Sounds from the POP beat -  
Problem-Orientated Policing in Cheylesmore

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Sounds from the POP beat: Problem-Orientated Policing in Cheylesmore

Abstract:

The sectorisation of the West Midlands Police has allowed officers to work in a highly localised environment and develop a sound understanding of their constituent community. Supported by a management team that encourages innovation and fuelled by a sense of ownership, officers have begun to adopt problem solving techniques to address long term issues previously overlooked by traditional incident-led approaches. Such a strategy was introduced in the Stivichall Sector of Coventry in March 1999 as a result of escalating crime levels on one particular beat (beat 10).

Analysis of crime records and command and control data identified a long-term crime trend that had previously been overlooked. Further analysis identified incidents of criminal damage and youth nuisance as a serious problem in one particular area. Increased interagency and public liaison helped to identify two targets who were believed to be behaving in a highly anti-social manner against their neighbours.

Beat 10 required a focused approach to redress the rising crime trend. A traditional enforcement based strategy was developed with the intention of reducing crime and disorder in the beat 10 area. The SARA model gave structure to the project and facilitated a step by step approach: Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment.

Although the targeting strategy initially appeared successful in reducing crime the assessment process demonstrated that youth disorder remained a problem local residents. Consequently the SARA process was reassessed and the response strategy modified to encompass a more holistic and tailored approach.

After discussion with partnership agencies anti-social behaviour orders were sought in respect of both youths. Both orders were eventually granted.

The initiative lasted for a year and resulted in the two targets being charged with numerous offences, in addition to the anti-social behaviour orders. Crime on beat 10 has considerably fallen, however the reduction in complaints of youth instigated disorder is less convincing. Nevertheless the initial objectives of a reduction in crime and disorder have been realised. Equally importantly "Operation Cockroach" demonstrated the impact that a focused POP initiative can have on an area blighted by the anti-social behaviour of a minority.

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1.0 Introduction

"Problem Orientated Policing" (POP) is a radical way of conceptualising the police function designed to increase police effectiveness whilst refining the use of police authority. The theory encourages police to engage in researching the specific behavioural problems they are expected to handle in their respective communities and, based on this analysis, to develop new and more effective responses. It emphasises prevention over simply reacting to incidents and encourages a broad range of creative responses over exclusive dependence on law enforcement.

The idea that police officers should concentrate on the root cause of incidents rather than repeatedly returning to them was formulated by American academic Herman Goldstien and has been adopted by a number of police agencies in the United States. Research into the implementation of POP has also been conducted in England and Wales and has resulted in the publication of "Brit Pop" and "Brit Pop II" by the Home Office's Police Research Group.

What follows is an account of work undertaken to address an identified crime and disorder problem in the Cheylesmore area of Coventry using problem solving methodology outlined in "Brit Pop". The initiative summarised in this report was undertaken by four local sector officers working in a proactive environment "ring fenced" from the demands of incident led policing. During the year's duration of this project officers also undertook a number of other proactive operations across the sector and were not exclusively dedicated to addressing Cheylesmore's problems.

This report is structured using the "SARA" process, a conceptual tool used to identify and develop a problem orientated response to a community problem. The work begins with a description of the Cheylesmore area and an account of the "scanning" process that identified and confirmed the nature of the crime and disorder problem. The study then goes on to describe the analytical processes used by officers to explore and define the causes and underlying conditions that were identified in part one. There follows a brief overview of the responses developed as a result before the operation is evaluated in the assessment section. The report is then brought to a close by a conclusion.

2.0 Operation "Cockroach": SARA in Cheylesmore

Cheylesmore is a pleasant residential area lying to the south of Coventry City centre. Despite its proximity to the city centre the area has its own local shops and a distinctly village atmosphere, enhanced by a community centre and a popular local social club. The local housing stock is an eclectic mixture of sheltered accommodation for the elderly, flats, large detached premises and a number of small modern terraced houses organised on closes.

2 Leigh, Read & Tilley 1996, 1998
3 SARA stands for Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment
Local police officers also know Cheylesmore as "beat 10", one of the six beats that form the Stivichall Sector. The area is policed from Fletchamstead Highway police station by approximately thirty sector officers, the majority of whom are engaged in a response role.

