

# Tilley Award 2004



|                          |  |
|--------------------------|--|
| <b>Title of Project</b>  | Pocket Note Book cover to support the implementation of problem solving and the integration of the National Intelligence Model                             |
| <b>Name of Force</b>     | Hampshire Constabulary   |
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# Pocket Note Book cover to support problem solving and the National Intelligence Model

## Summary

In January 2002 Hampshire Constabulary embarked on the introduction of a 'Problem Solving' approach to support its strategic aims and objectives. Literature from the UK and USA was researched, visits to other Force areas, and a variety of documents were collected. Note was also taken in respect of the impending National Intelligence Model (NIM) and its implications with problem-solving.

The analysis identified the following factors as major inhibitors into the progression and mainstreaming of this approach;

- There was a lack of quality information being recorded by officers at incidents around **victim, location and offender**, thus preventing quality analysis from taking place.
- There were inconsistencies in the introduction of NIM linking '**repeat victimisation**' '**hotspots**' '**nominals**' (target criminals / recidivists) to '**problem solving**' projects.
- A need to educate our own staff concerning, **environmental** and '**situational crime prevention**' techniques (social engineering was dealt with separately).
- TCG were not able to effectively communicate the **intelligence requirements** to officers on the street, reliance was placed upon posters and briefings *within the station*.

The response selected was to produce a pocket note book (PNB) cover that would address the problems identified, focussing on the main project objectives

The cover incorporated,

- Front – reinforcing the problem solving principles
- Rear – The 10 principles of crime prevention
- Front of page mark – THINK Have we been here before? Will we be called here again?
- Rear of page mark – Bomb Scene information.

The intelligence requirements of the bi-weekly tasking and coordinating group (TCG) were printed in documents that were of a size that could be contained/removed from plastic sleeves within the PNB. This included

- A TCG briefing sheet that could be customised regarding nominals, vehicles, hotspots and other intelligence requirements. This could then be printed to perforated paper for ease of use.
- Inserts providing guidance on investigation and problem solving information based on victim, offender and location for burglary, vehicles and violence.

The result was a succinct and focused method of conveying problem solving methodologies combined with the needs and priorities of the TCG to officers who are expected to implement their requirements. Evidence of improved knowledge of situational crime prevention techniques, the importance of community intelligence, identification of repeat incidents and the endorsement of senior management was clearly apparent. This method was recognised by Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabularies (HMIC) as '**Good Practice**' when carrying out the inspection of Hampshire Constabulary in August 2003. Contact has already been made with several forces, one of which is adopting the PNB cover to support problem solving and the TCG process.

## **Project Description**

During 2002 Hampshire Constabulary introduced the National Intelligence Model (NIM), at the same time a problem-oriented policing (POP) approach was identified as the preferred methodology about how we police the community and work with our partners.

A small project team of three was formed to carry out the research, analyse the information and propose a variety of options for the Force to consider that which would best address the objectives of the project.

Although POP is much more than just policing activity, the team recognised that it was critical to be successful in the implementation that the police themselves were equipped and prepared to embrace problem solving; hence the objectives were focussed solely on the police. Partnership engagement was addressed as separate activity not discussed in this report.

## **Objectives of the project**

- To immediately reinforce the strategic direction of the Force as a problem-solving organisation (partnership involvement was subject to another section of the overall strategy).
- To integrate POP with the NIM allowing both techniques to be joined up, particularly at grass roots level.
- To enhance the quality of community intelligence and the intelligence requirements of the TCG including prominent nominals / repeat offenders, hot-spot locations and repeat victims.
- To market the POP philosophy aggressively, so that all officers will be aware of the introduction of POP and the general principles of the process of SARA and PAT.
- To lay the foundations on top of which POP can flourish and be sustainable, this also included other areas outside the scope of the submission such as training and IT.

The initial objectives listed above are broken down in more detail relevant to the identified response to the problem identified after the analysis.

## **Scanning**

The team's first objective was to identify the relevant forces who had adopted a problem solving approach. The first points of reference were the publications 'Brit POP and Brit POP II' Those forces mentioned in these documents were contacted and it became apparent that in some cases the introduction of problem solving had failed apart from small groups of ardent problem solvers.

