Hartlepool: A Case Study in Burglary Reduction

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Executive Summary

- Hartlepool SDP was developed to combat the particular burglaiy problems of the Belle Vue and Rift House East areas of South Hartlepool.

- The project was founded on good pre-existing relations with the community in Belle Vue. However, attitudes in Rift House East were much less encouraging to interventions.

- The project was well planned and had, from the outset, the support of a Steering Group that engaged the various partners in finding solutions that matched the problem in the area.

- The aim of the project was to develop interventions that would not only be effective in their own right but enhance and strengthen each other. These included:
  - Alleygating: to protect the rear of properties
  - Target hardening: to protect repeat victims, hot spots of burglary and end terrace properties.
  - Property marking: extend existing scheme (covering 1000 households) to remaining area of 2500 households.
  - Diversionary schemes for young people: engage young people generally in structured programmes focussed on the Sports Centre.
  - Supervision of offenders: engage young offenders in personal development programme.
  - Education and awareness: promotion of good crime prevention within the community.
  - Community development: increasing the capacity of the community to respond to the problem of crime.

- The achievements of the scheme include:
  - 14 alleygates protecting 185 properties
  - 24 repeat victims identified, 15 of which had their properties target hardened

- 839 homes were property marked
- Over 200 young people attended evening sessions
- Over 50 young people attended outdoor activities
- 5 young offenders attended personal development course
- Family Fun Day (crime prevention theme), Crime Prevention Week, Community Newsletter and visits of crime prevention officers to schools
- 2000 community safety packs distributed to residents
- Employment of local people to coordinate anti-burglary activities

• Problems encountered:
  - legal difficulties and resistance to al ley gates
  - low take-up of property marking due to lack of interest
  - bad publicity wrecked the offender programme and caused the key person in the youth engagement work to withdraw

• Reduction in burglary, comparing two years before and after project started:
  - 25% reduction in overall burglaries reported
  - compared to 9% reduction in local police division and 12% in Cleveland Police Force Area
  - total savings over two years of 55 burglaries

• Impact of interventions:
  - no burglaries had been committed in houses protected by the early phase of alleygates
  - although less marked, there was also a reduction in burglaries of houses near the alleygating schemes
  - only 2 of 24 repeat victims suffered further burglary
  - plug-in timers reduced the burglary rate by 37%
  - repeat victimisation within 90 days was reduced by 26%
  - other crimes rate of change always lower for SDP than BCU or PFA

• Hartlepool SDP inputs had total cash value of £79,000.

- Total modelled costs had a value of £54,000 (that is after adjustment for life of project etc). Value of burglaries saved was £118,030 giving a cost benefit ratio of 2.19 (and net benefits of £64,000).

- To break even on cost, Hartlepool SDP would have needed to save 23 burglaries. It in fact saved 55.

- Main strengths of the project:
  - utilisation of existing resources gave the project a sound platform
  - carefully selected and achievable targets maintained momentum
  - project management was strong but not authoritarian
  - anti-burglary coordinators provided a crucial link with residents
  - a strong Steering Committee ensured regular review and monitoring of progress
  - community backing throughout the project

- Key benefits of the project:
  - improved feelings of safety and security have contributed to a more positive reputation for the area - a turn around in desirability of the area
  - enhanced support for police in area
  - more positive views of youth involvement in area, though volatility of public opinion is a problem
  - community involvement in bidding for funds e.g. New Deal
  - specific lessons about alleygating - successful use depends on a positive attitude to the use of the space, for example, as play area as well as improved security

- Problems encountered:
  - a degree of apathy among residents hampered property marking
  - volunteers were able to walk away when problems arose
  - volatile public opinion resulted in withdrawal of support and resources at a crucial stage in offender intervention.

Addendum

- Further reduction in burglary to 4 years after project start

- Total reduction after 4 years 28%
- Compared to 13% reduction in local police division and 8% in Cleveland police Force Area.
- Total savings over 4 years of 138 burglaries

- Continued impact of interventions
  - Repeat victimization within 90 days reduced by 33% after 4 years
  - Burglary in SDP alleygate areas still less than pre-installation
  - Addresses with plug in timers still 4% less monthly burglary rate than whole SDP after 4 years

- Community relations a likely contributory factor in sustainability

1. INTRODUCTION

In 1998 the Home Office launched the Crime Reduction Programme which consisted of a range of initiatives aimed at tackling crime. A significant part of this programme was the Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI) which was specifically aimed at reduction of burglary rates through funding of a variety of projects on a nationwide basis. Phase One of the RBI provided funding for 63 Strategic Development Projects (SDPs) throughout the country, all of which had a burglary rate of at least twice the national average. Each project consisted of a number of interventions aimed at reducing burglary rates, ranging from improvements in household security to working with offenders on an individual basis. The success of these projects is being separately evaluated for the North, Midlands and South of England. The consortium which undertook the evaluation of the 21 projects in the North of England consisted of research groups from Hull, Huddersfield and Liverpool Universities. The full evaluation will be published in due course but will be, by the very nature and scale of the evaluation, limited in the amount of detailed information it can provide concerning each individual project.

The aim of this case study is to examine the Hartlepool SDP in order to describe and understand processes and outcomes, whilst grounding them in the specific local context (i.e. within the framework of realistic evaluation - see Pawson and Tilley, 1997). In order to do this, the case study will examine the pre-existing burglary problem, detail the work that was undertaken in terms of interventions, examine *how* the work was undertaken (including problems encountered and solutions that were developed), assess the extent to which the project can claim success (especially with regard to burglary outcomes and its stated aims and objectives), and summarise key messages and lessons learned. Hartlepool has been chosen for this examination as it incorporated a variety of interventions and, as will be shown, is able to demonstrate success both in terms of burglary outcomes and of achieving its aims and objectives.

