Overland Park Kansas Police Department

Residential Security Initiative

Officer Michael Betten, MS, CPP
# Table of Contents

**Summary**
- 3

**Scanning**
- 5

**Analysis**
- 6
  - Alarm systems
  - Vacation House Watch Program
  - Children home alone
  - Physical security

**Response**
- 10
  - Physical security ordinance
  - Other programs
    - Officer training
    - False alarm prevention class
    - Residential security brochure
    - OPPD web page
    - Residential security surveys
    - Media coverage
    - American society for testing and materials

**Assessment**
- 17
  - Residential burglaries
  - Forced entry analysis
  - Analysis of door failures
  - Promising data

**Conclusion**
- 25

**References**
- 27
Scanning
In the summer of 1996, Overland Park was devastated by four home invasions resulting in the sexual assaults of four women. The Overland Park Police Department (OPPD) coordinated a neighborhood meeting where over 700 residents attended. Following the meeting the OPPD conducted over 200 residential security surveys and encountered a door type they did not know how to secure. The dilemma caused the OPPD to reach out for help from the private sector and other security practitioners.

Analysis
Edward Wayne Industries (EWI) volunteered to assist the OPPD. EWI in cooperation with the OPPD began testing door assemblies and quickly realized common security recommendations offered little to no security against unskilled opportunistic burglars. Officer Betten then reached out to members of the American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS) for additional assistance. Betten worked closely with EWI, ASIS security practitioners and Henri Berube of the Peel Regional Police Department. The research revealed very few if any security recommendations had been thoroughly tested or evaluated.

Response
After the analysis had been complete, residential security recommendations changed. The most ambitious initiative involved the implementation of a residential security ordinance which would require homebuilders and contractors to implement a minimum level of door security on all single family dwellings when issued a building permit. The ordinance was discussed by a city sub-committee and eventually adopted by the City Council in December 1998. The ordinance went into effect in January 1999.

Assessment
In 2010 the OPPD decided to conduct a 10 year assessment of the ordinance. The city’s population grew from 144,520 to 173,719 residents. 6,489 houses were built under the security ordinance. 243 burglaries were reported to houses built under the security ordinance. A closer analysis of the burglaries revealed:

- 89 open garage doors
- 78 to houses under construction,
- 38 showed no signs of forced entry,
- 30 forced entry
- 8 attempts.

Scrutiny of the 30 forced entries revealed:
- 18 attacks on windows or glass. *(NOT addressed in the security ordinance)*
- 11 exterior door attacks.
- 1 garage door
The 11 doors attacks were reviewed which revealed a problem with the inspection process and a weakness in some door types. However, the 8 burglary attempts were encouraging. The fact more entries were made through a window than a door is highly unusually. Given the few forced entries through a door it appears the security measures implemented show signs of initial success.
In the summer of 1996, an Overland Park neighborhood was devastated by four home invasions resulting in the sexual assaults of four female residents. The crimes received extensive media coverage generating a tremendous amount of fear throughout the community.

The Overland Park Police Department (OPPD) responded by organizing a neighborhood meeting where over 700 residents attended. Afterwards, the Police Department’s Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) conducted over 200 residential security surveys. During the surveys officers encountered a popular door-type referred to as the “side-lighted entryway.” Traditional security recommendations for most exterior doors were: anchor the door-frame strike plate with 3 inch screws using a deadbolt with a 1 inch throw.

The “side-lighted entryway” had a jamb 1 3/4 inches thick constructed of pine. Within 2 inches of the jamb is tempered glass. Officers were unaware of how to properly secure the entryway because it was not a traditional door system. However, an examination of residential burglaries throughout the city revealed traditional door systems were easily compromised by burglars. A frequent failure point was the door jamb. This problem not only plagued the local area, but is often reported as problematic nationwide. Traditional methods to secure exterior doors were not effective. OPPD felt if doors could be properly secured, most burglars would become frustrated and abandon an attack or gravitate to a less appealing option, a window.
However, it appeared most common security practices were not effective against opportunistic unskilled burglars.

**Analysis**

The CPU reached out to the Kansas City Homebuilders Association and developed a partnership with Dave Allen and Ron Olberding of Edward Wayne Industries (EWI). Allen and Olberding constructed a laboratory in a warehouse where door assemblies were attacked using common burglary methods. OPPD was permitted to assist in the tests and document the findings with EWI. Following several attacks on different door assemblies, it was apparent nearly all door assemblies were easily breached using simple opportunistic burglary methods. Traditional security measures often recommended by law enforcement officers were ineffective.

In 1997, OPPD and EWI realized status quo security strategies may be offering a false sense of security. Officer Michael Betten began to seek assistance from outside sources such as Constable Henri Berube and Tom McKay of the Peel Regional Police Department in Canada. Betten also developed contacts with private security practitioners from the American Society of Industrial Security. He independently researched burglary methods and effective security strategies. Using research from criminologists such as Paul Cromwell at Wichita State University; Scott Decker and
Richard Wright at the University of Missouri-St. Louis, all previous and current security recommendations were scrutinized and evaluated.

Alarm Systems

For decades the alarm system has been considered the “first line of defense” for protecting people and valuables (Kelly, B. 2010). Alarms are often recommended by police and security professionals and are believed to be a primary means of protection for many homeowners (NCPI). There is one persistent problem with alarm systems - false activations.

The false alarm rate has plagued the alarm industry for years, averaging 95 to 98 percent (IACP, 1993 September). The industry’s response has been to implement longer delays before notifying central stations and to call second or third parties who are not at the scene (Martin, Stan 2010); and/or to have municipalities fine alarm users for frequent nuisance alarms. The end result is officers are pulled from areas where they are needed the most and sent to areas where no crime exists (Betten & Mervosh. 2005, June).

Further scrutiny revealed other problems. During residential security surveys the majority of residents expressed concerns about their security while at home. Many residents turned to alarms believing this would keep them safe from an intruder. This offered the resident a false sense of security. First, nearly all residential alarms are designed to activate once the exterior is penetrated. The alarm annunciation only let the resident know someone was already inside. A serious problem was generated when
the alarm system activated inhibiting the resident’s inability to dial 9-1-1. Many alarm systems would seize the phone line notifying the central station the alarm had activated. Many residents were unaware they could not use the phone.

Finally residential alarms created a constitutional question for law enforcement (State of Oregon vs Stoudamire. 2002). Officers commonly respond to residential alarms to find doors open with no signs of forced entry. Many agencies would enter the residence with the understanding this is permissible. A closer examination of this practice suggested law enforcement officers were violating the Fourth Amendment.

*Vacation House Watch Program*

OPPD examined its Vacation House Watch program. Residents would notify the police when they left town expecting extra patrols of their residence. OPPD would distribute a list to officers each day requesting them to check the houses as duty permitted. When records were reviewed, houses on the list were not being checked as frequently as expected. When the program was studied against the burglary research, several problems arose. First, the greatest deterrent to most burglars is the illusion of occupancy (Cromwell, Olson, & Avary. 1991). Second, burglars often operated during the day and did their surveillance from the street in an area where they felt most comfortable, namely neighborhoods close to home or work (Wright & Decker. 1994).

The problem with the program became apparent - officers would respond to a house on the watch list, check the exterior, and then leave. This action likely indicated the house was vacant to anyone watching from the street or living in the neighborhood.
Officers paid little attention as to who may be watching. A committee was assembled to review the program. It found no research or documentation to show the program was a proven crime deterrent. The committee even discovered burglaries to residences that were on the watch list. The committee concluded the program offered a false sense of security to the residents, people best suited to watch their house were neighbors (House Watch Revision memo attached).

*Children Home Alone*

“Stranger Danger” is another popular presentation the CPU is asked to present. Many advocacy groups, security practitioners, and law enforcement officers encouraged children who were home alone during the day to remain quiet if a stranger knocked at the door. The intent was to create the illusion the home is vacant. Officer Betten examined these recommendations and compared it against criminology research. Most research pointed to “occupancy” as being a significant deterrent to burglars, yet this scenario involved a child’s safety. Creating the illusion a house was vacant leads a burglar to make an incorrect assumption. A home occupied by only a child has potentially serious consequences.

While the CPU conducted research on sex offenders, it discovered many had burglary convictions. Research conducted by the Virginia Prison System and John Douglas (1998), a former FBI profiler, suggested many sex offenders are burglars. The CPU then began to question the practice if children should remain quiet! The OPPD
came to the conclusion that security recommendations for children staying home alone needed to change.

**Physical Security**

Testing on doors and windows continues to this day by EWI. Their testing methods have identified vulnerabilities of many door and window assemblies. EWI’s research identified four vulnerable entryway components: the door, frame, deadbolt and hinges. Reinforcement methods were developed for entryways which were tested and implemented. The recommendations were simple, inexpensive, and aesthetically pleasing.

**Response**

Following the extensive research conducted by the OPPD and EWI recommendations regarding residential security were revised, stressing the importance of the physical security of the residence. The partnerships between EWI, Constable Berube, individual security practitioners and the OPPD ensured recommendations were sound, affordable and reliable. The revised recommendations were incorporated into literature, surveys and presentations.

The work done on residential security was recognized by the private sector. Officer Betten was invited to attend committee meetings of the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). The committees were drafting changes to burglary resistant window standards. Officer Betten's participation allowed him to network with
window manufacturers and develop a better understanding of how windows were constructed and how best to secure them.

\textit{Physical Security Ordinance}

For several years, Overland Park, Kansas was a leader in new home construction in the Kansas City metropolitan area. While conducting surveys, the OPPD observed all newly constructed homes were using solid doors with deadbolts - the core components necessary to properly secure a door assembly. Yet, as proven in tests performed by EWI, these assemblies were extremely susceptible to being kicked in.

