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31st May 2018

Dear Goldstein Award Selection Committee Members,

Project Engage: A multi-agency approach to prevent young people from SOC involvement

We wish to submit our project entitled “Project Engage: A multi-agency approach to prevent young people from SOC involvement” for consideration for the 2018 Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. This was completed by Jayne Horan (Greater Manchester Police), Dr. Laura Boulton, Dr. Rebecca Coleman and Professor Stuart Kirby (University of Central Lancashire).

Please find enclosed:

1. A summary of our project;
2. A description of our project, according to the SARA problem-solving model;
3. Agency and officer information;
4. Appendices.

Thank you for taking the time to consider our application.

Yours sincerely,

Rebecca

Dr Rebecca Coleman PhD, fHEA, MSc, BSc (Hons)

2018 Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing

1. Summary: Project Engage: A multi-agency approach to prevent young people from SOC involvement.

Serious Organised Crime (SOC) is a problem with significant financial and societal costs. Involvement can begin at a young age and is difficult to disconnect from. A preventative approach, to assist young people avoid involvement in SOC, is important in reducing the problem. This six month initiative (*Project Engage*) used a multi-agency approach to identify and generate interventions to divert those most at risk of future SOC involvement. The responses involved supporting the young people to develop self-esteem and resilience via a range of activities tailored to their individual needs (i.e. one-to-one support, CV development, training and chaperoning them to appointments as well as fishing trips, hiking tours, self-care and grooming etc.). An evaluation of the project found evidence of impact of the response, including:

- (i) A significant reduction on young people's offending rates during the intervention stage;
- (ii) No significant longer term reductions in offending post intervention;
- (iii) Engagement is key for a reducing offending; and
- (iv) The development of trusted relationships between young people and youth workers can increase self-esteem and resilience as protective methods against further vulnerability of criminal exploitation.

2. Description

A. Scanning

Serious Organised Crime (SOC) is estimated to cost the UK £24b a year (Mills et al., 2013), and in Greater Manchester (where this project takes place) costs between £850m-£1.7b. Reducing SOC in this region by a mere 1% could save Greater Manchester up to £17m each year¹, whilst also increasing community cohesion and well-being (Bullock et al., 2013). These financial and wider costs provide a strong business case on which to explore new initiatives to reduce the impact of SOC.

Much of the work conducted against SOC is reactive. Only after crimes are committed are the suspects targeted. This approach is both extremely costly and has limited impact, as incarcerated offenders are quickly replaced by others. There is an increased need to go up-stream and prevent individuals from becoming involved.

The most significant issue in Greater Manchester in this regard is young people involved in drug trafficking. Although drug trafficking is built on a complex network, local distribution is generally run by local gangs. In 2009, approximately 50,000 young people were reported to be involved in gangs in the UK (Centre for Social Justice, 2009). Research also found Manchester gang members engage in more than five times the criminality than individuals who do not belong to a gang; Manchester gang members had an average of two previous offences and a dozen prior arrests (Marshall et al., 2005).

The increased use of young people to store and carry drugs around the UK is “a major concern to practitioners” (Disley & Liddle, 2016, p. 25), which is linked to a new phenomenon known as ‘county lines’ exploitation² (Home Office, 2017). In this process, young people, often with “‘clean skins’ (those without a record), missing persons, children in care, children exposed to broader vulnerable

¹ Figure presented in ‘How to identify and work with individuals vulnerable to involvement in serious and organised crime (draft)’, Specialist Crime Solutions (2016, p.8).

² “County lines is the police term for urban gangs supplying drugs to suburban areas and market and coastal towns using dedicated mobile phone lines or “deal lines”. It involves child criminal exploitation as gangs use children and vulnerable people to move drugs and money” (Home Office, 2017, p.1).

issues” are exploited by organised criminals (NCA, 2017, p. 8). In this process, the young person is supplied with a phone and moved to a new area to facilitate drug deals on behalf of the organiser. In exchange, they receive tangible (i.e. money, drugs or clothes) and intangible rewards (i.e. status, protection or perceived friendship/affection). Further, they could become involved to prevent the occurrence of something negative, e.g. “to stop someone carrying out a threat to harm his/her family” (Home Office, 2017, p. 4). BBC (2017) reported that Safer London had approximated that 4,000 children in London may be at risk of exploitation and trafficking.

