

AN EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS

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CRIME PREVENTION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS

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"Trust in Allah, but tie
down your camel"
Arabian saying (in B. Aafjes,
Tomorrow the apricots bloom)

Introduction

A few years ago, the Department of Justice of the Netherlands initiated the establishment of a national organization for the Prevention of Crime. In 1980, this organization was officially established to promote, among other objectives, the avoidance by Dutch citizens and the authorities of unnecessary facilitation of committing crimes (Vader, 1980). This was done in cooperation with the police.

To prepare the founding of this organization, nationwide media campaigns were carried out on the general population in 1977 and 1978. The main objective of these campaigns was to increase the precaution preparedness of individual citizens concerning certain frequently occurring crimes. Design and evaluation of these campaigns were handled by the Dutch Government Information Services (R.V.D., 1977). However, the W.O.D.C. (The Research and Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Justice) had the opportunity to include a few questions about taking precautionary measures in the annual victim survey (Van Dijk and Steimetz, 1980). These questions were drafted in consultation with the Crime Prevention Organization and added to the victim surveys carried out in 1978 and 1979. In this article the survey data will be used to evaluate selected

issues in the national media campaigns: we will discuss the coverage of the campaigns, the precaution preparedness of the population and the effect of the campaigns on precaution preparedness (precaution preparedness is the general intention to use for instance fasteners or bicycle locks). But first of all relationships between the preparedness to take precautions and other attitudes concerning crime will be discussed. Like Van Dijk (1978) and Schwind and others (1978), precaution preparedness is considered as a component part of the action component of a general set of attitudes concerning crime ("fear of crimes"). The approach in this article considers the attitude theory of Fishbein and Azjen (1975) as a premises. Fishbein and Azjen's attitude theory emphasizes that action preparedness is a function of cognitive judgments and affects within the limits of the relevant social norms.

Precaution preparedness and the fear of crimes

Earlier Dutch studies found a positive correlation between fear of crime and the preparedness to take precautions (Cozijn and Van Dijk, 1976; Fiselier, 1978). In other foreign studies this relationship was less distinct (Peyrefitte, 1977; Fürstenberg, 1974; Curtis, 1970 and Schwind, 1978). The victim survey in 1979 focussed on five types of crime - theft of bicycle, moped theft, theft out of a car, car theft and residential burglary. At that time respondents were asked which practical measures they took in general to prevent crimes (locks and such). General precaution preparedness¹⁾ was constructed by means of a scale developed as a result from a latent structure analysis (Mooyart, 1979) of replies on precaution preparedness items of the five aforementioned types of crime. Subsequently, this scale of general precaution preparedness was correlated with five other attitudes

concerning crime. These data²⁾ showed, that precaution preparedness is strongly correlated with cognitive opinions concerning crime: for example, the opinion that one's personal chance to become a victim increased during the past two years correlates with taking more precautions. Prevention preparedness is also correlated with not opening the door for strangers in the evening hours. Not opening the door for strangers in the evening hours is another form of action preparedness. However, precaution preparedness is not correlated with the more emotionally charged attitudes concerning crime, such as fear of strangers in the street and being afraid alone at home at night.

These results differ somewhat from the results of other studies. For example, Schwind (1978) reports finding a correlation with the affective component in Bochum. If we look closely at the survey questions³⁾ used by him, we note that his operationalization of the affective component was less fortunate. The preparedness to apply measures in order to prevent property crimes is in the Netherlands according to the presented results mainly based on cognitive judgments and to a lesser extent on emotional feelings concerning crime. This conclusion supports the view that the cognitive component of "fear of crime" mainly focusses on crimes against property, while the affective component is oriented to in particular (sexual) violent crimes (Van Dijk, 1978). Because precaution preparedness was focussed on property crimes, it can be stated - in the terminology of Finkelstein and Arjen - that precaution preparedness is an attitude with a strong cognitive component.