The OPPD felt that if homebuilders would incorporate the enhanced security measures at construction, whole communities would benefit. The OPPD inquired about working with the Home Builders Association (HBA) on promoting a residential security program to properly secure exterior doors. When looking to develop the program the OPPD discovered it had attempted a similar program in the early 1980s called the “Shield of Security.” OPPD had learned homebuilders were reluctant to participate in voluntary programs. Interviews with city building officials expressed a similar experience with voluntary programs sponsored by the HBA. Voluntary programs through the HBA received little support and were difficult to sustain. The effort was abandoned.

In discussions with Constable Berube, he had drafted a residential security ordinance for his community, but was unable to get it passed into law (Peel Regional Police. 1995). Officer Betten researched the possibility of drafting an ordinance for
Overland Park. He discovered a security ordinance had been drafted by Robert Gardner, CPP, and implemented in Thousand Oaks, California, in the 1980’s. Gardner advised their ordinance had been in effect for a decade which significantly reduced the number of burglaries. A copy of the ordinance was mailed to the OPPD to review. With input from the private sector, homebuilders and local city departments, the Thousand Oaks ordinance and Berube’s draft ordinance were revised to fit the needs of Overland Park.

A residential security ordinance appeared to be a viable and sustainable option. The OPPD drafted an ordinance and submitted the idea to a City Council sub-committee. Following an extensive council debate and meetings with homebuilders and homeowners, the City of Overland Park adopted and implemented a residential security ordinance in January 1999. The ordinance applies to all single family dwelling exterior entryways.

The ordinance mandated builders implement the following provisions:

- Deadbolts must be installed on exterior doors meeting or exceeding the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) grade 2 for lock security.
- Door frames would require significant reinforcement and any deviation from the method prescribed in the ordinance must be tested to meet or exceed an ASTM door security provision.
- Doors constructed from metal, wood or fiberglass would have to meet the minimum standards prescribed in the ordinance.
- Hinges would have to be reinforced with 3 inch screws or alternative methods must be tested in accordance to the ASTM security standard.
- Exterior doors require additional protection of a door edge reinforcement or escutcheon plate.
- Front entryways must provide the occupant an opportunity to visually identify someone at the front door.

A few months following the passage of the ordinance, security products to address stipulations in the ordinance were readily available throughout the Kansas City Metropolitan area. Competition brought down prices on security hardware and entire communities being built within Overland Park were having enhanced security products installed.

**Other Programs**

Following the extensive research conducted by EWI and the OPPD, recommendations for securing a house changed significantly. When conducting residential security surveys, emphasis was placed on addressing the physical security. When compared to an alarm, physical security offered a proven and cost efficient method for securing the house. Physical security was not dependent upon police response or electricity nor was it subject to nuisance alarm fines (Garcia. 2001). It denied burglars access, and over time was far less expensive for the homeowner. Alarms were suggested to compliment the physical security, but primarily encouraged as a method for monitoring an unoccupied residence. Officers conducting surveys based recommendations on sound security practices researched by the CPU.
Recommendations were based on the resident's needs, perceived threats and financial limitations.

The committee which reviewed the house watch program concluded it offered no deterrence to burglars and should be discontinued. The findings were submitted to the Chief of Police, and the program was eliminated. Individuals requesting the program were directed to the CPU where it was explained why the program was eliminated. Calls were often followed up with residential security surveys. The surveys provided an opportunity to meet with residents and to discuss their individual security needs. Residents were better informed and officers in patrol were able to dedicate more time to problem areas.

Recommendations for children staying home alone changed. Children were encouraged to go to the door, make noise, yell for dad, but instructed NOT to open it (see “Home Alone” brochure). Parents were encouraged to address the physical security of the house concentrating on keeping perpetrators out. Parents were receptive to the new practice when a thorough explanation was given why children should make noise, contrary to remaining silent.

The OPPD then began to distribute the revised information through:

* Officer Training: All officers were trained in the new strategies regarding residential security. When officers responded to burglaries, they were better informed to address the needs of the residents. Officers referred victims to Officer Betten for more information or to schedule a residential security survey. The revised security program is part of the basic training officers receive at the police academy.
* **False Alarm Prevention Class:** This class was originally designed to teach alarm users the limitations of their alarm system and the impact false alarms have on the police. Following the residential security initiative of the OPPD, thirty minutes of the program was dedicated to implementing proper security strategies. The most frequent comment on participant's reviews of the class: "I wish we would have had this class before we purchased our alarm system." The class continues to receive positive reviews and has produced many requests for commercial and residential security surveys.

* **Residential Security Brochure:** In 2001, the OPPD produced a comprehensive residential security brochure (attached). The brochure was first printed and then distributed to residents when a residential security survey was conducted. The brochure evolved into a computerized digital format, which is now readily available to residents by accessing the city's Web page at: [www.opkansas.org](http://www.opkansas.org).

* **City's Web Page:** The information on the City's Web page reflected the work done by the OPPD resulting in more requests for residential security surveys.

* **Residential Security Survey:** Although the residential security survey had been a service offered to residents for many years, the recommendations changed dramatically. A video presentation of door and window attacks helped demonstrate the value of implementing sound physical security measures. The videos resulted in positive feedback from residents. The video helped emphasize how quickly criminals could breach an exterior door. It also proved to be invaluable to burglary victims who needed the reassurance their home could be secured (Birzer & Cromwell. 2007 November).
* **Media Coverage:** Burglary incidents that received media coverage proved to be the most effective method for reaching the public. The OPPD and EWI scheduled interviews with news crews at EWI’s facility so actual door attacks could be witnessed. The visual image of individuals kicking on doors resulted in numerous follow up calls inquiring about home security.

* **American Society for Testing and Materials:** Officer Betten’s participation on the committees permitted him to learn a great deal about window and glazing materials. The information was shared with residents and homeowners.
Assessment

Overland Park, KS is a suburb in the southwest Kansas City metropolitan area, which has steadily grown in population from 144,520 in 1999 to 173,719 residents in 2009, making it the second most populous city in Kansas. From 1999 to July 2010, the City issued 6,489 building permits for single family dwellings (monthly average of 54 permits).
Residential burglaries from 1999 to 2009 showed a consistent level of activity. Over half the burglaries recorded were the result of open garage doors. It appeared the initiatives implemented by the OPPD had little effect so the analysis was narrowed.

![Bar chart showing residential burglaries from 1999 to 2009.](chart)

The OPPD wanted to examine the effectiveness of the residential security ordinance. The OPPD believed this was the area of their initiative that would have the greatest impact on burglaries. Reviewing burglary data from the entire city would not accurately reflect the impact the security ordinance had for houses built under the security regulations. The COPPS unit (formerly CPU) retrieved the addresses of all the single family building permits which fell under the security code. Of the 6,489 building permits issued between 1999 and 2010, those addresses were crossed referenced with the 3,398 residential burglaries. When the analysis was complete, 243 residential burglaries were reported to dwellings built under the security ordinance. Once the
addresses were identified, each report was read to determine how entry was made into
the house.

The reports revealed:

- **89** were **open garage door** burglaries.
- **78** burglaries were to houses **under construction**. Most security hardware was
  not installed at this stage.
- **38** burglaries were reported as **unlocked** or showing **no signs of forced
  entry**.
- **30 forced entries** were reported where suspects broke a window or forced
  open a door.
- **8 attempted burglary** reports where signs of forced entry were apparent but
  the suspects did not gain access.

The 30 forced entries were closely scrutinized to determine what the suspect(s)
attacked permitting access to the residence. It should be noted early in the drafting of
the ordinance, provisions to secure windows against burglary were recommended but
not approved. This provision was seen as too costly and the number of window entries
did not justify the expense to homebuilders. The OPPD had argued once exterior doors
were secured, windows may become the path of least resistance for burglars.
Forced Entry Analysis revealed:

- **18 Glass/Window** attacks where the suspects either pried open a window or broke glass. *15 incidents were attacks on the glass*
- **8 single exterior doors** were forced/attacked
- **3 Double doors**
- **1 Garage door**

The OPPD anticipated an increase in the number of window/glass entries, but not at the levels revealed in the data. Although the security for double doors is addressed in the ordinance, they are very difficult to secure given both doors are typically operational.

A concern of the OPPD was the failure of the 8 exterior doors. Prior to this analysis a problem was recognized early in the implementation of the ordinance; *building inspections*. Officer Betten had noticed on some residential security surveys the houses built under the ordinance had some problems. The most common problem was security hardware not being installed according to the manufacturer’s specifications. Another problem occasionally identified was some security hardware not being installed. Lastly there were some questions about the quality of lock hardware homebuilders were installing. The deadbolt issue was recognized as a potential problem when the ordinance was drafted. Lock manufacturers do not place performance standards on the lock. At the final inspection all the packaging and specification information is discarded by the trim carpenters. Although provisions for specific lock quality are prescribed in the ordinance, inspecting for it was going to be very difficult, if not impossible.
Photographic evidence was collected from the forced entries. However, not all eight entries had pictures of the doors and frames submitted as evidence. After reviewing the photographs the problems were identified.

**Full-view glass doors**

Full view glass doors are inherently weak. The failure of full-view glass doors were not from the glass, but the door itself. When the interior of the door was cut away, it became inherently weak and susceptible to bending. The photos below reveal how the locks rolled out of the strike of the door frame allowing access.

