themselves can see a difference in their duty rosters, the cancellation of Rest Days and the number of their colleagues available to support them at busy times.

### *Some Weaknesses*

There have been some issues around data collection; for example, of the six BCU's in Merseyside, Wirral was to have been included in the evidence relating to the successful reduction in Rest Days cancelled at cost and overtime expenditure. Unfortunately, Wirral is a victim of its own success, having been able to source substantial external funding for local operations and initiatives. Their recorded overtime bill has actually risen in recent months owing to the number of volunteers working on these externally funded initiatives. The manner in which overtime is recorded does not (for the purposes of this bid) currently easily allow differentiation between what is internally and what is externally funded. Taking the time to differentiate would have been disproportionate under the existing system (but a change to the system to make this easier is being considered for the future).

Equally, because of the longitudinal nature of the project, three of the remaining BCU's were unable to evidence an improvement in the use of their staff time from the computer records – this is simply because they were the slower BCU's to fully take up CARMS recording and so their historical data is not adequate, although their current data shows vast improvements in recording and monitoring.


The two BCU's chosen to evidence the success of the project have consistently maintained the Resource Management approach for a sufficiently long period to enable a comparative analysis of past and current performance. Liverpool North, covering the City Centre and outlying suburbs, is one of the largest BCU's in the country; and Liverpool South, covering a largely residential part of the city, has some of the more complex Policing problems.

The below key success factors were identified as being indicators of the adoption of effective Resource Management and the subsequent

- an increase in staffing for front line duties, especially on Neighbourhoods
- a substantial reduction in cancelled rest days, particularly those cancelled at cost
- a reduction in deviations incurred under the VSA to meet demand and a subsequent reduction in casual overtime
- an increase in Constables normally available for patrol
- greater availability and therefore targeted responses, to free up other officers to deal with Neighbourhood issues.
- more efficient duty rostering, ensuring legality, appropriateness and pertinence.

In 2003 there were 21% more Constables on patrol duties (especially Neighbourhood) than there were in 1999 – an increase of 293. (Note that the Response function was reduced in size to reflect its new role).

Neighbourhood & Response Constable Staffing Levels



Rest Days cancelled at cost (thus incurring overtime) have dropped by 40% overall in the two BCU's.

VSA deviations have dropped by 32%, indicating a stabilisation of the duty rosters to better meet demand – this is supported by the fact that compared with the same period last year, overtime in quarter 1 of 2004 was 56% lower in Liverpool South and in Liverpool North overtime over quarter four 2003 (Christmas in the City) was down by 48%.

The Neighbourhood duty rosters now have at least 33% of staff rostered for duty at times of peak demand. Compared with the traditional Regulation 8-hour roster which provided 25% this is seen as an improvement. Areas continue to be monitored on how many staff they put out at times of peak demand and are encouraged to increase patrol visibility by applying a risk-assessed single crewing policy.

Every duty roster now passes through the Work Scheduling Unit before approval. This ensures that the rosters are legal, appropriate and pertinent to their stated aims. Approximately one in three changes to duty rosters are rejected on one or other of the above grounds, thus ensuring a corporate response to the reduction of crime and disorder.

Areas have now been enabled to deliver a cohesive and efficient response to the reduction of crime and disorder in Merseyside. In “making” time, through robustly managing staff hours and more effectively targeting those hours at local issues, Merseyside Police has supported the introduction of Neighbourhood Policing, developing an environment where staff have the flexibility to solve problems without necessarily – as has been in the past – incurring further cost.

*“We will always have time enough, if we will but use it aright”. Goethe*

Annex A


Data supporting conclusions.

Rest Days	No Notice			< 5 Days			5 - 14 days			>14 Days NO COST		
	2003	2004	Difference	2003	2004	Difference	2003	2004	Difference	2003	2004	Difference
LIVERPOOL	2003	2004	Difference	2003	2004	Difference	2003	2004	Difference	2003	2004	Difference
North	359	101	-71.9	1568	581	-62.9	2522	2008	-20.4	2537	1626	-35.9
South	194	32	-83.5	598	273	-54.3	507	368	-27.4	505	311	-38.4
Total	553	133	-76	2166	854	-61	3029	2376	-22	3042	1937	-36
<b>Under VSA</b>	<b>0-2 Hrs</b>			<b>2-4 hrs</b>			<b>4-8 hrs</b>			<b>&gt;8 hrs</b>		
LIVERPOOL	2003	2004	Difference	2003	2004	Difference	2003	2004	Difference	2003	2004	Difference
North	6382	4084	-36	1563	1378	-12	2742	1619	-41	1040	635	-39
South	2489	1993	-20	973	538	-45	541	385	-29	284	197	-31
Total	8871	6077	-31	2536	1916	-24	3283	2004	-39	1324	832	-37