Early 1999 saw the development of a sector-based team of four officers to proactively target Stivichall criminals using an intelligence led approach. This initiative was named "Operation Cockroach". Central to this strategy was the monitoring of reported crime to identify trends and patterns at an early stage. In late February 1999, whilst examining local crime levels, officers became aware that Cheylesmore crime was rising at an alarming rate. The identification of this trend prompted the "scanning" phase of the SARA process to provide further information on the phenomenon.

2.1 Scanning

Although reported crime figures suggested an increase in anti-social behaviour in Cheylesmore it was considered that reported crime, examined in isolation, would detract from the effectiveness of the scanning and analysis phases. The limitations of utilising crime statistics as research material have been well catalogued, however while their use may be problematic they still provide useful and obtainable empirical data.

Researchers have also commented on the inadequacies of data generated by police crime and control systems, drawing attention to the fact one incident may generate a number of incident logs and that the text of the log depends on the interpretation of the inputter. Nevertheless a decision was made to use crime data and data abstracted from the command and control database (OASIS). Both sources are indicators of the public’s demand for policing services and the information is easily accessed by officers using the force intranet system.

Despite relying heavily on the analysis of police generated quantitative data throughout Operation Cockroach, officers also regularly discussed the problems of the area with residents and council housing officers. Whilst the information supplied during these encounters was anecdotal it proved an invaluable indicator of the quality of life in Cheylesmore.

Notwithstanding an awareness that Beat 10 had experienced a significant increase in crime during March 1999 the trend was initially considered to be exceptional and without precedent. This conviction was challenged by the historical analysis of Cheylesmore crime that demonstrated an upward trend during the preceding six months. Consequently, despite overtly manifesting itself as a priority during March, Cheylesmore crime was identified as a long-term problem and deserving of a comprehensive problem solving approach.

May, 1993, pp.51-64
Leigh, Read & Tilley, 1996 pp. 28
Graph 1
Having confirmed and quantified a rising crime trend in Cheylesmore, the character of the crime figures was explored through the re-classification of offences into twelve categories. To examine the nature of the increase in recorded crime offences they were analysed by type from October 1998 to March 1999. Criminal damage was identified as the most common reported crime in Cheylesmore constituting 36% of all crime.

Offences were classified under the following headings: Burglary dwelling (Bdh), burglary other (Bob), assault (Ass), robbery (Rob), vehicle theft (TADA), theft from motor vehicle (TFMV), theft of pedal cycle (TOPC), theft from person (TFP), theft other (THO), indecency (Ind), criminal damage (Dam) and miscellaneous offences (Misc).

Graph 1: Cheylesmore reported crime
Apr 1998 – Mar 1999

Graph 2: Cheylesmore reported crime by type
The three most common offence types were then plotted alongside "total crime" over the twelve-month period to identify any possible relationships. Perhaps unsurprisingly this exercise identified a strong association between increases in criminal damage and overall crime. Assaults and domestic burglary remained relatively constant over the chosen timescale.

This three-step procedure demonstrated that the increase in Cheylesmore crime was attributable to a rise in criminal damage. The reduction of criminal damage on Beat 10 was prioritised in March 1999 when beat 10 crime represented 25% of total crime across the Stivichall sector. Criminal damage offences committed on beat 10 made up 9% of overall sector crime.

Crime statistics do not simply reflect the number and type of incidents of crime committed. From the decision to report a crime to the police decision to formally investigate it, a number of variables impact how and whether the incident is recorded. The use of data obtained from the force command and control system was therefore considered necessary to sustain the validity and reliability of the scanning process. OASIS logs generated by incidents in Cheylesmore were consequently also examined for the same twelve-month period detailed above.

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9 criminal damage, burglary dwelling and assaults
10 Graph 3
11 Graph 4
Although analysis of total logs demonstrated a sharp increase in demand for police resources through March there was no distinct upward trend that mirrored the experience of rising crime from October 1998 to March 1999. Logs are classified by the operator under one of nine headings depending on an initial interpretation of the incident\textsuperscript{12}. Of the nine subject classifications only two, "crime" and "disorder" were considered relevant to

\textsuperscript{12} The nine OASIS classifications are; alarm, bomb call, crime, disorder, major incident, miscellaneous, motorway, non-incident and traffic.
the analysis of criminal damage levels. Consequently, incident logs classified under the "crime" and "disorder" headings were added together and the results plotted 13.