Therefore the team decided to complete personal visits to, Lancashire, Nottingham, Dyfed Powys, Greater Manchester, Metropolitan and Surrey police, and contacted every other force via the telephone aimed at collecting as broad a range of information and support material in order to allow them to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the introduction of problem solving. This scanning process provided a plethora of documentation, leaflets, posters, etc. for the analysis stage. At this time, there did not appear to be anything available which would link problem-solving and NIM together; whilst there was IT and books available for officers to learn about problem-solving, there was nothing on the shelf which was available for the officer to have on their person whilst on patrol. This was a gap in support that had the potential to have a detrimental effect on the ability of the Force to promote quality 'problem solving' work and improve the intelligence gathering processes.

## **Analysis**

On analysing the documentation and observations from the scanning stage the team identified the following areas that fitted within the framework of the problem-analytical triangle:-

### **Victims**

Police – reactive policing, continually returning to hot-spot locations and dealing with the symptoms of the problem; this was causing a drop in morale as fire-brigade-policing was the norm. There was no recorded ‘good practice’ readily available so that a standard could be followed and developed. Officers were not equipped with the information they required whilst ‘**on patrol**’ therefore they lacked the ability to effectively deliver the intelligence requirements of the tasking and coordinating group (TCG) **and** collect the community intelligence which would help to support future scanning in problem areas.

**Community** – A MORI poll identified that a major concern of the community related to quality of life issues; research suggests that ‘signal crimes’ will influence of fear of crime and reassurance. As repeat calls to locations and effective problem solving was not occurring they were not receiving the service they needed, there was limited evidence of responses that gave any hope of long-term sustainable solutions to problems.

Partner organisations – before active engagement of other partners, it was important that the internal mechanisms of the police were improved so that it was best placed to support problem solving.

**Offenders** – Police culture and organisation. Police officers often tended not to record information in their pocket note books whilst being briefed when parading for duty, those that did needed to search for the correct page during the course of the day to find recorded information such as a registration number, name etc. The result was, with every new day the process of retrieving the information recorded became more difficult as officers forgot what day/page they wrote the information down. The crime and incident management units (CIMU) only made information readily available within the police station through posters, photographs and scrolling bulletins.

There was a clear lack of innovation and a reliance on ‘doing what we have always done’, the CIMU supplied the information and it was down to individual officers to supply the intelligence. There was a lack of knowledge in respect of crime reduction across the Force; this was often regarded as the ‘speciality’ of the crime reduction officer (CRO). The general principles of crime prevention as identified by R V Clarke were not encouraged or indeed allowed to permeate to grass roots level.

**Locations** – Information was only made available within the domain of the police station (apart from radio transmissions of course). Laminate cards have been issued over the years to officers, these can work out quite expensive and also generally end up out of date as soon as they are printed and then stored like a pack of cards in a drawer somewhere in an office!

The location the information is needed most is when the officer is on patrol and may come across a nominal, attend a call from a repeat victim or patrol in an identified hot-spot location. Officers had little idea about the community intelligence requirements and the important role it plays in the subsequent scanning of a problem; consequently little if any was collected. There was a need to communicate the POP methodology to all officers and this could not be achieved AND sustained by using posters and stickers on their own

### **Strengths**

- ✓ Where problem solving was effective it had been supported from senior management
- ✓ There was generally good information on the offender side of the Problem Analysis Triangle (PAT).
- ✓ Links were being made in some areas between POP and NIM (i.e. problem profile).

- ✓ The marketing of POP was present via posters, documents, aide memoirs, laminated cards etc. in most forces to varying degrees
- ✓ There was evidence that problem solving was becoming 'mainstreamed' into the organisation (Lancashire, Metropolitan, Dyfed Powys, GMP)
- ✓ In general there was a willingness and desire amongst most officers to engage in problem solving.

### **Weaknesses**

- ⊗ Problem solving was not seen as a priority.
- ⊗ Support material was recorded in documents and reports generally only accessible to a few personnel (they were often in boxes under desks or in the bottom of officers personal paperwork boxes)
- ⊗ Communication of the Forces commitment to problem solving was poor.
- ⊗ Standards of information obtained around victim and location within **PAT**, which is essential for the analysis stage, was poor.
- ⊗ Many forces were struggling with NIM, and in some quarters this was causing friction with the PRIME ethos.
- ⊗ No, or limited '**Marketing**' of problem solving was available.
- ⊗ No sustainable reminder that problem solving was a mainstreamed core activity had been developed.
- ⊗ NIM and POP activity information was restricted to briefing sheets and posters **within** the police station
- ⊗ Officers were not aware of basic crime prevention principles often considered in responding to problems, this undermined the development of PRIME as part of a crime reduction methodology.

