Tilley Award 2003

Crime And Disorder Reduction Category

Operation Guest

Burglary Initiative
Swinton, F2 Subdivision
Salford
Greater Manchester
Tilley Award 2003

Operation Guest

- Crime and Disorder Reduction Category

- Greater Manchester Police
  Salford West Subdivision

- Endorsing Chief Officer
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In November 2001 the Salford West Subdivision of Greater Manchester Police recognised that a coordinated response was necessary in order to combat the rising problems of burglary, car crime, and robbery. Analysis showed that 40 percentage of all crime on the subdivision occurred on only 7 of the beat areas. These were identified and named ‘threat areas’. These areas were increasingly becoming seen as 'problem' with a sense of hopelessness amongst the community and a lack of belief in the policing response.

Initially starting with the worst beat, Q1 at Patricroft, Operation Guest was set up to address the burglary problem. At that time this beat had the highest burglary level in Greater Manchester Police and similarly high levels of robbery and car crime. Over a 12-month period the operation set out to reduce the burglary level by 10% and increase detection rates by 5%.

It was clear that the crime trend was rising, analysis being conducted wasn’t sufficient, the response in place was inadequate, the community was becoming more disenfranchised and the support from Crime & Disorder partners was poor and misaligned.

Operation Guest set out (by a series of linked strategies) to achieve a marked reduction in the crime problem. It utilised a series of individual problem solving techniques or strategies to facilitate an overall outcome. Under Guest 1 twenty-two strategies were set that involved all elements of the sub division's resources & partnership working, from uniform section through CID, from SOCO to Homewatch coordinators, to media relations and Divisional & Force resources. Guest 2 was launched in November 2002 and expanded the operation to the other threat areas. It built on the successes of Guest 1 and added new strategies, which were to again increase the impact of Guest.

In the first 12 months (01/11/2001 – 01/11/2002) Operation Guest achieved an 18% reduction in burglary on the Q1 beat. In the twelve months up to April 2003, the reduction stood at 44% on the Q1, the threat areas (combined) had reduced 16%. Key crime on the threat areas had reduced (month on month) by 19%. These reductions are a success, but additionally the officers of the subdivision have embraced problem solving, guided by intelligence led analysis, as their normal way of working. Guest is a joined up strategy to overcome a large problem - by taking bite-sized chunks.
I am delighted to forward the submission from the Salford West Sub-division of Greater Manchester Police to the Tilley Award for 2003. The report outlines the success of an ongoing operation on the subdivision that has now been running since November 2001 and has achieved some startling results in reducing burglary and other key crime volumes on some of the hardest patrol beats in my Force area.

Operation Guest is a series of problem solving strategies. Some of the strategies stand-alone, others require the strategy as a whole to achieve a result. At its core Operation Guest is about the joined up thinking, the appropriate use of analytical material, the importance of willing Crime and Disorder partners and strong visionary leadership – all put together with the aim of reducing crime levels, increasing detections and improving the environment for our community.

Over the past 12 months, in the areas it has concentrated on Operation Guest, has achieved a 16% reduction in levels of burglary. On the Patricroft beat it started in November 2001 (at that time the worse beat in the Force area for burglary) it has achieved a 44% reduction. I would describe these as remarkable achievements.

I commend this submission to you. It reflects the dedication and efforts of all the staff at Swinton subdivision and the equal efforts of its crime and disorder partners. It also importantly shows the effect we are having in improving the quality of life for the communities we police.

Yours sincerely,

Chief Constable
Salford West Submission to Tilley Award 2003

Operation Guest 1 & 2

Overview

In November 2001 the Salford West Subdivision of Greater Manchester Police recognised that a coordinated response was necessary in order to combat the rising problems of burglary, car crime, and robbery. Analysis showed that 40% of all crime on the subdivision occurred on only 7 of the beat areas. These were identified and named 'threat areas'. These areas were increasingly becoming seen as 'problem' with a sense of hopelessness amongst the community and a lack of belief in the policing response (Operation Guest predominately dealt with 6 of these areas as the 7th (N3 Boothstown) is a threat for vehicle crime only).

Initially starting with the worst beat, Q1 at Patricroft, Operation Guest 1 was launched. At that time the Q1 beat was the worst beat in the Force for burglary, and had similar high levels of robbery and car crime. As part of the subdivision's tasking and coordinating process under the National Intelligence Model, an objective was set to reduce the level of burglary on the beat by 10% over 12 months, and increase the detection rate by 5% over the same period. The strategies put in place to achieve this would, by their nature, have an impact on other forms of crime (but at this stage no targets were set).

