


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U. S. Department of Justice  
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# **Neighborhood Crime, Fear and Social Control**



# **Neighborhood Crime, Fear and Social Control:**

A Second Look at  
the Hartford Program

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F. J. F  
T. W. M.

## ABSTRACT

In 1976, a unique effort to curb burglary and robbery as well as fear of these crimes in an urban neighborhood was implemented in the Asylum Hill section of Hartford, Connecticut. The program had three components:

1) By closing some streets and by making others one-way, through traffic using residential streets was substantially reduced. In addition, the residential character of the neighborhood was reinforced by creating visual entrances into the neighborhood from the busy streets that surrounded it.

2) A neighborhood police team was created, together with a Police Advisory Committee consisting of resident representatives, to strengthen the relationship between police and residents.

3) Formal organizations in the neighborhood were created and/or strengthened to provide effective ways for residents to work on neighborhood problems.

It is critical to understand that the components of the program were not themselves intended to affect crime and fear directly. Rather, they were intended to be catalytic and to create an environment in which the residents of the neighborhood could have a substantial impact on the rate of stranger-to-stranger crime and the extent to which people were afraid or concerned about crime.

The program was initially evaluated in 1977, after it had been fully in place for about a year. That evaluation showed that arrests of persons committing burglaries and robberies in Asylum Hill had risen markedly. There was evidence, of increased use of the neighborhood by residents and some, more limited, evidence of increased informal social control. The most encouraging findings were that the rate of burglary in the neighborhood dropped well below expected levels, and the robbery rate probably improved as well. Moreover, some of the measures of fear and concerns about crime, particularly those with respect to burglary, also improved.

Because of the importance of this experiment to a general understanding of the factors that affect crime and fear and because of its potential to improve conditions with respect to crime and fear, a second evaluation of the program was carried out in 1979, three years after complete implementation.

In 1979, the program was not the same as it had been in 1977. It was found that the police component of the program had changed markedly. Among other things, there had been significant manpower reductions in the Hartford police department and police service in 1979 was not the same as in 1977. One of the

concrete signs of the change was that arrests for burglaries and robberies in Asylum Hill dropped sharply to near pre-program levels. However, the community organizations were still active; the street changes were still in place; and the traffic through the area, if anything, was even lower in 1979 than in 1977.

The most significant finding of the re-evaluation is the extent to which North Asylum Hill residents increased in their behaviors and feelings related to informal social control of their neighborhood. Residents reported using the neighborhood more, a better ability to recognize strangers, a much higher incidence of actually intervening in suspicious situations and a markedly increased perception of neighbors as a resource against crime. Every measure related to informal social control was significantly improved in 1979 over pre-program levels. Moreover, there was an accompanying widespread confidence that the neighborhood was growing in strength: people felt that the neighborhood was improving and would continue to improve.

Second, some of the measures of fear and concern about crime were better than pre-program measures, while others remained stable. However, in the rest of Hartford, these measures had been rising steadily. Thus, if fear and concern about burglary and robbery had increased at the city-wide rate in North Asylum Hill, we would have found them to be significantly higher than they actually were in 1979.

Third, the levels of burglary and robbery appeared to rise between 1977 and 1979, returning approximately to the levels that one would have predicted from the city-wide trends.

The research results support five critical conclusions:

- 1) Environmental design changes can strengthen a neighborhood. Making a neighborhood more residential can have positive affects on the extent to which residents exercise control over a neighborhood area and on the way they feel about their neighborhood and neighbors.

- 2) Strengthening informal social control in a neighborhood can have a positive effect on fear of and concerns about crime.

- 3) Fear of crime in an area is more related to the character of a neighborhood than to the actual rates of crime.

- 4) Increased informal social control in an urban neighborhood does not, by itself, necessarily lead to crime reduction (at least given the period of time evaluated here).

- 5) There is correlational evidence that aggressive, effective arrest activity by police may deter crime in a neighborhood area.

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## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

### OVERVIEW

In 1976, an experimental effort to reduce residential burglary and street robbery/pursesnatch and the fear of those crimes was implemented in the Asylum Hill section of Hartford, Connecticut.

The most distinctive feature of that program was its integrated approach: police, community organizations and physical design changes were all used to create an environment in which residents would be more likely to control their neighborhood and to reduce opportunities for criminal behavior.

After that program had been in place for a year, a careful evaluation was carried out in 1977 (Fowler, et al., 1979). That evaluation produced evidence of some positive results:

- 1) Burglary was significantly reduced.
- 2) Street crime was probably also reduced.
- 3) Residents' fears and concerns about these crimes appeared to improve.
- 4) There was some evidence of increased informal social control in the area.
- 5) Arrests of burglars and robbers operating in Asylum Hill increased markedly.
- 6) There was evidence of increased use of the neighborhood by residents.

It was decided to re-evaluate the effects of the program in 1979, three years after the program was fully implemented. One reason for a second evaluation was concern that the positive results might be short-lived. In such a program it is not uncommon to see an initial positive response that does not endure. Second, although there were some positive effects on crime and fear, a number of the hoped-for changes in the character of the neighborhood did not materialize within a year, particularly changes in feelings about the neighborhood. It was thought that more time might be needed for these changes to occur. A second look at the neighborhood two years later obviously would help address both of those uncertainties.

This is the report of the re-evaluation of the program in 1979, some three years after it was fully implemented. In essence, data on the variety of

measures used in the initial evaluation were up-dated, so that the situation in 1979 could be compared both with the years before the program was implemented and 1977, when the program had been in place a year.

This report addresses three main topics. First, the program itself and its implementation are described in some detail. It is, of course, essential to describe a program in order to evaluate its impact. Moreover, the longitudinal nature of the evaluation permits description of the evolution or changes in the program over a three-year period and provides some general lessons about "crime-control" programs.

Second, the Impact of the program on crime and fear of crime is evaluated.

Third, some basic ideas about crime control and fear reduction are examined. This is the most important feature of this experiment. Informal social control is perhaps the most pervasive variable in community crime prevention theories. The Hartford experiment was an effort to reduce crime and fear by creating conditions under which informal social control would grow. This re-evaluation contributed to understanding the conditions that foster informal social control and the role of informal social control in the reduction of burglary and robbery and the fear of those crimes.

## PROJECT BACKGROUND

### Introduction

In 1973, the predecessor of this project was funded by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) through a grant to the Hartford Institute for Criminal and Social Justice.

Then, as now, the problem of what to do about community crime was a top priority question – and one to which there was no certain answer. There were, however, some interesting ideas. Some correlational studies suggested that crime was not distributed randomly. In particular, the physical design of an area and the way people used an area appeared to affect crime rates and patterns (Jacobs, 1961; Angell, 1968; Newman, 1972; and Reppetto 1974). The Hartford Project was designed using an understanding of the dynamics of community crime to produce an intervention that would reduce crime and fear of crime in an existing residential neighborhood.

There were several premises that underlay the initial project:

- 1) Robbery and burglary were the target crimes because of their prevalence, and the fact that they were committed by strangers, which made them among the most fear-producing crimes.
- 2) Fear of crime was as much a target as crime itself.
- 3) A neighborhood area was a reasonable level at which to attempt to reduce robbery and burglary.
- 4) A considerable amount of robbery and burglary is casual and unplanned. A path to crime reduction is deterrence through opportunity reduction.

5) The physical design of a neighborhood area is one feature that affects criminal opportunities. Proposed efforts at crime reduction should address physical design changes as one potential resource.

6) A variety of factors can affect criminal opportunities. The programs most likely to succeed would probably be multi-faceted.

The plan was to build a team of experts to analyze the features of a neighborhood with a relatively high rate of burglary and/or robbery. Its first task would be to identify the characteristics of the area that seemed to create criminal opportunities. Its second task was to design a feasible intervention that would reduce criminal opportunities and thereby crime and fear. The NILECJ grant was to fund the planning and evaluation of such a project.

Hartford, Connecticut was chosen as the site for this test for three reasons. First, there were neighborhoods in Hartford similar to those in many other cities where crime is a major problem. It seemed essential to test the approach in areas where extensive crime control efforts were most needed and most likely to be attempted. Second, the Hartford Institute of Criminal and Social Justice provided an ideal organization to carry out such experiments. As a non-profit institute outside city government, with strong working relationships with city officials, the police department and the business community, it offered a potential for successfully coordinating and implementing a complex experiment which did not exist in many other cities. Third, the project required independent funding of the proposed crime control program, including any physical design changes required. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) could only fund the planning and evaluation components of the experiment. In Hartford, there was an expressed willingness on the part of private and public interests to make capital investments in an existing neighborhood, if a feasible and convincing plan could be developed.

#### Planning the Program

In 1973, an interdisciplinary team was assembled to work with the Hartford Institute, which included experts in urban design and land use planning, as well as criminological, police and research experts. Using existing police record data, data from a sample survey of residents, site analysis and the results of interviews with offenders, police officials and other knowledgeable people, this team assembled a composite picture of crime and fear in the target areas. The principal focus of the analysis was the way the neighborhood environment contributed to the creation of criminal opportunities. The analysis also included an assessment of the roles, current and potential, of citizens and police in opportunity reduction.

The area chosen as a target was Asylum Hill, a residential area a few blocks from the central business district of Hartford. The 5,000 residents lived mainly in low-rise apartment houses and some two- or three-family houses. The area was racially mixed and consisted largely of single residents, young and old. It had a high rate of transiency and street crime.

Briefly, the analysis concluded that this neighborhood had become non-residential in character, because of the large amount of vehicular and pedestrian traffic that passed through each day. Residents avoided their

streets and yards, did not know their neighbors, could not exercise any control over who used their neighborhood, or for what purpose. Offenders could comfortably wander residential streets in such an environment. Although the composition of the neighborhood and the nature of the housing contributed to this situation, the extensive use of the neighborhood by outsiders was considered to be an important contributing factor – and one that could be changed.

The physical design team proposed:

- a) To restrict vehicular traffic through the neighborhood and to channel most remaining through-traffic onto two major streets within the neighborhood.
- b) To define visually the boundaries of the neighborhood and sub-parts of the neighborhood.

These changes were to be realized by creating cul-de-sacs at a few critical intersections, narrowing the entrances to some streets, and making other streets one-way. The combination of these changes, which could be accomplished in a reasonably short period of time at a modest cost, was intended to make the neighborhood more residential – to make it more a place that belonged to the residents, of which they would feel part of which they would take care.

The Hartford police were very well regarded by Asylum Hill residents. Their pattern of rotating assignments within a centralized department, however, did not foster intimate knowledge of the neighborhood, its physical environment, the patterns of crime, or the residents and their concerns.

The plan also proposed that a decentralized team of police be assigned permanently to the area. It was felt that police could be more effective in opportunity reduction if they were familiar with the neighborhood. This also would provide an opportunity for increased communication between citizens and police so that each could support the efforts of the other more effectively. Decisions about policies and procedures would more likely reflect neighborhood priorities.

It was felt that an increased citizen role in opportunity reduction would result from the physical changes and, perhaps, from closer relationships with the police as well. However, an important part of the program entailed encouraging existing community organizations and stimulating the development of others. Community organizations were needed to enable citizens to participate in the planning and implementation of the physical changes. Their approval of the plans was required before the physical improvements could be funded. In addition, such groups provided a mechanism for establishing a Police Advisory Committee through which citizens and police could discuss concerns, problems and priorities. Finally, it was thought that such groups might, on their own, initiate activities directly related to crime and fear or to improving the neighborhood in general.

The purpose of the community organization component of the program was not simply or primarily to mobilize citizens to fight crime. This component instead was seen as an essential ingredient to implementing all parts of the program. Moreover, the goal of increased citizen involvement in crime reduction was expected to be achieved through the combined effects of the

physical changes, the reorganization of police and the work of the community groups.

### The Program Implementation

Community organization work began in the fall of 1974. At that time, there was one existing resident organization serving the northern part of the neighborhood. Over a period of six months two more organizations serving other parts of Asylum Hill were formed.

The initial agenda for community meetings was the way the physical environment affected the neighborhood and how changes might improve the neighborhood as a place to live. Later, a Police Advisory Committee was formed, including representatives of the three major community groups. Over time, the groups initiated block watch programs, recreational programs for youth, improvements in a large neighborhood park and worked with others in Hartford to try to stabilize the housing situation in Asylum Hill.

The Hartford Police Department created a district which included Asylum Hill early in 1975. Within the district, two teams were created, one of which was designated to serve Asylum Hill. The team had geographic stability, a high degree of interaction with citizens, and it gained a moderate amount of autonomy in decision making.

The physical design plan underwent a long period of review during which a number of details were modified. Approval was difficult to obtain for several reasons. It was the most radically innovative component in that it proposed closing off several streets to through traffic. The logical connection between closing streets and crime reduction is a subtle one, more so than that between police or citizen efforts and crime, and therefore more difficult to communicate. The proposed street closings necessarily affected directly more people than the other two program components, including residents and businesses on the streets to be closed, city departments providing services in the area, and political officials of the city. Therefore more people had to be consulted and convinced of the value of the changes.

Eventually a plan was approved which entailed eleven changes in the public streets, all in the northern half of the neighborhood.\* Two key east-west streets were closed to through traffic. A number of other streets were narrowed at intersections; one was made one-way. One north-south street and one east-west street were left open to carry traffic not routed around the neighborhood. The goal was to make most of the streets in the neighborhood of use primarily to residents. Some of the street narrowings were also intended to give definition to neighborhood boundaries. The intersection treatments were designed to be attractive, including planters and areas for resident use. Work began in June, 1976. All street closings were complete by November, 1976. Some of the final landscaping was added in the spring of 1977.

\*The community organization and team policing components of the program were implemented for the entire Asylum Hill neighborhood.



## 1977 Evaluation

From the outset, evaluation of the program was a central part of the project. Hence, extensive data were gathered, starting in 1973. A detailed evaluation was prepared as of the spring of 1977, after all parts of the program had been in place for about a year (Fowler, et al. 1979).

The 1977 evaluation indicated that during the 1976-1977 experimental year, residential burglary in North Asylum Hill decreased by nearly half while robbery/pursesnatch at least leveled off. Both rates increased for Hartford as a whole.

There were corresponding changes in patterns of fear of these crimes among residents of the area. These changes occurred only where the physical design changes were in place, together with the police team and the citizen organization efforts; they were not apparent in areas without the street changes (South Asylum Hill through 1977 and North Asylum Hill from 1975 to 1976). The short-term conclusion was clearly that the program had a direct effect on crime rates and on fear.

Although the data on the impact of the program were relatively clear, the data on why the program worked were less so. There was evidence that the program had positive effects on resident behaviors that were crucial links in the model. Frequency of walking in the neighborhood increased significantly; this was found to be related to a significant increase in ease of stranger recognition. Residents were also much more likely to have made regular arrangements to watch one another's<sup>1</sup> homes. However, general attitudes and perceptions of neighbors and the neighborhood had not changed significantly. Informal social control was supposed to be the key to the way the program would work. Yet, the evidence for increased social control - while present - did not seem commensurate with the burglary and fear reductions observed.

There was some evidence of change in offender behavior. During the 1976-1977 evaluation year, there was a substantial shift in street robbery/purse snatch from side streets where they had predominated to main streets. Since this shift occurred (though in a smaller way) in South Asylum Hill as well as North Asylum Hill, we assumed it was the result not only of street changes, but also of citizen and/or police efforts.

The number of arrests of burglars and street robbers increased substantially in 1976 and climbed even higher during the evaluation year. The police seemed to become more effective. Police were generally more positive in their perceptions of the neighborhood, police-citizen relations, and their own work. Citizen attitudes toward the police, however, did not change for the better. In some cases, they became more negative.

## SIGNIFICANCE OF RE-EVALUATION

The results of the 1977 evaluation were inconclusive in two critical respects. First, it is easy to think that the impact observed on burglary and other crime-related measures may have been short-term. It is not uncommon to see some initial effects of an experimental program that quickly disappear.

More important, however, was the failure of the program after one year to show a marked effect on a variety of measures related to commitment to the neighborhood and informal social control. Although there was some increased use of the neighborhood and an increase in informal arrangements to watch homes, the variety of measures reflecting the ability and willingness to control events in the neighborhood did not indicate the substantial improvements which had been predicted and which would seem to be required in order to affect crime and fear levels over a long period.

By extending the evaluation, the opportunity was created to better understand neighborhood dynamics and to determine which factors play critical roles in reducing crime and fear. The reevaluation would provide greater understanding in four areas.

### Physical Design

One issue was the potential significance of the physical design of a neighborhood. The Hartford Project certainly had its roots in the work of Jacobs (1961), Angel (1968), Newman (1972) and Reppetto (1974). Each of those studies suggested that the way a neighborhood was built and used made an important contribution to the likelihood of crimes occurring in the neighborhood. The critical mechanism through which the environment affected criminal opportunities was informal social control. In essence, each of these researchers concluded that the way the physical environment was built affected the ability and willingness of people to control an area. In environments where would-be offenders were more likely to be observed, where they were more likely to be questioned, where they felt that intervention was more likely, offenders would be less likely to operate. These ideas are more fully developed in Tien et al. (1975) and Fowler (1979).

The theory about the relationship between the physical design of a neighborhood and informal social control was based on correlational studies. Researchers observed that neighborhoods with more favorable environmental designs seemed also to have more effective social control. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Hartford experiment was that it was the first time that physical design changes were implemented explicitly to increase the ability of residents to exercise informal social control over their neighborhood area.

### Informal Social Control and Crime

If the level of informal social control exercised by residents of North Asylum Hill actually increased as a result of the experiment, there were two other important hypotheses that could be addressed. First, the research cited above posited that increased Informal social control would reduce criminal opportunities, and thereby, reduce crime rates. This is an hypothesis that is difficult to examine on a cross-sectional basis. Multi-neighborhood studies are needed. Because neighborhoods often differ in a variety of ways, it is difficult to sort out the independent effects of informal social control or cohesion from other important determinants of crime, such as proximity of offenders. Although the Hartford project has its own problems with sorting out causality because of the potential for more than one change to occur over time, its longitudinal design provides a unique potential to see whether changes in informal social control coincide with reductions in crime rates.

## Informal Social Control and Fear of Crime

At the time the Hartford Project was initiated, research on fear of crime had not progressed very far. In the interim, primarily as a result of the Reactions to Crime Project at Northwestern University, there has been a substantial amount learned about the origins and correlates of fear. There are two critical conclusions that emerge from the Northwestern research. First, the actual rates of crime have relatively little to do with the extent to which people are afraid of crime (Skogan and Maxfield, 1980). Rather, neighborhood conditions have much more to do with the average level of fear that neighborhood residents report.

The conditions that are likely to create fear include what they labeled "incivilities": abandoned buildings, teenagers and drunken men hanging around and other signals that things are out of control or disorganized (Lewis et al., 1980). In essence, the issue of social control or social order shows up as playing a critical role in the origins of: fear of crime, much as similar variables play critical roles in the hypothesized link between the physical design of an area and the crime rate. It is not surprising, then, that Newman and Franck (1980) have found just such a link between the design of housing projects and their measures of fear of crime.

Again, if increased informal social control is observed in response to the Hartford Project, there is the potential to examine its relationship to fear of crime more closely and on a longitudinal basis.

## Police Efforts

Finally, a central idea underlying the design of the Hartford experiment was that neither police nor residents can control crime alone. The program was designed to create mechanisms so that police and residents could more effectively work together to reduce criminal opportunities.

The role of the police in affecting the rates of crime has long been uncertain. In the mind of the public, and probably police officials as well, police are thought to play a critical role in deterring crime. However, research over the past decade has consistently failed to show much relationship between what police do and actual victimization rates. In fact, based on research studies, it would be easy to conclude that police have little or no effect on crime rates (see for example Kelling, 1974; Greenwood, 1970; 1977; Wilson, 1975). However, a recent study by Wilson and Boland (1979), showed that aggressive arrest policies seemed to be associated with lower robbery rates. The relationship between police activity and crime rates remains **unclear**.

The situation with respect to police activity and citizen fear of crime is even less clear. When asked what they think should be done about crime or the fear of crime, people invariably ask for more foot patrol officers and more police in general. There is not much evidence, however, that intensity of police presence has much direct effect on residents and their fears. In fact, residents seem to be relatively unaware of variations in police activities (e.g. Kelling, 1974).

The Hartford Program included a control area in which the police and citizen components of the program were implemented but not the physical design changes (South Asylum Hill). As a result, the Hartford experiment provides some opportunity to look at the significance of police activity for affecting crime and fear over time with and without physical design changes.

### Hartford

In addition to these four major areas there are some other potential benefits to be gained from this re-evaluation. Among the most intriguing is the opportunity to look at the evolution of an experimental program over time and to consider the implications of changes that may occur for both those who would plan programs and those who would evaluate them. However, the central significance of the re-evaluation of the Hartford Program is the potential to improve our understanding of:

- 1) The potential for physical design changes to affect informal social control.
- 2) The significance of informal social control in affecting the rates of burglary and robbery within the neighborhood.
- 3) The role of informal social control in affecting resident fears about crime.
- 4) The relative roles of residents and police in affecting the levels of crime and fear.

### ABOUT THE REPORT

This report of the evaluation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the data, the methods used to collect the data and the analysis approach. It is intended as a general methodological chapter; more detail is available in the appendix.

Chapters 3 through 7 describe the neighborhood and the program components as implemented and as they evolved. We think it is essential to have a good understanding of what is being evaluated. These chapters provide the detail needed. In particular, Chapter 4 provides the rationale for the program; Chapters 5, 6 and 7 describe the three program components.

Chapter 8 presents the evidence regarding neighborhood changes in the degree of social control and social order. Chapter 9 and 10 present the evidence regarding changes in crime rates and residents' fears about crime. Chapter 11 is a more specific effort to sort out causality: to examine evidence that supports or refutes the hypothesis that the program itself caused, or affected, what happened in North Asylum Hill.

Finally, Chapter 12 is a discussion of the general implications of this research.

## CHAPTER 2 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYTIC PROCEDURES

### INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses two topics. The first, a critical part of any evaluation, is the information available to the researchers. In this case, a distinctive strength of the project was that information was collected in a variety of ways from a variety of sources. This multi-method approach reduces the likelihood that biases in the measurement process will affect the conclusions that are reached. The first part of this chapter describes the data available for the evaluation. Additional details about data collection procedures can be found in the appendix.

The second part of this chapter describes the analytic approach that was used. It includes a discussion of some of the difficulties in reaching firm conclusions based on a single experiment and the way the researchers attempted to solve those difficulties.

Although parts of this chapter may seem technical to the general reader, most of it is not. Familiarity with the issues discussed is important to assessment of the evaluation conclusions.

### DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES

The design for evaluating the Asylum Hill experiment called for collecting data from a wide variety of sources. Measuring critical variables in more than one way helps to increase confidence in the findings. The following is a description of the kinds of data that were developed by or made available to the researchers.

#### The Resident Surveys

The program was designed to reduce the rates of burglary and robbery/purse snatch and the fear of those crimes. Victimization surveys provide a consistent measure of the rate at which such crimes occur over time. The surveys also provide critical measures of people's fears and concerns about crime.

In addition, the surveys provided data about the demography of the neighborhood, people's perceptions about problems, their attitudes and experiences with police, and the quality of their relationships with neighbors.

Five different sample surveys were carried out as part of the total evaluation effort. The survey procedures were virtually identical each year, except for being restricted to Asylum Hill in 1976, and had the following characteristics:

a) Probability samples of households were selected throughout Hartford, with an oversampling of households in Asylum Hill to increase the reliability of estimates in that area.

b) Interviews were carried out by telephone wherever possible; personal interviews were carried out in households for which we were unable obtain an up-to-date telephone number. About half of the Interviews were done by telephone and half in person.

c) Complete interviews were taken only in households where residents had resided six months or more. If no one had lived in a selected household for six months, only a brief screening Interview obtaining descriptive information about the household was completed.

d) From among adults In the household who were 18 years old or older and had resided in the household for six months or longer, an objective selection procedure was used to designate a specific adult to be the household respondent. No substitutions were permitted and no interviewer discretion was involved in either household or respondent designation.

e) Response rates for all surveys were in the 70 to 80 percent range.

f) The vast majority of the questions in the survey instrument were repeated unchanged in each survey.

Additional details on the survey procedures, and a complete copy of the survey instruments, can be found in the appendix.

The sample sizes varied somewhat from survey to survey. The number of cases In the surveys in the target area, North Asylum Hill and in the balance of Hartford is presented in Table 2.1.

### Assessing the Physical Environment

An initial analysis of the physical environment in the neighborhood by the urban design team rested heavily on observations of the area. Since the physical design of the area and the way the neighborhood was used by residents constituted a critical part of the analysis of "the problem", it was important to have measures of these phenomena.

The surveys provided a reading on these issues. Questions about walking In the neighborhood, using the park, and seeing neighbors on the street formed one set of measures about how the neighborhood was being used by residents.

In addition, we wanted systematic observation of the neighborhood by urban design specialists. To accomplish this, the original urban design team walked the North Asylum Hill streets in 1977 and again in 1979 at specified times of the day. Their observations included the conditions of the street treatments, the way the street treatments seemed to be working, the condition of the housing stock, any changes in land use, and, most importantly, observations about the climate in the neighborhood and the way the neighborhood spaces were being used by residents and non-residents. The results of these observations were not quantitative. However, they provided information about these important dimensions of the neighborhood area.

TABLE 2.1

Number of Interviews and Response Rates for Resident Survey by Year and Area

<u>Area</u> _____ -	<u>Year</u>				
	<u>1973</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1979</u>
North Asylum Hill	93	88	79	193	218
South Asylum Hill	92	88	67	105	106
Rest of Hartford	<u>706</u>	<u>380</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>587</u>	<u>299</u>
Total	891	556	146	885	623
Response Rate	77%	74%	65%*	76%	73%

\* 71 percent in North Asylum Hill.

These observations were supplemented by two quantitative measurement procedures. Vehicular traffic through the neighborhood was, of course, the primary target of the street changes. Twenty-four hour traffic counters were installed in strategic places throughout the neighborhood before and after the street changes.

The flow of pedestrians through the neighborhood was considered to be an important aspect of the way the neighborhood was used. A set of observers was placed on neighborhood streets to count pedestrians. They recorded the amount of pedestrian traffic, as well as estimates of the age, sex, and ethnicity of pedestrians, at six specified hours of the day. These counts also were done before and after the street changes were in place. Both vehicular and pedestrian counts were repeated in 1979.

Thus, information about the physical design component of the neighborhood came from resident surveys, from the observations by the urban design specialists, from traffic counts, and from systematic pedestrian counts.

### Police Activities

Data from the resident surveys provided information regarding citizen perceptions of police and the extent to which citizens were contacting and informing police about events in the neighborhood. The information from the survey was supplemented in three ways.

First, police officers serving on the police team in North Asylum Hill completed questionnaires in 1975, when the team was first formed, and again in 1977 and in 1979. These questionnaires asked officers about their perceptions of the neighborhood, particularly its crime-related problems, and about their own performance and effectiveness.

Second, information about police activities in the neighborhood came from conversations with police officers and observations of police activities. In 1976 and 1977, as the full program was being implemented, a consultant to the project who was an expert on police spent a day or two every few months observing the Asylum Hill police officers in action. He would talk with leaders and ride with patrol officers. In addition, the Hartford Institute staff held periodic meetings with the leaders of the Asylum Hill police team during that same period. As a result, Hartford Institute staff members were informed about events in the police department and served as excellent sources of information.

In 1979, information about police activities was updated primarily through talking with police leaders. Interviews lasting over an hour were carried out with the current team leader, the current district commander, and the officer who had been the team leader for the majority of the time between 1977 and 1979.

The above data sources were supplemented by a third source, police record data. Figures on arrests were obtained from the police department. From the same records, we obtained official police statistics on crimes reported to the police department and information about arrested offenders in the Asylum Hill area.



## Community Organizations

The resident surveys provided some information about resident perceptions of community organization activities. However, most information about the activities of the community organizations came from other sources.

When the program was first developed, Hartford Institute staff members worked closely with community organizations leaders. They attended most major community meetings. In this way they were able to provide detailed, first-hand descriptions of the activities and efforts of those organizations.

In the initial evaluation in 1977, several neighborhood leaders were also interviewed by the research staff. These interviews included questions about the activities of the community organizations in the area and about problems in the neighborhood.

In 1979, the principal investigator interviewed leaders of the two major resident organizations, as well as three other people whom staff members at the Hartford Institute thought would be good informants about events in the neighborhood between 1977 and 1979.

## Conclusion

Thus, the data available for this evaluation came from a variety of sources. It included both qualitative and quantitative information. In most cases, data were available from more than one source about any particular aspect of the neighborhood.

## ANALYTIC APPROACH

### Introduction

There were two principal tasks of this evaluation: to conclude what actually happened in Asylum Hill and to elucidate, to the extent possible, the general lessons to be learned on the basis of the experience of Asylum Hill.

There are five major methodological problems that had to be addressed in the course of our analysis. These are discussed in the following sections.

#### When Did the Program Start?

The model for measuring the impact of a program is to compare values before a program was implemented with those after it was implemented. Such a model assumes that a program is implemented on a single day. However, that was not the case in this experiment.

As was discussed briefly in Chapter 1, meetings with community groups began in the fall of 1974. A police team was in place, though far from fully operational, in the spring 1975. The street changes were not implemented until the fall of 1976. In this report, the preprogram period is assumed to be that prior to the summer of 1976, when the streets were closed in North Asylum Hill.

From monitoring the events in North Asylum Hill, there is little difficulty in arguing that there was no effective program in place prior to the summer of 1975. It was only then that meetings between the police department and community

organizations got under way. It was only then that the police team and the resident groups began to develop programs and activities which were different from those that existed before. However, there can be little doubt that during the 1975 - 1976 year there was activity in North Asylum Hill that was different than what had gone before.

There are four main reasons why we have chosen to treat the pre-program period as ending in 1976, not in 1975. First, "the program" was intended to be an integrated package with all components in place. A basic assumption upon which the experiment was based was that an integrated three-pronged effort would be more effective than single elements implemented in isolation. Second, with this in mind, the evaluation design was set up and organized around evaluating the impact of the total program. In particular, because the 1976 survey was done only in Asylum Hill and not in other parts of Hartford, the data are not well suited to assessing 1975 to 1976 impacts. Third, examining the Asylum Hill data provided no evidence of an improvement in either crime or fear in the North Asylum Hill area between 1975 and 1976. Finally, to the extent that anything good was happening prior to 1976, our tests of program impacts will be conservative, because estimates of preprogram levels will be more positive than if there had been no program.

#### Creating Preprogram Estimates

A further analytic issue was the actual calculation of preprogram values. Three surveys were carried out in Asylum Hill prior to full program implementation in the summer of 1976 and two parallel surveys were carried out in the rest of Hartford in 1973 and 1975. The problem comes in deciding how to use these two or three estimates to create the "best" preprogram estimate.

There are essentially two alternatives. First, one could simply take the most recent estimate prior to the the summer of 1976 as the best estimate of preprogram values. However, any single sample survey estimate is subject to sampling error. A second approach recognizes that the reliability and stability of our preprogram estimates could be improved by combining the various preprogram surveys to create a single, combined estimate.

It is possible, of course, that there was actually a change that occurred between 1973 and 1976. In that case, such an averaging might be misleading. If there were no change, however, the combined estimate is much better.

To handle this problem, we have followed a "rule of thumb" suggested by Kirk (1968) and Weiner (1971): we did not combine 1973 figures with those from 1975 and 1976 if the difference between 1973 and 1975 estimates, using a straight-forward calculation of standard errors of differences, exceeded an alpha value of .20. If the two figures were that different, the "preprogram" estimate in Asylum Hill was simply the weighted average of 1975 and 1976 figures; and it was simply the 1975 estimate elsewhere in Hartford. However, if they did not differ, preprogram figures were calculated by aggregating all samples prior to the summer of 1976.

#### Calculation of Expected Values

One of the most complicated problems facing an evaluation which tries to assess impact is to calculate what the values would have been had there been no program intervention. The simplest assumption is that things would have stayed

the same. However, such an approach assumes that nothing else was going on other than the program that would have affected, in this case, the rates of crime and the fear of crime.

At this time, we have rather imperfect models of the factors that affect the levels of crime and fear of crime. However, it seemed to us that the experience in the balance of Hartford, outside of Asylum Hill, controlled for a variety of possible factors at a city-wide or broader level that might affect either the rate of crime or people's fears and concerns about crime. Thus, in assessing the impact of the program on levels of crime and fear, the estimates of preprogram values were adjusted by the experience in the rest of Hartford in order to develop an expected value.

One could argue that the design would have been stronger had we picked a "similar" area in Hartford and used that as a control, rather than using the entire city. Readers should be aware of what we were and were not doing by using the rest of Hartford as a control. It may be that factors such as unemployment, drug use, the weather, demographic changes and the way media handle crime stories could have some bearing on crime or fear. To the extent that such factors affect the city-wide experience, the kind of correction we did is appropriate.

In all probability, there are also factors that operate at a small-area level that affect neighborhood crime rates. Indeed, that is a premise of the experiment. However, any neighborhood area chosen as a control is subject to its own set of idiosyncratic changes over a three to five year period. In our view, choosing such a single area as a control area does not serve the desired function of helping calculate an expected value for North Asylum Hill.

#### Calculation of Statistical Significance

For most of this report, calculation of differences between groups or between years was accomplished by a simple calculation of standard error of differences based on two sample estimates. A straightforward t-test serves to provide an estimate of the probability that two estimates are statistically different. Sampling errors were calculated by simply dividing obtained variables by the number of sample cases.

Asylum Hill samples from 1975 on were essentially unclustered. Other samples had some clustering. When figures were based on clustered samples, sampling errors were inflated by 10 percent as an average adjustment for design effects. Calculations showed this to be a reasonable average, although it may over - or underestimate the effect for any particular figure. The principle conclusions in this report, however, are based on significance tests based on the unclustered 1979 Asylum Hill sample.

This approach does not apply to the calculations of the differences between an observed crime rate, for example, and an expected crime rate calculated as outlined above: that is, when an observed preprogram crime rate is adjusted by the city-wide experience. For these calculations, we have treated the expected rate as if it were not subject to sampling error, much as is done in a fixed-effect regression analysis model. We then calculated the probability that the observed rate, with its sampling error, was the same as or different from the calculated expected rate. Also, it should be noted that a one-tailed test was used since, in most cases, the only hypothesis being examined was that the observed situation was "better than" that which was expected.

We are aware that the assumption that there is no error in the calculation of the expected value is not altogether accurate. On the other hand, there is no commonly accepted solution to the statistical problem with which we were faced. We believe the approach we used is justifiable.