Over three-quarters of police forces reported that young people involved in county lines carried weapons (both knives and firearms), and could be associated with other crimes, such as assault, burglary, kidnapping, possession or use of acid or ammonia, serious or sexual violence (NCA, 2017). Indeed, the NCA report (2017) identified that there were 1500 external county lines nationally, which generated £0.5b annual turnover. This demonstrates that county lines serve as a successful business model for Organised Crime Groups (OCGs), generating high cash flow, whilst reducing the threat of detection for the organiser.

It therefore appears important to prevent young people becoming involved in SOC, rather than respond to the problem once it occurs. The UK Home Office identified Greater Manchester as one of the top three regions for SOC and gang activity in Britain. During the 2015-16 fiscal year, through *Project Engage*, it funded a process to identify young people at risk of SOC and generate interventions that could divert them from this threat. The critical questions for *early intervention* approaches revolve around: a) at what stage should the intervention take place, and b) on who should it focus? The dilemma is that the further upstream the intervention takes place, the more potential it has in reducing harm and cost. Conversely, the further upstream, the more problematic in showing the resources were correctly targeted, and the longer time frame needed to show impact. The next stage examines how the individuals were identified and the information generated to tailor subsequent interventions.

B. Analysis

A process to identify the relevant individuals was based upon risk factors highlighted in the academic literature. Research suggests SOC involvement may develop over time, such as individuals beginning their criminal participation within peer groups before gradually graduating to OCGs, with the type of offending activity varying according to the individual's position on the gang 'continuum' (Marshall et al., 2005). Risk factors that have been found to be associated with SOC involvement include:

- Being male (Bennett & Holloway, 2004; Blanchette & Brown, 2006);
- An early onset age to criminality (Flood-Page et al., 2000): (i) street gang participation has been reported from the ages of nine, (ii) the average age of gang members' has typically been found to be under 18 years (Disley & Liddle, 2016), and (iii) weapon carrying culture is argued to peak in boys aged 15 and 17 years (Wilson et al., 2006);
- Prior abuse, neglect and poor parenting (Farrington, 2002);
- Criminal peers and family members (Marshall et al., 2005), including siblings linked to gangs (Disley & Liddle, 2016; Medina et al., 2013);
- Living in poorer locations (Eades et al., 2007);
- School exclusion (Marshall et al., 2005);
- Absent, or pro-criminal, role models (Aldridge & Medina, 2007; Sharp, Aldridge & Medina, 2006), particularly the absence of males within the family (Vigil, 2007);
- Prior victimisation (Marshall et al., 2005; Youth Justice Board, 2004);
- Early onset trauma (i.e. death of a parent or sibling, witnessing serious violence within the home and/or community, etc.).

Incentives and motivations to gang membership can relate to protection, status, socialising and the sense of family belonging (Hallsworth 2005; Harris et al., 2011; Pitts, 2007), in addition to the

perceived glamour, excitement and material possessions. However, the realities of gang membership can be very different.

The highest proportion of those vulnerable to county lines exploitation (mentioned earlier) are reported to be aged 15 to 17 years, with people as young as 12 years old being recorded as carrying drugs for local gangs (Home Office, 2017; NCA, 2017; The Children’s Society, 2017). Methods used to force young people to participate in county lines include use of and/or threat of rape, kidnapping, scalding, maiming, and stabbing (NCA, 2017). In relation to county lines exploitation, the Home Office (2017, p.4) outlined key indicators of a young person’s involvement:

- “Persistently going missing from school or home and/or being found out-of-area;
- Unexplained acquisition of money, clothes, or mobile phones;
- Excessive receipt of texts/phone calls;
- Relationships with controlling/older individuals or groups;
- Leaving home/care without explanation;
- Suspicion of physical assault/unexplained injuries;
- Parental concerns;
- Carrying weapons;
- Significant decline in school results/performance;
- Gang association or isolation from peers or social networks;
- Self-harm or significant changes in emotional well-being.”

