

Organisational infrastructure project.

The Operational Policing Strategy

Greater Manchester Police

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The Operational Policing Strategy

Problem solving policing will fail if left unsupported. To achieve consistent and sustainable crime reduction, a problem oriented approach which redesigns the organisational infrastructure is vital.

Crime and disorder problems faced by GMP in the late nineties identified a number of areas for development.

Scanning and Analysis

A scanning process was undertaken to discover root causes of why GMP performance required attention. The following areas were highlighted:

- Limited problem solving, not identifying the root causes
- Priority for detection over reduction
- Uncoordinated activity between police and partners
- Crime Management Units' role confused
- Ineffective briefing and debriefing
- Undirected patrol activity
- Lack of understanding of intelligence process
- Culture concentrating on outputs
- Limited accountability for performance
- Lack of time for operational officers
- Complicated planning processes
- Priority on crime over wider policing issues
- Limited management information

Response

The initial response was to write the Operational Policing Strategy. It integrated all functions of policing and provided a framework for action by setting out :

Operational aims and a policing style which has five principles:

- Performance led ;
- Intelligence supported ;
- Community focused ;
- Problem solving ;
- Integration and partnership.

Prior to forcewide implementation a pathfinder project tested and developed structures and processes required to support the roll out of the Operational Policing Strategy. This achieved encouraging results reducing crime in the area by 5.4%.

The Operational Policing Strategy establishes :


- An implementation support team ;
- Operational Policing Units with detailed roles and responsibilities ;
- A problem solving approach ;
- Using partners and the community ;
- Problem solving training for police, support staff and partners ;
- A recording and management system for problem solving ;
- Greater use of intelligence processes ;
- A briefing and debriefing system ;
- Force and subdivisional tasking and coordinating groups at strategic and tactical levels ;
- Enhanced role for community officers across the force ;
- Performance management structures and processes ensuring accountability, corporacy and identification of good and bad practice ;

Assessment

The forcewide rollout of the OPS commenced in April 2000. On completion, previous years' crime statistics were compared against figures for the year of implementation with encouraging results.

The year on year increase was halted and a reduction in total recorded crime was noted with underlying reductions in the volume crime classifications of burglary dwelling (- 4.9%), car crime (- 5.2%) and burglarly other (-12.9%).

Total Recorded Crime in Greater Manchester



OPS Rollout commenced April 2000
Pathfinder Project commenced April 1999

The Operational Policing Strategy Project

1. Introduction

- 1.1. Greater Manchester Police face increasing demands and community expectations. Responsibility for community safety no longer rests solely with the police. These factors combined to present GMP with an unprecedented policing challenge which affected the core of its work.
- 1.2. To be more effective GMP needed to improve the way it worked, both within the force and in partnership with the community and other agencies.
- 1.3. As a result the Operational Policing Strategy (OPS) was written. This was the foundation for the redesign of the organisational infrastructure of GMP to support a new style of policing.
- 1.4. This submission is an account of the project detailing the research, analysis and implementation of the Operational Policing Strategy.

2. Defining the Problem

- 2.1. An examination revealed that problem solving was practised in an ad-hoc fashion. There were no effective processes or structures that supported a systematic approach to dealing with policing problems. Individuals engaged in problem solving were frequently frustrated by organisational difficulties. These frustrations were the symptoms of the underlying cause, which was an organisational infrastructure which did not support a problem solving.
- 2.2. The first stage was the establishment of a project team with a wide range of operational experience. This team was of mixed rank and under a Superintendent who reported directly to the three operational Assistant Chief Constables (Crime Operations, Uniform Operations, Community and Internal Affairs).
- 2.3. In defining the extent and scope of the problem the following research was conducted:
 - Visits and workshops at police divisions;
 - Consultation with other police forces;
 - PRCU papers;
 - "Brit Pop 1 & 2 "
 - "Not Rocket Science"

Meetings with staff in Crime Management Units (CMUs) to discuss current methods and procedures

- Review of public satisfaction surveys indicating areas of concern and expectations
- HMIC action plans from ;
 - HMIC force inspection;
 - "Policing With Intelligence"
 - "Winning The Race Revisited"
 - "Beating Crime"
 - "Calling Time On Crime"
- Audit Commission action plan from " Tackling Patrol Effectively"
- National Criminal Intelligence Service model
- The McPherson report

2.4. The research highlighted areas for development :

- Crime Management Units' role and responsibilities confused
- Limited problem solving, not identifying the root causes
- Priority for detection over reduction
- Uncoordinated activity between police and partners
- Ineffective briefing and debriefing of staff
- Undirected patrol activity
- Lack of understanding of the intelligence process
- Culture concentrating on outputs
- Limited accountability for performance
- Lack of time for operational officers
- Complicated planning processes
- Priority for crime over wider policing issues
- Limited management information

3. **How did we deal with the problem ?**

3.1. From the analysis it was evident that a number of fundamental changes were required to organisational structures and processes. The first stage was to write a strategic document detailing what we wanted to achieve.

