Countering an Influx of Gun Violence
A Comprehensive, Collaborative & Effective Approach

Worcester Police Department, 2007

Abstract

In 2004 the number of shootings in Worcester, Massachusetts reached a high that had only been seen once before in the City’s history. This problem surfaced at a time when the overall integrity of the Worcester Police Department (WPD) was facing unyielding criticism. News of these shooting incidents proliferated throughout the headlines of local papers and the public severely doubted local law enforcement’s ability to effectively counter the rise in gun violence. Notwithstanding these challenging adversities, the WPD responded to the problem head on, refusing to accept anything but success as an acceptable outcome in its endeavor to reduce the influx of gun violence.

To this end, under the command of a new Chief, several strategic leadership appointments were made and concomitantly a new emphasis was placed upon crime analysis and intelligence-led policing. At the time there was a dearth of empirical data to support anecdotal evidence suggesting that shootings were on the rise or with which to gain a better understanding of the nature of the problem. This served as the impetus for the WPD’s Crime Analysis Unit to design and manage a database for the principal purposes of tracking and analyzing shooting incidents. Resulting analyses confirmed an alarming escalatory trend in shooting incidents and produced a preliminary understanding of the nature of the problem.

Now armed with hard evidence that shootings were steadily increasing, the WPD implemented a two-fold response oriented toward the objectives of preventing street violence and enlisting the cooperation and support of the community. This ongoing response includes the following components, which are guided by the principals of the split-force model of policing and sixteen measurable goals that have been established by the WPD as a measuring rod for its success:

- **The Street Violence Prevention Group (SVPG)**- fully utilizes the collective efforts of local, state, and federal agencies working collaboratively to remove our most violent or repetitively violent offenders from the streets

- **Project ASAP (community Awareness, community Support, community Assistance, and community Partners)**- cultivates a positive relationship between the community and law enforcement by maintaining open communication between the same

By means of these two initiatives and the multifaceted innovative strategies that are contained therein, the WPD was able to effectuate a significant reduction in serious gun-related assaults. More specifically, the number of shootings in the City of Worcester was reduced by 50% from 36 shootings in 2005 to just 18 such incidents in 2006.
Scanning

*An Overview*

The Worcester Police Department (WPD) operates under a unique set of challenging circumstances with respect to law enforcement and continuous efforts to curb criminal activity. Worcester is the second largest city in the state of Massachusetts and the second largest city in all of New England; within 37.6 square miles lives a diverse population of 175,000 people as well as an unknown number of non-residents who regularly travel into the city for work and recreation. Worcester is also the home of nine colleges and universities, which collectively accommodate a population of approximately 27,000 students. With such a sizeable and diverse population that is largely transient in nature and operating within a relatively small geographic area, the environment is ripe for criminal activity.

*The Nature of the Problem*

In the early-to-mid 2000’s, WPD administrators and personnel began to notice that the number of shootings in Worcester appeared to be steadily increasing. Anecdotal evidence indicated what an in-depth analysis of the problem would later confirm; shooting incidents were in fact on the rise and the majority were perpetrated by youthful offenders with arrest records and connections to local gangs. It was also clear to the detectives involved in these cases that many, if not most, of the shooting “victims” also had violent criminal records and were uncooperative with law enforcement in its efforts to gather evidence and investigate these crimes, in some cases providing false information to derail the investigation.

*Identifying the Problem*

The steadily increasing number of shooting incidents was for the most part self-evident. Shootings (fatal and non-fatal alike) constitute such a small quantitative portion of Worcester’s overall crime problem when compared to other types of crime, that even subtle changes in its prevalence are unlikely to go unnoticed. In addition, the rise in recent shootings was also gaining increased media attention. Headlines about shooting incidents and the public’s lack of faith in law enforcement to successfully thwart gun violence proliferated throughout local newspapers *(See Figure 1.1)*. The enormous amount of media attention given to these incidents and to the public’s disdain for the ineffective policing strategies that were in place to respond to them served to underscore the need for a proper analysis of the problem in order to identify and more appropriately respond to its underlying causes.