Some work has already been carried out by the evaluators at Liverpool University to demonstrate the detailed level of analysis that can be undertaken within the framework of crime reduction when disaggregate level data (i.e. data concerning individual crimes) are available (Johnson, Bowers and Hirschfield, forthcoming). Their case study of Liverpool SDP demonstrates a variety of techniques for analysing changes in burglary rates, repeat

victimisation, displacement, and looking at the effectiveness of individual interventions. The present case study will demonstrate a number of alternative techniques which can be used in order to analyse and detail the outcomes of the burglary reduction initiative within the Hartlepool SDP. This will be contextualised by an analysis of the operation of the project which will seek to demonstrate the importance of local conditions and resources. In summary, the case study will demonstrate the importance of the local context to the success/failure of burglary reduction initiatives as a whole, and also its importance when considering particular types of intervention. It will also underline the crucial role played by personnel in both management terms and in the implementation of schemes.

2. SETTING **THE** SCENE

The Hartlepool SDP lies to the south of Hartlepool town centre and consists of approximately 3500 households. The SDP divides naturally into two distinct areas which are separated by a main road. Before the introduction of the RBI each area had its own separate identity. Belle Vue Estate lies to the east side of the SDP and was perceived as problematic in terms of anti-social behaviour of some residents and the high incidence of criminality and drug use within the area. Rift House East Estate, on the west side of the SDP, was considered to be less problematic than Belle Vue, although was by no means problem free. Burglary was a significant issue for the residents of Belle Vue and a number of them were in the process of trying to take some action against crime on the estate when the RBI began. A group of residents had already formed an association (in 1997) in the face of a good deal of opposition and intimidation from anti-social members of the local community, and were trying to improve conditions for local people. This group of residents became involved with the RBI at the stage of planning and bidding for funds. The scheme was, therefore, able to access a level of commitment and enthusiasm from the local community at the earliest stages of the project. Young people in the area were seen as a particular problem as it was felt that a relatively small number of young people on the estate were responsible for a significant proportion of the estate's difficulties in terms of crime and anti-social behaviour. Drug use was thought to be a particular problem as well as the attendant difficulties of crimes commissioned in order to fund habits. 'Sneak-in' burglaries were thought to be common, as was forced entry at the rear of properties. Prior to the RBI, attitudes towards the police varied across the SDP, with residents in Belle Vue being willing to work with the police whilst those in Rift House East were unwilling to do so, despite efforts from the police to encourage exchange of information. The location of the SDP is shown in Figure 1.



Figure 1 Location Map of SDP

The project itself began promptly in April 1999, following the planning phase which began in December 1998 and was managed by the Community Safety Strategy Officer from Hartlepool Borough Council and the Community Safety Officer from Cleveland Police. Throughout the life of the project the managers were supported by the Steering Group which consisted of representatives of partner agencies. These included: an SRB funded community safety organisation; a voluntary alarms project; several social landlords/housing associations; Belle Vue Sports Centre; Belle Vue Residents' Association; local councillors; local residents;

Neighbourhood Watch Co-ordinator; Crime Prevention Officer; and Community Police Officers. The interventions which were chosen by the project team attempted to match problems to solutions following crime pattern analysis and consultation with the local community* mainly in the form of Belle Vue Residents' Association.

3. PATTERN OF BURGLARY BEFORE PROJECT

Analysis of burglary figures shows that there was an average of 61 burglaries per 1000 households per year, in the two years before the start of the SDP, compared with 45 in Hartlepool 1 Police District, and an average monthly SDP burglary count of 17.5. Slightly less than half of the burglaries occurred in Belle Vue and slightly more than half in Rift House East, which is the reverse of the perceived problem referred to earlier. More burglaries took place in whiter and autumn than in spring and summer. The highest numbers of burglaries occurred on Sundays and the lowest numbers mid week. Because of the inexact way the date and time fields have been completed in the data provided by Cleveland Police, it has not been possible to generate information on time of day. Table 1 provides infonnation on MO although it must be noted that this information was only available for 75% of burglaries. The problem of rear entry highlighted earlier is confirmed but there is no evidence from the burglary data of a 'sneak-in' burglary problem.

Table 1 MO of Burglaries

	% Burglaries
Approach via alley	15.5
Burglaries by deception	0.5
Entry at rear	41.9
Entry at front	9.5

4. THE INTERVENTIONS PROPOSED AND CARRIED OUT

The aim of the Hartlepool project team was to develop a set of interventions which would all be of use in and of themselves, but which would also enhance and strengthen each other. Seven separate interventions were developed, planned and implemented. They were supported by the employment of two part-time burglary reduction coordinators who were

responsible for overseeing aspects of certain interventions. Their main responsibility was to undertake community development within the area. Although they cannot be considered as an intervention in themselves, their role certainly cut across several of the interventions.