### **Inhibitors**

- ⊗ Lack of consistency from one area to another regarding corporate message.
- ⊗ Absence of a cost effective 'means' of disseminating information and effectively communicating the needs of the TCG to those who were tasked to deliver.
- ⊗ Resistance to change.
- ⊗ 'Seen it before, it comes and goes' mentality amongst officers.
- ⊗ No impactful and sustainable promotion material was being used to continually market/support officers.
- ⊗ Firstly, there was a desire to move away from the term POP. POP was felt to be an exclusive term and did not reflect a partnership approach; the term conveyed more of a 'police led partnership approach' to problem solving.

It was identified that due to the scale of the project a 'Marketing Strategy' was required. This was necessary due to the lengthy timescales foreseen to develop and deliver training and an IT system, therefore the need for '*marketing tools*' that would bridge the gap in knowledge and support was seen as crucial. This would demonstrate and reinforce the forces commitment to the introduction of problem solving whilst the other support activities were developed.

### **Response**

The proposed responses and objectives of the project were re-defined to the underlying causes of the actual problem.

After consultation with partners in Hampshire the term **Problem Resolution In Multi-agency Environments** (PRIME) was agreed as an acronym that best reflected inclusive partnership problem solving, as no single organisation is identified; therefore any kudos is shared in a more egalitarian fashion.

Secondly, the provision of a cost effective and impactful 'marketing strategy' that took into account the strengths, weaknesses and inhibitors identified during the analysis stage was required to support and promote a problem solving approach and also link in with the NIM.

The most important issue was to ensure the marketing strategy would reach all officers and provide a set of tools to support PRIME and NIM as well as a constant reminder that Hampshire Constabulary has adopted a problem-solving approach.

Several possible responses were identified for consideration, they were;

- Utilise an enhanced marketing strategy consolidated by the **aggressive use of posters** etc
- Provide '**global emails**' (an email sent to all officers) to update/inform them of problem solving
- Provide messages via the existing **screensaver** facility used within force
- Continue to provide all officers with **laminated aide memoirs** linked to the posters etc
- Devise a pocket sized **support booklet** for all officers
- Utilise the existing **pocket note book** (PNB) to contain all the information

In considering the response consideration was given to the weaknesses of such an approach.

- The aggressive use of posters would provide a limited success and would not be the constant reminder we required.
- The global emails as an option was considered the least likely as there was clear evidence available that this approach is not liked by officers, who often delete the email without reading it.
- The current screensaver is not dynamic and would only get to officers in limited numbers. There are a considerable amount of laminated aide memoirs in circulation and most once issued get thrown in a drawer, or remain unused in the bottom of an officers paperwork box.
- This also applies to support booklets that often go unread and quickly out of date.

The favoured response was to utilise the officers PNB as it met all our aims and objectives for the following reasons;

- ✓ It was with the officers all the time they were on duty so it would provide a constant reminder
- ✓ It would provide a format that would improve the dissemination of information produced from the NIM TCG regarding prominent nominals (offenders), hotspots (locations), repeat victims and suspect vehicles etc.
- ✓ Information was at hand on the street for officers when they attended crime/incidents regarding standards of information around victim, offender and location thus supporting/improving the scanning and problem solving analysis.
- ✓ By branding our approach and reinforcing the message that Hampshire is committed to a problem solving approach.
- ✓ Initial enquiries had indicated that the notebook would be cheap to produce and quite durable.
- ✓ It could also be used to promote basic crime reduction by including selected principles within the cover.

The question was "How were we going to provide all the information and guidance in a format that would link to the PNB's ?"

Officers were already issued a leather PNB cover to hold their PNB, aide memoirs, etc however due to their cumbersome structure, hard cover and size, many officers did not use them as they would not fit into pockets comfortably.

Potential manufacturers were then consulted to develop the PNB prototype. A key priority was it needed to be supple enough to make it comfortable if placed in pockets and yet resilient

enough not to break, split or rip. This was hopefully achieved in the piloted use and confirmed in the assessment stage of the project.