Days Quarter 1 2003 / Quarter 1 2004		% Difference
16014	10829	-32
8790	5300	-40

Incurred		2003	2004 (Q4)
LIVERPOOL	2002	2003	
North	58431	30189	-48
	2003	2004	

Uniform Staffing	1999	2000	2003
Neighbourhood	267	305	1097
Response	1099	1088	562
Total Uniform Patrol	1366	1393	1659



**Variable Shift Arrangement**

**Agreement between the Chief Constable and Merseyside Police Joint Branch Board**

1. This agreement will apply to all Federated members of Merseyside Police below the rank of Inspector and is agreed under Regulation 26 (1-4) of Police Regulations.
2. Variable Shift Arrangements will entail shifts of not less than eight hours or more than 10 hours duration, unless agreed locally in consultation with Area Commanders and the Officers concerned and providing the variation is specifically agreed in writing by the Joint Branch Board and the Director Operations.
3. An 'outline roster' will be published annually setting out every officer's details in respect of core shifts, rest days, public holidays and any anticipated major event.
4. There will be three core shifts - mornings, lates and nights. Each will have a variable start time as follows :-

Morning duty	-	Normal start time of 07.00hrs variable between 07.00hrs and 10.00hrs.
Late duty	-	Normal start time of 14.00hrs variable between 12.00 hrs and 18.00hrs.
Night duty	-	Normal start time of 22.00hrs variable between 18.00hrs and 00.00hrs.
5. Where regularly occurring routine variations to the core shifts are required to satisfy operational demands - as identified by the Area's demand profile - the required variations should be included in the 'outline roster'.
6. All duties shall be rostered on the basis of properly identified demand.
7. Officers should not normally be rostered to finish later than 18.00 hours on Morning Duty or 03.00 hours on Late Duty unless the need can be justified.
8. In any event, subject to exigencies of the service, no officer should be required to work more than 8 duties in any 35-day period which finish later than 03.00 hours. This will be averaged

over a three month period, to allow Officers an element of individual choice. The regular review of this agreement will ensure that these requirements are being met.

9. A weekly roster will be published 35 days in advance giving exact details of the start and finish times of shifts. This should normally be available on the Computer Aided Resource Management System.
10. Alterations to duties published in the weekly roster should not be made other than for exigencies of duty\*, unless they are made at the officer's own request or have been otherwise agreed with the Joint Branch Board.

#### **\*Exigencies of Service - Definition**

11. The term '*exigencies of duty*' should be interpreted as relating to situations where a pressing\* demand, need or requirement is perceived that is not reasonably avoided and necessitates a change of the roster. Changes to rosters should only be made after full consideration of welfare, operational and practical circumstances rather than purely on financial grounds.

*\*In this context the word pressing relates to the expected situation at the time when the duty is performed rather than the time when the duty roster is changed; i. e. the reason for a change may be known many months in advance but still be pressing.*

Examples of '*exigencies of duty*' would include unforeseen public order situations, court attendance, some major events and essential, rather than routine, training. An officer should be told as soon as the requirement for the change is known.

#### **Court Attendance**

12. When the exigencies of duty require a Late duty officer to attend Morning court they should be given adequate notice ( at the latest by midnight on the calendar day before the changed period of duty commences).
13. Officers should not normally be required to perform consecutive shifts, e.g. 'Night' duty, followed by 'Late' duty , followed by 'Day' duty, to facilitate court attendance, unless at the officers request.
14. Changes to the duty roster should be made where an officer is required to attend court on consecutive days during a cycle of 'N' duty.

#### **Compensation for Duty on a Rest Day, Public Holiday**

15. Compensation in accordance with Police Regulations will apply in all cases with the exception of court attendance for which currently negotiated local agreements will apply.

### **Rest Periods between Shifts**

16. No duty rosters shall have less than a minimum period of 11 hours between shifts.
17. It may be that the Working Time Regulations may not apply owing to exigencies of duty and the 11 hours is breached. This may be in circumstances where the nature of Policing is regarded as in “inevitable conflict” with the WTR (usually unforeseen overtime). Managers should in the first instance seek, where possible, to ensure that the 11 hours are not breached. In the second instance, where this is unavoidable, Managers should ensure that staff receive adequate rest following subsequent duties.
18. Where, owing to the exigencies of duty, it is necessary to alter an officer's duties, all practical steps should be taken to avoid an interval of less than *eight* hours between periods of duty.
19. An officer who is required to parade for duty after a break of less than eight hours shall not, subject to exigencies of duty, be required to work a full tour of duty.

