
Using Repeat Victimization to Counter Commercial Burglary: The Leicester Experience

*Geoff Taylor*¹

Much of the discussion about repeat victimisation centres around the opportunity it presents to prevent or reduce crime by offering a prediction of its re-occurrence. In a unique crime prevention project in Leicester the practical implementation of a strategy to reduce commercial burglary by taking positive action with recent victims has shown remarkable results in the space of a few months. The strategy was designed to increase risks for offenders through enhancing detection levels. As an arrest-achieving model the outcome has been inconsequential but as a crime reduction project the results have been encouraging, at remarkably small cost in terms of both personnel and material.

Key Words: Repeat victimisation; business burglaries; timeliness of intervention; situational crime prevention; working with victims

Introduction

This paper outlines the results and early experiences of crime reduction work against commercial burglary undertaken during the Leicester Small Business and Crime Initiative (SBCI). Much of this project's work was against crimes other than burglary;² however, the project survey clearly identified burglary as a major source of business loss. Burglary reduction was an area in which much practical work had been successfully delivered.³ However, it quickly became apparent that much of this previous experience had taken place predominantly in domestic settings and that many of the practices and methods outlined were, for various reasons, not appropriate for the SBCI. Moreover, the aim of this project was to avoid large resource usage, so that replication of work undertaken in Leicester would not present decision makers in other towns and cities with difficulties in identifying and securing scarce resources in order to reduce the crimes which affect businesses. On a more positive note, the SBCI survey findings on repeat burglary victimisation prevalence accorded with those from similar research⁴ and it was determined to develop the intervention programme concentrating on reducing repeat occurrences.

The article begins with an examination of the repeat victimisation research used to shape the programme and considers its implications in terms of frequency and timeliness for practical intervention. The discussion further develops into the reasoning behind the chosen intervention strategy and elaborates on why crime reduction fieldwork of this kind sits squarely within the disciplines of situational crime prevention. The results of one year's fieldwork after using this strategy are then discussed, with a brief look at other issues which played an important role in the success of such an intervention strategy: namely, displacement, the importance of timely information and experience gained from working with victims. However, a short description

of the overall project, the SBCI, is necessary in order to reveal the framework within which this work took place.

The Small Business and Crime Initiative project

The SBCI aimed to fill the knowledge gap about the effects of crime on the most dynamic and volatile part of a developed economy, the small business sector.⁵ The project sought to work with these businesses and key public and private sector agencies⁶ to try to reduce business crime and its stifling effects on economic prosperity, so that those businesses affected could play their full role in the wider community as providers of local services and amenities, and as creators of employment through natural commercial growth. Leicester was the chosen location because it enjoyed a good reputation for partnership working amongst agencies and offered two highly 'typical' areas, where lessons learned through the survey and fieldwork would be readily transferable to similar areas throughout the country.

The NatWest Charitable Trust funded the project at £150,000 per annum for three years. The structure comprised an audit of business crime in the project areas, proactive crime reduction fieldwork based on audit findings, and an independent evaluation of project fieldwork by Professor Tilley of Nottingham Trent University. The two project areas of Leicester were the West End, because under the City Challenge government grant scheme it had a very well-known small to medium-size business population, and the Belgrave area because it is the base for a flourishing, small business community strongly characterised by Asian ownership.

Background research

On prevalence

There is a considerable body of research which outlines awareness of repeat victimisation as an issue,⁷ and more which specifies its potential as a starting point for crime reduction.⁸ However, a most compelling argument for using repeat victimisation as a reduction method for commercial burglary related to the natural subject matter of the SBCI, ie commercial premises. These were deemed far more liable to suffer from repeat burglary than domestic premises, as indicated by findings from the 1994 Home Office Commercial Victimisation Survey:⁹

The chance of retail or manufacturing premises being burgled was six times higher than that for a domestic premises. There were nine times as many incidents per 100 targets, which indicates that repeated victimisation was much higher for commercial premises.