It is important to realize that the calculation of statistical significance is not an exact science. What we attempt to do is to give readers the sense of the likely confidence they can have that an observed impact is stable, not due to chance variations. In essence, statistical significance is simply a way to flag differences which should be given weight and not dismissed. It is important to realize that the conclusions of this analysis do not rest on any single calculation of statistical significance. Rather, as readers will discover, the pattern of changes and findings which emerge from the analysis is the real basis of conclusions. We feel that the way we have handled the statistical calculations of crime and fear measures is appropriate for the purposes at hand. Although different legitimate approaches would produce somewhat different figures, they would not substantively alter the evaluation conclusions.

### Identifying Causality

In the ideal experimental design, the way one goes about ascertaining that an intervention produces an effect is through replication. If this program had been implemented in approximately the same way in a variety of settings and consistently had produced the same outcome, one would have statistical confidence in the program's effects. However, such designs are almost never implemented in real life. In this case, there was only a single example of the program as implemented; there was no replication.

Consequently, there is no statistical basis for generalizing from this experiment to any other setting. In addition, there is no statistical basis for concluding that the program itself produced the effects observed. The basis for generalizing from this experiment to other settings must be nonstatistical.

The evaluation proceeded by describing the program as implemented and then examining the levels of crime and fear to see whether or not they differed from those expected. Given the fact that crime and fear were the targets of the program, if they changed in the expected way, that itself is evidence that the program had the desired effect. However, since factors could have produced the effects that were not part of the program itself, and since the program was not replicated, we had to look for other ways to establish the link between the program and the levels of crime and fear observed.

The approach on which we had to rely was to specify a model, essentially a set of hypotheses about the way the program would accomplish its goals. If we could show that the intermediate changes occurred as predicted, it would substantially strengthen the argument that it was the program itself, and not some extraneous event, which produced the observed results.

In essence, the credibility of the case that the program was successful, or unsuccessful, rests on whether the combination of evidence about what happened in the neighborhood produces a convincing story. The judgment about whether or not, and how, the program worked must be made by taking into account all the evidence developed in the evaluation effort.

In much the same way, the judgment about the extent to which the program results observed apply to other settings must be nonstatistical. We have attempted to describe the setting and the way the program was implemented in as great detail as possible. Readers looking at the results here will have to rely on their understanding of the dynamics as we describe them to make a judgment about how the experience in Hartford will be of value in other places.

### Conclusion

In some places the above discussion may be somewhat technical for the general reader. However, there is probably a single main lesson to be derived from the above.

As evaluators, we have had to make decisions about the best way to present and organize the data available to us. In many cases, there was more than one way the analysis could have proceeded. The heart of an evaluation is to hold up a set of expectations about what was to be implemented and about the expected effects of the program, and to describe carefully what actually happened in the context of those expectations. Although statistics and figures are used throughout this report as a way of describing events and phenomena which cannot be described in other ways, in the end the judgment of what was learned from this experiment about our expectations and hypotheses rests on nonstatistical grounds.

In the conclusion to this report, we present what we believe to be the major implications and conclusions of this effort. However, the most important part of our job is to provide the basis upon which other readers can look at our data and reach conclusions about the Asylum Hill experiment.

CHAPTER 3  
POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS

INTRODUCTION

In understanding the impact of a crime control program, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the kind of neighborhood in which the project is implemented. The most obvious ways to describe a neighborhood are its size, the kind of housing that is there, the kind of people that live there, the kind of facilities which are there and the kinds of people who use the neighborhood. In this chapter, we briefly describe the housing and population of North Asylum Hill and discuss the stability, and lack thereof of its resident population.

THE PHYSICAL SETTING OF NORTH ASYLUM HILL

North Asylum Hill is a residential area surrounded by some major businesses and institutions. What we have called North Asylum Hill is bounded on three sides by major streets, all carrying a good deal of traffic. The northern boundary of North Asylum Hill is a depressed railroad track; the only public access into North Asylum Hill from the north over the railroad track is across bridge.

On the main streets surrounding North Asylum Hill are located offices of insurance companies. In addition, there is a major hospital and a factory. This land use contrasts sharply with what one finds when one leaves the main streets to enter the heart of North Asylum Hill, which is almost completely residential. Within the area, the only commercial establishments are a few small stores primarily designed to serve the neighborhood needs: a drugstore, a liquor store, a tailor and a small market.

There have been no significant changes in the basic structure of the physical design of the neighborhood or in the land use of the neighborhood since the inception of the project in 1973, with the obvious exception of the street changes which were implemented as part of the program.

Use of the Neighborhood

Because of its location near major institutions and because major city arteries cross through it, North Asylum Hill was, and continues to be, used by numerous people who live outside the area. For the most part, outsiders use the neighborhood to park in and to pass through; it is not that they have particular business in the area itself.

Three kinds of outside users were of particular concern to the physical design team. First, many people simply drive through the area on their way to somewhere else. The various commercial establishments that surround North Asylum Hill and the nearby central business district attract a significant volume of traffic. Understandably, some portion of that traffic finds the route through North Asylum Hill to be convenient and attractive.

Second, a significant number of people use the streets of North Asylum Hill for parking while they do business at one or another of the commercial establishments nearby. Probably the hospital produces the greatest amount of such use; but churches and businesses on the main streets produce some such activity as well.

Third, North Asylum Hill is a major passageway for students walking to and from school. As we will discuss below, there are relatively few school-age children who reside in North Asylum Hill. However, many children who attend schools in Asylum Hill reside north of the area. Both a middle school and a high school located in South Asylum Hill draw students through North Asylum Hill twice a day (coming to school and going home).

One other use of the area is worth noting. A central feature of the North Asylum Hill area is the Sigourney Park. That park provides a place for many potential activities. However, the use of the park by teenagers, who are primarily non-residents, is noteworthy. In addition, there is a liquor store conveniently located across from the park. As a result, the area near the liquor store is a frequent place for young men to hang out during the day and drink.

There is one final set of facilities in North Asylum Hill that should be mentioned. There are no fewer than nine "group homes" located in or around North Asylum Hill. These homes house between 10 and 30 teenage boys and girls, each of whom have had some kind of problem requiring placement in such an institution.

### Housing

The housing stock in North Asylum Hill is dominated by low-rise apartment houses. Nearly 70 percent of the housing units are in buildings with more than four units that are fewer than four stories high. However, in terms of the parcels of land in the neighborhood, two and three-family houses predominate, particularly around the park which is the heart of the residential area. Even though only 20 percent of the housing units are actually located in such buildings, they seem a more important part of the neighborhood than that number suggests.

As the housing stock would dictate, the area is predominately composed of renters. Less than 10 percent of the housing units in North Asylum Hill are owner-occupied. Before the program was implemented, slightly more than ten percent of all housing units were rented in a building occupied by the owner. In 1979 this statistic had increased to 18 percent.

The housing units in North Asylum Hill are small. Over sixty percent of the units are occupied by a single person.

According to 1970 Census figures, there were 3,500 housing units in the area. Our sample surveys did not provide a good basis for revising that estimate. However, there has not been any significant new construction or demolition of housing units in North Asylum Hill between 1973 and 1980. Therefore, the number of housing units has probably stayed about the same.

The vacancy rate has been consistently around 10 percent during the study period.

In addition, at any point in time, there were some units which were in the process of rehabilitation. The housing stock in this area is all old. It requires maintenance and care. According to informants, during the period 1973 through 1976, a significant number of landlords were letting their buildings deteriorate; there was little investment in the property of any kind. Since then, there is clear evidence of increased investment in property through rehabilitation. We do not have a systematically generated estimate of how much of this has occurred.

There have been two factors that clearly have been related to this increased investment. One is that neighborhood groups in Asylum Hill have worked to develop programs and incentives to "fix up" buildings. This potential secondary effect of the program will be discussed more in later chapters. In addition, one factor which has resulted from the increased willingness to invest in housing is an increase in property values. We do not have excellent data on this issue. However, we have compiled information on the sales we were able to identify between 1975 and 1979. We have combined one, two and three-family houses. In fact, there is little difference in the price of those houses in North Asylum Hill. Table 3.1 shows that property values have probably doubled between 1976 and 1979.

The significance of this apparent change in housing values in North Asylum Hill is difficult to assess. One question is the extent to which it is an effect of the program efforts. As noted, there was a community effort to obtain funding to fix up housing in the area. Perhaps more crucially, if the neighborhood became a more attractive place as a result of the program, either due to reduced crime rates or reduced traffic or some combination thereof, that certainly could have a positive effect on house values. In addition, of course, rising suburban prices and rising fuel costs probably work to increase the attractiveness of urban locations. We, unfortunately, do not have a good estimate of the rise in home values in the rest of Hartford, though it seems likely that North Asylum Hill went up faster than the city as a whole.

On the other hand, there is the question of the effect of the increased housing values itself. When housing values increase, it becomes economically feasible to put more money into housing. When the maximum price that any house brings is \$30,000, which was the case in 1976, there is very little likelihood of significant renovation. In contrast, when some houses in the neighborhood are selling for as much as \$85,000, as was the case in 1979, it becomes possible to invest in the housing stock in the neighborhood.

Furthermore, the role of rising house values in attracting new residents is important. The way residents feel about a variety of aspects of the neighborhood may be affected by the perception of increasing housing values.



TABLE 3.1

Median Housing Sale Prices in North Asylum Hill, 1975-1979

Year	<u>Number of Sales</u>	<u>Median Sale Price for 1, 2, and 3 Family Houses</u>
1975	4	\$18,500
1976	9	\$19,000
1977	21	\$25,000
1978	39	\$38,400
1979	43	\$40,000

As noted, it is difficult to sort out all the causes and/or effects of the changes in values in housing stock in North Asylum Hill. However, it is one of the real changes that has occurred since the program was implemented and will need to be taken into account in interpreting the evaluation findings.

In summary, then, for the most part, the housing stock has stayed the same. There has been little or no new construction or demolition in the neighborhood. However, there is evidence of increased investment in the neighborhood; and there is evidence of increases in the value of housing stock in the area greater than can be explained by inflation alone-

### Population Change

The population of North Asylum Hill is noteworthy for its degree of transience. At any point in time during the experimental period, fully sixty percent of Asylum Hill residents had lived in their current housing unit for less than two years (Table 3.2).

The characteristics of the population are, to some extent, dictated by the housing stock. Most of the housing units in the area are small. Thus, over half the housing units are occupied by single individuals. Almost all residents are renters; less than 10 percent of the housing units are owner-occupied.

Households with children are in a clear minority. Only about one in five housing units has any minor children. The dominant group consists of young singles under 40 years old.

The ethnic composition of North Asylum Hill is not so different from Hartford as a whole. About half the population is Black, a little less than 20 percent is Hispanic and the balance is white. There has been an increase in Hispanic households from 1975 to 1979 with a parallel decrease in white households. In Hartford as a whole, in 1979, the percentage of whites is a little bit higher and the percentage of Blacks a little lower (Table 3.3).

The population in North Asylum Hill tends to be somewhat better educated than the city-wide averages. About 40 percent of the adults have some college experience, compared with 31 percent of the city as a whole. However, with respect to income, the population of North Asylum Hill is just about at the city average.

Despite the extremely high degree of transience in the neighborhood, the characteristics of the population of residents have remained remarkably stable between 1975 and 1979. The educational level of the population, the rate of homeownership and the age of the population have registered no significant changes when we compare the populations before and after the fall of 1976, the time when the program was fully implemented. Even the rate of transience has remained stable. Indeed, there are only two changes that reached statistical significance. First, there has been an apparently slight increase in the rate of landlords living in the building they own, the figure moving from 11 to 18 percent of all households. Second, the ethnicity of the area has changed, with the fraction of households consisting of Hispanics increasing while the percentage of households that are white declining. The Black population stayed essentially constant.

TABLE 3.2

Population Characteristics of North Asylum Hill, 1975-1979

	Pre-Program	1977	1979
	N=247 <sup>a</sup>	N=289 <sup>a</sup>	N=287 <sup>a</sup>
<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>N=167<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>N=232<sup>b</sup></u>	<u>N=218<sup>b</sup></u>
Adults with college experience	43%	36%	40%
Households with children	17	22	22
Households with single heads under 40	44	45	36
Black	46	48	49
Spanish/Hispanic	11	16	18*
White	44	35*	31*
Owned households	7	4	8
Renters living in owner- occupied buildings	11	8	18*
Family income \$15,000 or higher	20	17	25
Households with someone looking for work	14	19	12
Households where occupant has lived at current address less than 2 years	59	59	61

a All households screened.

b Households in which current resident has lived there for at least six months.

c Asked only of households where resident has lived there for at least six months.

d Excludes 1973 data.

\* Difference from pre-program significant with  $p < .05$ .

TABLE 3.3

Population Characteristics of North Asylum Hill and All of Hartford, 1979

<u>Characteristic</u>	North Asylum Hill N=287a; N=218b	All of Hartford N=725a; N=623b
Adults with college experience <sup>c</sup>	40%	31%
Households with children	22*	29
Households with single heads under 40	36*	21
Black	49*	34
Spanish/Hispanic	18	20
White	31*	45
Owned households	8*	21
Renters living in owner-occupied buildings	18	23
Family income \$15,000 or higher <sup>c</sup>	25	29
Households with someone looking for work <sup>c</sup>	12	12
Households where occupant has lived at present address less than two years	61*	44

aAll households screened.

b Households in which current resident has lived there for at least six months.

c Asked only of households where resident has lived there for at least six months.

\* Difference with Hartford characteristics significant with  $p < .05$ .

The Important point about these figures is that they provide little basis for attributing change or the lack of it to some major shift in the population characteristics of the residents. For practical purposes, the demography of the area was the same before and after the program was implemented; and any observed changes would have to be attributed to other factors.

### Conclusion

The variables discussed in this chapter constitute the context within which the experimental program was implemented. In looking at housing and population characteristics, one would be concerned if changes had occurred in these respects that affected crime and fear in the neighborhood. It is important to keep in mind throughout the report that the physical design and the demography of the area remained essentially constant.

## CHAPTER 4 THE PROGRAM AS IMPLEMENTED: AN OVERVIEW

In order to understand this evaluation, it is important to understand what actually constituted the program and why the program designers thought it would be beneficial. In this chapter, we will present an overview of the program: the program designers' analysis of neighborhood problems that contributed to crime and fear, the rationale for their proposal and the way in which those proposals were implemented as of the time of the initial evaluation in 1977. The details of the problem analysis and the initial program implementation are described in much greater detail in the initial evaluation report (Fowler, 1979).

After this overview, the subsequent three chapters will provide an updated look, as of 1979, of the state of the program elements.

### ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

The following are the conclusions the program designers reached about the nature of the neighborhood and properties of neighborhood which contributed to the rates of crime and fear in North Asylum Hill.

The crimes of most concern to the program designers were robbery, purse snatching and burglary. Based on analysis of police records and victimization surveys in 1973, it was found that the rate of street crime tended to be somewhat above the Hartford city average; burglary was at or slightly below city levels. By 1975, just before the program was implemented, burglary had risen to a level at or slightly above the rates elsewhere in Hartford.

Two things stood out about the crime patterns in North Asylum Hill. First, the majority of those known to commit crimes in the area were outsiders. They lived within a mile of the area, but not in the area.

Second, street crimes were concentrated disproportionately on residential streets, rather than on main streets. More often, street robbers prefer the impersonality of main streets. To the program designers, this pattern in North Asylum Hill was an indication that the residential streets were impersonal and not controlled by residents.

Residents' relative fears about crime corresponded fairly well with the actual rates of crime. In 1973, street crime was more a concern than was burglary. By 1975, burglary and street crime were of about equal concern to neighborhood residents. However, a distinctive feature of the fears and concerns expressed by residents was that they were comparatively more afraid than the crime rate

would have led one to expect. While their actual rates of victimization were near city averages, their concerns and fears tended to be somewhat higher than the city averages.

One factor which seemed to affect this was the incidence of "incivilities." In particular, there was a considerable amount of known prostitution, a higher than average perceived drug problem and considerable concern about loitering and drunken men. These problems were all perceived to be more severe in North Asylum Hill than elsewhere in Hartford. The perceptions of these problems were correlated with people's fears and concerns about crime.

In looking for origins of the problems in North Asylum Hill, and what could be done about them, the analysts focused on the population, the physical design and the police.

As noted in Chapter 3, the residents of North Asylum Hill lacked characteristics which foster natural social cohesiveness. There were very few homeowners, very few families with children and an extremely high rate of turnover. Moreover, the neighborhood was quite heterogeneous with respect to ethnicity, racial background and age. It has been hypothesized that when neighborhood residents have a great deal in common or when collectively they have a strong commitment to a neighborhood area, it is easier for them to work together to make that area a desirable place to live. The residents of North Asylum Hill did not naturally have this kind of base on which to build.

Not surprisingly, there was also comparatively little formal organization in the neighborhood. Indeed, in 1973, there was only one identifiable neighborhood group, the Sigourney Square Civic Association. At that time, it was neither large nor active.

The urban design specialists identified several features of the neighborhood which they felt made it difficult for residents to exercise control over the neighborhood. Most important, the urban designers felt that the neighborhood was used excessively by outsiders. Over 10,000 cars per day drove through the neighborhood on their way to somewhere else. Pedestrians walked through the neighborhood, with the largest single group being school-age children commuting to and from junior and senior high schools. The effect of through traffic, according to the urban designers, was to reduce residents' ability to control what went on in the neighborhood. With residents outnumbered by outside users, the area became a public area, not a residential area that belonged to the people who lived there.

A major factor in this situation was the location of the area, surrounded by businesses and institutions which attracted outsiders. In addition, however, the traffic patterns encouraged vehicular traffic through the neighborhood. Moreover, the fact that the area had poorly defined boundaries to identify it as a separate kind of place, as a residential area that was distinct from the more commercial areas around it, encouraged outsiders to go through the area, treating it as a thoroughfare. These conditions also discouraged residents from identifying with their neighborhood as a place which they could control.

The Hartford Police Department was organized on a centralized basis. Officers received 60-day rotating assignments to patrol different parts of the

city. Decisions about patrol strategies and priorities were made at Central Headquarters. In general, the police department was very well regarded by residents of North Asylum Hill. However, there was little capability for close working relationships to develop between citizens and patrol officers nor were there easy means to affect police activities and priorities.

The problem analysis can be summarized as follows. Crimes were committed by outsiders. Residents' concerns about robbery and burglary were even worse than the crime rate, probably exacerbated by a sense that disorderly activities - drunks, loitering and prostitutes - were not controlled.

The nature of the population was not one that naturally produced a cohesive, tightly knit community; just the opposite. There was not a strong network of formal neighborhood organizations. The physical location and layout of the area did not promote neighbors getting together. Rather, the volume of outside use of the neighborhood made the residential area much less residential, made it difficult to distinguish neighbors from strangers, people who belonged from people who did not belong. In other words, it made the task of controlling activities within the neighborhood extremely difficult.

Finally, the police were not a particularly effective resource for problem solving at a neighborhood level.

The analysts saw a neighborhood in which offender movement was easy. They saw a neighborhood in which residents were not exercising control over what happened in their space. The problem, as they saw it, was to figure out ways to give the neighborhood area back to the people who lived there; to create an environment in which residents would begin to feel that they were able to exercise some control over what went on in North Asylum Hill.

#### THE PROGRAM

The essential task of the program planners was to design ways to intervene in ongoing neighborhood processes that would reduce criminal opportunities and assuage fears and concerns about crime. A premise of the project had been that citizens, police and the physical design of an area all had a role to play in reducing criminal opportunities. The task for the program designers was to consider ways in which each of these aspects of the neighborhood situation could be strengthened. Moreover, there was the notion that if the various components were mutually supportive, the results were likely to be more successful.


The program as proposed, and eventually implemented, did have three components, each with a single goal: to increase the ability of residents to control events in the North Asylum Hill area.

The physical design changes were the touchstone of the program. The urban designers proposed a set of changes in the streets that would reduce vehicular through traffic in the neighborhood. Some streets would be closed; others would be made one-way. Only two streets would remain open to through traffic within the neighborhood area. (Figure 4.1)

In addition, the urban designers wanted to add definition to the neighborhood boundaries. They proposed symbolic entrances from the main



Figure 4.1  
Street Changes in North Asylum Hill



streets into the residential part of the neighborhood; they proposed planters and attractively designed street narrowings to convey a sense of definition. They wanted to produce a visual sense that the neighborhood area was a place that belonged to residents, a place where people lived, a place that was not just an extension of the commercial areas that surrounded North Asylum Hill.

The program planners also proposed a neighborhood police team. One critical component of this proposal was that a set of officers be permanently assigned to the area with a team leader who had the authority to establish patrol assignments and to set priorities. A second critical part of the police proposal was to create a police advisory committee composed of neighborhood residents. A mechanism was to be established whereby residents could influence police priorities.

Finally, it was considered important to strengthen the neighborhood formal organizations. In part this was needed to enable residents to participate in the planning and administration of the program. Indeed, the process of implementing the physical street changes required evidence of citizen participation and ratification. In addition, though, strengthening the one neighborhood organization and creating additional organizations were seen as a necessary step to help residents help themselves. These organizations would provide a forum for problem solving.

One important and difficult thing to understand about this program is that there was no substance to it. There was no plan for the police to do any particular kind of thing - to patrol in a different way, to concentrate on a particular kind of crime. There was nothing about the program that suggested that the residents were supposed to block watch or initiate "Operation ID" or carry freon horns. The program was simply designed to create an environment which would increase the likelihood that residents could begin to control their own neighborhood and solve their own problems.

These points are very important:

1) The goal of reducing vehicular traffic by making street changes was not to keep out offenders. Rather, it was to create a more residential environment where residents would use the neighborhood more, where the ratio of residents to non-residents on the streets would be improved, where the streets would be quieter and less confused. Hence, both residents and outsiders would feel what happened on the streets was the business of the people who lived in North Asylum Hill. The planners very much wanted to reduce pedestrian traffic through the neighborhood as well. However, they were unable to design a politically feasible way to do that.

2) The police were not expected to engage in any particular program. However, by assigning them to the area and making them work with a Police Advisory Committee, a situation was created in which police were more likely to be an active problem solving force in the neighborhood, addressing the concerns and problems of the people who lived there.

3) More generally, having neighborhood organizations with broad membership and effective leadership potentially provided people with a way of solving problems that concerned them. It was thought that neighborhood organizations might address crime-specific problems. It was also thought that

they might address more general neighborhood concerns. Again, it was not important to the program conception what kind of problems these neighborhood groups addressed. The important feature of what was developed in North Asylum Hill was to have viable, effective community organizations to help work on problems that residents felt needed to be addressed.

In short, the program introduced some changes that increased the likelihood that residents could do whatever it was they decided to do. The program was not a set of activities. Rather, it was an effort to create an environment and some mechanisms out of which a set of activities, formal and informal, would evolve.

## IMPLEMENTATION

The "program" was not put into place in a single day. Meetings with community representatives began in the fall of 1974. The Asylum Hill police team, encompassing not only the target area for this program, North Asylum Hill, but also an equal sized area which we call South Asylum Hill, was first established in the winter of 1975. However, it was some time later that the Police Advisory Committee was fully in place and the organization of the group of officers in North Asylum Hill could be called a police team.

Implementing the street changes took considerably longer. The street changes were controversial. The initial proposal of the urban design team underwent some significant modification. However, in the summer of 1976, construction of the street closings was well underway. The last street changes were completed in the fall of 1976.

An important feature of this experiment was the extent to which it was implemented largely as planned. In fact, it is one of a relatively small number of examples in community crime prevention, perhaps the only one in an existing neighborhood area, where a systematic, multi-disciplinary analysis of crime and fear data led to a well-developed, integrated proposal which in turn was largely implemented.

The implementation process is described in some detail in Hollander et al. (1980). There are some important general lessons to be learned from the implementation experience. In the report of the initial evaluation in 1977, the program as implemented at that point was described in some detail (Fowler et al., 1979).

In the next three chapters, we provide a description of each of the components of the program as of 1979. The purpose of this in-depth review is twofold. First, general conclusions about the correlates of crime and fear emerging from this evaluation will depend on understanding exactly what the program was. Obviously, as Yin (1979) noted, it is essential to describe the reality of the program in order to interpret the changes that did or did not occur. Second, it will be seen that the program as implemented was not static. Moreover, the changes that occurred in the programs were somewhat predictable and provide some generalizations that may be useful in other settings.

Therefore, the next three chapters will present specific information about the nature and evolution of each of the program components and the direct ways in which they affected the neighborhood. After that, we will turn to the more general effects of the program on the North Asylum Hill area.

## CHAPTER 5 THE PHYSICAL CHANGES

### INTRODUCTION

In 1976 construction was completed on the most visible part of the crime control program, the street changes. There were three main things that were done. First, a set of cul-de-sacs was created by closing one end of several streets. These closings were effected by building raised curbs at certain intersections. Emergency vehicles could drive over these, as could any car for that matter; but they created a clear sign that the street was closed.

Second, some streets were not closed but rather the opening at intersections were narrowed. The purpose of such narrowings was to create a sense of a gateway into a residential area.

Third, some streets which had been two-way streets were made into one-way streets.

At the places where streets were closed or narrowed there was a certain amount of landscaping, including trees and shrubs in large planters, so that the street treatments were not only effective but also attractive.

Of course, in addition to the construction, the installation of appropriate traffic control signs was needed to support the system.

The purpose of the various treatments was two-fold: first and foremost, the goal was to reduce the amount of vehicular traffic on residential streets of North Asylum Hill. Second, through the combination of reduced traffic and increased definition of the area, it was hoped that the residential character of the area would be reinforced.

### EFFECT ON TRAFFIC

After the street changes were introduced, there was no question that they had the desired effect on vehicular movement in Asylum Hill. Table 5.1 shows a reduction from 7000 to 1800 cars on "blocked" streets from 1976 to 1977. A smaller but still noticeable reduction of 1500 cars was recorded on those streets which were "narrowed". Even the interior streets which were untreated showed some decline in traffic. While the predicted and desired pattern occurred, slight increases in traffic counts were recorded on border streets and on the interior collector streets.

The table goes on to show that the decreases observed within one year were even more evident in 1979, three years after the street treatments were

TABLE 5.1

Number of Vehicles Passing Selected Sites in North Asylum Hill  
in a Twenty-four Hour Period Grouped by Type of Street Treatment  
and Location for 1976, 1977 and 1979

<b><u>Type of Treatment*</u></b>	<u>Count</u>		
	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1979</u>
<b>Blocked <sup>a</sup></b>	7343	1850	814
<b>Narrowed</b>			
<b>Entrance to cul-de-sac<sup>b</sup></b>	2303	2780	2368
<b>Other<sup>c</sup></b>	6123	4185	3509
<b>Total Narrowed</b>	8426	6965	5877
<b>Untreated</b>	8219	6963	8120
<b>Interior residential<sup>d</sup></b>	24296	26424	22408
<b>Interior collector<sup>e</sup></b>	38886	41229	37370
<b>Border streets<sup>f</sup></b>	63182	67653	59778
<b>Total border/collector</b>	71401	74616	67898
<b>Total untreated</b>	23988	15778	14811
Totals: Interior residential	48284	42202	37219
Interior	87170	83431	74589
All streets			

<sup>a</sup> Includes Sargeant and Ashley Streets west of Sigourney.

<sup>b</sup> Includes May and Willard Streets.

<sup>c</sup> Includes Ashley Street (east of Sigourney) and Huntington.

<sup>d</sup> Includes Atwood Street and Sargeant Street (east of Sigourney).

<sup>e</sup> Includes Sigourney and Collins Streets.

<sup>f</sup> Includes Woodland Street, Asylum Avenue, and Garden Street.

\* Streets with both types of treatments are categorized according to the treatment nearest the counter.

implemented. There were further significant drops on the "blocked" and "narrowed" residential streets in the area. For some reason, which is not immediately evident, there were also noticeable declines in vehicular counts on the other streets where counters were located: on interior collector streets and on border streets. These changes could reflect a decreased use of that part of Hartford, due either to the difficulty of going through Asylum Hill or to some unrelated factor. Perhaps there was something idiosyncratic about the 24-hour period during which the traffic counts were done in 1979, or there may have been a decrease in auto traffic generally due to gasoline prices. In any case, there can be no doubt that the basic significant reduction of vehicular traffic through Asylum Hill was maintained and probably strengthened.

#### PROBLEMS

The other aspect of the street treatments that should be mentioned is their maintenance and repair. An early concern was that the planters would be vandalized, the landscaping ruined and the total effect would be negative rather than positive. The site-inspection team did observe that some planters had been moved. In addition, some of the plantings had not been watered and, therefore, were not as attractive as they should be. However, overall it seems that deterioration had not been excessive.

The traffic control signs are also worth noting. When the street changes were initially implemented, signs were not placed in all the right places. As a result, there were some laughable occasions when numerous cars were caught in cul-de-sacs from which they could not legally escape. On any given afternoon, it was easy to observe people driving over the barriers as their only mode of escape. There were also people who took short cuts over the cul-de-sacs and traveled the wrong way on one-way streets, simply to get from one place to another more quickly.

We do not have an exact reading of the extent to which these problems were resolved between 1977 and 1979. Our inspection did not lead us to think that the signs had been improved to any noticeable extent. There clearly were people who violated the one-way street signs and went through the street closings. In our interviews with police and residents, it was clear that these violations bothered some people. However, it is equally clear from the traffic count data that the main purpose of the street closings, to reduce traffic on key streets, was basically achieved. The violations may be problems from a moral and law enforcement view. However, they did not constitute a significant amount of vehicular traffic.

#### PERCEPTIONS OF VEHICULAR TRAFFIC

As we saw in Table 5.1, traffic was markedly reduced on the few blocked streets, considerably reduced on narrowed streets, and only slightly reduced on most of the streets which were untreated.

Given this actual traffic change it was not surprising to find only slight changes in residents' ratings of the amount of traffic in the neighborhood. In 1977, only residents who lived on blocked or narrowed streets mentioned any reductions in traffic in front of their homes. Clearly the perceptions of traffic reductions were relatively localized.

## PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC AND USE OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD

A general goal of the interventions was to make the use of the neighborhood by residents more likely and to reduce the use of the neighborhood by non-residents. There were several limitations, however, that precluded dramatic changes in use by non-resident pedestrians.

Early in the planning, the environmental design team wanted to block access to vehicles and pedestrians on the Sigourney Street bridge at the northern boundary of North Asylum Hill. This idea proved to be politically and practically untenable. The various city service departments (police, fire, trash collection) were against it, and so were many residents. None of the other street closings were of a nature to impede pedestrian movement.

The only reason to expect any change in pedestrian traffic would be if outsiders began to feel less welcome on the streets or if residents started to use the streets more often. The expectations then about pedestrian flow changes were modest.

The information we have about pedestrian flow comes from pedestrian counts. The counts were made by placing observers at about 20 sites at various times during the day. In the first year after implementation there was no change in pedestrian counts during those times when students were not going to or from school. From 1977 to 1979 there was about a 40 percent increase in these pedestrians, (Table 5.2).

Because the pedestrian data per se do not enable us to differentiate residents from non-residents, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about resident use of the neighborhood. However, there is some evidence from the pedestrian counts that suggests some relative improvement in resident use. A pattern that was apparent from previous counts was that certain groups of residents in the neighborhood were underrepresented in the pedestrian flow. In particular, whites, females and adults over 35 were less apparent on the streets than their rate in the resident population would lead one to expect. The data in Table 5.3 indicate some improvement in the "representativeness" of pedestrians by 1979, particularly among two groups who might stay off the streets because of fear - women and older adults.

## RESIDENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE STREET CHANGES

From the beginning, the street changes were controversial. The most organized vocal opposition came from the owners of the small businesses in the area, who were concerned that the reduction in vehicular traffic in the neighborhood would adversely affect business. Although a referendum taken at a neighborhood meeting produced a victory for those who favored street changes, resident support for the street changes was certainly not overwhelming.

When residents were asked whether they thought the street changes were "a good idea" or "not a good idea", this division showed up. There were more people who favored than opposed the street changes both in 1977 and in 1979. However, the population was not far from evenly split between those in favor, those against and those who did not know (Table 5.4).



TABLE 5.2

Number of Pedestrians Passing Selected sites<sup>a</sup> in North  
Asylum Hill

Type	Counts				
	Preprogram Average <sup>b</sup>	1977	%change <sup>c</sup>	1979	%change <sup>c</sup>
All Pedestrians	8,987	8,042	-11%	10,305	+15%
Children Under 20 Traveling Between 7:30- 8:30 a.m. & 2:15-3:15p.m.	3,432	2,536	-26%	2,525	-26%
Excluding Children Under 20 Traveling Between 7:30- 8:30a.m. & 2:15-3:15p.m.	5,555	5,506	-1%	7,780	+40%

a There were 19 counting sites and counts were made for one hour periods starting at 7:30 a.m., 10:30 a.m., 12:30 p.m., 2:15 p.m., 4:30 p.m., and 6:30 p.m.

b The preprogram count is an average of counts made in 1975 and 1976.

c Change is calculated in reference to preprogram levels.

TABLE 5.3

Observed Demographic Characteristics of Pedestrians<sup>a</sup> Passing Selected  
Sites<sup>b</sup> in North Asylum Hill

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Proportion of All Pedestrians</u>		
	<u>Preprogram<sup>c</sup></u> <u>N=11,110</u>	<u>1977</u> <u>N=5243</u>	<u>1979</u> <u>N=7780</u>
Female	40%	44%	45%
White	22	24	19
Black	60	60	60
Over 35 Years Old	18	24	23

<sup>a</sup> Excludes children under 20 traveling to and from school between the hours of 7:30-8:30 a.m. and 2:15-3:15 p.m.

<sup>b</sup> There were 19 counting sites and counts were made for 1 hour starting at 7:30 a.m., 10:30 a.m., 12:30 p.m., 2:15 p.m., 4:30 p.m., and 6:30 p.m.

<sup>c</sup> 1973 data not available.

TABLE 5.4

Resident Attitude Toward Street Changes In North Asylum Hill, 1977, 1979

<u>Feeling About Street Changes</u>	<u>Proportion of North Asylum Hill Residents</u>	
	1977 N=205 <sup>a</sup>	1979 N=218
Good Idea	42%	38%
Not a Good Idea	28%	30%
Not Sure	30%	32%
	100%	100%

<sup>a</sup> In 1977 this question was only asked of North Asylum Hill residents who said they were aware of the street changes: 14% of the residents were not aware of these changes in 1977 and were not asked their opinion. In 1979 all North Asylum Hill residents were asked their opinion of street changes.

For the most part, those who opposed the street changes did so on the grounds that they made it more difficult to get around North Asylum Hill. Those who favored the street changes did so because they felt they made the neighborhood quieter and more residential. The supposed link between the street changes and crime reduction was seldom spontaneously made by respondents (Table 5.5).