4.1 Alleygating

Possible sites for locating alleygates were identified following crime pattern analysis. This revealed that some streets were subject to high levels of burglary and that access was often gained via the rear of the property. This access was provided by rear alleyways which also provided cover and means of escape for those undertaking burglaries. Following identification of these possible sites, they were visited by highway engineers from Hartlepool Borough Council who surveyed the sites for feasibility of erecting gates. An important issue that had to be considered was the sheer size of gates, given that these alleyways provided vehicular as well as pedestrian access. A 'gate within a gate' design was chosen, so that the entire gate could be opened in order to allow vehicles to enter the alley, or the smaller section could be opened by those on foot. Following these decisions, a number of difficulties were encountered, the most problematic of which was the legal status of blocking off alleyways and this caused considerable delays in the implementation of the intervention. Various types of order had different implications for residents who were concerned about taking on sole responsibility for the upkeep of the alleyways. Eventually, it was decided that *Prohibition of Access* orders were appropriate given that responsibility for the alleys would remain with the local council. These orders, however, can only be made on a temporary basis and need to be renewed after 18 months, when the effectiveness of the gates will need to be reviewed.

As well as encountering difficulties of a legal nature, the SDP staff found a level of resistance from some of the residents who had concerns about the gates. Some were concerned that it would become more difficult to take out dustbins for refuse removal and access to keys became an issue given that a number of properties in the area were privately rented. Ultimately, it took a good deal of time and effort to persuade residents that the gates would protect them and that the benefits would outweigh the difficulties. A core group of residents were eventually convinced of this after the SDP staff arranged for them to visit gates in Middlesbrough and discuss with residents how burglary in the area had reduced.

Following resolution of the difficulties the first gates were installed in September 2000, much later than had originally been anticipated. These gates were situated in Charterhouse Street and Marlborough Street and protected 47 properties by closing off back access. At the same time 6 gates were erected on Kent Avenue, but these were rather smaller gates and closed off back access to 15 properties where pedestrian alleyways ran between the houses. A further set of large gates was installed in May 2001, following further analysis, and these protected a total of 123 properties on Patterdale Street, Borrowdale Street and Brenda Road. The RBI therefore funded a total of 14 alleygates which protected 185 properties. In addition to these gates, and due to their eventual popularity with residents (once they had been convinced of the benefits) a further 10 gates were installed in the SDP area using early wins funding from the New Deal for Communities. These gates were installed in April 2001 and their effects will be examined alongside the effects of the gates funded by the RBI, due to the fact that they were installed during the same period and within the SDP area.

4.2 Target Hardening

The aim of the target hardening intervention was to reduce the number of properties subject to repeat victimisation. This intervention began promptly on 14* April, 1999 when the first repeat victim was identified. Victims that had been burgled on more than one occasion were identified by the crime analyst and the local Crime Prevention Officer would then offer to undertake a crime prevention survey. Following the survey, recommendations were made as to suitable security upgrades. A local volunteer agency was paid by the project to fit the appropriate security measures (such as new locks on doors and windows, security lights etc), general crime prevention advice was given and victims were issued with community safety packs.

This intervention proved somewhat disappointing in terms of take-up. In the first instance, only 24 repeat victims were identified throughout the life of the project. It may be seen as a positive benefit that demand for this service was lower than expected. Of the 24 properties identified, only 15 were in fact target hardened and the others were not for a variety of reasons, some of which are listed below: the Crime Prevention Officer found that three of the properties were no longer occupied when he called; three residents failed to respond to repeated attempts to contact them; one resident had fitted his own security devices; one did not want the officer in his house and one said that the police could not tell him anything he did not already know about crime prevention.

The second aim of this intervention was to identify areas suffering from clusters of burglaries and provide the residents with security upgrades. In the event, this issue was partly addressed by means of alleygates. Those fitted in Kent Avenue protected 15 properties that had been subject to a cluster of burglaries. Those fitted in Borrowdale Street and Brenda Road closed off access to 40 properties that had been subject to a cluster of burglaries. In addition to this, street lighting was improved in a number of streets and 64 households were offered door chimes due to the high incidence of'walk-in[1] burglaries.

The intervention had a third and final aim, which was to improve security in end of terrace properties. However, there were no funds left to carry this out after cluster sites had been protected by means of alleygates (a more expensive option than individual security upgrades).

In addition to the target hardening discussed above, 364 subsidised plug-in timers were sold at the launch of the SDP on 24th July 1999 and during the Crime Prevention Week (18th October 1999 onwards). These were sold as part of the Education and Awareness campaign but can be seen as a form of target hardening device.

4.3 Property Marking

Prior to the inception of the RBI, Belle Vue Estate had been offered property marking and there had been a take-up rate of 62%. Under the RBI, all properties in Rift House East were to be offered property marking using Selectamark. This was carried out by personnel from a voluntary agency and entailed marking 5 items of property at each household. The marking was carried out in four phases, the first of which began in September 1999 and resulted in marking at 261 addresses, from a possible 534. Phase two began in November 1999 and resulted in marking at 100 addresses, from a possible 348. Phase three took place between January and March 2000 and resulted in marking at 134 addresses, from a possible 576. Phase four took place between April and June 2000 and resulted in marking at 344 addresses, from a possible 1031.

All of those involved with this intervention were disappointed with the low take-up rate. It would seem that this was partly due to the approach adopted by the voluntary organisation at the start of the intervention. Volunteers would leave a letter at the address stating that they would return the next day to undertake marking. They would visit the next day, but it seems

that they visited during working hours and consequently a lot of people were out. They eventually had to make visits between 6 and 8pm and found they had a little more success. It would seem that the fact that they were from a voluntary organisation did not help their cause. The approach to property marking that had been adopted previously on the Belle Vue Estate had employed the services of police officers to knock on doors and tell people about the benefits of marking their property. It would seem that such an 'official' face to a scheme increases the take-up rate. A large number of people either had no interest, or were actively opposed to property marking, stating that if their property was stolen it would be replaced by the insurance, others stated that they might sell the property and so did not wish for it to be marked, others did not own the property anyway, but rented it and others still stated that the property was not insured and they seemed to think that this negated the need for marking. It seems that perhaps the benefits of marking were not explained sufficiently to some people.

