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**Summary:**

**Project Title:** Orange County Sheriff’s Office – Violent Crime Initiative

**Scanning:** The violent crime problem in Orange County was recognized through both empirical analysis and anecdotal evidence. In 2004 Orange County experienced a rise of 3.1% in the UCR Violent Crime Index. The analysis of the types and causal factors of these crimes led us to postulate this was more than an anomaly, but was actually the onset of a significant change in rate of violent crime. This proved to be accurate as in 2005 the UCR Violent Crime Index rose 19.7% and in 2006 another 15.6%. During these two years Orange County experienced a record number of robberies and homicides.

In addition to the statistical evidence, the rise in violent crime was observed by the community and the media. It became routine for the local media to report as lead stories the rising record number of murders and shootings and the community expressed grave concern.

**Analysis:** The primary analysis of the problem was conducted through crime analysis. Violent crimes were analyzed from geographic, methodology and victimology perspectives. The goal was to determine the causal factors of the crimes to interdict or prevent them.

In addition to statistical analysis, community meetings were held to hear citizens’ observations and information was collected from patrol deputies of their observations of the change in crime patterns that would not be determined by crime analysis.
**Response:** The response required a significant shift in personnel resources working to target violent crime. These additional resources were drawn from within the agency and from partnerships with other agencies. Six specific and measurable enforcement strategies were developed and the additional resources were focused on “policing with a purpose.” Each day personnel resources were tasked with activities to directly impact at least one of these strategies. The strategies were developed based on statistical analysis, best practices in other jurisdictions and observations made by the community.

**Assessment:** Periodic statistical assessments were completed at specified intervals during the Initiative to measure short term and long term shifts in trends, possible displacement of crime and the effectiveness of the strategies. Additionally, formal presentations were provided to the Board of County Commissioners to not only solicit financial assistance in the form of overtime, but to allow the elected officials to provide feedback on their observations of the Initiative’s effectiveness. At the end of the Initiative, the precipitous rise in violent crime was abated and the trend was reversed downward.
Program Description

Scanning:

The problem that the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and the community encountered was the rapid and unprecedented rise in violent crime, specifically, murders, robberies and aggravated assaults. The onset of the problem was observed statistically in 2004 when the UCR Violent Crime Index rose 3.1%. Outside of crime analysts and law enforcement managers who studied the crime patterns, at this point the public did not appear to sense a problem with rising crime. However, this quickly changed in 2005 and 2006 as Orange County experienced record numbers of murders and robberies and the Violent Crime Index rose 19.7% and 15.6%, respectively. (*See Appendix: 2004-2006 UCR Yearly Comparisons.*)

Adjoining jurisdictions were also experiencing rapid increases in crime and consequently the electronic and print media were carrying almost daily stories on the record levels of crime. If the community had not previously been aware of the problem, it became impossible to ignore with the amount of media coverage.

The economic community became aware and concerned about the problem also. Orange County is a tourist based economy and the continual coverage and reporting of crime became a concern to the economic community as this unabated rise in violent crime had the potential of harming the reputation and financial livelihood of Central Florida.

Throughout 2005 and early in 2006 the Orange County Sheriff's Office used traditional methods of addressing the crime problem which proved to be unsuccessful for any sustained period of time. In August 2006 Sheriff Kevin Beary directed that all
agency resources should be reallocated and a plan developed for implementation within two weeks to stop the rise of violent crime.

**Analysis:**

Prior to 2004, Orange County, like much of the nation, had experienced decreasing crime. As we began to see the onset of a rise in violent crime in 2004 and then the dramatic increases the next two years, we continued to implement the CompStat style practices we have used for a number of years. The results of the efforts were short term gains, but the overall trend was not affected. We realized that a substantial shift in resources and philosophy would be necessary due to the overwhelming number of crimes being committed.

Prior to the shifting of these personnel resources and the commitment of significant financial resources, substantial crime analysis was conducted to determine the specific strategies that would have highest probability of success. The analysis demonstrated that 60% of violent crime in Orange County occurred in two small geographic areas, known as the South Orange Blossom Trail Corridor and Pine Hills. *(See Appendix: 2006 Orange County Robbery Map as an example of the analysis and Designated Violent Crime Areas Map for a depiction of the corridors.)*

The analysis led us to believe that by impacting the violent crime in these two areas, the crime statistics across the county would be positively affected.