A combination of crime and disorder logs demonstrated that such incidents remained relatively constant until March 1999 when demand increased by 40% over the average. However the proposition that the Cheylesmore community had suffered increased levels of disorder and crime since October 1998 was not supported by OASIS data.

Conscious that the only material used throughout the scanning phase had until now been police generated, attempts were made to sample the opinions of "the community" and another local agency; the council housing department. The conclusions reached through the quantitative analysis of police data were largely supported by these efforts. A community meeting at the local youth club attracted a number of local residents who expressed concern about the anti-social behaviour of a number of youths. Similarly the local housing officer provided evidence of a number of complaints she had received regarding the activities of some local children.

Although treated with some scepticism by officers, who felt they were aware of "problems" in Cheylesmore, the scanning process proved valuable in defining the scale and the nature of the issue. The historical perspective provided by this process demonstrated a six-month crime trend that would otherwise have been overlooked, identifying a long-term problem' that justified the subsequent analytical and response phases. Thus the scanning process confirmed the problem to be analysed as one measurable by criminal damage and disorderly behaviour.

### 2.2 Analysis

Having confirmed that Cheylesmore was suffering high levels of criminal and sub-criminal behaviour officers further investigated the issue. Although the problem had been broadly identified as "criminal damage in the Cheylesmore area" there was a requirement to focus on the issue in greater detail to ensure an effective response.

The consensus of opinion was that youths were responsible for the perceived increase in anti-social behaviour. To test this supposition OASIS "disorder" logs generated by incidents in Cheylesmore between 1st October 1998 and 1st April 1999 were examined. Each log was re-classified under one of five headings: youth nuisance, domestic incident, alcohol related, neighbour dispute and other.
During the first three months of 1999 45% of reported disorder incidents in Cheylesmore were connected with the behaviour of youths. During the final three months of 1998 only 33% of disorder related OASIS logs could be linked to problems caused by children. Although this disparity could be explained by seasonal changes, the fact that youth nuisance generated 45% of all disorder logs and 17% of overall OASIS logs supported the assertion that juveniles were at least partially responsible for the increase in local crime.

To identify the type of child involved in the incidents that created the youth related command and control logs a histogram was produced based on the time that complainants contacted police to report the disorderly behaviour.

Although only using data generated during the first three months of 1999 the graph demonstrated that the anti-social behaviour of the youths was concentrated throughout
the early evening period. This suggested that the children were either at school or otherwise occupied throughout the morning and early afternoon.

Cheylesmore covers an area of about two square miles. Consequently any response would be enhanced by the targeting of police resources in areas identified as being at high risk from crime and anti-social behaviour. The command unit's crime analyst assisted officers in locating, these "hot spots" by generating three "high risk" maps displaying the following information:

1. Total reported beat 10 crime – 01/01/99 to 31/03/99 (Map 1 Appendix C)
2. Total reported beat 10 criminal damage – 01/01/99 to 31/03/99 (Map 2 Appendix C)
3. Total "disorder" classified command and control OASIS logs – 01/01/99 (Map 3 Appendix C)

Each map highlighted the same relatively small "high risk" area known locally as 'the closes". "The closes" form part of a larger development constructed during the nineteen-sixties and consist of nine residential closes. The area is organised around small communal greens connected by footpaths but with no vehicular access. The housing is a mixture of three bedroom houses and small blocks of flats, many of which are council owned although there are an increasing number of owner-occupiers. The area cannot be described as deprived, there are few void premises and although graffiti is a regular occurrence it is often quickly removed.

The incidence of criminal damage and reported youth disorder in each close was analysed and it was found that 22% of all criminal damage and 33% of all disorder logs originated from "the closes"\(^{15}\). "The closes" cover approximately one eighth of Cheylesmore.

Graph 7: Comparison of reported crime and disorder in "the closes"
Jan – Mar 1999

\(^{15}\) Graph 7
An examination of the sixty reported incidents of criminal damage committed on beat 10 during the first three months of 1999 was undertaken to identify characteristics which made persons, or property, more susceptible to criminal damage than others. However, apart from the location determinant, there was a high distribution of risk. Ten offences were committed against four repeat victims. Two repeat victims became victims within the "high risk" area identified above: In February 1999 the Community centre had its windows broken on three occasions causing damage to the value of £800.00, whilst a resident has his flat window smashed twice.