Compiling all this research for Project Engage, the following risk factors were decided upon:

Project Engage Risk Factors

The most important risk factor highlighted in *Project Engage* is:

- The subject has familial links or close non-familial links to Organised Crime Groups or OC activity.

Other additional risk factors include:

- Resident within neighbourhoods with known SOC activity;
- Violent crimes (suspected, reported or convicted);
- Low educational attainment;
- Exposure to violence in the home;
- Impulsiveness/risk taking behaviour;
- Parent hostility towards authority figures/lack of engagement with professionals;
- Lack of appropriate parenting skills including boundary setting.

A further four risk factors were later added to the list, comprising:

- Involvement in antisocial behaviour/Criminal Justice System;
- Not in mainstream education e.g. pupil referral unit;
- Numerous exclusions from school;
- Substance abuse.

Using this criteria a multi-agency group came together, comprising:

- Police;
- Local Authority (Community Safety; Children Services; Early Help);
- Education;
- Housing Association;

- Health;
- Department of Work and Pensions;
- Independent Youth services;
- Voluntary Sector.

This group identified a total of 33 young people from four areas of Greater Manchester (Manchester, Salford, Oldham, and Stockport). They then took each of these individuals in turn and shared their information to provide a chronological profile of their life interventions (i.e. police, social services and health interventions). This was referred to as the order '*Deep Dive*' and provided a clear picture on which to base interventions.

C. Response

In 2012, following the deaths of two unarmed female police officers by a SOC offender, Greater Manchester formed a multi-agency team to tackle the problem under the label '*Programme Challenger*'. *Project Engage* was an extension of this approach and once the young people had been identified and reviewed, they were then passed to a '*lead professional*' to facilitate the intervention. In most cases this was a youth worker, but Community Safety workers from the local authority were also involved. Multiple agencies continued to provide information and assist with interventions.

The lead professional worked with the young person on an individual basis to address the issues that have put them at risk of SOC involvement; practitioners attempted to support the young people out of any involvement with criminal activity, attempting to reintroduce them to education or gain paid employment. As the intervention operated on an individual needs basis, it varied for every young person. However, the specific activities associated with the intervention stage could be loosely grouped into nine general categories:

- i. Accompanying individuals or parents to organisations, court hearings, and when applying for jobs, courses and administrative tasks, e.g. driving licence, library card;

- ii. One-to-one meetings to understand: motivations (some with additional activities, e.g. playing football/going for food to build rapport); addressing crime and consequences; how to avoid being drawn back into criminality and lead a positive lifestyle; work on motivation/self-esteem;
- iii. Support to create a CV;
- iv. Phone calls/discussions with parents. Examples include: support /offer training; help improve individual behaviour (e.g. sleep); answer requests for information, such as why the individual fears a certain area;
- v. Home visits;
- vi. Referrals to organisations, such as YMCA and City West;
- vii. Gym sessions for healthy lifestyle (reduce substance abuse), motivations and self-esteem;
- viii. Activities/rewards, e.g. paintballing, fishing, sports, art.
- ix. Centre-specific courses/processes, e.g. 'TAC' (tailored around child) process, EP assessment, attend Bodywise (specific stay safe programme about violent behaviour).

Table 1 identifies the areas in Greater Manchester that implemented such interventions. Up to 17 different private sector and voluntary agencies were involved in the associated activities and support provided during this stage. These included: YMCA; Skills Solutions; Connections; City West; The Skills Company; Prince's Trust; Salford Reds; Community Shed; Connexions; Monaghan Window Cleaning; Apprenticeship Schemes; Nacro; Greater Manchester Places; HITZ; Hulme Garden Centre; Salford Foundation; The Agency.