Although the average response to the street changes was not overwhelmingly favorable, feelings about the street changes were not uniformly distributed within the North Asylum Hill population. Interestingly, people who moved into the neighborhood since 1977 were significantly more positive about the street changes than those who had lived there longer (Table 5.6). In addition, better educated respondents were significantly more positive about the changes than those who had not completed high school; and, as a group, white respondents were more favorable toward the street changes than Blacks (Table 5.7). Indeed, among college educated whites and whites who had moved into the neighborhood within two years of 1979, about two-thirds rated the street changes "a good idea".

#### CONCLUSIONS

The significance of the street changes for North Asylum Hill can be summarized in the following four points:

1) Vehicular traffic was reduced significantly on some streets and slightly overall. For the majority of residents, there was not a sense of noticeably reduced traffic in front of their homes. However, there can be no doubt that there was in fact less vehicular traffic on a number of streets in the North Asylum Hill area; and reduced traffic was commonly cited as an effect of the street changes.

2) Overall, pedestrian use of the neighborhood was up. There was no evidence that outside pedestrian use of the neighborhood was either reduced or restructured.

3) Resident use of the neighborhood streets probably increased. Females and adults over 35 probably were more often pedestrians after the street changes.

4) Resident attitudes toward the value of the street changes was divided. There was more support for the street changes among whites and better educated residents. One of the most striking trends was that newcomers to the neighborhood were distinctively more positive about the street changes.

The above may appear to be a mixed success. However, these additional points should be kept in mind. Although the survey data are not overwhelming, interviews with informed, long-time residents produce strong consensus that the neighborhood was made much quieter and more residential by the changes. The physical design observers concurred. Second, although the other parts of the program changed as we shall see in the next chapters, the physical changes remained as implemented. An advantage of physical changes as an intervention is that they can endure. Third, the initial evaluation provided evidence that the physical changes were essential to the positive effects observed in the neighborhood.

TABLE 5.5

North Asylum Hill Residents' Mentions of Effects Street  
Changes had on Neighborhood, 1977, 1979<sup>a</sup>

<u>Ways They Improved Neighborhood:</u>	<u>Proportion of Residents<sup>b</sup></u>	
	<u>1977</u> <u>N=205</u>	<u>1979</u> <u>N=218</u>
Decreased Crime	9%	14%
Fewer strangers/neighborhood more private	9%	7%
Police job easier	7%	4%
Residents take better care of neighborhood	1%	5%
Safer for children	10%	3%
Improved appearance of neighborhood	19%	15%
Decreased traffic	49%	42%
Other improvements	4%	1%
No improvements mentioned	29%	33%

TABLE 5.5 (Cont.)

North Asylum Hill Residents' Mentions of Effects Street  
Changes had on Neighborhood, 1977, 1979<sup>a</sup>

<u>Ways They Made Neighborhood Worse:</u>	<u>Proportion of Residents<sup>b</sup></u>	
	<u>1977</u> N=205	<u>1979</u> N=218
Increased crime	2%	5%
Easier for criminal to work	2%	4%
Police job harder	1%	3%
Bad for business	2%	0%
Traffic problems worse	50%	34%
Parking problems worse	3%	1%
Appearance worse	0%	5%
Other negative changes	5%	1%
No mentions of making neighborhood worse	41%	56%

<sup>a</sup> These questions were asked in somewhat different ways in 1977 and 1979. The 1977 questions were asked only of those residents who were aware of the street changes. In 1979 all North Asylum Hill residents were asked the questions but they were asked to rate the effects on "neighboring" and "the amount of crime" before being asked for additional open ended mentions.

<sup>b</sup> Proportions add to more than 100% because each resident was allowed up to three mentions.

TABLE 5.6

Opinion of Street Changes of North Asylum Hill  
by Residents' Length of Residence and Race, 1979

Feelings About Street Changes	Proportion of Residents					
	Length of Residence for Blacks			Length of Residence for Whites		
	Less Than 2 Years (N=55)	2 to 5 Years (N=34)	6 or More Years (N=9)	Less Than 2 Years (N=31)	2 to 5 Years (N=26)	6 or More Years (N=34)
A good idea	32%	33%	— <sup>a</sup>	73%	47%	30%*
Not sure	43	27	— <sup>a</sup>	17	30	17
Not a good idea	_25_	_40	— <sup>a</sup>	_10	_23	_53*
Total	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%

\* Significantly different from group with less than 2 years residence with  
p < .05.

<sup>a</sup> Too few cases for reliable estimates.

TABLE 5.7

Opinion of Street Changes of North Asylum Hill  
Residents' by Education and Race, 1979

Feelings About Street Changes	Proportion of Residents					
	Not a High School Graduate		High School Graduate only		College or more	
	Black N=23	White N=17	Black N=37	White N=33	Black N=38	White N=41
A good idea	12%	21%	41%	42%	34%	64%*
Not sure	33	42	33	20	40	13
Not a good idea	_33_	_42_	_33_	_20_	_40_	_13_
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\* Significantly different from comparison group with  $p < .05$ .



In this chapter, we looked only at direct effects of the physical changes. However, the real test of their significance is their effect on levels of informal social control, crime and fear – topics covered in later chapters.

## CHAPTER 6 COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

### INTRODUCTION

In 1974, when the initial neighborhood analysis was complete and the outlines of the program had been sketched, the Hartford Institute set out to involve area residents in dealing with crime-related issues. Direct, organized action against crime was never a specific goal of the program planners. Rather, their main orientation was to develop mechanisms whereby residents could participate in planning and decision-making concerning general neighborhood and crime issues.

Two areas cropped up immediately that required resident participation. First, the plans for changing streets had to undergo political ratification to obtain funding from the City Council. In order to demonstrate the support of residents for the plan, it was necessary to have mechanisms for educating residents. An arena was needed where alternatives could be discussed and compromises made. Some measurement and expression of community consensus had to be the eventual product.

In addition, a part of the police component of the program called for citizens to work with the neighborhood team leader on a Police Advisory Committee (PAC). Some mechanism was needed for obtaining adequate neighborhood representation to that committee.

In a more general way, strengthening the ability of neighborhood residents to solve problems was seen as important. Because Asylum Hill was a highly transient neighborhood with little intrinsic, informal social organization or cohesion, formal organizations had a special role to play.

Since the development and evolution of community organizations in North Asylum Hill were not uniform, we will present what happened to each of the five relevant organizations individually. Then we will pull together these threads in the conclusion of this chapter.

### SIGOURNEY SQUARE CIVIC ASSOCIATION (SSCA)

In 1974, SSCA was the only existing resident organization in North Asylum Hill. Drawing representation largely from home owners and long time renters near the park, it was a general-purpose group that claimed as its jurisdiction approximately half of North Asylum Hill.

One of the first steps in making contact with the area residents was to meet with the leaders of SSCA. In 1974, although it might not be fair to call SSCA moribund, neither would it probably be characterized as vigorous. It claimed about 40 members on its roster. Almost all were white, even though the area it served contained about 50 percent black residents.

The crime control program appeared to provide a focus and direction for revitalizing SSCA. SSCA leaders, working with the Hartford Institute staff, played a major role in convening community forums for the debate about the street changes. Of course, it had representatives on the Police Advisory Committee. During the period between 1974 and 1976, the roster of SSCA members swelled to over a hundred.

The agenda for SSCA has always been broader than crime alone. Even in its revitalized state, for which the crime control program was undoubtedly a catalyst, its focus was the neighborhood as a whole. Thus, at a formal level, SSCA sponsored block parties and pot luck dinners for police. Such events were used to recruit new members and also may have enhanced neighborhood, solidarity.

The improvement of the Sigourney Square Park was a continuing concern of SSCA. By 1977, it had also begun to work with Hartford Institute staff and other community leaders in Hartford to see what could be done to stimulate housing rehabilitation and investment in the Asylum Hill area. In fact, the only specific thing SSCA ever did that was directly aimed at crime was to participate in a Block Watch Program where volunteers with CB radios patrolled streets during the early evening hours.

Since 1977, the focus of SSCA continued to evolve in ways which were perhaps predictable from its origins, and it continued to be quite strong. Leaders reported that they could produce eighty attendees at a meeting if an issue of broad interest was at stake. However, crime per se probably played less of a role in the SSCA agenda than ever before. The Block Watch Program gradually faded away in the spring of 1979, basically because of lack of concern and interest. One leader estimated that fewer than half the shifts were covered.

In contrast, SSCA was becoming increasingly active and involved in housing development activities. The initiatives to obtain outside money to support rehabilitation and investment in the area had come to fruition. A program whereby insurance companies lent money to rehabilitate houses at very low interest rates in Asylum Hill was initiated by a group in which SSCA played a major role. This program was later expanded city wide. Federal money was obtained for a similar purpose. Problem houses, apartments where tenants were undesirable or where landlords were not maintaining housing, were targeted by SSCA. City inspectors were called and asked to cite the landlords for code violations. When buildings came up for sale, the group attempted to influence who would buy the buildings and for what purpose. It succeeded in making major renovations in the park.

Overall, the evolution of SSCA is an intriguing one from the point of view of community organization and involvement in crime control. The issue of crime in 1974 was definitely a catalyst for SSCA, providing a focus and a basis for rejuvenating that organization. Over time, however, crime receded to a minor role on the agenda of SSCA, while its more traditional and general concerns

about housing and the quality of the environment continued and grew. In fact, the effect of the crime program was to develop a more sophisticated and professional organization that was more effective than was the case six years before. In 1979, SSCA was still the key resident organization. It was able to effectively solve problems, deal with city hall, marshal resources and, overall, exert a major force on what happened in that neighborhood.

#### CENTRAL ASYLUM HILL ASSOCIATION (CAHA)

The history of CAHA is very different from that of SSCA. It provides an example of another pattern of community participation in crime prevention.

To some extent, CAHA was the creation of the Hartford Institute. CAHA did not exist prior to 1974. When the Hartford Institute began to relate to Asylum Hill residents, there was no mechanism for reaching people who lived outside the SSCA area. Through formal and informal contacts a set of interested residents, most of whom worked in professional occupations, was identified. After a series of meetings, those people became the core of CAHA.

CAHA was different from some other organizations in that its members were renters, professionals and managers, well-educated people who came together because of an interest in the crime control program.

CAHA<sup>1</sup>'s only agenda item was crime. The way CAHA dealt with the crime problem was different from SSCA and from the Western Hill Organization which will be discussed next. CAHA seldom or never held block parties. CAHA's membership was always small. CAHA did not become involved much in housing or urban development issues.

On the other hand, CAHA was extremely effective and eloquent in lobbying for the street changes. The leadership of CAHA became fully enmeshed in the logic of community crime control on which the project was based. CAHA initiated a survey which obtained the kind of documentation in which the politicians were interested in to help support the political feasibility of the street changes.

When CAHA extended its areas of concern, it was not to urban development or housing but rather to other criminal justice issues. CAHA members became interested in capital punishment and mandatory sentences. They studied issues and wrote position papers.

By 1977, CAHA had grown from an initial dozen members to perhaps a roster of 40. However, meetings became less frequent and less well attended. CAHA's agenda was also less clear.

By 1979, CAHA was essentially out of business. Although there were still individuals who considered themselves to be CAHA members, there were no identifiable programs. CAHA was not holding regular meetings anymore.

In essence, CAHA is an example of a single-issue organization whose time came and passed. Recent studies of community organizations involved in crime prevention have shown that crime alone as a focus will not sustain an organization. Either an organization must broaden its issues and concerns or it will fade away. CAHA is a perfect example of such an organization.

#### WESTERN HILL ORGANIZATION (WHO)

The Western Hill Organization provides another contrasting example of what happens to community organizations involved in crime.

Like CAHA, WHO emerged from the efforts of the Hartford Institute. It is the only organization discussed here where membership came largely from South Asylum Hill.

When the Hartford Institute was first going out into the community, trying to identify ways of getting people involved in the crime control issue, a set of landlords met with the Hartford Institute staff about what steps they might take to reduce crime events in and around the buildings they owned. An idea that evolved from that meeting was to have the resident managers or maintenance people form a kind of watch in the area to spot suspicious events or other things that should be of concern.

In fact, the landlords never developed enough momentum to follow through with the idea. However, as a spinoff from that meeting, some older residents of the buildings involved became interested in the project and inquired what they might do. After a series of meetings, the Initial Block Watch Program in Asylum Hill evolved.

In essence, a set of older, long-time residents of Asylum Hill gathered together and volunteered to patrol a small segment of Asylum Hill during the early evening hours. The initial program was focussed south of Asylum Avenue in what we will call South Asylum Hill. Police agreed to train the volunteers. CB radios were obtained, and part of the program was to have a police substation which was manned to receive calls about problems.

The Block Watch Program provided a reason for these older people to get together. The Hill Center provided them with a place to meet. Over time, the group evolved an esprit de corps, and a set of other activities developed unrelated to the Block Watch Program. In essence, WHO ended up serving a very important social function for a set of individuals, as well as providing block watching to the neighborhood.

In 1979, WHO continued in very much the same way it had existed two or three years before, but it was having increased difficulty in finding enough people to volunteer to patrol. Leaders blamed it on some lack of interest and possibly less enthusiastic management of the program. Those in WHO who had an interest in crime had other outlets for their energies, in part through the variety of activities that had been spawned by the Police Advisory Committee which will be discussed below. The important social significance of WHO had been maintained unabated.

## POLICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (PAC)

An Initial part of the program was to set up a Police Advisory Committee (PAC) to work with the team leader of the police unit assigned to Asylum Hill. The PAC was composed of representatives of the three resident organizations described above. It met monthly with the police team leader, and sometimes the district commander, to discuss citizen priorities and concerns and to provide a vehicle for the police to communicate their problems and concerns to residents.

When the Police Advisory Committee was first formed in 1975, the police observers characterized it as largely a waste of time. They felt that the resident members had an unrealistic set of expectations about what police could do. However, over time, all parties seemed to agree that the relationship became more constructive and positive.

It was possible to see effects of the PAC on police priorities in a variety of ways. For example, foot patrols in the park, a recurrent citizen request, were instituted from time to time when manpower permitted. There were highly visible efforts to reduce the amount of prostitution in Asylum Hill, a problem which the police did not like to deal with but which concerned the residents of the neighborhood a great deal. Police also worked at the difficult task of breaking up groups of loitering men and controlling public drinking in response to citizen requests. Ticketing cars for parking violations and violations of the one-way streets created by the street changes was another area where citizen demands for law enforcement were heeded by police, even though they were relatively unattractive jobs from their point of view. Overall, in 1977 when the program was first evaluated, the constructive, positive relationship between the Police Advisory Committee and the police team was a very important and distinctive part of the program implemented in Asylum Hill.

Early in 1979, the Police Advisory Committee had become even more powerful and more important; and it had changed its character and name. Three different events were critical in shaping the situation. First, based in part on the experience in District Five, of which Asylum Hill is a part, the Hartford Police Department set up a Public Safety Committee in each district throughout the city. These Public Safety Committees, in turn, applied to LEAA for funding for community crime prevention programs. The Asylum Hill Public Safety Committee joined with that of another district to submit a grant proposal which was funded. This grant, in fact, spawned five programs: radio block patrols; an anti-burglary effort; a program to focus on sexual assault; a program of services to senior citizens; and a victim assistance program. These programs were run by paid, salaried staff who worked under a director of the Community Crime Prevention Program (the name of the umbrella of all five programs) accountable to the Public Safety Committee (PSC).

At the same time that the PSC activities were extended by the LEAA grant, the importance of its relationship to the district police team declined markedly. As will be discussed in a subsequent section, team policing in Asylum Hill deteriorated after 1977. In 1979, the PSC had very little to do with the police team or its leaders. When it felt the neighborhood needed additional police service, it would go directly to police headquarters. Reportedly, the PSC in Asylum Hill was able to lobby effectively for services to meet its needs.

The Public Safety Committee in Asylum Hill differed from those in the rest of Hartford in the extent to which there was resident involvement. Apparently, representatives of business and service organizations tended to dominate the committees in other areas.. However, in Asylum Hill, where the mechanisms for citizen involvement had been developed earlier, the history of resident control of the committee was maintained.

The evolution of the Public Safety Committee provides another example of the way in which programs change over time. The original PAC was simply a vehicle which enabled residents to express their concerns and priorities to the police. Their influence derived largely from the fact that the local police team leader had to meet with them routinely and appeared to have a genuine interest in attempting to respond. The committee had no real resources of its own. It only had the resources available through the police department. The one program effort of the committee prior to 1977, a program to sell Freon horns to people frightened of walking on the streets, turned out to be a fiscal disaster.

Two years later, the situation with the committee was completely different. The resources that it controlled were not those of the local police department but rather those derived independently from LEAA. There was a paid staff responsible to the committee. Although the relationship with the police team was reduced and the committee no longer could control local police resources through the team commander, the committee did have the political clout and savvy to obtain services from city agencies on an as needed basis. There is no doubt that the Public Safety Committee in 1979 was stronger than, although different from, the Police Advisory Committee that existed in 1977.

#### ASYLUM HILL, INC.

Asylum Hill, Inc. was a non-profit organization established in the early 1970's. It was one of several efforts, funded largely by insurance agencies and other businesses in Hartford, to try to revitalize and develop various parts of the Greater Hartford Area.

In 1973, when the Hartford project was initiated, Asylum Hill, Inc. had some plans for new housing in the Asylum Hill area. There were early efforts to coordinate the crime control program with the efforts of Asylum Hill, Inc. However, it is probably fair to say that the Asylum Hill, Inc. program reached a moribund state by 1974. In part, this may have been the result of some economic setbacks in the middle of the decade which reduced the interest of insurance companies in such ventures. In addition, we were told that Asylum Hill, Inc. had not been successful in establishing strong relationships with community residents on Asylum Hill. Thus, there was a lack of political and community support for its programs. By 1975, when the Hartford Institute was in the process of working out details for implementing the crime control program, little need was felt for directly involving Asylum Hill, Inc.

In this light, it is interesting to find Asylum Hill, Inc. back in the picture in 1979. Its role was as host institution for the LEAA community crime prevention grant. One of the problems that resident groups have in accepting money is the absence of a structure for such rudimentary bureaucratic tasks as

accounting for funds and paying bills. When the LEAA grant arrived, it was necessary to find a corporate entity to accept the funds and employ the staff. Asylum Hill, Inc. volunteered to be that agent.

The community crime prevention program clearly was run and controlled by the Public Safety Committee, not Asylum Hill, Inc. However, this peculiar and special need once again put Asylum Hill, Inc. back at the center of activities in the Asylum Hill area.

#### CONCLUSION

In their studies of community responses to crime, Podolefsky, et al. (1980) examined formal organizations and their efforts in crime-related areas. They reached some intriguing and important conclusions. First, they found that most groups that were active in -crime related activities did not define their organizational goals as primarily having to do with crime. Second, in a similar vein, organizations that started out with a crime-related focus either had to expand the definition of the organization or they faded away. Single-issue organizations, at least if the issue is crime, do not endure. Third, there are limits to voluntarism. Most community organizations find that their ideas for projects require more time than organization members can volunteer. This leads to pressures either to reduce the number of activities or to professionalize, to obtain funds to pay people to do things the organization would have previously tried to do through volunteers.

The evolution of community organization in Asylum Hill demonstrates all these principles. SSCA was always broadly aimed at neighborhood concerns and making the neighborhood better. The crime problem provided a catalyst that revitalized interest in the association. However, crime passed as a major agenda item. The subset of those members who were particularly interested in crime could find an outlet for their interest through the Public Safety Committee. Meanwhile, the organization grew in sophistication and professionalism as it explored ways to revitalize the housing stock in the area.

CAHA, the small single-issue professional group, essentially died. That organization was not rooted in the community. There were not any obvious directions in which that particular membership wanted to expand. In contrast, WHO, born of elderly residents' interest in block watching, endured because of the social need that the organization fulfilled. In essence, while crime was still on the agenda of WHO in 1979, its most important function continued to be social support for members.

In 1979, the Public Safety Committee had resources and an extended agenda. It had significant political power in the city. However, its original reason for being and its original power, to advise the neighborhood police team and structure the use of its resources, eroded. The potential to make the neighborhood better by working through that neighborhood team was essentially gone. The community crime prevention program was a much bigger and far-reaching responsibility. It will be interesting to see what happens when no further LEAA funding is available. Will the Public Safety Committee find other resources and agendas, whereby it can stay in business; or will it find itself a committee with nothing to do?



In conclusion, the goal of the community organization component of the program was to provide mechanisms whereby residents of the area could participate in decision making and problem solving, with special concern for their relationship to the police and with the proposed environmental changes. In 1977, that aspect of the program had been adequately achieved. Indeed, the only reservation we had was that Blacks and Spanish were inadequately represented in most of the community organization efforts.

In 1979, minority participation in formal community organizations in Asylum Hill was probably not much better than it was in 1977. However, in other respects the community organization component of the program would appear to have been strengthened between 1977 and 1979. The problem-solving abilities of the leaders of the SSCA and the Public Safety Committee in particular clearly were much stronger. The leadership was more politically astute. Overall, it would appear that this neighborhood was much better able to take care of itself and to look out for its own interests than was the case in 1975, before the program was started. That capability was obviously one of the enduring aspects of the crime prevention program in Asylum Hill.

CHAPTER 7  
THE NEIGHBORHOOD POLICE TEAM

INTRODUCTION

In 1973, the Hartford Police Department was organized on a city-wide basis. Patrols rotated through different parts of the city on a sixty-day basis.

In looking at ways to reduce criminal opportunities, the program planners concluded that several fundamental changes in police organization could make a significant difference. As noted in Chapter 4, the goal of the changes was not to produce any particular change in police activity. Rather, it was to increase the likelihood that police could and would focus effectively on those problems which would make the most difference to the neighborhood.

The basic proposal was to create a police team that could serve Asylum Hill. There were four elements that were considered essential:

- 1) Geographic stability: The same set of officers would be assigned to the area indefinitely.
- 2) Decentralized authority: The team leader would have the power to make decisions about tactics, policies and priorities, consistent with overall Department policies.
- 3) A formal citizens' advisory committee that would both serve as a vehicle for two-way communication and, most distinctively, give residents some real say in police priorities.
- 4) A good information system so that police would have detailed information about crime patterns and known offenders in the neighborhood.

In the first part of this chapter, we look at the basic organization of the police team. In the latter part of the chapter, we use police record data and data from surveys of police officers and residents to examine police performance and police-resident relationships.

ORGANIZATION

In January, 1975, the Hartford Police Department established district policing. Although the department actually created five different districts which covered all the city, it was only in District 5, which included Asylum Hill, that an actual neighborhood police team was created. In fact, two teams

were created In District 5, each with a neighborhood captain. One of these teams served the area called Asylum Hill, including the areas north and south of Asylum Avenue.

The initial team used a representative group of officers, not a group that was distinctive for its dedication or its abilities. Slightly over 50 men were assigned to District 5, about 25 to each area. The ratio of police to residents in District 5 was approximately at the city-wide average. During the initial evaluation, an outside expert in police operations visited Asylum Hill every two or three months to talk with team leaders and officers. He also observed operations by a variety of means including riding with officers on patrol.

In this update, information about police activities and organization was derived primarily from interviews with the three police officers who were most knowledgeable about the Asylum Hill police team. This information was supplemented to some extent by interviews with resident leaders who were active in the community.

#### Geographic Stability

Geographic stability was seen as one of the important goals of the neighborhood team police. In this way, police officers would be able to develop a familiarity with the residents and the kinds of problems that were of concern to them. In addition, it was thought some kind of feeling or commitment regarding the area might develop among the police officers.

During the first two years of the experiment, there was a reasonably high degree of geographic stability. Turnover among police team members was relatively low. The police team did not deal with all kinds of problems. For example, there was a city-wide burglary squad and a city-wide vice squad that continued to operate, though the Asylum Hill police team also dealt with those problems. A certain amount of crossover between districts with respect to calls for service was necessary. In 1977, we estimated that about a quarter of the calls for service in District 5 were handled by officers from outside the district; whereas, about a quarter of the calls to which District 5 officers responded were actually outside their district. Thus, the men did not handle everything in their area. However, members of the team delivered the majority of police service to Asylum Hill.

In 1979, geographic stability had deteriorated a great deal. Spurred by manpower shortages, there had been an increasing trend over the preceding two years to eliminate district integrity. There were two concrete ways in which this was done. First, central headquarters had taken over the assignment of men. On a routine basis, men were assigned from one district to work in another district. This happened on individual days and, when needed, for weeks at a time. As a result, there were very few men who on a routine basis could be said to work in Asylum Hill. The Police Department claimed it did not have adequate person power to cover all needed assignments unless it had this kind of flexibility.

The other key change was in the behavior of dispatchers. In 1977, dispatchers attempted to have calls for service responded to by a district officer if it was possible. In 1979, we were told that dispatchers virtually ignored district boundaries in assigning men to respond to calls for service.

In 1979, a district commander and a team leader still had some responsibility for police activities in the Asylum Hill area. Moreover, there was a set of men who worked more in Asylum Hill than anywhere else in the city. However, the size of that force was drastically reduced. District 5 had over 50 men assigned to it in 1975; the 1979 figure was less than 30. The District 5 men were divided about equally between the Asylum Hill team and the other team that serviced another neighborhood in that district.

Prior to 1975, the Hartford Police Department operated as a city-wide police force, with patrol officers rotated every 60 days from district to district. The 1979 system offered somewhat more geographic stability than that. There was a set of men that saw its main assignment as Asylum Hill and that spent a majority of its time working in Asylum Hill. However, since 1977, when the program was previously evaluated, there was a great reduction in the extent to which geographic stability of men and continuity of service characterized the police presence on Asylum Hill.

#### Decentralized Command

Decentralized command was considered to be another important goal and reason for having a police team in Asylum Hill. A main reason for having a neighborhood police team was to enable procedures and priorities to reflect the special problems and needs in the Asylum Hill area. A police leader who had the knowledge and authority to determine police activities in the area, within general guidelines established by the Department, was considered to be an essential part of this.

When the police team was first established in 1975, there were difficulties with respect to decentralized command. A long tradition of centralized authority existed in the Hartford Police Department. Even though the Chief of Police recognized the importance of giving authority to the team leader, it did not come easily. During the first year or so there was a good deal of checking back and forth. Neither the team leader nor some of his commanding officers in central headquarters felt completely free to let him operate on his own.

By the end of the second year of the program, however, this aspect of the team matured a great deal. The Hartford Institute played some role in pointing out the issues and stimulating both the central command and the neighborhood leaders to confront the issues directly. Eventually, they worked out an acceptable set of guidelines for authority. By 1977, the police team leader enjoyed a great deal of autonomy with respect to assigning men to tasks and setting priorities and patrol activities in this area.

In 1979, the district commander and team leader no longer exercised the kind of control over decisions in the area that they did in 1977. When questions were asked about what happened, the first response was always the reduction in manpower. For example, the Asylum Hill team leader said that he no longer had any decisions to make. On a busy afternoon, he claimed that he ran about 3 to 4 hours behind in responding to non-emergency calls. He said

that two years earlier, he had to explain to residents why he responded to some of their requests and concerns but not to others. He noted that in 1979 he no longer had to explain. He no longer responded to anything except direct calls for service and help.

No doubt the manpower reduction had a significant effect on the ability of the team leader to exercise authority and command. Indeed, in 1977 the police specialist was concerned that a team of less than 25 men was too small to have the excess capacity needed for specialized activities and patrols. Clearly that concern is even more appropriate for a team of fewer than 15 men. However, in our opinion, the reasons for the changes go beyond the reduction in manpower.

Starting in about 1977, there appears to have been a clear pulling back of authority into central headquarters and away from the team leaders. Two critical areas can be cited. First, in response to the manpower shortage, central headquarters took over responsibility for assignment of men on each shift. At that point, not only was the geographic stability undermined, but the team commander no longer had control over his own manpower. Rather than having the flexibility to reassign his own men to days and shifts to utilize his personnel most effectively, the team leader did not know from one day to the next how many, much less which, officers he would have at his disposal.

The other clear issue was the extent to which central dispatchers overrode district integrity. The most important aspect here was that the team commanders no longer had control over what their men did. Although that issue was something of a problem in 1977, in 1979 the team leader stated that he felt like little more than a coordinator of activities in his district.

Consistent with the increased importance of central headquarters, there was additional evidence of pulling back. Team leaders and district commanders began to spend less time in district field offices and more time in central headquarters. This may have been in part because it was increasingly important to coordinate and communicate with officers in central headquarters. In addition, it seems almost certain that there was a symbolic element to this pattern.

#### Police Advisory Committee

The relationship to citizens was perhaps the most distinctive aspect of the police component of the program in Asylum Hill. One of the first concrete steps was the establishment of a Police Advisory Committee (PAC). This committee consisted of representatives of the various community organizations. It met at least once a month with the team leader, and often the district captain as well, to discuss police-related problems and issues.

Although many team police experiments have stated that increased citizen input was a goal, the extent to which citizen influence of police priorities was achieved in Asylum Hill by 1977 appeared to be distinctive. On the police side, it was reported that initial sessions were not very constructive. Citizens presented gripes and demands, and had unrealistic expectations to which police could not respond. After six months, however, the group settled down seriously to work more constructively with police on neighborhood problems.

Police team leadership appeared committed to the idea of being responsive from the outset. Police leaders attended meetings. They also met regularly with staff members of the Hartford Institute, where many issues and concerns were discussed. It was clear that the police leadership from 1975 to 1977 in Asylum Hill was distinctively dedicated to the idea of making this aspect of the police team experiment work.

There was considerable concrete evidence that in fact the process did work. For example, foot patrols in the park were a recurrent resident request to which the police were responsive. Focussed efforts against prostitution and against loitering by drunks were two other areas that police had in the past avoided that now received priority in response to resident concerns. Finally, one of the clearest examples of resident influence on police priorities was with respect to the street changes. The one-way streets and street closings, together with some parking restrictions that these entailed, created some inconveniences for residents and non-residents alike. Especially at the beginning, some people would go the wrong way down a one-way street, would go over the street closings and would park in illegal parking spaces. The Police Advisory Committee was firmly in favor of strict enforcement. The police, understandably, felt that such enforcement was not a very high priority; it was time-consuming and thankless. In particular, they felt that way because residents were among those most likely to violate the laws. Nonetheless, despite police officer resistance, the police team in Asylum Hill was generally active in enforcing the restrictions that went along with the street changes.

Thus, in 1977 there was an unusual amount of resident influence on police activities. The police team was very responsive.

In 1979, the situation was completely changed. The Police Advisory Committee, then known as the Public Safety Committee, was still intact and active, but its focus had changed in ways described in Chapter 6. The Asylum Hill team leader and District 5 captain rarely met with the Public Safety Committee. The police leader noted that he did not even have the ability to decide which shift he himself would work. With decisions being made downtown, it was unusual for him to be on duty at the right time to attend the Public Safety Committee meetings. He did not feel it was appropriate for him to attend such meetings on his own time. Moreover, given his limited manpower and, more importantly, the limits to his own authority, the Asylum Hill team leader was explicit that he saw little reason to attend Public Safety Committee meetings. He felt there was little or nothing he could do to respond to the problems, issues or concerns that were raised.

In fact, as also was noted earlier, the Hartford Police Department had developed a centralized task force to handle problems throughout the city. If a Public Safety Committee felt it had a special law enforcement problem or concern, the way to have this addressed by the Police Department was to go directly to central police headquarters to request the assistance of the Special Police Task Force. Thus, one of the unique features of the neighborhood police team, its ability to focus efforts on special problems of concern to neighborhood residents, had been taken over, to the extent that it existed at all, by central headquarters. In essence, the Public Safety Committee exerted little or no influence on police service in the area via its relationship with the team leader; what influence it had came by way of central police headquarters.

## Information

Detailed information about the area was expected to be another benefit of having neighborhood team police. Initial analyses showed very poor capability in Hartford to map patterns of crime. This capability was developed only to a limited extent in 1977. There were two officers who at their own initiative had taken a special interest in burglary and robbery and were analyzing the patterns of crime in the area. The Hartford Institute also provided initial technical assistance in crime analysis. However, that was a short-lived activity. It did not even last through 1977.

Given the discussion above, it is not surprising that there was no further evidence of the development of detailed information about the neighborhood by the Asylum Hill police team since 1977. In the period 1977 to 1979, there was no specific crime analysis focussed on the North Asylum Hill area.

## SUMMARY OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

It would probably be unfair to say that there were no remnants of the neighborhood police team remaining in 1979. As noted, there was a set of ten to fifteen officers who primarily worked in Asylum Hill and who were quite familiar with the area. There was a team leader who served Asylum Hill and played some role in organizing police services to Asylum Hill. He certainly had good knowledge of the area and its problems. He and some of his men had informal relationships with residents, as well as a formal relationship with the Public Safety Committee, which gave them access to information about problems and concerns.

The team leader did sometimes assist residents in recruiting police services for the area. For example, there were sporadic continuing efforts to reduce the amount of prostitution in the area and the nuisance caused by loitering drunks.

Despite these qualifications, however, the main thrust of the change since 1977 was the deterioration of neighborhood team policing. What looked like a very strong model in 1977 had radically changed and nearly vanished by 1979. Perhaps the scarce resources available to the police department were a critical part in pulling back authority into central headquarters. Perhaps having five district commanders created a need for control and order that was more compelling than whatever benefits were derived from having a team leader who considered himself responsive to and supported by a committee of residents. Whatever the reasons, the main residual of the police component of the program was the strong Public Safety Committee.

## EFFECTS OF POLICE TEAM PROGRAM

The organizational features discussed above were important, of course, because they were expected to affect the way the police provided service. In this section we examine two other data sources – the questionnaire completed by the Asylum Hill police officers and the resident survey data – for evidence regarding changes in police service.

The analysis is somewhat weakened because we do not have a full array of measures of citizen perceptions of the police prior to 1975. Moreover, we have

no measures of police officer perceptions and feelings prior to 1975. However, since the main purpose of this project is to evaluate the total, integrated program, the restricted time frame for which we have data does not constitute a serious problem. In essence, our task is to identify the significance of the police component of the program as it existed in 1979. For that purpose, the context of 1975 through 1979 is adequate.

It will be recalled that the program as a whole was implemented only in North Asylum Hill. However, the neighborhood police team served both North and South Asylum Hill. Our data from surveys of South Asylum Hill residents essentially provide a replication of responses to the neighborhood police team, though population differences and some significant differences in the character of the area make it less than a perfect replication. Therefore, for this section, we are presenting data for both North and South Asylum Hill, as well as for the rest of the city, in looking at citizen responses to the police.

#### Police Officer Perceptions

One use of the police officer surveys was to obtain information regarding the organization of police services. Generally speaking, the responses of the police officers to the standardized questionnaire supported the conclusions that emerged from the interviews with police leaders. For example, in Table 7.1, we see their answers about the extent to which officers had flexibility on patrol and the effect central headquarters had on district decisions. While police officer flexibility did not change very much, it is very clear that in 1979 police officers perceived central headquarters as having a great deal more impact on district decisions than in 1975.