3.2. The OPS was written giving a vision of the future of policing in GMP. It integrated all functions of policing and provided a strategic framework for action by setting out :

- Operational aims; and

Our policing style.

3.3. The policing style focuses our efforts. It has five principles:

- Performance led ;

We provide recognised structures and processes at all levels of operational policing that provide direction and coordination with leadership and accountability.

- Intelligence supported ;

All our officers and support staff recognise the importance of gathering and developing intelligence. Intelligence informs our problem solving. We keep our staff fully informed by using effective briefings and debriefings.

- Community focused ;

There is an enhanced role and status for community beat officers which gives them a geographic or community based responsibility. We encourage the involvement of local partnerships to deal with community issues.

- Problem solving ;

There is recognised processes to identify problems, research them and establish the root causes. We allocate activity to address causes and then **assess the impact**.

- **Integration and partnership.**

We are effective and eliminate duplication of effort by working in an integrated way both internally and externally with the community and agencies. We encourage our partners to recognise their responsibilities in dealing with policing problems.

Forcewide changes to the organisational infrastructure

5. Operational Policing Units (OPUs) established

5.1. An effective Operational Policing Unit is crucial to the success of the Operational Policing Strategy. Specifically we changed the following:

5.2. Renamed the Crime Management Unit to the 'Operational Policing Unit' and redefine its core function.

5.3. The name of the unit will be crucial to the credibility and success of the new approach proposed. The word "Crime" gave too strong an emphasis on C.I.D. matters and did not acknowledge that much of our work involves dealing with incidents that are not crimes.

5.4. The title of the unit needed to describe the police work undertaken, be it reactive or preventative, from any of the following areas:

- Patrol;
- Road Policing;
- Crime;
- Community and Race Relations; or,
- Public Order.

5.5. As the unit would be instrumental to the implementation and development of the Operational Policing Strategy the Crime Management Units were renamed "Operational Policing Units".

5.6. Crime Management Units differed across the force. This unit was to become the hub of all police activities each sub-division. There was a need for a clearly defined core function which supported the OPS. The core function included;

- Problem solving scanning: In depth identification and research of problems by reviewing a wide range of data and information sources.
- Problem solving analysis: The identification of common characteristics and underlying causes of problems.
- Problem solving response: The development of suitable strategies to address problem causes.
- Problem solving assessment: The reviewing of problems and action taken to assess whether or not it was successful including its cost and the identification of good and bad practice.

- Providing support for tasking and coordinating groups.
- The briefing and debriefing of staff
- The intelligence function
- Other analytical functions
- Information and advice
- Research function which includes funding opportunities
- Providing local management information
- Marketing the OPS principles

5.7. With the transition to the OPU there was an increased range of functions covering all aspects of operational policing. There is shift of emphasis to include prevention and reduction work. This required a change in working practices and it was necessary that there was more direction and supervision of both the staff and the work undertaken in the unit.

5.8. It was necessary to implement a new supervisory structure. Two new posts were created.

5.9. A uniform inspector was appointed as the unit manager. This provided continuity of line management within the unit. It promoted the extended functionality of the OPU (not just crime matters), reflected the importance of the unit's role and gave parity of rank / position with team leaders from internal departments and partner agencies.

5.10. A uniform sergeant was appointed as the Operations Coordinator. This Operations Coordinator was tasked with managing the problem solving process and resource coordination of problem solving initiatives.

5.11. The Detective Sergeant remained but with a changing role. They became the intelligence coordinator with responsibility for intelligence acquisition, development and dissemination. They maintain a supervisory role in the evaluation, allocation and finalisation of crime investigations.

5.12. The organisational structure and roles of staff within the OPU is displayed at appendix 2.

5.13. The establishment of the increased posts within the OPU allowed close supervision of the new roles and responsibilities of the staff within the OPU which would be essential for the adoption of the OPS.