The intervention lasted six months: beginning in March 2016 and ending in September 2016. However, an immediate problem was found. Whilst 33 young people were initially identified as at risk of being involved in SOC, only four engaged in the response stage. Practitioners disclosed that the original identification criteria highlighted young people who were 'too far gone' in relation to

SOC, and refused participation and engagement in the program. After repeat attempts, practitioners began to identify young people who they thought were more appropriate and would benefit from this intervention to refer into the project instead. Subsequently, a total of 22 were referred and targeted to receive the interventions. At the time of the intervention, the average age of the cohort was 15 years, with ages ranging from 13 years to 18 years old. The data revealed 15 young people (68.2%) had been recorded as a victim previously, with the majority of the cohort reported as having engaged in the intervention (68.2%, $n=15$). It was found that individuals who engaged in the intervention were significantly younger than those who did not (see Table 2), and that young people who had previously been recorded as a victim had significantly less hours of engagement recorded, compared to those who had not previously been a victim.

Difficulties encountered

The difficulty of putting some of these interventions in place is illustrated with the example below.

An example of how problems can occur between action plan and implementation:

The leaders and managers in this area were committed to *Project Engage* and had invested significant resources. They designed a three-stage approach which went live in May/June 2016. Stage 1 commissioned a specialist youth provider (from outside Greater Manchester) to engage with the young men and facilitate their co-operation. Stage 2 involved a collaboration with the Princes Trust to use their 3rd Bridge programme to help the youths improve their basic skills (i.e. English). Stage 3 provided a vocational skills programme in relation to building, where successful candidates could be awarded a City & Guilds qualification. For those who successfully completed the programme there were five apprenticeships available.

Practitioners described the cohort as incredibly challenging. From an initial cohort of 14 youths, 12 showed initial interest. Due to several issues the cohort reduced to nine, although at the time of the

evaluation only seven were engaging. These individuals had a highly complex background already associated with drug dealing, organised crime and intimidation.

Unfortunately, the Prince of Wales Scheme proved unsuccessful as the youths would not enter a classroom environment. The Housing Trust scheme was also affected by many unforeseen implementation challenges. For example, in this area of Greater Manchester, territoriality is a major concern for young men who do not like to stray into other gang areas. This resulted in youth services paying for a taxi to take one of the subjects to training. Unfortunately, during one of his visits, he was identified by a rival gang member and challenged. Although managing to leave, the rival gang member brought a group of peers to exact revenge for a prior altercation. Fortunately, the young man wasn't in attendance but it created alarm to the staff who pointed out that they did not want to be engaged in this type of collateral issue as it detracted from their main purpose and affected other students.

The following issues were specifically identified as being a challenge encountered during the response implementation:

- *Contact*: The degree of the cohort's involvement in SOC meant that the young people were difficult to initiate and maintain contact with due to their chaotic lifestyle. Their circumstances were found to be very changeable (i.e. multiple-addresses and phone numbers) which made maintaining consistent engagement extremely difficult;
- *Resource intensive*: Difficulties with contact had a knock on effect in terms of increasing the amount of time and cost needed to properly engage with them;
- *Risk to staff*: The involvement of some young people in SOC was so high that continued engagement with them posed too high of a risk to the youth workers' safety and they were withdrawn from the project;

- *Short term:* The short-term nature of this project was described as being a barrier to its success, particularly considering the level of SOC that the cohort were already involved in and the complexities and trauma associated with this involvement;
- *Too late:* As a result of the higher level of SOC involvement of this cohort, this programme came too late for this group. Also, this age group were too old for preventative work;
- *Multi-Agency Challenges:* Conflict between agencies was apparent in terms of conflicting ideas of outcomes, roles and way of working. Furthermore, there were instances of poor communication and/or information sharing across different agencies.

D. Assessment

In order to assess whether the response goals and objectives were achieved, a mixed methods approach was taken to collecting and analysing data associated with the intervention.

Quantitative Assessment

To assess whether the intervention had had a significant impact in reducing their offending, behaviour data on the 22 individuals was collected from three police systems: (i) GMP intelligence system, (ii) GMP crime report system, and (iii) the UK Police National Computer which provides information on official disposals including court convictions. Assessment analysed this data across three data points: prior to the intervention (< March 2016), during the Intervention (March 2016-September 2016) and post intervention (September 2016 - January 2018).

The criminal histories of the young people was found to encompass various offending behaviour, including breach of bail, criminal damage, public order, assault, theft and driving offences.

Intelligence on the young people corroborated their engagement in wider antisocial behaviour and highlighted their association with known OCGs.

