TILLEY AWARDS
2019-20
Application Form
Please ensure that you have read the guidance before completing this form. By making an application to the awards, entrants are agreeing to abide by the conditions laid out in the guidance.

This application consists of four sections, as detailed below:

Section A: Application basics
Section B: Summary of application
Section C: Description of project
Section D: Endorsement by a Senior Representative

Please complete the following form in full, within the stated word limit. Failure to complete in full will result in your entry being rejected from the competition.

Completed word forms application forms should be emailed to Tilley_Awards@southyorks.pnn.police.uk.

All entries must be received by noon on 28 October 2019. No entries will be accepted after this time/date. Any queries on the application process should be directed to Dara Voice at the email address above.
Section A: Application basics

1. Category (please tick which category you wish to enter your applications for, applications can be entered into more than one category providing they meet the criteria outlined in the Terms & Conditions):

☑ Neighbourhoods

☐ Police Now & Student Officers

☑ Investigations

☑ Partners

☐ Business support and volunteers

2. Title of the project: Operation Waterside: CSE in the Town Centre

3. Key issue that the project is addressing: Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE), protecting vulnerable children, partnership working.

Author contact details

4. Name of application author: PC 30109 Gina VOLP

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### Endorsing representative contact details

12. Name of endorsing senior representative from lead organisation: Chief Inspector 3790 Jez TAYLOR

13. Endorsing representative’s email address: Jez.Taylor@cheshire.pnn.police.uk

14. Please list which agencies were actively involved in the project and underline the lead organisation: Cheshire Constabulary, Cheshire East Council’s Anti-social Behaviour Team, Social Services

15. Have you submitted this project in previous Tilley Award competitions? **No**

16. If yes please state which year *(Please ensure that the previous form is attached together with a detailed summary of changes and justification for resubmission): N/A*

17. Did you take advantage of the advice offered to applications prior to entry? **Yes** (delete as applicable)

18. If yes did you find the feedback beneficial? Please comment: **it was very well received and allowed some rework and focus on submission criteria. Thank you**

19. Please mark this box with an X to indicate that all organisations involved in the project have been notified of this entry *(this is to prevent duplicate entries of the same project and should correlate to those listed in point 14 above):*

[X]
Section B: Summary of application

This application will examine Operation WATERSIDE, an Operation to tackle Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE) in Macclesfield Town Centre. It will explain the SARA process that we took to both pursue the offenders and robustly protect the victims using a multi-agency approach. It will first, briefly, explain an earlier SARA cycle (Operation SCARP) which, at the assessment stage, led to the identification of the titular Operation.

**Scanning:** Through multi-agency meetings, we identified 40 youths persistently involved in ASB and violence (Operation SCARP). After instating ‘Handlers’ to work with these ‘Offenders’, we quickly began to receive intelligence suggested a far more serious problem was occurring: CSE. Through information sharing with key stakeholders, we uncovered a problem, previously unknown to the Police or our partners; intelligence suggested a female was taking vulnerable children to hotels, giving them drugs and alcohol, then bringing in males from another Force area to sexually exploit them.

**Analysis:** By utilising the Problem Analysis Triangle (PAT), we established that our previous ‘Offenders’ under Operation SCARP were also ‘Victims’ and that ‘Handlers’ would need to take on more of a ‘Guardian’ role. We analysed the factors that made these children vulnerable and attempted to understand the extent of the problem. We also focused on the location element of PAT, working with the hotels to try and establish what was enabling the CSE to take place. Finally, we examined the ‘Offender’ herself, looking at her motivations and what linked her to the males from the neighbouring Force area.

**Response:** A multi-faceted response was implemented to safeguard the vulnerable victims, using education, Child Abduction Warning Notices and partners’ input. We targeted the hotels, issuing “S116 NOTICES” (alongside educational leaflets), which put an obligation on their staff to contact the Police if they suspected CSE. We pre-empted the suspect moving by issuing ‘Warning Notices’ to all other hotels in the area. After a complaint was made, the suspect was arrested for sexual offences and bailed with conditions prohibiting her from contacting anyone under the age of 16. There have subsequently been 13 charges relating to the work done in this Operation.