Operation Guest is a series of linked strategies that as a whole seek to achieve a marked reduction in the crime problem. The Operation utilises a series of individual problem solving techniques or strategies to facilitate an overall outcome. Under Guest 1 twenty-two strategies were set that involved all elements of the subdivision's resources, from uniform section through CID, from SOCO to Homewatch coordinators, to media relations and Divisional & Force resources. Each strategy stood singularly, but contributed to a focussed approach to reducing the problem. It was recognised that it was important to have a long-term operation that allowed innovation and creativity, yet provided a sense of purpose to achieving outcomes.

When Guest 1 was reviewed in November 2002 it had already achieved significant reductions in burglary dwelling on the Q1 beat (the year on year reduction for November was 93%) – and was having a knock on effect as good practice started to transfer onto other beats. At this point it was decided to expand the scope into ‘Operation Guest 2’. Taking forward largely the same strategies (although some refinement and realignment occurred due to lessons learnt), Operation Guest 2 takes in all of the subdivisions 'threat areas' and is an ongoing operation. During the course of its 18 months of operation there have been various small scale specific problem solving initiatives carried out that have addressed individual problems within the threat areas as they have arisen, but it is the strategic focus to problem solving that Guest provides that is it's strength.

In the first 12 months (01/11/2001 – 01/11/2002) Operation Guest achieved an 18% reduction in burglary on the Q1 beat. In the twelve months up to April 2003, the reduction stood at 44% on the Q1, the threat areas (combined) had reduced 16%. Key crime on the threat areas had reduced (month on month) by 19%.
The Swinton Subdivision: The ‘Threat Areas’

The Swinton Subdivision covers a large geographic area on the western side of the city of Salford. It is made up of 31 beat areas, with police resources deploying from four parading stations, these being Swinton, Eccles, Little Hulton and Irlam. These four stations cover the main population centres. Seven areas were identified as being ‘threat’ areas to the crime figures of the subdivision. Those dealt with by Operation Guest are illustrated on figure 1.

Figure 1: Operation Guest Threat areas of Swinton Subdivision

Map of F2 Sub Division showing threat areas. Produced 19/05/03 by Patsy Lee Intelligence Analyst FIB

Objectives of the Project

The main objective of Operation Guest 1 was clear and specific:

- To achieve a 10% reduction in burglary dwelling in the Patricroft area (Q1) and increase the detection rate 5%.

This overarching aim overshadowed the other lesser aims (which were as important but couldn’t as easily be shown to be quantifiable or have a target set). These were:
- To reduce volume (or key) crime.

No target values were set for this, other than that already in place under the Salford Division Performance Improvement Plan of reducing key crime by 3 percent per annum for 5 years (2000 – 2005). This was because the aim was to focus on burglary. It was anticipated that there would be a reduction in all crime, but this was also met with concerns about displacement.

- To increase the rate of intelligence submissions in relation to active offenders.

The ‘poly' offending nature of offenders on the F2 (where offenders commit all forms of crime) means that intelligence on their movements etc is vital. It was identified that improvement of submission rates from all areas of staff was required. This would be beneficial to the Q1, but also the entire division.

- To improve public accountability and openness.

It was recognised that the public felt a level of ‘hopelessness' at the level of crime in the area, and there was a marked fear of crime. Guest sought to reduce this fear by improved contact, directly through focused groups such as ‘Public Voice on Policing', and indirectly by improved media linkages. Active measures were taken to reach local opinion formers rather than just the 'representatives' sitting on various local groups.

At the time Guest was launched the Q1 beat had the highest levels of burglary in GMP. The huge impact this was having on the area was marked. The cycle of despair was apparent and for the community of the area the police were seen as uncaring and uninterested. What was also apparent was that officers were also being affected. The high workload placed upon them was affecting both their working and social lives. This had to be addressed, as well as the need for the victim's perspective of the highly intrusive nature of domestic burglary, often magnified compared to the monetary value actually lost. For these reasons it was essential that Guest had an impact.

It was understood early on that the response needed to involve all elements of the subdivision, with each individual having a role to play. Thus the strategies developed were far reaching and may not have necessarily been seen as having a direct impact on the outcomes sought. This was even more the case under Guest 2 where the strategies were across a wider area and were broader focussed as a result of lessons learnt and capabilities built up under Guest 1. It was also important to recognise the involvement of our partners, particularly the Salford City Council in terms of the Community Safety Team, and the Housing department Burglary Reduction Initiative (BRI). Whilst partners were not directly tasked under Guest strategies, often the strategy owner would need to directly involve the partner in order to achieve the desired outcome. Much was learnt during this period to enhance effective partnership working across the entire division.