The plastic covers were cheap to produce, flexible (so fitted comfortably into pockets) and could contain inserts with the information previously identified. The cover was designed to contain some information and guidance which was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, this data was totally encapsulated and contained in the front and back covers, and the 'page mark' as follows: -

- Front cover – reinforcing PRIME, and the problem solving principles SARA and PAT
- Rear cover – The 10 principles of crime prevention
- Front of page mark – THINK Have we been here before? Will we be called here again?
- Rear of page mark – Bomb Scene information.

The current information / personalised sections were printed via documents that could be contained / removed from the plastic sleeves. These documents were developed after a considerable amount of consultation with representatives of all those involved in the activities. The documents included: -

- A TCG briefing sheet that consisted of 4 A4 pages that conformed to data protection and security marking of documents guidance. This could be customised regarding nominals, vehicles, hotspots and other intelligence requirements. This could then be reduced to the correct size for the PNB by printing all 4 sections from the previous A4 pages into quarters onto ONE A4 page. This would then be handed to the officers on their briefing sessions after the bi-weekly TCG. They would then cut the 4 sections out and place them into the appropriate section of the PNB cover.
- Inserts providing guidance on investigation / problem solving information around victim, offender, location for burglary, vehicles and violence. (see appendix A)
- Aide memoirs could be also be printed onto normal paper rather than laminated card and placed in the PNB, thus allowing each officer to have a bespoke PNB with information pertinent to their needs i.e. a probationer may have an insert which covers points concerning statement taking.

## **Assessment**

### **Scanning for feedback**

- The PNB was piloted in Southampton basic command unit (BCU) so that problems could be identified and addressed before launching across the whole of the Force.
- The TCG insert suffered from some printing problems created by the reduction process of converting 4 pages into 1. The result was that sometimes, blank pages were printed or the text spacing became muddled and words overlapped.
- Whilst officers liked the inserts they didn't like the process of cutting out the pages to the required size to fit into the plastic sleeves.
- Initial indicators showed that officers liked the design of the PNB and thought that it would prove a useful toolkit, although there was a report of ink transferring from the insert to the plastic cover.

### **Analysing the data**

- There was some evidence of ink rubbing off on to the plastic covers, which spoilt the impact of the information presented, this appeared to relate to officers who left the inserts in the PNB cover beyond the two weeks that they were required to keep them. Additionally, a common factor was that these officers also kept them in their rear trouser pocket and sat on top of the PNB.
- There were delays in the time it took for the station printers to produce the document for the PNB, and frustration by officer involved in the production was further increased by occasional poor end product delivery; this was a serious threat.

## Responses

- Revised PNB insert that incorporates all 4 pages on 1 sheet of A4 at initial production stage. This totally eliminated the print problems. (see appendix B )
- Due to the consistency of printing, a format was developed that allowed the document to be printed directly onto perforated paper, this made the process of transferring the 4 inserts much easier and quicker.
- Advice was given in respect of the ink transferring to the clear plastic covers, including the use of a detergent to remove any blemishes. As the covers only cost £1.60p each, a complete replacement was also an option.

In assessing the impact of the introduction of the PNB cover and contents questionnaires were designed to address three different perspectives.

- The community beat officers (CBO), as this group at the time of this report have been the main deliverers of PRIME compared to the rest of the Force, so would be able to give their views on an experiential basis.
- The intelligence / crime managers (Sergeants) within each BCU, as they could give their views in respect of any change in quality of intelligence received
- The Tasking and Co-ordinating Group Chairs, this comprised of Chief Inspectors and Superintendents who have the responsibility for the tactical TCG's on a bi-weekly basis and be in a position to contribute towards assessing the impact analysis.

The questionnaires were sent to eleven of the twelve BCU's as one BCU had not introduced the inserts due to a staff shortage

## Community Beat Officers

The team sent out requests to 220 officers from 11 of the 12 Police Basic Command Units (BCU). One BCU was not surveyed as it had not introduced the inserts. A return rate of 25 % was achieved from those surveyed. Question 1 indicated the inserts were introduced between October 2002 and March 2003. The questions are shown in Fig.1 and findings for questions 7 and 8 are specific to the pre and post comparisons of the TCG inserts these are shown in Fig.2 The findings for the remainder of the questions are shown in Fig.3.