The glass in these doors was not broken. Picture #1 is a steel door which bent in the area of the deadbolt. Picture #2 is a fiberglass door that failed at the deadbolt. The door frames of these doors were intact.
Hardware not properly installed

In some cases the hardware was installed, but not according to the manufacturer’s specification. As the example below demonstrates, the security hardware was installed at the millwork company but the strike plates were not properly anchored by the trim carpenter. The door frame splintered with the door frame reinforcement material intact. The door and deadbolt are undamaged. Had the strike been properly anchored it is unlikely the door would have failed, possibly forcing the burglar to abandoned the attack and seek another method of entry.

Promising Data

Eight burglary attempts were reported. One report identified a child home alone when a suspect tried to “shoulder the back door” but was unable to gain access.\(^1\) Another report indicated the suspect kicked the door but did not gain access.\(^2\) Yet another stated suspect(s) tried to “kick and pry” the door open but did not gain

\(^1\) Overland Park Police Department case#2009-003806
\(^2\) Overland Park Police Department case#2002-045489
access. The most promising incident which demonstrated the effectiveness of the security ordinance was a search warrant served by the OPPD Tactical Unit. Officers had orders to serve a search warrant on an individual’s home involving a child in need of care. The suspect had been struggling with mental health issues and the court had ordered the children be taken into protective custody. Officers knocked on the front door but the individual refused to answer. Tactical officers proceeded to hit the front door with a “battering ram” followed by kicking attacks. The front door withstood “several” impacts by the tactical team. Officers abandoned striking the lock side and moved to attack the hinges. Eventually the door came off the hinges and flew into the hallway. It was later discovered the house had been built under the residential security provisions. The pictures below show the impacts from the ram and kicks made by officers. Eventually the failure of the hinges permitted officers to enter. It should be noted this was the second incident where tactical officers struggled to gain access to a home built under the provisions of the security ordinance. The previous case could not be located for this report, but was confirmed by tactical officers through verbal communications.

---

3 Overland Park Police Department case#2006-008243
4 OPPD Search Warrant, case #2008-025200
Photos from the search warrant served by OPPD Tactical Units. Several door impacts are visible including damage to the door hinges. 2008-025200
Conclusion

The OPPD Residential Security Initiative must be considered a success. Although the overall residential burglaries for the city showed no dramatic decrease over time, the incidents of “forced entry” burglaries were significantly low for houses that were built under the provision of the security ordinance. Other benefits of the program were:

- Proven and reliable residential security information was provided for residents. This proved to be “invaluable” to victims of residential burglaries (Birzer & Cromwell. 2007, November).

- Physical security hardware is being installed impacting whole communities. If the hardware is not properly installed it only requires inexpensive, minor modifications to correct it.

- Other municipalities saw the benefits of the ordinance and adopted them into their codes. Those communities are: Olathe, KS; Shawnee, KS; Lenexa, KS; Leawood, KS and Oak Grove, MO. It should be noted that these communities also adopted the ordinance in multi-family buildings (apartment buildings). The security hardware built into multi-family units immediately permitted those properties to proclaim they “exceeded” the physical security provisions set forth in the Crime Free Multi-Housing (CFMH) program. Once those properties were constructed, they did not have to make any modifications to become compliant with the CFMH program. This is one of the most expensive provisions of the CFMH program.
Presently as homes are being built or remodeled, they are being secured as mandated by the ordinance. EWI has built six “Security Homes” in the metropolitan area where the main selling features are the built-in physical security measures (* pictured below).

Improving the inspection process of homes must be addressed. Work still needs to be done educating and training building inspectors. The police department should provide annual training for building inspectors and periodically inspect houses. Occasionally finding houses with no hardware or improperly installed hardware suggest many other dwellings may be vulnerable. The inspection stage of the ordinance is crucial for the overall success of the program.
References


STATE OF OREGON vs DAMON LAMON STOUDAMIRE (2002). No. CR02-0915

SECTION R328
PHYSICAL SECURITY

R328.1 Purpose. The purpose of this Section is to establish minimum standards that incorporate physical security to make dwelling units resistant to unlawful entry.

R328.1.1 Scope. The provisions of this Section shall apply to all new structures and to additions and alterations made to existing buildings.

R328.2 Doors. Except for vehicular access doors, all exterior swinging doors of residential buildings and attached garages, including the doors leading from the garage area into the dwelling unit, shall comply with Sections R328.2.1 through R328.2.5 for the type of door installed.

R328.2.1 Wood doors. Where installed, exterior wood doors shall be of solid core construction such as high-density particleboard, solid wood, or wood block core with a minimum thickness of one and three-fourths inches (1 3/4”) at any point. Doors with panel inserts shall be solid wood. The panels shall be a minimum of one inch (1”) thick. The tapered portion of the panel that inserts into the groove of the door shall be a minimum of one-quarter inch (¼”) thick. The groove shall be a dado groove or applied molding construction. The groove shall be a minimum of one-half inch (½”) in depth.

R328.2.2 Steel doors. Where installed, exterior steel doors shall be a minimum thickness of 24 gauge.

R328.2.3 Fiberglass doors. Fiberglass doors shall have a minimum skin thickness of one-sixteenth inch (1/16”) and have reinforcement material at the location of the deadbolt. Chapter 16.110 Supp. No. 2007-1 (3-31-07) 16-1809

R328.2.4 Double doors. Where installed, the inactive leaf of an exterior double door shall be provided with flush bolts having an engagement of not less than one inch into the head and threshold of the doorframe.

R328.2.5 Sliding doors. Where installed, exterior sliding doors shall comply with all of the following requirements:
A. Sliding door assemblies shall be installed to prevent the removal of the panels and the glazing from the exterior with the installation of shims or screws in the upper track.
B. All sliding glass doors shall be equipped with a secondary locking device consisting of a metal pin or a surface mounted bolt assembly. Metal pins shall be installed at the intersection of the inner and outer panels of the inside door and shall not penetrate the frame’s exterior surface. The surface mounted bolt assembly shall be installed at the base of the door.

R328.3 Door frames. The exterior door frames shall be installed prior to a rough-in inspection. Door frames shall comply with Sections R328.3.1 through R328.3.3 for the type of assembly installed.

R328.3.1 Wood frames. Wood door frames shall comply with all of the following requirements:
A. All exterior door frames shall be set in frame openings constructed of double studding or equivalent construction, including garage doors, but excluding overhead doors. Door frames, including those with sidelights shall be reinforced in accordance with ASTM F476-84 Grade 40.

B. In wood framing, horizontal blocking shall be placed between studs at the door lock height for three (3) stud spaces or equivalent bracing on each side of the door opening.

**R328.3.2 Steel frames.** All exterior door frames shall be constructed of 18 gauge or heavier steel, and reinforced at the hinges and strikes. All steel frames shall be anchored to the wall in accordance with manufacturer specifications. Supporting wall structures shall consist of double studding or framing of equivalent strength. Frames shall be installed to eliminate tolerances inside the rough opening.

**R328.3.3 Door jambs.**

A. Door jambs shall be installed with solid backing in a manner so no void exists between the strike side of the jamb and the frame opening for a vertical distance of twelve inches (12") each side of the strike. Filler material shall consist of a solid wood block.

B. Door stops on wooden jambs for in-swinging doors shall be of one-piece construction. Jambs for all doors shall be constructed or protected so as to prevent violation of the strike. Chapter 16.110 16-1810 Supp. No. 2007-1 (3-31-07)

**R328.4 Door hardware.** Exterior door hardware shall comply with Sections R328.4.1 through R328.4.6.

**R328.4.1 Hinges.** Hinges for exterior swinging doors shall comply with the following:

A. At least two (2) screws, three inches (3") in length, penetrating at least one inch (1") into wall structure shall be used. Solid wood fillers or shims shall be used to eliminate any space between the wall structure and door frame behind each hinge.

B. Hinges for out-swinging doors shall be equipped with mechanical interlock to preclude the removal of the door from the exterior.

**R328.4.2 Strike plates.** Exterior door strike plates shall be a minimum of 18 gauge metal with four offset screw holes. Strike plates shall be attached to wood with not less than three inch (3") screws, which shall have a minimum of one inch (1") penetration into the nearest stud. Note: For side lighted units, refer to Section R328.4.6.

**R328.4.3 Escutcheon plates.** All exterior doors shall have escutcheon plates or wraparound door channels installed around the lock protecting the door’s edge.

**R328.4.4 Locks.** Exterior doors shall be provided with a locking device complying with one of the following: Single Cylinder Deadbolt shall have a minimum projection of one inch (1"). The deadbolt shall penetrate at least three-fourths inch (3/4") into the strike receiving the projected bolt. The cylinder shall have a twist-resistant, tapered hardened steel cylinder guard. The cylinder shall have a minimum of five (5) pin tumblers, shall be connected to the inner portion of the lock by solid metal connecting screws at least one-fourth inch (1/4") in diameter and two and one-fourth inches (2-1/4") in length. Bolt assembly (bolt housing) unit shall be of single piece construction. All deadbolts shall meet ANSI grade 2 specifications.
R328.4.5 Entry vision and glazing. All main or front entry doors to dwelling units shall be arranged so that the occupant has a view of the area immediately outside the door without opening the door. The view may be provided by a door viewer having a field of view of not less than 180 degrees through windows or through view ports.

R328.4.6 Side lighted entry doors. Side light door units shall have framing of double stud construction or equivalent construction complying with Sections R328.3.1, R328.3.2 and R328.3.3. The doorframe that separates the door opening from the side light, whether on the latch side or the hinge side, shall be double stud construction or equivalent construction complying with Sections R328.3.1 and R328.3.2. Double stud construction or construction of equivalent strength shall exist between the glazing unit of the side light and wall structure of the dwelling. Chapter 16.110 Supp. No. 2007-1 (3-31-07) 16-1811

R328.5 Street numbers. Street numbers shall comply with Section R321.1.