5.14. Redefine roles and responsibilities of staff within OPUs

5.15. The existing job descriptions were generalised and lacked detail. This

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8. Problem solving training for police, support staff and partner agencies

8.1. The experience gained during the Pathfinder project and through "Brit Pop 2" indicated that the training should:

- Be tailored to the audience ;
Be capable of encountering and dealing with criticism ;
Deal with examples of problems relevant to the audience ;
Explain the structures and processes that support problem solving ;
Have ready examples of good practice and innovative problem solving ;

These findings were incorporated in a comprehensive training programme. The training was delivered at a variety of levels'.

8.2. Problem solving courses for all Operational Staff. (1 day)

8.3. To ensure a consistent quality of delivery across the force, a dedicated training unit was established under the control of the OPS implementation team. All operational staff were trained. This amounted to over 6,000 members of staff.

8.4. Problem solving courses for OPU staff (2 day)

8.5. The pathfinder project identified that an additional training course for staff in the OPU was necessary to provide an in depth knowledge of problem solving. The course was delivered by the OPS implementation team to over 300 OPU staff.

8.6. Problem solving courses for Community Beat Officers (CBOs, 1 day)

8.7. In order to reinforce problem solving and its links with the community, additional training courses were delivered to all CBOs. (600 officers)

8.8. Joint Partner and Police problem solving course (1 day)

The pathfinder recognised the difficulties in involving partners and police in joint problem solving. A training course for partner agency staff which involved community beat officers was devised and is being delivered locally.

8.9. A further training need was identified for OPU and CBO staff on crime reduction responses.

At the completion of the training the staff had:

- A greater understanding of crime reduction techniques, including examples of good practice.
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9. **A recording and management system for the problem solving process.**

9.1. A database system was developed to support problem solving. The system was designed to lead OPU staff through the SARA process.

9.2. The purpose of the system is to record and manage the problem solving packages (SARAs) on the subdivision, providing management information as required.

The system is broken down into the four stages of the SARA model

- Scanning ;
- Analysis ;
- Response;
Assessment

9.3. It steers the user through the key elements of the model producing reports and links problem solving to tasking and coordinating.

9.4. The SARA system provides management information on police and partner activity.

10. **A greater awareness and use of intelligence**

10.1. The key role of intelligence during the scanning of problems is recognised . The OPU ensure that intelligence acquisition and development is correctly targeted towards policing priorities. These priorities are set by subdivisional TCGs who are aware of the C&D issues affecting local communities.

10.2. The intelligence function is driven by the Intelligence Coordinator in the OPU (Detective Sergeant), with a greater emphasis on briefing and debriefing operational staff.

11 **A briefing and debriefing system.**

11.1 Effective briefing and debriefing is an essential element of the OPS. It is of crucial importance that operational staff have relevant and up to date intelligence.

11.2. A model was developed which incorporated good practice from around the country. It reflects the findings in " Tackling Patrol Effectively ". It set requirements concerning the :

- Environment ;
- Quantity and quality of items ;
- Shift relevant briefings ;
- Presentation (digital photographs etc.) ;

- Tasking ; and,
- Debriefing ;

11.3. The OPU hold responsibility for providing subdivisional operational briefings. This is coordinated by the Detective Sergeant ensuring that patrol activity is targeted towards subdivisional priorities.

11.4. The briefings are delivered electronically using the forcewide intranet. This allows for increased sharing of intelligence across divisional borders.

12. Force and subdivisional Tasking and Coordinating groups at strategic and tactical levels.

12.1. The OPS established tasking and coordinating structures at subdivisional and force level. Effective tasking and coordinating is crucial in managing our operational policing and it is important that they were aligned to the performance management structures. The profile of these groups are outlined below.

12.2. Strategic TCG

This meeting will take place at subdivisional level on a three monthly basis. It will be minuted and actions created. It involves senior management and its function is to :

- Perform a strategic threat assessment incorporating:
 - Crime and Disorder analysis
 - volume crime profile
 - trends and demand profile, eg. seasonal, prolific offender(s), repeat locations, repeat victims.
 - market state interpretations
 - organised and serious crime threats
 - dangerous offenders
 - Community Awareness
 - community information (political, partner and community issues)
 - planning, design, building, and change of use threats.
 - demographic information

13.4. A simplified integrated business planning process supports these structures. National and local plans are incorporated into a Divisional plan clarifying priorities, targets and reporting procedures.

14. **Marketing**

14.1. In order to breach cultural resistance to change a marketing plan was devised which highlighted the operational gains to be made through problem solving.

These included

- Active Command support ;
- Presentations internally and externally ;
- Police internal newspaper and video ;
- Intranet site highlighting innovative problem solving ; and,
- Local police orders/bulletins

14.2. A quantity of support material ranging from aide-memoires to implementation packs assisted.

15. **Assessment and the Way Forward**

15.1. The full impact of the OPS has yet to be achieved. The evidence of the outcomes in reducing key crime are very encouraging with significant reductions across the force, especially in the later stages of the year as the OPS is further into it's rollout.