For the purposes of analysis persons who had reported youth disorder were also considered "victims" of anti-social behaviour. Of the thirty incident logs generated by residents notifying police of sub-criminal behaviour by youths not one was a repeat caller. This caused concern as each OASIS log was considered to be a potentially valuable source of information. This assumption was based on the premise that the caller was prepared to contact police to pass on information to address a local problem. An analysis of the logs found that although in the majority of cases officers were dispatched to the incident, when resources permitted, they usually arrived after the youths had dispersed. In 43% of logs no further action was taken, 16% "advice " was given in and 13% of logs the incident resulted in the generation of a crime report.

OASIS logs and crime reports were scrutinised and a list prepared of persons, resident in the "high risk" area, who had recently either reported a locally committed crime or youth disorder. Each individual was contacted as an exercise in intelligence and evidence gathering. When potential witnesses were visited at their home addresses officers always attended in the morning and wearing plain clothes to reduce the fear of retaliation. This activity proved remarkably productive as residents welcomed renewed and focused police interest in the area. A number of residents recognised that police resources had to be prioritised and were pleasantly surprised that "plain clothed" officers were keen to address what was perceived to be a series of minor crimes.

Through "cold calling" officers learnt that the youths responsible for the localised anti-social behaviour lived within the "high risk" area and were known by name or home address to a number of their victims. Although this information was extremely valuable many residents were adamant that, while happy to supply information, they would not provide formal witness statements due to the close proximity of the offender's home to their own. It became apparent that not only were residents wary of making statements against the children of their neighbours, they were also wary of reporting offences due to a perception that police involvement would invite reprisals. Consequently many criminal offences went unrecorded. Crime figures and OASIS logs therefore only indicated "the tip of the iceberg".

This practice of approaching local residents who had previously requested police assistance identified two youths who were perceived as being responsible for much of the local anti-social behaviour. A number of witness statements from those local residents, who were prepared to challenge the criminal conduct of the youths, were also obtained.
Liaison with the Council Housing office provided details of complaints made regarding the behavior of local youths. This led to a number of joint council and police interviews with residents who had suffered anti-social behavior but were apprehensive of dealing with the police. Complaints made to the council confirmed that the youths were using a block of flats in Campion Close to meet and smoke drugs. Persons who complained to the council also identified two youths perceived to be the ringleaders of the group; the boys can be described as follows:

Youth 1: White male, fourteen years old, resident in a privately owned house with both parents, a persistent truant, one conviction for theft

Youth 2: White male, fifteen years old, resident in a council rented house with his mother, attends a local school, one caution for burglary.

In summary, the analysis phase of the SARA process indicated:

- Youth disorder was an increasing problem in Cheylesmore
- Youth disorder was most likely to occur between 1600 hrs and 2200 hrs
- Disorder, crime and criminal damage were geographically concentrated around the "closes" area
- There was a low rate of repeat victimisation
- There was a "hot-spot" at the Cheylesmore Community centre
- There was a "hot-spot" block of flats in Campion Close
- Victims and witnesses who were able to identify the offenders felt intimidated
- Youths 1 and 2 were suspects

This information was used to develop a response to address the Cheylesmore youth problem..

2.3 Response

The analysis's identification of the two suspects determined that the response to the problem would be enforcement led. Officers continued to examine new logs and crime reports pertaining to the "high risk" area and conducted "follow-up" visits when appropriate, thereby developing new sources of information and obtaining occasional witness statements.

This evidence gathering approach was supported by Coventry City Council who undertook two surveillance operations focused on the Campion Close and Community Centre "hot-spots". Council-funded operatives used static cameras and staffed observation posts to record evidence of anti-social behavior. This tactic was particularly effective in Campion Close where the two targets were filmed stealing a vehicle,
committing a burglary and riding on a stolen invalid scooter\textsuperscript{16}. A large number of sub-criminal acts of anti-social behavior were also recorded at both locations.

By April 1999 sufficient evidence had been gathered to allow both youths to be arrested and charged with a total of six offences. The boys were later bailed with non-association conditions. Despite this initial success the cycle of intelligence gathering, evidence gathering and arrest continued resulting in both boys being further arrested on a regular basis. On each occasion they were either remanded in police custody or conditionally bailed.

