July 1, 2005

To Members of the Herman Goldstein Award Selection Committee:

I am pleased to submit the Belmont Neighborhood Violence Reduction Project for consideration for the Herman Goldstein Award.

This project highlights a straightforward and successful problem solving project that was implemented in Charlotte’s Belmont neighborhood which has been plagued by decades of street drug sales, violent crime, and the social and quality of life issues that are characteristic of many older urban neighborhoods.

This project began with a simple perception on the part of police officers and community leaders that many victims and perpetrators of crime in Belmont were not from the neighborhood and were involved in the drug trade. The officers wanted to test their hypothesis that installing barricades in the northeast corner of the neighborhood, where the problems were most significant, would disrupt the operation of the drug markets and reduce the associated crime and violence. Five years of data indicates that the hypothesis was correct and the barricades made a significant difference in crime and quality of life in the Belmont community.

This project illustrates the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department’s willingness to partner with neighborhoods in finding mutually acceptable solutions to their concerns. It also demonstrates the extensive use of data to assess the quality of the results of our problem solving efforts.

I hope that you will give this project every consideration for the Goldstein Award.

Sincerely,

Darrel W. Stephens
Chief of Police
Belmont Neighborhood Violence Reduction Project
Executive Summary

The Belmont Neighborhood Violence Reduction Project was an effort to reduce the violence associated with drug markets in the northeast section of the Belmont neighborhood in Charlotte, North Carolina.

Scanning
The Belmont neighborhood, in the heart of Charlotte’s inner city, experienced an increase in violence in 1999. Neighborhood residents contended that the many of the people involved in drugs and the associated violent activity did not live in the Belmont neighborhood. A preliminary review of offense reports showed that many of the victims of violent crime did not live there but were traveling through the neighborhood to purchase drugs.

Analysis
Officers identified all known drug sales markets in the Belmont neighborhood and had them geocoded by crime analysts. Analysts then mapped the addresses of offenders arrested for drug activity in Belmont and found that over 80% of the drug arrests in the northeast corner of Belmont were of individuals who did not live in Belmont. Officers assumed that this was due, in large part, to the distinct travel routes through the neighborhood which facilitated drug activity.

Response
Officers suggested the installation of traffic barriers on two Belmont streets, Umstead and Parson, at their intersection with Kennon Street. The barricades would be strategically located in the northeast corner of the neighborhood, an area associated with its greatest density of crime and drug arrests over an extended period of time. Officers felt that disrupting the easy access to the drug markets would reduce the number of people coming into the area specifically to buy drugs, consequently, reducing the associated violence. Officers partnered with the City Department of
Transportation to install the barricades and worked extensively with neighborhood residents to gain acceptance for the barricades to be installed for a trial period.

**Assessment**

An analysis of five years of pre/post data shows that violent crime in the study area decreased by 46%; overall arrests decreased by 51.8% and arrests for violence decreased 57%. The data demonstrates that the environmental change associated with the barricades was the variable responsible for the decrease in violent crime and overall crime. The 48% decrease in violence victims living outside of the Belmont neighborhood and the reduction in drug arrests for individuals living outside the neighborhood suggests that the barricades achieved the desired effect of closing drug markets by disrupting the external traffic flow through the area.
Belmont Neighborhood Violence Reduction Project

Scanning
Community Profile
At the time the project was initiated in early July 1999, Belmont was an inner-city neighborhood comprised of over 860 single family and multi-family housing units, 60 percent of which were low-income rental and Section 8 housing. Habitat for Humanity housing comprised 24 percent of all housing in the neighborhood.

Neighborhood stability dimensions are periodically calculated city-wide, in a study titled “Charlotte Neighborhood Quality of Life Study,” which evaluates Charlotte’s neighborhoods based on social, crime, economic and physical conditions. According to the study conducted in 1999 and released in 2000, Belmont’s median annual household income was $12,503, compared to a city median income of $41,385. Juvenile crime, which indicates all crime where a child under the age of sixteen was suspected of or arrested for a criminal offense, was 310 percent of the city average. Violent crime was 470 percent of the city average. The neighborhood high school drop out rate was nearly twice the City average. Finally, alcohol and drug dependency, as well as domestic violence were and remain substantial problems in the neighborhood.