R328.6 Exterior Lighting. Exterior lighting shall comply with Sections R328.6.1 through R328.6.2.

R328.6.1 Front and street side exterior lighting. All front and street side door entrances should be protected with a minimum of one light outlet having a minimum of sixty (60) watts of lighting (or energy efficient equivalent), installed so that the light source is not readily accessible.

R328.6.2 Rear exterior lighting. Homes with windows or doors near ground level below eight feet (8') on the rear side of the house shall be equipped with a minimum of one light outlet having 100 watt lighting (or energy efficient equivalent) and shall be of the flood light type. Those fixtures placed below eight feet (8') shall be fixtures manufactured such that the light source is not readily accessible.

R328.7 Alternate materials and methods of construction. The provisions of this Section are not intended to prevent the use of any material or method of construction not specifically prescribed by this Section, provided any such alternate has been approved by the enforcing authority, nor is it the intention of this Section to exclude any sound method of structural design or analysis not specifically provided for in this Section. The materials, methods of construction, and structural design limitations provided for in this Section shall be used, unless the enforcing authority grants an exception.
Revisions of Vacation House Watch Program
SOP 200-07

Overview of Recommendation:
The purpose of this paper is to document proven methods of how burglars operate. The
documentation supports claims by the committee that the current methods
incorporated by SOP 200-07 are not beneficial to the homeowner or police department,
but may actually do more harm than good.

Observations:
✓ Burglars operate during day light hours when most residents are not home.
✓ The single most effective deterrent to a burglar is the “illusion of occupancy.”
✓ Burglars case or survey a house prior to burglarizing it.
✓ Burglars attempt to blend into the neighborhood
✓ Burglars are easily deterred by incorporating simple prevention strategies.

In all this research, prevention programs are vastly targeted at educating the
community and encouraging cohesiveness. Those houses that are most vulnerable are
those that appear vacant or offer little surveillance from neighbors. But note that many
of the residential burglars operate during the day and choose their targets after some
surveillance. One study mentions that the burglar typically selects targets in the
following sequence 1) the desirability of the neighborhood, 2) selection of the block, and
finally 3) selecting the actual house. Nowhere in all these articles and publications is it
mentioned that officers occasionally checking houses serves as a crime prevention tool.
So the question has to be asked, if burglars operate during the day and conduct their
surveillance during the day, is the Vacation House Watch Program actually effective or
creating a liability?

Cromwell, Paul F.; Olson, James N.; Avary, D’Aun Wester (1991) BREAKING AND
ENTERING: An Ethnographic Analysis of Burglary. Sage Publication

“Although the average burglar fears being seen, many professional burglars do not.
Rather, they fear being seen and reported. The experienced burglars stated that it was
important to fit into a neighborhood or situation. They attempted to make their
presence in a neighborhood seem normal and natural. The most professional burglar in
our study, Robert, always drove a car that fit the neighborhood’s socioeconomic level or
a van disguised as delivery vehicle...Other time he would stop his car near a proposed
target residence, open the hood, tinker around under the hood, appear to be angry, kick
a tire and angrily walk over to the potential target house...” (page 36)

Using Risk Cues: We found that most burglar use a simple yet highly efficient three
component decision-making strategy. The decision model rests on two assumptions.
The first assumption is that burglars are not attempting to maximize outcomes. They
are generally seeking satisfactory target choices rather than optimal ones. The decision
model can best be described a satisficing strategy rather than an optimizing one... Do
the immediate risks exceed the minimal expectation of gain? (page 37)

The first component of operating assumption is: “Someone will see and report me.” The
second component addresses occupancy. The operating assumption is: “Someone is
home.” The third component concerns accessibility. The essential features of
accessibility concern the ease of access and exit. The operating assumption is: “Entry
is too difficult.” The burglar makes an initial assumption (Someone will observe and
report my activity), assumes that it is true, and then searches the immediate physical
environment for evidence that contradicts it. If a contradiction is found (the
neighborhood appears deserted), the initial assumption is rejected. When only two conclusions can logically be reached, the alternative conclusion is accepted by default (No one will observe or report my activity). (page 39)

We found that burglars are opportunistic and are easily deterred or displace from on target site to another. Situational factors such as the presence of a dog, an alarm system, security hardware, and alert neighbors may be the most effective deterrents. When one or more of these risk cues are discerned by the burglar, the target is usually considered too risky and the burglary is aborted. (page 40)

The authors concluded that the number of caretakers (guardians) at home during the day has decreased because more women are participating in the work force, leaving a greater percentage of homes unguarded during the day. With the decline of the traditional neighborhood, other guardians (friends, neighbors) have dwindled. Furthermore, the supply of marketable, easily transportable goods has increased, making the volume of available targets much greater. (page 44)

The normal activities of criminals also affect crime rates. Offenders are more likely to commit crimes if their daily activities bring them into contact with potential victims. When questioned as to how a particular residence was selected as a burglary target, the responses given by informants were frequently consistent with routine activities theory. Jesse, professional burglar, stated: “When I was younger I used to ride my bicycle over to the skating rink. If I saw a house that I liked while I was coming to the rink, I’d do it on the way home.”

Ramon, Jesse’s co-offender, explained his approach to target selection: “When I’m going to work or over to a friend’s house or someplace, I keep my eyes out for a good place to hit. I’ve been watching this one house on my way to work for a couple of weeks.” (page 45)

These results tend to suggest that as burglars go about their everyday activities, traveling to and from activity hubs such as school, work, and recreational facilities, they come into contact with residential sites near those facilities. Residences on or near their transportation routes are also potential burglary targets. When burglars stop at a nearby and may choose a potential target during those moments. It is possible that this accounts for the disproportionate selection of conrener houses as burglary targets. (page 46)

Prevention: Burglars fear being seen or identified and reported to the police while casing the neighborhood or committing the burglary. Consequently, the most effective prevention strategy is composed of “nosy neighbors,” alert and vigilant persons who know their neighborhood and know the habits of those who live nearby. (page 95)

The most important ingredient of a situational crime prevention approach to burglary is to give a residence the illusion of occupancy. Nearly all (95%) burglars will avoid an occupied residence. The most important of all the steps the burglar takes in arriving at a decision to break into a targeted residence is to determine whether or not anyone is at home. (page 98)


Burglars select a neighborhood, then a street, then a specific property. Accessibility is the most important consideration. Being located with 3 blocks of a major thoroughfare makes a home twice as likely to be burglarized; in these areas, an alarm system reduces risk by more than two. Isolation and expensiveness also are risk factors... Contrary to
popular belief, homes near youth – gathering places and in areas of high pedestrian traffic are not attractive to burglars. Burglars are not particularly imaginative in deciding on point of entry – 70% enter through the front or back door. Effective deterrents include a car in the driveway, an alarm company sign in the yard, exterior and interior lights, a deadbolt lock, and an alarm system. Surprisingly, results indicate that dogs are not much of a deterrent.

Arnold, R.T. (1972) **THE BURGLARS ARE COMING.** Arnold publishing
It should be pointed out here that more and more daytime burglaries are taking place. Unattended apartments and houses are becoming increasingly easy prey for the burglar. The daytime rate of residence burglary has increased 337 percent in the past ten years. (page 16)

There are so many burglars these days that he could be your next door neighbor, the teenager down the street or the man or woman who works next to you. There are some teenagers who burglarize for kicks or for money to spend to impress their peer group. There are part time burglars who steal to supplement a low paying job in order to support their family. There are also the dope addicts, in all age brackets, who must steal to support the dope habit. Then there are the professional burglars who would rather steal than work at an honest job for a living. Burglars come in all sizes, shapes and colors. (page 19)

As with the door checker, he probably will ring the doorbell or knock to be sure there is no one in the house or apartment before trying to enter. (page 21)

Richard T. Wright & Scott Decker (1994) **BURGLARS ON THE JOB: Street Life and Residential Break-Ins: Street Life and Residential Break-Ins.** Northeastern University Press
This is probably the most comprehensive study done on residential burglary. As with the previous study, Wright and Decker provide the following useful insight and information:

“In such circumstances residential burglary, which typically requires nothing more than readily available objects (e.g., screwdrivers, hammer, or small crowbar) for its commission, becomes correspondingly more attractive.” (Pg. 56)

“Almost all of the offenders initially were attracted to residences which, judging from the outside, appeared to them to contain good stuff... The most obvious cue was the size of the structure. Other things being equal, a large house was regarded as promising the biggest payoff. Another cue was the condition of the property. Well-maintained dwellings were believed to contain the most desirable goods. Several of the offenders said they were attracted to residences specifically by BMW’s and Mercedes-Benzes rather than by expensive cars in general” (pg. 82-83)

“...most of the offenders wanted to steer clear of neighborhoods in which the residents appeared to be keeping an eye out for each other. They inferred whether this might be the case from a variety of factors including the general condition of the area and the age composition of its population. The offenders as poor areas from which to select targets viewed other things being equal, well-kept neighborhoods with a high proportion of elderly residents. The residents of such neighborhoods were presumed to be especially vigilant and prone to reporting suspicious-looking persons to the police.” (Pg. 92)
“After occupancy, the subjects generally regarded visibility as the next most important issue in assessing risk. They did not want to be observed while entering or leaving a residence and therefore were drawn to dwelling with access points that could not be seen easily from the street or from surrounding buildings.” (Pg. 97)

“In a related vein, the subjects also were concerned about the possibility of being heard while attempting to break into their intended targets. Accordingly, they would not choose residences that were situated too close to other dwellings.” (Pg. 97)

“The prevailing sentiment was captured by a subject who pointed out, “As long as houses are made of wood and glass, I can get ‘em.” Ease of access was a primary consideration when burglars searched for prospective burglary sites. Door and window locks are often indistinguishable from a distance, so they do not play a prominent role in initial decisions on the ease of entering prospective targets. (Pg. 98)

“Nevertheless, some offenders said that they had confidence in their ability to defeat deadbolt locks. One, for example, claimed to have what he referred to as a “dead pull,” a device which enabled him to undo such locks. Others reported using some sort of “jimmy,” usually a crowbar or large screwdriver, to pry door from their frames, thereby rendering the locks useless.” (Pg. 122)

“Occasionally, the burglars were lucky enough to discover an unlocked window that was accessible and well screened from public view. More typically, they were unable to find an insecure window and had to choose between to alternative methods of entry. The first involved forcing or prying the window open.” As one burglar explains, “With some kinds of windows you can take a screwdriver and you can, uhm, right where the window’s set into the frame, you can bend the frame back and the window come unclosed.” (Pg. 123)

Berube, Henri (2001) *An Examination of Alarm System Deterrence and Rational Choice Theory: The Need To Increase Risk*

The decision to commit a crime is essentially the same as any other decision, undertaken with respect to consideration of two elements; the pain (risk) and gain (rewards) that will result from any given course of action. Risk and reward factors therefore are the foundations on which offending choices will be built upon and require further examination.