The analysis also studied the methodology and victimology of violent crime. For example, it was demonstrated that murder victims in most cases had similar arrest records as the murder suspects/defendants. It was their underlying crimes and lifestyles that led to the murders. Similar patterns were demonstrated for aggravated assaults and
robberies. (See Appendix: 2007 Homicide Involved Persons Analysis [mid year] and the 2005-2007 Homicide Causal Effect Analysis as examples of the analysis.)

Geographic analysis of shootings and murders demonstrated matching patterns with street level narcotics trade and over 80% of murders were committed with firearms.

Analysis further demonstrated that a growing percentage of juveniles were involved in violent crime and a substantial number of daytime residential burglaries were committed by truant juveniles. A growing number of these residential burglaries were resulting in firearms being stolen. The University of Central Florida conducted a parallel study of violent crime with an examination of juvenile crime that corroborated our analysis.

In addition to the statistical analysis, meetings were held with community leaders. The observations by community members complimented the statistical analysis, as they were concerned about open air drug sales that preceded the violence, crimes committed by youths and the number of repeat offenders.

Information was also gathered from the patrol deputies regarding their observations of crime trends that may not necessarily be gathered by crime analysis through incident reports, but based on the deputies’ knowledge of criminal activity.

The comprehensive analysis demonstrated that while the majority of violent crime was concentrated in two geographic areas, the entire community was being affected by it. Orange County hosts approximately 53 million tourists each year, as it is the home to many major theme parks, e.g. Disney World, Sea World, Universal Studios and one of the largest convention centers and busiest airports in the nation. It has been demonstrated in the past that media reports of crime have had a negative impact on the tourist based
economy of Florida. Our ability to reduce the crime would not only impact specific victims and neighborhoods, but would prevent the potential far reaching negative effects for the Central Florida economy and help maintain the region’s reputation as a family friendly environment.

**Response:**

After analysis of the problem and crime trends, the examination of past operations and best practices and the communication with the community, it was determined that six strategies would be implemented. The agency’s resources would be directed in small groups to focus on these six strategies primarily in the identified geographic areas and targeting the offenders that were engaged in practices that analysis demonstrated led to violent crimes. The strategies were meant to be measurable and also be correlated to the crime trends.

The six strategies that were implemented were as follows:

1. Increase the seizure of firearms used or possessed illegally.
2. Increase arrests of drug offenders, specifically dealers, through street level enforcement.
3. Increase the service of felony warrants.
4. Target specific violent criminals and disrupt violent crime patterns through deployment of plainclothes tactical squads.
5. Increase proactive patrol in high crime neighborhoods by redirecting agency resources.
6. Prevent and reduce juvenile crime through truancy sweeps and targeting known juvenile offenders.
The purpose of the strategies was not for them to stand alone as independent benchmarks or operations, but to overlap and compliment each other, therefore compounding the measurable effect.

It would not have been possible to implement the six strategies simultaneously and consistently without the dedication of additional personnel resources. The decision was made to redeploy resources within the agency to the Violent Crime Initiative and task them with specific objectives within the six strategies. Examples of personnel that were partially, temporarily or permanently redeployed for the 15 months of the Initiative were personnel assigned to Training, Civil Writs, Investigations, Specialized Patrol, Professional Standards and School Resource Officers. Depending on the nature of their primary assignment, various schedules were developed to either substitute their primary duties or use them in an overtime capacity so that all components of the agency were involved with the Violent Crime Initiative at various times.

The shifting of significant personnel resources away from their normal duties to concentrate on small geographic corridors of crime and to implement specific enforcement strategies which may have been foreign to their normal work responsibilities entailed a high degree of calculated risk. For example, there would be services to the public that would be reduced for a period of time, e.g. service of civil process, specialized patrol such as marine and agricultural patrol, and some juvenile programs like PAL. Also services provided within the agency to the employees, e.g. training, staff inspections and internal investigations would be reduced or re-prioritized. Consistent communication with the public and media was necessary to keep their support of the Initiative. Also, presentations were made to the Board of County Commissioners to at the beginning of
the Initiative, periodically during the Initiative and at the end of the Initiative to solicit their political and financial support. Approximately six months into the Initiative, the Board of County Commissioners’ understanding of the significant gains that were being made and their support for the Initiative continuing was demonstrated when they provided an additional $1.3 million for overtime funds to be used to fund the Initiative.

Additionally, the deputies needed to understand the dramatic rise in crime, the critical need to shift resources for a period of time and needed to receive continual feedback on how their contributions were making a positive effect on the community. Daily briefings were held and commanders gave updates on the successes and challenges encountered and the rationale for the specific tasks the deputies were being directed to do to accomplish the strategies.