Being an older inner-city neighborhood, the street network follows a grid design and the adjacent corridor network provided ready access to it through twelve entrance points very near and accessible from/to Interstates 77, 85 and 277, as well as through various bus routes.

Belmont is a neighborhood that for decades has been among the most downtrodden and violent in Charlotte. At several junctures in the course of its troubled history, City and neighborhood leaders have unsuccessfully attempted to stabilize the community. Crime and violence, among a number of other persistent problems, continued to frustrate these attempts. The predominant police response continued to include enforcement and arrest. At the time this project began, the only ongoing initiative was a
Neighborhood Action Plan which was stalled as a result of disagreements between neighborhood leaders and City agencies.

**Area Violence**
The Belmont Neighborhood Violence Reduction Project was a response to a series of homicides and serious assaults, with firearms being the weapon of choice. These assaults appeared to be growing in frequency in the spring and early summer, 1999. Neighborhood leaders and residents continually asserted that the people involved in drug activity and violence did not live in Belmont and wanted police to somehow remove them from the neighborhood to reduce crimes associated with drugs and violence. Given the history of drugs and violence in this neighborhood, police were skeptical of this conclusion, but did suspect some linkage in drugs and violence among people who lived outside of the neighborhood, particularly in its northeast corner.

North Tryon Division staff conducted a preliminary and limited review of police offense reports for the offenses in this area, which revealed that the majority of victims of these violent crimes generally did not live in or near the Belmont neighborhood, but were traveling through it. In some cases, it was clear that their intent was to buy drugs; in others, it was suspected. Further, these assaults seemed concentrated mainly in northeast Belmont, on Umstead, Parson and Kennon Streets. The analysis of this problem supported our initial perception that violence was most often drug related and directed at victims who did not live or work in the community, but were traveling through it to purchase drugs. Discussions with officers experienced with area problems also supported this preliminary analysis.

**Analysis**
North Tryon Division staff enlisted the aid of the CMPD Research, Planning and Analysis Division to help better understand the violence dimensions in this northeast corner of Belmont. To begin, officers identified all known drug sales markets in the Belmont neighborhood. Those locations were provided to the crime analyst to geocode for mapping association purposes. This northeast corner of Belmont shared a particularly heavy portion of the known drug markets identified in the neighborhood.

Data analysis then centered on individuals arrested for any drug related offense in this area of Belmont. Once the arrest data were isolated, we mapped offender addresses, which consisted of known addresses
at the time of arrest. The analysis of drug arrest data was limited to drug offense UCR codes, and could not be aggregated more granularly by offense type. If that were possible, it would have been possible to distinguish between buyers and sellers, which would have strengthened the analysis overall.

The analysis revealed that over 80 percent of all drug offense arrests in northeast Belmont, including buyers and sellers, were of people who did not live in the Belmont neighborhood. Further, over 65 percent had home addresses residing more than a mile away. While most of those arrested were from other areas of Mecklenburg County, several were from other North Carolina counties and even York County, South Carolina. This analysis supported our assumption that the community was a known and popular drug market because of its proximity to several major roadways and Interstates. The analysis supported perceptions that distinct travel routes existed through the community for drug trafficking. Two of the most prominent routes, supported by officer opinion and confirmed by crime analysis, were on Umstead and Parson Streets.

**Response**

**Hypothesis**

North Tryon Division staff suggested the installation of traffic barriers on Umstead and Parson Streets, at their intersection with Kennon Street. The hypothesis was that installation of the traffic barriers would prevent easy access to, and escape from, the community's drug sale areas, and would create sufficient insecurity or fear among drug buyers to reduce their overall frequency of visits - and by extension, reduce victimization and related violence. The traffic barriers would then be a means of achieving the goal of reducing violent crime in the study area.