This assertion stands the test of time. Conklin and Bittner¹⁰ examined police records of burglaries over twelve months (from mid-1968 to mid-1969) in a large north-eastern city in America and found a residential burglary rate of 22 per 1,000 (one in 45) compared with a commercial burglary rate of 217 per 1,000 (more than one in five). More recently, the SBCI's own survey in Leicester over a twelve-month period found:"

The overall prevalence rate for burglary [actual and attempts] was established in the survey at 41%. Of the 359¹² victims of burglary, 155 suffered more than one incident of burglary: the risk of a future burglary (within the 12 month time window) for previous victims of burglary was therefore 43%... It is possible to determine that there would have been 191 repeat incidents had offenders' selection of victims been totally random: but there were in fact 298 repeat incidents.


Clearly, commercial premises in the project areas suffered not only from high levels of burglary but also from very high levels of repeat burglary. It was determined to try and reduce overall burglary prevalence by eliminating repeats. A natural question to consider in respect of repeat victimisation is how long is the time interval between incidents, for this is the period in which a prevention strategy has to be implemented.

On period

Research undertaken on the time-course analysis of repeat victimisation consistently indicates a need for prompt action. The SBCI's own research confirmed this trend, showing that the chances of becoming a repeat victim diminish with time.¹³

Figure 1 indicates that when repeat victimisation occurs it is far more likely to do so within one month of the initial incident than at any other time; and, that as time passes, so do the chances of suffering a repeat occurrence. However, when examining victimisation over a time-limited period such as one year, a victim who suffers a burglary at the beginning of the period has longer in which to become a repeat victim than one victimised at the end of the period in question. Equally, a victim who suffers an incident just prior to the time-window may become a repeat victim but will not appear in the research as such. Tilley¹⁴ endeavoured to overcome this limitation by examining data from a two-year period to gain the 'before' and 'after' picture from a twelve-months time-window. Table 1 divides the twelve-month period into one-fifth fractions of 73 days. Although the focus shifts from examining months in Figure 1 to days in Table 1, the short duration in time between incidents remains apparent.

Figure 1. Time-course analysis of repeat burglaries taken from the SBCI survey



Tilley found that 56.9% (119 of 209) of repeat incidents occurred within 73 days of the initial incident; the remaining 90 incidents took place over the remaining period, with decreasing frequency as time passed. Equally, the SBCI findings were that 43% of repeat incidents occurred within two months of the initial burglary, or 56% within three months, which is close to Tilley's figures. On this question of time, Farrell and Pease¹⁵ observed:

...the risk of re-victimisation is greatest in the period immediately after victimisation —

- (i) crime prevention measures need to be in place soon after victimisation;
- (ii) temporary prevention measures which provide cover during the high risk period after victimisation might be an effective and efficient means of preventing crime.

Table I. Number of repeat incidents suffered over a twelve month period using two years of data

Days between burglaries	Number of repeats						Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6+	
0-73	21	17	17	18	17	29	119
74-146	6	12	6	6	5	2	37
147-219	7	6	4	8	3	1	29
220-292	7	4	2	0	0	0	13
293-365	9	1	1	0	0	0	11
Total repeats	50	40	30	32	25	32	209
Total burglaries	100	60	40	40	30	36	306
Total addresses	50	20	10	8	5	4	97

If the disciplines of routine activity theory are accepted, the ingredients of criminal activity are present when a motivated offender meets an opportunity in the absence of a capable guardian.¹⁶ For a project such as the SBCI, operating over a specific time period (twelve months) in which to devise and deliver an intervention strategy, the options for work directly with offenders are virtually non-existent. Therefore the only two areas for progress are concerned with either introducing a capable guardian or controlling the opportunity. While the term 'capable guardian' may embrace a range of measures from target-hardening through to security awareness training, due to the short timescale, small team, large areas and wide variety of commercial victims (ie shops, offices, factories etc, with an equally large variation in physical security standards) it was felt that the introduction of 'capable guardians' required resource implications beyond those available. Thus, by process of elimination, it was decided that the most likely area with the greatest potential was that of the opportunity; it is noticeable that other burglary reduction projects have also concentrated on this area, albeit not exclusively.