Two other effects of the erosion of team policing were apparent in the table. When police officers were asked whether or not they thought "team policing" was a "good idea", they were almost unanimously agreed in 1977. In contrast only 38 percent thought it was a "good idea" in 1979. It is clear that somehow the climate with respect to team policing deteriorated a great deal.

It is also interesting to note how police officers rated their job satisfaction. It is important, to understand that there were other changes in the Hartford Police Department besides the erosion of team policing. The cutbacks in manpower, salary disputes and internal conflicts with respect to department management all could easily have had a negative effect on police officer morale. For whatever reasons, job satisfaction was probably down somewhat in 1979 compared to 1977 figures.

A second use of the questionnaire response was to provide 'a reading on how officers saw their performance. The most salient responses are shown in Table 7.2. On three key performance measures, responding when someone calls for help, cutting down crime and clearing cases, the Asylum Hill officers were completely consistent. For each measure, there was a marked increase in their ratings of their performance between 1975 and 1977. Then, there was a marked decrease in their ratings of the team's performance between 1977 and 1979. Consistent with what the leaders said, police officers obviously felt that they were not delivering the quality of police service in 1977 that they had two years earlier.



TABLE 7.1

## Asylum Hill Police Attitudes Toward Their Jobs, 1975-1979

<u>Attitudes Toward Job</u>	<u>Proportion of Asylum Hill Police</u>		
	<u>1975</u> <u>N=17</u>	<u>1977</u> <u>N=22</u>	<u>1979</u> <u>N=20</u>
They are "satisfied" or "somewhat" satisfied with their jobs	53%	86%*	63%**
They feel team policing is a good idea	__a	85	38**
Officers have "little" or "no" flexibility to patrol	12	18	11
Central Headquarters has "a lot" of effect on District decisions	53	45	90**

<sup>a</sup> Data not available.

\* Significant difference from 1975 level with  $p < .05$ .

\*\* Significant difference from 1977 level with  $p < .05$ .

Note: The significant tests shown for this and subsequent tables which present police questionnaire responses were calculated as if the answers were a sample drawn from an infinite population. Of course, this was not the case; all officers were surveyed. There was no sampling in the true sense of the term. However, we felt the calculations would help to give readers a sense of which changes to take seriously given the small number of respondents.

TABLE 7.2

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 Asylum Hill Police Ratings of Their Performance, 1975-1979
 

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	<u>Proportion of Asylum Hill Police</u>		
	<u>1975</u> <u>N=17</u>	<u>1977</u> <u>N=22</u>	<u>1979</u> <u>N=20</u>
Ratings of "very good" or "good"			
Responding when someone calls for help	64%	77%	50%**
Cutting down crime in team area	24	64*	30**
Clearing cases	44	78*	35**

\* Significantly different from 1975 levels with  $p < .05$ .

\*\* Significantly different from 1977 levels with  $p < .05$ .

Table 7.3 presents some concrete evidence of that judgement. One of the effects of the institution of the police team was to significantly increase the number of arrests made for crimes committed in Asylum Hill. The arrests for burglary and robbery in 1976-1977 were more than three times those made in 1974-1975. However, the figures for the two years since 1977 were down in each year to about 60 percent of the total number of arrests achieved in the peak year.

A final area to be considered is the relationship between the police and the residents of Asylum Hill. One of the improvements observed between 1975 and 1977 was in the feelings police officers had about their relationship with residents. In Table 7.4, we can see that police ratings of citizen respect for police actually continued to climb into 1979, but there was somewhat of a drop in their rating of overall relationships between team police and citizens. In general, it seems clear that police felt service delivery problems were more at issue between 1977 and 1979 than police-citizen relations.

#### Citizen Perceptions

It has been observed that changes in police service that seem significant from a police management point of view can go unnoticed by the citizens whom they serve. In part, of course, this is because many citizens do not have direct information about police activities. Thus, perhaps it is not surprising that the citizen responses regarding their perceptions of police services had little relationship to assessments made by observing police activities or from police officer responses.

Several items regarding respondent perceptions of police performance and police-community relations were found to inter-correlate and were combined into a single index or rating of police effectiveness. In Table 7.5, these data are presented for North Asylum Hill residents, South Asylum Hill residents and for people living in the rest of Hartford.

Looking at North Asylum Hill, we see that although there was a basis for thinking that police services had actually improved in North Asylum Hill between 1975 and 1977, citizens' average ratings in North Asylum Hill declined during that period. Then, in the next two-year period when, according to police sources, police services deteriorated, there was no sign of any further erosion of citizen ratings of police effectiveness.

There is an intriguing parallel between those ratings and the other data presented in the table dealing with the frequency with which police officers were seen patrolling on foot and patrolling in cars. Citizens perceived a decline in visible patrol in North Asylum Hill occurring between 1975 and 1977. Police visibility stayed constant between 1977 and 1979, as did the ratings of police effectiveness.

The response patterns in South Asylum Hill were somewhat similar to those in North Asylum Hill. There was some decline in the overall ratings of effectiveness of police by South Asylum Hill residents; the pattern was parallel to that in North Asylum Hill. The visibility of police officers in South Asylum Hill stayed essentially constant during the period.

TABLE 7.3

Number of Arrests Made for Crimes Committed in Asylum Hill  
for Residential Burglary and Street Robbery, 1975-1979

Crime by Area	Number of Arrests				
	1974- 1975 <sup>a</sup>	1975- 1976	1976- 1977 <sup>a</sup>	1977- 1978 <sup>a</sup>	1978- 1979 <sup>a</sup>
<u>North Asylum Hill</u>					
Residential Burglary	30	57	58	32	35
Street Robbery	5	37	40	27	19
<u>South Asylum Hill</u>					
Residential Burglary	10	14	20	10	13
Street Robbery	2	15	41	20	24
<u>Total Asylum Hill</u>					
Residential Burglary	40	71	78	42	48
Street Robbery	7	52	81	47	43

<sup>a</sup> "1974-1975" includes the period July, 1974 through June, 1975, etc.

TABLE 7.4

Asylum Hill Police Ratings of Relationship with Citizens, 1975-1979

	Proportion of Asylum Hill Police		
	1975 N=17	1977 N=22	1979 N=20
Ratings of "very good" or "good"			
Citizens' respect for police	24%	36%	40%
Relations between police and citizens	18	59*	45*

\* Significant difference from 1975 levels with  $p < .05$ .

TABLE 7.5

## Residents' Ratings of Police Performance, 1975-1979

Area Resident Ratings by Year	Rating of Police Performance		Mean score on police effectiveness index <sup>d</sup>
	Police seen patrolling neighborhood on <u>foot</u> "almost every day" or more	Police seen patrolling neighborhood in <u>vehicle</u> "almost every day" or more	
North Asylum Hill:			
Preprogram <sup>b</sup> , N-167	17%	83%	2.81
1977, N-232	5*	69*	2.64*
1979, N-218	4*	73*	2.68
South Asylum Hill:			
Preprogram <sup>b</sup> , N=155	19	68	3.08
1977, N-118	12	67	2.97
1979, N-106	24	68	2.86*
Rest of Hartford <sup>a</sup> :			
Preprogram <sup>c</sup> , N=380	4	58	2.94
1977, N=535	4	42*	2.85
1979, N-299	2	38*	2.62*

<sup>a</sup> Rest of Hartford refers to all of Hartford except Asylum Hill,

<sup>b</sup> This was an average of responses given in 1975 and 1976.

<sup>c</sup> Data were available for the Rest of Hartford only in 1975.

<sup>d</sup> This index combines response to ratings of response time, job done protecting neighborhood residents, and treatment of white, Black, and Hispanic residents. The scores ranged from 1.00 to 4.00 with 4.00 being most effective.

\* Significant difference from preprogram levels within that area with  $p < .05$ .

The data that matched the view of the police officers most directly were those from residents in the rest of the city. For them, there was a significant drop in police effectiveness ratings in 1977 and 1979 from the 1975 levels. Moreover, police visibility in vehicle patrol showed a steady erosion since 1975.

With respect to their perceptions of the police, probably the most important point is that there was no erosion of the rating of police services in North Asylum Hill between 1977 and 1979. Moreover, in the context of a declining rating of police in the rest of Hartford, the ratings in 1979 by North Asylum Hill residents were better than would have been predicted.

The other aspect of importance to citizen orientation to police was their willingness to call the police when it was appropriate. In Table 7.6 we present some relevant measures. The first two measures in the table present answers to hypothetical questions about whether people would report an attempted burglary or a robbery if it happened to them. The rates at which people said "yes" were unrealistically high and showed no tendency to change over the evaluation years, either in North Asylum Hill or elsewhere in the city.

Respondents were also asked whether or not they had called the police for any reason during the year preceding their interview. There was some increase in 1979 over preprogram levels in calling police for both North Asylum Hill residents and those in the rest of the city. There is also an increasing trend among North Asylum Hill burglary victims to report it to the police between preprogram and postprogram levels. The association is not statistically significant given the small number of cases. However, as we will see in Chapter 8, this change was consistent with other data that showed North Asylum Hill residents becoming more active in informal social control in their area.

Thus, overall, citizen ratings of the police by North Asylum Hill residents were down somewhat since the program was fully implemented. However, in the context of the declining ratings of the police in the rest of the city, they may even have been better than would have been expected. From a crime control point of view, probably the more important point was that citizen reporting of crimes to the police was probably up since the program was implemented; and calling the police for any reason may have increased some between 1977 and 1979.

## CONCLUSION

The role police were expected to play in fighting crime and fear in North Asylum Hill was not specified by program planners. Certainly one role was to provide resident groups with a formal, problem solving mechanism for certain kinds of neighborhood problems, such as prostitution or loitering men. It seems almost certain that the police were more effectively serving that function in 1977 than they were in 1979. According to all reports, police did not have resources to do any special purpose problem solving in 1979. Moreover, the working relationship with the Public Safety Committee was minimal.

Police visibility may be important. The sight of a policeman may well reduce fear to some extent. Certainly, citizens almost always want more

TABLE 7.6

Proportion of Residents Who Would Report or Did Report Crimes  
to Police in North Asylum Hill and the Rest of the City

Reporting Behavior	Area	N	Year		
			Preprogram	1977	1979
Would report an attempted burglary	N. Asylum Hill	167 <sup>b</sup> , 232, 218	80%	83%	81%
	Rest of City <sup>a</sup>	380, 535, 299	87	87	83
Would report a robbery	N. Asylum Hill	167 <sup>b</sup> , 232, 218	94	93	94
	Rest of City <sup>a</sup>	380, 535, 299	97	97	92
Called police in last year or so	N. Asylum Hill	260, 232, 218	43	41	49
	Rest of City <sup>a</sup>	1086, 535, 299	36	40	44*
Burglary victims who reported it to the police	N. Asylum Hill	20, 30, 42	58	77	73
	Rest of City <sup>a</sup>	131, 84, 39	73	68	69

<sup>a</sup> Excludes South Asylum Hill residents and preprogram based on 1975 data only.

<sup>b</sup> Excludes 1973 data.

\* Significantly different from preprogram levels with  $p < .05$ .



visible police when asked for their suggestions. Because of the nature of the area, police in the Asylum Hill area are relatively more visible than elsewhere in Hartford. Most residents frequently saw police officers in cars if not on foot. In interpreting the data with respect to fear, we need to recall that visibility of foot patrols in North Asylum Hill declined between 1975 and 1977. Basically the visibility of police was constant between 1977 and 1979.

Finally, it has been questioned whether police activity itself can affect the crime rate over a very large area. Obviously, police can be physically present only a fraction of the time in any neighborhood area. However, there have been some recent analyses which suggest that an aggressive arrest policy may serve as a deterrent to criminals (Wilson and Boland, 1980).

When the program was planned, increasing the rate at which offenders in Asylum Hill were arrested was not an explicit goal. Essentially, it was assumed that the agenda for police would emerge out of the process of meetings between the police team leader and the Police Advisory Committee. However, one result as of 1977 was a very substantial increase in the number of people arrested for robbery and burglary in Asylum Hill once the team was instituted. In the context of a general sense that the effectiveness of police service was reduced between 1977 and 1979, possibly the most salient change from the point of view of the expected crime rate in North Asylum Hill may be the more than 40 percent reduction in the arrest rates. Of course we know that simply because a person is arrested, it does not mean that he/she will be deterred from further crime. Most people who are arrested are not actually incarcerated. However, in looking at the overall changes occurring in North Asylum Hill which might affect crime rates, this change in police activity may be particularly salient.

In conclusion, the neighborhood police team was instituted in Asylum Hill in 1975, approximately one year before the street changes were installed. It was found that from 1975 through 1977, the police team increasingly met the goals it was established to achieve. A considerable amount of autonomy of command evolved. There seemed to be an effective, mutually satisfactory working relationship between the police team and the Police Advisory Committee. The feelings of police officers about their jobs and about the community improved markedly between 1975 and 1977. Police officers reported increased satisfaction with their effectiveness in performing their jobs, and a significant increase in arrests for both robbery and burglary provided some concrete evidence of this. Only citizen perceptions of police performance and police-community relations failed to show similar patterns.

Between 1977 and 1979, the team changed markedly. Decentralized service and resident input into police priorities nearly disappeared. The police saw themselves as less effective, and they arrested many fewer people. At the same time, though, resident ratings of police service in Asylum Hill stayed relatively positive. Their cooperation with police may even have increased.

In the balance of this report, we will be examining what the impact of the program as a whole was on the neighborhood. The information in this chapter alone, however, can serve as an important lesson and warning to those involved in program evaluation. Programs are not static; they evolve and change. The

stability of a program as implemented and the way that it is likely to evolve or change must be components both of program planning and of evaluation. When one reaches conclusions about the impact of a program based on a one-year experience, it is well known that the longer term impact may be different. This experience demonstrates that the one reason why things may be different at a later date is that the program itself may no longer be the same.

CHAPTER 8  
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL

INTRODUCTION

The main way in which the experimental crime control program in Hartford was supposed to reduce crime and alleviate fear of crime was through increasing informal social control in North Asylum Hill. Informal social control requires that residents be both able and willing to monitor and affect what goes on in the neighborhood. The theory is that when there is informal social control, potential offenders - particularly those who live outside the neighborhood - can less comfortably wander the streets looking for targets. When an opportunity arises, the theory is that an offender is less likely to commit the crime if he/she feels that neighbors may be watching and may intervene in some way. The same theory suggests that people will be less fearful to the extent that they feel part of a neighborhood in which people work together to produce order and to control what occurs.

Each of the program components was designed to strengthen informal social control in North Asylum Hill. The key program component in this respect, of course, was the physical design changes: the reduction of traffic through street changes and the increased definition of the neighborhood. By reducing traffic and increasing the residential character of the neighborhood, it was hoped that people would be encouraged to walk the neighborhood streets. Upgrading the park was aimed at increasing its use as well. People who are on the streets and in their yards and in the park are able to exercise surveillance in a way that people who are in their homes cannot. In addition, people who use the neighborhood are more likely to know their neighbors, know what goes on in the neighborhood, and are thus better able to identify suspicious or inappropriate people or behaviors. Furthermore, the quieter, less congested environment produced by reduced traffic would make a would-be offender stand out more, be more conspicuous. Thus, the street changes were designed to make it easier for people to exercise informal social control.

In addition, it was hoped that residents of this environment would be more willing to intervene if they thought it necessary. It was hoped that if residents used the neighborhood more and knew their neighbors better, they would feel more responsibility for affecting what went on in the neighborhood and what happened to neighbors. The entrances were designed to reinforce the residential nature of the area and, more importantly, to enhance residents' sense of belonging to a place. Finally, in a context of less congestion it may seem more appropriate to intervene or to look out for other people.

Although the physical design changes were seen as critical, the community organization and police components of the program also had a role to play in strengthening informal social control. In fact, the roles of the two components were rather similar. In both cases, it was hoped that neighborhood problems which could not be addressed effectively in an informal way could be dealt with either by the resident organizations or by the police, depending on the problem. Thus, the police were called into the fray against prostitutes, loitering drunks and traffic violators while the community organizations addressed cleaning up the parks, working out relationships with the group homes and, perhaps most importantly, working on housing-related problems that affected the neighborhood. Such activities and efforts may have the potential for a direct effect on either the rate of crime or resident fear of crime. In addition, though, they have the potential for providing a sense of hope and power to neighborhood residents. It may well be essential for residents to feel they have access to effective, formal problem-solving mechanisms in order for them to work day in and day out informally to affect what goes on in the neighborhood.

The data on social control and organization constitute the critical link in the evaluation. The entire anti-fear and anti-crime thrust of the program was to provide an environment in which residents would control the neighborhood. The program never included a significant amount of target hardening; installing locks or other physical devices to make it more difficult to get into homes and buildings. In the first two years of the police team, there was a marked increase in the number of arrests made for robbery and burglary. However, as we have seen, the police effort in this and other respects was significantly reduced after 1977. Thus, if the program was to have any hope of affecting crime and fear, it had to be through producing a significant increase in the amount of informal social control exercised in the neighborhood. In this chapter, we review the evidence regarding informal social control and so-called incivilities.

#### USE OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD

There were four questions asked in the resident survey that dealt with use of the neighborhood: frequency of walking in the neighborhood during the day and at night, frequency of being outside in the yard or on the porch, and liking to use the neighborhood parks.

There was a significant increase between 1976 and 1977 in the rate at which residents said they walked in the neighborhood during the day. Although the period 1977 to 1979 showed some drop in the reported frequency of walking in the neighborhood during the day, the rate in 1979 was still significantly higher than before the physical design changes were implemented. There was also a significant increase in reported walking at night between the 1977 and 1979 surveys (Table 8.1).

There was a significant increase between preprogram ratings and 1977 in the rate at which North Asylum Hill residents said they liked to walk in the park. This increase was maintained at the same level through 1979. The number of days that respondents said they spent outside of their homes in the preceding week also increased significantly between 1977 and 1979, though the change between the preprogram rate and 1979 did not quite reach the level needed for statistical significance.

TABLE 8.1

## Use of Neighborhood for North Asylum Hill and Rest of City

Use Indicator	Area	N	Year		
			Preprogram <sup>a</sup>	1977	1979
Walk in neighborhood more than once a week during the day	N. Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	53%	70%*	64%*
	Rest of City	380, 535, 299	58 <sup>b</sup>	57	58
Walk in neighborhood more than once a week at night	N. Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	22	18	27**
	Rest of City	380, 535, 299	15 <sup>b</sup>	19	22*
Like to use nearby park	N. Asylum Hill	123, 177, 174	26	37*	36*
	Rest of City	234, 391, 219	51 <sup>b</sup>	49	51
Average number of days spent outside last week	N. Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	1.7	1.6	2.2**
	Rest of City	380, 535, 299	2.8 <sup>b</sup>	2.6	2.8

<sup>a</sup> 1973 data excluded.

<sup>b</sup> 1975 data only.

\* Significantly different from preprogram levels with  $p < .05$ .

\*\* Significantly different from 1977 levels with  $p < .05$ .

Overall, there appears to be clear evidence that there was a significant increase in the rate at which North Asylum Hill residents were out in their neighborhood after the street changes were implemented. Not surprisingly, there were no similar overall changes elsewhere in the city.

#### STRANGER RECOGNITION

One important precursor to exercising informal social control is knowing who belongs in a neighborhood and who does not. The program planners hoped to improve stranger recognition in two ways. First, if people use the streets more, they are more likely to become familiar with their neighbors. Second, to the extent that congestion is reduced, it is easier to become familiar with people who belong in the neighborhood.

By 1977 there was somewhat of an increase in the rate at which North Asylum Hill residents said it was "pretty easy" to recognize strangers. This ability rose slightly higher between 1977 and 1979 and became significantly higher than the preprogram level, (Table 8.2).

#### TERRITORIALITY

Territoriality is a concept introduced by Newman (1972). His idea was that there are some spaces, pieces of turf, for which individuals take responsibility, which they will supervise and control. In some areas, people feel responsible for only small spaces - for instance, their own housing units and spaces quite adjacent to them. In order to have informal social control operating effectively at a neighborhood level, residents must feel responsibility for larger spaces. To the extent that residents will take control of the sidewalk in front of their homes, of their neighbors' yards, of the parking lot near their building, in short, for areas which do not strictly belong to them but rather belong to the neighborhood, the potential for effectively controlling the area is markedly increased.

There were two measures directly related to the extent to which residents were taking responsibility for or were concerned about what went on in their neighborhood and what happened to their neighbors. One question in the survey asked whether or not people had made arrangements with neighbors to look out for one another's houses. They also were asked whether these were routine regular arrangements or only occurred on special occasions. In 1977 there was a significant increase over preprogram figures in the rate at which there were routine arrangements between North Asylum Hill residents to look out for one another's homes. This significant increase was maintained in 1979 (Table 8.2).

A second measure asked whether respondents had observed any suspicious event in their neighborhood in the year preceding the interview. If so, they were asked whether they had done anything about it. Responses were coded into three main categories: those who essentially did nothing or ignored it, those who intervened directly either by asking the person what he/she was doing or calling a neighbor, and those who called the police. There is probably no measure which more directly captures the concept of "territoriality" than the rate of intervention.

TABLE 8.2

Residents' Territoriality Behavior for North Asylum Hill and Rest of City

<u>Territoriality Indicator</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Year</u>		
			<u>Preprogram<sup>a</sup></u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1979</u>
Have regular arrangement with neighbor to watch each other <sup>18</sup> house	N. Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	16%	26%*	29%*
	Rest of City	380 <sup>b</sup> , 535, 299	32	30	30
Easy to recognize a stranger	N. Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	25	32	35*
	Rest of City	380 <sup>b</sup> , 535, 299	49	54	54
Have intervened in a suspicious neighborhood situation	N. Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	21	20	30* **
	Rest of City	380 <sup>b</sup> , 535, 535	16	17	24* **

<sup>a</sup> Excludes 1973 data.

<sup>b</sup> Based on 1975 data only.

\* Significantly different from preprogram levels with  $p < .05$ .

\*\* Significantly different from 1977 levels with  $p < .05$ .

There was no apparent change in the rate at which "territorial" behavior was reported between 1976 and 1977. However, the 1979 interviews revealed a significant increase in the rate at which respondents reported having intervened in a suspicious event in their neighborhood. In this case, though, there was also a parallel change in the rest of the city for which we have no explanation.

#### NEIGHBORS AS A RESOURCE

Obviously informal social control of a neighborhood is a two-way street. Not only were we concerned about the extent to which residents reported doing constructive things, we were also interested in the way they viewed their neighbors as resources with respect to neighborhood crime control. A number of questions were asked which all seemed to relate to the general topic of the way North Asylum Hill residents felt about their neighbors. To simplify the analysis, as well as to produce a more reliable indicator of respondent feeling, seven items were combined into a single index. Included in the index were the following: whether respondents thought their neighbors would intervene in a suspicious situation, whether the neighborhood was the kind where neighbors help each other, whether respondents felt part of a neighborhood, whether respondents thought neighbors would report a crime to the police, answer questions to help the police and help with the crime control groups; and the extent to which respondents thought neighbors were concerned about keeping crime from happening to others. Details of the construction of this index can be found in the appendix.

When the program was evaluated in 1977, resident perceptions of "neighbors as a resource" had not changed from pre-program levels (Table 8.3). However, between 1977 and 1979, there was a statistically significant increase in the way North Asylum Hill residents saw their neighbors in a helping role. This change provides very clear evidence that North Asylum Hill residents in 1979 had a much more positive view of the part that their neighbors could and would play in controlling crime in the neighborhood. In this case, the pattern in the rest of Hartford was stable, as one would expect.

#### INCIVILITIES

Lewis and his associates (1980) have coined the term "incivilities" to characterize activities that indicate disorders occurring in some neighborhoods. Their observation is that groups of teenagers hanging around, drunken men, drug dealing and prostitution may generate other crimes themselves. However, whether or not they actually generate crimes with victims, they communicate to residents a state of disorder, a breakdown of the mechanisms of social control, that things are out of control. The argument goes that such signs of disorder undermine confidence in the neighborhood and make a major contribution to fear.

Incivilities have been a significant part of the Asylum Hill scene since 1973 when the evaluation began. According to residents' own ratings, drunken men, loitering teenagers, prostitution and drug use were all more likely to be rated "serious problems" by Asylum Hill residents than by residents in the rest of the city.



TABLE 8.3

Rating of Neighborhood as a Resource for Informal Social Control  
of Crime for North Asylum Hill and Rest of City

Index	Area	N	Year		
			Preprogram <sup>a</sup>	1977	1979
Mean rating on neighborhood as a resource for control of crime <sup>b</sup>	North Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	2.85	2.88	3.18* **
	Rest of City	380 <sup>c</sup> , 535, 299	3.28	3.34	3.30

<sup>a</sup> Excludes 1973 data.

<sup>b</sup> The neighborhood as a resource index includes ratings of whether neighbors help each other, whether respondent feels part of neighborhood, the neighborhood's concern about crime, and ratings of whether neighbors would: intervene in a suspicious situation, report a crime, answer questions for police, and help with a crime control group. On a scale from 1 to 5, a high score indicates the most favorable opinions of the neighborhood as a resource for informal social control of crime.

<sup>c</sup> Based on 1975 data only.

\* Significantly different from preprogram levels with  $p < .05$ .

\*\* Significantly different from 1977 levels with  $p < .05$ .

Police have made some effort on at least two fronts to reduce these problems. Back in the 1976-1977 era, when the police team captain was working closely with the PAC, there were several intensive, highly publicized campaigns against prostitutes in Asylum Hill. Since then, the central vice squad has occasionally staged campaigns against prostitution in Asylum Hill. However, neither police nor resident observers felt there had been any enduring impact on the problem. The prostitutes returned after the "hassling" was over. In fact, it is likely that the publicized police efforts against prostitution actually heightened public concerns about prostitutes.

Drinking and loitering have been a somewhat similar focus of attention. Sigourney Park, located in the middle of the residential part of Asylum Hill, has long been an attractive place for older teenagers and young adult men who are not otherwise occupied during the day to "hang out". A liquor store is conveniently located across the street from the park. The combination has created a situation which was stressful for many residents for many years. Police have made efforts from time to time to disperse these gatherings or, at least, to keep them small and orderly. There is no effective legal means of keeping people from congregating in the park or on nearby street corners; and such efforts have not been considered successful.

Police efforts against prostitutes and loiterers certainly diminished greatly during the 1977 - 1979 period as the police team effort was reduced.

When the urban design specialists conducted on-site observations of the North Asylum Hill area, they felt that the problem of loitering men and teenagers was much greater in 1979 than it had been in 1977. Their guess, based on their observations and without seeing data, was that crime problems were likely to be up as a result of the increased pressure from these groups.

When resident survey ratings of all these kinds of problems are combined into an index, the ratings generally were no better and no worse in 1979 than they had been in preceding years (Table 8.4). Public awareness of prostitution as a problem had clearly increased between 1975 and 1977. The only other negative trend, consistent with the urban designers' ratings, was a possible increase in the rating of drunken men as a problem.

The ratings of police were more volatile than the ratings of citizens. In general, police in 1979 considered problems related to drugs to be somewhat less than in the preceding years; and some even thought that prostitution might be somewhat less of a problem, though it still led the list of incivilities (Table 8.5). However, their rating of the problem of teenagers and drunken men, both of which they thought had improved in 1977, returned to pre-1977 levels. Moreover, police officers considered groups of men in the streets or in the parks to be a bigger problem than ever before.

The extent to which these various "problems" actually generate crime can be debated. The police we talked with did not feel that loitering men created very many crimes themselves. However, the urban design specialists said that their presence undermined the ability of residents to control the streets in the area, and their presence helped to create an environment in which criminal activity can occur with less risk of intervention. Moreover, loitering men and teenagers scare some people directly and perhaps indirectly, by communicating a sense of disorganization.

TABLE 8.4

## Residents' Ratings of Neighborhood Incivility Problems, 1973-1979

	Pre-program (N=260)	1977 (N=232)	1979 (N=218)
<u>Percent who rated as a big problem:</u>			
<u>North Asylum Hill</u>			
Use of illegal drugs	41%	45%	39%
Sale of illegal drugs	41	40	34
Loitering by teenagers <sup>a</sup>	40	35	32
Loitering by men <sup>a</sup>	34	33	30
Drunken men <sup>a</sup>	22	28	33
Prostitution	33	59*	57*
Mean score on incivility index <sup>b</sup>	2.06	2.11	2.12
<u>Rest of City<sup>d</sup></u>			
	(N=1086 <sup>c</sup> )	(N=535)	(N=299)
Use of illegal drugs	20%	21%	26%*
Sale of illegal drugs	18	19	22
Loitering by teenagers <sup>a</sup>	26	22	27
Loitering by men <sup>a</sup>	17	13	18
Drunken men <sup>a</sup>	15	10	17
Prostitution	6	8	11
Mean score on incivility index <sup>b</sup>	1.56	1.57	1.68*

<sup>a</sup> 1973 data not included.

<sup>b</sup> The incivility index combines respondents' ratings on the degree of a neighborhood problem on the following: drug use, drug sale, loitering by teenagers, loitering by men, drunken men, and prostitution; on a scale from 1 to 3, a high score indicates the most problems.

<sup>c</sup> Data not available.

<sup>d</sup> Excludes South Asylum Hill.

\* Significantly different from preprogram levels with  $p < .05$ .

TABLE 8.5

Asylum Hill Police Ratings of Incivility Problems In Their Team Area, 1975-79

	1975 <u>N&gt;17</u>	1977 <u>N=22</u>	1979 <u>N=20</u>
<u>Percent Who Rate as a Big Problem:</u>			
People selling illegal drugs	76%	77%	50%* **
People using illegal drugs	88	64	40*
Groups of teenagers in streets or parks	65	32*	50
Groups of men in streets or parks	53	32	70**
Drunken men	41	14*	40**
Prostitution	88	86	70

\* Significantly different from preprogram levels with  $p < .05$ .

\*\* Significantly different from 1977 levels with  $p < .05$ .

A good deal of the significance of this remains conjecture, though our analyses showed that there is an association between perceptions of these incivilities and the extent to which residents are afraid. In evaluating the impact of the crime control problem, however, it is critical to note that these "incivilities" were not curbed since the program was implemented. To the extent that they play a role in engendering crime and fear, these forces will work to undermine and mitigate whatever positive impact on crime and fear the program may have accomplished.

#### OVERALL CONFIDENCE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD

Another component in developing informal social control in a neighborhood is the degree of resident confidence in the area. Unless people feel that some good can come from their efforts and that problems can be solved, they are unlikely to persist indefinitely. The evidence presented thus far suggests a number of improvements in resident feelings about their neighbors, at the same time their perceptions about some neighborhood "problems" remained unchanged.

Since 1973, sample survey respondents were asked whether they thought the neighborhood had been getting better, getting worse or had stayed about the same in the preceeding year or two. They were also asked whether they thought it would get better, get worse, or stay about the same in the upcoming five years.

It is important to note that there was some evidence of a generalized increase in optimism throughout Hartford, though this may in part be a methodological artifact, (see note in Table 8.6). However, even adjusting for the city-wide experience, the proportion of North Asylum Hill residents who perceived that the neighborhood had gotten better in the year or two preceeding 1979 had increased somewhat.

#### CONCLUSION

The findings in this chapter regarding the change of atmosphere in North Asylum Hill are potentially quite important. Virtually every measure of people taking care of their neighborhood and exercising informal social control was significantly higher in 1979 than it had been in any previous year studied. Use of the neighborhood increased according to all measures; stranger recognition improved; residents more often reported that they intervened when they observed suspicious situations; more reciprocal arrangements to look out for burglaries were reported; a greater number of residents perceived their neighbors as a resource against crime. Although ratings of neighborhood problems had not improved, there clearly was an overall improvement in the way residents viewed North Asylum Hill as a place to live.

With three exceptions, these changes were found in North Asylum Hill but not the rest of the city. Whatever the reasons for the city-wide effects, the consistent changes on all measures observed in Asylum Hill point to a distinctive, clear change in that neighborhood.

The central role of informal social control in the general model of community crime prevention makes the data in this chapter of critical importance to this evaluation. The implications of these findings will be discussed in detail in the final two chapters.

TABLE 8.6

Residents' Perceived Change in Neighborhood  
Quality for North Asylum Hill and Rest of City

Perception of Change	Area	N	Year		
			Preprogram <sup>a</sup>	1977	1979
Neighborhood has gotten better in past year <sup>b</sup>	N. Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	16%	18%	39%* **
	Rest of City	380 <sup>c</sup> , 535, 299	6	13	15*
Neighborhood will be a better place in 5 years <sup>d</sup>	N. Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	26	34	57* **
	Rest of City	380 <sup>c</sup> , 535, 297	18	20	32* **

<sup>a</sup> Excludes 1973 data.

<sup>b</sup> In 1979 the question referred to the past two years.

<sup>c</sup> Based on 1975 data only.

<sup>d</sup> The context of this question was different in 1979. The question was preceded by a question asked for the first time, which focused on specific ways the neighborhood might have gotten better in the last few years. This methodological change probably accounts for some of the observed differences in the 1979 levels.

\* Significantly different from preprogram levels with  $p < .05$ .

\*\* Significantly different from 1977 levels with  $p < .05$ .

## CHAPTER 9 IMPACT ON ROBBERY AND BURGLARY

### INTRODUCTION

The goals of this program were to reduce the rate at which North Asylum Hill residents were victimized by burglary and robbery and to alleviate fears and concerns about these crimes, thereby improving the quality of life in North Asylum Hill. The primary way in which the program was to reduce burglary and robbery was through catalyzing increased resident control in North Asylum Hill.

In 1977, when the first evaluation was completed, there was some evidence of increased social control. However, the evidence presented in Chapter 8 shows much more significant changes in 1979 than were apparent in 1977. In fact, virtually every measure indicated that there was more resident control of the area than was the case before the program was instituted.

In a natural setting, it is hard to have a pure test of any theory. However, the clear prediction, based on the program model and the apparently positive findings in Chapter 8, is that there should have been a significant effect on robbery and burglary, reducing their rates well below expected rates in North Asylum Hill.