Precaution preparedness, victim experiences and objective risks

The cognitive component of "fear of crime" is strongly related to potential victim experiences and objective risk of victimization. The research by Schwind (1978) as well as our own research has clearly shown this too⁴⁾. The conclusion that precaution preparedness is cognitively strongly determined leads to the proposition that attitudes concerning crime prevention will also be closely correlated with personal experiences of crime as well as with the extent of the objective risks. Actual experiences with crime were operationalized by checking whether or not one has ever been the victim of the five property crimes concerned. We have elsewhere shown (Van Dijk, Steelmets, 1979), that objective risk of these crimes is higher than average when one is young and living in a big city. Table 1 shows how the characteristics of being/not being a victim, age and size of community of residence are correlated with precaution preparedness. Precaution preparedness has been dichotomized into a weak and strong preparedness.

Table 1 shows that within all four population groups distinguished in accordance with the hypothesis, the victim category shows a greater precaution preparedness: that is the percentage of people with a strong preparedness is in the victim category approximately 10% higher (which is in addition statistically significant at $p < .01$). Furstenberg (1974) as well Schwind (1978) found a positive relationship between earlier experiences (victimizations) and precaution preparedness. The Dutch research by Snaal (1980) supports this hypothesis. Snaal interviewed recent victims of break and entry and found that they frequently take extra precautions after the event. More evidence for this hypothesis can be found in Waller and Okhiro (1978).

TABLE 1 Percentage of respondents with a strong precaution preparedness per age group, subdivided by small or large communities, with a further dichotomy into the categories of having/not ever having been a victim (survey 1977).

		<u>Percentage with strong precaution preparedness</u>		
			never a victim	been a victim
smaller cities <50,000	old	(over 40 years)	26% (N=1827)	39% (N=366)
	young	(less than 40 years)	31% (N=2534)	41% (N=635)
bigger cities >50,000	old	(over 40 years)	41% (N=2127)	52% (N=488)
	young	(less than 40 years)	35% (N=1624)	48% (N=831)

On the average inhabitants of larger cities (where crime does occur more often) have a relatively greater precaution preparedness as shown in Table 1. Therefore, the taking of preventive measures does indeed appear to be partly based on a realistic estimation of the risks one is running. However, this relationship is partly an artefact of age. The correlation between size of community and precaution preparedness is greater among older people than among younger ones: younger persons in big cities who have not yet been victimized, show little precaution preparedness. The precaution preparedness of these young people is a remarkable phenomenon, because younger people in bigger cities are twice as likely as older persons to become victims (Van Dijk, Steimetz, 1979). The data would appear to indicate that younger people in big cities become conscious of their high victimization risks only after they have been victimized. This interpretation is confirmed by the data from cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants for 1978: of young persons under 25, who had never yet been victimized, only 24% had a high precaution preparedness (N=501), while for other age groups more than 50%

had this preparedness. However, if one looks at the respondents who had been victims, the differences disappear: for both younger and older persons approximately 60% do have a high precaution preparedness. A final conclusion is that with the exception of younger persons in the big cities individual citizens tune their precaution preparedness to a fairly realistic estimate of their risks. The age group under 25 in the big cities begins to adjust to the high risk only after they have been victimized.

Besides being under 40 and living in a big city, membership of a higher social class and being male also entail somewhat higher risks (Van Dijk, Steimetz, 1979). Men are somewhat more inclined toward crime prevention than women, but the difference is very slight and is therefore not tabulated. Table 2 shows for 1977 that the highest social class displays a considerably greater prevention preparedness than the lower levels. (The data for 1978 show the same picture). This difference applies to the big cities as well as to rural areas. Schwind (1978) in Germany and Boyge (1971) in the United States found a similar relationship. The difference in prevention preparedness among the higher levels and the lowest level (unskilled workers) is so great, that the difference in risk does not appear to provide a sufficient explanation. Further, the lowest level runs a somewhat higher risk than the middle level. It may be assumed that the higher precaution preparedness of the highest level is partly caused by their stronger economic position: technical means of prevention are relatively cheap for the higher income groups. In addition, a difference in lifestyle could also play a part. Especially the higher and middle levels are possibly more attached to their property and are therefore more interested in preventing theft. It seems that

persons belonging to the lowest social level only adjust themselves to the risk they run after they have been victimized, like young people in big cities.