**Assessment:** After assessing that we had merely displaced the suspect onto another Force Area, we liaised with them to ensure their Officers would have the appropriate information when encountering the suspect. The Operation was ultimately successful in safeguarding our vulnerable children – we measured this by using qualitative and quantitative assessment methods.

Number of words: 399

Section C: Description of project

**Introduction**

This application will be focused on Operation WATERSIDE; an Operation to tackle Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE) in Macclesfield Town Centre. Although, ultimately, it will explain the SARA process that we took to both pursue the offenders and robustly protect the victims using a multi-agency approach, it is first essential to explain an initial SARA cycle that was completed which, while in the ‘assessment’ stage, led to the identification of the subsequent Operation. Thus, this document will be structured by first, briefly explaining Operation SCARP, a youth anti-social behaviour (ASB) and group violence problem, then comprehensively examining Operation WATERSIDE.

**Operation SCARP**
Operation SCARP was initiated in November 2018 when it became statistically apparent that there had been a significant rise in both the severity and volume of youth violence and ASB. By speaking with partners, we identified approximately 40 youths who were consistently involved, some of whom were previously unknown to the Police. Police intelligence also suggested that there were significant problems that were yet to start filtering through into actual occurrences – members of the group carrying knives and drug dealing.

Through the ‘analysis’ stage of the initial SARA cycle, we compiled a comprehensive document which all partners contributed to. The Police called for a multi-agency meeting where we devised a personalised ‘plan’ for each child, triaging their needs and ensuring the most appropriate agency was assigned as their ‘Handler’ – this ensured that we would have the maximum impact upon, both, the group as a whole and its individual members.

At this point in time, all identified youths fell onto the ‘Offender’ side of the Problem Analysis Triangle (PAT). Consequently, for this SARA cycle, the Police were instrumental in engaging appropriate ‘Handlers’ to “control” and influence each youth away from criminality (POP CENTRE). We used Partner Agencies to ensure that, where parenting was insufficient and ineffective, we could introduce ‘Handlers’ in the form of Social workers, Police Officers, teachers etc. This was critical in establishing the intelligence that ultimately led to the identification of CSE.

A significant response was carried out for Operation SCARP including proactive policing and educational actions. It was ultimately statistically successful in reducing ASB and youth violence. However, most importantly, the strong groundwork which was established during this initial SARA cycle ensured that, during the ‘assessment’ stage, we were able to identify the titular problem, Operation WATERSIDE: Child Sexual Exploitation in the Town Centre.

**Scanning**

As a result of the multi-agency meetings, due to the complexity of the ‘offenders’ needs and the scale of the problem, a ‘handler’ was instated for every identified ‘offender’. Because of this, Social Services became involved with some youths that would not ordinarily have passed the ‘threshold’ to normally be given a social worker. The objectives of the strategy was, consequently, to give the young people mechanisms to prevent further criminality.

At this time, the following agencies were involved in the monthly multi-agency meetings:

- **Social Services** - working with our more vulnerable young people and their families to put in place mechanisms to help curb them away from crime (as a result of Operation SCARP);
- **Schools** - often best placed to notice changes in behaviour and note underlying issues;
- **The Council’s Anti-Social Behaviour Team** - who were putting in place, and monitoring, restrictive ‘Anti-Social Behaviour Contracts’ (ABC) to some of the more criminally active youths. These ABCs limited who the youths could associate with and banned them from areas that they had previously caused problems;
- **The Missing from Home Coordinators** - monitoring and reporting on any increase in frequency of certain individuals, identified as vulnerable, going missing;
- **Youth Workers** – working in various roles including: ‘Drugs and Alcohol Workers’ and ‘Anger Management Workers’
As each agency began to work, as ‘Handlers’, with their assigned young people, we began to receive reports that some of the teenagers were mentioning an older female (who will now be referred to as S) that hadn’t previously been identified. We were initially told that S was dealing drugs to children in an old school uniform so as not to raise suspicion. For context, S is 18 years old but visually, could pass for 14. She was on the Police system five times before Operation WATERSIDE; four as a victim and once as a suspect in relation to a hate crime that resulted in no further action. At the beginning of Operation SCARP, she wasn’t noted by Police or Partners as being a potential threat to children.