### **Refreshment Periods**

20. Refreshment periods shall, as far as exigencies of duty permit, be as follows:

For shift of 8hrs. but less than 9hrs.- 45 mins, where possible taken during the 4th and 5th hour.

For shift of 9hrs. but less than 10hrs.-50 mins, where possible taken during the 4th to the 6th hour.

For shift of 10hrs or more- 60 mins, where possible taken during the 4th to the 6th hour

### **Monitoring of Shift Variations Health and Safety, etc.**

21. Resource Managers will be responsible for monitoring the efficiency of the Area Patrol Plan in respect of the frequency and equity of changes to individual's duties.
22. Resource Managers will be responsible for ensuring that variations from core shifts are justified on the basis of customer demand and/or officer safety.
23. In the case of major pre-planned events, major disasters, serious disorder, major crime or other like emergency, where exigencies of duty may require changes of duty, the Resource Manager will be responsible for monitoring both changes to individuals duties and the nature of hours worked.

*signed by the Chief Constable*

*signed on behalf of the Joint Branch Board*

## Annex C

### Summary of Outcomes

#### Resource Managers Interviews Carried out to Identify Blockages and Solutions

##### Resource Problems

###### BLOCKAGES

1. Lack of understanding of the role of the Resource Manager at Command Level
2. Inadequate initial resourcing, compounded by that same lack of understanding & subsequent lack of support, further compounded by apparently arbitrary decisions made by line managers especially at evenings and weekends
3. Not enough Sergeants
4. Operations Planning centrally compound a lack of consultation with a lack of appreciation of local issues
5. Protective Neighbourhood Inspectors and Chief Inspectors (a microcosm of the Force)
6. Lack of Supervision creating situation where many staff cannot justify their working day or get given advice and direction
7. CID sacred cow
8. "We are not listened to!"
9. "We are multitasked at the expense of our role"
10. Lack of proper and consistent use of CARM

###### LOCAL SOLUTIONS

1. Local champion (Fed Rep / Ops Mgr)
2. Invites to key meetings where expertise would be acknowledged
3. Ensuring CARMS compliance
4. MG10 from CARMS
5. Systems to allow some form of equity where Neighbourhoods are required to provide staff for abstractions
6. Use Health and Safety Law as a lever
7. Single Parade Station
8. Changeover/Refreshment Polices from Patrol Plan are used and monitored
9. 2 Resource Managers (one Daily / one Ops Planning)
10. CARMS printout to ensure that overtime is not incurred through poor management of abstractions
11. Access for managers to Lotus Calendar in absence of CARMS training or ability

###### I WOULD IMPROVE THE ROLE OF THE RESOURCE MANAGER THROUGH:

1. Role exclusivity
2. Direct line of central support for the role
3. More resources (staff in the Area)
4. Commitment / Support at local level
5. Backing up words with actions when it comes to policy compliance
6. Application of sanctions for non-compliance
7. Clearly define role in terms of lines of local command (Ops or Personnel?)
8. State how Neighbourhood Policing is to be addressed.



Annex E

Content of Merseyside Police Resource Management Course

**Title: "Resource Management and Work Scheduling for Resource Managers"**

**Target Group:** Resource Managers / Personnel Managers  
**Learning Group Size:** 16  
**Delivery Method:** Learning Centre Based, Trainer Led, Workbook Driven, including Facilitated Group Work  
**Duration:** 10 Days  
**Learning Outcomes:** At the completion of the module, the participant will:

- a) have a greater understanding of the role of the Resource Management function
- b) have a greater understanding of the consequences of resource management and work scheduling decisions in relation to
  - 1) *Customer demand*
  - 2) *Corporate policy and procedure*
  - 3) *Health and safety legislation and best practice*
  - 4) *equality of opportunity*
  - 5) *the Area Planning process*
- c) have a greater understanding of the systems and processes for obtaining, collating, analysing, retaining and transmitting management information in this regard
- d) be more able to design, plan, monitor and review schedules consistent with Force policy, Police Regulations, Support Staff Conditions of Service, the Working Time Regulations and the above knowledge base
- e) have an awareness of sickness absence management
- f) be able to more effectively use supporting resource management IT systems to achieve Force and Area goals
- g) be able to complete and deliver a Resource Allocation Plan to best distribute staff time to meet stated goals

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