Table 2 The percentages of respondents with high precaution preparedness per social class, with a further dichotomy into the categories of having/having not been a victim (survey 1977)

	never a victim	victimized
high	49% (N=1147)	52% (N=474)
medium	32% (N=6430)	43% (N=1593)
low	26% (N=1257)	44% (N=243)

In summary preparedness to take crime precautionary measures is a reaction to a fairly realistic assessment of one's own risks. The experience of being a victim plays an important role in their assessment, especially for younger people in big cities, who require a concrete victimization experience before they take action more consistent with the others in the higher risk groups.

The higher social class shows relatively high preparedness, and the lowest level shows relatively little preparedness to take measures.

These results can be interpreted very well within the framework of the attitude-theory of Fishbein and Ajzen (1977). Prevention preparedness appears to be a function of a particular cognitive attitude-component on the one hand, and of certain internalized, social norms on the other hand. We have already discussed in detail the close relationship to cognitions. Precaution preparedness is partly a positive function of earlier victimizations and higher objective risks. The disturbing effect of the social norms becomes evident in the first place in the irrational

carelessness displayed by younger people in big cities, who themselves have never yet been victimized. The effect of certain social norms is moreover visible in the remarkable differences in precaution preparedness among the social levels.

The aforementioned developed insights seem to offer a good perspective for crime prevention campaigns, who aim at increasing the precaution preparedness of the individual citizen. A strongly cognitively determined action-preparedness, however, appears to be the main concern. Attempts to increase this action preparedness by influencing the "true" perception of risk of victimation (cognitions) would definitely have a chance. A precaution preparedness on the other hand which is mainly determined by feelings or social norms, would not leave that much room for a change of the preparedness by means of a publicity campaign.

The coverage of the campaign

A publicity campaign in 1977 and 1978 was organized through the mass media and posters to encourage the general public to take certain precautionary measures in order to prevent specific crimes. In January 1979, a victim survey was carried out covering all of 1978. As a final question in this survey respondents were asked to recall specific information of the crime prevention campaigns. The campaigns reached a large part of the population. Sixty-eight percent of the population was able to recall one or more of the information campaigns. Recalling percentages of the population for specific items in the crime-prevention campaign show the following pattern:

pickpocketing : 47%
 theft out of a car : 39%
 burglary (residential): 37%

Among those who mentioned the campaign items, by far the greater part (82%) mentioned television as one of their sources of information. Newspapers (37%), posters (9%), radio (8%) and weeklies (8%) turned out to have played a less important role.

The coverage of the campaigns was not the same for all population groups. The percentage of respondents who could not recall any of the campaigns was greater among the aged, women, inhabitants of smaller cities and among the lower social levels. In an earlier investigation (Van Dijk and Coenen, 1978), these same groups showed to have fewer conversations in general after watching T.V. or reading the papers. Evidently, the average frequency and/or intensity with which these population groups assimilate media reports is generally somewhat lower. A lower assimilation will probably have had an adverse effect on the coverage of these groups by the campaigns. In addition, probably the interest in the subject in question will also differ from group to group.

After identifying those who were able to remember one or more of the campaigns - two thirds of the population - the interviewer asked them subsequently whether the campaigns had precipitated their use of more precautionary measures, and if so, which. 17% gave an affirmative reply, of whom 38% paid more attention to locking doors, 14% had bought better locks and 22% had marked down the frame number of one's bike.

If one converts these figures to the total population, one in every ten (12%) Dutch people over 15 started to do more in the way of crime prevention because of the campaigns.