A growing body of evidence is indicating that burglary prevention can be achieved through the strategic application of target hardening measures developed under rational choice theory. Many of these measures are supported by scientific research and include information suggesting that alarm systems act as a deterrent. However, the application of alarm systems as a stand-alone deterrent measure is only supported by rational choice theory if the risk in apprehension is increased.

During the last decade, advances in technology have resulted in a significant change in the fundamental nature of burglary. Burglary is an increasingly profitable business, to which alarm systems no longer pose a significant risk of apprehension. Complicating matters further, practices are being implemented by the alarm industry, to reduce burden of false alarms on police services. This thesis will, through literature review, and data analysis, examine two seemingly separate issues, the changing nature of burglary and false alarm verification. These issues will be inextricably linked and contrary to rational choice theory shown to be reducing the risk of apprehension, resulting from alarm response.
Additionally, it will be shown that the alarm industry’s singular focus on alarm deterrence may be impairing the application of other effective situational security measures. The use of alarm systems as a stand-alone security strategy is therefore no longer supported by rational choice theory. However, when combined as part of an overall security strategy including effective false alarm verification technology, alarm systems can play a vital role in increasing the risk of apprehension.

Homes were at significantly greater risk of victimization if: (1) the burglar saw signs that the neighborhood was not cohesive, (2) the burglar would not be confronted by the resident, (3) the home was not sufficiently secure or (4) the burglar would not be seen by a neighbor. Manipulation of either target or guardian aspects of the environment affected victimization in accordance with expectations.

Because many burglary prevention programs find it difficult to keep participants actively involved, this study examined the problem... Data analysis showed that declining participant involvement in burglary prevention increased with the proportion of residents living on a block where there was an active block club and with the extent of neighborhood discussion about what was going on in the community. The authors suggest that burglary prevention programs should encourage neighborhood residents to participate routinely in activities that stimulate continued interest in burglary prevention.

The program was designed to reduce burglaries particularly among elderly homeowners. Its site-hardening activities involved installing double cylinder deadbolt locks, pinning windows, and placing wire screens on windows, as well as recommending lighting and landscaping improvements... reported forced-entry burglaries for 260 homes site-hardened during July-December 1978. A previous evaluation showed a decrease in the number of burglaries 1-12 months after site-hardening. These findings indicate that the site-hardening program is having a positive effect on decreasing the burglary rates for participating homes. Only three forced entry burglaries were reported in the survey period and the burglary rate was reduced 70 percent between the pre-site hardening period and the post-site hardening period. Most forcible entries resulted from the homeowner’s failure to comply with recommended site hardening techniques.

Not only do poor surveillance and an empty house mean that burglars can approach without being seen but, because the burglars are unobserved, they may have sufficient opportunity to deal with security hardware which might otherwise have deterred them from entering. Thus, isolated homes may have greater security hardware requirements. Burglary prevention policies should adopt a broader perspective than simple target hardening; different approaches may be required for different types of housing and
areas. Local police forces should carefully map the incidence of burglary in their area so that appropriate efforts can be directed toward burglary prone areas.


An analysis of reported forced-entry burglaries in Portland, OR indicated that a police-directed residential security program which focused on site hardening substantially decreased burglary rates for participating households during a 3 year follow up period...Of the 300 homes, only 13 forced entry burglaries were reported during the follow up period. Burglaries decreased by 62% in the 3 years. The 13 burglaries reported during the follow up period represented an annual rate of 1.4 burglaries per 100 households compared to a citywide rate of 3.0. Windows were the points of entry in seven burglaries and doors in the remaining 6 incidents. In most cases, doors and windows were broken after site hardening materials had prevented an easier entry into the homes.

BURGLARY OF DOMESTIC DWELLINGS: Finding from the British Crime Survey
By Tracy Budd (1999)
Nature of Burglary, 1998 British Crime Survey
- In just over a half (54%) of burglaries no one was at home at the time. In a quarter (25%) someone was at home and aware of what was happening.
- **Two-thirds (67%) of burglaries involved some form of property damage, usually caused by the offender trying to gain entry to the home.**
- In almost two-thirds (63%) of burglaries with entry, and a half (48%) of attempts, victims said they would have like some form of help or support immediately after the incident. Of these proportion who were offered or asked for help was 84% and 65% respectively.
- Evidence from the British Crime Survey suggest that even the most common security devices, deadlocks and window locks, greatly reduce the risk of being burgled. Those who additionally have burglar alarms, security lights or window grilles reduce their risks further.

OTHER STUDIES, PUBLICATIONS, OR LESS SPECIFIC INFORMATION ADDRESSING RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES:

Findings show that most burglaries occur in the suburbs within three blocks of arterial routes that lead from poor neighborhoods to the outskirts of the metropolis. The number of burglaries diminishes with distance from crime generating centers. Single family homes adjacent to central cities experience a high number of burglaries...Generally, burglars tend to choose residential streets that provide concealed operation. Although cul de sacs provide residents with privacy, they also afford burglars that same privacy, especially if backed by a wooded area or abandoned railroad tracks. A particular house on a street is targeted for burglary because it displays signs of wealth, is well concealed from the street and from neighbors, and takes few precautions against burglary. Larger homes on larger lots are primary targets for burglars. Newly occupied properties have the highest risk of burglary, since neighbors are unfamiliar with one another. Most residential burglaries occur during daytime hours when residents are absent from the home. Entry is usually through the first floor, particularly through a front or side door.
Study on Post-Incident Maladjustments of Burglary Victims: Reports of the National Research Institute of Police Science; Volume: 36: Issue: 2 (Dec. 1995) by J Kobayashi; H. Saito

This study examines what kinds of burglary victims are more likely to suffer from psychological maladjustments after the victimization and the kinds of incidents that are more likely to be related to the victims’ psychological maladjustments... “Psychological distress” and “fear of re-victimization” were the measures of post-incident psychological maladjustments. “Psychological distress” refers to comprehensive psychological problems commonly experienced by victims of crime and accidents...The study found that female victims were more likely to develop the symptoms of psychological distress and fear of re-victimization; and younger victims, particularly young females who lived alone, were more likely to suffer from fear of re-victimization. Those most likely to have experienced fear of re-victimization lived in condominium or apartment houses and did not have close relationships with neighbors. **Victims who performed individual household protection behaviors such as keeping door and windows locked before the victimization were more likely to suffer from psychological distress and fear of re-victimization.** Victims who received information on crime prevention from the police were less likely to develop the symptoms of psychological distress and fear of re-victimization. Victims who experienced previous incidents of criminal victimization as well as those who saw or heard the burglars were more likely to suffer psychological distress and fear of re-victimization, and victims who lost large sums of money also suffered from psychological distress. Those who suffered significant property damage or who assumed they were victimized by professional burglars also suffered from psychological distress.

Burglary Called Gateway Crime to Rape: Study Says Many Sex Offenders Start With Break-ins By Amy Worden  APBN News.com (July 14, 2000)

At least 40% of convicted sex offenders start their criminal careers as burglars, according to an ongoing study of inmates in the Virginia prison system. Forensic scientists examining 100 men who were matched to unsolved sex offenses through their DNA found 40% were apprehended because their genetic makeup was in the state database for burglaries and larceny. The other 60% had DNA on file from previous sex offenses such as rape or sodomy. “We looked at early criminal histories and found burglaries where the (method) used looked similar, so we stockpiled them and looked at more and there seemed to be similarities,” said Jame Kouten, director of the Institute for Forensic Science and Medicine. “Those who started out as left-handed burglars, then pursue crimes of opportunity, are the same types engaging in more serious crimes later.”

Michael Betten, CPP
Crime Prevention Unit
327-6886
Baby sitter sentenced for

Woman gets jail time, probation. She caused infant to become blind.

By TONY RIZZO
Staff Writer

Rebecca Schroeder was only 6 months old, last August when her skull was fractured, damaging her brain and leaving her blind. On Thursday, Lisa M. Gardner, the baby sitter who accidentally swung the baby's head into a kitchen counter in a fit of anger, was sentenced to 15 days in the county jail.

That term will be followed by 60 days of house arrest. Johnson County District Judge Thomas Bornholdt also ruled that Gardner cannot care for children other than her own during the three years of probation he imposed.

Gardner, a 26-year-old Olathe mother of two girls, pleaded guilty in July to a felony charge of reckless aggravated battery.