The only success criteria that can be applied to the operations are the achieved reductions. Guest is a linked strategy with no outcome in itself. The individual strategies do have some success criteria – although often this will only be anecdotal evidence. What is clear is that the success of Guest can be seen not only in the reductions achieved, but in the improved capabilities of staff, improved public relations and media relations, reduction in fear in the
Definition Of the Problem

The level of crime within Patricroft (under Guest 1) and all the threat areas (under Guest 2) could easily be seen from the recorded figures and from some analysis carried out by the crime analyst. It was clear in November 2001 that the amount of crime on the Q1 was rising.

Figure 2: Burglary Trend Graph
(Reproduced from F2 Strategic Threat Assessment, January 2002)

What is also apparent from the Strategic document produced at the time is that whilst recognising the problem, there was a lack of definition to the response. The control strategy (from the National Intelligence model) that ran from January 2002 referred under burglary dwelling to “identify repeat locations”, “situational analysis” and “SARAs for hotspots”. It lacked a coordinated focussed response that everyone could buy into. Guest was to provide that (and it will come as no surprise that this occurred at the same time as a senior change of Leadership took place, and the value of Guest as a principle was recognised).
The best form of analysis being undertaken at the time Guest commenced can be summarised by figure 3 that was contained in the Strategic Document for the subdivision in January 2002. It was actually originally produced as part of the Quarterly Performance Review process that was in place in GMP at that time. It can be seen that it was fairly superficial, with some minor Victim/Offender/Location.

**Figure 3: Extract from Strategic Threat Assessment, January 2002:**

**Situational Analysis.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Situational analysis/profile: Victim, Offender, Location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwelling</td>
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<td>Reduce</td>
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<tr>
<td>burglary</td>
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<tr>
<td>By 0.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Current</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>detection</td>
<td>Performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rate 9.1%</td>
<td>Shows a rise of 6.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F1= 0.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F2= 12.3%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Current</td>
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<td></td>
<td>detection</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate 5.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F1= 5.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F2= 5.0%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Burglary dwelling has risen by 12.3% and the detection rate currently stands at 5.0% for the F2 Subdivision. The rate fell, compared to the previous year's figures, at the start of the financial year but has risen since July with a peak, as with other offences, in October. The detection rate has varied throughout the year but the best figure (of 7.9%) was achieved in November 2001 indicating that the Volume Crime Project, with increased forensic examinations and improved liaison between the OPU and CSEU, was beginning to bear fruit.

Victim: Burglary hot-spots cover both good and poor quality housing. Often houses are not alarmed and do not feature window locks in use on the ground floor. Keys including vehicle keys are often left in the lock or within view and reachable, via implements, from the letter box. In some of the poorer areas Home watch scheme take-up rates are poor.

Offender: Offenders tend to live close to the burglaries they are committing, i.e. 1-1.5 miles. They are regularly feeding drug habits and are often known PYOs. Some burglaries are committed by offenders to obtain vehicles with which to then commit robberies.

Location: See Victim above. A mix of good and poor quality housing, e.g. Patricroft, Winton, Kenyon Way Estate and also Swinton/Worsley, Boothstown and Ellesmere Park/Monton. Some offences have shifted from being committed overnight to the late afternoon, possibly as a result of operations as well as darkness during the winter.

The responses put in place as a result of Figure 3 were fairly superficial, relying upon ongoing initiatives mainly. But Guest was starting to have an impact. The detection rate was up due to increased forensic examination and improved communication between the OPU and the CSEU (Guest Strategy), intelligence submissions were up 70% since September 2001 (Guest Strategy) and a minimum standard of investigation for burglary crime had been produced (Guest strategy).

Guest did bring the need for rapid improvement in understanding, this did occur. Appendix A contains extracts from the November 2002 Strategic Threat Assessment. These show the improved knowledge, understandings and abilities. What these extracts also show is the downward trend achieved. As Guest 2 was launched specific demands were placed on the analyst to really drill down into the problems in the threat areas. Problem profiles were produced that gave comprehensive understanding of the problems. These documents were essential in the continued success of Guest. Appendix B contains extracts from the M1 profile for illustration of the type of analysis now being carried out.
Response to the Problem

What is important to recognise is that the Guest strategies were not 'one-offs'; they were ongoing and developed on virtually a weekly basis as a result of expansions that occurred following the weekly tactical & coordinating meeting. Guest strategies never changed in response to short term problems; they only dealt with issues that were considered a threat to the subdivision.