*Why Shootings were Selected from Among Other Crime Problems*

The Worcester Police Department’s fight against gun violence is driven by its commitment to protecting the public and upholding the interests of public safety. Serving three primary functions, the WPD gives first priority to responding to emergency calls-for-service, and considers its other two primary functions to be dealing with violent crime and addressing quality of life issues. Though gun violence constitutes a quantitatively small portion of Worcester’s overall crime problem, it contributes disproportionately to the detrimental effects of crime on the community’s overall quality of life. The aforementioned reasons justify the WPD’s decision to do something about gun violence because they implicitly demand it.
Figure 1.1: Media Headlines

**Telegram & Gazette Headlines**

*Community Leaders Oppose Police Plan*...(June 23, 2004)

*Man shot outside Main Street Bar*...(July 3, 2004)

*Hector A. Rivera, 22, shot dead*...(July 18, 2004)

*Man shot dead on street*...(July 19, 2004)

*Shootings lead to call for greater police presence* (July 20, 2004)

*Driver, 80, shot in head*...(August 7, 2004)

*Slaying makes 8th in City*...(August 11, 2004)

*Shots fired*...(August 16, 2004)

*Action sought to stem rising violence* (August 18, 2004)

*Shots fired before crash*...(August 19, 2004)

*24-year-old in parked Volvo shot dead*...(August 20, 2004)

*Needed: dysfunction reduction*...headquarters is so unstable that its upper echelon was dubbed “dysfunction junction” by the mayor...(September 19, 2004)

*Forum cites ideas to curb violence*...(September 20, 2004)

*20-year-old found shot dead in back*...(September 23, 2004)

*Chief’s leaving sparks doubts*...(October 7, 2004)
Analysis

Extent & Nature of the Problem

In 2004 a new Chief took command and gave new primacy to crime analysis and intelligence-led policing as tools for guiding the operations of the WPD. The WPD’s Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) was charged with furthering the Department’s understanding of the extent and nature of the problem through a careful analysis of Worcester’s shooting incidents. To this end, analysts created a database of shooting incidents for tracking and analysis purposes, which had not been possible in the past due to the limited querying capabilities of the Department’s records management system. This shooting database dates back to calendar-year 2000 and includes detailed incident, offender, and victim information. Later in 2006, an academic researcher expanded on the CAU’s preliminary work through the Department of Justice-funded Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN). Some of the findings from that study are included here.

The CAU discovered that while the overall level of assaultive gun violence in the City fluctuated and had even slightly decreased in recent years (See Figure 2.1), the number of shooting incidents had steadily increased (See Figure 2.2). In fact, the number of annual shootings rose by 80% (or by 16 incidents) from 2000 to 2005. Thus, while the overall level of gun violence in Worcester varied widely, shootings followed a more steady and predictable trend.

Shooting totals from 2004 and 2005 reveal the following:

- Most shootings were intra-racial: 19 of the 28 known Black or Hispanic offenders (69%) shot a Black or Hispanic victim
- 46 of the 70 shootings (or 66%) are unsolved
- 43 of the 46 unsolved cases (or 93%) involve uncooperative victims

Figure 2.1: All Assaults w/ Firearms (2000 – 2005)

Figure 2.2: Shooting Incidents (2000 – 2005)

History

Although the steadily increasing number of shooting incidents gave rise to renewed concern over the problem, shootings were not a new phenomenon in Worcester.

According to the PSN Study:

- Nearly 58% of the homicides between 1996 and 2005 were committed with firearms (41 of 71 homicides)
- During that time Worcester averaged about 4 gun homicides per year
The years with the highest homicide counts, 1999 and 2004, were characterized by higher numbers of gun homicides – 7 and 8 respectively.

Of the 7 homicides in 2005, 5 were committed with a firearm.

