Operation Migraine
Tilley Awards 2003

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Operation Migraine - Summary

Carlisle is unique in Cumbria. Carlisle is developing at a fast rate with more investment in the city centre than at any time in the last 20 years.

This has lead to an increase in the number of licensed premises and an increase in the capacity of premises available in the city. This, in turn lead to an increase in incidents of violent crime which, until December 2001, appeared to be irreversible.

Determined 'structural' work was being conducted by the relevant parties to prevent an increase in violent crime, and some evidence of success was apparent, but the violent crime figures continued to rise.

Carlisle police used research conducted by the Targeted Policing Initiative, a Home Office funded team of researchers focussing on violent crime, who provided an innovative methodology to identify where and when incidents of violence were occurring.

Research with licensees, door staff and the public identified that what was required was a clear, visible police presence which was supportive of the industry and whose aim was to prevent disorder and violence.

The need was for a clearly targeted form of police foot patrol which, unlike the foot patrols of yesterday,

- had a structured approach,
- were armed with up to date intelligence on premises and offenders,
- had a clear direction for locational and temporal deployment
- acknowledged the need to effectively and regularly communicate with industry members
- were prepared to be seen to be part of the night time industry rather than a paid and hostile bystander
- were aware of the need to proactively intervene and resolve emerging problems
- were not prepared to tolerate disorder or anti social behaviour
- supported the spirit of the party feel of the night time economy in Carlisle.

This approach was supported by the BCU commander and was structured to be part of our policing philosophy, a sustained response to the desires of the public.

The result, over a year into the change of approach, has led to a 24% reduction in violent crime in the City Centre up to February 2003. It has also led to a complete turn around in attitude between those involved in the entertainment industry and the police and has led to greatly improved working relationships and understanding between the different parties.

As an example of problem solving, Op. Migraine proved that the scanning and analysis demanded a response that appeared very simple, namely high visibility foot patrols. The benefits of using the model is that it lead to a change in approach by the patrolling officers themselves, and that is what has resulted in the success of the tactic. The results to date speak for themselves and assessment is ongoing, due to the continued implementation of the strategy.
Operation Migraine

Summary

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1. Operation Migraine - An Introduction

Carlisle is unique in Cumbria. Carlisle is developing at a fast rate with more investment in the city centre than at any time in the last 20 years. National property developers and brewery companies are targeting Carlisle as ripe for large-scale investment. The entertainment industry identifies that there is still growth potential in the city, which has not been exploited, and that there are niche markets, which have not been filled. The industry also believes that there is still capacity for quality premises with the right vision.

This has lead to an increase in the number of licensed premises and an increase in the capacity of premises available in the city. It has also led to an increase in the number of people using the premises. This, in turn led to an increase in incidents of violent crime which, until December 2001, appeared to be irreversible.

Figure 1: Violent Crime in Carlisle City Centre (Dec 00 to Dec 01)

![Violent Crime Chart](chart.png)

Operation Migraine is a project which was set up in North Cumbria at the start of 2002 with three specific purposes:

1. To provide a genuine analysis of alcohol related violent crime in Carlisle.
2. To provide a reduction in alcohol related violent crime in Carlisle
3. To provide an improvement in the city’s reputation.

Success was to be measured by three separate criteria:

1. The implementation of a system which gave an accurate and timely analysis of incidents of violent crime in the city centre in Carlisle.
2. A reduction of incidents of violence in the city centre
3. An increase in the perception of safety in the city by those who were part of the night time economy.

This problem was identified as a command unit priority due to various factors.

* It was acknowledged that crime figures in the city centre areas (beats X11 and X12) were increasing on a month by month basis in the areas of disorder and violent crime.
* The types of incidents appeared to be getting more serious, with the seriousness of injury to victims increasing.
* There were financial implications for Carlisle police due to the expense of investigations into an increased number of serious assaults.
* Without a clear city vision and the direction by a city centre manager or Carlisle City Council, the night time economy appeared to be increasing without structure or direction. To be able to argue coherently at a strategic level in favour of, or against continued expansion, a clear level of analysis of the issues was required.
* The economy of Carlisle was clearly benefiting by the expansion of the night time industry on one level, but the personal and social cost of incidents of violence attributed to the night time economy was arguably damaging the reputation of the city in the long term.