In the past the agency had either used large amounts of manpower to suppress crime, but for limited periods of time and with less measurable and articulable strategies. Or, the agency had a specific strategy, but tasked small specialized units to accomplish the task. The unprecedented rise in violent crime required a paradigm shift in the policing strategies along with the commitment and coordination of large amounts of staffing sustained over a long period of time.

Assessment:

After the implementation of the Violent Crime Initiative, analysis continued on a daily, bi-weekly, monthly and annual basis. The necessity for both long term and short term analysis was vital to ensure that emerging or changing trends were quickly addressed, but that the overall operation and strategies addressed the long term crime trends that would have the greatest long term impact.
The data that was collected on a daily basis was the output of the work product of the dedicated resources. The outputs demonstrated whether the strategies could be effectively implemented, but they had to be constantly measured against the crime rates and trends to determine if the desired outcomes of a lower crime rate, crime suppression and crime prevention were being achieved. The overall goal was not to solve crimes that had already been committed, but to take proactive enforcement action that would prevent violent crime from occurring and prevent the displacement of crime into other communities.

After the initial six week operation that began on September 5, 2006, two month intervals were used to reassess the effectiveness of the strategies and reallocate the resources based on analysis. For example, during the first six weeks it was observed that the strategy of servicing more felony warrants was not being achieved. Adjustments were made to the number of personnel assigned and the manner in which warrants were supplied to them as it was believed this was a viable strategy that could reduce violent crime, but required an alternate means of implementation. Other examples of strategies that were adjusted during the course of the operations based on the comparison and analysis of deployment and crime trends were the use of more uniformed tactical units to address street level narcotics, rather than undercover narcotics enforcement and the very limited use of stationary plainclothes stakeout teams replaced instead with mobile plainclothes units to interdict suspicious activity before violent crime occurred. While modifications were made with the tactics the overall strategies were producing the desired results.
The first phase of the Violent Crime Initiative began on September 5, 2006 and lasted for 6 weeks. The six week duration was chosen to give adequate time for the strategies to show success, if indeed the interpretation of the analysis was correct, but not so long as to allow the crime trends to continue if adjustments were required. After the first six weeks, new operational plans were developed in two month intervals to adjust resources and fine tune strategies. Intermediate to the two month operational plans were bi-weekly crime control meetings to give the command staff updates and allow them to provide direction based on the latest statistical analysis and daily comparisons of deployments, strategy implementation and crime occurrences continued.

To demonstrate the results of the Violent Crime Initiative information will be provided both on the outputs of the six strategies and the outcomes as it relates to the suppression and prevention of crime. The outputs and outcomes of the initial six weeks will be used as an example of an intermediate assessment and the final results at the end of the fifteen months will be used to demonstrate the overall effectiveness of the Initiative.

After the first six weeks of the Initiative the following data was gathered on the six strategies:

1. 133 firearms were seized during the six weeks. This represents a 12% increase in seizures over the 2006 monthly average and a 26% increase over the 2005 monthly average.

2. Personnel assigned to the detail made 423 narcotics arrests. 391 adults were arrested and 32 were juveniles. The number of street level narcotics
3. Personnel assigned to the operation made 471 warrant arrests. Analysis demonstrated that warrant service agency wide during the six weeks did not increase and the implementation of the strategy was addressed.

4. Three CID Squads, along with resources from Criminal Intelligence, Training, Special Operations and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement formed multiple anti-robbery surveillance and interdiction squads. A disruption in narcotics activity was reported. Additionally, through both crime analysis and observation by personnel in the detail, a disruption in crime patterns was reported.

5. Approximately 12,000 additional man hours of personnel in uniform were dedicated to the operation. These personnel were from each bureau and division in the agency assigned either on a full time or part time basis. Personnel were able to hold perimeters for extended periods of time; officer safety was increased due to the number of units deployed and discretionary patrol time dramatically increased to address specific crime problems. Patrol received extra support at schools and businesses that are daily problems.

6. Personnel assigned to the detail recovered 170 truants and as an agency truancy recovery increased 32% over its monthly average. Additional contacts were made with juveniles on community control and SHOCAP offenders and coordination between day shift units and school resource
deputies was enhanced to track specific juvenile criminals that were truant on specific days.

Overall during the first six weeks, 30,252 man hours were dedicated to the operation, resulting in 1526 arrests. 490 arrests were for felonies, 423 of the arrests were for narcotics violations, 185 juveniles were arrested and 152 stolen vehicles were recovered.