A relatively little understood area, but one which affects crime reduction based upon repeat victimisation, is the role a victim plays in the generation of crime (see Conclusion below). Victims generally present the opportunity, but the quality of that opportunity is in the control of the victim and not of the police or other external agent. The ability to influence the victim is therefore key to successful repeat victimisation reduction, and the best opportunity to exert influence is in the period most immediately after victimisation. This subject was broached by the repeat burglary and car-crime project undertaken in Huddersfield.¹⁷

...the notion of crisis intervention, that human behaviour is most tractable at times of crisis, suggests that victimisation is potentially the most profitable time at which to persuade people toward self-protective change.

In summary, the research on repeat victimisation and the necessity to impress upon victims

how they can play a part in reducing their own vulnerability indicate the need for an intervention system free from unnecessary delay and prevarication.

Situational crime prevention

If it is accepted that action must be taken quickly to prevent the recurrence of a crime, and that in the immediate aftermath of an incident it is unlikely that the identity of the offender is proved in a court of law thereby removing the opportunity of demotivating the offender, then routine activity theory holds that either a change is required to the opportunity or that a capable guardian is introduced. Ringing changes to either aspect requires the employment of situational crime prevention measures. Clarke¹⁸ outlines twelve techniques concerned with situational crime prevention which are categorised under three main headings: Increasing the Effort, Increasing the Risks and Reducing the Reward.

A popular, if disputed, aspect of increasing the effort is target-hardening; however, introducing such methods to an average of 20-30 commercial burglary victims in each area per month was clearly a resource-intensive option beyond the scope of this project, even if time were not an important factor. Included in the cost calculation is the fact that some premises were large factories or similar buildings in which achieving meaningful target-hardening would have been very expensive. The options for reducing the reward were somewhat inhibited by the relationship between a crime reduction project and a victim. Unlike an agent representing an insurance company where there is a financial arrangement, a project officer has firstly to establish a relationship and then build upon it. Much advice was passed on to victims about effort-increasing and reward-reducing options, but in order to achieve meaningful implementation and keep resource usage within acceptable levels, the only realistic area of progress for this project was to try to increase the risk of detection for offenders by improving arrest and detection rates.

Strategy beginnings and developments

During the early stages of the project, visits were made to commercial burglary victims with police teams. Two features about offender behaviour were noticed: firstly, that many victimised businesses did not have alarms, despite their widespread availability and usage; and secondly, that in alarmed premises the offender still committed the burglary but did so with speed and aggression, to be clear of the premises by the time taken for even the most efficient police response. It was decided to place portable silent alarms in premises without alarms; in those businesses with alarms portable covert CCTV systems (which record pictures and sound only during periods of activity) were used. These two systems were used from the start of the intervention phase in late July 1996. They made it possible to intervene quickly where a repeat victimisation appeared likely, and the equipment could be moved on to newer victims once the 'risk period' had passed.

In February 1997 a third option was tried by using 'traps' designed to secure good quality forensic evidence. In May 1997 the 'proximity alarm' became available. This device was located inside the premises but sensed through the building fabric (usually glass or wood) to 'guard' the immediate external area. It was sited to protect those directions from which burglars had already approached and attacked a premises. This latter development was important because it represented a step from a passive 'detection' strategy aimed at increasing risks for offenders and moved to a proactive 'prevention' strategy by introducing a guardian, albeit of indeterminate capability. Table 2 elaborates on the technological systems employed.

Table 2. Outline of systems employed to increase risk to offenders

System	Method	Aim	Result
Silent alarm (dials out to a telephone number when activated)	Activated by intruders entering an otherwise unalarmed premises	To achieve arrest of persistent offenders thereby reducing overall crime rates	36 sites covered, some false alarms 1 arrest, 1 case interrupted
Covert CCTV (records pictures of intruders)	Activated by intruders	To collect evidence from burglaries in alarmed premises on which police investigations could be mounted	11 sites covered, 1 arrest for criminal damage, 1 clip of a burglary but results too poor to assist with identification
Forensic trap	Placement of 'treated' mats and paper	To collect forensic evidence to assist in police investigation	6 sites covered, 1 trap 'sprung' and excellent evidence recovered
Proximity alarm	Produces local 'alarm'-style noise when a premises is approached from a particular direction	To dissuade offenders from re-attacking	14 sites covered, one premises re-burgled when fitted with this equipment

Methodology

In order to implement this strategy an arrangement was made that as soon as police information-handling departments were informed of a commercial burglary on an appropriate beat (ie a police beat in the project area) a copy of that notification was forwarded to the SBCI office by fax. In fact, it took a considerable period of time to establish this system, which remained dogged by Data Protection Act considerations throughout the project. Also, until Leicestershire Constabulary adopted a totally new Information Technology system in April 1997, it was not uncommon for a notification to take over seven days to reach the SBCI office.