Fig.1

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| <b>Q.2</b>  | Reinforced the introduction of PRIME as a problem solving approach into the Force ?  |
| <b>Q.3</b>  | Improved your knowledge around the information required around Victim, Offender, Location for burglary, vehicle and violence ?   |
| <b>Q.4</b>  | Made you think more about repeat calls/attendance via the THINK have I been here before, will I be called again reminder on the page mark ?  |
| <b>Q.5</b>  | Awareness of the 10 principles of crime prevention contained on the back of the PNB cover influencing your actions ?   |
| <b>Q.6</b>  | The PNB cover was designed to be cost effective to produce and last for a minimum of 1 year. Taking this into account; How robust is the PNB cover ?   |
| <b>Q.7</b>  | <b>Prior</b> to the introduction of the pocket notebook inserts, how well equipped did you feel <i>whilst on patrol</i> to respond to the intelligence requirements of the TCG?  |
| <b>Q.8</b>  | With the photographs of prominent / developing nominals, hot-spot locations and intelligence requests contained within the inserts how well do you <b>now</b> feel equipped to deliver the requirements of the TCG <i>whilst on patrol</i> ? |
| <b>Q.9</b>  | What influence if any, has the PNB inserts had on your submissions of intelligence logs for the CIMU?  |
| <b>Q.10</b> | Have you submitted intelligence to CIMU that you can attribute to the information within the TCG inserts?  |
| <b>Q.11</b> | Within the PNB are guidance inserts for burglary, vehicle crime and violent crime based around the victim, offender and location to assist with the initial investigation. How useful have you found this information?                       |
| <b>Q.12</b> | Do you expect that the inserts will contribute to the better collection of intelligence in the future?   |


Question 10 revealed 56% of those surveyed could attribute intelligence submitted was as a result of the TCG inserts

The answers section was graded to provide responses from 1 to 5; in order to make this more meaningful questions 7 and 8 had the following grades assigned to them by the team,

- ✓ 1 lowest Grade = 'Not very well equipped'
- ✓ 2&3 middle grade = 'Adequately Equipped'
- ✓ 4&5 top grade = 'Very well equipped'

The same rationale with slightly different headings has been applied for the remainder of the questions in order to show an easier interpretation of the scoring process.

Fig.2




The graph at fig.2 above shows prior to the introduction of the TCG inserts a majority of the officers felt adequately equipped. However, post their introduction that changed with 85% of officers now indicating they felt 'Very well equipped' with only 11% feeling they were 'adequately equipped'. It was interesting to note a qualitative dialogue with them revealed that post introduction they were not very well equipped as they no longer received information about people on *their* beat regularly. This acted in a negative way for them and they ignored the details of the prominent nominals not relevant to their area.

The findings of Fig.3 clearly show that the marketing strategy had raised the profile of PRIME, including the collection of information around victim, offender and location. There were also good gains on officers now thinking about repeat incidents and the application of the crime prevention principles.


Clearly there had been a positive difference made to the knowledge base of officers in respect of situational crime prevention, which in turn was also being applied in the course of their work where necessary.

Fig.3



This confirmed there was a significant improvement **Post** the introduction of the PNB cover and inserts. Qualitative information from those officers who indicated there was no change provided similar findings to those already mentioned, including that most of them were mature long serving officers who allegedly already possessed those skills and information.

Fig.4



The cost to produce the PNB cover including the inserts was £1-60 each. The anticipated life expectancy of 1 year was considered a good return on investment. The findings as above indicate the covers achieved the objectives of the project.