**Planning and Partners**

North Tryon Division staff met with City Department of Transportation (CDOT) staff and neighborhood leaders about installing the barriers. CDOT determined that such a change would require Charlotte City Council approval of the road closures, but agreed to support and fund the installation of the barriers. CMPD confirmed support from the Charlotte Fire Department, Medic and the City Sanitation Department, all important service providers who would be affected by the change.
Neighborhood leaders were initially cautious in their support of the project. However, many residents directly affected by the street closures objected to the project. In the opinion of many, the installation of the barriers, which they insisted we call “barricades,” created driving route inconveniences they would rather not face.

Neighborhood leaders and North Tryon Division staff went door to door and discussed the project at length with residents in this area, and explained that, if the barriers were not successful, they would be removed. We assured them of periodic reviews of crime data to ensure that they were successful or removed, with the initial intervals set at six months and one year.

Neighborhood leadership also clearly conveyed that they wanted the barriers to be temporary – that they would be removed at some future date when housing, home ownership and other physical and social dimensions improved in that particular area of the neighborhood. Together, North Tryon Division officers and neighborhood leaders earned the trust and support needed among residents to ensure approval by City Council.

In mid August 1999, solid-concrete highway barricades were installed on Umstead and Parson Streets, at their respective intersections with Kennon Street. Umstead and Parson Streets effectively became dead end streets that opened only to Parkwood Avenue (no longer flowing through to Kennon Street as they had previously). The barricades were upgraded the following year to improve their appearance by replacing them with a post a chain barricade design surrounded by an azalea garden. Plants were donated by Home Depot and the gardens were maintained with the help of the county sheriff’s prisoner brigade, residents and police officers.

Other intervention strategies, including preventive patrol, code enforcement, street drug interdiction, were not applied any differently in the study area of the community than in other areas of Belmont for at least the first fifteen months after installation (see Task Force for more information). In essence, we had created a fairly sound test environment to analyze the impact of the environmental change - the introduction of barricades - upon victim and suspect behaviors.
**Task Force**
In November 2000 through February 2001, after over two months of intensive planning, the CMPD initiated a task force enforcement effort called the Belmont Concentrated Community Enforcement Plan (BCCEP). This plan coordinated staff resources of Patrol, Street Drug Interdiction Units, Vice and Narcotics, Criminal Intelligence, Alcohol Beverage Commission (ABC) officers, Violent Crimes Task Force (a local, state and federal law enforcement partnership), and state and federal prosecutors. The goal of the plan was to efficiently identify, target and prosecute those persons and locations responsible for drug, firearm and violent criminal activity within the specific geographically defined area of the Belmont, Optimist Park, and Villa Heights Communities. Drug and violence suspects were identified, criminal histories reviewed and summarized, and linkages to other associates were created. The BCCEP group did not focus any additional attention on the barricade area, and the arrest numbers suggest that less attention may have been applied. Overall, the project cost an estimated $400,175 to plan and implement. The BCCEP effort resulted in 176 arrests and 23 search warrants for drug and other offenses.

**Assessment**

**General**
The initial assessments of barricade effectiveness were completed at six months (March 2000) and one year (September 2000), as agreed among the CMPD and Belmont neighborhood leaders (also see Tables 1-7). An assessment each year, through year five, was also completed to determine their lasting impact, as the barricades were removed in October 2004. These analyses sought first to determine the effect of the barricades upon crime overall and, more specifically, violent crime. It was also important to measure the volume of arrests, to determine whether an increase in arrests could be responsible for a decrease in crime or violent crime. Analyses of arrest and violent crime victimization data also helped identify whether those arrested for drug offenses or victimized lived in Belmont or elsewhere, to determine if installation of the barricades effectively disrupted the travel routes and drug markets. There are limitations to an assessment over such a long period of time, as a variety of contributions by police, city and county agencies, other service providers and neighborhood residents can influence overall assessment numbers. However, by isolating and comparing a variety of datasets, the accuracy of the overall assessment is strengthened.
**Overall Assessment**