Taking measures on behalf of the campaigns did not take place to the same extent in all subgroups of the population. When one traces who knew of the campaigns and took a measure for that reason, the following picture emerges. Compared to the average of 12% for the population as a whole, higher percentages were found for inhabitants of big cities (13%), among the highest social class (16%) and for the group under 55 (13%). Exceptional low percentages are found among the inhabitants of small cities (10%), among the lower social class (7%) and among the aged (8%).

These results confirm once again that taking precautionary measures is a rational matter. Exactly those population groups with the highest objective risks took the campaigns most to heart. Here too, however, upon closer consideration the same earlier mentioned two exceptions to precaution preparedness are applicable to the rationality rule. The very youngest ones in the big cities have reacted to a lesser extent to the campaigns than the group from 25 to 35 (respectively 15% and 17%), although their risk is significantly greater. The campaign has had less effect on the lower social class (7%) than on the middle level (14%), although the risk of the former is greater. Therefore, the difference between the precautions taken, based on what we could expect (objective risk) and then actually practised by the younger people in the big cities and especially by the lower social class has not been reduced by the campaigns.

The precaution preparedness in 1977 and 1978

On the basis of the aforementioned survey results, it may be assumed that the average precaution preparedness level in 1978 has to be at a higher level than in 1977. The two victim surveys asked which precautionary measures one is in the habit of taking for the five types of crime, in order to check the correctness of this assumption. Table 3 gives the precaution preparedness in 1977 and 1978 for the three crimes most involved.

TABLE 3 The percentage of relevant (owners of a bicycle and/or car) respondents stating they take no, one, or more than one measure to prevent bicycle theft, theft out of a car or breaking and entering in 1977 and 1978 respectively.

		no measures	one measure	two or more measures
bicycle theft	1977 (N=8215)	8%	66%	25%
	1978 (N=7445)	8%	63%	28%
$\chi^2=19, df=2 (s)$				
theft from car	1977 (N=6735)	2%	76%	20%
	1978 (N=5982)	2%	44%	53%
$\chi^2=1502, df=2 (s)$				
break and enter	1977 (N=11099)	13%	55%	32%
	1978 (N= 9956)	12%	52%	36%
$\chi^2=38, df=2 (s)$				

Table 3 shows that the general precautionary preparedness has indeed increased significantly for the three types of crime. The increase is most clear for precaution of theft out of cars. Also, the respondents with a moped - not reflected here - showed a small increase in the category "two or more measures" (from 28% to 31%). For the car owners an increase in precautionary measures in order to prevent car theft was also found in the two or more measures category (from 70% to 75%).

In short, the readiness to take one or two measures has become greater from 1977 to 1978. For the crimes of moped theft and break and enter, the principal measures taken were better locks and for theft out of cars, they avoided leaving expensive items in the car. The percentage of car owners stating that they took this latter precaution rose from 5% in 1977 to 4% in 1978. One of the campaigns recommended this measure strongly especially for car theft, and considerable increases occurred in locking the steering column: from 35% to 45%; and carefully locking doors/windows: from 63% to 93%. Naturally these increases cannot be completely attributed to the campaigns. Most probably private crime prevention has been showing a rising trend for several years. Some of the noticeable increases in 1978 - a year in which the percentage of victims of theft and such did not show an increase (Van Dijk, Steinmetz, 1979) - do appear to be at least partly an effect of the campaigns directed at those specific measures. This is very plausible, because as mentioned above, 12% of the respondents themselves stated at the end of the survey that for reason of the campaign they had started to take more measures.⁵⁾

What people say and what they do

In earlier research, good consistency was demonstrated between what respondents say they do and what they actually do. This was investigated for opening the door to strangers at night (Van Dijk, Nijenhuis, 1979). As was done in the survey just mentioned, observation studies were carried out in England also concerning the locking of cars (Burrows, Neal, 1979). Does the public actually take more practical preventive measures, when they say they do? For a definitive answer one should observe actual behaviour. How far do the victim survey data available to us help us to answer this question?