### THE BURGLARY RATE

Burglary is the crime of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, most often grand larceny or theft. For some accounting purposes, "attempted burglaries" are grouped with burglaries. Attempted burglaries are instances where there is evidence of effort to illegally enter a home, but entry is not successful and, of course, nothing is taken. Because of the difficulty of knowing when such events actually occur, and hence the unreliability of reporting, attempted burglaries are not included in our analysis\*. One difficult task turns out to be deciding what the appropriate estimate of the actual rate of burglary was after the program was implemented. The reason for the difficulty is that the measured rates in 1977 and 1979 are

\*For our analysis of crime rates, we rely only on the victimization experiences reported by survey respondents. Because of various internal changes in the Hartford Police Department, we did not feel that the incidence of burglaries from police records constituted a reliable indicator of the rate at which these crimes occurred. This issue is discussed in more detail in the appendix.

different. One approach to estimating the rate of burglary victimization after program implementation would be to average the measures from 1977 and 1979. The other approach would be to treat them separately and conclude that the impact of the program was different in 1977 than it was in 1979. There is not a right answer about which of these approaches to use. However, we have decided to keep the estimates separate.

One of the most fundamental questions to be answered in this project is whether the rate of burglary victimization was different in North Asylum Hill than it would have been if the program had not been implemented. Another difficult task is deciding what the "expected" level of burglary would have been had there been no program.

We know that burglary rates can be influenced by factors that were experienced city-wide, (e.g., unemployment rates or the weather). Therefore, one reasonable approach to calculating an expected level in Asylum Hill is to apply whatever city-wide trends are observed during the post-experimental period to the preprogram reading in Asylum Hill. This will produce an expected rate in Asylum Hill adjusted for city-wide trends.

The expected burglary rate in North Asylum Hill in 1977, adjusting for the experience in the rest of Hartford, was over 22 burglaries per household (Table 9.1). This figure is obtained by applying the 25 percent increase in burglaries observed city-wide between the preprogram period and 1977 to preprogram burglary rate in North Asylum Hill. The observed burglary rate in North Asylum Hill in 1977 was less than 11 per 100 households, a rate which was significantly lower than that which was expected.

Turning now to the figures for 1979, we see that between 1977 and 1979 burglary victimization rates for the rest of Hartford declined. In 1979, an adjustment for the city experience yields an expected burglary rate in North Asylum Hill of 19 burglaries per 100 households for 1979. The observed rate in North Asylum Hill was exactly the expected rate of 19 burglaries per 100 households.

If a parallel set of calculations is carried out using the percentage of households burglarized, an essentially identical conclusion is reached. Adjusting for the experience in the rest of the city, one would have expected that 15 percent of the households in North Asylum Hill would have experienced a burglary in 1976-1977. The survey showed that only 9 percent of the households experienced a burglary during that period, a rate which was significantly lower than the expected rate. (Table 9.2).

The expected rate in North Asylum Hill in 1979, adjusted for the city experience, was also that 15 percent of the households would experience a burglary during the year. In fact, the observed rate was 14 percent, therefore, one reaches the identical conclusion as above: that the rate in 1979 was not significantly different from what one would have expected.



TABLE 9.1

	N's	Preprogram <sup>b</sup>	Year	
			1977	1979
Observed, rest of Hartford	380, 535, 299	12.4	15.9	13.5
Observed, North Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	17.5	10.6	19.3
Expected for North Asylum Hill, based on experience in rest of Hartford			22.4	19.1
Probability that observed - expected difference is not significant <sup>c</sup>			.01	NS <sup>d</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Rate is computed as number of crimes per 100 households,

<sup>b</sup> 1973 data excluded

<sup>c</sup> Based on one-tailed t-test. Usual probability required for statistical confidence is .05 or lower.

<sup>d</sup> Probabilities are reported as NS if they exceed .20.

TABLE 9.2

## Percent Households Burglarized, Observed and Expected, 1973-79

	N's	Rates per Year		
		Preprogram	1977	1979
Observed, rest of Hartford	380, 535, 299	8%	11%	11%
Observed, North Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	11	9	14
Expected for North Asylum Hill, based on experience In rest of Hartford			15	15
Probability that observed - expected is not significant <sup>a</sup>			.01	NS <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Based on one-tailed t-test. Usual probability required for statistical confidence is .05 or lower.

<sup>b</sup> Probabilities are reported as NS if they exceed .20.

## ROBBERIES/PURSESNAATCH

Robbery is the crime of taking something from someone by force or threat of force. Pursesnatching is akin to robbery in that the victim is present and goods are seized from the victim. There is only a fine line between robbery and pursesnatching, depending on the amount of force used to grab the purse and on the amount of confrontation between the victim and the offender. Because of the basic similarity of the two, we have chosen to combine these two street crimes in our analysis.

All of the discussion about the calculation of expected and observed rates applied to burglary in the preceding section applies equally to the robbery/pursesnatch data (Table 9.3). Moreover, it turns out that the findings are similar.

In 1977, the observed rate was lower than that which would have been expected, and this difference approaches the standard level of statistical significance.

In 1979, the observed rate for robbery/pursesnatch in North Asylum Hill was not different from the level one would have predicted for North Asylum Hill without the program.

There is another aspect of the street crime picture which is worth noting. When the patterns of crime in North Asylum Hill were first analyzed, it was observed that a distinctively high percentage of all robberies/pursesnatches occurred on residential side streets. In other settings, robberies typically occur on main streets, which are less personal. The program designers interpreted this pattern in North Asylum Hill as an indication that the side streets were not under appropriate control by the residents (Table 9.4).

In 1977, after the program had been implemented for a year, one of the striking changes observed was the reduction of the proportion of street crimes taking place on the side streets. When these ratios were calculated for the period since the middle of 1977, it was observed that there had been a change back to the old pattern. In 1977-78, over half the incidents of street crime known to the police in North Asylum Hill occurred on side streets. In 1978-79, the rate was nearly two thirds.

Thus, not only does it appear that the rate of robbery went back up in North Asylum Hill between 1977 and 1979, it also appears that the pattern of geographic distribution of robbery deteriorated during this period.

## OTHER CRIMES IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD

If the residents of North Asylum Hill were effectively controlling destructive and criminal events in the area, there are other events besides burglary and robbery that one might expect to improve. In particular, one would expect to see some decrease in the rate of vandalism or property damage. In addition, it is possible that thefts from mail boxes might be affected by people exercising more control over the neighborhood area.

TABLE 9.3

Robbery/Pursesnatch Rates,<sup>a</sup> Observed and Expected, 1973-79

	N's	Year		
		Preprogram	1977	1979
Observed, rest of Hartford	380, 535, 299	1.5	2.2	1.9
Observed, North Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	4.0	4.2	6.6
Expected for North Asylum Hill, based on experience in rest of Hartford			5.9	5.1
Probability that observed - expected is not significant <sup>b</sup>			.13	NS <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Rates are computed as number of crimes per 100 people, i.e., the number per 100 households divided by average household size.

<sup>b</sup> Based on one-tailed t-test. Usual probability required for statistical confidence is .05 or lower.

<sup>c</sup> Probabilities are reported as NS if they exceed .20.

TABLE 9.4

Location of Asylum Hill Robberies/Pursesnatches by Main Street or Side Street

	1/76- <u>12/76</u>	1/77- <u>6/77</u>	7/77- <u>6/78</u>	7/78- <u>6/79</u>
<u>North Asylum Hill</u>				
Main Street	36%	58%	47%	35%
Side Street	<u>64</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>65</u>
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(107)	(52)	(99)	(109)
<u>South Asylum Hill</u>				
Main Street	42%	52%	43%	51%
Side Street	<u>58</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>49</u>
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(80)	(60)	(90)	(115)

In Table 9.5, we look at the reported rate at which a household experienced vandalism or arson. The pattern observed is not too dissimilar to that for robbery. The rate observed in 1977 was below that which was expected approaching statistical significance. However, there was an increase between 1977 and 1979. The 1979 figure was actually higher than would have been expected to a statistically significant degree.

Table 9.6 reports the rate at which people said their housing units experienced mail box theft one or more times during the year. There is no evidence of any positive effects apparent from the table.

#### CRIMES IN ADJACENT AREAS

North Asylum Hill is surrounded on three sides by residential areas. To the south is the area we have called South Asylum Hill. This area, consisting largely of apartment houses, lies just across Asylum Avenue. It will be recalled that the police team that was part of this experimental program served both North and South Asylum Hill. In addition, there was some community organization activity in South Asylum Hill.

The residential areas to the north and west of North Asylum Hill were not the object of any systematic program. Reportedly, these areas suffered a significant amount of deterioration, and there were a few efforts at rehabilitation during the years we have been looking at North Asylum Hill. In fact, a significant number of the people known to commit crimes in the Asylum Hill area live in this adjacent area. Tables 8.7 and 8.8 show the patterns of robbery and burglary in these two areas adjacent to North Asylum Hill during the evaluation period.

In South Asylum Hill, we first looked at the percentage of households burglarized (Table 9.7). One point to note is the extremely low rate of burglary that characterized the area. The burglary rate in South Asylum Hill was much lower than in North Asylum Hill or elsewhere in Hartford prior to the implementation of the experimental program. The burglary rates remained low, though as the table shows, if anything, based on its rate prior to the summer of 1976 and on the experience in the rest of Hartford, the percentage of households in South Asylum Hill which reported experiencing at least one burglary was slightly higher than one would have expected. With respect to robberies and pursesnatches, the experience in South Asylum Hill was almost exactly what one would have expected. There was no evidence of changes in victimization rates for robbery or pursesnatch.

Looking at the experience in the area adjacent to North Asylum Hill on the north and west, we see that, if anything, the rate of experiencing burglary or robbery/pursesnatch in this area was lower than what would have been expected. The differences were not statistically significant however. (Table 9.8)

There are several implications to be derived from these data. First, in a crime control program, there is always concern with the possibility of displacement—driving crime out of one area and into another. In the case of North Asylum Hill, we observed that burglary was apparently much lower than would have been expected in 1977, though the rate in 1979 was at expected levels. One question is whether burglary was displaced to nearby areas. The answer would seem to be that this is extremely unlikely. There is certainly

TABLE 9.5

Percent Households Experiencing any Arson or Vandalism,  
Observed and Expected 1975-79

	N's	Year		
		Preprogram	1976- 1977	1978- 1979
Observed, rest of Hartford	380, 535, 299	11%	10%	9%
Observed, North Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	12	9	16
Expected for North Asylum Hill, based on experience in rest of Hartford			11	10
Probability that observed - expected is not significant <sup>a</sup>			.15	NS <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Based on one-tailed t-test. Usual probability required for statistical confidence is .05 or lower.

<sup>b</sup> Probabilities are reported as NS if they exceed .20.

TABLE 9.6

Percent Households Experiencing any Mailbox Theft, Observed and Expected, 1975-79

	N's	Year		
		Preprogram	1976- 1977	1978- 1979
Observed, rest of Hartford	380, 535, 299	4%	5%	4%
Observed, North Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	4	7	4
Expected for North Asylum Hill, based on experience in rest of Hartford			5	4
Probability that observed - expected is not significant <sup>a</sup>			.13	NS <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Based on one-tailed t-test. Usual probability required for statistical confidence is .05 or lower.

<sup>b</sup> Probabilities are reported as NS if they exceed .20.



TABLE 9.7

Observed and Expected Incidence of Burglary and Robbery/  
Pursesnatch in South Asylum Hill, 1973-79

Type of Crime	N's	Year		
		Preprogram	1976- 1977	1978- 1979
<u>Burglary</u>				
Observed percent households experiencing burglary	247, 118, 106	3%	6%	5%
Expected <sup>a</sup> percent households experiencing burglary	247, 118, 106		4	4
<u>Robbery</u>				
Observed percent households experiencing robbery/ pursesnatch	247, 118, 106	5	8	7
Expected percent households experiencing robbery/ pursesnatch	247, 118, 106		7	6

<sup>a</sup> Expected rates adjusted for experience in the rest of Hartford.

TABLE 9.8

**Observed and Expected Incidence of Burglary and Robbery/  
Pursesnatch In North and West Adjacent Area to North Asylum Hill, 1973-79**

	N's	Year		
		Preprogram	1976- 1977	1978- 1979
<u>Burglary</u>				
Percent households experiencing burglary, observed	247, 118, 106	8%	8%	9%
Percent households experiencing burglary, expected <sup>a</sup>	247, 118, 106		11	11
<u>Robbery</u>				
Percent households experiencing robbery/pursesnatch, observed	247, 118, 106	5	5	4
Percent households experiencing robbery/pursesnatch, expected <sup>a</sup>	247, 118, 106		7	6

<sup>a</sup> Expected rates adjusted for experience in the rest of Hartford.

no evidence of an increase in burglary in the adjacent areas north and west of North Asylum Hill. And the burglary rate in South Asylum Hill was not significantly higher than would have been expected, based on the experience in the rest of Hartford. Moreover, the absolute increase in burglary is quite slight in the context of the size of the decrease in burglary in North Asylum Hill in 1977. Although patterns of displacement are very difficult to trace with precision, there seems little basis for concluding that what improvement there was in burglary in North Asylum Hill was a result of displacement to other areas. With respect to robbery and pursesnatch rates, the improvements in North Asylum Hill in 1977 were sufficiently modest so that concerns about displacement do not seem warranted.

Another issue which can be addressed by these data is an intriguing reversal of the above. One hypothesis for the apparent increase in the rate of burglary between 1977 and 1979 is that burglary was attracted from some other area. In fact, we have seen that home values increased somewhat in North Asylum Hill, while apparently there was some deterioration in the north and west adjacent areas. It is possible that North Asylum Hill became a more attractive target for burglars between 1977 and 1979, essentially drawing burglary from adjacent areas. We can not fully assess this possibility. However, the lower than expected rates in the adjacent area are consistent with this idea.

Perhaps the most important implication of these data has to do with sorting out the features of the program which are most important to creating the change seen in North Asylum Hill. If it were the police program alone, or police and community organizing, that was responsible for the observed decline in burglary, one would expect equal or similar results in South Asylum Hill. Attempts to explain or understand what happened in North Asylum Hill must include the fact that there was no evidence of reduced crime, either with respect to burglary or street crime, in South Asylum Hill. Significant improvements in crime rates were apparent only in North Asylum Hill and only in 1977 when all three program elements functioning as planned.

#### CONCLUSION

The data in this chapter are most consistent with four general conclusions. First, in the year immediately following implementation of the full program, the rate at which households were burglarized in North Asylum Hill dropped significantly, and the rate at which residents were victimized by robbery and pursesnatch dropped somewhat below expected levels as well. Second, there was apparently a significant deterioration with respect to these crime rates in North Asylum Hill between 1977 and 1979. As a result, the rates of crimes observed in the 1978-79 year were not far from what would have been expected had there been no program intervention.

Third, whatever improvement in burglary was observed did not lead to displacement of burglary to other adjacent areas. Fourth, to the extent the burglary situation in North Asylum Hill was improved, that improvement must be linked to factors which are unique to North Asylum Hill and not shared with South Asylum Hill. The implication of these generalizations for our general conclusions about the program, and programs like this, will be discussed in more detail in the final two chapters.

CHAPTER 10  
THE IMPACT ON RESIDENT PERCEPTIONS AND FEAR OF CRIME

INTRODUCTION

In some ways, reducing residents' fears and concerns about crime was a more important objective of the program than reducing the rate of burglary and robbery. Crime itself, of course, takes its toll on the population particularly its direct victims. However, fear and concern ultimately can affect the quality of life and the attractiveness of an area for all residents.

Interestingly, it is becoming increasingly clear from other research, (e.g., Skogan and Maxfield, 1980) that the actual victimization experiences may play only a minor role in the extent to which people are afraid or concerned about crime. Skogan's research, and that of his colleague Lewis (1980) point to three very different, although sometimes related, origins of people's level of fear. One potentially important factor is the rate at which people are exposed to "incivilities" in their neighborhood. Such things as obvious vice, loitering teenagers and drunken men, abandoned buildings and uncared for property may communicate to people that there is danger. The authors hypothesize that these occurrences are taken as signs of the breakdown of social order. Second, they observe that people's confidence in problem-solving mechanisms in the neighborhood, mechanisms for exercising either formal or informal social control, is related to their fears and concerns about crime. Finally, Skogan has carefully traced the role which can be played by the stories people tell, by the popular images transmitted informally and in the media, in affecting the level of fear in an area.

Although some of these links are tentative and require additional confirmation in order to be firmly accepted, there can be no doubt that the rate of crime alone does not enable one to predict the level of resident fear in a neighborhood. Thus, as we turn to those measures in North Asylum Hill, the predictions are not absolutely clear. Based on the crime rates themselves, one would predict somewhat improved perceptions with respect to burglary in 1977, with deterioration between 1977 and 1979. For street crimes, predicted trends would be more modest but in a similar direction.

When one looks at the ratings of "incivilities", we have seen that there was no improvement in these aspects of the neighborhood. In fact, prostitution and possibly drinking men were rated as more problematic in 1979 than before the program.

However, there was a clear improvement between 1977 and 1979 in people's perceptions of their neighbors as a resource in the control of crime. Indeed,

there appeared to be more "territoriality". Following the suggestive evidence of Lewis (1980) and recent work by Newman and Franck (1980), one would expect such changes in perceptions to be associated with decreased concerns and fears. Moreover, the improved perceptions of the effectiveness of the formal neighborhood organizations also could be expected to have some salutary effect on resident concerns.

Overall there-is-not a clear basis for predicting whether the changes described previously in this report would or would not lead to an improvement in the levels of fear and concerns about crime reported by residents. The prediction of change would depend on one's theory about the origins of fear.

We also need to discuss the problem of what is meant by fear of crime and how we measured it. There are many questions that people have asked which purport to tap such fears or concerns. One can ask about feelings: how worried, say, or anxious people feel. One can ask about cognitions: what are the odds that someone may be a victim? One can ask about behaviors: what people do differently because of their fears. The focus of the question can be on the respondent, the respondent's family, the neighborhood or the city. One can ask about crime in general, or one can ask about specific crimes such as burglary, robbery, car theft or assault. One can ask about different conditions or situations: when one is at home or out in the street, when one is alone or with others, whether it is day or night.

From this myriad of questions, we selected a set of questions and used the same wording in each survey. In this chapter, we will discuss the responses to these measures in two general groups. One group deals with personal concerns about crime. People were asked how worried they were about various crimes occurring to them in different situations, how safe they felt in different situations and how likely they felt they were to be victims of various crimes. These measures turned out to be highly intercorrelated. They were combined into two indices, one of which combined all the items with concerns about burglary, which we labeled "fear of burglary", and another which combined items related to street crime, which we labeled "fear of robbery". The details of the construction of these indices and their reliability are presented in the appendix.

A second set of items uses resident ratings of the extent to which various crimes are a "problem", using the neighborhood, rather than the person's own concerns, as a referent. Again, an index was constructed combining the ratings of a number of different crime problems into a single measure, labeled "crime problem rating". In addition, the items rating burglary and robbery as problems were analyzed separately, as were the answers to a question about whether crime was going up, going down or staying about the same in the neighborhood.

The analysis is presented in this way for several reasons. First, keeping perceptions of robbery and burglary separate makes conceptual sense, because they are rather different crimes. Items dealing with burglary tend to correlate higher with other items relating to burglary than they do with items relating to robbery; and vice versa. Moreover, factor analytic work by Baumer (1979) also suggests that they are different.

The argument for keeping personal concerns separate from the ratings of neighborhood problems is again conceptual and supported by the fact that the two kinds of measures behave differently (i.e., they have different patterns of association, even though they are correlated to some extent).

A final note before we begin presenting data: we have used the same approach to modeling expected values as we did in the case of crime rates. It is reasonable to think that some factors might affect people's fears and concerns about crime at city-wide level. The most obvious example of such a possible effect is the coverage of crime given by the television and print media. Thus, we have calculated the preprogram value of a measure from data gathered before the program was implemented, that is before the summer of 1976. Then we examined what happened to these measures in the rest of Hartford during the postprogram period. If there was any change in the rest of Hartford, we adjusted our expected values for North Asylum Hill accordingly. We then calculated the likelihood that the observed value of the measure in North Asylum Hill was lower than the expected value.

#### FEAR OF BURGLARY

Table 10.1 presents the values of our index of fear of burglary for North Asylum Hill and for the rest of Hartford, that is, all of Hartford outside of the Asylum Hill area. If one looks at the data for North Asylum Hill alone, the value of the index has been extremely constant during the experimental period. However, in the rest of Hartford, there was a steady increase in this index since the preprogram period. As a result, based on the experience in the rest of Hartford, we would have expected a rise in fear of burglary in North Asylum Hill. In fact, we observed no increase. Thus, although there was not a decline in the fear of burglary in North Asylum Hill, in the context of what was happening in the rest of Hartford, one must conclude that the responses to this index were significantly lower in 1979 than would have been expected from the city-wide trend, and almost significantly lower in 1977.

#### FEAR OF ROBBERY

Table 10.2 presents a parallel table dealing with our index of fear of robbery. The findings were almost identical to those above. The value of the index was almost constant across the years in North Asylum Hill. However, in the rest of Hartford, there was a steady increase in fear of robbery since the preprogram period. When we calculate the values expected in North Asylum Hill by applying the city-wide trend, we find that fear of robbery in 1977 was lower than expected, approaching statistical significance. The 1979 figure was significantly lower than we would have expected.

#### RATINGS OF NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME PROBLEMS

In the next four tables, we present data on the way people rated crime problems in their neighborhood.

Respondents were asked whether they considered burglary to be a "big problem, some problem or almost no problem" in their neighborhood. It can be seen in Table 10.3 that there was a marked shift in the rate at which North Asylum Hill residents considered burglary to be a problem after the experimental program was implemented. In this case, the reduction compared to

TABLE 10.1

Observed and Expected Fear of Burglary in North Asylum Hill, 1975-79

Mean score on fear of burglary Index <sup>b</sup>	N's	Year		
		Preprogram <sup>a</sup>	1977	1979
Observed, rest of Hartford	380, 535, 299	2.30	2.38	2.45
Observed, North Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	2.29	2.30	2.32
Expected for North Asylum Hill, based on experience in rest of Hartford			2.37	2.44
Probability that observed - expected is not significant <sup>c</sup>			.15	.02

<sup>a</sup> 1973 data excluded

<sup>b</sup> The fear of burglary index includes respondents' ratings of how much they worry about being burglarized during the day and during the night, and a rating of the likelihood of being burglarized. On a scale from 1 to 4, a high number indicates the most fear.

<sup>c</sup> Based on one-tailed t-test. Usual probability required for statistical confidence is .05 or lower.

TABLE 10.2

Mean score on fear of robbery index <sup>a</sup>	N's	Year		
		Preprogram	1977	1979
Observed, rest of Hartford	380, 535, 299	2.21	2.28	2.35
Observed, North Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	2.48	2.48	2.50
Expected for North Asylum Hill, based on experience in rest of Hartford			2.56	2.64
Probability that observed - expected is not significant <sup>b</sup>			.10	.01

<sup>a</sup> The fear of robbery index includes respondents' ratings of how much they worry about being robbed during the day and during the night, and their ratings of the likelihood of being robbed, assaulted, and having their purse or wallet snatched. On a scale from 1 to 4, a high number indicated the most fear.

<sup>b</sup> Based on one-tailed t-test. Usual probability required for statistical confidence is .05 or lower.



TABLE 10.3

Observed and Expected Ratings of Burglary as a  
Neighborhood Problem, In North Asylum Hill, 1973-79

Percent who rated burglary as a big problem	N's	Year		
		Preprogram <sup>a</sup>	1977	1979
Observed, rest of Hartford	380, 535 299	28%	20%	27%
Observed, North Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	40	31	26*
Expected for North Asylum Hill, based on experience in rest of Hartford			29	39
Probability that observed - expected is not significant <sup>b</sup>			NS**	.01

<sup>a</sup> 1973 data excluded.

<sup>b</sup> Based on one-tailed t-test. Usual probability required for statistical confidence is .05 or lower.

\* Significantly different from preprogram values with  $p < .05$ .

Probabilities are reported as NS if they exceed .20.

to preprogram values which was observed in 1977 was almost statistically significant; and it was even larger in 1979 and significantly different.

When the expected values are adjusted for the city-wide experience, there is a slight shift in our interpretation. In fact, in the rest of Hartford we observed some decline in 1977 in the rate at which burglary was considered a problem. Adjusting for this trend diminishes the significance of the difference between the 1977 observed responses and the preprogram levels. However, that same adjustment continues to show that the figures in 1979 were significantly different than the preprogram levels. On the basis of the experience city-wide, we would have expected 39 percent of respondents in North Asylum Hill to rate burglary as a big problem. In fact, only 26 percent did so.

In Table 10.4, we present the parallel table dealing with the extent to which robbery was considered to be a problem in the neighborhood. The findings were similar to what we observed with respect to fear of burglary. No absolute change in the rate at which respondents considered robbery to be a problem in North Asylum Hill can be associated with the implementation of the program. Once again, though, the data need to be interpreted in the context of what was going on throughout the city. In the rest of Hartford, there was an increase in the rate at which robbery was considered a problem between 1977 and 1979. When one adjusts for that fact, the observed rating in North Asylum Hill in 1979 was significantly lower than we would have expected.

Table 10.5 presents a combined rating of a variety of neighborhood crime problems which were presented in the survey. In addition to robbery and burglary, the index includes ratings of car theft, commercial robbery and assault.

In several respects, the data are parallel to those we have seen. First, the value of this index showed little absolute change in the experimental period. The 1979 North Asylum Hill rating approaches a statistically significant decline from preprogram levels. There was, however, a significant increase in the ratings of these combined crime problems by residents in the rest of Hartford between 1977 and 1979, while at the same time there was somewhat of decrease in North Asylum Hill. Taken together, then, one finds that resident ratings of crime problems in North Asylum Hill were significantly lower in 1979 than would have been expected based on the city-wide experience.

Finally, Table 10.6 presents the answers to the question of whether residents thought crime was going up, staying about the same or going down in their neighborhood. There was an absolute improvement in resident perceptions in North Asylum Hill. The striking change occurred between 1977 and 1979. Although people throughout the city of Hartford also improved slightly in the extent to which they saw crime going down, adjusting for the city-wide experience does not diminish the statistical significance of the change observed in North Asylum Hill. Very clearly, North Asylum Hill residents were more likely to see crime as declining than one would have expected from preprogram responses and from the experience in the rest of Hartford.

TABLE 10.4

Observed and Expected Ratings of Robbery as a  
 Neighborhood Problem, in North Asylum Hill In 1973-1979

Percent who rated robbery as a big problem	N's	Year		
		Pre-program	1977	1979
Observed, rest of Hartford	1086, 525, 299	14%	14%	19%
Observed, North Asylum Hill	260, 232, 218	25	26	24
Expected for North Asylum Hill, based on experience in rest of Hartford			25	34
Probability that observed - expected is not significant <sup>a</sup>			NS <sup>b</sup>	.01

<sup>a</sup> Based on one-tailed t-test. Usual probability required for statistical confidence is .05 or lower.

<sup>b</sup> Probabilities are reported as NS if they exceed .20.

TABLE 10.5

Observed and Expected Ratings of Crime Problems, 1975-79, North Asylum Hill

Mean score on crime problem index <sup>b</sup>	N's	Year		
		Preprogram <sup>a</sup>	1977	1979
Observed, rest of Hartford	380, 535, 299	1.65	1.64	1.70
Observed, North Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	1.90	1.93	1.88
Expected for North Asylum Hill, based on experience in rest of Hartford			1.89	1.96
Probability that observed - expected is not significant <sup>c</sup>			NS <sup>d</sup>	.01

<sup>a</sup> Excludes 1973 data

<sup>b</sup> Crime problem index includes respondent ratings of the degree of the following neighborhood crimes: car theft, burglary, robbery, commercial robbery, assault. On a scale from 1 to 3, a high number indicated the biggest problems.

<sup>c</sup> Based on one-tailed t-test. Usual probability required for statistical confidence is .05 or lower.

<sup>d</sup> Probabilities are reported as NS if they exceed .20.

TABLE 10.6

Observed and Expected Ratings of Decline in Neighborhood  
Crime North Asylum Hill, 1975-79

Percent who say crime went down	N's	Year		
		Preprogram <sup>a</sup>	1977	1979
Observed, rest of Hartford	380, 535, 299	7%	8%	12%
Observed, North Asylum Hill	167, 232, 218	12	17	32
Expected for North Asylum Hill, based on experience in rest of Hartford			14	21
Probability that observed - expected is not significant <sup>b</sup>			.13	.01

<sup>a</sup> 1973 data excluded

<sup>b</sup> Based on one-tailed t-test. Usual probability required for statistical confidence is .05 or lower.

## CONCLUSION

The data presented in this chapter provide evidence that resident perceptions of crime in general, and particularly their concerns and fears about burglary and robbery, were better than one would have expected considering city trends. Some of these changes were apparent in 1977. However, in every measure observed in this chapter, the responses in North Asylum Hill were significantly better than would have been expected in 1979.

CHAPTER 11  
FURTHER ANALYSES

INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapters, the following points have been fairly well established:

1) There was an intervention into the ongoing process of the North Asylum Hill neighborhood. Changes in the streets clearly reduced vehicular traffic through the neighborhood. Community organizations in the area were more effective problem solvers than they had been before. A police team serving the Asylum Hill area was an effective, responsive unit that addressed residential concerns and increasingly arrested robbers and burglars from 1975 to 1977. Since 1977, the effectiveness of the police team and its ability to concentrate on neighborhood problems clearly declined.

2) One year after the program was fully implemented, there was some evidence of increased informal social control of the neighborhood by residents. Residents reported walking more in the neighborhood, more routine arrangements to look out for one another's houses, and an increased ability to recognize strangers. However, there was little evidence of increased confidence in the neighborhood.

In 1979, three years after the program was fully implemented, a large number of significant changes had occurred in measures related to informal social control in the neighborhood. In addition to maintaining the changes observed in 1977, residents reported much greater confidence in their neighbors as resources against crime, they showed evidence of intervention on their own, and their reported feelings about the neighborhood area as a whole and its future were clearly more positive than in the past. The consistent improvement in almost every measure related to feelings about and use of the neighborhood pointed to a distinctively positive set of changes in North Asylum Hill in this respect.

3) The rate of burglary dropped significantly below the expected levels in the first year in which the program was fully implemented. The reported rate of robbery/pursesnatch also appeared to ebb, though the change was not statistically significant. By 1979, however, the rates of both of these crimes were at expected levels. There was no evidence of continued program impact on these crime rates.

4) Measures of residents' concerns and fears of crime showed a different pattern. In 1977, there was evidence that fear of crime was better than expected, but not all measures showed this pattern. By 1979, however, all

measures of fear and concerns about crime in North Asylum Hill were more positive than one would have predicted given city-wide trends.

These data constitute a circumstantial case that the experimental interventions in North Asylum Hill were successful in creating an environment in which informal social control could grow, which, in turn, helped to assuage residents' concerns and fears about crime. The above evidence further suggests that increased informal social control did not, by itself, reduce crime rates.

Naturally, there were many events other than those that can be attributed to the program which could have affected crime or fear of crime. It is important to be able to more directly link the results to the program implemented. In this chapter we will use the available data to further examine the relationship between the program and the effects observed.

#### THE RATES OF BURGLARY AND ROBBERY

Two principal targets of the program were the rates of burglary and robbery against North Asylum Hill residents. The idea was that if residents were better able to control the neighborhood area, offenders would feel less free to wander the area looking for opportunities, and they would be more concerned about intervention. Hence, the rates at which criminal opportunities occurred and casual, unplanned crimes occurred would be reduced.

Looking simply at the area level patterns over time, if one could conclude all other relevant factors were constant, one would also conclude that increased informal social control alone is not enough to directly impede crime. In fact, however, it does not appear that all salient factors remained constant.

There is not a well developed model of the factors that effect crime rates. However, most would agree that there are at least four factors that will affect the rate of crime in any neighborhood: 1) the amount of informal social control exercised by residents, 2) the vulnerability of the targets, i.e., the physical security of buildings, in the case of burglary and the characteristics of individuals using the neighborhood in the case of robbery, 3) deterrent forces generated by official law enforcement agencies, and 4) the proximity and density of would-be offenders.

As we look at the levels of each of these factors in North Asylum Hill over time, it seems fair to conclude that the amount of informal social control increased. The vulnerability of targets in North and South Asylum Hill probably remained unchanged. There was no significant change in the physical stock of housing, and there was little change in the demographic characteristics of the population. There was some increase in the rate at which residents reported walking in their neighborhood, which might have some bearing on exposure to robbery. However, such an explanation would have no bearing on burglary; and the increase in neighborhood use had already occurred by 1977.

It is, of course, difficult to obtain the information about offenders. However it seems likely that there was some change in the offender situation from 1977 to 1979.



Probably the most important reason for thinking that the offender situation may have become worse is that the urban design observers said they thought it had changed. They observed more young men hanging around the neighborhood during the day than they had seen before. Moreover, observers thought the men were more spread out, less concentrated in and around their favorite hang out, the park. In their report (see Appendix) the urban designers guessed, even without seeing the survey results, that crime would be up in the neighborhood; and their reason was their sense of an increased presence of individuals they considered to be potential offenders.

In the resident surveys, ratings of the seriousness of the problems did not indicate an increase in loitering men or teenagers; but the ratings of drunken men showed some increase over time. Police ratings reflected a clear perception that loitering men were a greater problem in 1979 than in 1977.

Three other bits of evidence tend to be consistent with the urban designers' analysis. First, there were absolutely more people counted in the pedestrian counts in 1979 than in 1977. Of these, there were absolutely more young adult males on the streets than in 1977. Although we have some concerns about the reliability of the pedestrian counts, that particular fact is consistent with the urban designers' analysis.

Second, we noted that the pattern of street crimes shifted. The dominant pattern in North Asylum Hill prior to the program had been for the majority of crimes to occur on side, residential streets. The data right after the program was implemented, in 1977, showed a shift away from crimes on residential streets. In 1979, there was a shift back to having the majority of street crimes occur on residential streets. This shift is consistent with the urban designers' observation that offenders seemed to be spread throughout the neighborhood.

Third, a tangential, but potentially related fact emerges when we tabulate the place of residence of people arrested for crimes committed in North Asylum Hill (Table 11.1). Generally speaking, those arrested for crimes in North Asylum Hill have lived outside the neighborhood. That was the case in 1977. Although the numbers are small, in 1979, there seemed to be an increased percentage of known offenders who actually lived in North Asylum Hill.

It is possible that this latter trend simply resulted from some kind of change in police activity. For example, perhaps when police have less time to engage in investigation, they are more likely to catch offenders who live in the area in which they are working. However, the data are also consistent with the possibility of some kind of increase in offender pressure on North Asylum Hill.

It should be noted, in addition, that the crime data are not consistent with the hypothesis that there was a general increase in the number of offenders in nearby areas outside North Asylum Hill. Had that been the case, one would have expected significant increases in the crime rates both in South Asylum Hill and in the areas adjacent to North Asylum Hill to the north and west. There was not any evidence of any significant change in crime rates between 1977 and 1979 in either of these areas.