As a result, a violent crime strategy was considered, headed by Sgt Mark Pannone the licensing Sergeant and Michelle Skeer, the Detective Inspector for Carlisle.

2. Identifying the problem

2.1 Obtaining accurate statistics

This was a difficult question to answer.

It firstly became apparent that our crime recording system (Oracle) told a different story to the police incident system (Polis) when identifying what was happening, where it was happening and to whom it was happening. The statistics which were provided by The Information Management Section at Headquarters were historic and of little use in reacting to crime trends on a weekly basis, and gave no breakdown of location or causes of incidents. This issue led to the owners of the violent crime strategy identifying that clear, genuine and timely analysis was necessary prior to considering any responses.

As a result, a group of Home Office funded researchers, the Targeted Policing Initiative, were used to assist in analysing the true picture of violent crime in Carlisle City Centre. These researchers were based at Cumbria Constabulary Headquarters, funded solely by The Home Office, with a specific remit of considering violent crime in Cumbria generally. The focus on the night-time economy in Carlisle was relevant to their remit and their experience as analysts provided knowledge and the ability far above that in Cumbria at the time.

Analysis of the problem also came from other areas, not just from police statistics.

2.2 Research conducted by CN Research on behalf of Cumbria Constabulary

The objective of the research was to examine opinions and attitudes towards safer drinking and drug use and examined
* Attitudes towards alcohol and drinking
* Attitudes towards violence and disorder
* Attitudes towards the police
* Attitudes towards pub and club door staff.

The initial research was conducted at the end of 2001 and illustrated the following:

Only 22% of those spoken to were satisfied with the level of policing of the night time economy.

66 respondents stated that "a greater police presence on the streets" would reduce the amount of trouble.

5% had seen police walking in the area of pubs and clubs, compared to 40% who had seen police driving in the same area.

Violent crime appeared to be the most under reported of any form of crime and the survey indicated that only 37% of violent incidents were reported to the police.

95% of those surveyed expected to see most violence on a Friday and Saturday night with 93% of those surveyed expecting to see the most trouble between 11 pm and 2am.

2.3 Individual Licensees

Regular contact held between the licensees and Carlisle Police's licensing Sgt identified the following to be the main themes of concern for the licensed industry

* Violent activity was becoming more acceptable
* Inconsistent policing methods led to confusion within the trade as to what conduct was acceptable and what led to prosecution
* A general lack of respect for property and staff in premises
* Slow response by police to attend to issues

2.4 Licensees as a collective through Pub watch

Carlisle has an active Pub Watch system in place and has had since May 2000. Every pub and club in Carlisle City Centre is part of the Pub watch scheme and the scheme is acknowledged as successful. The scheme is co-ordinated by the Licensing Sergeant, but all decisions are made by the licensees only. A full constitution identifies the purpose of the scheme to

"Improving the ambience of the environment in and around premises covered by Pub Watch and enhance the safety, security, comfort and well being of customers so that their visit is a pleasurable occasion, which they will wish to repeat."

To promote this aim a formal exclusion system exists, banning people from entering all pub watch premises due to incidents of violence, drug abuse or general criminality. The level set takes into consideration the number of people banned, seriousness of offences and practicality. All those banned are restricted from entering premises for a minimum of 6 months and their photographs are distributed on a regularly updated poster, accessible to all licensed premises employees.
Pub watch meetings are held every few months to discuss issues for the trade and to discuss who to ban and remove from the banned list. The meetings are a good forum to hear the concerns of the trade regarding issues of violence and disorder.