**Offenders, Victims, & Motives**

A careful examination of shooting victims and offenders revealed that the characteristics of these two groups are virtually indistinguishable (See Appendix A). Using shooting data from 2005 to mid-July of 2006, the PSN study discovered the following:

- The majority of victims and offenders were:
  - Male
  - Non-Caucasian
  - Under the age of 30

- The mean victim and offender ages were 26.1 and 26.0 respectively

- Almost 76% of the victims and 96% of the offenders had at least one prior arraignment on their criminal record

- The majority of victims and offenders had at least one prior armed violent crime

**Offenders – A Look beyond Demographics**

- Of the 27 offenders who had prior involvement with the criminal justice system almost 41% were under active probation supervision at the time of the shooting incident

- Nearly 85% had been on probation, 74% had been committed to an adult and/or juvenile correctional facility, and 44% were convicted felons before their shooting offense (See Figure 2.3).

**Victims – A Look beyond Demographics**

- The criminal histories of the 27 known offenders were characterized by a wide variety of offenses including:
  - Armed violent crimes
  - Unarmed violent crimes
  - Property crimes
  - Drug crimes
  - Nonviolent firearm crimes (such as illegal gun possession)
  - Disorder offenses

- Shooting offenders had slightly lengthier arraignment records prior to the shooting incident when compared to victims - 14.3 and 13.1 arraignments respectively

Examining data from 2004 and 2005 shooting incidents, the CAU further determined that of the 33 known shooting offenders from this two-year time period, the majority (64%) were gang members, 85% had arrest records, and 42% had violent arrest records.

- Of the 37 victims who had prior involvement with the criminal justice system, slightly more than 43% were under active probation supervision at the time of the shooting incident (See Figure 2.3).
• About 81% had been on probation, 70% had been committed to an adult and/or juvenile correctional facility, and 41% were convicted felons before their shooting victimization.

In addition, the CAU examined shooting data from 2004 and 2005 and found that of the 70 non-fatal shooting victims from this time period, 35% were gang members, 69% had arrest records, and 50% had violent arrest records.

Previous Response

Historically the WPD’s response to shootings was characteristically uncoordinated and inefficient. Each of the Department’s investigative units operated independently, was unaware of the particulars of the others’ investigations, and rarely shared information with the other units’ investigators. This lack of intra-department communication impeded investigations considerably. Perhaps more important, it was only a small representation of a much larger inter-agency communication problem. These obstacles have since been successfully surmounted and are covered in further detail under Response (more).

Precipitating Events

The PSN study researched the events that precipitated Worcester’s shooting incidents. It found that 37% of non-fatal shootings between 2004 and mid-July of 2006 involved gang-related motives (See Table 2.1):

• Ongoing conflicts between rival gangs accounted for 26.8% of shootings
• Personal disputes with gang-related overtones accounted for 5.6% of non-fatal shootings

• Gang-involved drug business disputes accounted for an additional 4.2% of non-fatal shootings

Table 2.1: Motives of Worcester Non-fatal Shootings, 2004 - 2006 (mid July)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gang – related</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang – ongoing conflict</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang – personal</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang – drug</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Dispute</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug – related</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic / Family violence</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Situational Factors: When & Where

The CAU conducted various analyses using shooting data from 2000 to 2005 to more closely examine the situational factors surrounding shooting incidents. These included temporal analyses with respect to time of day, day of the week, and month of the year, and geographic analysis by mapping known gang territory with an overlay of shooting incidents to determine a correlation, if any. In addition, the PSN study incorporated a focus group component to identify active gangs in Worcester and determine their respective levels of involvement in shooting incidents.

Time

Temporal analyses indicated that a disproportionate number of shooting incidents occurred between 0200 hours and 0300 hours (See Figure 2.4). Furthermore, more shooting incidents took place on Saturday and Sunday than on any other day of the week (See Figure 2.5). These data suggested that many of our shootings
coincided with the closing hours of bars and clubs during the weekends. Analysis of shooting incidents by month also revealed that shooting incidents followed a somewhat seasonal pattern with marked peaks in the months of August, September, and January (See Figure 2.6).

