Summary

In summer of 2010, Dayton Police Department (DPD) Fifth District Officers observed a rise in the amount of aggravated robberies. Through scanning it was determined that delivery personnel, specifically food delivery drivers, were the majority of the victims. With over 70% of the incidents involving a gun, it was clear that at least one element of the crime triangle had to be altered. Further analysis of the incidents provided an understanding that, at times, delivery personnel share some of the same vulnerabilities as Police Officers. Continued analysis of reports, searching for a pattern or some type of similarity of incidents in order to predict the next incident, proved futile. DPD quickly realized they could not predict the next incident due to not knowing where the crime would take place, which delivery driver was going to be the next victim, or who the next suspect was going to be. DPD recognized they could not predict the next incident, they needed to prevent it.

During the analysis phase, DPD looked at five (5) key factors: type of address, time/day, weapon used, point of delivery, and whether the incidents could have been prevented by the driver or business. Based on the results of the analysis, DPD formulated a multi-step response which included building partnerships with the local delivery businesses, media, and residents of the community. The response included free training provided to delivery personnel, working with delivery businesses to change their delivery procedures, and staying in communication with all delivery businesses as new incidents occurred. DPD encouraged the businesses to share incident information with other businesses that serviced the same area.

Sharing crime information proved to be one of the key elements to preventing this type of crime as a local Domino’s Pizza was robbed shortly after the training and the manager shared all information from the incident with the Donato’s Pizza across the street. A short time after Domino’s was robbed, the same suspect attempted to place an order to the Donato’s. Having the information from the Domino’s robbery the Donato’s manager contacted DPD, who set up a sting which resulted in the arrest of an armed robbery suspect. Through the collaborative efforts by the community, the delivery businesses, and the DPD, there has been a Citywide year to date reduction in armed robberies of delivery personnel of 47%, and a 78% reduction in the targeted area.
Safe Delivery Project

Scanning

In the summer of 2010, the Dayton Police Department (DPD) observed a rise in aggravated commercial robberies. Lieutenant Michael Wilhelm of the West Patrol Operations Division identified this rise specifically in the area of northwest Dayton. After a review of all incidents it was determined that delivery personnel, specifically food delivery personnel, were the primary targets. During the review of all incidents, DPD learned that over 70% involved a gun. It was clear that at least one element of the crime triangle had to be altered. Further scanning of the incidents provided an understanding that, in many ways, food delivery personnel share the same vulnerabilities as Police Officers. If someone wants to harm or rob them, a suspect can simply call and “order” the delivery personnel to a specific location at a specific time. Scanning also revealed a new part of the problem, the media. Given the nature of the incidents occurring, the media was almost always going to report the incident. The problem was that the story the media was reporting was basically a ‘blueprint’ on how to rob a food delivery driver, and how easy it seemed to be to get away with it.

Analysis

After scanning the incidents it was determined something needed to be done and further analysis was necessary. DPD analyzed every incident and focused on five (5) key elements: type of address, time/day, point of delivery, type of weapon used, and could the driver or business have prevented the incident by changing something with their procedures. When DPD looked at the type of address, the results were somewhat surprising. Over half of the incidents occurred at a residence that was not vacant, about a third of the incidents occurred at an apartment complex and the rest occurred at a vacant structure (see appendix 1).

DPD also wanted to get a good understanding on when these incidents occurred most often and on what days. During the analysis we learned the majority of the incidents occurred on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. (see appendix 2). The third element we analyzed was at what point...
of the delivery did the robbery occur: before or after the delivery transaction took place. This revealed that in nearly three out of four incidents the robbery took place before the transaction was completed.

The fourth element DPD used to formulate a response was the type of weapon that was being used. This part of analysis revealed the seriousness of the incidents occurring. With 74% of the incidents involving a gun, the majority of the incidents could turn into a shooting very easily (see appendix 3). The last element DPD looked at, and probably the most important, was whether or not the driver or business mentioned something in the initial report that could have prevented the incident. In 75% of the incidents, either the driver or the business indicated that something was “not right” with the delivery. They indicated anything from the phone call not feeling right to the house looking vacant when the driver arrived on scene as indicators something “wasn’t right”. This clearly stated that the business and the delivery driver play the biggest role in prevention.

Continued analysis of reports, searching for a pattern or some type of similarity of incidents in order to predict the next incident, proved futile. DPD quickly realized they could not predict the next incident due to not knowing where the crime would take place, which delivery driver was going to be the next victim, or who the next suspect was going to be. DPD recognized they could not predict the next incident, they needed to prevent it.