TABLE 11.1

Residence of Arrested Offenders who Operated in North Asylum Hill, 1971-79

<u>Type of Offender by Area</u>	<u>Year</u>		
	<u>1971-76*</u>	<u>1976-77*</u>	<u>1977-79*</u>
<u>Burglars</u>			
<u>Area of Residence</u>			
Asylum Hill	38%	14%	42%
North End	51	45	42
Other	11	41	16
Total	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(129)	(58)	(39)
<u>Street Robbers</u>			
<u>Area of Residence</u>			
Asylum Hill	23%	18%	42%
North End	38	61	41
Other Areas	39	21	17
Total	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(79)	(40)	(36)

\* 1971-1973 data are for calendar years; other data are for fiscal years beginning July 1.

There is another plausible explanation for the apparent decline and then comparative increase in crime in North Asylum Hill – the effectiveness of police services. Police service probably improved as crime rates fell in 1977. Then, the service deteriorated while crime rates rose in 1979. However, there is one way that such an explanation does not fit the data: the police team serviced both North and South Asylum Hill. Crime rates in South Asylum Hill were relatively stable.

South Asylum Hill is not a perfectly matched control area. It differs from North Asylum Hill in several important ways. A much higher proportion of South Asylum Hill is occupied by commercial enterprises; a quite busy street with numerous small stores and shops runs through the middle of the area. The housing stock consists of larger apartments with better physical security than that in North Asylum Hill. South Asylum Hill has consistently had burglary rates much lower than North Asylum Hill or other parts of Hartford. Finally, it is important to note that the population of South Asylum Hill is different from that of North Asylum Hill. There are fewer minority people and more elderly.

Given these differences, it is not unreasonable to posit that the crime situation in South Asylum Hill was markedly different from North Asylum Hill's and not responsive to change by police efforts.

However, it is more parsimonious to conclude that in North Asylum Hill in 1977, all three program elements worked together to reduce crime. But by 1979, with the decrease in police effectiveness and the increase in offender pressures, the remaining elements of the program could not impede an increase in crime levels.

In conclusion, if we were confident that all relevant variables had remained stable between 1975 and 1979, we could simply conclude that the rate of crime in an area is unrelated to levels of informal social control exerted by residents and created by the experimental program. The marked increase in neighborhood strength between 1977 and 1979, contrasted with the marked increase in burglary and robbery relative to rates in 1977, points in that direction. However, it is not appropriate to assume that other relevant variables remained constant. The effectiveness of police deteriorated between 1977 and 1979. It is also likely that the pressure from offenders increased during that same period.

The above patterns point to two conclusions. First, the drop in burglary in 1977 cannot be ignored. The evidence suggests that an aggressive police arrest policy in the context of a strengthened informal social control situation on the part of residents can be successful, at the very least, in producing short-term reductions in crime.

The second conclusion consistent with the data is that increased informal social control by itself is not enough to reduce crime rates. In all probability, a model which includes, at the very least, offender prevalence and effectiveness of police service is needed. The role of informal social control, in the context of these other variables remains to be further explored in other settings. However, as the program designers anticipated, it is, at best, only one of several factors which must be changed in order to affect the rate of crime in a neighborhood.

## FEAR AND CONCERN ABOUT CRIME

While the preceding analytic problem was to understand why the program with its positive effect on informal social control failed to continue to affect the crime rates, in this section our task is to further examine the hypothesis that it was the program that produced a beneficial effect on the level of fear of crime in North Asylum Hill.

In 1977, when the program had been in place for a year, the rates of crime had gone down and there was evidence of increased use of the neighborhood and cooperative neighborhood arrangements with respect to crime. In that context, although the results were not completely consistent, there was also some evidence of positive decreases in people's fears and concerns about crime.

In 1979, the rates of crime were up from 1977 levels, just about at the level one would have expected without a program. Neighborhood problems of incivility – prostitution and drinking men especially – were stable or up a bit in the eyes of residents. However, there were marked improvements in people's perceptions of their neighborhood and their neighbors as positive resources against crime. In this context, we observed all measures of residents' fears and concerns about burglary and robbery and crimes in general were more positive than would have been expected although not decreased significantly in an absolute sense.

This pattern is quite consistent with the hypothesis that emanates directly from the work of Lewis (1979) and Skogan and Maxfield (1980) that neighborhood conditions and the way people feel about the social organization of their neighborhood are the main determinants of their fears and concerns about crime. Moreover, the pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that the program intervention created conditions in which increased informal social control and neighborhood confidence emerged, leading directly to improvements of residents' fears about crimes.

The existing literature about what accounts for people's reported fears and concerns about crime would suggest a model which has the following elements: the actual crime rates, incivilities, (signs of the presence of offenders) people's sense of order and neighborhood resources to help maintain order, and a person's own sense of personal vulnerability. Of these, we have noted that the actual rate of crime went up between 1977 and 1979 and the perception of incivilities was stable or increased during this period.

Therefore, the only way to account for the observed pattern with respect to changes in fear levels is to conclude that either

- 1) there were changes in the residents' sense of vulnerability, or
- 2) that informal social control is a major determinant of fear and the changes in this element in North Asylum Hill accounted for the relative improvements in fear levels.

We have already seen in Chapter 3 that, in the aggregate, the demographic profile of North Asylum Hill remained quite stable over the evaluation period. Thus, a shift away from the more frightened population groups, the elderly, females, or whatever, is not the explanation for the observed changes.

However, it is possible that newcomers may have been different with respect to fear of crime in ways which are not captured demographically. One reason for entertaining this hypothesis seriously is the pattern observed in Chapter 5 in which newcomers were distinctively positive about the street changes.

To examine this possibility, the measures of fear of crime were tabulated across years by the recency with which respondents had moved to the neighborhood (Table 11.2). Simply focussing on the 1977 versus 1979 responses of each group, we see that the responses of newcomers are virtually identical across time for all six measures in Table 11.2. If there is a group that shows more than average improvement with respect to the fear measures, it is the group that had been in the neighborhood from two to five years. That group was generally less fearful in 1979 than its cohort was in 1977. However, that pattern does not support the notion of a change in the population as the explanation for the relative improvement in fear of crime in the neighborhood. Rather, it says that people who had lived in and experienced the neighborhood for awhile in 1979 were less fearful than those who had experienced it for a while in 1977.

The long-time residents, those who had lived there five years and longer, did not show a consistent pattern across the measures. On some measures they were more fearful in 1979 and on some measures they were less so. Overall, the hypothesis that population change is responsible for the improvement with respect to fear does not seem tenable.

To help strengthen our ability to draw conclusions about the linkages among the factors leading to fear we carried out two regression analyses of data collected in all of Hartford in 1979. These were done at an individual level of analysis to identify the correlates of fear of burglary and fear of robbery. The results tend to be consistent with the model outlined above.

The most important correlates of peoples' fears about crime are indicators of the condition of the neighborhood. In our analysis these conditions were measured by perceptions of crime trends, incivilities, and the crime problems in the neighborhood.

Another important factor was vulnerability. This was particularly true for robbery, which women fear more than men. We also found that previous victimization experience was an important correlate of fear of burglary.

Other factors influenced fear levels indirectly by affecting peoples' ratings of neighborhood conditions. These included perceptions of neighbors as resources against crime, police effectiveness, and the crime rates in the area.

These analyses provide a basis for explaining the levels of fear in North Asylum Hill at a neighborhood level. Some of the correlates of fear did not change and some did. The proportion of women remained unchanged, as did perceptions of incivilities. On the other hand, perceptions of crime problems, crime trends, and neighbors as resources against crime improved. These

TABLE 11.2

Values on Crime and Fear Indicators by Length of Residence, North Asylum Hill

Crime and Fear Indicator	Length of Residence	N	Year		
			Preprogram	1977	1979
Mean score on fear of burglary index	6 months to 2 yrs	69,95,103	2.24 <sup>a</sup>	2.35	2.33
	2-5 years	64,79,70	2.37 <sup>a</sup>	2.36	2.23
	more than 5 yrs	34,58,45	2.25 <sup>a</sup>	2.08	2.46
Mean score on fear of robbery index	6 months to 2 yrs	109,95,103	2.44	2.29	2.34
	2-5 years	84,79,70	2.37	2.62	2.41
	More than 5 yrs	66,58,45	2.76	2.70	2.98
Mean score on crime problem index	6 months to 2 yrs	69,95,103	1.83 <sup>a</sup>	1.85	1.88
	2-5 years	64,79,70	1.99 <sup>a</sup>	2.00	1.84
	More than 5 yrs	34,58,45	1.85 <sup>a</sup>	1.98	1.92
Percent who say burglary is a big problem	6 months to 2 yrs	69,95,103	33% <sup>a</sup>	27%	26%
	2-5 years	64,79,70	54 <sup>a</sup>	44	33*
	More than 5 yrs	34,58,45	27 <sup>a</sup>	16	14
Percent who say robbery is a big problem	6 months to 2 yrs	109,95,103	20	23	25
	2-5 years	84,79,70	29	30	23
	More than 5 yrs	66,58,45	27	39	22
Percent who say crime went down	6 months to 2 yrs	69,95,103	15 <sup>a</sup>	13	35*
	2-5 years	64, 79,70	13 <sup>a</sup>	19	28*
	More than 5 yrs	34,58,45	2 <sup>a</sup>	23	33*

<sup>a</sup> Includes 1975 and 1976 data only.

\* Significantly different from preprogram level with  $p < .05$ .

improvements were strong enough to produce relative decreases in fear levels compared to the rest of the city, although absolute decreases generally were not observed.

In conclusion, we have already noted that with a single experiment it is impossible to fully establish causal linkages to fear. Without replication, there will always be competing hypotheses that cannot be ruled out. However, there was a strong, consistent change in North Asylum Hill by 1979 in resident behaviors with respect to controlling things in the neighborhood and their perceptions of their neighbors as resources for combating crime. Moreover, it is clear that North Asylum Hill residents enjoyed an advantage with respect to fear of robbery and burglary in 1979 that could not be predicted from city-wide trends and, indeed, was inconsistent with the crime rate, the incidence of incivilities and the objective reality of the police service available to them. There does seem to be a strong circumstantial case for concluding that the program as implemented was a catalyst in a chain of events which, by 1979, had a salutary effect on North Asylum Hill residents fears about burglary robbery and crime in general.

## CHAPTER 12 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The experimental program evaluated in this project has the potential to contribute to understanding of community crime prevention issues in a variety of ways. In this closing chapter, we want to summarize the main conclusions and implications we feel are justified based on the analyses which have been presented.

One result of the evaluation of some importance that might go unnoticed is the value of documentation of the evolution of the program as implemented. Both the community organization and the neighborhood police components of the program changed significantly over the four-year period for which they were observed.

Podolefsky *et. al* (1980) derived two important generalizations about crime-oriented neighborhood groups from their cross-section studies. First, they observed that groups have to deal with a variety of issues dealing with the neighborhood, not just with crime alone, in order to endure. Second, there are real limits to volunteerism. Thus, it is informative to observe what happened to the three groups that were started or revitalized around planning the crime prevention program in North Asylum Hill. The one group that focussed only on crime and developed little formal structure passed from the scene. A second group, that was particularly interested in block watching, served a variety of social and volunteer functions for an elderly membership as well. That group is still functioning, still involved in neighborhood crime control, though block watching may be a decreasing part of that group's agenda. A third group already in existence thrived and grew with the technical support and agenda that came with the crime control program. That group has taken on a much fuller agenda of housing and neighborhood improvement issues than it ever could have tackled before.

At the same time, a grant to support five anti-crime programs with paid staff enabled the neighborhood groups, for the most part, to get out of the direct crime fighting and planning business. A Public Safety Committee, with community representation, was overseeing these funded activities; but their continuation did not depend much on voluntary effort.

These kinds of changes are completely consistent with what one would expect from the work of Podolefsky *et. al*. However, it is very useful to have this kind of documentation over time. The Hartford experience is particularly useful in that it shows how quickly changes can occur.

In much the same way, the experience in Hartford with team policing may be instructive for those with similar plans. Indeed, it has been found before



that police departments have difficulty with decentralized command. Other team police experiments have been less than ideal because the decentralized authority was never developed.

The Hartford experiment was noteworthy because of the extent to which the team captain exercised autonomy in setting priorities. In addition, a real rapport developed between the team captain and the Police Advisory Committee. There was a clear feeling on both sides that he genuinely attempted to respond to their needs and concerns. At the same time this responsiveness lay at the heart of some of the difficulties for the team police. There is considerable potential for stress when a district captain is supposed to be responsive to two constituencies, the department leadership and neighborhood residents. For a police department, the easiest solution to whatever stresses occur is, obviously, to reduce the power of the relationship between the team captain and the neighborhood committee.

No doubt the cuts in police manpower in Hartford played a role in the deterioration of the neighborhood police team concept. Indeed, there was concern from the start that Asylum Hill, and even the larger District 5 of which it was a part, were too small for a police team. However, our observations lead us to be confident that the unusual success of the Asylum Hill police team in establishing autonomy also played an important role in the eventual reduction of support for the police team concept.

The physical design changes were the most difficult of the three program components to implement. One great advantage of physical design changes, however, compared to other kinds of programs, is that they can endure. Other physical design experiments have found, however, that provisions for continuing maintenance frequently are not made. In the case of the Asylum Hill program, maintenance of the planters and upgrading of the traffic control signs, which would have required very minor expenditures and would have strengthened the program, were not made. The fact that the planters were not particularly well maintained and that after three years cars were still being trapped in cul-de-sacs without warning only served to provide the foes of the street changes with continuing ammunition. However, an important strength of the physical design changes, for which the designers deserve credit, was that they could endure and be effective with a minimum of maintenance. Certainly anyone anticipating a physical design program should attempt to minimize the need for continuing care and expenditure.

Thus, for each of the program components, there are some lessons to be learned from the Hartford experience by those who would consider similar approaches to crime control. The programs as implemented will almost certainly evolve and change. The kinds of changes observed in Hartford are likely to recur. Even if exactly the same principles do not apply, a program planner must give attention to how the program components are likely to evolve in the future.

This evolution is not significant only for program planners, however. It also has considerable significance for program evaluators. Most often, an experimental program is implemented and rather quickly evaluated. Understandably, people are anxious to find out whether or not a program "works". However, the Hartford experiment provides concrete evidence of two rather important principles. First, the program as implemented will not be

she same as the one that endures. Second, the effects of a program shortly after it is implemented are not necessarily those that one will observe after the program is in place for some time.

Useful as the above may be, the reason why the evaluation was undertaken was for its potential to contribute to our understanding of community crime prevention issues. Therefore, the most important parts of this research are the contributions it makes to our understanding of the interrelationships among crime, fear of crime, informal social control and the physical environment.

Certainly one of the most significant results of this evaluation is the documentation of change in the measures thought to be related to informal social control and territoriality. Without quibbling too much about exactly what to call the phenomena measured, the combination of people using the streets more, recognizing strangers more easily, taking more initiative and feeling more confident that their neighbors were a resource against crime, would pitch in to help out, does add up to very much what theorists such as Jacobs, Newman and others were talking about. Those are the kinds of things and the kinds of feelings that go with a neighborhood where people are taking care of themselves. These measures showed significant improvement between 1977 and 1979 in North Asylum Hill.

A critical question is the extent to which one can attribute these changes to the "program". Let us be clear and state that we can not prove that the program caused the changes, in a statistical sense. There was only a single experiment. The experiment took place, not in a vacuum, but in an ongoing neighborhood within a city over a four or five-year period, with a variety of events going on around it. However, there are several important points that can be made.

A crime control experiment is not like an experiment in a laboratory where a single ingredient, or combination of ingredients, is added and the reaction is observed. This program was an effort to solve some problems that were thought to exist in North Asylum Hill. Essentially, all that was done was to establish catalytic mechanisms. These mechanisms included several community organizations, a neighborhood police team, and an environment (a neighborhood that was less thoroughly inundated with outside traffic) which would enhance the likelihood that problem solving would occur. The program was not intended as the solution to problems but as the means to solve problems. The solutions to problems, if they occurred, would emerge from the actions of police and residents within the neighborhood environment over a period of time.

From this perspective, then, it almost is not an appropriate question to ask, "did the program do it?" There was never any thought that the actions that occurred in 1975 and 1976, on their own, could do anything. The hope was that they would be a catalyst, a facilitator, to provide mechanisms to facilitate change and problem solving.

There is no question that there were some factors that were not planned but that helped the neighborhood. The escalating prices of oil and the escalating prices of suburban housing no doubt made urban housing alternatives attractive to some set of people. The availability of money from neighboring insurance companies to help with housing rehabilitation clearly was an

unanticipated plus. However, it is important to remember that there was not a large influx of professionals into the neighborhood; the education levels in the neighborhood and did not change a great deal. Moreover, while housing rehabilitations have no doubt been important symbols, the number of actual units helped by the insurance programs was not large.

The exact role of the program in strengthening territoriality and informal social control is hard to document. Two concrete links can be established. First, introduction of the street changes was associated with increased use of the neighborhood. It also corresponded with increases in stranger recognition and an increased likelihood of informal arrangements to watch houses. In addition, the neighborhood organizations involved more people in neighborhood problems in 1979 than in any previous year; and those organizations were judged to be more effective than in the past. These are all potentially important pieces to putting together a stronger neighborhood.

Two critical questions remain. First, are these direct impacts that we can document sufficient to produce the other changes that were observed? The theorists say yes. They say that use of the neighborhood and confidence in the neighborhood can produce a synergistic interaction that strengthens the community as a whole. We can not directly document the process. However, there is a strong circumstantial case. What happened is what was predicted. The changes which were thought to be precursors, that should be observed, were observed. It is hard to think that the program was not a critical catalyst.

Second, this view is reinforced by observers. Because of the turnover endemic to this neighborhood, there were not many people who had been directly involved in the neighborhood over the six year period from 1973, when the analysis first began, through 1979. However, the two such active leaders we spoke with both were unequivocal in their belief that the program had been critical in three ways. First, the formal organizations in the neighborhood were much stronger once they became organized around the crime issue. Second, they were convinced that the street changes actually worked to make the neighborhood quieter, more residential and more easily controlled. Third, they were convinced that the problem solving capabilities in the neighborhood were fundamental to the improvements to be observed and to people's confidence that the neighborhood could be turned around.

It is important to understand that events outside the program occurred that helped produce progress. Although there has been no suburban influx, some middle class suburban people have moved into the neighborhood and provided leadership. The rising prices of housing in the neighborhood have made it possible to fix up and rehabilitate housing that at former levels could not have been restored. There was particularly good fortune, it seems to us, in the leadership that was available to the neighborhood police team in its first two or three years. The relationship with the police provided a focus for thinking about crime problems in the neighborhood and provided neighborhood leaders with a real problem-solving capability early in the program when, perhaps, the capabilities of the community groups themselves to solve problems were not as great.

On the other side, the political difficulties in getting the physical changes implemented, which delayed implementation and detracted from program momentum, undoubtedly reduced the likelihood of success. There was continual

vocal opposition to the program from businessmen in particular and others in the neighborhood. The police department had problems throughout, both with internal political problems and with resources, which reduced the role the police team could play. The transient nature of the neighborhood certainly made it a difficult one for a program such as this.

Altogether, as we argued at greater length in the initial program evaluation, this experiment seems to us to have been neither distinctively blessed nor distinctively disadvantaged. The idea that the neighborhood might have become stronger in the ways observed without the program is plausible. Each reader will have to make up his or her mind on that score. However, to us it seems that the program as a whole, and particularly the street changes, had a critical role to play.

As to fear of crime, the people in North Asylum Hill were significantly less fearful and concerned about crime after the program was implemented than one would have expected given the trends in the rest of the city. This finding was absolutely clear in the 1979 data for all relevant measures.

The patterns of fear observed in North Asylum Hill point fairly clearly in the direction that Lewis and his associates have been pointing with respect to the origins of fear. The data available to us do not permit elaborate model building. Identifying a path or pattern of causality is not really feasible. However, our data are consistent with the notion that the degree of social control and organization in a neighborhood and the degree of fear and concern about crime are connected. When people see incivilities, when they feel that there is not help available, the crime that exists in the neighborhood is problematic for them and they are frightened. When they see their neighborhood as a resource against crime, when they see police, when the incivilities such as drunken men and teenagers hanging out are at a minimum or under control, the problems of crime seem less severe and people are less afraid.

In North Asylum Hill, of course, the incivilities did not really improve; they may have gotten worse. The visibility of police remained unchanged. However, there was a clear and significant increase in the extent to which North Asylum Hill residents saw themselves and their neighbors banding together to control the neighborhood and to control crime in the neighborhood. It seems almost impossible to think that these changes did not play a central role in the amelioration of the fears and concerns about robbery and burglary that were observed. Moreover, the fact that the positive results regarding fear occurred in the face of a rising crime rate, and possibly some increase in apparent incivilities, makes the importance of the neighborhood strength for determining fear levels take on added significance.

And what about crime? The data clearly show that burglary dropped significantly below its expected levels immediately after the program was implemented, but then rose significantly during the following two years. The data are slightly less clear with respect to robbery/pursesnatch; but probably the same general pattern applies to that crime as well.

If that indeed is what happened to those crimes, there are several conclusions that follow. First, if one accepts the data, it means that a program such as the one implemented in Hartford can affect the rate of crime in a neighborhood.

Second, the fact that the victimization patterns do not correspond very well with our measures of fear and concerns about these crimes is one more piece of evidence that fear of crime and the actual prevalence of crime are not necessarily closely related.

Third, the most critical part of the data is that burglary and robbery apparently went up between 1977 and 1979 at the same time that our various measures of informal social control and territoriality were indicating a significant improvement. We have cited at least two factors which may be responsible for the increase in crime. First, there is reason to be concerned that the pressure from offenders on the area increased between 1977 and 1979. Second, there seems to be little doubt that the effectiveness of police service in the area peaked in 1977, then declined in the subsequent two years.

Police success in arresting people for burglary and robbery declined since 1977. In addition to making arrests, the police team also attended to the drunks and loitering men. Although they did not feel they solved these problems, they certainly attempted to control them. Such efforts were among the casualties of reduced police service in Asylum Hill. It is quite plausible that the reduction in police service is the key explanation for reduced arrests, for perceptions of a greater problem with loitering, drinking men and for the increased crime rates in 1979.

Perhaps the best way to fit the pieces together is the following: What was needed and established in North Asylum Hill was some problem-solving capabilities that were not there before. Day-to-day supervision of neighborhood activities is necessarily an on-going, informal process. However, for some problems – such as obtaining housing financing, cleaning up the park or mobilizing police efforts – some kind of resident organization is needed. Moreover, there are some problems with which only the police can deal effectively. Arresting criminals, dispersing groups of men and controlling public drinking are among these.

In 1977, the police component of the program was working well, and the citizen efforts – formal and informal – were gaining strength. In 1979, the police were no longer effective neighborhood problem solvers in their sphere, but the residents were doing a better job than ever before. One could surmise that what the residents were doing was helpful to fear levels; but that the police component was essential to affecting crime rates. We also would expect that had the police component remained strong in 1979, there would have been a continued reduction in crimes rates and more dramatic positive effects on fear.

Unfortunately, we are not in a position to unequivocally sort out the answers. In the end, this evaluation can only provide hypotheses. However, one very important conclusion does emerge from these data: informal social control by itself is not enough to reduce robbery and burglary/pursesnatch in a neighborhood like Asylum Hill. Despite the striking improvements in these respects observed in North Asylum Hill, some set of additional factors worked to create an increase in burglary and robbery. Although our results are not definitive, they lead one to take a hard look at the offender population and at police activity, as well as informal social control and territoriality, in trying to predict rates of crime.

Finally, we need to address the question of whether this is a good kind of program for other communities to attempt to implement. In our view, that is the wrong question to ask. In essence, this experiment should not be looked at with the expectation that it be exported in toto to some other community. Rather, it was a project in which neighborhood problems were analyzed and solutions to those problems that were feasible in the particular context were designed and implemented. A crime control program such as this must be custom made to fit a particular set of circumstances. What one would want to derive from the Hartford project is not a program design but rather what we have learned about the nature of problems.

In conclusion then, we feel the following are the principal legacies of the Hartford Project:

- 1) The process of planning and implementing the program should provide a number of realistic lessons for those who would consider programs with components that are similar to any of those in Hartford.
- 2) The particular lessons about the way that program components evolve over time are important to understand and are well documented in Hartford.
- 3) The fact that measures of informal social control and territorially could change significantly over time in response to a program like this is a critical finding which has not been demonstrated before.
4. The apparent intimate relationship between people's fears and concerns about crime and the degree of social organization and Informal social control in a neighborhood is a critical finding.
5. The fact that burglary rates and robbery rates increased significantly, in the face of significantly increased social control is a very important observation with which theorists must deal. In essence, the project emphasizes the need to focus on offenders and on police activities, as well as informal social control, in order to predict crime rates.
6. The project provides further evidence that victimization rates or objective risks of crime have little relationship to resident concerns and fears. The latter, as we have said, are much more closely tied to people's perceptions of the conditions of the neighborhood.
7. Finally, the project provides evidence that changes in the physical environment are one important lever for producing significant changes in a neighborhood environment. Although the street changes were not a sufficient condition, there can be little doubt that they played a necessary and crucial role in catalyzing the improvements in the neighborhood that were observed.

The Hartford Project has been a long one. However, the longitudinal nature of the project has provided us with an opportunity to make observations and test ideas that have not been tested as well before. Certainly, no one project is going to be definitive on the variety of topics which this research has addressed. However, the above litany of findings seem to us to constitute a significant contribution to the theory and practice of community crime control.

## APPENDIX

Data were collected in numerous ways for this project, and the descriptions of the various procedures used follow in the appendix. Also the methods used in creating the crime and fear indices used in analysis are described. The following sections include:

- A. The Resident Survey
- B. Resident Survey Interview Schedule
- C. Creation of Indices
- D. Police Attitude Questionnaires
- E. Police Record Data
- F. Vehicular Traffic Data
- G. Pedestrian Traffic Counts
- H. Report of the Urban Design Specialists.

APPENDIX A  
THE RESIDENT SURVEY

Five different surveys of residents were done. In the fall of 1973, a survey of approximately 900 households throughout Hartford provided basic data for problem analysis and planning. These data were updated twice: in the spring of 1975 with a survey of about 600 households throughout Hartford, and in the spring of 1976 with a survey of about 200 households in Asylum Hill (to provide data immediately prior to implementation of the physical changes). In the spring of 1977, a sample of approximately 900 households throughout Hartford was conducted. Two years later, in the spring of 1979, a fifth survey was carried out.

SAMPLE PROCEDURES

The procedures for each survey were essentially identical each year - the samples, questionnaires, field procedures and coding procedures - in order to insure comparability across time. The one exception was that the 1976 sample was not independent of the 1975 sample, an issue which will be discussed below.

SAMPLING

The basic design was to do a citywide survey, with oversamples in key areas to permit more detailed analysis. To this end, Hartford was divided into four parts or strata: Asylum Hill, Clay Hill/SAND, the area adjacent to Asylum Hill and the remainder of Hartford.

The 1973 sample started with City Directory listings. The City Directory may have two sources of error, omitting an address or omitting units at a particular address. To make certain that every address had a chance of falling into the sample, two supplementary procedures were completed: a sample of new construction was drawn and a block supplement procedure was conducted.

A list of all new construction for the city of Hartford from January 1970 to June 1973 was obtained. The list was compared with the City Directory. All new construction not listed in the City Directory was divided into areas and the overall sampling rate for each was applied.

The block supplement consisted of sampling census blocks at the same rate at which housing units were selected and checking to see if all the addresses on the selected blocks were listed in the City Directory or in the stratum of new construction. All addresses found but not accounted for in one of those other two sources automatically became part of the sample.



In order to correct for omitted units at a particular address, all units for each selected address in Clay Hill/South Arsenal and Asylum Hill, plus a sizeable proportion of Adjacent and Remainder, were independently listed. Additional ("found") units were added to the sample at the same rate as the units at that particular address which had fallen into the sample.

For the parts of the Adjacent and Remainder areas which were not field listed, the total number of units expected from the City Directory were compared with the total units reported to be at that address\* for those addresses where ten or fewer units were expected.\*\* If there was a discrepancy, an interviewer was sent to the address to do field listing.

In 1975, a new independent sample of households was selected, this time using an area probability sample approach. The reason for the change was that we were not realizing much cost savings by using the City Directory. Almost all structures in Hartford are multi-unit, meaning almost complete listing.

Blocks were selected proportionate to 1970 housing unit estimates. Selected blocks were listed, and specific housing units were selected. An advantage of the approach was that housing units selected from blocks were distributed around the blocks, minimizing the homogeneity of clusters and thereby improving the efficiency of the design. Except for the possible improvement in the power of the design, the samples were comparable in 1973 and 1975.

The 1976 survey was conducted only in Asylum Hill because of limited available funds. The addresses in the Asylum Hill sample in the 1975 survey were re-contacted in 1976. Eligibility was determined again, and respondent selection was redone. Thus, some households ineligible in 1975 were interviewed in 1976; and vice versa. Some respondents were the same, some different when interviews were conducted in the same household.

This survey was a compromise. The implementation was delayed a year longer than expected. We felt it essential to up-date the survey data to the spring of 1976. There was no budget for it. By using the same sample, considerable sampling costs were saved.

There are limits to the use of these data. There are no comparable citywide data in 1976. The estimates are not independent of the 1975 survey estimates. On the other hand, the sample is unbiased. Based on panel analysis in the research literature, the effect of re-interview a year apart on data should be trivial.

In 1977, a new sample was selected, again an area probability sample, with clusters well dispersed around blocks. This sample differed from those of previous years in two ways. The Asylum Hill area was divided into areas

\* For phone interviews, respondents were asked the number of units at their address. For personal interviews, it was done by observation.

\*\* The rate at which additional units would have to be found in order to be added to the sample where there are more than 10 units practically eliminates their chance of becoming part of the sample.

north and south of Asylum Avenue (North Asylum Hill and South Asylum Hill, respectively), and these two areas were sampled at different rates. In addition to the household-based sample, Asylum Hill residents who were members of the community organizations directly associated with the program (SSCA, WHO and CAHA) were sampled from lists. Membership lists were obtained from each of these organizations, containing a total of 260 names. A total of 50 interviews were desired. A sampling rate was determined based upon a 75 percent response rate, as well as the expected eligibility rates.

Checks were made for duplication of members' addresses in the area sample. Essentially, those on membership lists had a higher probability of selection than other residents. By weighting to adjust for the probability of selection, these interviews can be included in the Asylum Hill sample with interviews based on household selection. This feature of the sample was introduced to increase our ability to describe "active" residents.

the 1979 sample used a clustered area probability sample throughout Hartford outside of Asylum Hill. In Asylum Hill, however, the sample was so done that the entire area was listed; there was no clustering. In essence, the Asylum Hill samples may be treated as systematic random samples.

#### INSTRUMENT DESIGN

For the 1973 resident survey, two interview schedules, one a subset of the other, were constructed by the evaluation team working closely with the other study principals. The Interviews were developed around the following general topics: perceptions of neighborhood and degree of neighborhood cohesiveness, use of the neighborhood, protection of home, perception of the police, fear and the perception of crime, perception of danger zones in the respondent's neighborhood, victimization, the media and general demographic information.

The short form was used in the control areas and for a random half of the samples in the two target areas. The other half of the respondents in the target areas were interviewed using the large questionnaire.

The decision as to which questions would be asked in both forms and which would only be asked in the long form was based on the intended use of the questions. If the purpose of the questions was evaluation of the theoretical model being tested, it was included in both forms. If, on the other hand, the purpose of the question was primarily to aid in the design of the crime control plan to be implemented, it was asked only in the long form which was to be used on in the target areas. Measures of each of the general topics were included in the short form.

In 1975, only one interview schedule was used. It was a subset of the 1973 long form covering the same general topical areas of neighborhood attitudes, perceptions of police, fear, victimization and demographic data. It included some items that had not been asked in the 1973 short form.

This same Interview schedule was used for the 1976 Asylum Hill resident surveys, with the addition of questions dealing with awareness of and attitudes toward neighborhood street changes and organizational changes for the police.

The 1977 interview schedule included all items asked in 1976, with some additions to deal with the citizen evaluation of the experimental program. The questions which were added to the schedule were designed to assess the respondents' awareness and degree of involvement with community organizations and their perceptions concerning both neighborhood street changes and changes within the police department. The 1979 interview schedule was essentially identical to that in 1977.

Schedules for all four surveys were pre-tested before going into the field. In general, they averaged less than 45 minutes in length, with the exception of the hour-long form used in 1973.

#### INTERVIEWING PROCEDURES

For all five surveys, two methods of data collections were used - telephone and field interviewing. In 1973, telephone interviewing was used only for the short interview schedule. If an interview could not be taken on the phone, the interview was then conducted in the field. About 60 percent of the short interviews were conducted on the phone, the remaining short interviews and all of the 200 longer (target area) interviews were taken in person. For the other three years, interviews were conducted on the phone when telephone numbers were obtainable; otherwise, they were assigned to the field.

The telephone interviewing was done from Boston by the Center for Survey Research's permanent professional staff of interviewers. A field interviewing staff was hired and trained in Hartford for each of the five surveys.

New interviewers received about a week of training including how to ask questions using the exact wording appearing in the questionnaire, the use of non-directive probes, and verbatim recording of open responses.

Advance letters were sent to selected households. Households were then contacted, either by telephone or personal visit. In situations where the respondent could not be contacted on the first field call at a sample household, interviewers were required to call back at the household at least six times in order to obtain the interview; more calls were required (if necessary) for addresses assigned to the telephone. These call-backs were to be made at different times of day and on different days of the week to maximize the chance of a contact. Addresses at which the designated individuals refused to be interviewed were generally reassigned to a second interviewer who contacted the individuals and attempted to persuade them to be interviewed.

As noted above, there was a resident eligibility requirement. An adult had to have lived at selected addresses for 6 months or more in order to be eligible for the full interview. This ensured a minimum level of experience in the neighborhood, and a basis for reporting household crimes.

A screening interview was conducted with any responsible adult.

In occupied households where one person had resided for six months, some information was obtained in order to be able to describe "ineligible"

households. In eligible households, an objective selection of adults (persons 18 or older) was used to designate a respondent. The procedure (Kish Selection Tables) permits no interviewer discretion.

Of course, no substitutions for sample households or selected eligible respondents were allowed.

#### SAMPLE AND FIELD RESULTS

Tables A1 and A2 show the results of the data collection efforts. Addresses which fell into the original sample were classified as non-sample when either the address was not an occupied housing unit or no occupant had lived at that address for six months. Reasons for non-interviews were refusals or inability to contact occupants after a reasonable number of calls distributed over day time and evenings, weekdays and weekends.

Response rates varied somewhat among the five sample areas in each of the five surveys. Average response rates for the city as a whole were 77 percent in 1973, 74 percent in 1975, 65 percent in 1976\*, 76 percent in 1977 and 73 percent in 1979.