Whatever reasons were given for not taking up the offer of property marking, it is clear that there are lessons to be learned from this experience. In the first instance, it is clear that it was not necessary to purchase over 2500 marking kits before the popularity of the scheme had been established, hi the end, a number of kits were given to Oxford Road East Residents' Association to distribute amongst those that wanted them, but no records were kept of how many of these kits were eventually put to use. It is clear, also, that issues arise from using volunteers to carry out interventions. In this instance, it would seem that lessons that had already been learned from the success of the scheme undertaken in Belle Vue were not passed on for the benefit of the new scheme. It is also clear that it is not always possible to control volunteers in the ways that might be hoped for, nor to keep them enthused when they are experiencing difficulties. Problems with this intervention clearly demonstrate the view that central aspects of interventions can be better served by contracting an organisation for a particular piece of work given that volunteers can, and do, walk away from difficulties when they become disheartened. The voluntary organisation lost a number of volunteers directly as a result of the lack of interest in this intervention, and the intervention itself eventually ran out of volunteers.

4.4 Diversionary Schemes for Young people

The diversionary schemes for young people consisted of i) structured evening sessions and ii) outdoor activities. These events used the Sports Centre as a focal point, given that it was already being accessed by a number of young people. The intervention aimed to occupy the young people in a constructive way, as well as supplying them with positive messages

regarding crime, crime prevention and good citizenship. The first young people targeted were those already using the Sports Centre. The Police Community Safety Officer and a supervisor from the Sports Centre then made visits to schools (as part of the Education and Awareness Intervention) and this created further interest in the activities. Interest then grew via word of mouth once the young people began to attend sessions.

A programme of evening sessions for young people aged 12-17 years was held between 29 April and 7 June 1999. Total attendance was 91, averaging 15 at each session. The sessions included input from the police, fire service, youth service, prison service and a Durham based Youth Action Group. A structured programme for 8-11 years was held from 16 September to 28 October 1999. There was an average of 19 young people at each session. Five sessions were held and these covered good citizenship, fire awareness, prisons, crime prevention and drugs awareness. Due to the popularity of the sessions a second programme for the older age group was held from 3 March until 12 April 2000. These sessions covered bullying, truancy, drugs awareness, crime prevention and prisons. Young people who successfully completed the courses were presented with certificates at an awards ceremony at which the local press was in attendance, thus generating good publicity for the area's young people.

Diversionary activities took place during the summer of 1999 and early 2000 and these included the following:

- Six climbing and mountain biking sessions - some of which were full days and some of which were evenings only - 48 youngsters attended.
- Formation of a football team consisting of offenders and non-offenders from the SDP area - training and 'friendly' matches included - average of 20 youngsters attended.
- 15 youngsters attended Wet 'n' Wild as a reward for attendance at structured programmes.
- 14 of the older age group were taken on a visit to Durham Prison.
- Arising from this intervention was the formation of a Youth Action Group.
- 2 day kayaking course and an overnight stay at a youth hostel near Whitby.
- Learning archery at the Sports Centre.
- 17 young people spent a day paintballing.

This intervention is viewed by the SDP staff as the real success story of the project. They feel it went incredibly well and were impressed by the interest shown by the young people, the levels of participation reached and the ongoing effects in the area, which suggest that the intervention may well have longer-term benefits for the local community. Local people have stated that they feel the behaviour of young people in the area has improved and the local police believe that levels of disorder have reduced. It is also clear that relationships have been built between young people and the police, relationships which the police are keen to foster and maintain by remaining involved with the young people.

It would seem that the key to the success of this intervention was the way in which it tapped into existing local resources. It did this in two ways: firstly, by focussing on the Sports Centre which was a space already used by a number of young people. There was already a pool of young people who could be encouraged to undertake new activities. Secondly, much of the work with the young people was undertaken by a Supervisor at the Sports Centre who already had a relationship with the young people having been employed at the centre for 14 years. He was in a position to encourage the young people to try new things, already being trusted by them. It is clear that this intervention would not have been such a success, in terms of interest and participation, had it not been for the work of this individual. The success of this intervention clearly illustrates the need to access resources that already exist in a local community and to use them to best advantage. It also illustrates the central importance of local people, and the effect that their skills and knowledge can have if put to good use.

4.5 Supervision/Treatment of Offenders - Fairbridge Programme

Analysis of burglary data, prior to the start of the project, revealed that there was a considerable problem with a number of young people in the area. It emerged that a significant number of burglaries in the target area had been committed by a relatively small group of 23 young people. For this reason it was deemed appropriate to target one of the interventions specifically at these troublesome offenders. The SDP managers realised that this would not be an easy task, but felt that it was worth a serious attempt. A partnership was formed whereby the Fairbridge organisation in Middlesbrough was paid in exchange for providing places for 12 young offenders on their personal development course. The aim of the course is to encourage active learning in order to raise awareness and challenge attitudes, values and behaviour. Fairbridge works with disadvantaged young people from 14 to 25 years of age. Following completion of the course each young person is entitled to access a range of further courses and obtain support from Fairbridge until the age of 25. It was clear that a good deal of

work would be required in order to recruit young offenders onto the course and, once again, the project utilised the skills and experience of the Sports Centre Supervisor, who was contracted at an hourly rate to undertake outreach work with the young people in his spare time (a list was drawn up by the police in order that prolific young offenders could be targeted).