Once notified, the project officer paid a 'cold visit' to the victim in as short a period of time as manageable. If a working relationship could be established, then the premises was examined both for offender behaviour whilst on the premises (to assess the likely effectiveness of the intervention systems) and where possible a physical inspection was made from the offender's approach. The examination also considered what had attracted the burglar, the method used to gain entry and whether any changes had been effected which might dissuade a repeat. An assessment was made of the 'likelihood' of a repeat victimisation, using a formula which was devised and amended as experience and knowledge developed. Where appropriate, one or more of the above systems was deployed.

In just over 11 months 154 commercial burglary victims were visited, information was systematically collected on different factors in order to learn in as much detail as possible all


about repeat burglary victimisation, such as time intervals, indications as to whether a victim was the subject of the 'same' burglary (therefore probably the same offender/s) or whether there were differences such as point-of-entry or burglary target which indicated a 'different' offender. This information is still undergoing analysis and will be presented in due course.

Results

One of the difficulties in monitoring crime levels lies in the actual identification of crimes against businesses. Commercial burglary is easier than most as it is classified as 'burglary other than dwelling' in Home Office crime recording practices. However, this category also captures burglary against non-commercial premises such as garages and sheds, education and religious establishments amongst other premises. For the results shown below, the raw data has been 'filtered' and the figures given are for burglaries against commercial enterprises.

The intervention phase began on 30 July 1996, and final visits were made during the first week of July 1997. Figure 2 shows the number of business burglaries during the twelve months prior to intervention work (1995-96) compared with the number during the eleven months of the intervention phase (1996-97) in the West End.

Figure 2. Business burglaries in the West End area




Commercial burglary rates based on recorded crime figures in the West End¹⁹ area of Leicester for the period twelve months prior to, and eleven months during, the business burglary intervention phase of the Small Business and Crime Initiative.

For the first few months up to December burglary levels were higher than those of the previous year, although the offending pattern remained similar. From a high in July, possibly associated with local holiday arrangements when many premises (commercial and domestic) are unoccupied, the rate dropped during August, increasing through September, possibly due to the onset of longer nights; the rate then fell steadily to December. However, in January 1996 it increased dramatically, tailing away as the length of daylight increased but maintaining an average of 25 cases per month; whereas in January 1997 this trend did not re-assert itself and the rate continued to decrease significantly. It dropped to a low of four burglaries in April, and breached double figures in only two months (February and July).

Naturally, there are many factors which can influence overall offending levels in a distinct geographical area, such as the presence or absence of prolific offenders, or specific police operations; however, as stated earlier, the SBCI operated over two areas, and Figure 3 examines findings from the Belgrave area.

In the Belgrave area the available information permitted calculation of a monthly average of commercial burglaries over a four-year period. This data is more robust than for that over just twelve months for the reasons concerned with offender availability and police activity given above. In the Belgrave area the drop in offending rates commenced almost immediately with the onset of intervention work. Whereas the four-year average depicted a clear low in December followed by an immediate rise in January, during the intervention phase there was a slight rise in December but the trend continued to fall to a monthly single-figure rate.

Figure 3. Business burglaries in the Belgrave area



Commercial burglary rates based on recorded crime figures in the Belgrave²⁰ area of Leicester for the period of four years prior to, and eleven months of, the business burglary intervention phase of the Small Business and Crime Initiative.

As can be seen from the above diagrams, while Table 2 demonstrated a lower arrest rate than might have been expected, given the levels of burglaries and repeat burglaries shown by survey findings, the overall prevalence rate diminished considerably. Also, while sub-judice and confidentiality concerns rule out detailed discussion, it can be surmised that in neither case was the arrest of an offender who could be regarded as a 'hardened' criminal.