As Guest 1 was launched some strategies were put forward, sometimes using best practice from elsewhere, and then discontinued as shown not to work in the Patricroft environment. What did occur very quickly was the expansion of the operation into other forms of crime (i.e., Robbery) and then other beat areas as the tactics were shown to be working.

Each strategy under Guest was given ownership of to a particular lead individual, who was responsible for its implementation and progression. This allowed individuals to feel part of the team but also gave each area a leader who would be responsible for pushing it through and making a difference. This was especially relevant when it came to dealing with outside partners.

Operation Guest 1 was launched with the following 14 strategies dealing directly with improving the burglary dwelling situation. Due to limitations of space only some of the strategies are discussed in detail:

Problem: Insufficient / poor information from scenes of crime.
Solution: Minimum standards of Investigation for Burglary.
Overseen by the Detective Inspector this project gave staff details of what would be expected at a scene as a minimum. This was to ensure maximum benefit was gathered from each scene. The standards were published on a leaflet for all officers and were there as an aide memoire. Individual shift inspectors were also expected to quality assure work. An immediate improvement in scene preservation, house-to-house enquiries and quality of crime reporting was noticed. This is an ongoing minimum standard.

Problem: Environmental weaknesses meaning prone to attack
Solution: Location hardening.
It was identified by the analysis of the beat that the area suffered from particular environmental characteristics that made it vulnerable to burglary crime. This included ginnels that gave effective, non-overlooked access to rear of properties, poorer lighting and overhanging trees etc. The subdivision's Crime Reduction Advisor has responsibility for this area and has worked closely with the City Council housing department Burglary Reduction Initiative (BRI). With the backing of the Community safety Unit great strides were made to improve the 'neglect' aspects and remove environmental eyesores. Following evidence provided in problem profiles great strides were made to improve street lighting (at not inconsiderable cost). The name of Operation Guest was very useful in pushing things through, and was used by our partners as well in dealing with their fellow agencies (i.e. the BRI when dealing with street lighting).
Problem: **Insufficient evidence on Modus Operandi (MO’s)**  
Solution: Maximising Scene of Crime Investigators Intelligence value, analysed by the OPU.

Problem: **Lack of intelligence from informants in the area**  
Solution: Source Handling Unit was set up in March 2002 and immediately started to have an impact on Guest.

Problem: **Time lag in identifying new series**  
Solution: Analysis by Crime Evaluators and immediate highlighting to the tasking group for response.

Problem: **Lack of intelligence from Prisoners arrested**  
Solution: Maximising each arrest, debrief sheets and use of Detective officers for dealing with arrests from the area.

Problem: **Motivating Staff to achieve results & poor intelligence flows**  
Solution: Presentations & Intelligence debriefs of Shifts.  
It was recognised that it was vital to include the section officers in Operations and ensure they knew the aims and objectives of the Operation. That way they were more likely to respond in a positive fashion to the taskings that were coming out from Guest.

Problem: **Lack of resources on the ground at key times**  
Solution: Maximising use of the shift overlaps.  
The variable shift arrangements in place in GMP gave shifts the opportunity to carry out initiatives in response to particular problems. Guest encouraged shift supervisors to actively use the time for targeted work. The OPU showed commitment to Guest and the shift staff by providing briefing packages and intelligence updates.

Problem: **Maximising benefits of scene recoveries of footwear marks**  
Solution: Crime Scene Examination Unit to develop system to identify footwear issues (ongoing Force level development).

Problem: **Lack of local ownership of the problem amongst community**  
Solution: Homewatch & improved consultative groups.

Problem: **Lack of detailed knowledge of the crime problem**  
Solution: Development of the skills of the Crime Analyst.  
As Guest developed the role of the crime analyst expanded massively - and to the credit of the individual involved so did his capabilities. Demands placed upon this position - especially when Guest expanded to include all threat areas - meant that in depth problem analysis had to be produced that gave the tasking group the sort of information it required to make tasking demands on its various resources.
Problem: Lack of targeting our persistent offenders
Solution: Development of the 'Top 20' wanted list.
Communication blockages between internal departments were overcome to ensure we knew whom we needed to target. By overcoming this a list of 'top 20' most active and most actively sought offenders developed. This gave staff a goal and allowed for some focussed, justifiable targeting of individuals. The list was mainly prioritised according to the offence committed and the knowledge of the staff within the OPU. It was to eventually become more formalised with the national introduction of J-Track.