The information about S began to trickle though at the beginning of 2019. These reports came from multiple partners put in place to work with the identified Operation SCARP youths. For instance, the Youth Worker, who completed the ‘Return Home Surveys’ with youths missing overnight, reported some of the children had stated that they had been staying with S at hotels. Social Services also reported that S had been mentioned as being a ‘new’ friend to some of our vulnerable cohort. One of the schools had caught 4 of our Operation SCARP females drinking alcohol and, when they had confiscated their phones, messages were flashing up from S about meeting them later.

Once it came to light that S seemed to be part of a more serious problem, we re-assessed the risk and the information gathered. It seemed clear that this was an altogether new problem and, given its seriousness, we realised information sharing would be key to properly assess the extent of the problem. Consequently, we shared our concerns with Partners, requesting that they, while working with their identified children, begin to take note of S being mentioned. Very quickly, we began to receive intelligence from multiple children about S. Some of this intelligence suggested that she was taking young girls to hotel rooms, giving them alcohol and drugs before inviting males from a neighbouring Force area to come and sexually assault them. Intelligence also suggested that S had a 14 year old girlfriend.

After realising that we had identified an entirely different problem, we created a separate Operation with the objective to address the potential Child Sexual Exploitation occurring in the Town Centre. The ‘scanning’ phase of Operation WATERSIDE was a direct result of, and fused to, the ‘assessment’ phase of Operation SCARP. This Operation was primarily led by the Police; key stakeholders included the Partners already involved in the multi-agency meetings and extended to the hotels where these offences were allegedly taking place. Given the severity of the suspected offences, it was essential that we begin a further SARA Cycle in order to tackle this new Operation.

Primarily, the data used to identify the problem was the intelligence that we received from our partners, disclosed by our youths. There was no previous intelligence on the Police System (Niche) and so we were initially relying on qualitative data. It was therefore very difficult to measure the full extent of the problem given that it had previously been hidden. It was only the intense relationship building undertaken by partners, with their assigned youths, that led to the intelligence being received. This, in itself, was a problem since we were initially unsure how many young people were at risk. The community were not directly involved in identifying this problem because of the way that it was uncovered. However, CSE is a National Government priority so robustly addressing it, once it had been uncovered, was essential.

**Analysis**

Given that, after the ‘scanning phase’, we knew very little about the identified problem, the ‘analysis’ stage was key in breaking down what we did know and developing the intelligence into actual evidence. Once we had identified the problem and shared our concerns with partners, we emphasised the importance of learning as much about S, and the alleged offences, as possible. Consequently, in the following three months, we received 35 intelligence reports. Interrogating the intelligence was vital in ensuring we could more accurately assess the risks and build up a
bigger picture. Thorough research into the content of each intelligence report was essential in identifying potential ‘offenders’, ‘victims’ and ‘locations’.

A big hindrance to this initial analysis however, was that, while we had amassed a large quantity of intelligence, we had no evidence of any offences which would, later, be imperative in pursuing the ‘Offender’ in the ‘response’ stage. Despite speaking to the suspected victims, they would not engage with the Police. Revisiting the PAT was, therefore, essential. Through this analysis, it became apparent that the young people who had previously been identified as ‘Offenders’, quite clearly now lay on the ‘Victims’ side of PAT. This change of position on the Triangle, meant that their ‘Handlers’ began to take on a different role, as ‘Guardians’, building relationships to try and ‘pull’ them away from engaging with S.