#### RELIABILITY OF THE DATA

Sample surveys, even though properly conducted, are liable to several kinds of errors. These include response errors, which arise in the reporting, recording and processing of the data; non-response errors, which arise from failure to interview all individuals selected in the sample; and sampling errors, which arise from the fact that, by chance, any sample may differ from the population from which it was drawn. Some evaluation of each of these types of error is necessary for the proper interpretation of any estimate from survey data.

##### Response Errors

Such errors include inaccuracies in asking and answering questions in the interview, recording responses, coding the recorded responses, and processing the coded data. They can be reduced by thoroughly pretesting field procedures and instruments, training interviewers and coders, and exercising quality controls throughout the data collection, coding, and editing phases of the research process.

The questionnaire and field procedures used in the resident survey were pretested before each survey. Since the later instruments largely replicated earlier ones, the most extensive pretesting was carried out in the earlier years.

New interviewers were trained for about five days prior to their first assignment. Extensive role playing in standardized, non-directive techniques was included. Their training also included a question-by-question review of the survey instrument. They took practice interviews and discussed them with a supervisor. Supervisors reviewed their work throughout the field period. These procedures were followed for each of the four surveys.

\* Sample in Asylum Hill only.

**TABLE AI**

**Sample and Field Results, 1979**

	<b>North</b>	<b>South</b>				
	Asylum	Asylum	Clay Hill/ SAND	Adjacent	Remainder	Total
	Hill	Hill				City
Original Sample	438	187	23	130	316	1094
Additional Housing						
Units Found	2		-	1	-	3
Total Sample	440	187	23	131	316	1097
Non-Sample*	143	24	5	25	47	244
Total Eligible						
Sample*	297	163	18	106	269	853
Non-Interviews**	79	57	4	27	63	230
Interviews Taken	218	106	14	79	206	623
Response Rate	73%	65%	78%	75%	77%	73%

\* Includes sample addresses which were not dwellings and sample households at which no eligible respondent was found.

\*\* Includes sample households where no contact was made after a reasonable number of calls and those where selected respondents could not or would not be interviewed.

TABLE A2

## Number of Interviews and Response Rate, 1973-79

	North Asylum Hill				
	1973	1975	1976	1977	1979
Number of Interviews	93	88	79	193	218
Response Rate	73%	73%	71%	75%	73%
	Total City				
	1973	1975	1976	1977	1979
Number of Interviews	891	556	**	885	623
Response Rate	77%	74%	**	76%	73%

\* For these years, response rates were not calculated separately for North and South Asylum Hill.

\*\* In 1976, interviews were taken only in North and South Asylum Hill.

In 1973, responses were coded onto coding forms and keypunched from these forms. Responses to the later surveys were coded directly on the interview schedules and keypunched from the schedules. Before starting on this task, the coders were taught both the codes and the coding conventions. Coding was checked by coding 10 percent of the interviews twice (by two different coders) and comparing the two codings for discrepancies. Because of the importance of the crime data and the various complications which occur in classifying crimes, all of the information pertaining to victimization was independently check-coded. Key punching was key verified 100 percent.

Data tapes made from the keypunched data cards were checked for inconsistencies and incorrect codes and errors found were corrected.

It is impossible to eliminate response errors from data. Moreover, we know there is reporting error, yet cannot estimate its magnitude in most cases. However, the quality controls used should keep such errors at a level or below the level found in the best examples of household surveys. Moreover, because procedures were consistent across surveys, some types of errors - such as memory bias in reporting - should be constant and not affect comparisons across time.

#### Non-response Errors

Some proportion of the sample in any survey fails to respond, usually because of refusals or the failure of the interviewers to contact potential respondents in spite of repeated attempts. To the extent that nonrespondents are concentrated in some population subgroup (such as single persons living alone), this subgroup (and their perceptions or experiences) may be underrepresented in the sample responses.

In addition, because of the six-month residency requirement, there is the possibility that the proportions of certain groups eligible could vary from year to year. Although this is not a problem of non-response, it is a factor which could affect comparisons from year to year. It also means that in any given year those interviewed could differ from the population as a whole.

Tables A1 and A2 showed response rates and rates at which sample addresses failed to produce an eligible respondent for each of the four years. There is not a good way to estimate the biases non-response may have introduced into the data. However, the responses were similar from year to year. Again, it is likely that the biases, to the extent they exist, are constant.

In 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1979, brief interviews were conducted whenever possible at households where no one was eligible and when the eligible respondent refused the full interview. These short interviews gathered data on household composition and the racial or ethnic background of household members.

Comparing those eligible with the total sample, we found the 1975 sample interviewed included fewer blacks and Hispanics and more white in Asylum Hill and the city as a whole than the rates at which they were in the population. This was apparently the result of higher mobility within Hartford among minorities than among whites at that time. Minority households were less

likely to have lived in their residence long enough to be eligible for the full interview.

By 1977, this was no longer the case; the sample population interviewed did not differ significantly from the entire sample (including non-sample and non-interviews) in racial/ethnic composition.

#### Sampling Error

The extent of the sampling error can be determined if it is known exactly how, and with what probability, the sample was selected from the total population. The size of the sampling error varies in relation, a) to the size of the sample selected and b) the values for any given characteristic or attitude. Sampling errors can also be affected by particular features of the sample design (such as clustering).

The exact calculation of the amount of chance variability which could occur with respect to a sample depends in part on the clustering - the fact that in samples prior to 1979, three to five housing units were selected from the same block to reduce listing and travel costs. A key question is the degree of heterogeneity of those clusters compared with the population as a whole in variables measured. To the extent that clusters are homogeneous, the sample variances are larger than if an unclustered sample had been selected.

We calculated the ratio of the variances of the design to what an unclustered sample would have yielded for a number of key variables and for different areas. On average, the increased variance due to the design was less than 10 percent.

Based on these computations, it appeared that using sampling error estimates about ten percent larger than those for simple random samples is reasonable for most estimates based on clustered samples. The 1975 and later Asylum Hill samples were designed so they are essentially unclustered and hence can be treated as simple random samples.

In general, sampling errors vary with the sample size and the values for the characteristic measured. Table A3 is a generalized table of sampling errors which takes both these factors into account. Thus, when 26 percent of the 220 families interviewed in North Asylum Hill in 1977 report that they think crime has gone up in their neighborhood, the sampling error (actually two standard errors) is six percentage points. This means that there are 95 chances in 100 that the true population value lies within plus or minus six points of 26 percent. That is, there are only five chances in 100 that less than 20 percent or more than 32 percent of all the families in North Asylum Hill would say crime went up if a complete census, rather than a sample, survey were done. The table shows that when there is a smaller percentage reported in the sample, the sampling error is smaller; when there is a smaller subgroup, the sampling error is larger.

There is a further consideration. It is important to know whether a difference between two values obtained in the sample is "statistically significant." That is, would the difference still exist if other samples of the population were interviewed or if the whole population were surveyed? Calculation of statistical significance again depends both on the size of the



TABLE A3

## Approximate Sampling Errors of Percentages

Chances are 95 in 100 that the central value lies within the reported value,  
 plus or minus the number of percentage points shown in this table.

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<u>Sample Size</u>	<u>Sampling Errors for Reported Percentage Around</u>			
	<u>5 or 95%</u>	<u>10 or 90%</u>	<u>20 or 80%</u>	<u>50%</u>
50	-	-	12	16
75			10	13
100	-	7	9	11
150	4	5	7	8
175	4	5	7	8
200	3	4	6	8
300	3	4	5	6
400	2	3	4	6
500	2	3	4	5
750	2	3	4	5

groups being compared and on the percentages obtained. Table A4 is a generalized table of average sampling errors of differences. Thus, when the 43 percent of the 71 households in the North Asylum Hill sample interviewed in 1976 who thought crime had gone up as compared with the 26 percent of the 220 households interviewed there in 1977 who said crime had gone up, there were 95 chances in 100 that the differences was not due to chance. (The table shows that a differences of about 13 percent would be significant with groups of about these sizes and with these percentages.) This means that a difference of this magnitude (43 minus 26, or 17) would arise through chance fluctuations or because this particular sample was selected considerably less than 5 times in 100.

#### Combining the Sub-Areas: Weighting

For each of the surveys, households were sampled from Asylum Hill at a higher rate than those selected for other areas of the city in order to produce sufficient cases for separate analysis. In early surveys, Clay Hill/South Arsenal was also sampled at a higher rate than the rest of Hartford. To allow combining the cases from different areas for a given year, weights based on the probability of selection in each area were computed and assigned on a case by case basis. Weights based on their probability of selection have also been computed and assigned to cases from the 1977 organization membership list sample so that these may be combined with the area sample cases. All of these weights may be called "area weights".

It will be recalled that once an interviewer had contacted a sample household, he or she had to determine how many adults eligible to be interviewed lived in the household; where there was more than one eligible adult, one had to be selected at random using a prespecified procedure. The probability of any individual's becoming a respondent is the product of the probability of his or her household's selection and the probability of any eligible adult's selection within that household, hence, individual respondents are weighted by the product of the area weight and the number of eligible adults in the house (the "combined weight").

Which of these two weights is used depends on the type of variables under consideration. Where the variables represents information about households (such as household composition, total family income, or victimization experience which was asked for everyone in the household), the responses are weighted by the total weight. Where a variable represents information about individuals (such as education completed, frequency of walking in the neighborhood, any perceptions or attitudes), responses are weighted by the combined weight.

Weighting can seem complicated. However, it is simply a way of accurately combining units that had different chances of selection to produce accurate aggregate estimates. All percentage distributions in this report are based on appropriately weighted data. Statistical reliability, of course, is dependent on the actual number of observations (interviews) - not on weighted numbers - and all statistical tests were so calculated. There are not any statistical tests presented in this report that rely on combining data from areas that were selected at different rates in a given year.

TABLE A4  
**Sampling Errors** of Differences: 95% probability  
**Differences** required for significance in comparisons of  
**percentages** from **two** different sub-groups

Size of Sample or Group	<u>75</u>	100	200	350	500	750	<u>1000</u>	<u>1500</u>
For Proportions from About 30% to 70%								
75	15	14	13	12	12	11	11	11
100		13	12	11	10	10	10	10
200			10	9	8	8	7	7
350				7	7	6	6	6
500					6	6	5	5
750						5	5	4
For Proportions Around 20% or 80%								
75	13	13	11	10	10	10	10	10
100		11	10	9	9	9	9	9
200			8	7	7	7	7	6
350				6	6	6	5	5
500					5	5	5	5
750						5	4	4
For Proportions Around 10% or 90%								
75	10	10	8	8	8	8	8	7
100		9	8	7	7	7	7	7
200			6	6	6	5	5	5
350				5	5	4	4	3
500					4	4	4	3
750						3	3	3
For Proportions Around 5% or 95%								
200			5	4	4	4	4	4
350				4	3	3	3	3
500					3	3	3	3
750						3	2	2

APPENDIX B  
RESIDENT SURVEY INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Following are the questions asked in the 1979 resident survey. The great majority of these questions were asked in the four earlier surveys as well. The 1975 schedule consisted of a subset of questions asked in 1973, with a few minor changes. Several questions were added in 1976, 1977, and 1979. These additions are noted when they occur.

In order to obtain household information and, when possible, a cover interview, any responsible adult from a housing unit could give information about that unit's residents. A resident was eligible for a full interview if he or she had lived at the present address for 6 months or longer; from these a respondent was selected using an objective process. If there was no eligible adult in a housing unit, the interview concluded with the coversheet material.

The questions are listed sequentially as they were asked. Omitted question numbers are those assigned to instructions for interviewers, which have not been typed. Response categories for closed-ended items are underlined in the questions.

COVER INTERVIEW

16. Now, would you tell me how many people in your household, who are 18 years old or older, have lived at this address for six months or more?

(If any:)

17. We would like to conduct our interview with someone in the household who is randomly selected. In order to make this random selection, I need to know, first, how many males, 18 years old or older there are in your household. How many are there who have lived here for at least six months?

18. Are there any males under 18 who are married? (If so, how many have lived here for at least six months?)

20. Are there any females under 18 who are married? (If so, how many have lived here for at least six months?)

21. Are all these men and women you have mentioned living here at the present time?

22. Is there anyone else over 18 that you haven't mentioned who lives here but who is temporarily away, or someone who isn't a member of the family like a roomer? (If so, how many have lived here for at least six months?)
23. O.K., that's fine. Now according to my selection table with (NUMBER OF ADULTS) total living here in this house we want to interview \_\_\_\_\_ Is (he/she) home now?

(All Cover Sheet Informants:)

24. Now I would like to ask you just a couple of questions about where you live. Do you or your family own or rent your home?

(If rents:)

25. Does the owner live in the building?

(All:)

26. In which city or town and state did you live before you moved to this address? (If Hartford:) Could you give me the number and street where you lived?

(If household has no eligible R:)

28. And what is your background—is it Oriental, Black, White, Spanish or Indian?
29. Where were you born?

(If born in U.S. or Canada and not Black:)

31. What country did most of your family come from originally - that is before they came to the United States (or Canada)?
32. I need to know who lives here with you. I don't need names, but only how they are related to you. Let's start with you.
33. How old was/were) (PERSON) on (his/her/your) last birthday?
34. And (is/are) (PERSON) married, widowed, separated, divorced or never married (SINGLE)?
36. Is there anyone else that you haven't mentioned who lives here but is temporarily away or someone who isn't a member of the family, like a roomer?

## Interview Schedule

### NEIGHBORHOOD

A1. First I'd like to start by asking you about your neighborhood. In general, is it pretty easy for you to tell a stranger from someone who lives in this area, or is it pretty hard to know a stranger when you see one?

A2. In the past two years, do you remember seeing any strangers in your neighborhood whose behavior made you suspicious?

(If yes:)

A3. Did this happen once or more than once? (About how many times in the past two years?)

A4. Did you do anything, like check on the situation, or call the police, or did you ignore it?

(All:)

A5. What do you think your neighbors would do if they saw someone suspicious outside your door - do you think they would probably check on the situation or call the police, or would they probably ignore it?

A6. In some neighborhoods, people do things together and help each other - in other neighborhoods, people mostly go their own ways. In general, what kind of neighborhood would you say this is, mostly one where people help each other or one where people go their own ways?

A7. Would you say you really feel a part of a neighborhood here, or do you think of it more as just a place to live?

A8. In general, in the past two years or so do you think this neighborhood has gotten to be a better place to live, a worse place to live, or has it stayed about the same?

(If better or worse:)

A9. What is the most important way in which it is (better/worse)?

(All:)

A10. Now I'm going to read some statements about specific ways neighborhoods can change. For each would you tell me whether your neighborhood has gotten better in the past two years or so, worse in that time, or has it stayed about the same? (1979 only)

- a. Residents do things together to make the neighborhood a better place to live.
- b. People take care of their homes and property.
- c. Neighbors watch out for each other.

All. Five years from now, do you think this neighborhood will be a better place to live than it is now, worse, or about the same as it is now?

A12. In the past year, have you gone to any meetings of any group concerned with problems in this neighborhood?

(If yes.)

A13. About how many meetings like that have you gone to in the past year?

(All:)

A14. Could you tell me the name of any groups you know of (including any you've just been talking about) that are working on problems in this neighborhood? (Any others?)

(If knows of any groups:)

A15. How much good (have these/has this) group(s) done - a lot, some, or not very much?

(All:)

A16. How many people, both adults and children, would you say are usually on the street in front of your home during the daytime - a lot, some, a few or almost none?

A17. How about after dark, how many people would you say are usually on the street in front of your house - a lot, some, a few, or almost none?

A18. During the day do most of the people you see on the streets live around here, about half and half, or do most of them come from outside the neighborhood? ~

A19. When you think about cars, motorcycles, and buses, that pass in front of your home during the daytime, would you describe the traffic as very busy, busy, moderate, light or very light?

A20. And at night, how would you describe the traffic in front of your home - very busy, busy, moderate, light, or very light?

A21. How many days during the past week were you outside your house or apartment for some period of time - sitting on the porch or steps, working in the yard, or something like that?

A22. Is there a public park near where you live?

(If yes:)

A23. Is it a place you like to go to or walk through, or not?

(If no to A23:)

A24. Why is that?

(AH:)

A25. How often would you say you walk to some place in this neighborhood during the day - would you say almost every day, a few times a week, once a week, less often or never?

A26. And after dark, about how often do you walk some place in this neighborhood - almost every night, a few times a week, once a week, less often, or never?

(If ever:)

A27. Do you often get someone to walk with you when you go out at night?

(All:)

A28. When you go out at night in your neighborhood, do you often drive or get someone to drive you rather than walk?

A29. Do you usually carry anything for protection when you walk in your neighborhood - such as a weapon, a whistle, or tear gas? (What is that?)



A30. During an ordinary week about how many days are there when no one at all is home for some time during the daytime?

(If any:)

A31. About how many hours a day is that (that no one is home)?

(All:)

A32. And during an ordinary week, about how many evenings are there when no one at all is home for periods after dark?

A33. Do you have special locks on your doors? (All of them or just some?)

A34. Have you had your valuables engraved with your name or some identification in case they are stolen?

A35. Have you and any of your neighbors ever made an arrangement to watch one another's houses when you are not at home?

(If yes:)

A36. DO you do that all the time, or just on special occasions, such as vacations?

(All:)

A37. Do you have anything else to protect your home from being broken into? (What is that?)

A38. How many of the people living in this area do you think always lock their doors during the daytime - all of them, most of them, some of them, a few of them, or almost none?

A39. How many of the people living in this area do you think would report a crime to the police, such as a burglary, if they saw it happening to someone they did not know - all of them, most of them, some of them, a few of them or almost none?

A40. How many people living in this area do you think would be willing to answer questions to help the police find a person who had committed a crime, such as burglary - all of them, most of them, some of them, a few of them, or almost none?

- A41. How many people living in this area do you think would be willing to help with a group that was concerned with preventing crime in this area - all of them, most of them, some of them, a few of them, or almost none?
- A42. When neighbors are concerned and try to keep crime from happening to others - how much difference do you think it makes in the amount of crime in a neighborhood - a lot of difference, some difference, or not much difference at all?
- A43. How much do you think people in your area are concerned with preventing crime from happening to others living here - a great deal, some, or not much?
- A44. How do you think this has changed in the past year - are people in your area more concerned with preventing crime, less concerned or about the same as they were a year ago?

(Asylum Hill only:)

- A46. As you probably know, two years ago some streets in Asylum Hill were closed or narrowed, some were made one-way. Overall, do you think these changes were a good idea, not a good idea, or are you not sure? (1976, 1977, 1979 only)
- A47. How much difference do you think the street changes have made in the amount of time people spend outside in the area sitting on porches, chatting with neighbors, going for walks and that sort of thing?
- Do you think the changes have made a lot of difference, some difference or not much difference? (1979 only)
- A48. How much difference do you think the changes have made in the amount of crime in the area - would you say a lot of difference, some difference, or not much difference? (1979 only)
- A49. In what (other) ways, if any, have these changes improved the neighborhood? (1977 and 1979 only)
- A50. In what (other) ways, if any, have these changes made the neighborhood worse? (1979 and 1979 only)

(All:)

- A51. Thinking again about the people, adults and children, that you see on the street in front of your house during the day – would you say there are more people on the street than two years or so ago, fewer people, or is it about the same? (1977 and 1979 only)
- A52. How about your neighbors, do you see more of your neighbors out on your street during the day than you did two years or so ago, or fewer of them, or is that about the same? (1977 and 1979 only)
- A53. And how about the cars, motorcycles, and buses that pass in front of your home during the day – would you say the traffic is heavier than it was two years or so ago, lighter, or about the same? (1977 and 1979 only)

POLICE

- B1. Now I'd like to talk about the Hartford Police Department. About how often do you see a Hartford policeman in this neighborhood on foot - several times a day, almost every day, a few times a week, once a week, a few times a month, or almost never?
- B2. And about how often do you see Hartford policemen patrolling the streets in a car or on a motor scooter - several times a day, almost every day, several times a week, once a week, a few times a month, or almost never?
- B3. When someone in this neighborhood calls the Hartford Police Department for help, do they usually come right away, or do they take quite a while to come?
- B4. Have you had occasion to call the Hartford Police Department for help or about a crime in the last year or so?
- (If yes:)
- B5. What was it about?
- B6. How satisfied were you with the help you received from the police - very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not too satisfied, or not at all satisfied?

(All:)

- B7. If you came home and found signs that someone had tried to break in, but nothing was stolen, would you report it to the police?

- B8. Why is that/why not?
- B9. If you were robbed on the street and had some money stolen would you report it to the police?
- B10. Why is that/Why not?
- B11. Overall, how would you rate the job the Hartford Police Department does protecting people in this neighborhood - very good, good enough, not so good, or not good at all?
- B12. And how would you rate the way the Hartford police usually treat people in this neighborhood - very well, well enough, not so well. or not well at all?
- B13. If 0 stands for very poorly and 10 stands for extremely well- in general, how would you rate the way white people are treated by Hartford police?
- B14. How about blacks - what number would you give for the way they are usually treated by Hartford police?
- B15. And how about Spanish speaking people, which number would you give for the way the Hartford police treat them in general?
- B16. Do you think police services in this neighborhood have gotten better, worse, or stayed the same over the past two years? (1976, 1977, 1979 only)
- B17. As far as you know, have there been any changes in the police service or the way police are organized in this neighborhood in the last two years or so? (1977 and 1979 only)
- (If yes:)
- B18. Tell me about that. (1977 and 1979 only)

FEAR

(All:)

- C1. In the daytime, how worried are you about being held up on the street, threatened, beaten up or anything of that sort in your neighborhood? Would you say you are very worried, somewhat worried, just a little worried, or not at all worried?

- C2. And how about at night, how worried are you about that sort of thing in your neighborhood - very worried, somewhat worried, just a little worried, or not at all worried?
- C3. And, how worried are you about your home being broken into or entered illegally in the daytime when no one is home? Would you say you are very worried, somewhat worried, just a little worried, or not at all worried?
- C4. And how about at night, how worried are you about your home being broken into then when you're not at home - very worried, somewhat worried, just a little worried, or not at all worried?
- C5. Think of a scale from 0 to 10. Zero stands for no possibility at all and ten stands for extremely likely. During the course of a year, how likely is it that \_\_\_\_\_?
- a) someone would break into your (house/apartment) when no one is home
  - b) your purse/wallet would be snatched in your neighborhood
  - c) someone would take something from you on the street by force or threat in your neighborhood
  - d) someone would beat you up or hurt you on the street in your neighborhood
- C6. During the day - how safe do you feel or would you feel being out alone in your neighborhood - very safe, reasonably safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?
- C7. How about after dark - how safe do you feel or would you feel being out alone in your neighborhood - very safe, reasonably safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?
- C8. I am going to read you a list of crime-related problems that exist in some areas. For each, I want you to tell me whether it is a big problem, some problem, or almost no problem in your neighborhood.
- a) People selling illegal drugs
  - b) People using illegal drugs
  - c) Groups of teen-agers around in the streets or parks
  - d) Groups of men in the streets or parks
  - e) Drunken men
  - f) Prostitution

(If any rated as big problem or some problem:)

C10. Have you or any of your neighbors tried to do anything about (this/these) problem(s)?

(If yes:)

C11. What have **you** done?

(All:)

C12. How about \_\_\_\_\_? Is that a big problem, some problem, or almost no problem?

- a) Stealing cars
- b) Burglary - breaking into people's homes
- c) Robbing people on the street
- d) Holding up and robbing small stores or businesses
- e) People being beaten up or hurt on the streets

C13. Overall, what do you think is the most important crime problem in your neighborhood?

C14. Over the past two years, would you say that crime in this neighborhood has gone up, gone down, or stayed about the same?

(Asylum Hill respondents who said crime went down:)

C16. How much do you think the Asylum Hill Crime Prevention Program - the street changes, team police and community organizations - has had to do with crime going down. Would you say the program has had a lot to do with it, something to do with it, or not much to do with it? (1979 only)

#### VICTIMIZATION

We have some specific questions to ask you about crimes that may have happened to you or a member of your household during the past year within the Hartford city limits.

- Di. a) During the past year, since a year ago (MONTH), did anyone enter your (house/apartment) (garage, or any other building on your property), who didn't have a right to be there, to steal something?
- b) (Other than that) Did you find any sign that someone tried to break in but did not succeed such as a forced window or lock, or jimmied door?

- c) Did anyone steal something who had a right to be in your house, such as a neighbor, repairman, or delivery man?
- d) Did you (or any member of your household) have your purse or any of its contents snatched without force or the threat of force?
- e) Did anyone take or try to take something from you (or any member of your household) by using force or the threat of force?
- f) To the best of your knowledge, was anything stolen from your mailbox during the past year?
- g) To the best of your knowledge, were there any other times when someone broke or tried to break into your mailbox in the past year?
- h) Did anyone steal your car or use it without your permission?
- i) (Other than that) Did you find any signs that someone tried to steal your car or use it without your permission?
- j) Did you (or any member of your household) have any other property stolen that did not involve breaking into your home or using force or the threat of force such as something you left outside your home, something taken from your car or part of your car?
- k) (Other than the things you have mentioned) During the past year, were you or any member of your household threatened with any weapon Or tool, or beaten up, or attacked?
- l) (Other than that) During the past year, did anyone attempt to forcibly rape, molest, or sexually abuse you (or anyone in the household)?
- m) Did, anyone purposely destroy or damage anything belonging to you including your (house/apartment) or car, such as breaking your windows or lights, slashing the tires on your car, marking the doors of your (house/apartment) or burning something? We are interested only in your property or property you are responsible for. This does not include street lights or common territory, such as the halls of an apartment building.

(The following set of probes was asked for each of the above when a crime had occurred:)

a) (IF SOMETHING WAS STOLEN) Was it worth \$50 or more?

b) What month and year did \_\_\_\_\_ happen?

c) Did you or anyone else inform the police?

(If yes:)

d) Did (you/PERSON) or the policeman fill out a formal report?

e) Did you ever again hear from the police about this?

(All:)

D2. Now I am going to read some statements. For each, I want you to tell me whether you agree or disagree,

a) People in your neighborhood have a lot of say in what police do.

b) The police don't really understand the people in your neighborhood.

c) The police in your neighborhood really try to do what id best for the people that live there.

d) Police don't spend their time on the problems the people in your neighborhood really care about.

#### DEMOGRAPHICS

E1. Finally, we have just a few questions for background information.

How much education have you had? (IF "HIGH SCHOOL" OR "COLLEGE"<sup>11</sup>: Did you graduate?)

E2. How long have you been living in this (house/apartment)?

E3. And what is your background – is it Oriental, Black, White, Spanish or American Indian?



(If not American Indian:)  
E4. Where were you born?

(If born in U.S. or Canada and not black:)  
E6. What country did most of your family come from originally - that is before they came to the United States (or Canada)?

(All:)  
E7. Are you (or anyone 18 or older living with you) out of a job and looking for work?

(If yes:)  
E8. Who is that? (Anyone else?)

(All:)  
E9. a) I need to know who lives here with you. I don't need names, but only how they are related to you. Let's start with you.  
b) How old (was/were) (PERSON) on (his/her/your) last birthday?  
c) And (is/are) (PERSON) married, widowed, separated, divorced or never married (SINGLE)?  
e) Is there anyone else that you haven't mentioned who lives here but is temporarily away or someone who isn't a member of the family, like a roomer?  
E10. I would like you to estimate the total combined income of your family for the past 12 months - (that is, yours, your (ALL ADULT's, etc) - before deductions for taxes. Please include income from all sources - that is, wages, salaries, social security or retirement benefits, help from relatives, rent from property and so forth.  
Would you say it is under \$5,000, \$5,000 to \$10,000, \$10,000 to \$15,000, or over \$15,000 for the year?

(IF LESS THAN \$5,000:) Is it more or less than \$3,000?

(IF \$5,000-\$10,000:) Is it more or less than \$7,000?

E11. Finally, we have talked a lot about crime and fear. I would like you to tell me how crime and fear in your neighborhood affect you personally, if they do. (Anything else?) (1977 and 1979 only)

APPENDIX C  
CREATION OF INDICES

There were six critical constructs that we attempted to measure with several questions each. When there are multiple measures of the same variable, a more reliable measure can be constructed by combining the answers to each question into a single index.

Below we present details of the construction of six indices used in this report. The inter-correlation matrix shows the degree to which items were related to one another. The calculation of alpha (  $\alpha$  ) indicates the reliability of the index.

In general, the approach to index construction was the same for each index. Items were collapsed so they had the same number of categories. Categories were assigned ordinal numbers from 1 to N, and scores were summed. The sum of item scores thus assigned was the index score.

Item construction was based on 1979 data for the entire Hartford sample. We compared correlation coefficients city-wide and in North Asylum Hill and found them to be nearly identical.

The crime problem index includes ratings of the degree of a neighborhood problem the following are: car theft, burglary, street robbery, commercial robbery, and assault. The scale ranges for 1 to 3, with a high score indicating the most problems.

Inter-correlation matrix:

	<u>Car theft</u>	<u>Burglary</u>	<u>Robbery</u>	<u>Commercial Robbery</u>
Burglary	.46			
Robbery	.45	.45		
Commercial Robbery	.38	.35	.48	
Assault	.43	.42	.65	.53

Average correlation = .46,  $\alpha$ =.81

The fear of burglary robbery index includes measures of the degree the respondent worries about being burglarized during the day and during the night, and ratings of the likelihood of being burglarized in a year. The scale on each item was standardized with a range from 1 to 4, with a high score indicating the most fear.

Inter-correlatlon matrix;

	<u>Worry about burglary during day</u>	<u>Worry about Burglary during night</u>
Worry about burglary during night	.81	
Likelihood of burglary	.57	.56
Average correlation = .65, a=85		

The fear-of robbery index includes measures of the degree the respondent worries about being robbed during the day and during the night, and ratings of the likelihood of being robbed, assaulted, and having one's purse or wallet snatched. The item scales ranges from 1 to A, with a high score indicating the most fear.

Inter-correlation Matrix:

	<u>Worry about robbery during day</u>	<u>Worry about robbery during night</u>	<u>Likelihood of pursesnatch</u>	<u>Likelihood of robbery</u>
Worry about robbery during night	.62			
Likelihood of pursesnatch	.42	.47		
Likelihood of robbery	.40	.42	.81	
Likelihood of assault	.47	.46	.69	.78
Average correlation = .55, a= .86				

The incivility problem index Includes ratings of the degree of a neighborhood problem the following are: drug sale, drug use, loitering teens, loitering men, drunken men, prostitution. The itme scales ranged from 1 to 3, with a high score indicating the most problems.

Inter-correlation Matrix:

	<u>Drug Sale</u>	<u>Drug Use</u>	<u>Loitering Teens</u>	<u>Loitering Men</u>	<u>Drunken Men</u>
Drug Use	.85				
Loitering Teens	.50	.51			
Loitering Men	.58	.61	.57		
Drunken Men	.51	.54	.47	.68	
Prostitution	.46	.48	.32	.48	.50

Average correlation - .54, a= .87

The police effectiveness index includes ratings of how quickly police respond to a call for help, how well police protect residents, and how well police treat people in general, blacks, and Hispanics. The item scales were translated to a range from 1 to 4, with a high score indicating the most

Inter-correlation Matrix

<u>How Well;</u>	<u>Response Speed</u>	<u>Protection</u>	<u>Treat People</u>	<u>Treat Blacks</u>
Protect people	.47			
Treat people	.34	.56		
Treat blacks	.30	.39	.47	
Treat Hispanics	.32	.39	.47	.79

Average correlation = .45, a=.80

The perceived neighborhood resources against crime index includes ratings of whether neighbors help each other, whether respondent feels part of the neighborhood, the degree the neighborhood is concerned about crime, and ratings of whether neighbors would: intervene in a suspicious situation, report a crime, answer questions for police and help with a crime control group. The item scales ranged from 1 to 5, with a high score indicating the most favorable feelings about the neighborhood and Informal social control.

	Neighbors help each other	Feel part of Neigh- borhood	Neighbor- hood crime <u>concern</u>	Neighbors would <u>intervene</u>	Neighbors would report <u>crime</u>	Neighbors would answer <u>questions</u>
Feel part of neighborhood	.48					
Neighborhood crime concern	.36	.30				
Neighbors would intervene	.35	.24	.33			
Neighbors would report crime	.31	.29	.45	.36		
Neighbors would answer questions	.30	.29	.43	.33	.65	
Neighbors would help with crime group	.21	.22	.40	.17	.43	.41

Average correlation = .35, a = .79

APPENDIX D  
POLICE ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRES

METHOD OF ADMINISTERING THE QUESTIONNAIRES

Data on police attitudes were collected in three waves, in November, 1975; June, 1977; and July, 1979. Patrol officers and sergeants in both District 5 neighborhood teams (those assigned to Asylum Hill and those to Clay Hill/South Arsenal) were surveyed. Self-administered questionnaires and mail-back techniques were used.

Most questions asked in 1975 were repeated in 1977, with additional questions about the street changes and about participation in police-community activities. A few minor deletions were made in 1979. Topics covered in all years include: team-policing and related items on patrol tactics and participation in team decision-making; perceptions of police-community relations; perceptions of team area crime problems and the team area as a place to live; perceived level of resident fear; perceptions of team success in past years in clearing cases, arrests and reducing crime; and job satisfaction. A copy of the 1979 questionnaire is included at the end of this discussion, with questions added since 1975 indicated.

In all three years, packets were distributed to all team members (except team commanders and the district commander) by the officer in charge. In 1975, the packets included a questionnaire, a letter from the Center for Survey Research explaining the study which also stated that replies would remain anonymous and confidential, and a postage-paid envelope to be used to mail back the completed questionnaire. In 1977 and 1979, the packets included these materials as well as a letter from the head of HPD Field Services assuring team members of the confidentiality of their responses and urging the officers to respond. These packets also included a self-addressed, postage-paid postcard stating the questionnaire had been returned. Officers were asked to return the postcard when they returned the questionnaire. This allowed follow-up packets to be distributed to those who had not responded to the first round while maintaining anonymity of respondents. Three rounds of follow-up distribution were conducted for the first wave, and two for the second and third.

In 1975, 41 of the 56 officers then assigned to the two teams responded (a response rate of 73 percent); 17 of these responses were from Asylum Hill officers and 25 from Clay Hill/South Arsenal officers. In 1977, 35 of 45 officers responded (for a response rate of 78 percent); 18 responses were from Asylum Hill officers, 13 from Clay Hill/South Arsenal officers, and four from

relief officers who worked in either area depending on need. In 1979, 28 of the 37 officers on the District 5 roll sheet responded (for a response rate of 76 percent); 17 responses were from Asylum Hill officers, eight from Clay Hill/South Arsenal officers, and three from relief officers working in either area.