From a period of year on year increases in volume crime GMP is now in a position to report that total recorded crime has reduced. There are most encouraging signs as the benefits and outcomes of the OPS take effect.

See appendix 4 for the performance data, which includes comparison with the ACPO family Forces.

This encouraging performance is however only the beginning. Under our performance management and quality assurance regimes we will continue to examine how each subdivision of GMP is adopting the principles of the OPS.

15.2. The project plan includes this evaluation. Each subdivision is visited and supported by members of OPS implementation team examining the:

- Functions of the OPU staff against new job descriptions ;
- Use of the SARA database ;

- Stages of problem solving ;
- Support for TCGs ;
- Use of intelligence and briefing; and,
- Partnership working ;

15.3 The implementation team then produce an action plan aimed at highlighting development issues. This is agreed with subdivisional management and there then follows a period of support and assessment.

15.4. An independent evaluation of the OPS implementation is conducted by the Research and Development branch of GMP. It involves interviews on subdivisions and questionnaires to operational staff. These inform both the subdivisional management and OPS project board.

15.5. The OPS requires a continuing examination of how all GMP's information systems support effective problem solving. We are currently developing and integrating our systems in the following areas

- Crime and Incident pattern analysis ;
- SARA recording/management ;
- Command and control ;
- Crime and intelligence recording ;
- Briefing and debriefing

15.6. Problem solving commences at the initial contact with the victim or caller. We are currently developing a new response policy which reflects a problem solving approach.

15.7. The future for problem solving is in strong partnerships. The development of OPU's allows for integration of local agency resources in a combined unit. There are issues to overcome but the OPS recognises this as the way forward and is working towards it.


16. **Conclusion**

16.1. The OPS is a live strategic vision of how we should police Greater Manchester. It creates a structure which not only supports problem solving but integrates it into our everyday policing efforts, making it "the way we work".


16.2 Problem solving will not fail in Greater Manchester. It has the support of the Operational Policing Strategy. It will make Manchester a safer and better place.

Appendix 1 Pathfinder Performance Data


Crime trends April-March 1999/2000




Key crime trends April- March 1999/2000



Crime Trends April-March 1999/2000



Appendix 2 Organisation structure for Operational Policing Units



Explanatory table

Post	Core Function
OPU Manager	Manages the unit and its functions, provides the focus for the unit in delivering the subdivisional priorities. Provides the link to the Tasking and Coordinating Group
Operations Coordinator	Manages the problem solving process on the subdivision, ensures that SARA packages are resourced as directed by the TCG.
Intelligence Coordinator	Manages the intelligence function on the subdivision. Supervises the crime evaluation process on behalf of the DCI. Provides the link with the informant controller (DCI)
Crime Reduction Advisor(s)	Supports the problem solving process with strategic and tactical crime reduction advice.
Analyst	Provides both a proactive and reactive analytical capability supporting operational policing on the subdivision
Crime Evaluator(s)	Provides the crime evaluation function for the subdivision, provides investigative support, provides information concerning crime and incidents supporting problem solving and briefing.
Intelligence Officers	Operates the Intelligence function within the OPU to provide information concerning crime and incidents, supporting problem solving and the briefing system.
Field Intelligence Officer(s)	Provides a proactive intelligence function to the subdivision providing information concerning crime and incidents, supporting problem solving and the briefing system.
Support Assistant(s)	Provides administrative support to the OPU functions.

Appendix 3 Problem Identification Form

GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE

Problem Identification SARA Form

OP U Reference

Submitted by: (Rank/PIN/Name) _____ Date: _____

Relief/Station: _____ Beat(s) _____

Contact No.: _____ FWIN(s)/Crime ref no. (attached copies)

Exact location of the problem:

Brief description of the problem:

Contributory factors location:

Contributory factors/offenders or incident

Contributory factors victim/caller


Root cause/ Common Characteristics:

Action already taken/ideas on solutions:

Appendix 4 — Performance Data

Metropolitan Family Force comparison

Percentage reduction in Total Recorded Crime ACPO Family Force comparison



	GMP	Cleveland	Merseyside	West Mids	West Yorks
April 2000 - Sept 2000	-2.7%	-2.4%	-2.1%	+0.6%	-1%
April 2000 - Feb 2001	-3.6%	-1.1%	-3.1%	+1.7%	-0.3%