The overall impact of the barricades, in comparing five years of pre/post data, reveals extensive reductions in all categories evaluated: violent crime, crime in general, arrests and drug arrests, violence to victims who live inside Belmont and elsewhere, and drug arrests of offenders who live inside Belmont and elsewhere. Over five years, violent crime decreased dramatically by 46 percent overall. At the same time, arrests and arrests for violence decreased 51.7 percent and 57 percent, respectively. This clearly demonstrated that the environmental change associated with the barricades—and not arrests—was the variable responsible for the decreases in violent crime and crime overall. Further, the significant reductions in victimization and drug arrests of people who live outside of Belmont also suggest that the barricades achieved the desired effect of closing drug markets by disrupting their normal flow. When considered as a whole, it is clear that the installation of the barricades was an appropriate response to a chronic drug and violence problem in the Belmont community.

**Crime and Violent Crime**

The tables below reveal the percentage changes in crime and violence for the barricade area and the neighborhood as a whole. In the barricade area, the greatest reduction in crime and violence occurred within the first year achieving a 64.2 percent decrease. The larger neighborhood did not duplicate these levels of reduction in crime and violence, with only a 7.3 percent decrease in violence. Overall, crime and violence were reduced 40 percent and 46 percent, respectively, during the five-year comparison in the barricade area. These results suggest that displacement of crime and violence from the barricade area to other areas in the neighborhood was, at most, minimal. It also highlights the enormous impact the installation of the barricades had upon the northeast corner of the neighborhood, and possibly upon violence in the neighborhood as a whole.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barricade Area (In Percentages)</th>
<th>6 Month</th>
<th>1 Year</th>
<th>2 Years</th>
<th>3 Years</th>
<th>4 Years</th>
<th>5 Years</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offenses</td>
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<td>Violent Offenses</td>
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<td>Violence Victim Lives Outside of Belmont</td>
<td>-13.7</td>
<td>-76.6</td>
<td>-63.1</td>
<td>-47.2</td>
<td>-48.6</td>
<td>-48</td>
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Table 1
In comparing the barricade area to the larger Belmont neighborhood, the analysis of violent crime victimization data revealed the barricade area nearly doubled the overall percentage reductions for all victims who lived outside of Belmont. As indicated in Tables 1 and 2, the first year barricade area assessment yielded a decline of nearly 77 percent, while the five-year assessment yielded a decline of 48 percent. At the neighborhood-wide level, the first year data revealed a one-half of one percent increase, while the five-year review yielded a decline of 29 percent. It is also clear that, overall, victimization of those who lived within Belmont declined dramatically in the barricade area and substantially in the larger neighborhood.

The data suggest that perhaps two things occurred: The first thing is that the barricades clearly disrupted the flow of outsiders into the neighborhood, particularly in the barricade area. The second thing is that the barricades frustrated the drug markets to the point that they moved, closed or went indoors, any of which would have an effect upon victimization rates in general, but particularly upon those from outside the neighborhood.

**Arrests**

Arrest data for the barricade area reveals dramatic reductions in all arrests and arrests for violence in every year studied. It strongly suggests that arrests did not influence the reductions in violence in the barricade area and throughout Belmont.

While drug related arrests declined every year in the barricade area, such arrests in Belmont increased in the second year. This anomaly is a result of the CMPD implementing a task force initiative to remove targeted drug dealers from the neighborhood and prosecute them aggressively either locally or federally. The North Tryon Division Street Crimes Unit continued the initiative for approximately eighteen months following the task force. These efforts do not reflect any concentration in the northeast corner of Belmont,
as demonstrated by the consistency among yearly reductions; rather, those efforts focused on other drug markets and suspects in the larger Belmont community.

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>6 Month</th>
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<th>3 Years</th>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>Arrests for Violence</strong></td>
<td>-50</td>
<td>-63.2</td>
<td>-75</td>
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<td>-59.7</td>
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<td><strong>Drug Arrests</strong></td>
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<td>-44.9</td>
<td>-49.7</td>
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### Table 4

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<th>3 Years</th>
<th>4 Years</th>
<th>5 Years</th>
</tr>
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<td><strong>All Arrests</strong></td>
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<td>-17</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-19.1</td>
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<td><strong>Arrests for Violence</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Drug Arrests</strong></td>
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<td>+9.3</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
<td>-23.7</td>
<td>-32.8</td>
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### Drug Offender Arrests

One important part of the assessment is to review the data sets used for the initial analysis, to determine if suspect and victim behavior changed as a result of the barricade installation. The data indicate substantial decreases each year in drug offender arrests, particularly of those who had known home addresses outside of the neighborhood, which suggests the barricades effectively disrupted drug markets, discouraged buyers from purchasing drugs and forced sellers to change locations, move inside or close shop.