Those who state that they have become the victim of a crime were always asked which preventive measures they had taken on that occasion. Since earlier in the survey respondents already have been asked about the usual precautionary measure, a comparison can be made between the (verbal) precaution preparedness and actual behaviour for the group of respondents who have been victimized. As elucidated above, on the basis of the number of precautionary measures concerning the five types of crime the respondents state to take usually, respondents have been divided into three groups (low, average and high precaution preparedness). The victims in each of these groups too are classified in the same manner. Observing the average number of measures victims actually have taken per preparedness category, shows a clear positive correlation between preparedness and behaviour. The victims in the low preparedness category, on the average, practised in 1977 only 0.6 measures, the victims with a modal preventive preparedness 0.8, and those with a high prevention preparedness 0.9⁶⁾. Consequently, with regard to this aspect of target hardening behavior a positive attitude definitely appears to have an effect on actual behaviour.

For a more precise comparison between attitude and behaviour, one should consider the number of measures victims ordinarily take and the number which actually have been taken when victimization occurred. Both number of measures have to be placed beside each other for every type of crime. In this manner, it can be determined how great (per incident category) the gap is between the measures one states to take and the measures actually taken in practice. There is however an interpretation problem in comparing levels of intentional and actual measures. A certain number of the victims probably developed on behalf of their victimization experience a greater precaution preparedness than before victimization occurred. Consequently taking fewer measures than one states doing as a rule, does not necessarily mean that the good intentions were not carried out in practice. The intention however to take certain (extra) measures could date from after the victimization.

To get around this problem, we decided to compare the measures actually taken by victims with a low, average or high precaution preparedness with the measures whom average Dutch people with a low, average or high prevention preparedness state to take usually.

The average number of measures for those with a low, average or high general prevention preparedness are in Table 4 presented per type of crime. The same table includes also the average number of measures actually practised by victims with the same low, average and high general precaution preparedness.

TABLE 4

Average number of measures per crime that Dutch people state they take and the average number, victims have actually taken, per category of general prevention preparedness. The intended measures are indicated with an I and the actual ones with a A.

	low prevention preparedness		modal prevention preparedness		high prevention preparedness	
	I	A	I	A	I	A
bicycle theft	.9	0.6	1.1	0.7	1.7	0.8
moped theft	1.0	0.6	1.0	0.7	2.0	1.0
theft out of cars	1.0	0.7	1.3	0.9	1.3	0.9
car theft	1.3	0.9	2.0	1.5	1.9	1.3
break and enter	1.0	x)	1.5	x)	1.4	x)

Table 4 shows, as one can expect, that the crime-specific precaution preparedness (A) follows the same pattern as the general precaution preparedness (I). It is further evident, that for the four types of crime separately as well, actual precaution increases in accordance with displaying a greater verbal preparedness. It is also noteworthy, that on the whole the gap between intentions and behaviour is greater for those with a high precaution preparedness. However, the data in Table 4 are particularly interesting because they render it possible to compare the gap between verbal preparedness and actual behaviour for the various types of crime. The table shows that the difference between the preparedness level and the application level for the crimes of car theft and theft out of cars is much smaller than for the crimes of bicycle theft and moped theft. It is noticeable concerning these crimes, that those who are precaution-prepared, also very consistently convert this preparedness into deeds.

The words-deeds consistency of prevention for these crimes seems to be hardly less than the very high consistency found earlier concerning the behavioral intention not to open the door to strangers ringing the doorbell after 10.

According to the theories of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) the consistency between behavioural intentions and actual behaviour is determined by the extent of specificity of the intention, by its stability and by the practical and social opportunities for this behaviour. In our opinion, the relatively high consistency in the intention to take measures to prevent theft of cars and theft out of cars is mainly a result of the ease of executing the intentions concerned. For it takes less time and energy for example to use a steering lock or to lock a car door than bringing along and using a chain lock. In addition for many people the possible loss of a car will weigh more heavily than the loss of a bicycle: the intention to prevent a car theft will therefore in general be stronger and therefore more stable than the intention to prevent a bicycle theft. The relatively great inconsistencies among those with high precautionary preparedness would appear to indicate that the intention to take extraordinary measures is less stable than the intention to observe the normal precautionary measures.