In addition, mapping was used to overlay known gang territory with shooting incidents to determine an association. This revealed that there are identifiable locations within Worcester where gun violence is most prevalent and that these hot spots do in fact correlate with known gang territory in the City (See Figure 2.7).

The PSN study found the following:

- There were 8 gun violence hot spot areas located in and around gang turf in Worcester
- These hot spots locations represented only 1.8% of the city’s landscape but generated 26.5% of the shooting incidents and 46.4% of the “shots fired” calls for service

Of particular interest to the WPD was a housing project named Great Brook Valley (commonly referred to as GBV), which is occupied by two rival gangs, the GBV Outlaws and Mira Mira. In 2005, there were twelve “shots fired” calls-for-service and two shooting victims in this area alone (See Figure 2.8).

Gang Involvement

The PSN study’s focus group, consisting of officers from the WPD’s Gang Unit, established a comprehensive list of active gangs in Worcester. Because gang-related motives accounted for such a significant portion of Worcester’s gun violence
problem, each gang’s level of participation in Worcester’s shooting incidents was evaluated.

Figure 2.8: GBV Housing Project, Shots Fired Calls and Shooting Victims, 2005.

The focus group identified 28 active gangs in Worcester with a cumulative membership ranging between an estimated 740 and 911 members (See Appendix B). Several gangs were identified as having high levels of involvement in shooting incidents including the GBV Outlaws, Kilby / MKP, and the Notorious / Untouchable Vice Lords (See Figure 2.9). Between 2004 and mid-July of 2006 these gangs were responsible for 10, 9, and 7 shooting incidents respectively.

Figure 2.9: Top Worcester Gangs Involved in Shootings, 2004 – 2006 (mid July)

Summary

In sum, analyses conducted by the WPD’s Crime Analysis Unit in conjunction with findings from the PSN study presented a clearer understanding of the extent and nature of shooting incidents in Worcester. They revealed that shooting incidents were steadily rising, highly concentrated in a few hot spot locations, and perpetrated by a small number of young, active offenders with gang-related motives. These findings guided ensuing prevention strategies to target the specific nature of the problem.

Response: Organizational Changes & Response Programs

The WPD first made several major changes to its internal organization as they would prove critical to the success of the response programs that were to follow.

Major Organizational Changes

Integrating the various investigative units of the WPD and establishing a well-embraced open forum for communication and information sharing were paramount to succeeding in the central objective of effectuating significant reductions in shooting incidents. Given the common proclivity of police departments to steadfastly resist such changes, this transition presented a monumental challenge.

Formerly, the WPD was structured hierarchically with commanders in the upper strata whose primary focus was on administration. The Department’s specialized investigative units were function-specific and operated independently of each other. The unforeseen corollaries of this organizational scheme were impeded cooperation, a stifled creative problem-solving process, and discouragement of the type of open communication and information sharing that are necessary for thorough investigations.

Because of these shortfalls the Chief introduced the revolutionary split-force model and established sixteen measurable
goals to unify the objectives of the Department’s various units (See Appendix C). The split-force model espouses the fundamental tenets of problem-oriented policing as it “splits” the police force into two complementary Divisions:

- A **Community Impact Division** responsible for developing and executing problem-solving strategies and projects
- An **Operations Division** responsible for the continued efficient response to calls-for-service (emergency and non-emergency).

The split-force model fundamentally “transformed” traditional reactive police work to incorporate proactive problem-solving strategies with specific focuses on crime, fear of crime, and quality of life issues.

In addition, a **Captains’ Roundtable** was formed to facilitate information sharing. The Captains’ Roundtable is a weekly meeting attended by the Chief of Police, Deputy Chiefs, Captains, and Crime Analysts in a collegial atmosphere for the purposes of discussing trends and patterns in crime, sharing information on these crimes, and discussing innovative solutions. During the interim, each of the Department’s units can post and share important information via an electronic journal which is accessible to each unit in the Department.