Total Crimes recorded ACPO Family Force comparison

	GMP	Cleveland	Merseyside	West Mids	West Yorks
Apr to Sept 2000	180,884	31,383	71,029	182,931	127,172
Apr to Sept 1999	185,955	32,147	72,570	181,824	128,441
Apr to Feb 200011	331,758	58,564	130,438	337,158	236,307
Apr to Feb 1999100	344,185	59,195	134,670	331,647	237,034

Percentage reduction in House Burglaries - ACPO Family Force comparison

	GMP	Cleveland	Merseyside	West Mids	West Yorks
April 2000 - Sept 2000	-1.2%	-20.7%	-15%	-14.7%	-6.8%
April 2000 - Feb 2001	-4.9%	-8.1%	-10.3%	-12.3%	+1.9%


Percentage reduction in Burglary dwelling crimes. Family force comparison



Burglary Dwelling Crimes recorded ACPO Family Force comparison

	GMP	Cleveland	Merseyside	West Mids	West Yorks
Apr to Sept 2000	18,490	3,121	5,879	14,531	13,196
Apr to Sept 1999	18,708	3,934	6,918	17,045	14,164
Apr to Feb 200011	35,621	6,501	11,298	28,629	27,661
Apr to Feb 1999100	37,476	7,077	12,592	32,626	27,158

Percentage reduction in Car crime. Family force comparison



Percentage reduction in Car Crime ACPO Family Force comparison


	GMP	Cleveland	Merseyside	West Mids	West Yorks
April 2000 - Sept 2000	-3.3%	+5.4%	-3.9%	-6.9%	+4%
April 2000 - Feb 2001	-5.2%	+0.8%	-6.3%	-6.9%	+1.3%

Figures for Car Crime used ACPO Theft of and from Motor Vehicles presented together with car related crime data.

Percentage reduction in Burglary (other) crime ACPO Family Force comparison

	GMP	Cleveland	Merseyside	West Mids	West Yorks
April 2000 - Sept 2000	-12.1 %	+6%	-3.4%	-4.8%	+1.3%
April 2000 - Feb 2001	-12.9%	+4.3%	-4.4%	-3.6%	+2.5%

Percentage reduction in Burglary (Other) crime. Family force comparison




Burplary Other Crimes recorded ACPO Family Force comparison

	GMP	Cleveland	Merseyside	West Mids	West Yorks
Apr to Sept 2000	15,765	4,283	5,886	16,559	15,490
Apr to Sept 1999	17,941	4,039	6,096	17,398	15,296
Apr to Feb 2000/1	27,512	7,418	10,424	29,114	27,533
Apr to Feb 1999/00	31,583	7,109	10,907	30,191	26,867


Percentage reduction in Robbery ACPO Family Force comparison

	GMP	Cleveland	Merseyside	West Mids	West Yorks
April 2000 - Sept 2000	+24.2%	+23%	-10%	+16.4%	+20.3%
April 2000 - Feb 2001	+16.9%	+11%	-11.4%	+12.5%	+19.7%

Percentage reduction in robbery crimes. Family force comparison



Further details of Robbery percentage change in GMP




Robbery Crimes recorded ACPO Family Force comparison

	GMP	Cleveland	Merseyside	West Mids	West Yorks
Apr to Sept 2000	5,088	460	1,133	5,435	1,693
Apr to Sept 1999	4,095	374	1,259	4,669	1,407
Apr to Feb 2000/1	9,083	839	2,178	10,273	3,372
Apr to Feb 1999/00	7,771	756	2,457	9,128	2,817

Violent crime - ACPO Family Force comparison

Percentage reduction in Violent crimes. ACPO Family force comparison




Percentage reduction in Burglary (other) crime ACPO Family Force comparison

	GMP	Cleveland	Merseyside	West Mids	West Yorks
April 2000 - Sept 2000	+0.7%	+1.1%	+5.9%	+7.7%	-1.2%
April 2000 - Feb 2001	+1.8%	-7%	+5.9%	+29%	-2.7%

Violent Crime recorded ACPO Family Force comparison

	GMP	Cleveland	Merseyside	West Mids	West Yorks
Apr to Sept 2000	26,614	2,109	9,714	21,362	11,159
Apr to Sept 1999	26,428	2,087	9,177	19,839	11,292
Apr to Feb 2000/1	47,606	3,639	17,706	44,522	20,266
Apr to Feb 1999/00	46,775	3,911	16,714	34,522	20,818

Comparison - Pathfinder site Year on Year Crime Reduction



Pathfinder commenced April 1999