#### RELIABILITY OF THE DATA

Because all officers were asked to fill out the questionnaire, there is no sampling error in the data. There was, however, the chance for non-response bias. Non-response bias may occur when those who do not answer a questionnaire (or some portion of it) are concentrated in some subgroup of the population surveyed; the perceptions and experiences of such a subgroup will be under-represented. Of course, the higher the response rate, the less likely there is to be non-response bias in the data.

The overall response rates for the three waves of data collection on police attitudes were relatively good for a self-administered, mail-back questionnaire. Since this report has concentrated on the data from the Asylum Hill tam, it should be noted that there were differences in response among the waves. In 1975, about a third of the 26 men then assigned to the Asylum Hill area did not return a questionnaire for reasons unknown to us. In 1977, nearly all of the officers working in the area, all or part of the time, returned a questionnaire.

In 1979, there was a unique problem of the disintegration of district policing, that is, officers actually on the roll sheet for District 5 were being assigned to work in other areas of the city as well. Several officers mentioned this disintegration and general manpower shortage as serious problems in their questionnaires. Although there were 37 names on the roll sheet, according to the District 5 Commander fewer than 30 men were regularly assigned to Asylum Hill and Clay Hill/South Arsenal. Therefore it is difficult to know the degree of involvement of the respondents with these areas. Even so, it seems that there is a notably better response rate among the officers working predominantly in Asylum Hill, probably owing to the heavy emphasis on that area in the questionnaire. Assuming the team to be divided equally between the two areas the receipt of 17 responses from Asylum Hill yields a considerably higher percentage than the eight from Clay Hill/South Arsenal. In fact, we feel the response from Clay Hill/South Arsenal is too low for reliability; and their responses are not presented in this report.

Police Views on the Neighborhood Team Police Unit, July, 1979

1. How well have you gotten to know each of the following since you joined your unit of the District 5 Team Police? (1977 and 1979 only)

<u>Very</u> <u>well</u>	<u>Well</u> <u>enough</u>	<u>Not too</u> <u>well</u>	<u>Not at</u> <u>all well</u>
----------------------------	------------------------------	-------------------------------	----------------------------------

- a. The crime patterns in your Team Area.
  - b. The kinds of offenders in your Team Area.
  - c. The concerns of citizens in your Team Area.
  - d. The way the geography of the Team Area relates to crime.
  - e. Your responsibilities as a Team member.
  - f. Patrol tactics.
  - g. The general idea behind Team policing.
2. How many formal Team meetings have you attended in the last 2 months?

\_\_\_\_\_ (If "none" write "0")  
Number

3. How much can you decide on your own how to patrol?
- Complete freedom
  - Some flexibility
  - A little flexibility
  - No flexibility
4. Compared with most assignments in the Hartford Police Department, how much chance do Team members have to affect decisions about how things are done in District 5? (1977 and 1979 only)
- More of a chance than on other assignments
  - About the same
  - Less of a chance than on other assignments



5. How much effect do you think Central Headquarters has on day-to-day District decisions?

- A lot
- Some
- Very little
- Almost none at all

6. How would you rate each of the following for your Team?

	Very Good	Good	Fair	Poor
a. The amount of respect citizens who live in your Team Area have for police.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Your usual response time when you are called for help in your Team Area.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. The rate at which your Team is clearing cases.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. The overall relations between police and citizens in your Team Area.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. The success of police efforts to prevent or cut down on crime in your Team Area.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

7. How many of the people living in the Team Area do you think would report a crime to the police, such as a burglary, if they saw it happening to someone they did not know?

- All of them
- Most of them
- Some of them
- A few of them
- Almost none

8. How many people living in the Team Area do you think would be willing to answer questions to help the police find a person who had committed a crime, such as burglary?

- All of them
- Most of them
- Some of them
- A few of them
- Almost none

9. How touch do you think people in your Team Area are concerned with preventing crime from happening to others living there?

- A great deal
- Some
- Not much

10. What do you think most people in your Team Area would do if they saw someone suspicious outside a neighbor's door?

- Probably check on it
- Probably call the police
- Probably ignore it
- Other (specify): \_\_\_\_\_

11. Listed below are several crimes and crime-related problems that exist in some areas. For each, we'd like to know how much of a problem you feel it is in your Team Area.

	Big Problem	Some Problem	Almost No Problem
a. People selling illegal drugs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. People using illegal drugs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Groups of teenagers around in the streets or parks	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Groups of men in the streets or parks	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Drunken men	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Prostitution	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g. Stealing cars	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
h. Burglary	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
i. Robbing people on the street	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
j. Robbing small stores or businesses	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
k. People being beaten up or hurt on the streets	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

12. In general, in the past two years or so, do you think your Team Area has gotten to be a better place to live, a worse place to live, or has it stayed about the same?
- Better
  - Worse
  - About the same
13. Compared to two years ago, how afraid do you think residents of your Team Area are of being burglarized? (1977 and 1979 only)
- More afraid than two years ago
  - About the same
  - Less afraid than two years ago
14. Compared to two years ago, how afraid are residents of being mugged on the streets in your Team Area? (1977 and 1979 only)
- More afraid than two years ago
  - About the same
  - Less afraid than two years ago
15. In general, is it pretty easy for you to tell a stranger from someone who lives in your Team Area, or is it pretty hard to know a stranger when you see one?
- Pretty easy
  - Pretty hard

16. READ THE STATEMENTS BELOW. For each, we want you to tell us whether you agree or disagree.

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
a. People who live in the Team Area have a lot of say in what police do.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. The police don't really understand the people who live in the Team Area.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. The police in the Team area really try to do what is best for the people that live there.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Police don't spend their time on the problems the people in the Team Area really care about.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. No matter what police or citizens do, crime in the neighborhood will keep going up.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. If police got more help and cooperation from citizens, they could reduce crime in the Team Area.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

17. Which Team Area do you work in most often?

- Asylum Hill
- Clay Hill/SAND (SKIP TO Q.23, PAGE 6)

18. Three years ago, some streets in Asylum Hill were closed or narrowed, some were made one-way.

Overall, do you think these changes were a good idea, not a good idea, or are you not sure? (1977 and 1979 only)

- 1• Good idea
- 2• Not a good idea
- 3• Not sure

19. In general, how do you think these street changes have affected crime in Asylum Hill? (1977 and 1979 only)

- Have reduced crime
- Have increased crime
- Haven't made a difference

20. Overall, how do you think the majority of the people living in Asylum Hill feel about the street changes. Do most people think they are a good idea or not a good idea? (1977 and 1979 only)

- Good idea
- Not a good idea

21. Some people feel that these street changes have created problems in Asylum Hill. For each of the following items, we'd like to know how much of a problem you feel it is in Asylum Hill. (1977 and 1979 only)

	Big Problem	Some Problem	Almost No Problem
a. Violation of one-way street signs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Violation of do-not-enter signs and/or street closings	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

22. As you may know, a Police Advisory Committee (PAC) has been set up in Asylum Hill. Do you ever hear about what PAC does? (1977 and 1979 only)

- Yes
- NO

23. In general, do you think that neighborhood team policing is a good idea or not? (1977 and 1979 only)

- Good idea
- Not a good idea

24. Why is that? (1977 and 1979 only)

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25. All in all, how satisfied would you say you are with your job?
- Very satisfied
  - Somewhat satisfied
  - Not too satisfied
  - Not at all satisfied
26. How long have you been a part of your Team Police Unit in District 5?  
(1977 and 1979 only)
27. How long have you been a police officer?
- Less than a year
  - 1 to 5 years
  - 6 to 10 years
  - 11 to 15 years
  - More than 15 years
28. How old are you?
- 25 or less
  - 26 to 35
  - 36 to 45
  - 46 or older

APPENDIX E  
POLICE RECORD DATA

TYPES OF DATA OBTAINED

The Hartford Police Department (HPD) provided several types of data from its Management Information Division, its Records Division and its Data Analysis Unit throughout the project period. For the most part, these data cover the period January 1971 through June 1979 and were provided for the two original target areas, Asylum Hill and Clay Hill/South Arsenal, and for the city as a whole. The data thus obtained are as follows.

Incidence of Crime

Data on crime incidence came from police reports. They include aggregated incidences of violent crimes (murder, forcible rape, robbery) property crimes (burglary, larceny, auto-theft), robbery and burglary for Hartford as a whole.

In addition, the numbers and aggregated rates of certain crimes were obtained for Asylum Hill, Clay Hill/South Arsenal and the city. These crimes included residential robbery, other robbery and pursesnatch.

Location of Target Crimes

The geographic locations of residential burglaries, street robberies and pursesnatches reported to police were taken from police reports of these crimes for Asylum Hill and Clay Hill/South Arsenal and noted on maps of the areas.

Arrests

The number of arrests made for residential burglaries and street robberies/pursesnatches committed in Asylum Hill was obtained from police arrest record data covering the period July 1974 through June 1979.

Offender Residence

The addresses of arrested burglars and robbers operating in Asylum Hill were taken from police arrest records. These data provide the information available on residential mobility of Asylum Hill offenders during the project period.

## RELIABILITY OF THE DATA

### Incidence of Crime

Police can only record crimes they know about, and for much of their knowledge they must depend upon reports from citizens. Victimization surveys have consistently shown that a substantial amount of crime is never reported to police, though more serious types of crime—those inflicting more serious loss or injury on the victim—are more likely to be reported than not. Also, police have some discretion about whether to file formal reports for crimes reported to them, indeed in deciding whether an actual offense has occurred. Their exercising this discretion in the matter of record-keeping is affected by departmental regulations and procedures, and by other departmental events.

Three occurrences in the HPD affected its record-keeping practices, and thus the record data, between the time the Hartford project began in 1973 and the time the present evaluation period ended in June 1979. First, in April 1974 a new police chief was appointed. Prior to his taking office, HPD crime reporting procedures differed from UCR guidelines, and the new chief instituted use of UCR procedures.

Second, a contract dispute existed between the local International Brotherhood of Police Officers and the city of Hartford for much of the project period. In January 1975, the two groups began negotiating a new contract, to take effect July 1, 1975. That year was spent in negotiation and arbitration. Early in 1976, the union began to resort to other tactics to force a settlement, encouraging patrol officers to engage in such things as work slowdowns, ticket blitzing and absenteeism. The contract dispute lasted until early 1977.

Third, in mid-1976, HPD began to computerize the data it gathered, including incident record reports. This required some changes in the forms and procedures used to record information; there were, however, no official changes in definitions used to categorize crimes.

These three occurrences apparently affected the crime incident report data in different ways, making it difficult to derive estimates of crime rates from them that are comparable across time. The adoption of UCR record keeping procedures was followed by an apparent substantial increase in crime in 1975. As an example, the residential burglary rate for the city, estimated from police data, more than doubled between 1973 and fiscal year 1974-1975, while comparable victimization rates (based on the UCR definitions) indicate a much less severe increase. The ratio of police record to victimization survey rates for these periods changed from .40 to .55. Before mid-1974, HPD's crime reporting procedures differed from UCR guidelines in ways that probably resulted in substantial underreporting, as compared to places following the guidelines. For example, HPD did not count attempted and non-forcible burglaries as burglaries; and it virtually never included a forcible pursesnatch as a robbery.

On the other hand, the contract dispute and the procedural changes associated with computerization may have acted together to discourage patrol officers from filing formal reports. The ratio of residential burglary rates, estimated from police data, to comparable victimization rates, again changed



from .55 for fiscal year 1975 to .32 for fiscal year 1977. Data on the results of calls for service (CFS) for residential burglary for these years indicate that the proportion for which no report was filed increased somewhat.

In addition, in 1979 HPD experienced a severe manpower shortage. Many officers cited this as a very serious problem in their questionnaires. During this time the team policing plan practically dissolved, and officers were sent to work in all parts of the city, not just a particular neighborhood. The officers did not have time to answer and deal with all calls for help, which may have resulted in fewer people reporting crimes and fewer officers recording them. In any case, there was another decrease in the ratio of recorded crimes to crimes reported in the victimization survey.

These factors taken together lead us to conclude that crime rates from police record data could not be compared over time. We did not feel that we could correct the figures, or compensate for the changed procedures, in any way that would be meaningful. Hence, crime rates from police records are not used in this report. However, for the interested reader the incidence of burglary and robbery/pursesnatch from police records are shown in Table A5.

#### Other Types of Police Data.

Since 1974, the information required to be provided in an incident report has remained the same. Hence, the data on location and time of the target crimes in Asylum Hill is comparable over time. Arrest reports are (and have been) required and the residence of the arrested offender has always been a part of this report, though of course reports are sensitive to changes in arrest patterns.

The key assumption in using these data is the extent to which events or individuals in police files are representative of all events or, at, least, that biases are consistent over time. Since police records were the only source of information on the location of crimes or the characteristics of offenders, we relied on the data, at the same time trying to be judicious in our interpretation.

TABLE A5

Crime Figures for North Asylum Hill  
And Total Hartford City from Police Records

	1974- 1975*	1975- 1976*	1976- 1977*	1977- 1978*	1978- 1979*	
<u>North Asylum Hill**</u>						
No. residential burglaries	305	316	290	297	241	
No. street robberies plus pursesnatch	98	152	120	123	139	
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1977- 1978*</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1978- 1979*</u>
<u>Total City</u>						
No residential burglaries	3513	2703	,2638	2749	2463	2551
No. street robberies plus pursesnatch	1685	1470	1564	1538	1550	1490

\* Refers to fiscal year beginning July 1

\*\* The figures for the last two years came from special tabulations made by the Hartford Police Department. The other figures involved counts of incidents by Census tracts, which may differ slightly from final official figures. Also, the figures from 1976 were pro-rated to correspond to fiscal years. The police figures are for Census tracts 5022, 5033 and 5034, an area slightly larger than North Asylum Hill. Finally, street crime figures refer to all crimes committed in those tracts, while the survey measures only crimes to residents.

## APPENDIX F VEHICULAR TRAFFIC DATA

In April, 1976, just prior to implementation of the physical changes, machine counts were conducted at 15 sites; these were repeated twice in June, 1977, at the end of the formal evaluation year; and again in June, 1979.\*

### SELECTING THE SITES FOR COUNTS

Sites were selected to provide before and after counts for streets for which the greatest change was expected. These included: streets for which treatments were planned (Sargeant, Ashley, Atwood, May, Willard, Townley and Huntington), collector streets being left open to through traffic in North Asylum Hill (Sigourney and Collins and the streets bordering the area (Woodland, Garden and Asylum). Figure A1 shows the 15 sites at which counts were conducted.

### METHODS FOR GATHERING THE DATA

All vehicular traffic counts were carried out by a Hartford consulting firm with expertise in traffic analysis.

The counts each year were conducted by machine for a single 24-hour period, broken into 15-minute sequences to allow aggregation of data by time of day. Counts were taken separately for each side of the street at each site to determine the volume of traffic in each direction. The counting machines were placed in the same mid-block locations each year.

### RELIABILITY OF THE DATA

Because the counts were performed each year at the same sites, using the same methods, the data should provide comparable estimates of the traffic volume on each block when counters were placed. These estimates may be compared across time and from site to site. The main uncertainty is the extent to which traffic rates vary from day to day in a random fashion.


Two points should be noted about further uses of the machine count data. First, there is some difficulty involved in inferring traffic flow patterns

\* Counts were also carried out in 1975 as part of a study of the feasibility of the proposed change requested by the city. The sites selected and methods used differed somewhat from the counts done for purposes of evaluating program effects. Data from the 1975 counts were not used for evaluation purposes; hence they are not discussed here.

from these data, particularly since counts were not obtained for each block face in the area. Second, because of the difficulties involved in inferring flow patterns, it is also difficult to adjust sums of counts from sites along the same street, or on intersecting streets, so that vehicles crossing more than one counter are counted only once.

This consideration most clearly affects the totals obtained for "collector streets", "border streets", and overall totals; these totals probably overestimate the traffic volume to some extent. However, the degree of such overestimation is probably proportionally similar from one year to the next. The indicated changes over time should be reasonable indications of the type of change that actually occurred, though they may underestimate the degree of such changes, whether positive or negative.

Figure A1  
 VEHICULAR TRAFFIC COUNT SITES, 1976-1979



KEY: — MECHANICAL 24-HOUR COUNTERS (15 SITES)

APPENDIX G  
PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC COUNTS

Manual counts of pedestrian traffic passing selected sites at selected times of a single day were performed in June, 1975 and April, 1976, (before implementation of the street treatments), in June, 1977, (after implementation at the end of the formal evaluation year), and again in June, 1979. These counts were carried out at the same sites, using the same methods, each year. There is one difference in the 1979 methodology: many sites were counted twice, on separate days, by different counters. This was done to obtain some indication of the day-to-day variability of the counts. For these sites, the numbers used for analysis are the means of the two respective counts. Further discussion of the implications of the two sets of numbers is found in the section on reliability.

SELECTING THE SITES AND TIMES FOR COUNTING

Sites were selected to provide before and after counts for streets which the planned street treatments were particularly expected to affect, as well as some that were not expected to be affected. Sites were chosen at the main pedestrian entry points into the neighborhood (the bridges over the railroad tracks at Woodland, Sigourney and Garden Streets), on all streets for which treatments were planned (Sargeant, Ashley, Atwood, May, Willard and Huntington), on the two collector streets being left open to through vehicular traffic to which pedestrian traffic might also be redirected (Sigourney and Collins), and other streets used as routes by pedestrians (Garden, Summer, Gillett and Woodland). In 1975, counts were performed at all 22 sites shown in Figure A2. In 1976, 1977 and 1979, counts were performed only at the 19 sites in North Asylum Hill. The three sites south of Asylum Avenue were eliminated in the final three waves of counts because the street treatments were expected to have no effect on those sites.

Six one-hour periods were selected so as to provide data on the range in volume and type of traffic over a day:

Schools start; morning rush hour	7:30-8:30AM
Mid-morning	10:30-11:30PM
Early afternoon	12:30-1:30PM

School Is out	2:15-3:15PM
Afternoon rush hour	4:30-5:30PM
Early evening	6:30-7:30PM

These time periods were used each year for each site.

#### METHODS FOR COUNTING

Counts were performed each year on days when school was in session and businesses open—two types of institutions that brought many non-residents into the neighborhood. The four waves were conducted in similar weather, on relatively sunny spring days; counting was not done during rain, snow, or very cold temperatures.

Counters were stationed at mid-block sites. Each pedestrian who passed in front of the counter, on either side of the street, was counted.\* Pedestrians counted were categorized according to four dimensions:

- o direction of movement
- o sex
- o racial or ethnic background (white, black and other, primarily Spanish)
- o age (preteen, under 12; teenagers, 13-19, young adult, 20-35; middle-aged, 36-64; elderly, 65 or older)

Very broad age categories were used because of the difficulty of judging precise age by observation. It was also expected that it would be difficult to distinguish Spanish from whites by observation in some cases. Therefore, a rule was made: only pedestrians who were obviously Spanish (e.g., because they were speaking Spanish) were to be counted as "other"; whites who were not obviously Spanish were to be counted as white.

Five to seven counters were hired for each wave. They were trained as to the rules for counting and forms to be used. The training included a practice counting period on street, followed by a group discussion, led by their trainer, of problems that arose. Figures A3 and A4 are copies of the written instructions given to counters in each wave. Figure A5 shows the arrangement of the counting form used each year.

#### RELIABILITY OF THE DATA

Because the same sites, times and methods for counting were used for each wave of data collection, the data provide comparable estimates of the volume of pedestrian traffic for each block and time that the counts were performed.

\* Because of the volume of traffic on Sigourney Street Bridge, each side of the street was considered a site and counted separately

However, the day-to-day stability of the counts is questionable. For most years, the counts were done on one day only, and therefore there was no indication of the degree of variability between days or between counters. In 1979, 12 of the 19 sites were counted twice, on separate days, by different counters. The difference in the numbers counted ranges from very slight to considerable. A Pearson correlation was calculated to determine the strength of the relationship between the one set of counts for a site, and the other.

As there were six distinct hours when pedestrians were counted at a site on a given day, the correlation first was done using each of the six counts separately. This gave 72 counts, each done twice. The resulting Pearson correlation coefficient was .19. As this indicated a weak relationship, it was decided that it might be a better measure to view the counts in terms of day totals; that is, summing up the six counts for the given day. The correlation between the 12 site totals, each done twice was -.05. Two sites were discovered to have extremely different totals: 1151 and 460, and 296 and 1061 respectively, and this caused the negative coefficient. A Pearson correlation coefficient, which excluded these two sites which varied so extremely, resulted in a coefficient of .67.

These data clearly indicate a fairly high degree of variability between counts done on separate days. This may be owing to actual differences in pedestrian flow from day to day, at least in part. It may also result from the differences in counters counting techniques. Although all counters were given the same training from year to year, their ability to record their observations may vary enough to cause fairly wide discrepancies. Because of the observed day-to-day variability of the pedestrian counts, a very limited use of these data was employed in writing this report.

As noted above, distinguishing the racial and age groups of pedestrians counted was difficult to do by observation. However, the use of broad age categories and of a specific rule for distinguishing Spanish reduces the error in these counts and makes the data comparable across sites and time. The training counters received insured that they understood their task and used the rules in the same way.

Because the counts were performed on a block by block basis (and because pedestrians were not counted on each block in the area) it is difficult to make absolutely accurate inferences about traffic flow patterns from these data. Similarly, it is difficult to adjust sums of counts from sites along the same street or from those on intersecting streets so that pedestrians passing more than one counter are counted only once; therefore, totals in tables necessarily are an overestimation of the actual number of people observed to some extent. However, there is no reason to believe that the amount of such overestimation changed from one year to the next.



FIGURE A6  
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PEDESTRIAN COUNTERS

May 4, 1979

MEMORANDUM

TO: Pedestrian Counters  
FROM: Barbara Russell, Center for Survey Research  
RE: Instructions for Pedestrian Counts

Attached you will find the sites listed at which you are to do your pedestrian counts. These counts at each site are to be completed during the following six hour periods:

7:30-8:30AM	2:15-3:15PM
10:30-11:30AM	4:30-5:30PM
12:30-1:30PM	6:30-7:30PM

You are to judge the following characteristics of each pedestrian as indicated on the forms provided:

1. Direction in which the person is moving - south or east being "inbound", toward Farmington Avenue or downtown; north or west being "outbound", away from Farmington Avenue or downtown.
2. Sex of each pedestrian.
3. Race of each pedestrian.
4. Age of each pedestrian - grouping ages into five categories: preteen (under 13 years of age); teen (13-19); young adult (20-35); middle age (36-64); or elderly (65 or older).

A separate form is to be completed for each time period at each site (six per day), Please make certain that you fill in your name, the street location, the cross streets, the exact time begun, time ended, and the date on each form at each time at each location. A separate form is to be used for each time period. If you do happen to use more than one per time, make sure you indicate it is 1 of 2, 2 of 2, etc.

The counts are to be completed on the first non-rainy, non-threatening days, starting Wednesday, May 23, not including Saturday or Sunday.\* In case of doubtful weather, Rudy Brooks will decide by 7:00 AM whether or not the counting should take place that day. If there is any question about the weather, it is important that all counters hear from him so that the same decision (whether to count or not) is made for all sites. Each site must be counted on one day, not split between more than one day.

If you have any problems, contact Rudy Brooks at the Hartford Institute of Criminal and Social Justice in Hartford at 527-1866.

GOOD LUCK!! HOPE FOR THE SUN TO SHINE !!

\*or Memorial Day, May 28.

FIGURE A7

NOTES FOR COUNTERS

Supplies needed:

Clipboards  
Pencils  
Recording forms - 6 for each site  
Assignment map  
Letter from Hartford Institute  
Return envelopes - 1 for each day

1. Stand in the middle of the block indicated. With a few exceptions, the site at which the previous counter stood has been recorded. If this previous site is not in the middle of the block, choose a more appropriate spot. Record at top of each form where you stand while counting. Count all pedestrians who pass by or in front of you. Count in both directions.
2. In some cases it may be difficult to distinguish between Spanish origin and white. If person is speaking Spanish, is part of a group whose other members are obviously Spanish, etc., count as Spanish, i.e., "other". Use your best judgment. If you observe no justification for classifying an individual as non-white, count that person as white.
3. Please observe time periods carefully. It is important that you do so in order that the data are comparable.
4. At the end of the day, put completely forms in return envelope and mail immediately to the Center for Survey Research.

APPENDIX H  
REPORT OF THE URBAN DESIGN SPECIALISTS

The following report was filed by the urban design specialists after their review of North Asylum Hill in 1979. It should be noted that they did not have the benefit of access to other data about the area - crime statistics, survey results, etc. By design this is a report based only on their observations. Hence, this document is not the same as they might have produced had they been permitted to review all relevant materials.

PRELIMINARY REPORT: THE HARTFORD NEIGHBORHOOD RE-EVALUATION STUDY

This preliminary report is intended to identify and document physical and use changes that have occurred since the first evaluation in 1977. By collecting such information and comparing it with conditions present in 1977, an assessment can be made of crime opportunities and the strength of the neighborhood. A secondary objective is to test the usefulness of urban design as a potential tool in: analyzing crime problems and patterns; developing physical solutions which can assist in reducing the opportunity for crime to occur; and thereby providing a framework for positive social relationships to germinate.

In responding to the first objective, the urban design consultant (Gardiner) has collected the following types of data:

- land use
- porosity
- circulation, pedestrian and vehicular
- use of space
- condition of street treatments

The second objective, concerned with the value of urban design as a criminal justice tool, is somewhat more difficult. The nature of physical planning and design cannot be considered an exact science, but rather an environmental problem solving process that can only be empirically tested and evaluated over extended periods of use. There is, however, an opportunity in this particular situation to indirectly test the capability of urban design as well as recently evolved knowledge in crime prevention through environmental design (Environmental Security Planning and Design), in assessing the perceived crime problems in the neighborhoods and their probable causes and effects. Specifically, the urban design consultant was asked to make an onsite inspection and to offer such insights without the use of exact data on pedestrian movements, automobile circulation counts, demographic changes and crime statistics, etc. The Center for Survey Research, having independently collected such data, will compare these data to the urban design assessment.

## I. FINDINGS

The findings have been grouped under Physical Changes and Conditions and Use Changes. The first category combines land use, porosity, and the condition of street treatments. Use changes documents both circulation and how the neighborhood is being used. Based upon a two day site inspection on June 7th and 8th, 1979, and a review of the 1977 evaluation, the following was perceived:

### A. Physical Changes and Conditions

Land use and over-all conditions around and adjacent to the North Asylum Hill neighborhood have changed dramatically since 1977. The area north of the neighborhood has deteriorated considerably. Significant numbers of abandoned residential buildings, stores, and vacant lots were noted. While this same area in 1977 was in serious disrepair, the pace of decay has escalated beyond what was expected. The primary access roads leading into North Asylum Hill (Sigourney Street especially and, to a lesser extent, Woodland and Garden), have a noticeable number of abandoned or derelict structures. In contrast, the areas south of North Asylum Hill, i.e. Farmington, have undergone substantial revitalization and improvement. Arthur's Drug Store, in this area, which was perceived to have been a major illegal drug meeting and transfer point during the original study, has to all appearances been turned around. The improved condition of the area, coupled with a lack of teen and young adult loitering, would seem to indicate a dramatic change of conditions. New structures, such as the Y.M.C.A. at Coggswell and Farmington, and the increased pedestrian traffic and shoppers suggest an economic and social improvement of the area.

Given these changes around North Asylum Hill, it would suggest that the neighborhood continues to be a major transition area socially, economically and from a crime and fear standpoint. If this is true, then it would be in direct conflict with the area as a stable yet mixed residential neighborhood. While there has been a marked reduction in automobile traffic due to the street changes, the traffic along Sigourney, Woodland and Garden seems to have increased considerably. This is especially true of Sigourney Street.

Physical Changes within the Neighborhood:

A noticeable physical difference exists between the eastern portion of the neighborhood, Sigourney Street, and the western portion of the neighborhood, north of Collins Street. The area south of Collins Street seems to be more stable and in reasonably good condition. Specific changes since 1977 follow:

#### Abandoned Buildings

- 1 mid-block on Huntington between Collins and Ashley
2. mid-block on Sigourney across from park between Ashley and Sargeant
3. two on Willard at the northwest corner of Townley

4. two houses at culdesac at west end of Sargeant before Woodland  
With the exception of numbers 2 and 4, the other buildings could  
be in the process of rehabilitation, although no such process was  
underway.

Rehabilitated buildings were also identified as being either  
completed or in the process of reconstruction, such as the third  
house in from Sigourney on Sargeant Westard. A considerable  
number of rehabilitated homes and buildings were found in the  
eastern portion of the neighborhood, i.e. east of Sigourney  
Street, with a lesser amount to the southern end of the  
neighborhood, and very few in the western portion (west of  
Sigourney and north of Collins). Interestingly, a new school has  
been built at Garden and Ashley. Finally, work was underway  
installing a fence and other improvements in Sigourney Square  
Park.

General yard, street and building improvements underway or  
completed:

1. Along Ashley, starting midblock (between Sigourney and  
Huntington), extending to Garden
2. Along Sargeant between Sigourney and Garden
3. Along Huntington (entire length)
4. Along Willard (although spotty)
5. Along Townley (although spotty)
6. Along Atwood between Collins and Sargeant
7. At Hospital (improved offstreet parking)
8. Along Summer

Deterioration:

1. Severe along Sigourney between railroad bridge  
and Collins
2. Moderate along Sigourney between Collins and Asylum Avenue
3. Severe along certain side streets off Sigourney:  
- Ashley, east for 1/2 block - Ashley, west for 1 1/2 blocks
4. Slight to moderate on May between Collins and Sargeant
5. Along Sargeant between Woodland and Sigourney

Holding its own:

1. First 1/2 block on Sargeant, east of Sigourney
2. Remaining streets and sections of streets

Condition of Street Changes:

Little damage or vandalism to the street changes was noticed.  
However, a number have been either moved or pushed aside.  
Specifically, the cul-de-sac at Sargeant and Sigourney has been  
opened up, as well as the planter at Ashley between May and  
Sigourney. The health and condition of the plants in the wooden  
planters was generally good, although a number of them had died.  
This was probably due to lack of watering and maintenance rather  
than to vandalism.

B. Use Changes

Use changes include pedestrian circulation, auto traffic, as well as the types of users and range of uses. As has been indicated previously, area traffic and circulation seems to have increased on Sigourney Street. Other streets which are perceived to have increases in traffic are: Ashley, Collins, with moderate increases along Garden and Woodland. We would anticipate that the remaining streets in the neighborhood have the same volume of traffic or less. (Note: this is assuming that there has not been a dramatic resident population change in the neighborhood).

- Pedestrian Traffic: the predominant pedestrians were:
  1. Teen and young adults along Sigourney, with heavy concentrations between Collins and the railroad bridge; moderate along Sigourney between Collins and Ashley.
  2. A mix of pedestrians by race and sex, but predominantly young adults east of Sigourney and north of Collins. A noticeable number of young mothers with children, as well as people sitting or working in their yards (varying ages, sex, and racial make-up).
  3. A heavy concentration of young adult black males and teenagers at Sigourney Square Park, at liquor store, and at particular buildings and houses on Sigourney Street between Collins and Ashley.
  4. A concentration of young Hispanic children and teens along Sergeant toward Woodland.

While pedestrian traffic volumes and users varied according to the hour of the day certain patterns of use and activity were perceived:

- A mix of black and white families of varying ages, but with a predominance of young to middle-aged adults, in the area of Sigourney and north of Collins, with a number of young white families who seem to have moved into the area. Activities varied between walking, sitting on front porches and working on yards. This area of the neighborhood seemed positive and healthy.

The Sigourney Square Park, the liquor store at Sigourney and Ashley, and several houses at the southwest corner of Ashley and Sigourney have become a gathering point for teenagers, young adults and single adults. The park continues to be dominated by young male adults.

The north side of Sergeant from Sigourney west to Woodland has a considerable number of transients. The area is not well maintained.

- No dramatic demographic or use changes seemed to have occurred within the Huntington Street apartment area (south of Collins and north Asylum Avenue).

## II. PERCEIVED CRIME AND FEAR PROBLEMS

The 1977 evaluation showed a major drop in residential burglaries, 42%; an equally substantial reduction in side street crimes, neighborhood streets as opposed to main thoroughfares; and a small net reduction in main street crimes. Based upon the findings as described, we would anticipate;

1. Residential burglary and street crime rates have probably increased over-all, but with certain areas maintaining the 1977 reduction rates. Those areas would be: east of Sigourney and north of Collins; the Willard/Townley area; and the Huntington/Summer^area.
2. Main street crimes have increased substantially and specifically along Sigourney Street.
3. General crime patterns will show a severe corridor effect along Sigourney with indentations into adjoining side streets and Sigourney Square Park. The most severe hot spots will be the corners of Sigourney and Ashley and Sigourney Square Park.
4. Questionable areas: Sargeant cul-de-sac to Woodland; May Street; Sargeant to Sigourney (neighbor to neighbor crimes).

## III. CONCLUSIONS AND PERCEPTIONS

North Asylum Hill is still viewed as a neighborhood in severe transition, with the predominant change being that of a change from white population to non-white. The question that remains central is whether such a transition is leading to a stable or unstable neighborhood population. Perceived evidence would suggest that the area east of Sigourney Street is in the process of social stabilization, while the area west of Sigourney is unstable and probably has more crime and fear, as well as more transients. The areas south of Collins, while experiencing moderated changes, probably haven't undergone the same amount as those north of Collins.

The primary environmental crime problem is one which was first identified in 1973 and 1974, that is the Sigourney Avenue bridge, Sigourney Square Park, and Sigourney Street itself. This area was at that time the most feared area, with the highest rate of crime and victimization. A major recommendation made at that time was to discontinue access over the railroad bridge. It was evident that out-of-area traffic, both auto and pedestrian, was splitting the neighborhood in half. Coupled with this effect was, and is, the presence of an uncontrolled and open park, and a liquor store. It would not surprise us to find that the activity at Arthur's Drug Store had transplanted itself to this area. Additionally, there was in 1974 evidence of prostitution along Atwood Avenue between Collins and Ashley. This activity also may have been transferred to the Sigourney Square area.

If our perceptions are correct concerning the Sigourney Street crime and fear generator, it would have two impacts. First, it would validate, to a certain degree, the capability of urban design as an added tool in analyzing and helping to reduce crime and fear. On the other hand, it would seem to severely threaten the primary objective of evaluating the success or failure of this particular program implemented in North Asylum Hill. We could find ourselves in the unfortunate position of seeing an increase in crime and fear rates, knowing why, but being unable to separate the causal factors in order to arrive at a clear evaluation. It is clear to us, however, that our original analysis and recommendations concerning the Sigourney Street bridge, Park, and its related land use (liquor store), has proven to be correct.



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