Whilst this analysis found no consistent evidence for a lasting reduction in offending behaviour after the intervention for the whole cohort, there was evidence to suggest that:

- There was a significant reduction in offending behaviour, as indicated by crime records (see Table 3) and intelligence records (see Figure 1; Table 4), during the intervention compared to before or after the intervention, which suggests that the intervention was most effective at reducing offending behaviour whilst it was ongoing;
- Young people who have higher rates of offending before the intervention, remain more persistent in their offending during and after the intervention;
- Young people in the sample were receiving the same conviction multiple times (up to 10 times), suggesting that certain convictions may not be effective in deterring reoffending or breaching of an order given;
- The intervention had a stronger positive effect (in terms of a decreased number of intelligence records after the intervention) for those who engaged well;
- The frequency of the offending behaviour is reducing during and after the intervention, compared to before it.

Qualitative Assessment

From the analysis of interviews with five practitioners involved in the response, one practitioner not involved in the response and one parent of a young person who received the intervention stage of the response, the outcomes of the interventions and what works were discussed. Whilst the outcomes were not always the hard changes that were hoped to be found (i.e. employment and desistence), the soft outcomes observed were thought to indicate change in the attitude and resilience in the young person. Others expressed how important the organisational learning from the project was and how this should be considered an outcome (see Table 5 for supportive quotes).

- *Employment or Education:* A young person getting a job or re-engaging with education occurred on three occasions. Two of those were the young people for whom additional work had been funded, potentially suggesting that a longer term approach was beneficial for generating tangible employment and/or educational outcomes. Employment or education was described as being the main outcome goal of the project in order to provide the young people with an attractive alternative route to financial gain than OC. This was a positive thing to aspire to 'on paper' but was more difficult to achieve in reality due to the level and complexity of the cohort recruited;
- *Engagement:* Some participants claimed engagement levels were high and concluded this to be a positive outcome of the programme, however it was unclear what impact this had on the cohort's level of SOC involvement. Participants felt that those who did engage with the programme, engaged well;
- *Reduced Offending/Minimised Offending Severity:* A reduction in the severity or frequency of reoffending in the cohort as a result of this project was reportedly observed, but the evidence of this was not clear;
- *Re-Engagement with Other Services:* Getting young people and their families to re-engage, and establish trusting relationships, with other services (mainly statutory) was described as an important step in improving the young person's future resilience. Facilitating re-engagement with other services via the trusted youth worker who can break down barriers between services and service users was thought to lead to a stronger support network of resilience for vulnerable families. It also appears to be a more achievable goal than offending desistance or employment;
- *Soft Outcomes:* Soft outcomes refer to the changes in attitude, appearance and behaviour that were recognised in the young people over the course of the project (e.g. being respectful to teachers or parents, swearing less, on time to appointments, with smarter haircuts and/or outfit choices). Measuring and recording soft outcomes like these were

discussed as being important as they are thought to reflect changes in attitudes towards community involvement and/or OC which indicate resilience against future vulnerability to SOC involvement.

In terms of 'what works' for successful engagement and/or generating successful outcomes for the cohort, a number of factors were found (see Table 6):

- *Individual Needs:* Work needs to be based on the individual needs and interests of that young person. *Youth workers* need to be flexible in their approaches so that they connect with those individual needs and respond reactively changes in circumstances;
- *Relationship Building:* Relationships with the young person needs to be built on trust and developed over time using consistency, credibility and non-judgment based support. Furthermore, relationships with the young people's families were viewed as integral for any work to have a lasting impact;
- *Support:* Interventions should focus on supporting the young person to build their own resilience, to develop self-esteem and to expand their horizons in order to see alternative paths is crucial to the success of any programme. One-to-one time between the young person and their youth worker, enabling the development of a trusting relationship, was considered crucial;
- *The 'Right' Youth Worker:* Getting the right person to deliver the programmes is considered integral to the success of any project. The right youth worker does not need to be an ex-offender themselves, but they need to have some sort of lived experience and understanding of the cohort's lives (credibility) in order to connect with them from a place of shared experience. Furthermore, they should treat the young people they work with like adults: this cohort did not see themselves as young people, instead they see themselves as adults (18-21 year olds) because that is the age group that they associate with and that is the level of behaviour that they participate in.