Despite the difficulties of engaging with and recruiting young offenders on to the scheme, which the SDP managers had anticipated as a potential problem, this intervention began remarkably well. By the end of June 1999, five young offenders had been recruited, attended and successfully completed Fairbridge's personal development course. Three young people successfully completed Fairbridge between 19-26 May 1999 and two from 20-30 June 1999 which was seen as a major accomplishment. The course is of 8 days duration and works towards improving self-esteem and developing the skills necessary for adult life by means of challenging outdoor activities and ongoing training and support. Young people attend for 6 hours on 6 days and visit the Lake District on a residential basis for two days.

A limited amount of follow-up data are available concerning the five attendees (up to February 2001). Following completion of the course one of the young people had no further contact with Fairbridge. Two applied to undertake a variety of other courses (e.g. Health and Safety, First Aid) but did not attend. On a more positive note, the two remaining young people applied for places on the *Spirit of Fairbridge* training ship based in Scotland and were accepted onto a ten-day course to learn sailing skills and working closely within a team. Unfortunately, the two young people concerned were found to be smoking cannabis and had to leave the ship. This incident attracted some very negative press attention from the *Hartlepool Mail* where the young people were branded 'a disgrace to Hartlepool[1]. The actions of the young men cannot be condoned, having broken the rules, to say nothing of the law and yet the condemnation can be seen as rather harsh given that the young men had shown themselves to be open to the idea of change by taking part in the Fairbridge course. What is also clear is that these young men had previously been heroin users and had, at that time, stopped using heroin, an action which must be viewed as positive.

In October 1999, following this incident, the intervention suffered a fatal setback when the Sports Centre Supervisor was forced to withdraw from undertaking any further outreach work. This was partly as a result of events described above and partly because he was being

accused by the local community of 'helping offenders' who were perceived as being rewarded for bad behaviour. As we have seen with regard to other interventions, problems arise when volunteers (albeit ones who are paid for their time) are the sole providers of essential roles. In the case of this intervention it meant that no further young offenders were recruited. Damage would also have been done by the negative press reaction to the young people described above.

These events were obviously deeply unfortunate for the project and resulted in the collapse of the intervention. This was distressing for the SDP managers and outreach worker who had invested so much time and effort in the intervention. However, there was early success, in terms of participation, which shows that interventions like this can work under the right circumstances. What we do not have is information regarding the behaviour of the young people following their participation in the scheme. Any change would, in any case, tend to occur over the longer term and would be unlikely to have a drastic effect upon short-term burglary rates. The important lessons of this intervention will be discussed in section 10 below.

4.6 Education and Awareness

The aim of this intervention was to mount a campaign to raise awareness of crime prevention and to educate local residents as to the measures they could take in order to reduce the likelihood of becoming victims of crime. All residents in the SDP were targeted by this campaign which consisted of a number of elements:

- A Family Fun Day was held at Belle Vue Sports Centre during July 1999 - this had a crime prevention theme.
- Community Safety Police Officers visited all three primary schools in the SDP and gave crime prevention presentations to over 1,000 pupils.
- A Crime Prevention Week was held in October 1999. Cleveland Police Force's crime prevention caravan was located in several different spots in the SDP, providing information on crime and community safety.
- Presentations were given to a variety of local groups by the RBI coordinators (senior citizens, PTAs, Townswomen's Guild, residents association) and aimed to provide basic advice about crime prevention.
- A Community Newsletter was produced by the RBI coordinators and delivered to all 3400 households on 4 occasions. This gave common-sense advice about community

safety e.g. to lock doors and windows at all times. It also gave information regarding the other interventions to encourage residents to use them e.g. the property marking service.

•2000 Community Safety information packs were handed out by the RBI coordinators - these contained a number of leaflets giving advice about protection against crime of various types.

•A number of articles appeared in the local press publicising the project. In the main, these were very positive and provided information about the various interventions.

This intervention was concerned with raising awareness of crime issues and educating residents regarding taking measures to prevent crime. Children were seen as being central to delivering the crime prevention message to parents and were given pencil cases printed with a simple message 'Lock your doors, even when you're in. Leave a light on, even when you're out.[1] It was felt that young children tend to take such messages seriously and would pass them on to parents and family members. Children were even told to nag their parents to convey the message that protection against burglary can be simply a matter of locking doors and windows.

The programme of education and awareness linked in closely with the other interventions and was used as a vehicle to publicise and promote them, as well as focusing on community safety advice itself. It particularly linked with the Community Development intervention, within which two part-time RBI coordinators were employed. As well as being responsible for community development on the project the two coordinators carried out a large proportion of the educational work.

4.7 Community Development

The aim of this intervention was to work with the community in order to increase the capacity of local people to respond to and prevent burglary. To achieve this aim, two RBI coordinators were employed. The project coordinators were both employed on a part-time basis (20 hours per week each) and had complementary employment histories. One was a long-term local resident and the other had experience of community development. The local residents were involved in interviewing and selecting the coordinators. Once employed, they were based in the Belle Vue Sports Centre, which acted, in practice, almost as a community centre.