## Intelligence / Crime managers


A return rate of 7 out of 11 was achieved from those surveyed. The questions are shown in Fig.5 and the findings are shown in Fig.6 and Fig.7

Fig.5

|            |  |
|------------|--|
| <b>Q.1</b> | <b>Prior</b> to the introduction of the pocket notebook inserts, how well equipped did you feel that officers were able to respond to the intelligence requirements of the TCG <i>whilst on patrol?</i>  |
| <b>Q.2</b> | With the photographs of prominent / developing nominals, hot-spot locations and intelligence requests contained within the inserts how well do you <b>now</b> feel officers are equipped to deliver the requirements of the TCG <i>whilst on patrol?</i> |
| <b>Q.3</b> | Has the quality of the intelligence submitted by officers been affected since you introduced the PNB inserts.  |
| <b>Q.4</b> | In your opinion, how 'useful' are the inserts for officers to have readily available at all times whilst on patrol?  |
| <b>Q.5</b> | Do you expect the inserts to contribute better quality intelligence in the future  |
| <b>Q.6</b> | Are you aware of any evidence of intelligence provided that has been linked with the provision of information your CIMU provided within the PNB cover?   |


The findings identified in Fig.6 re Q.2 clearly indicate there is a perceived improvement from the managers of the CIMU that **Post** implementation officer are now 'Very well equipped' with information whilst on patrol. The remaining answers to the other questions also indicated significant improvements.

Fig.6



In relation to Fig.7 below it showed all of the CIMU managers who completed the questionnaires identified that there had been intelligence submitted as a result of the TCG inserts.

Fig.7



**TCG Chairs**


A return rate of 8 out of 11 was achieved from those surveyed. The questions are shown in Fig.8 and the findings in Fig.9. and Fig.10.

Fig.8

|            |  |
|------------|--|
| <b>Q.1</b> | <b>Prior</b> to the introduction of the pocket notebook inserts, how well equipped did you feel that officers were able to respond to the intelligence requirements of the TCG <i>whilst on patrol</i> ?   |
| <b>Q.2</b> | With the photographs of prominent / developing nominals, hot-spot locations and intelligence requests contained within the inserts how well do you <b>now</b> feel that officers are equipped to deliver the requirements of the TCG <i>whilst on patrol</i> ? |
| <b>Q.3</b> | Have the PNB inserts made any improvement on the quality of intelligence required by the TCG?  |
| <b>Q.4</b> | Do you expect the inserts to have a positive impact in the future?   |


The TCG Chairs are responsible for the co-ordination of our policing activity. There was early anecdotal information that the introduction of the TCG inserts was seen by some key personnel as possibly 'questioning' their existing processes and a certain amount of defensive dialogue occurred. The findings of the users confirmed they felt more informed as a result of the introduction of the PNB covers and inserts.

Fig.9



The findings shown in Fig.9 show the change in how the TCG inserts have been perceived as improving officers on patrol from adequately equipped to very well equipped. This demonstrates combined with the user findings there has been a considerable improvement in delivering both PRIME and TCG processes post introduction.

Fig.10



When examining the impact as shown in Fig.10 there is a marked improvement in the quality of intelligence post the introduction and it is identified it will make a significant difference in the future.

Assessment of the introduction of the new PNB cover has provided the following benefits;

- ✓ Evidence that officers have a greater knowledge and appreciation of **situational crime prevention**.
- ✓ A greater understanding of the need for community intelligence around **victim, offender and location**.
- ✓ Officers were now **'thinking'**, more about the repeat calls for service and more importantly doing something about it.
- ✓ **PRIME** was clearly recognised as a method of problem solving endorsed and encouraged by the Force.
- ✓ The need to duplicate the information all over the station has been reduced.
- ✓ Current and relevant information to support **'problem solving'** and the **'NIM'** was easily accessible for officers no matter where they were.
- ✓ The benefit of removing the need to laminate information to protect it meant **cost savings** could be made as the information could be protected within the plastic sleeve.
- ✓ Information guidance could be easily and cheaply changed.
- ✓ Officers could **customise** their PNB cover contents for their role/responsibilities (a new probationer could place info relevant to them whilst a senior officer could include information such as firearms scene information).
- ✓ It has been recognised by Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabularies (HMIC) as **'Good Practice'** during an inspection of several BCU's in 2003.
- ✓ Contact has already been made with several forces that have expressed an interest in adopting the PNB cover to support their officers and improve performance; South Wales police have already ordered 3,500 of the PNB covers. They were so impressed with the potential of the PNB cover as the benefits were so obvious, they made their decision without waiting for any evaluation.

To date, over a year after their introduction only 3 PNB covers have had to be replaced, which is a testimony to their resilience.

## Appendices

# Appendix A



"Appendix Tilley PNB  
inserts Scene 7.8.02v

# Appendix B



"Appendix C99  
unprotected 30.10.03