The assessment of whether the implementation of the strategies was effective in the reduction of violent crime was imperative to determine early in the operation due to the significant amount of resources that had been redirected.

Countywide robbery declined 12% during the first six weeks as compared to the previous six weeks. In the South Orange Blossom Trail (SOBT) Corridor, robberies declined 12% from the previous six weeks and in the Pine Hills Corridor robberies declined 45% from the previous six weeks. An analysis of robberies to persons (either armed or strong armed)\(^1\) combined with aggravated assaults and aggravated batteries (not domestic violence related) revealed a reduction of 17% countywide as compared to the previous six weeks. In the SOBT Corridor persons robberies combined with aggravated assaults and aggravated batteries declined 28% and in the Pine Hills Corridor they declined 26%. It is worth noting that auto theft, while not classified by UCR as a violent crime, but often coincides with violent crime, was reduced 31% in the two geographical areas.

During the six weeks eight murders were committed, five of which were in the targeted areas for violent crime. It is believed seven of the murders were drug related.

\(^1\) Armed and strong armed robberies to persons accounted for approximately 75% of all robberies and therefore had to be addressed to reduce overall robbery numbers.
Personnel assigned to the operation developed information, recovered evidence or identified previously unknown witnesses that resulted in 5 murders being solved or the probable cause enhanced. Four of the murders were in the county and another in the City of Orlando.

The double digit decreases in crime, specifically in the geographic areas targeted and in the violent crime categories that had previous dramatic increases justified the continuation of the Violent Crime Initiative by using the six specific strategies.

Throughout the 15 months, through the end of 2007, that the Violent Crime Initiative was operational the Initiative continued to produce results that demonstrated the consistent output of the strategies and the effectiveness at reducing violent crime. The following demonstrates strategies that proved most effective:

During 2007, 1253 firearms were seized compared with 1077 in 2006 and 901 in 2005 representing a 39% increase over two years. 5540 narcotics arrests were made in 2007 compared with 5059 and 4687 narcotics arrests in 2006 and 2005 respectively, an 18% increase. The 2006-2007 school year saw 1079 truants recovered compared with 886 during the 2005-2006 school year, a 22% increase.

The 2007 Uniform Crime Report statistics demonstrate that murder in 2007 was reduced 9.4% compared to increases of 28.9% in 2005 and 30.6% in 2006. Robbery increased only 1.7% in 2007 compared with increases of 37.5% and 35.4% respectively in 2005 and 2006. Aggravated Assault decreased 9.5% in 2007 compared with increases of 14.7% in 2005 and 9.6% in 2006 and Auto Theft decreased 7.5% compared with increases of 3.9% and 19.2% the two previous years.
Overall the UCR Violent Crime Index decreased 4.0% in 2007 after it had increased 19.7% in 2005 and 15.6% in 2006. (See Appendix: 2005-2007 UCR Comparison Chart.)

The hypothesis that by concentrating enforcement efforts in geographic areas where the majority of violent crime occurred and implementing strategies that addresses the underlying and predicate crimes proved to be correct. Not only did violent crime decline in the two targeted geographic areas, but also declined county wide demonstrating that the crime was not simply being displaced.

The UCR statistics for the entire State of Florida were used as a benchmark to determine if the Violent Crime Initiative was a determining factor in the reduction of violent crime rather than other variables. Other portions of the state were also experiencing an increase in violent crime and it was presumed that the factors affecting the increase of violent crime in Orange County were not isolated or unique. (See Appendix: Orange County and State of Florida UCR Comparison Chart.)

During 2007 the State of Florida saw an increase of 1.8% in violent crime while Orange County’s Violent Crime Index declined 4.0%. The State of Florida had a 6.5% increase in murder, while the Orange County Sheriff's Office murder rate declined 9.4%. The State of Florida’s robbery rate increased 11.7%, as the Orange County Sheriff's Office robbery rate only increased 1.7%. Aggravated Assaults for the State of Florida decreased 1.7% while at the Orange County Sheriff’s Office they decreased 9.5% and Auto Theft decreased statewide by 3.7% while decreasing 7.5% at the Orange County Sheriff's Office.
In the benchmark violent crimes, auto theft and the Violent Crime Index the Orange County Sheriff's Office showed greater reductions and more prevention than the state as a whole and significant reductions from the previous two years.