The Belmont-wide arrest data with known home addresses indicate that the number of arrested drug offenders who live in the neighborhood and who live outside the one mile radius increased in years two and three. This may suggest some displacement from the barricade area, but there are a number of variables that make any conclusion difficult at best, including other well established neighborhood drug markets, nine other neighborhood access points and the implementation of the task force.
**Belmont Neighborhood** *(In Percentages)*

Assessment Period September 1999 – August 2004

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<tr>
<th>Drug Arrests Only</th>
<th>6 Month</th>
<th>1 Year</th>
<th>2 Years</th>
<th>3 Years</th>
<th>4 Years</th>
<th>5 Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrestee Lives in Belmont</td>
<td>+8.3</td>
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<td>+35.1</td>
<td>+18.4</td>
<td>-13.4</td>
<td>-21.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrestee Lives within 1 Mile</td>
<td>-50</td>
<td>-22.2</td>
<td>-33.3</td>
<td>-39.7</td>
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<td>-52.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrestee Lives Elsewhere</td>
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<td>-29.7</td>
<td>+20.6</td>
<td>+2.8</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-29.7</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 6

**Spatial Analyses**

To assist in visually clarifying the data revealed in each step of the SARA process, please refer to Attachment 1. This series of seven graphics adds a great deal of perspective to the interpretation of all data, including:

1. *Study Area*- The barricade area as defined for all statistical analyses.
2. *Scanning*- An analysis of both violence and drug arrests for the one year period prior to the installation of the barricades.
3. *Analysis*- The analysis of drug offender home addresses with respect to their proximity to the Belmont neighborhood, for the year prior to the installation of the barricades.
4. *Response*- A review of the scanning map, with the inclusion of the barricade location labels.
5. *Assessment*- Analyses of violence and arrests at the following time intervals: six months, two years, and five years. Each graphic compares violence and arrest data and their respective spatial relationships within the barricade area and larger neighborhood.

The assessment graphics clearly indicate that, over the five year study period, the environmental change associated with the introduction of the barricades had a dramatic influence upon the reduction of violence in the barricade area. That cooling trend, along with one other along Belmont Avenue, fuels the majority of violence reductions throughout the neighborhood. For the bulk of the neighborhood, violence and arrests are comparatively flat in the five years prior to and after barricade introduction. Ironically, the graphics also demonstrate elevated violence in areas and periods when police enforcement activities were greatest and arrests were more frequent, particularly in the two-year assessment when the Belmont Task Force was operational.
Lessons Learned

Neighborhood Relationship Dynamics
As mentioned earlier, the barricades were controversial within the neighborhood. At the time they were installed, residents living closest to the barricades objected the most, while community leaders gave cautious support, requesting periodic evaluations of effectiveness. In an ironic turn of events one year later, those living closest to the barricades most supported their continued use, while leaders most objected. The supporters indicated that drug activity in the study area, although not eliminated, was noticeably less prevalent. They were also positively impressed with the reduction in violence. However, opposition among neighborhood leaders resulted from their concern that the City was imposing the barricades as a permanent solution, which they viewed as inadequate. In any event, all involved residents were concerned with barricade appearance, so they were soon replaced with a heavy-grade post and chain design surrounded by a mulched garden.

Additionally, as this project began to demonstrate initial results, Drs. Herman Goldstein and Ron Clarke reviewed the data in a consultation with the CMPD on a broader set of issues for the larger neighborhood. Intrigued by the initial results of this project, and the less dramatic results of several other intensive CMPD initiatives taking place within the larger neighborhood, they supported a strategy of expanding the use of the barricades in strategic locations throughout the neighborhood. There was a belief that five or six additional barricades could substantially reduce violent crime in the neighborhood and help stabilize it while the other aspects of the Neighborhood Action Plan could be stimulated and implemented. Neighborhood leaders who analyzed this data with us rejected this approach, expressing their concern that the neighborhood would become segmented and that navigating through it would be inconvenient. Without neighborhood support, this strategy was ultimately abandoned.