As we received increasing amounts of intelligence, we assessed that we had at least 12 possible victims who were vulnerable to CSE. Working with partners, we evaluated these girls as ‘victims’ on PAT and identified what was making them vulnerable. Of note, all youths had strained relationships with their parents. Parents appeared not to have suitable boundaries in place and were not acting appropriately by notifying the Police when their children did not return home at night time. We knew, from the intelligence, that these girls were staying over at hotels with S. After Police verified these stays with the hotels, we noted that parents had not reported their children as missing on the associated evenings. In addition, schools were reporting a lack of engagement, withdrawal from healthy friendship groups and increased truancy. Furthermore, youth workers, engaging with the young girls, revealed that some of them were drug and alcohol dependent. All of these factors added to our victims’ vulnerability and made them prime targets for exploitation.

We also examined the ‘location’ side of PAT. Given that the intelligence suggested young girls were regularly being taken to one distinctive large chain hotel, we contacted the hotel and began to collect details of S’s visits. We then cross-referenced these with the intelligence received, verifying their validity. We quickly identified that one of the issues that helped enable the problem was the layout of the hotel. You enter the doors on the ground floor and are immediately faced with a lift. The helpdesk is on the first floor so, once you have a room pass, you are able to take whoever you want up to your room, without having to pass any members of staff. In addition, there was an outdoor area to the back of the hotel where a fire door was apparently being propped open. Working with the hotel revealed that the alarms for this door had previously been turned off; this was easily remedied by the manager. All of these factors allowed S to book a room and then, once she had a room key, bypass the helpdesk and take youths up to her room using the lift. Of note, there are not a great number of hotels in Macclesfield and this chain hotel was the largest and most central; this appeared to be why it was originally, almost exclusively, used by S when ‘hosting’ our vulnerable victims.

We initially struggled when it came to analyzing S, the ‘offender’ side of PAT. While we began with no information on her at all, we quickly amassed a significant amount about her movements and activities. We were lacking, however, her motivation. We also had intelligence which suggested she was bringing in males from another Force area to exploit our young females. On Niche, we only had her linked to one male, who resided in Macclesfield. Through analysis of this male, however, we discovered a link to the other Force – his cousin (the same age as S) lived there. Checks on this male with his home Force were not fruitful however, despite this, we notified our Response Officers about this male who we believed may be coming to Macclesfield for criminal purposes. A few weeks later, the male was stop searched in Macclesfield and drugs were found on him. He was arrested, his phone seized and his texts revealed that he had been supplying S with drugs for the young girls. We were therefore able to verify the intelligence and build up a bigger picture on S. This also revealed that S was bisexual and confirmed that she was in a relationship with a 14 year old girl from Macclesfield; this suggested that her motivation may be sexual gratification.
Finally, we knew that S contacted most of her victims using ‘Snapchat’, we therefore employed covert tactics to further develop our intelligence on her as an ‘offender’. All of these factors identified in the ‘analysis’ phase contributed to the CSE that the intelligence identified. At this point, however, we still had no actual evidence implicating S in any offences.

Response

We split our response into targeting the three elements of PAT. In relation to the offender, S, we liaised with the local Proactive Beat Investigation Team who used plain clothes and covert methods to collect information. Given that we suspected S to be drug dealing, we raised her profile, highlighting her involvement in the suspect offences through Daily Briefings. We requested that she be Stop Searched if there were appropriate grounds.

Regarding safeguarding the suspected victims: we had already identified the vulnerable young girls who we believed had either already been exploited or were most at risk of being exploited. Safeguarding them was imperative and so we began by comprehensively speaking to each young person’s parents. We had identified, in the ‘analysis’ stage, that a major factor contributing to their vulnerability was the fact that they were often not being reported missing when they should have been. By emphasising the importance of this, and the potential consequences Social Services would implement if we were not satisfied that their parenting became sufficient, we were trying to reinstate parents as a ‘protective factor’. We also employed the assistance of Social Workers to work with the family and help fix some, clearly failing, family dynamics. They worked on educating the parents by raising their awareness of CSE and how, by setting boundaries, they were much better placed to safeguard their own children.