Another positive outcome that was not predicted was the reduction in the use of force and citizen complaints. Initially there was a concern that high profile enforcement against violent criminals in specific neighborhoods would result in more uses of force and citizen complaints causing a division between the agency and the community. The reduction in use of force and complaints was attributable to community involvement, strong supervision, positive training and specific objectives to achieve.

Additionally, the agency received good public relations with the local media, the local elected officials and the tourist based economy suffered no negative effects.

While the reallocation of personnel could not continue indefinitely, the agency did reorganize and formed new squads to sustain the efforts and the strategies have become part of the normal crime accountability processes within the Orange County Sheriff's Office.
Agency and Officer Information:

The problem and response to the record levels of violent crime in Orange County was adopted by the entire agency as the problem was multifaceted and large in scope. Previous attempts to use specialized units for a short duration had proven unsuccessful.

During the Initiative over 133,000 personnel hours were dedicated to the strategies that were developed and an additional $1.3 million in overtime was granted to the Orange County Sheriff’s Office from the Board of County Commissioners to continue the Initiative for another six months in 2007.

Management had previously received training in problem oriented policing, but specific training prior to or during this Initiative was not conducted. To assess the problem and plan a coordinated response the agency looked at best practices used by other jurisdictions and lessons on strategic, crisis and change management presented by PERF’s Senior Management Institute for Police.

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Chief – Criminal Investigations Division
2500 West Colonial Drive
Orlando, FL 32805
Office: 407-254-7220
Fax: 407-254-7255
Email: ron.stucker@ocfl.net
APPENDIX
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Index</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Burglary</td>
<td>-4.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auto Theft</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2006 ORANGE COUNTY ROBBERIES

Purple Circles = Armed Persons Robberies, Blue Squares = Strong Armed Persons Robberies, Red Circles with Horizontal Line = Commercial Robberies, Brown Circle with #1 = Bank Robbery, Green Triangles = Home Invasions, Black Flags = Carjacking
Designated Violent Crime Areas

SOBT Corridor

Pine Hills Corridor
### 2007 Homicide Involved Persons Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Arrestees (40)</th>
<th>Victims (54)</th>
<th>D/S Involved Shootings (14)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Without Prior Crime History</td>
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<td>Multi-state Offenders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Felony Arrest</td>
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<td>31</td>
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</table>

- **30 Unknown Suspects**
- **23 Suspects**

- **Shootings (14)**
- **Victims (54)**
- **Arrestees (40)**
### 2005 THROUGH 2007
HOMICIDE CAUSAL EFFECT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UCR CATEGORIES</th>
<th>2005</th>
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<tr>
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<td>49</td>
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## UCR YEARLY COMPARISON

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<th>2006</th>
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<td>Violent Crime Index</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
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<td>37.5%</td>
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<td>5.1%</td>
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<td>8.0%</td>
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<td>Auto Theft</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
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ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE UCR YEARLY COMPARISION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Type</th>
<th>Orange County 2005</th>
<th>Orange County 2006</th>
<th>Orange County 2007</th>
<th>State of Florida 2007 UCR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auto Theft</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>-7.5%</td>
<td>-3.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
May 28, 2008

Herman Goldstein Award
c/o Rob T. Guerette, Ph.D.
School of Criminal Justice
Florida International University
University Park, PCA 366B
11200 S.W. 8th Street
Miami, FL 33199

Dear Selection Committee:

It gives me great pleasure to nominate the Orange County Sheriff’s Office Violent Crime Initiative for the Herman Goldstein Award for excellence in innovative and problem oriented policing.

During 2005 and 2006 the Central Florida community suffered from violent crime as never before experienced. The safety and reputation of our community was at stake unless a significant reduction in crime and a shift in the crime trends could be achieved.

Through the precise analysis of the underlying causations of the violent crime and then the specific strategies that were adopted, the Orange County Sheriff’s Office, during 2007, not only stopped the precipitous rise, but achieved reductions in violent crime trends that continue into 2008.

Throughout the Violent Crime Initiative, I constantly reminded the troops that all the problem analysis and planned responses were only administrative exercises until the plans were actually implemented by the deputies. I cannot be prouder of the response of the entire agency to reduce these epidemic levels of violent crime, making the community safer.

This was truly a problem that affected the entire community and it took the combined efforts of the entire agency being focused and committed to a long term solution to achieve the outstanding results of the Violent Crime Initiative.

Thank you for your consideration of this submission and recognition of the excellence in policing by the men and women of the Orange County Sheriff's Office.

Sincerely,

Kevin Beary
Sheriff of Orange County