\textbf{2.4 Assessment}

The response phase was assessed on a bi-monthly basis through the examination of reported crime, OASIS logs, and contact with local residents.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{graph8.png}
\caption{Cheylesmore reported crime Jun 1998 - May 1999}
\end{figure}

An analysis of reported crime in Cheylesmore demonstrated a significant reduction that correlated strongly with action taken during the response phase against the targets at the end of March and in late April\textsuperscript{17}. Reported crime fell by over 50\% from a high point in March of 69 offences to 32 offences in May. This decrease was directly attributable to a fall in the level of reported instances of criminal damage.

\textsuperscript{36} The motorized wheel chair was later destroyed when it was thrown in a nearby pond, depriving its eighty-year-old keeper of his only means of mobility.

\textsuperscript{\rightarrow} Graph 8
Reclassified "disorder" OASIS Iocis Cheylesmore

Reclassified disorder logs failed to demonstrate a decrease in complaints from Cheylesmore residents of anti-social behaviour by youths. This was supported by contact with local residents, who stated that they were still suffering from anti-social behaviour. Both boys had also breached their bail conditions. This prompted a reassessment of the analysis and response phases of the SARA process, leading to the conclusion that the response strategy required modification.

2.5 Response

The adoption of a purely enforcement based response was successful in that when the targets were charged reported crime significantly reduced. However the youths failed to adhere to their bail conditions and continued to behave in a criminal and sub-criminal manner. This situation weakened the credibility of officers in the eyes of residents who had provided witness statements, as although police action had been taken against the boys, there was little discernible improvement in their behaviour. Consequently, while the enforcement strategy continued, a longer-term approach was adopted using target hardening techniques and new Crime and Disorder Act legislation.

Consideration was then given to restricting the access to the block of flats in Campion Close used by the youths. The flats were entered through two doors, neither of which was regularly locked. Council employees permanently sealed one door and fitted a combination lock on the other causing the youths to stop using the premises, much to the relief of residents.

In order to adopt a more holistic interagency approach the matter was discussed by the Coventry Information Sharing and Orders Group (CISOG), a multi agency forum attended by representatives of partnership agencies. Following discussion it was decided that Coventry City Council, in their capacity as social landlords, would apply for Anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) against each youth.

ASBOs were introduced by s. 1 of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act and came into force on April 1st 1999. The orders were designed to address the problems of obtaining
evidence from vulnerable witnesses in relation to persistent criminal and sub-criminal acts and to deal with the totality of anti-social behaviour as opposed to individual events. Moreover, hearsay evidence, evidence of co-accused and complaints made to other agencies are admissible in respect of ASBOs. This was a considerable advantage as a number of new witnesses were prepared to give police statements detailing persistent anti-social behaviour on the understanding that they would remain anonymous and that their presence would not be required in court. The legislation appeared an ideal tool with which to address the acute problems experienced by Cheylesmore residents.

Once the decision to pursue ASBOs for both youths was made the evidence gathering process was broadened to encompass not only behaviour prohibited by criminal law but also all sub-criminal and anti-social behaviour. Within a matter of weeks a substantial body of evidence had been amassed detailing the conduct of the boys. The evidence was organised into two separate ASBO application packages and submitted to the local authority legal team.

Summonses were served in person on both youths and their respective parents. Youth one had, by that time, been moved away from Coventry by his parents to avoid any further breaches of conditional bail and the possibility of a remand in custody. In July 1999 youth one pleaded guilty to twelve offences and received a supervision order. Youth two pleaded not guilty but was eventually found guilty of nine offences (including causing a public nuisance) in January 2000, and also received a supervision order.

Both boys contested the ASBO. Due to the well documented offending history, proven "beyond all reasonable doubt" in criminal court, the allegation that they had "acted in an anti-social manner" was not challenged. However the defence questioned the "necessity" of the orders; at the time of the court case youth one was still residing outside of Coventry, and youth two's offending behaviour had reduced since the service of summons. It was argued that the threat of the order was curtailing the behaviour of both boys and in youth two's case a civilian witness gave direct evidence that challenged the argument that the defendant had ceased to behave in an anti-social manner since being sentenced by criminal court; Both orders were granted by a stipendary Magistrate and included geographical restrictions and prohibited the boys from causing persons in the local authority area of Coventry alarm, harassment or distress.