Response

Evaluating the incidents using the crime triangle (victim, suspect, location), DPD recognized that the location and suspect are usually not known until after the incident and decided the best strategy was to “harden the target” by offering some type of training to delivery drivers and provide them with tools and knowledge in order to help them avoid becoming the next victim. DPD Officers knew this was not going to be easy and that it would have to be done in multiple steps.

Step One – With over half of the incidents taking place in northwest Dayton, officers began building partnerships with the different food delivery businesses in that area. During the development of this partnership, DPD worked with these businesses to improve the safety in their policies and procedures. The businesses were
asked if they would be willing to send their employees to a free training hosted by DPD. Every business was enthusiastic about the idea. While the training was being planned, DPD continued to be in frequent communication with the businesses and provided them with pertinent information as new incidents occurred.

Step Two – DPD had to also build a partnership with the local media. Due to the frequency and seriousness of this type of crime, the media was going to report most incidents. Fearing that the stories could encourage more incidents, DPD wanted the media to report an enhanced message, instead of just simply reporting the incident. DPD wanted the media not only to report that these crimes had happened, but emphasize that DPD was being proactive, working with the local delivery businesses to prevent this crime. DPD invited the media to the training session and provided them with information prior to the training session in order to do a story encouraging greater participation.

Step Three – DPD wanted to provide effective training. The training session focused on the personal protection of the delivery driver. The training was primarily a mental self-defense class, which focused on methods for the individual to become more aware of their surroundings, and helped them to realize that no one can protect them better than they can themselves. The training advised attendees to pay attention to their subconscious. For example, if they thought something didn’t “feel” right, it probably wasn’t and they needed to act on that feeling by changing something in their delivery routine. One question that was asked by a delivery driver was, “If something doesn’t feel right can we call the police before anything actually happens?” DPD eagerly responded offering to assist in any way, stating that “If nothing happens that is good, but if something does happen, DPD will be on scene.” DPD provided training participants and management with the pertinent facts from previous incidents (time, day, weapon used, suspect information, etc). DPD encouraged them to network with each other, even with competing businesses. DPD told them that if one business gets robbed, after calling the police, they need to immediately contact all the other delivery businesses in the area and share the information. The training was held at the Dayton Police Academy and lasted just over two (2) hours. Sixty-one people were in attendance.
Step Four – DPD provided the businesses with a vacant house list that was 88 pages in length and had over 10,000 addresses. The businesses were instructed to use the list as a starting point to do a little more investigating on a call when the delivery location appeared on the list.

Step Five – DPD requested email addresses from all attendees and began to send out information whenever incidents took place. DPD stayed in regular communication with the attendees after the training and provided answers to any questions they had. By this time DPD had successfully built a partnership with the media and the delivery businesses.

Assessment

Nineteen days after the training, a robbery occurred on a Friday night. The business involved was Domino’s Pizza, located on N. Main Street. After the event, the manager walked across the street and shared the information with the manager of Donato’s Pizza. One key piece of information shared was the phone number the suspect used to call in the order. Twelve days after that robbery, an order was received by Donato’s Pizza on N. Main Street from the same phone number used in the Domino’s robbery. An alert employee recognized the number and called the police. Under the supervision of Sergeant Mark Spiers, DPD placed an Officer in civilian clothes, replacing the delivery driver. As the Officer delivered the pizza, the suspect pulled out a gun and demanded both the food and money. The Officer identified himself as a Police Officer, at which time the suspect opened fire on the Officer. By the end of the incident, over twenty bullets were fired. The suspect was struck three times. No Officers were injured. A few days later the suspect admitted to being involved in several other similar robberies. The training provided and proactive response by our business partners clearly show the life of a food delivery driver was saved on this night.

After DPD looked at the numbers on May 23, 2011 there was a year to date reduction Citywide year to date reduction in armed robberies of delivery personnel of 47%, and a 78% reduction in the targeted area. Measures and trainings are still being offered to maintain these reductions.
DPD was contacted by the Charleston, South Carolina Police Department because Charleston was seeing a rise in pizza driver robberies. DPD talked with the crime prevention officer from Charleston and went over the entire project and how we used the SARA method of problem solving. DPD even posted the project online so the Officer could review it and implement it in Charleston. When DPD was asked how much the project cost from start to finish (excluding on-duty man hours), DPD advised the Officer the total cost was less than a deluxe pizza.

Appendix 1 - Type of Location

- Vacant House: 25%
- Residence: 60%
- Apartment: 15%
Appendix 2 - Time and Day

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day Shift</th>
<th>Afternoon</th>
<th>Midnight Shift</th>
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<tbody>
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Appendix 3 - Type of Weapon Used

- **Physical Force**: 14%
- **Knife**: 6%
- **Board/Bat**: 6%
- **Gun**: 74%