Stability Beyond Crime Reduction
The barricades were installed in August 1999 and removed in October 2004. They were installed as a means of discouraging drug trafficking and related violence. Because this area happened to comprise a large corner of the overall neighborhood, there seemed a logical fit between stabilizing crime and reinvesting in the community to stabilize housing infrastructure and ownership, using this corner as a launching point for efforts to stabilize the larger community. Unfortunately, in the five years subsequent to
the barricade installation, the City was unable to stimulate the requisite investments in infrastructure and ownership to create a revitalization anchor in this area of the neighborhood.

The City has continued to work with the Belmont community to create revitalization plans for the neighborhood. In the spring of 2005, the City was awarded a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development HOPE VI grant. This grant will provide funding for the demolition of a decaying public housing community, located in the southwest corner of the Belmont neighborhood, and replace it with a mixed income community. It appears that this HOPE project will be the first step to create the requisite investment momentum within the larger neighborhood for full revitalization to occur.

**Initial Analysis**
Analysis tends to be a consistently weak link in problem solving. While the initial analysis in this project was adequate to clarify the response and suggest it to be an appropriate course of action, it could have been strengthened by also analyzing victimization data. The review of victim information in offense reports was one of the initial clues to concluding the hypothesis that violence could be reduced by disrupting the traffic flow through the neighborhood, given the intensity and popularity of the drug markets there. Additionally, one could expect that the analysis of drug offender home address data would draw the same conclusion. However, the review of several offense reports is no equivalent to the analysis of data over time, and may not always correlate to the degree anticipated. Fortunately, a review of the victimization data in the project assessment would have suggested entirely the same course of action.

**Costs of Enforcement Versus Cost of Barricades**
The impact of the barricades over the first year is substantial as indicated in Tables 1, 3 and 5. The association between the barricades and the reductions in crime and violence is also very strong, in spite of a significant reduction in overall arrests and those for drug offenses. Although the introduction of a task force initiative complimented efforts to eliminate drug markets and target offenders, its' impact on crime and violence in Belmont overall was less clear or dramatic, as demonstrated in the arrest and crime data in Tables 2, 4 and 6.
The overall cost for barricade installation at both sites was $15,000, with no additional costs over five years. The cost for operating the task force was $400,175 for over two months of intensive planning and four months of operational work. Barricades constituted 3.75 percent of the overall cost of operating the task force, yet yielded 27.5 percent greater reductions in crime and 29.7 percent greater reductions in violent crime in the first two years of the project. Table 7 describes the cost per offense reduction for all offenses and for violent offenses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Offense Category</th>
<th>Offense Reduction</th>
<th>Cost of Tactic</th>
<th>Cost per Offense Reduction</th>
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<td>Task Force</td>
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<td>$13,799</td>
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</table>

Table 7

Table 7 reveals the barricades to be very worthy investments in the reduction of crime and violence in this neighborhood. This cost analysis does not factor the cost savings associated with a reduction in police response to calls for service, crime reporting and follow-up investigations for crimes that were prevented as a result of the barricade installations. Such an analysis would only add weight to the value of this strategy.
Agency and Officer Information

● This problem solving initiative was adopted at the Patrol Division level.

● All Charlotte-Mecklenburg police offices have received training in problem solving. During the life of the project, project personnel met with Herman Goldstein and Ron Clarke who were looking at the barricades as a part of the larger issues in the Belmont community.

● There are no additional incentives for officers who engage in problem solving, other than positive entries in their performance appraisals.

● The project was conceived by North Tryon Division personnel who did not use any outside resources in designing and managing the project.

● There were no issues with the problem solving model.