Problem: Slow response to scenes of burglary due to pressures on Shifts.
Solution: Burglary car initiative (eventually this was discontinued as it felt officers not working the car could start to deskill & the minimum standards of burglary gave the required results)

Problem: Perception amongst public of lack of police response and fear of crime.
Solution: Media Liaison.
It was seen as vital that the operation addressed the fear that many members of the Community had over crime, and to reinforce the message that the police were concerned and were having an impact. As Guest 1 was launched there were no formal links between the subdivision and the local media. This was addressed and the local paper very enthusiastically took on board a local 'crime page'. This enabled the subdivision to get over crime prevention messages; warnings about repeat methods of entry and also some details of successes achieved.

When Guest 1 was initially launched the intention was to focus on burglary and on the Q1 beat. It quickly became clear that the techniques being applied had application to other forms of crime in the area - which were also high. Because of this the operation expanded in January 2002 to include vehicle crime and robbery. It still remained focussed towards the Patricroft beat area, but many of its benefits were already beginning to be applied across the other threat areas (particularly the Q2, N1 & N2 beats)

The additional strategies added to Guest 1 were:

Problem: Elderly being targeted for streetcrime & the associated fear of crime amongst this community.
Solution: The BB Bag initiative to deal with robbery of elderly persons.
This groundbreaking project involved a covert 'bum-bag' that was personally fitted to elderly people and was worn beneath outer clothing. It was used to carry the wearers pension etc., and thus prevent loss should a 'bag snatch' occur. Bags were fitted at coffee morning presentations and such like, and included crime prevention advice. The reception was massive and over 5,000 units were fitted. In one month alone over 1650 units were fitted. This was a very successful initiative and proved very important in combating fear of crime.
Problem: **Perception amongst Community of lack of Police presence**  
Solution: Hawk Van deployment on the beat.

Problem: **School pupils being targeted for Mobile phone theft**  
Solution: Schools liaison regarding robbery of mobile telephones.

Problem: **Robbery of students at Eccles College**  
Solution: 'Safe Routes' established that had a more visible police presence.

Problem: **Use of motor vehicles by offenders living on the subdivision.**  
Solution: Improvement of the intelligence on offenders' movements (this led under Guest 2 to the purchase of a covert ANPR to fully research offender transit routes)

Problem: **Criminal use of motor vehicles prior to their abandonment.**  
Solution: research into abandonment sites by crime analyst.

Problem: **Getting the crime prevention message across where needed**  
Solution: High visibility signage in the area to warn of car crime (moveable electronic messaging board)

Problem: **Lack of visibility of patrols due to competing demands**  
Solution: Deployment of Force & divisional resources.  
Every opportunity was taken to utilise resources from outside of the subdivision on high profile public reassurance initiatives. The Mounted Unit were very successfully used. Their high visibility and inherent 'approachability' were excellent tools for breaking down the reluctance on the part of the community to provide intelligence and information.

In November 2002, Operation Guest 2 was formally launched, which retained many of the original strategies but had the benefit of lessons learnt. The main changes and new strategies were as follows:

Problem: **Lack of 'ownership' within CID of the Custody Office aspects of Operation Guest**  
Solution: A dedicated officer identified to act as a Custody Liaison Officer.

Problem: **The levels of Distraction Burglary (Bogus Official)**  
Solution: Operation Baldry.  
This stand-alone operation conducted by the uniform shifts in response to distraction burglary crimes on the threat areas. This involved appropriate responses, leafleting and raising awareness and identification of possible vulnerable households. A lot of work was done in partnership with the BRI. This has now developed into a joint 'graded' response to this form of crime.

Problem: **Lack of specific understanding of the problems on certain beats.**  
Solution: Problem profiles by the crime analyst.
**Problem:** Ineffective use of specialist resources to assist in reducing crime.
**Solution:** Street crime traffic Unit – dedicated detachment from Traffic Unit working to OPU tasking priorities

**Problem:** Lack of joint working with other enforcement agencies with regard to Handlers.
**Solution:** Activity with trading standards.
Under Guest 2 Trading Standards were given a more active role, with joint visits being conducted to second hand dealers to try to combat the handling aspects of acquisitional crime, Salvage dealers and test purchasing of alcohol to under age persons.

But it was during 2002 that 2 strategies developed under Guest that were to be formalised under Guest 2, that were to have a marked impact and led to much of the successes that were achieved:

**Problem:** Slow receipt of identifications from forensic activity
**Solution:** Fast Track DNA & fingerprints.
This strategy allowed the subdivision to prioritise work through the force resources to ensure that scenes from within the target areas were dealt with as a priority. This meant quick fingerprint and DNA matches were achieved. This allowed the OPU to act more quickly take an offender off the streets, thus reducing their impact.