By the end of 2001, the points consistently raised at meetings were the following:

* Licensees were trying hard to combat violence and disorder inside premises, but the policing of the night time economy in Carlisle was reactive and inconsistent
* If licensees and their employees caught offenders, often they would be released shortly afterwards by police.
* The police appeared to spend time breaking fights up rather than arrest offenders, only for the offenders to re-offend later that night.
* There was a desire for the police to ‘nip problems in the bud’ rather than allow problems to escalate.

2.5 Door Supervisors

Carlisle City Council employs a policy of regulation of door supervisors and has done since 1996. The door supervisors have to take and pass an accredited door supervisors’ course within 6 months of registering as door supervisors and are police vetted for previous convictions. Door staff had previously been viewed with suspicion by police officers and the mutual relationship historically had not been good. However, with an active involvement in their training, the following issues were identified as being of note for the police in considering a policing strategy for the night time economy.

* Door staff often felt disbelieved by the police when incidents had occurred in premises
* Door staff felt undervalued in their role
* Door staff wished for a better image
* The policing of Carlisle at night was inconsistent
* There was a lack of dialogue between doorstaff and police on a nightly basis.

2.6 Police Officers’ comments

As part of the initial analysis, comments made by those officers who worked Carlisle on response teams, and those who investigated incidents of violence and disorder, were considered to highlight themes of concerns. The main points which were of concern were as follows:

* Some premises had better systems in place than others to prevent incidents occurring
* The more modern premises had fewer problems than the older ones.
* Those premises which were attractive to the younger age groups had more problems than others.
* Too often the police arrive on scene after an incident has occurred and evidence gathering is impossible.
* Incidents could be prevented by increased staffing rather than ‘fire brigade’ policing.

it was clear that any statistical analysis undertaken had to identify if the concerns by Licensees, doorstaff and police were accurate and to then be able to identify an effective response to those concerns.
3. Detailed Analysis

Due to the previously mentioned concerns regarding the accuracy of available statistical evidence regarding number of incidents, location of incidents and the time taken to obtain this material, a new method of analysis was created.

3.1 Carlisle Alcohol Related Violent Crime

ARVC - Alcohol Related Violent Crime - was a grouping which was created after research was completed on all Home Office Violent Crime Categories of crime recording. Violent crime under Home Office recording includes a number of offence types which could not be attributed to the night time entertainment industry. Their inclusion therefore prevented accurate analysis of the issues which were being considered. To accurately monitor any initiatives considered, only those offences which were relevant to the issue could be included. As a result the ARVC grouping was created by TPI analysts, The Licensing Sgt and The Detective Inspector.