Under Kansas law, she was entitled to probation instead of prison, but the judge imposed the jail sentence as a condition of probation.

She was a licensed day-care provider for five years and was holding Rebecca on Aug. 21, 1995, when one of her own children began pestering her.

Gardner told police that she turned around suddenly and the baby's head struck the wall. She then called 911 and told police to "Get the blotto out of here."

Her Thursday about She did have two days Are morose fully affecting nesting choices She

Tips pouring in from area of rapes

Residents report suspicious characters in their neighborhood.

By RICHARD ESPINOZA
Staff Writer

A day after Overland Park police asked for help in catching a rapist, several residents reported suspicious characters in their neighborhood Thursday.

More than 600 people who live in and around the Montgomery neighborhood packed a community meeting Wednesday night to learn about three rapes and an assault in the area since May. Police suggested ways to protect themselves, emphasizing extra diligence in reporting strangers.

At least one home got a new front door Thursday, and several residents wanted no time-alerting police to people in their streets.

One woman reported a man who sat shirtless in his car Thursday morning, and gave police his license plate number. An officer will phone the man and ask what he was up to, said Police Capt. Glenn Ladd. Police will listen to all such tips, but that doesn't mean they always will investigate them, he said.

"It may not be real popular, but we're not going to follow up every piece of information we get, because some of it is just, 'I saw a guy who was kind of spooky last Thursday,'" Ladd said.

None of the 10 or so phone calls Thursday helped police find whoever committed the rapes and assault near 95th Street and Antioch Road. Detectives don't have enough evidence to prove in court that a single person is responsible for the crimes, but "for all practical purposes we're talking about one," Ladd said.

An accumulation of trash at 44th and South in Kansas City is just one of the dumpsites. A new city auditor's report

---

Tips pouring in from area of rapes

Residents report suspicious characters in their neighborhood.

By RICHARD ESPINOZA
Staff Writer

A day after Overland Park police asked for help in catching a rapist, several residents reported suspicious characters in their neighborhood Thursday.

More than 600 people who live in and around the Montgomery neighborhood packed a community meeting Wednesday night to learn about three rapes and an assault in the area since May. Police suggested ways to protect themselves, emphasizing extra diligence in reporting strangers.

At least one home got a new front door Thursday, and several residents wanted no time-alerting police to people in their streets.

One woman reported a man who sat shirtless in his car Thursday morning, and gave police his license plate number. An officer will phone the man and ask what he was up to, said Police Capt. Glenn Ladd. Police will listen to all such tips, but that doesn't mean they always will investigate them, he said.

"It may not be real popular, but we're not going to follow up every piece of information we get, because some of it is just, 'I saw a guy who was kind of spooky last Thursday,'" Ladd said.

None of the 10 or so phone calls Thursday helped police find whoever committed the rapes and assault near 95th Street and Antioch Road. Detectives don't have enough evidence to prove in court that a single person is responsible for the crimes, but "for all practical purposes we're talking about one," Ladd said.

An accumulation of trash at 44th and South in Kansas City is just one of the dumpsites. A new city auditor's report

---

Tips pouring in from area of rapes

Residents report suspicious characters in their neighborhood.

By RICHARD ESPINOZA
Staff Writer

A day after Overland Park police asked for help in catching a rapist, several residents reported suspicious characters in their neighborhood Thursday.

More than 600 people who live in and around the Montgomery neighborhood packed a community meeting Wednesday night to learn about three rapes and an assault in the area since May. Police suggested ways to protect themselves, emphasizing extra diligence in reporting strangers.

At least one home got a new front door Thursday, and several residents wanted no time-alerting police to people in their streets.

One woman reported a man who sat shirtless in his car Thursday morning, and gave police his license plate number. An officer will phone the man and ask what he was up to, said Police Capt. Glenn Ladd. Police will listen to all such tips, but that doesn't mean they always will investigate them, he said.

"It may not be real popular, but we're not going to follow up every piece of information we get, because some of it is just, 'I saw a guy who was kind of spooky last Thursday,'" Ladd said.

None of the 10 or so phone calls Thursday helped police find whoever committed the rapes and assault near 95th Street and Antioch Road. Detectives don't have enough evidence to prove in court that a single person is responsible for the crimes, but "for all practical purposes we're talking about one," Ladd said.

An accumulation of trash at 44th and South in Kansas City is just one of the dumpsites. A new city auditor's report

---

Tips pouring in from area of rapes

Residents report suspicious characters in their neighborhood.

By RICHARD ESPINOZA
Staff Writer

A day after Overland Park police asked for help in catching a rapist, several residents reported suspicious characters in their neighborhood Thursday.

More than 600 people who live in and around the Montgomery neighborhood packed a community meeting Wednesday night to learn about three rapes and an assault in the area since May. Police suggested ways to protect themselves, emphasizing extra diligence in reporting strangers.

At least one home got a new front door Thursday, and several residents wanted no time-alerting police to people in their streets.

One woman reported a man who sat shirtless in his car Thursday morning, and gave police his license plate number. An officer will phone the man and ask what he was up to, said Police Capt. Glenn Ladd. Police will listen to all such tips, but that doesn't mean they always will investigate them, he said.

"It may not be real popular, but we're not going to follow up every piece of information we get, because some of it is just, 'I saw a guy who was kind of spooky last Thursday,'" Ladd said.

None of the 10 or so phone calls Thursday helped police find whoever committed the rapes and assault near 95th Street and Antioch Road. Detectives don't have enough evidence to prove in court that a single person is responsible for the crimes, but "for all practical purposes we're talking about one," Ladd said.

An accumulation of trash at 44th and South in Kansas City is just one of the dumpsites. A new city auditor's report

---
Man charged in burglary, rape in 1996 attack

By RICHARD ESPINOZA and TONY RIZZO
Staff Writers

A 20-year-old Overland Park man was charged Tuesday with breaking into a woman's house and raping her in 1996, and detectives are investigating whether he may be a suspect in three other attacks that year in the neighborhood.

The charges filed Tuesday in Johnson County District Court allege that Jason Scott Landreth broke into a house in the 8800 block of West 97th Street on Aug. 22, 1996, and raped the woman who lived there.

He was charged with felony counts of rape and aggravated burglary. District Judge William Cleaver set bond at $1 million and scheduled Landreth's next court hearing for April 2.

Preliminary DNA tests that came back Monday matched Landreth's blood to physical evidence from the attack, police said. They would not say what evidence they compared to Landreth's blood.

The attack was the fourth in 1996 in the Morningview neighborhood near 95th Street and Antioch Road, where Landreth lived with his family. Police thought the attacks might have been the work of one man. The crimes appear to have stopped after police held a public safety meeting attended by more than 600 residents.

Plan seeks more home security

New Overland Park houses may face additional rules.

By BRAD COOPER
Staff Writer

Homebuilders are battling Overland Park over a proposed law requiring new houses to be equipped with security measures intended to deter burglars.

The Police Department is urging the City Council to add minimum security standards to the city’s building code. The new standards could increase the price of a new house by $5,350.

“The more time a perpetrator has to spend getting into the house, the less likely they’re going to try to hit it,” said Mike Betten, a member of the Overland Park Police Department’s crime prevention unit.

Betten and his unit have been working to develop minimum security codes since the summer of 1996, when the Morningview neighborhood was hit by burglaries and sexual assaults. After conducting hundreds of residential surveys, officers found that newer homes offered weak resistance to break-ins. There were 451 break-ins in Overland Park in 1996.

Basically, the door frames were not reinforced, and basement windows were vulnerable to break-ins. That’s the common underlying problem with the new home constructions that the proposal before the council includes.

So the crime prevention unit developed a proposed law that would require several security devices in new homes. The proposal before the council includes:

- Reinforced doors and door frames.
- A security system alarm.
- A deadbolt lock on each exterior door.
- An entry alarm system.
- Security bars on doors and windows.
- A security system alarm.

Little fossils, big arguments

At the University of Kansas, graduate student Zhonghe Zhou (left) displayed the fossil of the bird cathayorincus, about 135 million years old. Paleontologist Larry D. Martin showed the fossil of a bird called confuciusornis, thought to be the oldest bird with a beak.

Johnson County homeowners who want to appeal their property tax appraisals in the spring will have a new tool — a video of their home.

Video images shot last fall and new footage to be shot this month will be available to residents wishing to contest tax appraisal notices mailed by the county in March, said Bonnie Dunham of the Johnson County tax assessor’s office.

Since fall, Geospa, a Minneapolis-based mapping firm, has been using computer, global-positioning and video technology to capture every building on broadcast-quality videotape. The raw footage then is transferred to CDs and allows tax assessors to do a virtual drive-by of a home from their desk computers.

Geospa officials had hoped to have the $247,000 job completed by now, but the weather has not cooperated. Thirty percent of the county’s 180,000 structures have yet to be taped.

Weather woes for Geospa began in the fall, when the leaves clung to trees for too long and again this winter, when snow blanketed the area.

“All bets are off in the winter,” said Ted Lachniti, president of GeoSpa. “There was a fair amount of snow between Thanksgiving and Christmas, and we didn’t have a lot of good weather.”

The Geospa technicians now are processing the raw footage shot in fall and should send images to the county by the third week in January. At the same time, videotaping will continue, Lachniti said.

Officials in the appraiser’s office also are creating a 14-minute tax video that will be available in February at the county’s 13 branch libraries.

It tells how property is appraised, how you appeal your evaluation and what happens in the appeal process. “The people know what to expect,” Dunham said. She reminds residents that new state laws this year shorten the time to appeal tax appraisals to 30 days from 45 days.

Videotapes to help residents appeal property appraisals

Homeowners can use footage provided by Johnson County.