Towards a more effective response

The two key problems identified in implementing the response plan to achieve preventative aims related to the timing of the intervention for the young people identified and the duration of the response. It was concluded that *Project Engage* came too late to achieve preventative aims as the young people identified to receive the response were already substantially involved in SOC.

Literature suggests that SOC involvement occurs between 12 and 14 years of age, therefore the average age of this cohort (15 years) was beyond the scope of early intervention and into the prime years of SOC involvement. Furthermore, the short-term nature of this project appeared to be a major barrier to its success, particularly considering the level of SOC that the cohort were already involved in and the complexities and trauma associated with this involvement. It is recommended:

- Interventions should be earlier, targeting individuals or groups (between ages 11-14) who are showing first signs of a problem prior to crisis point (i.e. high rate of school absence, early experience of trauma, living in an area or estate where poverty and OCG activity proliferates etc.);
- Longer term engagement plans to generate sustainable impact;
- Encouraging engagement and prioritising relationship building between the young person, and their family, and a specialised and credible youth worker. Family buy-in can be key for engagement with the young person (i.e. family members trusting the youth worker enough to tell them where the young person is and who they are with) and to help endorse the learning and development;
- Supporting early intervention and collaborating with both primary and secondary schools to identify trauma and vulnerability, and to deliver interventions within schools.

3. Agency and Officer Information

- Key Project Team Members:
 - Jayne Horan, Dr Laura Boulton, Dr Rebecca Coleman, Prof Stuart Kirby
- Project contact person:
 - Dr Rebecca Coleman

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4. Appendices

Table 1: Types of Intervention

Type of Intervention	Salford	MCR	Oldham	Stockport
Accompanying individuals or parents to organisations, court hearings, and when applying for jobs/courses/admin e.g. driving licences/library card	X			
1-1 meetings to understand: motivations (some with additional activities e.g. playing football/going for food to build rapport); addressing crime and consequences; how to avoid being drawn back into criminality and lead a positive lifestyle; work on motivation/self-esteem.	X	X		
Support to create CV	X			
Phone calls/discussions with parents. Examples include: support /offer training; help improve individual behaviour e.g. sleep; answer requests for information e.g. on why individual fears a certain area.	X			X
Home visits.	X			
Referrals to organisations e.g. YMCA / City West	X			
Gym sessions for healthy lifestyle (reduce substance abuse), motivations and self-esteem.			X	
Activities/Rewards e.g. paintballing, fishing, sports, art.	X	X	X	
Centre-specific courses/processes e.g. 'TAC' (tailored around child) process, EP assessment, attend Bodywise (specific stay safe programme about violent behaviour).				X


Table 2. Statistical tests for significant differences

Variable	Kruskal Wallis		Mann Whitney U			
	χ^2	Df	Comparison		U	z
Crimes frequency	6.476*	2	Pre intervention	During intervention	138.00*	-2.45
PNC frequency	17.71***	2	Pre intervention	Post intervention	127.50**	-2.74
			During intervention	Post intervention	73.50***	-4.06
Intelligence frequency	7.06*	2	Pre intervention	During intervention	138.50*	-2.43
			During intervention	Post intervention	153.50*	-2.08
Hours of engagement	-	-	Engaged	Did not engage	10.00**	2.85
	-	-	Victim	Not previously recorded as victim	20.00*	-2.05
			T-Test		T	Df
Intelligence frequency: Post-intervention	-	-	Engaged	Did not engage	-2.25*	20
Age	-	-	Engaged	Did not engage	-2.37*	20

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 3. Crime Frequency Descriptive Statistics

Stage	M (SD)	Median	Range
Pre	9.77 (6.55)	8.50	0-22
Pre (12 months)	4.77 (4.09)	3.50	0-13
During	5.73 (7.75)	3.00	0-33
Post (12 months)	7.00 (7.36)	5.00	0-33
Post	8.14 (8.37)	6.50	0-37
<i>Total</i>	<i>23.64 (16.15)</i>	<i>22.00</i>	<i>2-60</i>

Figure 1. Intelligence data Pre, During and Post Intervention**Table 4. Intelligence Descriptive Statistics**

	M (SD)	Median	Range
Pre	21.09 (14.69)	20.00	1-53
During	10.95 (9.04)	8.00	0-34
Post	18.36 (12.76)	17.00	2-48
<i>Total</i>	<i>52.64 (27.54)</i>	<i>61.50</i>	<i>7-94</i>

Table 5. Outcomes subthemes with supportive narratives from the transcripts.