**Response Programs:**

**SVPG and Project ASAP**

**Street Violence Prevention Group**

With the underpinnings of the WPD’s internal structure now in place, the Department invited executive leaders from outside criminal justice agencies to participate in its Street Violence Prevention Group (SVPG). The SVPG was conceptualized in 2005 and fully implemented by November of that year as a model to control, investigate, prevent, and deter violent crime in Worcester. This group meets on the first Tuesday of every month at WPD Headquarters. The SVPG not only coordinates the investigatory efforts of the WPD’s Detective Bureau, Gang, Vice, and Anti-Crime Units allowing for an integrated multidivisonal response, but also serves as the primary catalyzing force behind the cohesive partnerships that have been formed between the WPD and outside criminal justice agencies at all levels of government. These agencies include:

- Several neighboring municipal police departments
- The Worcester County District Attorney’s Office
- Massachusetts State Police
- The Sheriff’s Department
- Massachusetts Department of Probation
- Massachusetts Department of Parole
- U.S. Attorney’s Office
- U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement Agency
- U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
- U.S. Marshals Service
- U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
- U.S. Postal Inspectors Office
- Federal Bureau of Investigation

The SVPG applies these agencies’ collective resources to remove Worcester’s most violent or repetitively violent offenders from the streets, including uncooperative “victims” whose contributions to the crime problem are, in most cases, tantamount to their offender counterpart’s. The SVPG relies on data to support its decisions regarding which offenders to focus on. It also uses data to hold the owners of problem bars accountable via the threat of license suspension or revocation for criminal activities that take place in or on bar property including:

- Drug sales
• Illegal Carrying
• Unlawful gang activity

In an effort to surmount the strictly adhered to “don’t snitch” maxim, the SVPG distributes business cards and posts signs in jail cells advertising the potential benefits of assuming an informant role.

ASAP

An integral component of the WPD’s street violence prevention strategy is to maintain open and honest communication with the community so that we can collaboratively focus on the complex issues involved with violent crime. Project ASAP (Community Awareness, Community Support, Community Assistance, and Community Partners) is committed to the following goals:

• Promote community Awareness by informing community members that most of the gun violence problem is concentrated among a small number of young, violent offenders, and that the WPD is focusing its activities on high risk violent offenders
• Gain community Support by demonstrating that efforts to address gun violence are justified; the WPD recognizes that the community will not support indiscriminate, highly aggressive crackdowns that needlessly sweep non-violent youths into the criminal justice system
• Enlist the Assistance of the community in a zero-tolerance campaign against violence and the illegal use of guns
• Develop Partnerships within the community to connect violent offenders with alternatives to violent offending that are beyond the scope of services the WPD is able to provide (See Appendix D)

Assessment

As with any social science (or soft science) there are inherent challenges involved in assessing the effectiveness of a criminal justice response. Evaluating the effectiveness of the WPD’s response to shooting incidents is no exception.

A Marked Decline

While it is impossible to ascertain exactly how many shooting incidents have not occurred as a direct result of the WPD’s efforts to address this problem, there exists clear evidence in support of a direct correlation between the WPD’s response to shootings and an abrupt decline in shooting incidents that prior to the WPD’s response had been following an uninterrupted escalatory trend (See Figure 4.1). In fact, by the end of calendar year 2006 the number of shootings in Worcester was reduced by 18 incidents (or 50%) from 36 incidents the previous year.

