National City Police Department

Helping Diversity Come Together
1100 "E" Avenue
Community and Community Leader
Re-Education Project

SUMMARY

SCANNING:
The 1000 to 1300 block of "E" Avenue is a geographically small region of National City. Nevertheless, the region has been plagued for years by a disproportionate concentration of gang activity resulting in an increase of assaults, homicides, narcotics activity, vandalism, and public disturbances. In addition, this area of the city was laden with poorly managed/dilapidated buildings, and abandoned vehicles which generated overall poor quality of life issues.

ANALYSIS:
The Crime Analysis Unit of the National City Police Department, verified that the area was a problem for community members and a drain of police resources. The problem existed for over ten years, but a comprehensive effort of tracking/evaluating calls for service with assessment of community needs was only recently preformed. Learning from shortcomings of past traditional policing techniques that had limited and temporary results, a more diversified Problem Oriented Policing (POP) plan was formulated for more comprehensive and long-lasting results.
RESPONSE:

The response plan was an all-inclusive educational effort to reverse the effects of the "broken window" theory in conjunction with limited traditional law enforcement techniques.

The nucleus of the response relied heavily upon designing or redesigning a safe and clean neighborhood program encouraging involvement between community members, property managers/owners and the police.

During an extensive education process, the police department demonstrated how disorder and crime is inextricably linked in a kind of developmental sequence, causing chaos within the community. The police department educated the community behind the basics of the "broken window" theory, demonstrating how it was possible to disentangle or undo the link between disorder and crime, then attack each problem separately. As environmental issues, housing issues and social changes were formulated and implemented, the criminal element was beginning to fade away, leaving a safe and clean neighborhood program intact.

ASSESSMENT:

Positive impressions in the area were immediate after the implementation of the totality of the response measures. A reduction of calls for service and the perception of a safe and clean neighborhood were the overall desired long-term goals of the project. The
results were found successful through voiced community perceptions and a reduction of 61% in calls for service compared to 1995-1996, 48.7% reduction compared to 1996-1997, and 65.1% reduction in calls when compared to 1997-1998.
DESCRIPTION

A. SCANNING:

1. What was the nature of the problem?

   The "symptomatic problems" at 1100 "E" Avenue was a disproportionate concentration of dilapidated houses, apartment complexes, and condominiums in conjunction with a high number of gang members loitering the area. This combination resulted in an increased number of police calls for service and substandard living conditions for residents in the area. The "root problem" in the project area was poor property management by property owners and property management.

2. How was the problem identified?

   The symptomatic problems and the root problem have existed for many years. Recently however, the symptomatic problems escalated to an unbearable magnitude. Homicides became common place nearly every Fourth-of-July and just about everyday, police personnel were in the area responding to calls for service. Complaints from beat officers responding
to chronic calls, along with complaints from city officials and community members identified the symptomatic problems as being significant. Beat officers, community members and local officials requested a probe for a long-term solution to both the symptomatic problems and the root problem.

3. **Who identified the problem?**

See above under #2.

4. **Far more problems are identified than can be explored adequately. How and why was this problem selected from among problems?**

The symptomatic problems have had an increasingly negative impact upon the city, much more so than other problems. The project area, because of its close proximity to the city council building (less than a city block), a public park (Kimball Park-located across the street), shopping complexes, and a library facility, became a constant *eye-sore* to visiting consumers, recreation seekers, and city officials. In addition, media attention of the annual Fourth-of-July festivities at Kimball Park and the tragic homicides that occurred during the event just across the street, portrayed the perception that the City of National City was an unsafe place to visit.
5. What was the initial level of diagnosis/unit of analysis (e.g., crime type, neighborhood, specific premise, specific offender group, etc.)?

There was a multitude of symptomatic problems associated with the project area. These problems included but were not limited to: gangs, illegal aliens, narcotic activity, crimes of violence, property crimes, and public disturbances. However, poor property management by property owners, encompassing tenant screening and background checks, allowing property to fall in a dilapidated state, overpopulated the apartment units, and low rent, constituted the root problem.

B. ANALYSIS:

1. What methods, data and information sources were used to analyze the problem (e.g., surveys, interviews, observation, crime analysis, etc.)?