Actual precautionary behaviour in 1977 and 1978

The finding that a considerable gap exists between the number of measures one says to take and actual precautionary behaviour gives rise to the question, how the media campaigns influences the actual application level. The campaigns have caused the precautionary preparedness to increase.

A possible effect of the campaigns could have been a smaller words-deeds inconsistency as a result of an intensification of the precautionary preparedness. Another campaign effect might have been, however, a verbal increase of the precautionary preparedness. The latter case will actually result in an increased words-deeds inconsistency. The survey data concerning 1977 and 1978 showed that both effects occurred. The gap between the precaution preparedness and actual behaviour of the victims of a bicycle theft was in 1978 clearly smaller than in 1977 (see Fig. 1). The same applies to moped theft. However, for victims of theft out of a car the gap is somewhat greater in 1978 than in 1977 (1977: 40%; 1978: 65% not consistent). Those who formed on behalf of the campaigns the intention not to leave expensive items in their cars anymore, do not always fulfill this intention in practice.

Finally, for three crimes⁷⁾ one might wonder whether the actual application of precautionary measures in 1978 by victims was at a higher level than in 1977. This turned out to be so in all cases. The increase was statistically significant ($\chi^2=9.97$; $df=2$, $p < .01$ for victims of bicycle theft). Particularly the percentage of victims which had not taken one single measure decreased (from 30% to 22%). The increases for moped theft and theft of cars were less great and concerned in addition a smaller number of observations⁸⁾. However, in their mutual coherence the available data allow the conclusion that the campaigns have had a positive effect on the actual precautionary behaviour as well.

x) No information was gathered about actual taken measures by victims of break and entry.



The discussion of the data concerning the differences between the number of measures the respondents mentioned to take in both years and the number of measures victims actually practised, have been visualised for bicycle theft in the following figure (Fig.1). This figure shows the increase in 1978 of both the intended as well as the actual prevention for this type of crime.

Discussion

In the Netherlands, the decision to take practical precautionary measures turns out to be based on a more or less realistic assessment of the objective risks one runs. There are no indications that this behaviour flows from a strongly emotionally coloured attitude of fear concerning offenders as for some other forms of precautionary behaviour (not opening the door to strangers, no longer walking along the streets at night). The finding that more practical precautionary behaviour has a fairly rational basis up to a certain extent offers the opportunity for the government to have a guiding part in this area by means of information services.

The survey has provided some indications that the national information service campaigns concerning the occurrence of crimes in 1977 and 1978 have had a positive effect on the preparedness to take precautionary measures as well as on their actual level of application. In this respect, it would appear that the campaign has certainly not been without success. However, the campaigns did not contribute to a more balanced distribution of the precautionary measures for the population as a whole. Specific groups belonging to the lowest social class as well

Figure 1 Visual reproduction (trace-lines) of the numbers of persons in 1977 and 1978 stating they take no, one or two or more precautionary measures to prevent bicycle theft and of the numbers of victims who actually have taken no, one or two or more measures, subdivided according to their general precaution preparedness (low, average, high). The number of measures per precautionary preparedness classification has been shown by means of percentages.



as specific groups of younger people in the big cities do not pay attention to crime prevention which would be applicable in the light of their objective risks. Since the publication campaigns on crime prevention did not reach these population groups in particular, their arraimage has consequently sooner been increased by these campaigns than decreased.

Campaigns concerning crime prevention can only be called a success if application of the preventive measures recommended has resulted in decreased objective risks for those applying them as well as in a decrease or stabilization of "petty crime".

Although the literature on this subject is yet very limited, it contains already some indications that the application of certain practical precautionary measures lead to a slight decrease in individual risks (Repetto, 1974; Waller, Okihiro, 1978; Mayhew, 1976). However, well-executed semi-experimental evaluation studies - for example with the help of a panel of those who apply measures and those do not apply them - are still completely lacking.