● Resources for the project included the cost of the barricades, $15,000, which was funded by the Charlotte Department of Transportation. The cost of the personnel associated with the Belmont Task Force was $400,175. These personnel were assigned to the project as a part of their regular duties and were paid their normal salaries from the department’s budget for the duration of the project. There were no resources expended beyond the existing department budget.

● Contact Person:

  Major Ken Miller
  Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department
  West Service Area Center
  4150 Wilkinson Boulevard
  Charlotte, North Carolina
  704-398-6730 (ph)
  704-398-6701 (fax)
  kmiller@cmpd.org
Attachment 1
Barricade Study Area

This graphic illustrates the study area used in calculating all barricade area statistical data. Although the drug market and barricade influences may actually be larger, the defined area provides the most precise analyses of the different variables as these properties are most directly affected by the violence, drug markets and effects of the barricades. These boundaries consist of the tax parcel boundaries for properties on both sides of Umstead, Parson and Kennon Streets, and the south side of Parkwood Avenue between Pegram Street and Hawthorne Lane.
In Charlotte, North Carolina’s Belmont Community, Officer information and collected data indicate the link between drugs and violence to be very strong. The most severely afflicted area was shown to be the northeast corner of Belmont (boxed in yellow), and was selected for further analysis.
Analysis

Analysis revealed that over 80% of those arrested on drug charges in northeast Belmont came from addresses outside of the Belmont neighborhood. Further, over 65% of those arrested came from greater than 1 mile away. Data showed that arrestees came from all over the county and from as far away as neighboring South Carolina to do business in this area.
A response was designed to reduce the level of violence by making the conditions for drug sales less favorable. The response called for barricades to be strategically located to reduce drug traffic by complicating drug customer routes. Umstead and Parson Streets were barricaded where they met Kennon. Kennon itself thus would receive traffic from Pegram and Hawthorne only. Community support for a trial period to study barricade effects allowed the response to proceed with minimal delay.
Six Month Assessment

Violence was dramatically reduced in the barricade area, while at the same time, arrests declined substantially. In the upper left portion of the highlighted area, it appears that some displacement of violence occurred. However, that displacement is substantially less than its prevalence in the barricade area prior to barricade installation.

Barricade Area
Offenses: 80 to 37 (-54%)
Violent Offenses: 37 to 12 (-68%)
Arrests: 110 to 57 (-48%)
Drug Arrests: 39 to 17 (-56%)

Belmont Community
Offenses: 350 to 300 (-14%)
Violent Offenses: 112 to 70 (-38%)
Arrests: 317 to 234 (-26%)
Drug Arrests: 65 to 40 (-39%)
Two Year Assessment

Overall, violence in the neighborhood decreased slightly; however, it increased in the neighborhood center, which may indicate a level of displacement. The change in violence also coincides with increased drug arrests and police presence associated with the Belmont Task Force. Despite this, the declines in both violence and arrests in the barricade area demonstrate the dramatic impact of the environmental change there.

Barricade Area
Offenses: 273 to 178 (-35%)
Violent Offenses: 87 to 54 (-38%)
Arrests: 320 to 180 (-44%)
Drug Arrests: 96 to 62 (-35%)

Belmont Community
Offenses: 1337 to 1239 (-7%)
Violent Offenses: 353 to 324 (-8%)
Arrests: 1031 to 1004 (-8%)
Drug Arrests: 214 to 234 (+9%)
Five Year Assessment

After five years, the barricade area continues to demonstrate consistently significant decreases in violence and arrests. The larger Belmont community also demonstrates substantial decreases in both categories, largely attributable to barricade area and the Belmont Avenue area in the lower left of the map. Violence in the majority of the neighborhood remains flat when comparing five year pre/post data.

Barricade Area

Offenses: 713 to 428 (-40%)
Violent Offenses: 202 to 109 (-46%)
Arrests: 629 to 303 (-52%)
Drug Arrests: 162 to 78 (-52%)

Belmont Community

Offenses: 3767 to 2650 (-30%)
Violent Offenses: 954 to 595 (-38%)
Arrests: 2884 to 1945 (-33%)
Drug Arrests: 586 to 394 (-33%)