The project managers believe that the employment of the burglary coordinators was a key to success for the project as a whole. The coordinators integrated well with the local community and this was partly due to their informal and relaxed attitude towards their role. They were independent of the local authority and were therefore not considered 'official' by the local residents. Furthermore, they were employed by Belle Vue Residents Association, line-managed by the Council's Community Safety Officer and paid through the Sports Centre. They reported to the Steering Group and they fed back information from that group to other members of the community. The coordinators were approachable and the fact that they were employed by the residents association gave the community a sense of ownership of the project.

The anti-burglary coordinators decided to work together on the project, rather than to divide their roles geographically between the two distinct areas of the SDP. They made this decision for several reasons: in order to be assured of their personal safety; they felt that residents may be reluctant to open their doors to a lone male; and they felt that it was necessary to plan their work and carry it out together for the sake of consistency and flow of information.

The anti-burglary coordinators were able to encourage and assist local people in forming 7 new Neighbourhood Watch groups. Due to difficulties with setting up such groups in the past (i.e. lack of interest) the coordinators chose to concentrate on small clusters of about six houses. In Rift House East some roads are quite long, making it impractical to try and include the whole street. The coordinators raised interest within the community by giving presentations to various groups within the community regarding crime prevention, community safety and personal safety. The coordinators chose to deliver the Newsletter themselves. This was an expensive use of their time but enabled them to interact with the local people and afforded them the opportunity to give common-sense advice, especially about the high number of opportunist burglaries. The coordinators also supported the formation of, and attended meetings held by Young Belle Vue in Action in order to support the young people, but they attended these fortnightly meetings alternately as they had no wish to impose adult views upon the young people concerned. A Fear of Crime survey was carried out by the coordinators, and the Belle Vue Residents Association delivered it to 500 homes that had had improved street lighting. The response to this survey was disappointing at only 12%. The coordinators succeeded, however, in establishing the Oxford Road East Residents' Association , which was one of the central aims of the project. Forty residents attended the first meeting and the establishment of this association was a major success.

The project coordinators took on a level of community development work beyond their remit as anti-burglary coordinators. For example, in October 1999, they became involved with a petition against drugs on the Belle Vue Estate. They felt it was appropriate to support this petition due to the links between drug use and crime (especially burglary). The petition coincided with a campaign in the *Hartlepool Mail* called 'Stop the Pushers' which provided a telephone number on which residents could give information on drug use/dealing to the police who then used the information to disrupt and target offenders. Although this campaign was Hartlepool-wide, it would seem likely that a number of those ultimately arrested and charged may have been committing burglaries within the SDP area. However, there are no data available to confirm or deny this view.

5. IMPACT OF THE PROJECT

5.1 Data Issues and Methodology

The following section outlines the nature of the data used for analysis (including problems with the data) as well as the methodology used to examine the effectiveness of various aspects of the project. Disaggregate crime data, for the period April 1997 - September 2001, were obtained from Cleveland Police. Since Hartlepool SDP was said to equate to a RAS area (or police beat), burglaries for the SDP were selected by RAS code. However for other parts of the analysis, (such as the areas near to alleygates, the division between Belle Vue and Rift House East and the buffer analysis), it was necessary to use GIS and the grid references of the offences to make the selection as described below.

Some problems were encountered in the disaggregate data supplied by Cleveland Police. Firstly there were problems relating to the poor reliability of the geographic coding of crime in the period before July 1999 when Cleveland Police improved their computer systems. For burglary the data were cleaned up to post-July 1999 standards, but this was not possible for other crime data. This means that reliable before and after data are available only for burglary. Figure 2 shows total crime in the SDP and in Hartlepool District 1 (HI) indexed to 100 at April 1997 in order to make the two areas comparable. It can be seen that in both areas there is an abrupt rise in crime other than burglary dwelling in July 1999 showing the extent of the pre-July 1999 undercounting. For this reason no crime shift analysis for Hartlepool SDP is possible.

Figure 2 Total Crime Increase at July 1999



The second problem relates to the beat coding of the pre-July 1999 data. Burglaries for the SDP were selected by beat while the more detailed analysis used geographic coordinates. As a result some minor anomalies have occurred.

The third issue is that the outcome figures in this report do not accord with those for Hartlepool in the Northern Consortium Report on the 21 SDPs. This is because, in order to maintain consistency with the other areas, the figures for the Cleveland PFA in this report have been aggregated from the disaggregate data supplied by Cleveland Police, while the main report uses figures supplied centrally by the Home Office.

The hot spots maps were produced using the disaggregate data and the Kemal Density Interpolation tool in the Crimestat programme, National Institute of Justice, Washington D.C.

The main analysis of outcomes uses burglary and other crime figures aggregated from the disaggregate data and compares the SDP with Cleveland Police Force Area (PFA), Hartlepool 1 Police District (Basic Command Unit or BCU) and with a comparison area. The latter was chosen due to its similarity to the SDP in terms of socioeconomic composition. It lies to the north of the town centre. In addition, a buffer zone was constructed between 0 and 600m around the SDP boundary. 600m was chosen to give approximately equal numbers of burglaries in the buffer and the SDP itself.

For target-specific interventions - alleygates, target hardening and plug-in timers - lists were drawn up of addresses protected and in close proximity. These were cross-matched with addresses of burglaries in the before and after periods. For repeat victimisation, repeats were

identified on the basis of repeat identical addresses. It was not generally considered whether the victims were the same. However a problem was found with multi-occupied dwellings. Where identical addresses were burgled more than once on the same day, it was found that these were different victims, an assumption made that the address was a multi-occupied dwelling and the burglary counted as one offence. There was, however, no way of identifying separate victims with identical multi-occupied addresses where the interval between burglaries was longer. Time from last repeat in days was calculated using the date reported.