Community meetings were set up and hosted for property owners, property managers and residents both at the police station and at the project area. It was important to ascertain if our perception of the problem was the same as the community members who were affected.

The community's perception and that of the police differed. The community, in this case, was looking for a quick, simple fix of the symptomatic problems, while the police's stance was one of a more comprehensive long-term solution to the root problem.
In addition to community meetings, statistics were drawn from the police department's CARS data bank. The data collected showed calls for police service, specific type of calls, and most frequented locations.

Statistics were used to supplement and assist the police department in introducing new ideas and existing theories about problem solving to property owners, property managers, and residents at the meetings.

2. **History: How often and for how long was it a problem?**

Symptomatic and root problems had existed for more than fifteen years. The problems usually followed a cycle, where periods of high criminal activity subsided to less intensified criminal activity after intensified police presence. The problem was diagnosed as being at its peak just before the project was put into action.

3. **Who was involved in the problem (offenders, victims, others) and what were their respective motivations, gains and losses?**

Identified offenders within the problem were members of the most predominant gang in National City, OTNC-Old Town National City. The gang has over three hundred documented members and is estimated to have a total makeup that surpasses six hundred individuals. The alley that
ran parallel to the west of "E" Avenue was "claimed" by a sect of OTNC -
the Insane Boys. This alley was dubiously named "Insane Alley."

"INSANE ALLEY"
Nonetheless, at any given time, the victors became the vanquished. It was not uncommon to find OTNC gang members victims of assaults, batteries and/or homicides in the alley they claimed as their own.

Other individuals involved, and ultimately the root of the problem, were the property owners in the area. Their lackadaisical and often near-criminal approach to property management created and then perpetuated the symptomatic problems. It was not uncommon for property owners to rent their properties to gang members who, once they gained access, converted the property into a hub for criminal activity. Such activity included narcotics activity, burglaries, robberies, and vandalism. As a
result of the gangsters' activities, the property owner ultimately loses out in the long run. While helping perpetuate the crime, the property owner easily became a victim when robbed and often beaten by their gangster tenants while collecting the month's rent.

Inevitably, the ultimate victim was the average citizen trying to make a meager living in an attempt to support their family. Property owners and gangsters alike, in an array of methods, victimized residents of the project area.

Property owners victimized residents by charging unreasonable rent while not maintaining basic utilities (heat, water, and waste). In addition, property owners simply allowed the property they own to become overpopulated, dilapidated, and a hub for criminal activity, making quality-of-life poor at the very best.

It was not out of the norm for gangsters to conduct illegal activities and crimes of violence in plain view of community members. The gangsters then often harassed tenants as they would come and go from their homes. Tenants were left feeling helpless and ultimately intimidated, making them prisoners in their own homes.
4. What harms resulted from the problem?

The three-block area of "E" Avenue was a picture-perfect example of the "broken window" theory. As the area quickly succumbed to neglected yards and buildings, abandoned vehicles, and discarded furniture in the streets and alleys, the neighborhood began a perpetual spiral downward and there was no efforts by property owners to improve conditions. Residents soon became complacent and accepted the neighborhood's deplorable condition.

The apathy toward the neighborhood by property owners and community members only drew seedy individuals from different symptomatic groups to the area. It was commonplace for young children to be huddled around a lifeless heroin overdose body when police arrive on scene. Furthermore, drug dealers and gang members would thrive in rundown dwellings where they could "sling dope" without the threat of the police being called upon.

As for drug users and addicts that were allowed tenancy in the area, they enjoyed the convenience of their suppliers being in close contiguity and the luxury of abandoned dilapidated buildings to "crash in" after shooting up. Often the abandon buildings used by transients, drug users, and gang members during the night were playgrounds to young children during the day.
Many of the buildings were laden with human feces, used hypodermic needles, and half-consumed alcohol containers—a breeding ground for all types of disease.

5. **How was the problem being addressed before the problem-solving project? What were the results of those responses?**

In years past, prior to the implementation of this project, traditional, direct enforcement techniques were commonplace when dealing with the symptomatic problems. More often than not, the beat officer with minimal problem-solving training and experience, resorted to spending unobligated time making arrests, conducting field investigations and "shake-downs" on drug dealers, gang members and other undesirables in the area. The responses typically taken by beat officers lacked long-term goals and were reactionary in nature rather than proactive. These short-term "fixes" lasted but a few days, then the symptomatic problems resurfaced, returning the area to its original chaotic state, leaving the root problem unscathed.