A list of offence types which were included are illustrated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence Code</th>
<th>Offence Title</th>
<th>Offence Sub Type</th>
<th>Sub Group Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CD98002</td>
<td>BREACH OF ANTI SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR ORDER</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Other Wounding, Weapons &amp; Harassment etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD98003</td>
<td>RACIALLY AGGRAVATED WOUNDING/GBH</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Other Wounding, Weapons &amp; Harassment etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD98004</td>
<td>RACIALLY AGGRAVATED ASSAULT/ABH</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Other Wounding, Weapons &amp; Harassment etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD98005</td>
<td>RACIALLY AGGRAVATED COMMON ASSAULT</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Other Wounding, Weapons &amp; Harassment etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD98018</td>
<td>RACIALLY AGGRAVATED HARASSMENT/Writing</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Offences against Public Order Classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD98050</td>
<td>RACIAL/RELIGIOUS AGG HARASSMENT/WORDS</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Offences against Public Order Classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ88001</td>
<td>COMMON ASSAULT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Common Assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ88116</td>
<td>COMMON ASSAULT AND BATTERY</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Common Assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ88117</td>
<td>HAVING ARTICLE WITH BLADE OR POINT</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Other Wounding, Weapons &amp; Harassment etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJ94003</td>
<td>RESIST/OBSTRUCT CUSTODY OFFICER</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Common Assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL67001</td>
<td>IMPEDE APPREHENSION OF OFFENDER/MURDER</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Threat or Conspiracy to Murder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COML022</td>
<td>MANSLAUGHTER</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Manslaughter etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COML025</td>
<td>MURDER-VICTIM 1 YR OLD OR OVER</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Murder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COML025A</td>
<td>ATTEMPT MURDER-VICTIM 1 YR OLD OR OVER</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Attempted Murder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COML026</td>
<td>MURDER VICTIM UNDER 1 YR OLD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Murder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F168062</td>
<td>POSSESS AWEAPON W/ ENDANGER LIFE</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Wounding or Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF61004</td>
<td>MANSLAUGHTER</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Manslaughter etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF61014</td>
<td>THREATS TO KILL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Threat or Conspiracy to Murder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF61016</td>
<td>WOUND W/ TO DO GBH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wounding or Other Act Endangering Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF61016A</td>
<td>ATTEMPT TO WOUND W/ TO DO GBH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wounding or Other Act Endangering Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF61017</td>
<td>CAUSE GBH W/ TO DO GBH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wounding or Other Act Endangering Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF61017A</td>
<td>ATTEMPT TO CAUSE GBH W/ TO DO GBH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wounding or Other Act Endangering Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF61018A</td>
<td>ATTEMPT WOUND W/ RESIST/PREVENT ARREST</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wounding or Other Act Endangering Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF61019</td>
<td>CAUSE GBH W/ TO RESIST/PREVENT ARREST</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wounding or Other Act Endangering Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF61020</td>
<td>WOUNDING</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Other Wounding, Weapons &amp; Harassment etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF61020A</td>
<td>ATTEMPTED MALICIOUS OR UNLAWFUL WOUNDING</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Other Wounding, Weapons &amp; Harassment etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF61021</td>
<td>INFLECT GBH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Other Wounding, Weapons &amp; Harassment etc</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Using this form of grouping rather than the traditional general Home Office violent crime grouping, gave us the confidence to believe that our analysis would now be accurate for the issues being considered, namely alcohol related violence and disorder connected to the night time economy.

### 3.2 ARVC Mapping Tool

As well as the ARVC method of grouping, a ‘hot spot’ mapping tool was utilised to provide an essential briefing tool for operational officers to overcome the problem of not having accurate and timely information which could be acted on. The targeted Policing Initiative analyst was able to identify the location and time of incidents over the weekend, to highlight trends and to be able to provide operational officers with accurate information, which would lead to more effective deployment of resources. The command and Control incident logs were compiled for the previous weekend each Monday and thematically mapped using the GIS (Geographical Information System) MapInfo 6.5. These were then converted into a web-based (html) file, allowing any officer to see where incidents had occurred over the weekend, and even click on the colour coded points representing the incidents for in-depth details of the incident. These maps were to be used over a prolonged period to identify ‘hot spot’ trends spatially over time. ‘Incidents’ rather than ‘recorded crimes’ were used for this analysis as they more accurately reflected operational occurrences. As the frequencies of incidents were higher than crimes (by approximately 3:1) they provided a more genuine representation of reality. Accompanying these maps were additional statistics exploring the temporal aspects of crimes as well as incidents to provide a comprehensive cross-section of events during the weekend.
4. An Appropriate Response

4.1 Existing Structures

It was clear that there were mechanisms and structures in place which were preventing an escalation in incidents of violence, but that the trend of violence was clearly upwards. The variables which were in place which were designed to be proactively preventing disorder and violence were as follows:

1. Registered door supervisors, regulated and controlled by Carlisle City Council
2. An accredited door supervisors course, taught mainly by local police, with a specific focus on law, licensing, self defence, drug awareness, first aid, health and safety and communication skills.
3. A proactive licensing approach, to ensure a clear link between licensees, pub and club management and police. Also proactive regulation with a strategic desire to support the industry.
4. An active pub watch, run by licensees and co-ordinated by the licensing officer with local authority involvement.
5. An active exclusion system to prevent recidivists entering any city centre premises, supported by posters of those on the 'banned list'
6. A radio link system, linking all pubs and clubs with permanent 'talk through' to ensure that all premises were aware of ongoing incidents and people to be prevented from entering licensed premises due to disorder or inebriation.
7. The co-ordination of the radio link by local authority CCTV operatives. The city centre is almost completely covered by over 30 cameras. By co-ordinating the communication between licensed premises as well as the CCTV, individual incidents were identified and monitored.
8. Direct radio link between the pub watch radio and CCTV to Police control, via CCTV operatives.
9. Police also had pub watch radio system radio.
10. The use of initiative, especially focused on the premises themselves, such as issuing all premises with metal detectors, paid for by Home Office funding and the distribution of gimmicks at the end of the night, to reduce tensions which led to violence.

However, as the graph on Page 1 illustrates, at the end of 2001, violent crime was still rising in Carlisle city centre.

4.2 Operation Migraine

All evidence appeared to suggest that there was a missing link in the night time economy to prevent and reduce alcohol related violent crime. The locational analysis of incidents conducted by the Targeted Policing Initiative indicated that incidents were decreasing inside premises. This is arguably as a result of better communication between licensees and the police, with the clear message that incidents inside licensed premises would be likely to result in enforcement action being taken if preventative safety issues had not been enforced by the licensee. Also, as more nationally based companies were coming into Carlisle, it was clear that an improvement in the management, training and standards expected by staff were having an effect in raising standards inside licensed premises.

As a result, incidents outside licensed premises were increasing. The majority of licensed premises were starting to prevent incidents inside their premises by removing and banning problem clientele and then notifying each other through radio and CCTV in real time, then following up by banning and excluding individuals through the Pub watch system.

The police however were not responding by providing what all those in the industry and those who used the industry knew to be necessary.

Foot patrols.

Evidence from the CN research, door supervisors, entertainment industry and Pub Watch collective all identified the need for foot patrols in the city centre.

This was initially disappointing to those involved in the North Cumbria Violent Crime Strategy as it appeared to be a rather old fashioned and 'unintelligent' response to a problem. However we had to respect the evidence. Not only were the structures that were in place not sufficient, but violent crime was consistently increasing month on month.

4.3 The New Foot Patrol

There were fundamental differences with the foot patrols which were to be deployed under Operation Migraine compared to the haphazard patrolling which had occurred previously.

> The officers would be volunteers with an interest in working with the night time economy
> The officers would be highly visible, with fluorescent jackets making them identifiable on the streets
> The officers would be equipped with up to date intelligence on premises and offenders with clear analysis of the times and locations of hot spots as identified by the previous week's analysis.
> The officers were trained in and aware of the work that was being done with the industry on a structural basis and were given further training in licensing legislation and on going action against certain premises and door staff.
> The officers were made aware of the importance to be seen to be a regular and fundamental part of the night time industry rather than a paid and hostile by stander.
> The need to effectively and regularly communicate with industry members was also seen as vital in obtaining industry respect and understanding.
> Training and an awareness in the benefits of proactively intervening and resolving emerging problems was promoted to prevent the escalation of incidents. This involved an increase in deliberate communication between patrolling officers and the public, rather than the more traditional approach of standing arms folded on the opposite side of the street until the first punch was thrown.
> Disorder and anti social behaviour was not tolerated and violence was no longer to be an acceptable or inevitable by product of the night time economy.
> The patrols were to be seen as supportive of the 'party atmosphere' of Carlisle at night.

Operation Migraine was promoted throughout Carlisle. Regular articles in the local paper and a series on regional television ('Crime fighters' - Border TV) highlighted our more proactive response. The industry was made aware of our approach through personal visits and Pub Watch meetings. The Licensing Justices were informed of the change in response and the philosophy behind proactive operational foot patrols. Similarly the Local Authority Licensing and Regulatory Panel were also made aware of Operation Migraine.