By FINN BULLERS
Staff Writer

Ollie Gates in line for highway panel

By MATT CAMPBELL
Staff Writer

Kansas City restaurateur and businessman Ollie Gates was nominated Wednesday by Gov. Mel Carnahan to serve on the Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission.

Gates would be the first African-

state of Missouri. Gates would fill the expired term of Thomas M. Boland of Han
tibal. Carnahan also nominated Barry Orschel of
**JOHNSON COUNTY/METRO**

Security measures sought in homes

**New Year's closing**

City offices, municipal courts

Lenexa

Olathe

Overland Park

Shawnee

County offices and courts

Johnson County

State offices

Financial markets

U.S. markets

Banks

Trash pickup

JOHNSON COUNTY

Brownsville-Allie Thursday pickup (Commercial only in JC)

Deerfield-Thursday pickup on Friday

Olathe-Thursday pickup on Friday

Libraries and museums

Johnson County Library

Kansas City Museum

National Frontier Trails Center

Nelson-Alkensin Museum of Art

Truman Home

Truman Farm Home

Johnson County Museum

**DEATHS & FUNERALS**

Missouri eulogizes a servant

James C. Kirkpatrick was a friend to all, speakers tell mourners.

By WILL SENTELL

Jefferson City Correspondent

WARRIORS, Mo. - James C. Kirkpatrick, whose estate is in Warrensburg, Mo., died Wednesday, January 1, 1998. He was 70 years old. It was the earliest date on the calendar, according to the family's public service notice.

"The celebration of his life," the family said, "will be held on January 19, 1998, at 10:30 a.m. at the Temple Israel Cemetery in Warrensburg. Interment will follow at 2 p.m. in the cemetery.

"The family requests that in lieu of flowers, donations be made to the Hebrew Benevolent Association of America, 555 East Main Street, Kansas City, MO 64101.

"The family would like to extend their deepest appreciation to the Temple Israel Cemetery and to Temple Israel of Warrensburg for their assistance in planning the funeral arrangements.

"The family asks that in lieu of flowers, donations be made to the Jewish Charities Fund, 7500 Country Club Plaza, Kansas City, MO 64114.

"The family thanks all those who have supported and encouraged them during this difficult time.

"The family requests that in lieu of flowers, donations be made to the Jewish Charities Fund, 7500 Country Club Plaza, Kansas City, MO 64114.

"The family would like to extend their deepest appreciation to the Temple Israel Cemetery and to Temple Israel of Warrensburg for their assistance in planning the funeral arrangements.

"The family thanks all those who have supported and encouraged them during this difficult time.

"The family requests that in lieu of flowers, donations be made to the Jewish Charities Fund, 7500 Country Club Plaza, Kansas City, MO 64114.

"The family would like to extend their deepest appreciation to the Temple Israel Cemetery and to Temple Israel of Warrensburg for their assistance in planning the funeral arrangements.

"The family thanks all those who have supported and encouraged them during this difficult time.

"The family requests that in lieu of flowers, donations be made to the Jewish Charities Fund, 7500 Country Club Plaza, Kansas City, MO 64114.

"The family would like to extend their deepest appreciation to the Temple Israel Cemetery and to Temple Israel of Warrensburg for their assistance in planning the funeral arrangements.

"The family thanks all those who have supported and encouraged them during this difficult time.

"The family requests that in lieu of flowers, donations be made to the Jewish Charities Fund, 7500 Country Club Plaza, Kansas City, MO 64114.
Summer is almost upon us. Home security and child safety quickly become topics of concern for parents as criminal activity has a tendency to increase over the summer months. Nothing concerns parents more than leaving children home alone during the day. So, what should parents be telling their children when they may be home alone for short periods of time during the summer?

A commonly accepted rule of thumb for children staying home alone has been to ignore a knock at the front door or a ring of the door bell. A common misbelief is that the individual at the front door will leave if the illusion of a vacant home is created. The police department has done extensive research on the matter and believes this may not be the best course of action for your children. Here’s why:

First, we encourage residents to view the registered sex offender list for the State of Kansas. You can find it online at: http://www.kansas.gov/kbi/ro.shtml

Most people visit the site to find out where these offenders live. A closer examination of the offender list reveals that the majority of them have some kind of conviction involving a child! Research by a correctional institution closely examined the criminal history of convicted sex offenders. The research revealed that one crime many of the sex offenders had in common was burglary. This fact also has been substantiated by John Douglas, a former FBI profiler and author of the book “Obsession.” This information provides us with insight into how some sex offenders may think and operate.

Residential burglars typically operate during the weekday because this is when most houses are unoccupied. Occupancy is the single greatest deterrent to burglars. They often conduct their surveillance from the street to determine if a house is occupied. The best method for confirming occupancy is by knocking on the door or ringing the doorbell. The presence of anyone in the house is a significant deterrent to a burglar. The ability of an occupant to recognize the burglar and call police is a significant risk to a criminal.

The next question often raised by parents to the police department is “what if the perpetrator is targeting my child?” A perpetrator that targets a child probably knows that the child is home alone. Our question to a parent is: “What have you done to keep the criminal out?” The Overland Park Police Department strongly suggests parents consider the following courses of action:

**MAKE NOISE:** Children should make noise, yelling “Dad” or take some action which leaves no doubt the house is occupied. The illusion that a house is unoccupied is an ideal situation for a burglar. Once a burglar forces their way into a house, this becomes horrifying and dangerous for a child.

**PHYSICAL SECURITY:** Most perpetrators that force their way into a house do so through an exterior door. Parents should address the physical security of the house first. The physical security of the house is the foundation of any security scheme. This can frustrate and delay a burglar from gaining access to the house, but more importantly provide the child time to call 911 and exit the home if necessary. For more information on residential security contact the Community Policing Section at 913/895-6408.

For more information on child safety and security, the police department encourages parents to go to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children at: www.ncmec.org/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PagId=713
Crime Prevention

Residential Security

Reducing Criminal Opportunity

The length of time a burglar spends attempting to get into your home is proportional to the probability of detection. The chance of being seen and possibly identified is the burglar's biggest fear. Most burglars allow themselves one to two minutes to get into a home. Beyond that, the risk of detection becomes too great. A good security strategy slows burglars and extends them past their self-imposed time limits.

The fear of crime and its associated victimization is so pervasive in our society, people sometimes take extreme steps to prevent becoming a victim. In fact, the alarm industry has grown significantly due to this fear among residents. For an alarm system to be truly effective, a homeowner must first address the physical security of their home. When considering home security, a homeowner needs to "invest" in quality security hardware and ensure it is properly installed. Unfortunately, homeowners cannot always assume a new home contains quality security hardware. The cost of a new home is no indication of the level of security installed. In his book, Effective Physical Security, Robert L. O'Block writes:

"Even though door and window security are effective and simple methods of increasing the security of a structure, builders continue to use low-quality, low-security hardware and materials."

Thus, home buyers desiring security are often at a disadvantage before they even move into their home. While structural weaknesses may be expensive to repair, home security can be substantially increased by implementation of a few simple and inexpensive, yet effective prevention techniques. An exterior door is only as strong as its weakest component. A high quality lock installed in a door attached to a weak frame remains vulnerable to forced entry, and is equivalent to putting a padlock on a paper bag.

In order for an exterior door to be an effective barrier between the burglar and their target, three aspects of a door assembly must be addressed and secured: the door, the door frame, and the lock.

**THE DOOR**

Exterior doors are often constructed of soft-wood products filled with insulating material and covered by veneer or metal sheeting. To improve security, it is extremely important that exterior doors be solid-core and include a method to protect the door's susceptibility to door edge splitting. (see photo below)

All exterior doors should be 1 ¾ inches thick. Steel doors should be a minimum of 24 gauge. Regardless of their type, most residential doors have wood-framed edges, which need to be protected to prevent splitting at the deadbolt. To counter door splitting during an attack, the door should be equipped with an escutcheon plate, or door “reinforcer.” Escutcheon plates are found in most hardware stores and are easy to install. An escutcheon plate significantly increases the rigidity of the door edge and reduces the chance of the door splitting around the deadbolt area. Some steel-edge doors are adequately protected without an escutcheon plate.

**THE DOOR FRAME**

The door frame is often referred to as the door jamb, which is inherently weak. In most cases, the door frame is the weakest component of the door assembly. Door frames are usually constructed of soft wood and offer little or no resistance to splitting. The most important point of any door security system is the place where the deadbolt lock meets the frame. This is the point "where the rubber meets the road." Adequately anchoring the strike plate to the wall structure of the house is critical. A strike plate is a piece of metal, usually brass or steel, that attaches to the door frame and receives the lock bolt.
Standard strike plates are secured with two screws, which offer little or no protection against door-frame failure. It is recommended that all exterior door frames be fitted with high-security strike plates. Available in a variety of designs, high-security strike plates utilize four or six offset screws and are usually constructed of heavy-gauge brass or steel. It is further recommended the strike plate be secured with at least 3-inch screws with a hardwood filler (blocker) inserted between the door jamb and wall structure (studs). The hardwood filler should extend a minimum of 12-inches above and below the strike plate. Commercially-made security products consisting of aluminum plates that install behind the door frame are available which can substitute for a hardwood filler. This type of reinforcement method has proven to be very effective while maintaining aesthetics.

For an added measure of security, it is recommended that all door hinges be anchored with at least 3-inch screws and shimmed. While less likely an occurrence, the possibility exists a burglar could attack the door from its hinged side.