Subthemes	Participants³	Frequency⁴	Sample data extract
Employment or education	6	12	“From someone who wasn’t attending at all, really got them to engage and to look at engaging in education.” (P3) “TS – just got a job working with [youth worker]. LD is in college.” (P6)
Engagement	5	10	“Those that we actively engaged with throughout the programme, there was 2 out of 15. So might have reduced risk of harm by 16%. And that’s only if they completely turn their back on crime. Probably not.” (P2) “The wins for us were getting them to engage with their workers and programmes.” (P3) “The level of engagement with staff was good [...] I was shocked by how well engaged they were.” (P5)
Organisational learning	4	13	“When it’s a pilot the outcome that you want is to be able to learn for future projects. Learning where our gaps were in our services and it kind of opened our eyes to a lot of stuff that was going on.” (P3) “In some respects, the success of the programme that is happening now is because of the failures in this one. Minds have changed. We can’t do what we did last time I think that is a success.” (P4).”
Collaboration	5	10	“For me the revelation was the benefit was working with local providers, the youth providers. Listening to a youth worker and a police officer talking about an individual and making those connections.” (P3)
Familial link	6	9	“With hindsight, you need a strong familiar link to form those bridges.” (P2) “use an existing relationship, if you like, rather than a cold call” (P3).
School collaboration	8	17	“School is the only structure they have in their life.” (P7) “Interventions should work within schools – schools tend to send them home but that’s a reward for them.” (P8)
Reduced offending/severity	5	7	“we started realising that this kid hasn’t been involved in the criminal system for 6 months. To me, we’ve just prevented him being involved in the criminal system [...] it’s a win.” (P4) “Our initial evaluation was that we weren’t sure. We didn’t get them to desist.” (P5).
Re-engagement with other services	5	12	“Engaging positively with some sort of service to help them with whatever is going on. Because if we are not addressing why, we are just dealing with the offence, those risk factors are still there and unaddressed.” (P6) “When you speak to parents about statutory services, there is a lot of confusion, but if you mention Social Services, their instant reaction is ‘they are gonna take my kids away’. So what I’ve been good at is

³ Number of participants referring to the sub-theme.

⁴ Number of references to the sub-theme.

			reintroducing them to statutory services because my services were never going to be around indefinitely.” (P7)
Soft outcomes	5	12	“A job or apprenticeship would be amazing but for this cohort, them consistently getting out of bed and having their needs met is much more of an outcome. [...] For me that is success and needs to be looked at when evaluating a programme. The fact that they are on time. They didn’t go out last night because they know they had an appointment with you. They are smoking less weed than they did when they met you. He doesn’t swear at his mum when you’re around anymore. That’s the start of the success [...] Unfortunately the job didn’t work out but he had resilience [...] Before he used to wear a hat and trackies all the time. Now his hair is styled nicely and he wears a t-shirt and jeans which tells me he is in a different place.” (P4)

Table 6. What Works subthemes with supportive narratives from the transcripts.

Subthemes	Participants⁵	Frequency⁶	Sample data extract
Individual needs			
<i>Flexible and reactive</i>	5	14	“There needs to be that reactive resource in place and we didn’t have it. It was very fixed. We had workers that were doing other things and needed to fit this around those and that ain’t going to cut it with this cohort” (P2) “Pace it for the young person - that flexibility - depending on the individual need of that young person.” (P5).
Relationship building			
<i>Relationship with young person</i>	6	14	“they went to court with him, gave him a reference to build a relationship so they saw (youth worker) as a real friend” (P2) “But they never broke trust. I knew that he had someone to turn to. [...] (youth worker) sent him a Christmas card and said how proud they were of him which he said made his day. It was from the heart, you could just tell.” (P8).
<i>Relationship with family</i>	6	10	“Because of the relationship she had with us she then said that she would accept the Early Help offer.” (P6) “I would regularly pop round when I knew the kid wasn’t there for a brew to find out what’s been going on – it’s like gathering intelligence. They would know that was happening. If you haven’t got the relationship with

⁵ Number of participants referring to the sub-theme.