The survey gathered by us do allow to check whether those with a strong precaution preparedness during the past year have or have not become the victim of a crime. In doing so, the (verbal) appliers and non-appliers can be rendered mutually equal concerning typical risk-determining characteristics such as age and place of residence. A complication in this analysis, however, is that a number of the respondents with a high precaution preparedness probably developed this preparedness after their victimization experience. This effect has a consequence that the percentage of victims among the group with high

precaution preparedness is being pushed up, which complicates a comparison with the group with a low precaution preparedness. The impact of this effect cannot be determined. However, the investigation by Smale (1980) concerning the reactions of victims of break and enter renders it acceptable that there is a considerable effect.

On the other hand a higher percentage of recent victims among the group with a high precaution preparedness than among the group with a low prevention preparedness, can be expected, if a high precautionary preparedness would not have a mitigating effect on victimization risk. This is certainly not the case according to our analyses, in particular not among the high risk groups (big city, young). Respondents with a high precautionary preparedness became, for most of the distinguished risk categories, just as frequently as respondents with a low precautionary preparedness or even less frequently the victims of a crime⁹⁾ during 1977 or 1978 (in spite of the influx of an unknown number of recent victims into the group with a high prevention preparedness).

There is, meanwhile, no other possibility to interpret this analysis result otherwise than as an indication, that a high precaution preparedness leads to a smaller risk of become a victim. Our analyses did also provide the information that the (verbal) intention to take certain precautionary measures does not mean at all that deeds will also follow words. The latter can be conceived in addition as a fairly strong indication that actual application of certain precautionary measures provides a certain protection from the crimes concerned.

Whether the smaller victimization risks of the actual appliers of preventive measures can also contribute to the control of crime on a national or regional scale is the final question which has to be commented upon. Elsewhere we have advanced a few theoretical arguments which plead for a moderately positive reply to this question (Van Dijk, Steinmetz, 1980). A related discussion to the same effect can be found in Clarke (1979). In our opinion, a necessary condition for the occurrence of a criminality-dampening effect is the attaining of a fairly high general level of precautionary measures among the target population. If only a minority of the citizens observes certain precautionary measures, a diversion of the risks will lead towards the non-preventers and so one cannot speak of a dampening effect on criminality. Like Block (1980) we have the impression that the degree of coverage by crime prevention among the Dutch population is still relatively low, so that certainly in The Netherlands no dampening effects may be expected for the time being.

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(Translation of Dutch titles only, as marked).

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NOTES

1. Latent structure analysis is based on the principle of local stochastic independence. This principle contains that the algorithm searches for an optimal classification of Dutch inhabitants. A classification of persons who say to do little, medium or much on precautionary measures. The classification was done on the basis of their replies concerning their intention to take precautionary measures in order to protect themselves from theft of

or out of a vehicle and/or breaking and entering. The persons were then classified on the basis of a latent common pattern of taken measures. This common latent pattern emanates from all the possible preparedness questions answered by them. It should be remembered here, that each respondent can answer a minimum of two and a maximum of five preparedness questions. This is taken into account during the classification. In scaling the preparedness questions, use is made of a special option of the program, namely order restrictions on the parameters (Mooijart, 1980). For technical reasons, in carrying out the LSA-analyses, a weighted B.C.D.-file was used, for which reason the totals per table differ somewhat.