6. **What did the analysis reveal about the causes and underlying conditions that precipitated the problem?**

The analysis overwhelmingly demonstrated that efforts set forth by the police department were ineffective. Critical personnel hours were being
consumed without any spoils to show for the effort. The area had slipped into such disrepair that none of the property owners were willing to initiate funds or efforts to improve the area for fear their resources would be wasted. Due to the analysis, it was evident that a shrewd and energetic approach was needed for any sort of long-term change. Traditional policing alone could not transform the area single-handedly.

7. What did the analysis reveal about the nature and extent of the problem?

The information provided by the Crime Analysis Unit at NCPD revealed a large amount of calls for service stayed at a constant level over three years. Statistics were gathered for a three-year period on the project area.

In the first year, from March 1, 1995 to February 28, 1996, the total calls for service were 203. Twenty-five of the calls were gang related (figure 1).

The second year, March 1, 1996 to February 28, 1997, the calls for service dropped to 154. However, the gang related calls increased to twenty-nine (figure 2).

In the final year analyzed, March 1, 1997 to February 28, 1998, the calls for service increased to 227, with an increase in gang related calls to
thirty-three. During this year, crimes of violence, including homicides increased (figure 3).
CALLS FOR SERVICE
MARCH 1, 1995 - FEBRUARY 28, 1996

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<td>GANG RELATED CALLS</td>
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Fig. 1

CRIME CATEGORIES
MAR. 95 - FEB. 96

- CRIMES AGAINST PEOPLE
- CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
- NARCOTICS
- TRAFFIC
- PUBLIC DISTURBANCE CALLS

52%
15%
15%
8%
10%
CALLS FOR SERVICE
MARCH 1, 1996 - FEBRUARY 28, 1997

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<td>GANG RELATED CALLS</td>
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</table>

Fig. 2

CRIME CATEGORIES
MAR. 96 - FEB. 97

- CRIMES AGAINST PEOPLE
- CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
- ONARCOTICS
- TRAFFIC
- PUBLIC DISTURBANCE CALLS
CALLS FOR SERVICE
MARCH 1, 1997 - FEBRUARY 28, 1998

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<td>11-45 Suicide</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL NUMBER OF CALLS</strong></td>
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<td><strong>GANG RELATED CALLS</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
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</table>

Fig. 3

CRIME CATEGORIES
MAR. 97 - FEB. 98

- CRIMES AGAINST PEOPLE
- 16%
- OCRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
- 11%
- EINARCOTICS
- 9%
- TRAFFIC
- 2%
- PUBLIC DISTURBANCE CALLS
- 62%
COMPARISON OF ALL THREE YEARS
Further, a common occurrence in all three years analyzed was the high rate of disturbance calls. This can be attributed to the helplessness of the community calling the police to vent frustrations concerning quality-of-life issues in their neighborhood. In addition, the lack of interest the property owners showed in the maintenance and improvement (broken window) in their property was amplified by the respect the tenants funneled toward the property where they lived; hence, the major reason why the neighborhood fell into such a shamble.

8. What situational information was needed to better understand the problem (e.g., time of occurrence, location, other particulars re: the environment, etc.)?

See above questions and answers.

9. Was there an open discussion with the community about the problem?

As previously stated, several community meetings were organized both at the station and out in the project area. We were successful in achieving the full participation in regards of every property owner attending each meeting. During the meetings we presented our "game plan" to the property owners, describing what our obligations would be and expressed what we expected of the property owners. In turn, the meetings gave
property owners and residents a forum to express their concerns and expectations.

After the initial meeting, members of the Neighborhood Policing Team met with property owners on a one-to-one basis. These meetings were done in this way for intelligence gathering and "pep talks" without other property owners ganging up on each other. Property owners were also encouraged to network amongst themselves without the police to solve minor problems. For the networking program, the police prepared and distributed a phone list of all the property owners to each other and offered the use of the "community room" at the police department as a neutral facility.