We also decided to disclose to parents that we had identified that their child was at risk of CSE from S. Given the aforementioned failing relationships, some had not realised that their daughters were spending increasing amounts of time with an older female. We also discussed the option of Child Abduction Warning Notices - which were ultimately issued to S. These Warning Notices explain that the child’s Guardian does NOT consent to the child being with a certain person and so if the child is found with them, the person will be arrested for Child Abduction. While issuing these notices, we were essentially alerting S that the Police were now monitoring her; our justification for this came from the assessment that the safeguarding element of this Operation far outweighed any investigation and charges we might obtain. This option was also chosen after reflecting on the Independent Inquiry into Sexual Exploitation in Rotherham (1997 -2013) which determined that safeguarding was paramount.

As well as engaging the parents of these victims, we also recognised the importance of education to the victims themselves. We worked with each ‘at risk’ child individually, explaining what exploitation is and going through a number of examples. This was done with the support of Social Services. While none of the victims, initially, reported exploitation to us, the intention was to help them feel confident, in the future, to speak to the Police. At this point we also introduced ‘Drug and Alcohol’ workers to engage the youths and mitigate this part of their vulnerability.

While we wanted to educate our ‘at risk’ young people individually, we also couldn’t rule out that there may be some vulnerable PAT ‘victims’ that we had missed. Therefore, we utilised the Youth Engagement Officer to work with local High Schools, presenting on exploitation so that all students knew how to spot the signs and could report back to teachers if they saw them in one of their classmates.

It is important to note that, while it was the Beat Management Team that was leading on these actions, it was imperative that our Response Officers were kept up to date with who our vulnerable young people were and any actions that needed taking if they were encountered. Consequently, we briefed Response Officers and added markers to the Police Systems so that, once a youth was identified, the Radio Operators would be able to deliver key
information (e.g. Social Worker’s telephone number). The key to combatting this problem and safeguarding our vulnerable youths was consistency in our response and so it was imperative that all Officers had up-to-date information.

In relation to the ‘location’ side of PAT, a key piece of legislation that we utilised was “Section 116 Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014”. This legislation had not previously been used in our Force Area so we researched how other Forces had employed it to combat CSE. From this research, we created a “S116 NOTICE” which states that the Police reasonably believe that a hotel has been/will be used for the purpose of Child Sexual Exploitation. The notice is served on the hotel and allows Police Officers to quickly obtain information relating to their guests within a certain time period. It also puts an obligation on the hotel to ring the Police if they suspect CSE. It proved invaluable because, previously, when requesting guest details, we had to wait weeks for the request to be processed by their Head Offices. This notice allowing us to receive information quickly and so safeguard more effectively.

We also advised the large chain hotel to move their cameras to monitor the lift area which allowed people to go up to rooms without having to pass the helpdesk. Furthermore, when issuing the S116 Notice we also gave members of staff informational booklets that would help them spot the signs of exploitation and posters for the staff areas with key indicators of CSE.

Once this notice had been issued, we received reports that S had moved to another, smaller hotel in the area. We quickly issued a S116 NOTICE to this hotel and then pre-empted her moving again by issuing ‘warning notices’ (and informational guides) to all hotels in the Macclesfield Area. We wanted them to be educated on, and alert to, the signs of CSE. This proved successful and children involved reported to their ‘Handlers’ that S had stopped using hotels.

Up until this point, we had been severely hindered by the fact that we had a lot of intelligence, but no evidence of offences. However, as a result of the educational inputs, delivered by Police and Social Services to parents and vulnerable youths, S’s 14 year old girlfriend made a complaint of sexual assault against S. S was arrested and her phone seized; she was bailed with conditions not to be in the presence of anyone under the age of 16.