It would have been interesting to undertake further analysis of the interventions involving young people, education and awareness and community development in order to assess the behavioural changes achieved. However this has proved impossible for a number of reasons, not least of which is the detailed level of data required in order to undertake such a task.

5.2 Changes in Patterns of Burglary

Figure 3 shows the more dispersed burglary pattern for the period 2 years after the SDP start, compared with the two years before, resulting from the reduction in burglary.

Figure 3 Burglaries Before and After the SDP Start (Base maps © Crown Copyright/database right 20(yy). An Ordnance Survey (Datacentre) supplied service)



Table 2 confirms that the density of the burglary pattern has reduced and the mean distance between burglary locations has increased. Although there is a slightly smaller nearest neighbour index in the after period, the difference between the before and after periods is not significant at the 95% level. Therefore clustering in the SDP as a whole has not reduced.

Table 2 Measures of Burglary Pattern Before and After SDP start

	Before	After
Sample size	423	319
Density of burglary per sq km	429	324
Mean nearest neighbour distance	16.44m	18.10m
Nearest neighbour index	0.6817	0.6518
Standard error	0.61m	0.81m

However Figure 4 shows that some concentrations of burglary have changed. The Oxford Road/Cornwall Street hotspot in the north west of the area has disappeared while the hotspot in the south east of the area appears to have moved westwards. A new hotspot has appeared at the southern end of Stockton Road. This is the result of 10 burglaries at one address which appears to be a block of flats owned by a housing association. The burglaries are spread over the whole two year "after" period and continue with 2 further incidents before September 2001.

Figure 4. Burglary Hotspots Before and After the SDP start



Table 3 outlines total burglaries for the two years before the scheme and the two years after.

Table 3 Yearly Burglary in SDP

	Burglary in the SDP
April 97 - March 98	223
April 98 - March 99	197
April 99 - March 00	154
April00-March01	162

Table 4 gives a comparative view on burglary outcomes. We use mean monthly burglaries to assess the relative significance of changes in the Hartlepool SDP in relation to the comparison area and buffer zone, the local BCU and the whole of Cleveland Police Force Area. We also use the variability of the monthly figures to estimate high and low limits to the difference between the before and after means. Thus in Hartlepool SDP there was an average of 17.5 burglaries per month in the two years before its start and 13.2 in the two years after. The difference, or gross change, was a reduction of 4 burglaries per month (ignoring rounding errors), which was a significant reduction at the 95% confidence level. The accumulated gross reduction in burglaries over the two years was 104. Removing the effect of the overall reduction of 11.6% in Cleveland's burglary rate lowers Hartlepool SDP's gross percentage

Table 4 Burglary Outcomes

		Mean monthly burglaries												Percentage change	
				Gross change					Net change						
** Months before/after		Before	After	Diff	Highest	Lowest	Sig	2-yr	Diff	Highest	Lowest	Sig	2-yr	Gross	Net
Cleveland PFA	24	704	622	-82	-39	-124	R	**-1959**	0	32	-32	ns	+0	-11.6	+0.0
Hartlepool Div 1	24	134	121	-12	-2	-23	R	**-294**	3	11	-4	ns	+78	-9.2	+2.4
Buffer 0-600m	24	16	12	-3	-1	-6	R	**-83**	-2	2	-5	ns	-39	-22.1	-10.5
Hartlepool SDP	24	18	13.2	-4	-1	-8	R	**-104**	-2	1	-5	ns	-55	-24.8	-13.2
Comparison Area	24	19	17	-2	1	-5	ns	**-50**	0	3	-3	ns	+3	-10.9	+0.7

** Evaluation period
24 = Apr 1997 - Mar 2001

Sig
● Sig increase at 95% confidence level
ns No sig change
R Sig reduction at 95% confidence level

2-yr = reduction over first 2 years
+ = increase, - = saving/reduction

reduction of 24.8% to a net reduction of 13.2%. This is equivalent to 2 burglaries less per month, or 55 less in total over the two years.

The comparison area in the north of the town fared less well. There the gross decrease was 10.9%, less than the Cleveland average and giving a net increase in burglary of 0.7% over the two years. There were therefore no savings in burglaries in the comparison area.

The buffer zone, on the other hand, had reductions in burglary similar to the SDP itself. If the primary impact of the interventions in the SDP was to displace burglary, then an increase in the buffer zone would be expected. That this is clearly not the case does not rule out displacement effects but does suggest that, at the very, least diffusion of benefits dominates the impact on surrounding areas. Table 5 takes this analysis a step further. It assumes that SDP and buffer zone are a closed system in which there are no other explanations for their differences. In this closed system, Hartlepool SDP had a gross reduction in burglary of 104. Of this, 49 were accounted for by Cleveland's overall reduction in burglary, leaving 55 to be explained by the SDP's interventions. The relative change between SDP and buffer, all other

Table 5 Breakdown of Hartlepool SDP Outcomes

	No of burglaries saved		
	First year	Second year	over 2 years
Gross Outcome	-56	-48	-104
Net Outcome	-38	-17	-55
Deterrence within SDP	-40	-4	-44
Displacement to buffer zone	2	-13	-11

things being equal, suggests a maximum of 11 burglaries displaced to the buffer zone, leaving 44 to be explained by the deterrent effect of interventions. In reality, such a closed system does not exist, so the figures must be seen as indicative.