C. RESPONSES:

1. What range of possible response alternatives were considered to deal with the problem?

At the start of the project, we anticipated resistance from the property owners due to expenses that could incur for repairs and reconstruction. Although we never ran into the problems in the magnitude anticipated, we were prepared to seek assistance from various entities within the city and
county. These entities included:

- The City Attorney’s Office for abatement proceedings of nuisance properties.
- The National City Building and Safety to address unsafe and illegal structures.
- The National City Fire Department for fire hazards and fire code violations.
- The San Diego Health Department regarding issues that were potentially hazardous to tenants living in the neighborhood.

2. **What responses did you use to address the problem?**

1) Our initial stage of the response to the project was to host meetings with property owners and their managers. The meetings focused on the calls for service and general problems with the project area. We explained in a politically correct manner that complacent absentee property owners were the root of the problem. The police department set forth expectations of the property owners and property managers.

In addition, we reinforced that the owners had a responsibility to fix their "broken window" for the tenants and the whole community. The meetings served as a springboard to disseminate to tenants, property owners and
property managers that there would be a "no-tolerance" approach to municipal codes and state laws as they pertain to the condition of their properties. Also included in the meetings were:

- Explain the "broken window" theory and how easily the problem can be rectified.
- Proper screening techniques for potential tenants.
- Easy eviction of problem-tenants either by the use of an attorney or on their own.
- Provide each property owner with neighboring property owner's name and address for networking and peer pressure.
- Suggest CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) ideas and explain the benefit of utilizing the ideas.
- Provided and request each of the property owners sign a trespass enforcement authorization letter, authorizing police officers to arrest and remove any trespasser on their property.

The purpose of these meetings were to get property owners involved in the community, educate them on problem solving, check progress, and instill pride in ownership. In addition, the meetings gave property owners a chance to voice their expectations of the police department. At this stage, there were some preliminary disagreements due to property owners wanting the police to solve all of the problems. The police department
quickly quashed these misconceptions. We emphasized that in order for the project to be a success, property owners were going to have as much, if not more, of an involvement.

2.) Individual meetings were scheduled between officers and property owners. During these meetings, officers made recommendations using CPTED surveys regarding lighting, landscape, common areas laundry facilities, and the exterior of buildings, including windows and doors.

In addition, property owners were given verbal and then written notification of municipal code violations on their property. In the event of the need for a third and fourth notification, the National City Code Conformance would issue a written notice, followed by the fourth written notice from the City Attorney.

As a result of our tenacity, three apartment complexes were renovated, three unpaved parking areas at three different complexes were paved, and one apartment complex was placed on the real estate market.

3.) One property owner had no interest in revitalizing his property and eventually put the property up for sale. Subsequently, this property was responsible for 50% of the calls for service in the area. The National City
Police Department became instrumental in the smooth acquisition of the property by a new property management company.

4.) The next approach to fixing the "broken window" was to take a more traditional approach to the symptoms created by poor property management. We impounded twelve abandoned vehicles in the target area and another fourteen for vehicle code violations. Furthermore, Code Compliance at National City had five other vehicles removed that were an unsightly mess in yards.

5.) We compiled a comprehensive intelligence file of approximately 300 Old Town National City (OTNC) gang members, cross-referenced by aliases who frequent the area. The file continues to assist patrol officers in proper identification.

6.) Using gathered intelligence, the National City Police Department, in conjunction with the City Attorney, secured a "gang injunction." The injunction prohibited 66 of the most notorious OTNC gang members from standing, walking, driving, gathering, or appearing anywhere in public view with any named defendant, or any other OTNC gang member within the project area.
7.) Individuals identified as being on parole and probation and were recognized as problematic, became a focus for Fourth Amendment waiver searches and covert surveillance.

8.) The Neighborhood Policing Team organized and initiated three warrant sweeps in the target area to weed out any potential precarious individuals.

9.) We established a working relationship with San Diego Gas and Electric, who were responsible for damage to trees and vegetation (8 palm trees were cut halfway up the trunk several years prior) on city easements during routine maintenance. SDG&E replaced the palm trees with trees more proportional to the surroundings.