Once her phone was downloaded, extreme pornographic images were found. More significantly however, a number of indecent images of children, who S was associating with, were also discovered. This was a good opportunity to assess whether there were any additional victims that we had not identified and we did find a number of indecent images of children who were not known to either the Police or Partners; subsequent safeguarding was completed with these children.

While the phone was being analysed, we received reports that S was still speaking to a number of our vulnerable females – not prohibited by her bail conditions. Learning from this, when S was arrested for the images found on her phone, we created an additional bail condition that prohibited S from being in contact with anyone under the age of 16, including on social media. Furthermore, as a result of the arrests, a successful warrant was conducted on a prolific males address for the supply of controlled substances.

In relation to our ‘exit strategy’, while acquiring a conviction seemed important to put future limitations on S, the safeguarding elements were deemed far more essential. Through the intensive support Partners were providing our vulnerable youths and their families, we wanted to shift attitudes so that the young people realised they were putting themselves in dangerous situations. Furthermore, the work we completed allowed our local hotels to become more proactive in identifying youth exploitation; consequently, as a result of their improved knowledge and relationship with the Police, we recently identified an unrelated County Lines group bringing children to Macclesfield to drug deal.
Assess

We used several assessment methods to evaluate the success of this Operation:

- Quantitative Assessment – Through examining changes in statistical information on the Police System.
- Qualitative Assessment – Through feedback we have gained from the children, their families and our partners. Since CSE is a hidden harm offence, this information was very important in establishing that the problem had been resolved, not just pushed underground.

One of the main objectives of this Operation was to effectively safeguard the children identified as being exploited. While initially there were 12 vulnerable females subject to CSE, we now know that 11 no longer associate with S. Initially, we saw a rise in the amount of times that each child was reported missing from home – as a result of parents being better informed of when to report this to the Police. After the ‘response’ stage, however, the amount of times that all but 1 of the identified vulnerable young people have gone missing from home has reduced by 64%.

Qualitatively, a significant number of our young people have also told their ‘Guardians’ that they are no longer friends with S, and that they now understand why their relationship with her was inappropriate. Partners have reported that family relationships have improved and Schools have reported an increase in engagement – reinstating ‘protective’ factors into these vulnerable females’ lives.

Despite S being previously unknown to Police, we now have 42 pieces of intelligence about her on the Police System. In addition, she has just been charged with 3 sexual offences and 3 drug related offences in relation to Operation WATERSIDE. Her bail conditions remain: not to be with, or contact, anyone under the age of 16. In addition, as a result of the analysis of her phone, a prolific Macclesfield male has been charged with 7 drug related offences. Another individual, one of the males (from a neighbouring force) suspected of CSE, was caught with drugs in Macclesfield and given a Conditional Caution with conditions to help continue to safeguard our ‘at risk youths’. These conditions include: “NOT TO BOOK, VISIT, OR RESIDE IN HOTELS IN THE MACCLESFIELD AREA WITH ANYONE UNDER THE AGE OF 18 YRS” and “NOT TO ASSOCIATE WITH ANYONE UNDER THE AGE OF 16 YRS IN MACCLESFIELD, (EXCLUDING RELATIVES).”

On reflection, during the initial analysis stage we needed to put more emphasis on Partners engaging their young people about S; our original strategy of waiting for the young people to bring her up lost valuable time. However, once intelligence began to come through, we revisited our approach and asked Partners to be more proactive.

Finally, while assessing our response, it became clear that we had displaced S to a neighbouring Force. However, because of Partner’s good relationship with the young people, we were immediately notified about this through intelligence. We were able to liaise with BTP and the neighbouring Force to provide them with intelligence about S and our vulnerable youths. They put markers on their own systems so their Officers would be relayed appropriate information allowing them to take suitable action if S, or our vulnerable youths, are encountered. We also revisited our vulnerable Youth’s parents and advised them that, if their children were visiting the Town Centre of the neighbouring force, they should be accompanied by an adult.

Number of words: 3979
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[letter of endorsement](op Waterside.doc)