Figure 4.1: Shooting Incidents (2000 – 2006)

SVPG Accomplishments

Since its inception, the SVPG has accomplished the following achievements:

• 6 uncooperative victims have been arrested by members of the SVPG on charges including:
  o Distribution of Cocaine
  o Possession of Class B
• Possession of firearm/ammo without an FID Card
  • 4 shooters have been identified and captured after renewed victim cooperation stemming from an arrest
• 21 problem bars have had their licenses suspended and 8 licenses have been revoked

There is also evidence that the SVPG has made strides toward circumventing the “don’t snitch” mentality that is pervasive amongst our shooting victim population. From January 1st 2007 to-date, the SVPG has achieved a 46% cooperation rate with shooting victims. During the same time frame in 2006 the cooperation rate of victims was only 30%. Thus, the business cards and jail cell stickers that solicit informants appears to have bolstered cooperation despite the fact that no implicit or explicit promises are made to victims or offenders regarding the disposition(s) of their pending charge(s).

**ASAP Accomplishments**

The WPD has involved the community in its response to shooting incidents and consulted with the community every step of the way throughout this initiative. By doing so, the WPD was able to successfully avoid many of the problems encountered by other law enforcement agencies that do not involve their communities or get their community’s input on a problem. Although there is no way to quantify Project ASAP’s success, it has certainly realized its core goals of promoting community awareness, gaining community support, enlisting the assistance of the community, and building partnerships within the community.

**Ancillary Benefits**

There are many ancillary benefits to the WPD’s response that are neither quantifiable nor tangible in nature. Although it cannot be measured, the improvement of the community’s overall quality of life that has resulted from the reduction in serious gun violence is immense, and serves to further two of the Worcester Police Department’s three supreme functions. The major organizational changes that were successfully implemented by the Chief of Police have essentially broken down the metaphorical silos that previously characterized the Department’s investigative units and inhibited vital communication and information sharing. In addition, because the WPD has successfully integrated its investigatory units, coordinated their responses to shooting incidents, and placed such a strong emphasis on crime analysis and intelligence-led policing, it has been able to discern patterns of crime and disorder, develop directed strategies and tactics, and positively impact all types of crime in the City thereby improving its residents’ general quality of life.

**Putting it Into Perspective**

Despite the identification of shooting incidents as a serious problem warranting an intensified focus, Worcester has historically been, and remains, one of the safest cities in the State of Massachusetts. From 2004 to 2005 when most major Massachusetts cities were experiencing an increase in the number of aggravated assaults with firearms, the number of aggravated assaults with firearms in Worcester decreased (See Appendix E). Worcester also had one of the lowest gun assault rates per 100,000 residents in major Massachusetts cities in 2005 (See Appendix E). Therefore, although Worcester’s number of shooting victims increased over the first half of the 21st century, Worcester remains one of the safest cities in Massachusetts in terms of gun assault rates.
Agency and Officer Information

Q. At what level of the police organization was this problem solving initiative adopted (e.g., the entire department, a few select officers, etc.)?
A. This problem solving initiative was adopted at all levels/department-wide.

Q. Did officers or management receive any training in problem solving oriented policing and/or problem solving before this project began or during its execution?
A. Yes. The command staff has received advanced POP training and all sworn personnel have received on site training by POP staff.

Q. Were additional incentives given to police officers who engaged in problem solving?
A. Additional incentives included financial opportunities for officers who showed initiative via grant OT, and career advancement for involvement in leadership and church-related mentoring.

Q. What resources and guidelines (manuals, past problem-solving examples, etc.) were used, if any, by police officers to help them manage this problem-solving initiative?
A. We have relied on POP Manuals and best practices. We have used other successful programs as benchmarks; Project Ceasefire in Boston and the Twelve Points Program were modeled. We hired Dr. Braga and utilized the services of Project Safe Neighborhood’s funding.

Q. What issues/problems were identified with the problem oriented policing model or the problem solving model?
A. Identified problems include adequate funding to sustain the POP model and tailoring current successful programs to Worcester’s unique urban climate.

Q. What general resources (financial and/or personnel) were committed to this project, and of those resources, what went beyond the existing department budget?
A. Beyond the WPD’s existing department budget, grant funding was used to support this project.