Prevalent in residential subdivisions are entryways with side lights (pictured below, left) on one or both sides of the exterior door. While these types of doors are aesthetically pleasing, without proper security, they offer very little protection. The Crime Prevention Unit, working in cooperation with area homebuilders, tested a product which reinforces door frames for side-light units. A "jamb brace" (pictured, right) can be installed in an existing door frame, or ordered with new doors from local millwork companies in the Kansas City metropolitan area. The application of an impact-resistant material, such as security film, may be considered. Security film has limitations, so it is critical to install such products to manufacturer’s specifications. A superior glazing product is laminated glass. Laminated glass is the type of glass used in automobile windshields. It offers resistance to penetration other glass products do not possess.

Patio doors can also be defeated by prying the lock, sliding the door open, or by lifting the door out of its track. Fortunately, both of these types of attacks can be prevented. To prevent forcing the door open, a secondary-locking device reinforcing the door lock should be used. Examples include pins or “charlie bars.” Available at most hardware stores, these devices are inexpensive and easily installed. To prevent the patio door from being lifted out, it is recommended a homeowner use evenly spaced screws inserted in the upper slide track. The head of the screws should protrude just enough to allow free movement of the door, but prevent the door from being lifted out of its track (pictured, next page).

THE DEADBOLT
When choosing a deadbolt, it is important it have the following minimum specifications:

- Minimum ¼ inch interlocking carriage bolts to hold the cylinder halves together.
- Tapered cylinder guard.
- Hardened steel bolt with a 1-inch throw.
- Bolt encased in a single piece housing.
- Bolt constructed to limit internal movement or "play" when bolt is fully extended.

Not all deadbolts are created equal. They appear similar on the exterior, but the internal components are critical to the overall integrity of the lock. Inquire and ensure the deadbolt meets or exceeds ANSI grade 2 testing standards.
WINDOWS AND GLASS
In Overland Park, roughly 10% of all residential burglars enter through windows. Very few windows are manufactured with security as the main consideration. Most windows are designed for aesthetics and energy efficiency. Basement windows are extremely vulnerable and offer virtually no resistance to forced entry. The typical basement window is held in place by two spring-latches. These windows are typically constructed poorly and offer inadequate locking devices. Basement-window security can be improved with installation of security bars or glass blocks. While increasing the security of the residence, bars and glass blocks can restrict occupants from escaping the residence during a house fire. This should be considered prior to installing bars or blocks.

Single or double-hung windows are difficult to secure. Casement windows offer a better form of security. When considering window replacement or during construction of a new home, ask whether the window unit meets or exceeds the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) F 588-97. Windows meeting or exceeding this standard have been tested for their ability to resist forced-entry attacks. Window units meeting the ASTM standard are an improvement from the typical builders-grade window unit and are more costly. Laminated glass (pictured above) should also be considered to enhance the overall security of window units. Laminated glass consists of two panes of glass with a tough plastic interlayer that makes forced entry extremely difficult. The glass may crack, but it will take several blows for a burglar to penetrate it. This type of window will not sacrifice aesthetics to enhance the overall security of the home. The ability to exit the house in the event of fire is not compromised for security purposes, because building codes mandate windows open from the inside. Having to break glass to facilitate escapes during fires is not recommended.

LIGHTING
Lighting can serve as an effective deterrent to burglars. Lighting is often the most prescribed, yet misunderstood security recommendation. In general, a residence will benefit from leaving the lights on during hours of darkness. Lighting assists the police with identification of street addresses and provides the entire neighborhood a more secure feeling.

The sides and rear of the home are different. Motion-sensitive lighting is preferred for several reasons:

- It increases the potential for witnesses by suddenly illuminating the environment. The human eye is naturally attracted to light.
- It saves on light-bulb maintenance costs, because lights are activated only when motion is detected, and they cycle off when activity ceases.
- It may create a "fight or flight" response in the perpetrator.

Burglary research conducted by criminologists list motion activated-lighting as a significant deterrent to burglars who committed their crimes at night.

DOGS
Dogs have proven to be an effective deterrent to burglars. Researchers Paul Cromwell, James Olson and D'Aunn Avary write in their book, Breaking and Entering: An Ethnographic Analysis of Burglary (Sage, 1991)

When asked what were considered absolute “no go” factors, most burglars responded that dogs were second only to occupancy. However, approximately 30% of the informants initially discounted the presence of dogs as a deterrent. Yet, during “ride alongs” the sight or sound of a dog at a potential target site almost invariably resulted in a “no go” decision.

But are all dogs a deterrent? Professional dog handlers suggest some breeds are better at “watch dog” duties than other breeds. Dr. Stanley Coren in

The worst watch dogs identified by Dr. Coren are: Bloodhound, Newfoundland, English Bulldog, Pug or Scottish Deerhound. A dog is a big responsibility and more information can be obtained through your local veterinarian or the American Kennel Club website, [www.akc.org](http://www.akc.org).

**OCCUPANCY**
The single greatest deterrent for most burglars is occupancy. Consider what Cromwell, Avary and Olson write about occupancy.

Almost all burglars avoid selecting as targets houses that are occupied. Only two of our informants (from 30 active burglars) stated that they would enter a residence that they knew was occupied. Therefore, it is important that the burglar develop techniques to probe the potential target site to determine if anyone is at home. The most common probe used by our informants was to send one of the burglars to the door to knock or ring the doorbell...

Any strategy which gives a house an “illusion of occupancy” while the residents are gone, will serve to significantly reduce burglary.

Creating the “illusion of occupancy” may be more difficult than it sounds. The FBI’s Uniformed Crime Reports (UCR), indicate over 50% of all residential burglaries occur during the day. Lights and televisions on timers have limitations. Another interesting fact which the researchers point out is the method by which burglars check homes for occupancy; ringing the doorbell or knocking. In 2000, the UCR reported 2,049,946 burglaries, with two-thirds being residential in nature.

**CHILDREN HOME ALONE**
One of the common recommendations made to parents with children who stay home alone is “don’t answer the door.” Given the information about a burglar’s method of checking for occupancy, it is not recommended for children to remain quiet to create the illusion the house is unoccupied. Parents should consider strategies for their children to deal with this possibility. A child opening the door is much different than children making noise and creating the unmistakable “fact” a house is occupied. If children are left home alone, the physical security of the home is paramount. Misconceptions were demonstrated in the fall of 2001 when Prairie Village and Overland Park experienced three home invasions where children were home alone during the day. The burglar came to the front door, knocked, got no answer and proceeded to the rear of residence and kicked in the back doors. Given the deterrent value of occupancy, parents should teach their children strategies to acknowledge someone at the door rather than to remain silent.

**THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT**
The intent of this brochure is to aid homeowners in self protection from unskilled, opportunistic burglars and their common entry methods. However, every individual, home, or neighborhood is different and may dictate or require specific security strategies. Constable Henri Berube, CPP of the Peel Regional Police has identified five threat levels in a residential setting.

| Level 5: Opportunistic/Unskilled Burglar |
| Level 4: Professional/Skilled Burglar |
| Level 3: Home Invasion/Robbery |
| Level 2: Stalking/Domestic Violence |
| Level 1: Terrorist Threat |

Crime Prevention Practitioners can help identify your specific threat. The opportunistic burglar’s behavior is impacted by simple precautions, while a violent or abusive perpetrator is motivated by emotion and anger. For each of the five levels listed, security strategies vary.
CITIZENS FOR CRIME PREVENTION
The Neighborhood Watch Program employs the cooperative involvement of residents in a neighborhood. The program’s goal is for neighbors to become acquainted with each other and to actively prevent and combat crime. Members of a Neighborhood Watch Program assist their police department by providing many additional eyes and ears. The City of Overland Park has approximately one uniformed police officer for every 800 residents. Protective neighborhoods are needed to help prevent criminal activity.

Uniformed officers cannot be present when every situation occurs. It is up to you, as an interested citizen, to report what you see and hear when it is happening. You are strongly encouraged to limit your involvement to placing telephone calls for police service. You should not attempt to take action on your own or try to apprehend suspects. Your job is to be a good witness. Our job as trained law enforcement officers is to apprehend criminals using your information.

To start a Neighborhood Watch Program in your area, contact the Overland Park Police Department Crime Prevention Unit, (913)327-6917 or (913)327-6929. Help us reduce criminal opportunity!

OPERATION IDENTIFICATION
Operation Identification originated in Monterey Park, CA, in 1963. This program is designed to prevent theft and burglary by notifying potential thieves that all property in a home can readily be identified by law enforcement agencies.

How does this prevent thefts?
If a marked item is stolen, it is more difficult to trade or sell and could be used as direct evidence against the thief if found in their possession. After you have marked items of value, you will be provided Operation Identification decals to place in locations a thief might use to enter your home, i.e., doors or windows. This notice can be a major factor in preventing burglaries. The success of the program depends both on marking your property and displaying the decals.

What marks should I engrave on my property?
Engraving your property with your driver’s license number, preceded by the state abbreviation (Example: KSDL K00005789). The item should be marked near the manufacturer’s serial number if possible. If not, mark the item on the bottom or backside. Items can be marked in more than one place if desired, but at least one marking should be visible without having to dismantle the item.

ALARMS
Effective alarm systems serve as a deterrent to intruders. They can alert authorities to intrusions and provide residents with peace of mind while their home is unoccupied.

However, alarm systems have limitations. Alarms cannot prevent an intruder’s entry. They depend on a police response. If an alarm is activated while a house is occupied, the alarm system can seize the phone line inhibiting a resident’s ability to dial 911! The most prominent problem with most alarm systems is false activation. 99% of all alarm activations received by the Overland Park Police are false. Prior to the purchase of an alarm system, we strongly encourage residents to contact the Crime Prevention Unit to match their needs, concerns, and lifestyle with the most appropriate security strategy. For more information, see the Crime Prevention Fact Sheet “Understanding Alarms.”