Key issues

Displacement

A stated argument against a crime reduction strategy based upon situational crime prevention is displacement. The difficulties surrounding this complex subject were summarised by

Bridgeman and Hobbs'':

A common issue with any reduction in crime is whether it has merely been displaced to 'softer targets', for example other types of offence, location or victims. Displacement is notoriously difficult to measure, but such research as there is suggests that displacement is rarely if ever complete.

One feature of the **SBCI** project is that a full evaluation will immediately follow the fieldwork, and Tilley (forthcoming) will be in a better position to assess displacement considerations such as comparable domestic burglary rates and overall burglary levels in neighbouring areas.

Information timeliness

Farrell²² stressed the importance of time when working on repeat victimisation:

A discussion of the pioneering work on residential burglary is followed by case studies of school burglary, racial attacks, domestic violence, and business crime. Each study demonstrates that the risk of re-victimisation is greatest in the period immediately after victimisation and that this is robust across crime type, location, and the method and period of study.

Experience in Leicester has confirmed the extreme time-sensitivity of repeat victimisation work. It is absolutely crucial that, whichever agency is most likely to be first aware of the type of crime, strong communication links are forged to ensure that there is no delay in informing an intervention agency. Time is so important to crime reduction work based on repeat victimisation that senior managers must lend not only moral but active support to ensuring that information channels are properly maintained and serviced. In the commercial premises relevant for SBCI work, most alarms are monitored by control rooms run on a commercial basis which report activations to the police. For other types of crime the issue may be more complex: for example, with more personal crimes such as sexual or racial abuse, the agency concerned could be a social services department, social services-funded project or Victim Support, where confidentiality issues may conflict with crime reduction concerns.

Working with burglary victims

After their work in Huddersfield, Anderson et al²³ addressed the impression created by contact with victims:

Read about in research reports, or otherwise distanced from personal emotions, repeat victimisation can be regarded as an interesting phenomenon with crime prevention implications. Interviewing repeat victims brings one face-to-face with the effects such victimisation has upon people's lives.

Forrester et al,²⁴ working in Rochdale, also noted:

Although the victim questionnaire was timed during the pilot stages to take 35-45 minutes to complete, it was found that the victim so relished the opportunity of talking to a police officer about the crime that the interview took from 90 minutes to 2 hours.

As in Rochdale, the Leicester experience confirmed the readiness of most victims to discuss their 'burglary problem' and that some visits lasted considerably longer than anticipated, despite the interviews not being conducted by a police officer. Victimisation is an emotional experience

prompting a complex variety of reactions which manifest themselves in the level of support actually delivered with the intervention systems used on the SBCI. An early experience was that while most victims were approachable and readily took part in deploying devices (particularly as the service was free), on checking it was found that a number had simply disconnected and removed them because they were 'inconvenient', and clearly felt no obligation to inform the project.

In the case of the systems outlined in Table 2, difficulties were experienced when the silent alarms were tripped by victims returning to their premises out of scheduled working hours, or simply working late. The CCTV system required daily management over and above merely switching 'on' at night and 'off' in the morning. While these particular machines were not as user-friendly as a domestic video recorder, the required management was not particularly onerous. Some victims were quite industrious in overcoming the inconvenience, whilst others simply gave up after the first seven to ten days. The forensic traps were limited because there was only 'one shot', and if the trap was 'activated' it meant the same trap could not then be reset for its intended target. Contractors, substitute keyholders, new employees, sickness, holiday arrangements and customers all contributed to difficulties reported by victims in ensuring they were not accidentally 'sprung'. Perhaps due to their relatively late introduction, important lessons had been learned and fewer problems were reported with the proximity alarms, although their deployment was limited by the location of a mains power supply. If the nearest electric socket required a cable to obstruct a doorway, then installation requirement times could escalate considerably depending upon internal layout and concerns with aesthetic appearance. For example, in a restaurant or retail outlet appearance is usually an important consideration, whereas in a repair workshop or factory simply tacking a mains lead over a door frame is a minor affair.

Conclusion

The strategy devised and delivered during the SBCI appeared to have a major influence in reducing the number of commercial burglaries suffered by the business sector in two disparate areas of Leicester, while it did not achieve the arrest rate which may have explained this reduction by removing 'prolific' offenders. Tilley (forthcoming) will be able to examine other key factors such as local police initiatives, the presence or absence of known offenders during the relevant periods and displacement to other crimes or areas. It remains currently open to discussion as to why this approach appeared so effective.