10.) Finally, we used the media primarily to highlight the project. We found that public awareness brought about a revitalized attitude from both the property owners and residents, promoting them to take an increased pride of ownership and community.

3. **How did you develop a response as a result of our analysis?**

From our analysis, we were certain that the key to improving the neighborhood was through social changes (property management,
improved dwellings, and neighborhood aesthetics) then the change in criminal activity would follow.

We focused the majority of our efforts on property management. If the current property owners were not willing to live up to their responsibilities to the community, we strongly encouraged them to sell the property to new investors or hire new property managers who were motivated to better the community.

4. **What evaluation criteria were most important to the department before implementation of the response alternative(s) (e.g., legality, community values, potential effectiveness, cost, practicality, etc.)?**

The evaluation criteria included: 1) legality-To justify the constitutionality of the gang injunction secured by the police department and city attorney to the courts, public and defendants. 2) potential effectiveness and community values- we wanted to have a long lasting relationship between the property owners and the police department and hope that they did not feel bullied by the changes they were incurring due to the project.

5. **What did you intend to accomplish?**

The overall goal was to greatly reduce calls for service and criminal activity in the project area, while lessening the burden on patrol units.
The objective was to target poor property management as the underlying cause of the problem, manipulate the physical environment via CPTED, making the area less attractive to criminal activity, and build a sense of responsibility and ownership among property owners and residents in the area.

6. **What resources were available to help solve the problem?**

   Because the project area was so small in geographic terms, we taxed only entities within the city for assistance. The entities relied upon included:

   - The City Attorneys office for the gang injunction
   - Code Conformance for abatement of abandoned vehicles
   - City Planning
   - Parking Control
   - Animal Control for problem residents with animals

   It was made clear at the beginning of the project, that the city and police department had very little, if any, funding to proffer toward our efforts.

7. **What was done before you implemented your response?**

   Refer to "Scanning" and "Analysis" sections.
8. **What difficulties were encountered during the response implementation?**

Difficulties were minimal but included initial reluctance on the part of property owners and property managers who did not want to take ownership of the root problem (poor property management). Property owners were reluctant to spend money to make improvement on dilapidated building and out of code dwellings. Property owners tried every avenue to avoid the inevitable costs and construction usually moved at a slow pace.

9. **Who was involved in the response to your problem?**

See previous questions and answers.

D. **ASSESSMENT:**

1. **What were the results? What degree of impact did the response plan have on this problem?**

The results were not immediate, however, they were very dramatic and overwhelmingly surpassed our expectations. Calls for service were compiled for May of 1999 to May of 2000, There were 79 calls for
service that year. Breaking statistics down monthly there was an average of 6.5 calls for service a month, compared to 16.2 calls per month for service over the three-year period analyzed for the project. This equates to a 61% drop in calls from 1995-1996, 48.7% drop in calls from 1996-1997 and an incredible 65.1% drop compared to 1997-1998.

Statistics were not the only sign of improvement in the area. Beat officers expressed positive feedback indicating less calls for service and incident reports. Residents and property owners were vocal about improvements stating that they felt the neighborhood was a safe place, even during hours of darkness.

In terms of aesthetics, the entire area has taken on a new and extremely improved appearance. The refurbished dwellings and landscaped common areas have heightened the enthusiasm of property owners toward improving the resident's standard of living.
2. **What were your methods of evaluation and for how long was the effectiveness of the problem solving effort evaluated?**

Methods of evaluation consisted of statistics provided by the Crime Analysis Unit regarding calls for service, location, and type and personal observations and perceptions of beat officers assigned to the project area. In addition, there was a decline in the need for enforcement, field interviews and a decline in public complaints directed at city officials and our department. We received positive feedback by property owners, residents, and other city personnel and a follow-up story was conducted by the media. The project effectiveness continues to be evaluated and will continue for one more year.

3. **Who was involved in the evaluation?**

See above.

4. **Were there any problems implementing the response plan?**

See question #8 under "Response."

5. **If there was no improvements in the problem, were systematic efforts considered to handle the problem?**

NIA
6. **What response goals were accomplished?**

The assessment analysis indicates all the primary response goals were accomplished.

7. **How did you measure your results?**

See #1 under Assessment.