**Problem:** Lack of resources to act on OPU provided information.
**Solution:** Creation of the Operational Support unit (OSU)
With fast tracking and the much improved levels of intelligence that were being received under Guest (both from uniform & CID staff, and from the Source Unit), it was identified that the ‘Top 20’ list and other associated time bound information needed to be acted upon quickly. It was therefore decided to form an ‘enforcement’ element to the OPU, in the form of the ‘Operational Support Unit’ (OSU). This unit would be 5 staff detached from each shift on a 10-week cycle. This highly motivated unit immediately started to have an impact.

None of these strategies could have stood on their own and made a significant impact on the problem. However, when they were combined they achieved results. What was also noticeable was the focus it gave the officers involved and it allowed staff with ownership of certain strategies to demand extra “in the name of Guest”.

The Operational Policing Unit at Swinton managed the project, under the daily supervision of the Operations Sergeant. Once the strategies were published a lot of the management decisions came down to the individual owners – however they tended to be guided by the wishes of the TCG group, and in response to new intelligence etc.
Other than some additional funds for the fast tracking of DNA, most of the strategies were funded from normal police funds. Where appropriate additional funds were sought for specific operations, for instance £14,000 was received from central funds for Operation Baldry, and this was later increased by a further £17,500 when the effect of the interventions were shown. This additional money was also used for the purchase of the ANPR system. There were additional funds received from partner agencies, such as Community Against Drugs.

**Evaluation**

As has already been mentioned Operation Guest was subject to a virtually weekly review at the subdivision's tactical and co-ordinating meeting. From these meetings it was easy for the group to pick up what was working and what was failing and adjust as necessary. This means that Guest had a form of 'rolling' evaluation. However, a number of more formal evaluations took place.

The first review took place in April 2002, after five full months of Operation Guest 1. The evaluation that took place was fairly crude - it must be remembered that a constant development in analytical ability was occurring on the subdivision during the life of Guest.

Two quarters worth of figures were reviewed (October/November/ December, against January/February/March). This actually means the first quarter included figures from before Guest and a period of Guest. This is not the best for evaluation of the effectiveness of Guest, but the report makes no mention of this. What the figures do show is that there was a 33% reduction in burglary dwelling between the 2 quarters, robbery was also down 22%, Key crime reduced 18%.

Some crude forecasting was carried out that predicted a figure for burglary dwelling for the Q1 beat for April. This figure was actually a rise to 42/43. This flew in the face of what Guest was aiming to achieve, and it was 'hoped' that this wouldn't happen. At the subsequent review later, it was clearly shown it didn't, burglary fell (against prediction) to 17. This boosted the confidence of staff who felt that they were achieving results – by preventing the predicted rise.

Guest continued to be reviewed on an ad-hoc basis, and the expansion into Guest 2 came as a result of seeing the effects the strategy was having, but no actual in-depth evaluation was made to see if the effects were as a result of Guest or purely 'random'. This was resolved in February 2003, when the crime analyst carried out a comprehensive Results analysis.

Statistical tests were conducted on the achieved results for the threat areas. The statistics were taken from April 2001, to allow for the effect of Guest to be seen from November 2001 onwards. Regression analysis was used to show the forecast for the coming months and also where the forecast for previous months fell against the reality achieved. Z Scoring, which checks for statistical significance, was also conducted. This was done to test whether Guest was having an impact or was it 'random fluctuation'.
Looking at Burglary dwelling (figure 4) it can clearly be seen that the trend was significantly down since Guest was started, and that the achieved results were below the forecast. At the time of the report in February, it can be seen that the prediction for January was exactly the same as reality. February and March were to be slightly above the prediction, prior to April 2003 dropping below the prediction. The trend of course is still downwards.

**Figure 4: Extract from Results Analysis – Burglary Dwelling**

**Burglary Dwelling**

**Burglary Dwelling Forecast**

![Graph of Burglary Dwelling Forecast](image)

**Burglary Dwelling Z Test**

![Graph of Burglary Dwelling Z Test](image)
The z scoring was even more important in evaluating the effects of Operation Guest. From figure 4, it can be seen that from a high point in October 2001, the test shows that the volume of burglary in the threat areas was significant, it was considerably beyond random (the higher the positive the figure the less random it is). But whilst it remained significant until May 2002, the effects of Guest can start to be seen (it should be remembered Guest was 'dripped' onto the other 6 threat areas, not from November 2001 as with the Q1 beat). From June 2002 onwards the interventions Guest was making were having an effect, and an effect that was as a result of a positive intervention (the more negative the figure the more it has been effected by an external influence and is not random fluctuation).