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Appendices

Appendix A

During the analysis stage, a careful examination of shooting victims and offenders revealed that the characteristics of these two groups are virtually indistinguishable. The table below compares victims and offenders along the dimensions of demographics and prior involvement in the criminal justice system.

Characteristics of Worcester Shooting Victims and Offenders in 2005 and 2006 (through mid-July)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Known Suspects</th>
<th>Victims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>96.4%</td>
<td>95.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Caucasian</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>79.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 30 or younger</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>81.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known to CJ System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>96.4%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean prior arraignments</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one prior armed violent crime</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one prior unarmed violent crime</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one prior drug crime</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
<td>75.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one prior property crime</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one prior disorder offense</td>
<td>88.9%</td>
<td>91.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one non-violent gun crime</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: PSN Study - 2006)
The PSN study’s focus group identified 28 active gangs in Worcester with a cumulative membership ranging between an estimated 740 and 911 members. The matrix below illustrates the conflicts and alliances among them.

(Source: PSN Study - 2006)
Appendix C

The Worcester Police Department uses sixteen goals to measure its performance. The community and the Worcester Police Department worked together to develop these objectives. The accomplishment of these goals directly influences the overall quality of life in the community.

The Worcester Police Department’s 16 Measurable Goals:

1. The Reduction of Fear in Neighborhoods
2. Provide Better Services to the Community
3. Prevention of Crime through Proactive Prevention Strategies
4. Quality of Life Improvement
5. Guns Off the Streets and other Issues Associated with Guns
6. Law Enforcement Partnerships: Municipal, State, County, and Federal
7. Curbing Youth and Gang Violence
8. Driving Drug Dealers out of the City of Worcester
9. Strategies to Break the Cycle of Domestic Violence
10. Build and Enhance Community Partnerships
11. Reduction of Auto Related Thefts/Crimes
12. Promoting Diversity – Recruitment, Hiring, and Advancement
13. Reclaiming the Roads of Worcester
14. Heightened Courtesy, Professionalism, Respect, and Integrity
15. Bringing Fugitives to Justice
16. Use of Public Funds and the Budget

Appendix D

Project ASAP is committed to violence prevention and intervention thru community partnerships. Violent offenders are classified in one of three possible risk groups. Based on their level of risk, violent offenders have opportunities to participate in the various intervention programs that have been made available by the partnerships that the WPD has formulated with agencies throughout the City.

Risk Levels:

- High-risk individuals – High potential for violence
- Moderate-risk individuals – Potential for violence & intervention
- Low-risk individuals – Strong parental and familial influence

Moderate/Low-Risk Police Partnerships:

- Gang Unit PAL & Mentoring Programs
- Clergy Police Mentoring Program
- Surviving High School Program
- Gang Awareness for the Next Generation (Camp)
- Boys and Girls Club Diversion
Public School Police Partnership & Mediation
Gang Resistance Talks
DA and Police Mock Trials
Community Policing Youth Summer Initiative

High-Risk Police Partnerships:

- The current law enforcement focus is arrest and prosecution
- Potential Prevention Strategies include:
  - Police Parole Partnership Home Visits
  - Clergy Police Outreach Home Visits
  - Community Response Agenda

Appendix E

From calendar year 2004 to calendar year 2005 Worcester was one of just a few Massachusetts cities to experience a decline in the number aggravated assaults with firearms.

### Aggravated Assaults with Firearms, 2004 - 2005

Source: Massachusetts State Police

- Worcester: -2.0%
- Boston: +34.8%
- Brockton: +14.3%
- Fall River: +7.2%
- Lowell: +35.0%
- Lawrence: +41.7%
- Lynn: +40.4%
- New Bedford: +16.3%
- Springfield: +5.2%

(Source: PSN Study – 2006)
Appendix F

Worcester had one of the lowest gun assault rates per 100,000 residents in major Massachusetts cities in 2005.

(Source: Massachusetts State Police)