2. Distribution of the replies to the fear of crime items per precaution preparedness class.

<u>Prevention preparedness classes</u>			
N=10.002 percentage of population	low (31%)	average (34%)	high (35%)
<u>Distribution prevention preparedness classes over anxiety questions</u>			
<u>evaluation of chance of becoming victimized</u>			
greater	33%	37%	45%
remained the same	47%	53%	49%
smaller	5%	2%	1%
don't know	15%	8%	5%
$\chi^2=392$ df=6 c(ramér)=-.11 (2x3 table)			
<u>thinking of possible personal victimization</u>			
never	66%	56%	48%
rarely	17%	24%	26%
sometimes	13%	16%	20%
regularly	3%	3%	4%
frequently	1%	1%	2%
$\chi^2=245$ df=8 c(ramér)=-.15 (2x3 table)			
<u>reaction to doorbell after 10 at night</u>			
opening	62%	53%	50%
acquaintances only	23%	27%	30%
trustworthy impression	10%	15%	15%
do not open	5%	5%	5%
$\chi^2=104$ df=6 c(ramér)=-.09 (2x3 table)			
<u>not daring to go out on street alone at night</u>			
no	74%	81%	68%
yes	26%	19%	32%
no correlation curvi-linear			
<u>sometimes afraid when alone at home at night</u>			
no	87%	85%	89%
yes	13%	15%	11%
negative correlation			

3. Schwind, Ahlhorn, Weiss (1978) did operationalize the affective component by means of the question whether one does or does not feel (un)safe at home, in the neighbourhood, etc. They themselves remark in their explanation that this item also measures a cognitive attitude component. We suppose that the cognitive aspect dominates. Besides practical measures, the aforementioned authors also counted the no-longer-going-out-onto-the-street among the protective measures to be taken. After Conklin (1975) we are of the opinion that a distinction must be made among avoidance behaviour and mobilization measures (i.e. practical prevention). Our data support this theoretical opinion (see Table in footnote 2). The prevention preparedness scale of Schwind a.o. has in this vision a too heterogeneous character.
4. Among those who state that they never think of the possibility of becoming a victim 14% has been a victim, while among those who state that they personally think of victimization 26% has been a victim. Dutch people in the bigger cities and in addition younger people think more often of the personal chance to become a victim of crime than those in the rural areas and particularly older rural inhabitants. Among the younger people in the big cities for example, 56% sometimes thought about becoming victimized, while among the older people in the big cities 34% sometimes thought of the chance of victimization. Among the older people in rural areas only 26% sometimes think of the possibility of victimization.
5. Not all effects of the campaign are expressed in the amount of precautionary measures measured in the survey. The publicly best

known campaign component concerned pickpockets. No questions concerning this had been included in the survey.

Registration of frame numbers and luxury goods is not covered by the precautionary measures asked about in the survey (in a strict sense, this is not really a means of prevention).

6. Comparing of the amount of intentional and actual measures was based on the distinction between no measures, one measure and two or more measures. Also, in interpreting Table 4 the possibility should be taken into account that at the very moment victimization occurred one had omitted to take certain measures, as well as the possibility that victims as a group do act somewhat less consistently than the others by which they would not be completely representative.
7. In the survey questionnaire in 1978 the question about actual precautionary behaviour of the victims of car thefts and break and entries was omitted because of the very small number of victims to be expected.
8. The number of victims of moped theft who took two or more measures increased from 12% in 1977 (N=66) to 20% (N=55) in 1978. The percentage of victims of theft out of a car who had not taken a single measure decreased from 36% in 1977 (N=163) to 21% (N=145) in 1978.

9. Victim percentages per combined risk group for two intentional precaution classes (high preparedness - low preparedness). Risk groups are constructed on the basis of municipality size, precaution classes and age groups.

Victim percentages have been given in the table for victims in 1977 and for victims in 1978.

Victims in 1977

Municipality size	the three big cities		50 - 400.000 inhabitants		20 - 50.000 inhabitants		20.000 inhabitants	
	low	high	low	high	low	high	low	high
age								
< 40	26%(434)	24%(397)	10%(1048)	16%(576)	10%(842)	9%(517)	5%(1253)	5%(597)
> 40	6%(471)	5%(555)	5%(1001)	5%(588)	-	-	2%(1352)	7%(414)

Victims in 1978

Municipality size	over 100.000 inhabitants		20 - 100.000 inhabitants		under 20.000 inhabitants	
	few	many	few	many	few	many
age						
< 35	16%(738)	18%(619)	8%(1039)	14%(535)	5%(1061)	5%(278)
> 35	8%(804)	6%(1015)	5%(1318)	2%(777)	3%(1469)	5%(350)