Similar tests were to be applied to Robbery and burglary Other. Robbery showed the same effects and the interventions were again not random. What was highlighted up for burglary other was the trend was rising, but the Z score showed that the effect of Guest was there, but the pattern was very jumbled. At the time it was known that the subdivision was suffering from a spate of school computer breaks. The highlighting of the problem from the Results analysis allowed more effort to be put into this form of crime, and Guest techniques began to be applied.

**Figure 5: Results Analysis of Robbery**
Conclusions

Guest has achieved results. What it has also done is become the way of working for the subdivision's staff. Operation Guest was as much as anything about changing culture, making police and partners work together. It was no short-term solution; it is a long-term operation that leads to results. It has engendered a problem solving approach to working in all of the staff and reflects how the subdivision now responds to all threats it faces.

The aggressive use of performance data and belief in the analytical products has allowed the subdivision to achieve results using Operation Guest as its philosophy of working. The use of regression analysis and its comparison against real time data has generated a sense of purpose amongst staff as the techniques applied are shown to be working.

Operation Guest is not over and there is much more work to be done in refining the tactics and developing the analytical aspects. The clear link that has been developed between the application of operational policing tactics to address problem solving and achieved outcomes - guided by intelligence led analysis - is attracting interest from throughout GMP and now further a field. Guest was a major part in the identification of the Little Hulton area as an area suitable for Priority Policing Area status. The Government Office North-west has recognised the value of Guest as a means of improving performance elsewhere.

Guest is a joined up strategy to overcome a large problem - by taking bite-sized chunks.
Appendix A: Extract from November 2002 Strategic Threat Assessment

3.5 Burglary Dwelling

Burglary dwelling accounts for 12.64% of recorded crime across the F2 Subdivision April to October 2002.

Figure 20
Data compiled from ‘R’ Department.

Figure 20 illustrates the burglary dwelling figures and trend between April 2001 to October 2002. There was a significant increase in the number of burglaries being recorded between October and January 2002. Not only was this a ‘threat’ to the Subdivision, it also impacted on the forces performance. It was identified that the Subdivision had three separate beats within the ten worst beats across the force area for burglary dwelling.

Since January 2002, burglary dwellings have reduced significantly across the Subdivision and more noticeably within the ‘threat areas’. May 2002 recorded an increase in burglaries however, target offending has greatly improved the subdivisions knowledge and understanding of prolific offenders.

Figure 21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beat</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>Patricroft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>Peel Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N1</td>
<td>Swinton/Worsley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N2</td>
<td>Winton/Monton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>Ellesmere Park</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although the trend has significantly change direction, and a -2.2% reduction has been achieved, this is a critical point within the year, as it is expected that burglary dwellings will increase with the festive period looming. The increase is expected but not to the extent and nature that the Subdivision encountered last year.

- April to October 2001 recorded 1479 burglary dwellings
- April to October 2002 recorded 1447 burglary dwellings

3.6 Burglary Dwelling Analysis

Figure 23
Burglary Dwellings F2 Subdivision
April to October 2001/2002.
Figure 22 is a Sub divisional breakdown by beat since April to October 2002. From this chart it can be established that almost a third of burglaries occur within 4 'threat areas' Q1,N2,P3,Q2. The M1 beat has significantly increased over previous months. This has already been targeted through the Tactical Assessment.

(With the recent success, and reduction of burglaries of the N1 beat (Swinton / Worsley), it must be considered that M1 beat (Little Hulton) becomes a 'threat area', however this is for discussion).

3.8 Burglary Dwelling 'Threat Area' Analysis

F2Q1 Patricroft

Figure 27
F2Q1 Burglary Dwellings: October to October 2001/2002.
Data complied from 'CPA'

Patricroft recorded the worst burglary dwelling figure across the force 12 months ago. As a result of 'Operation Guest' the impact has significantly reduced burglary dwellings. The forthcoming months are potentially a huge threat to both force and subdivision.

372 burglary dwelling have been reported within the last 12 months within Patricroft.

Demographics
Patricroft is a densely populated area. Predominately, local authority housing estates and accommodation, with many high rise flats. Many families within these areas are caught in a poverty trap and suffer the cycle of deprivation.