⁶ Number of references to the sub-theme.

			the family, and the young person isn't there when you are due to meet, you drive away. If you have got it, they tell you where they are. [...] The reason why the family engagement is important is that I spend 3 hours a week with them but then they go back in to the family home. If they aren't reinforcing what I'm saying to them, it's pointless." (P7)
Support			
<i>1-to-1</i>	4	5	"Needs to be one to one." (P5)
<i>Build resilience</i>	4	5	"Need to give them the skills so when they start being groomed they can see it." (P5)
<i>Build self-esteem</i>	3	4	"Somebody that was able to praise them and has faith in you and is willing to work with you. To these young people, they don't have that in society. In their mind, 'teacher's hate me', 'parents hate me', 'police hate me'. [...] They paid for him to get his haircut in a proper barbers and apparently he came out and said 'nobody has ever taken me to get my haircut. Nobody has ever taken the time to ask me how I want my hair cutting or style my hair.'" (P2) "It's about self-confidence and self-esteem. Finding that one thing that they are good at. They often have this self-perception that they are garbage." (P5) "He was told he was 'too far gone'. JA felt he had been dropped when he needed the support the most. [...] When young people get into trouble, they shouldn't just dump them completely. They feel support is reliant on behaviour and that they didn't actually care about him at all. They think 'I'm already in trouble, so I may as well carry on'." (P8)
<i>Expand horizons</i>	5	7	"If you can give them an idea of a future, you have more of a chance. If you say to them their future is going to be prison, benefits like their family, they aren't going to care if they hang around someone with a knife." (P1) "Almost like 'whoa. Society is bigger than I thought' and I think we need to explain that to some young people. Because if you break down that view that they have to live in Little Hulton their whole lives then you breakdown the idea that the only people that do well there are drug dealers." (P2) "I asked one on a fishing trip, what job they could see themselves doing. And he said lorry driver. I asked why, and he said, well my next door neighbour is the only person I know with a job and he's a lorry driver." (P6)
The 'right' youth worker			
<i>Credibility</i>	6	13	"It can be the best content in the world, but if you don't have the right person delivering it, it fails. Credibility is the key." (P1) "You can't take a traditional youth worker to work with high risk individuals. [...] It needs a specialised person with a credible background. [...] They've got to be the sort of people who can engage with this culture. [...] We should get someone who is highly experienced and pay them 2 youth workers money." (P4)

			<p>"I would always tell them on the first meeting that I am an ex-offender myself and that would always clinch it. I grew up on similar estates that those kids are living in, I did all the things they are doing, for similar reasons. [...] My life was the same as theirs and I'm not doing too bad for myself - it gives them hope - it doesn't have to be like this." (P7)</p>
<p><i>Treat young people like adults</i></p>	3	9	<p>"They see themselves as 18-19 year olds like the lads on their estate, they don't see themselves as 14 year old kids. So I didn't work with them as children. That's where Social Services might be stuck. You get a better response by treating them with maturity. [...] Talking to them about the consequences of crimes they commit. Things they wouldn't even think about. Like until 2 years ago, I couldn't get insured to drive a car. All these lads wanna drive and that's a consequence they never thought about. [...] Another problem is that they are told so many times about consequences, 'if you do this again, this will happen' and it never does. So until they have committed an offence so serious they have to be sent to jail, they experience no real consequences. Curfew is not a consequence. One I knew had breached his 97 times with no consequence. [...] I was 17 when I went to prison, so not far off their age – I could talk to them about what it was like. Because no-one comes out of prison and says it was horrible in there. They come out saying 'it was great, it was a holiday, I was smoking spice everyday'. Prison is awful. I had a fight every day. These lads don't hear those dark stories. So being able to tell them that might steer them away." (P7)</p>

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