2.6 Assessment

This initiative was measured using crime and OASIS data over the period October 1998 to April 2000. The response to the youth problems in Cheylesmore began on 29th March 1999 with the arrest of both targets. The initiative was ended in March 2000 following the granting of the second ASBO against youth two. The twelve-month life span of the operation saw a steady decrease in reported crime.

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28 Graph 9
Both boys were arrested on numerous occasions and charged with a total of forty offences. Youth one’s parents moved him away from Coventry in May 1999, while youth two was eventually remanded in custody following a robbery committed whilst on bail. Despite focusing on criminal damage officers charged the targets with a variety of offences ranging from “threats to kill” to affray 19.

Graph 10: Summary of offences charged 20
Mar 1999 – Mar 2000

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19 Graph 10
20 Includes vehicle theft (TADA), criminal damage (Dam), theft, breach of bail conditions (Bail), assault (Ass), burglary dwelling (Bdh), burglary other (Bob), Robbery (Rob), Vehicle interference (Veh In) and miscellaneous (Misc)
A comparison between the crime risk map for January to March 1999 and the corresponding period in 2000 shows that the geographical risk area has moved northwards away from “the closes”. The community centre is no longer clearly defined as a “hot-spot” and a new risk area has developed around Quinton Park.\textsuperscript{21}

Graph 11: Cheviesmore crime and disorder logs  
Oct 1998 – Apr 2000

Graph 11 illustrates a fluctuation in crime and disorder logs during the initiative. A decrease in the volume of logged incidents from June to November correlates with the absence of youth one from the city and the setting of bail conditions for youth two. However November 1999 to March 2000 witnessed an increase in crime and disorder logs. This trend has been attributed to a local family who have recently been evicted as a result of their anti-social behaviour. At the time of writing it is anticipated that they will be made the subjects of ASBO’s having been targeted by a similar strategy.

\textsuperscript{21} APPENDIX C, Map 1 & 4
A quarterly analysis of re-classified disorder logs demonstrates an overall reduction in calls to police reporting incidents of youth related disorder. A direct comparison between the first quarters of 1999 and 2000 show that youth related disorder incidents have fallen by 37%.

3.0 Conclusions

• Crime and disorder in Cheylesmore fell during the duration of this project, thereby reducing the overall volume of demand for policing services. Although subject to numerous external factors, this reduction can be partly attributed to the problem orientated approach adopted by Operation Cockroach.

• If the initiative is regarded as a success then it is the success of a partnership approach rather than that of any one agency. The pooling of financial and human resources to address a common problem considerably enhanced the effectiveness of this undertaking. Interagency co-operation, guided by CISOG, facilitated improved community liaison, surveillance evidence and pioneering work in respect of the ASBOs.

• The problem-orientated strategy did not provide a "quick fix". Although crime did fall significantly within the first two months of the project the underlying disorder problem remained. This experience demonstrated the importance of regularly assessing the impact of any response strategy with a view to modifying it if the desired results are not realized.
• The problem solving approach was assisted by access to the crime and OASIS databases through the medium of the force Intranet. The value of reliable and current data is vital to the scanning and analysis procedures.

• The sector-policing model was conducive to POP as it encourages officers to take ownership of a geographically limited area making the scanning process a realistic element of the daily routine. However had the officers involved been subject to the demands and distractions of incident led policing the formulation of a structured and analytical approach would have been considerably more challenging.

• The experience of this initiative supports the proposition that only a handful of offenders commit the majority of offences. The targeting of two individuals appeared to meaningfully impact on the degree of anti-social behavior experienced by the Cheylesmore community.

• There was no conflict between this initiative and the current police performance culture, which places an emphasis on both crime detection and crime reduction.

• The imposition of the ASBO's helped restore the resident's lost confidence in the police. The making of the order for youth one corresponded with his move out of the community and therefore members of the local community saw his absence from the area as a direct result of the ASBO. At the time of writing youth two is alleged to have breached his ASBO the day it was granted. The matter will go to trial and he is currently on conditional bail in respect to this offence. It is anticipated that as the use of ASBOs become more frequent they will both act as a deterrent and offer an increasingly recognized and viable alternative to traditional enforcement responses.