Patricroft records a high percentage of volume crime across the Subdivision. Many of the offenders live within these areas and are sometimes known to the victims. Many victims fail to make any complaint as a result of fear of reprisals. Patricroft has many exit and entry routes in which offenders will benefit from. Large amounts of class A drugs have been recovered within this area and in most cases this is a root cause for acquisitive crime.
Figure 28
F2 Subdivision
Burglary Dwellings F2Q1 Patricroft
October 2001 to October 2002

Figure 30
F2 Subdivision
Burglary Dwellings F2Q1 Patricroft
Burglary Initiative (500sq meter grid 'Hot spot')
Previous analysis identified a burglary 'hot-spot' (highlighted in the yellow square) SARA F2/387/02. All business premises and repeat victims in the immediate area of Devonshire Road footbridge were offered crime reduction advice, and the funding from the business security grant scheme. Domestic properties were referred to the burglary reduction initiative, and are to receive basic target hardening measures, improved street lighting, and alleygating. Railtrack have been asked for their support in environmental improvements to land owned by them.

Figure 32
F2 Subdivision Time Analysis
Burglary Dwellings F2Q1 Patricroft
October 2001 to October 2002
Key offending time is between 1400hrs & 2100hrs. As a result of directed tasking within this time period, temporal and geographical displacement has been evidenced on numerous occasions.

Figure 33
Burglary Dwellings F2Q1 Patricroft
Days of The Week
October 2001 to October 2002
Figure 34
Burglary Dwellings F2Q1 Patricroft
April to October 2001/2002

F2Q1 Patricroft
April to October 2001/2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- - 2001 - - 2002 - - BDW Trend 2001 - - BDW Trend 2002
Appendix B: Extract from MI Problem Profile

1.1 Historical Events & Forecasting.

Since the start of the financial year until November 2002 there has been a total of 95 burglary dwellings within the housing estates of Amblecoats and Captainfold. In comparison to 1998/99, the burglaries within this area have significantly reduced however, an increase has been evidenced since the year 2000 to date. The figures highlighted in red, December 2002 to March 2003 are projected figures based on the population since April 2001.

Figure 1
5yr Burglary Dwelling
M1 Beat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5yr Period</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Total Per Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Per Month</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2
5yr Burglary Dwelling
M1 Beat

This chart has been produced to demonstrate the historical seasonal trend. Basically, you can clearly identify that between October to March over the last five years, there has historically been an increase in the amount of burglaries that have been recorded within the M1 beat.

The Subdivision is now faced against reversing this trend. In order to do this long term strategies must be enforced and target profiling of prolific offenders will help combat this problem.
The seasonal trend over the last four years has been compared against burglaries that have been recorded since the start of the financial year, through to November 2002. In July 2002, the trend started to change. This area has already been targeted through the weekly Tactical Assessment. November data for this year has significantly changed in comparison to the previous four years. Working tactics have already been evidenced, however, this is a mere starting point for the Subdivision.

Figure 4
April 2001 to November 2002
Forecasted figures.

Linear regression has been conducted in order to project / forecast what burglary figures could be anticipated to the end of the financial year. (see figure 1 for actual numbers)
Tactical Displacement can be easily seen whereby short-term hits have been evidenced.
(points 18 & 19 illustrate where burglaries have significantly been effected)
1.2 Vulnerability

Analysis has shown that almost 50% of the burglary problem within the M1 beat, is generated from twelve separate streets. This has also demonstrated to the Subdivision that in order to combat the burglary problem, we must target harden the following streets, regular high profile patrolling, and to identify the root cause of why these streets have been targeted.

Figure 6
Repeat Locations.

This map is the area of the M1 beat, the roads highlighted in red account for 50% of the overall burglary problem within both housing estates.

Figure 7
Repeat Locations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Street</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Old Lane</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moorland Drive</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cleggs Lane</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Upland Drive</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Manchester Road West</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Newgate Drive</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Spa Crescent</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Baron Fold Crescent</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Captain Fold Road</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bank Lane</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Moorhey Road</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Thornfield Grove</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the 12 locations, 82 burglary dwellings have been recorded.
From the same map as figure 6 (repeat locations) street lighting data has been included to illustrate if there is a correlation between offending areas and street lighting. If you study the chart, burglary dwellings within the high sodium lighting area is at a minimal. However, when low sodium street lighting is included onto the same map, a somewhat different can clearly be witnessed.

Figure 9: Repeat Locations High & Low Sodium Street Lighting

Inference
Residents in areas of low sodium street lighting are more vulnerable and potentially pose a greater risk to those residing in high sodium street lighting.