8. **What data supported our conclusions?**

Crime analysis numbers stated earlier in the Assessment.

9. **How could you have made the response more effective?**

Conceivably by involving more personnel from within our own department at various levels and drawing upon their areas of knowledge, experience and training could provide potential response actions. In addition, we could have increased our level of communication about the project (stages, successes, changes, etc.) with others in the department.
10. **Was there concern about displacement (i.e. pushing the problem somewhere else)?**

Displacement was not as much a concern as property owners reverting back to prior methods of operation. We felt that the likelihood of displacement of the root problem (poor property management from existing owners) was minimal at best. However, as for the symptomatic problems (gang member, drug addicts, drug sellers) we expected drug users/sellers to continue to stay involved with narcotics, and gang members to not disappear. We anticipated that these segments of the population would relocate to another area either within the city or neighboring cities. We realized that we could attempt to resolve one problem at a time and cannot cure the entire city’s woes through one project.

11. **Will your response require continued monitoring or a continuing effort to maintain your results?**

The effectiveness of the problem solving effort is being evaluated on a continual basis. Calls for service comparisons will be conducted every six-months. A continued liaison is maintained between the police, property owners, and property management, as well as updating the telephone list provided to all the involved parties.
AGENCY AND OFFICER INFORMATION

1. At what level of the police organization was this problem-solving initiative adopted (e.g. the entire department, a few select officers, etc.)?

Our problem-solving effort on "E" Avenue was researched, initiated, and completed entirely by entities within the City of National City, but the organization, management, and control of the project was facilitated by members of the Neighborhood Policing Team (NPT).

The Neighborhood Policing Team is a proactive policing unit aligned to assist patrol and the department in continuing efforts to provide problem-solving and community policing strategies within National City. One sergeant and six officers currently staff NPT.

Through stages in the project, NPT had the support of the Chief of Police at National City, along with our Captain, and shift Lieutenants. On occasion, when problem-solving techniques were being demonstrated, patrol units were assigned to assist so they could gain experience.
2. **Did officers or management receive any training on problem-oriented policing and/or problem solving before this project began?**

All members of the Neighborhood Policing Team are annual members of the International POP Conference held in San Diego, California. In addition, NPT members are encouraged to attend P.O.S.T certified courses relating to problem-solving strategies. Patrol Officers involved in project areas are given POP -related line-up training by NPT Officers prior to their involvement in the project.

3. ** Were additional incentives given to police officers who engaged in problem solving?**

Additional incentives are given to officers who engage in problem-solving project at our department. As a requirement to test for open positions in units such as the Neighborhood Policing Team or even move up in rank, individual officers are required to show that they are competent in problem-solving techniques and have actually engaged in a project. In addition, National City Police Officers are evaluated annually; problem-solving strategies are looked upon favorably by sergeants and the upper administration.
4. **What resources and guidelines (manuals, past problem-solving examples, etc.) were used, if any, by police officers to help them manage this problem-solving initiative?**

In terms of resources, the Neighborhood Policing Team keeps a comprehensive file and binder for all the projects initiated. The folders/binders contain detailed plans proposed by the case agent and officers assigned to the project because of their specialty (narcotics, vice, etc.). All of the plans are composed using the S.A.R.A. model. Along with detailed plans, the folders/binders include media clippings, videos, photos, statistics on calls for service, after-action reports, and other relevant/related material. The folders/binders are a beneficial tool for other projects that encompass the same root and symptomatic problems.

We have other resources within our reach: 1) a small library consisting of manuals, books and journals, 2) the internet as well as being linked to the city network system, and 3) round table brain storming sessions in an attempt to come up with new and innovative plans to solve problems.

5. **What issues/problems were identified with the problem-oriented policing model or the problem-solving model?**

None.

6. **What general resources (financial and/or personnel) were committed to this project, and of those resources, what went beyond the existing department budget?**
Going into our projects, the Neighborhood Policing Team generally does not expect any financial aid. There are occasions where we are awarded a grant for a specific topic, but these are few and far between. We rely heavily on brainstorming within the unit. We have come to the conclusion that our resources were limited only by our imagination, ingenuity, and creativity in asking for assistance or employing a new idea or tactic.

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