Migraine was not an alternative to the other structural work conducted with and within the industry, but provided the clear link previously missing.

4.4 Migraine - Worth It?

What soon became clear was that the approach under Operation Migraine was popular with both the industry and public alike. However, it is resource intensive and expensive. Migraine is funded through overtime, paid from the North Cumbria Area budget. It currently costs £35,000 per annum to fund the initiative, based on 6 Constables and 1 Sergeant working Operation Migraine for 5 hours between 2230 and 0330 through the weekend. The BCU Command team is prepared to actively support the scheme for three main reasons

1. The alternative is a continued increase in crime. Other methods have been attempted and, without foot patrols have been proved to be insufficient.
2. The Home Office Crime Reduction Unit identifies each incident of GBH or Wounding to cost £120,000 from incident investigation to conviction and prison and other social costs. Preventing just one serious incident will have justified the annual expense to North Cumbria.
3. Public support for the approach is high and is also now becoming the accepted way of policing the night time economy.

Without doubt, to remove the policing approach adopted through Operation Migraine would lead to a decrease in the satisfaction levels of the public in how we police the
city at night. For this reason, North Cumbria is committed to continuing the Migraine approach.

5. How Successful is Operation Migraine?

Since Operation Migraine first came into existence at the start of 2002, Carlisle has continued to develop.

5.1 Statistical Success

By considering Public Entertainment Capacities of licensed pubs and clubs in the city centre, in 2001 there was the capacity for 9676 people, compared to 11461 at the end of 2002.

From the period when Operation Migraine started, there has been a reduction of 9.7% of violent crime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Violent Crime Offences</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 2001- February 2002</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>-9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2002- February 2003</td>
<td>539</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When taking the 18.4% growth in capacity of premises in Carlisle beats X11 and X12 into consideration, there has been a 23.8% reduction in crime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Violent Crime Offences</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Offences per 1000 capacity</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 2001- February 2002</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>9,676</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2002- February 2003</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>11,461</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>-23.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures statistically justify the continued approach taken in Carlisle to police the night time economy.

5.2 Survey Success

CN research has also conducted another survey of public perceptions of The Night Time Economy for Cumbria Police. 73% now state that the policing of the streets around pubs and clubs makes them feel safer, compared to 22% a year ago. The CN research also indicated that there was now a belief that the police would intervene when required and that their presence was reassuring.

Licensees state that the city is safer than it has ever been and that the structured co-ordinated approach works now that uniform foot patrols are providing the appropriate police response which had previously been missing.

Evidence from those who are excluded from premises, who write letters requesting to be allowed back into premises, identify that they cannot get past the police, let alone CCTV, the doorstaff and licensees, to support the system of exclusions.
6. Conclusion

Operation Migraine has illustrated the need for a clear and structured approach to problem solving.

1. A clear identification of the problem needed to be made, in this case the increase of violent crime and understanding of the reasons behind it. Despite the majority of licensed premises were becoming more responsible, and incidents decreasing inside premises, the policing approach was letting the industry and the public down.

2. A rethinking of the way in which we obtain data, and dedication by trained analysts presented the opportunity to target resources more effectively.

3. It was also important to listen to those directly affected by the issues, in this case the drinking public, licensees, door staff, Justices, Councillors, taxi drivers, medical staff and police officers. These groups all identified that a more sophisticated form of traditional policing techniques was vital for public confidence and a reduction in crime.

4. Once Operation Migraine was deemed to be the best way to combat rising violence, an agreement by BCU Command for a long-term commitment to the project prevented disappointment and a reversal of success.

5. Ongoing assessment of the effect of the patrols and the dedication of the officers involved is necessary to ensure continued success.

6. A commitment to review the analysis of the problem and to have the flexibility to deploy effectively.

Sgt Mark Pannone
Licensing and City Centre Sergeant