The resources used for this work were very minor: one full-time project officer with approximately £5-6,000's worth of specialised security equipment. The SBCI survey determined that the cost of an average commercial burglary is £1,158;²⁵ by six months after beginning this work the reduction in commercial burglaries meant that £20-25,000's worth of business loss was being prevented in each area, each month. It would not be difficult to build a convincing business case for repeating this work, which was a founding principle behind the establishment of the SBCI.

An important lesson was that an intervention strategy cannot make assumptions about enjoying a uniform level of support from the victim population which it sets out to assist. The best options are either to use intervention systems which require no input from the victim at all (or to ensure that systems require as little involvement from victims as possible), or to consider freeing up resources to put in place strategies which encourage victim participation. The victim population in the case of the SBCI was principally small businesses and it may be that for this

sector the most valuable commodity is time (sometimes over money). As some of these systems required time for their management it remains an open question whether other approaches which do not impose upon a highly-valued commodity might enjoy better support. For instance, systems such as those employed for the SBCI might enjoy much better support amongst a victim population such as the elderly and retired, where time may not be such an overriding consideration.

Notes

- 1 A freelance security researcher with an interest in devising practical solutions to identified crime and public order problems. Contact (UK) 07970 836347 or geoff@buac.demon.co.uk. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers whose comments have strengthened this article.
- 2 Tilley forthcoming. Professor Tilley's evaluation will consider project work assisting 'chronically victimised' businesses and project efforts against fraud, customer theft and abuse, threats and intimidation problems.
- 3 Anderson, D. Chenery, S. and Pease, K. (1995) *Biting Back: Tackling Repeat Burglary and Car Crime*. Police Research Group. Crime Detection and Prevention Series, Paper No. 58. London: Home Office; Forrester, D. Chatterton, M. and Pease, K. (1988) *The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project, Rochdale*. Crime Prevention Unit, Paper 13. London: Home Office.
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- 5 Wood, J., Wheelwright, G. and Burrows, J. (1997) *Crime Against Small Business: Facing the Challenge*. Swindon: Crime Concern.
- 6 Leicestershire Constabulary, the Community Safety Department of Leicester City Council and the Leicester Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
- 7 Farrell, G. (1995) Preventing Repeat Victimisation. In Tonry, M. and Farrington, D. (eds) *Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Table 1 lists 27 published items, starting with Sparks, Glenn and Dodd in 1977 and finishing with Tilley in 1993.
- 8 Farrell, G. and Pease, K. (1993) *Once Bitten, Twice Bitten: Repeat Victimisation and its Implications for Crime Prevention*. Police Research Group Crime Prevention Unit Series, Paper 46. London: Home Office.
- 9 Mirrlees-Black, op cit.
- 10 Conklin, J. E. and Bittner, E. (1973) Burglary in a Suburb. *Criminology*. Vol. 11, No. 2, August 1973. American Society of Criminology.
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- 12 Ibid (n=894 businesses, which was 65 per cent of the 1,381 total business population).
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Tilley, N. (1993) *The Prevention of Crime Against Small Businesses: The Safer Cities Experience*. Police Research Group Crime Prevention Unit Series, Paper 45. London: Home Office.
- 15 Farrell and Pease, op cit.
- 16 Cohen, L. and Felson, M. (1979) Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: a Routine Activity Approach. *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 44.
- 17 Anderson et al, op cit.
- 18 Clarke, R. V. (1995) Situational Crime Prevention. In Tonry, M. and Farrington, D. (eds) *Build-*

ing a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

- 19 Source: Leicestershire Constabulary Central Area.
- 20 Source: Leicestershire Constabulary East Area.
- 21 Bridgeman, C. and Hobbs, L. (1997) *Preventing Repeat Victimisation: The Police Officers' Guide.* Police Research Group. London: Home Office.
- 22 Farrell, op cit.
- 23 Anderson et al, op cit.
- 24 Forrester et al, op cit.
- 25 Wood et al, op cit.