Tables 5 and 6 also show that the impact of the interventions was greater during the first year after the scheme started - 38 net burglaries were saved compared to 17 in the second year. The first year saw an emphasis on deterrence within the SDP, and by corollary, diffusion of benefits, compared to the second year when displacement became more important. This connects well with the fact that, with the exception of some alleygates and youth diversionary work, most SDP activity was finished by December 2000. Indeed, the gross burglary figures for April to September 2001 seem to show an increase compared with previous years, perhaps indicating that the effects of the SDP have not been sustainable.

Table 6 Gross Burglary Figures April to September - Hartlepool SDP

	Gross Burglaries
1997	84
1998	106
1999	54
2000	60
2001	91

In terms of the impact on burglary figures, Hartlepool SDP has been very successful. Burglaries have been reduced by more than the Cleveland average, and the impacts have been to the benefit of not just residents of the SDP but also of the surrounding area as well. However the proximity of Hartlepooi's New Deal for Communities project in space as well as time makes a definitive attribution of benefits to SDP interventions much harder to claim.

53 **Interventions**

Where effects on burglary outcomes of individual interventions have been measurable, these are discussed below. For some interventions such as property marking, this was not possible because of incomplete information on the location of properties marked.

5.5.7 *The Effects ofAtteygating on Protected Properties*

Table 7 shows that the three groups of alleygates had different effects upon burglary rates in their local areas. The SDP gates installed in September 2000 stopped burglary altogether for the whole of the period for which we have data (up to September 2001). However, for the houses protected by the April New Deal alleygates and May 2001 SDP the situation is less clear. Closer examination of the burglary pattern for the September alleygates shows that in fact there were no burglaries to the properties in question after December 1999, even though the gates were not installed until September 2000. It is thought that the reduction can be attributed to the alleygating scheme given that the gates were first publicised in January 2000. It therefore seems that even the announcement of such a scheme can have an impact on burglary rates.

Table 7 Houses Protected by Alleygates

	Before Gates	After Gates
Gates installed in:	Burglaries per Month	Burglaries per Month
Sept 2000	0.5	0
April 2001	0.4	0.2
May 2001	1.3	2.0

The one burglary to occur within the properties protected by the New Deal gates (April 2001) may have occurred during installation rather than after it, as we cannot be certain about the exact installation date. However, data are available only for 6 months following the installation and there have been other periods during which there were no burglaries in the same area, such as that between August 1998 and May 1999. Therefore, it is not possible to be confident that the reduction in burglaries was actually due to the gates.

Although the second set of SDP alleygates are regarded as having been installed in May, it is not known how long the installation actually took. One of the burglaries in the "after" period was in May, and 5 were in June. Again, bearing in mind the shortness of the after period, these figures may be unreliable.

5.3.2 The Effects of Alley-gating on Nearby Properties

It is clear from Table 8 that alleygates have impacts on residents near to as well as those directly protected. Again there are problems with the shortness of the after period and with the exactness of completion dates, but the overall pattern of reduction is very similar to, if not as strong as, in Table 7.

Table 8 Area Near to Alleygates

	Before Gates	After Gates
Gates installed in:	Rate per Month	Rate per Month
Sept 2000	1.0	0.5
April 2001	0.9	0.5
May 2001	1.9	3.2

5.3.3 MO in Alley gated Areas

Before the areas were alleygated, between 50 and 75% of burglaries were undertaken following entry by the rear of properties. The proportion of burglaries indicating approach by an alley ranged from under a quarter to one third. Table 9 shows the monthly average MO figures before and after the installation of the alleygates. After the alleygates were installed, rear entry became less frequent but continued to be the MO for 70% of those burglaries which did occur after the September and April alleygates. For the May alleygates the percentage was only 40%. However, four of the burglaries occurring after May were where the approach was via the yard, which still implies a rear entry. Following installation of the gates, approach by alley was generally less common.

Table 9 MO in Alleygated Areas

	Monthly average			
	Rear Entry		Approach by Alley	
	Before	After	Before	After
Sept 2000 Protected	0.3	0	0.1	**0**
Sept 2000 Near	0.5	0.2	0.2	**0**
April 2001 Protected	0.3	0.2	0.1	**0.2**
April 2001 Near	0.6	0.5	0.2	**0.2**
May 2001 Protected	1.0	0.8	0.4	**0.2**
May 2001 Near	1.3	1.2	0.6	**0.4**

5.3.4 Overall Effects of Alleygates

It can be seen from the above that, although the effect on burglary is not always clear, there were definite benefits from the alleygates intervention. The disappearance of the hotspotf in the Oxford Road/Cornwall Street area noted at paragraph 5.2 can be attributed to the September alleygates. From the September alleygates protected houses alone there has been a saving of 6 burglaries, which is one quarter the number that the SDP as a whole needed to save to break even on cost (see Section 7 below). If the properties near to the September alleygates are included, another 3 burglaries were saved.

5.3.5 The Effects of Target Hardening

Target hardening was to be offered to residents of the SDP on the basis of repeat victimisation. However, as Table 10 shows, it was also offered to a household that had been

victimised once and to a household that had not been burgled at all. There is no reason given for these offers having been made. Of the remainder of offers there appears to be no clear relationship between the number of repeat victimisations and take up of the offer of target hardening.

The houses which were offered target hardening but were either unoccupied, not contactable or refused it did not suffer burglary after the offer date. However, two of the 15 repeat

Table 10 Households Offered Target Hardening

	No contact/refused	Implemented
Not victimized prior to offer	0	1
Victimised once prior to offer	1	0
Victimised twice prior to offer	7	13
Victimised three times prior to offer	2	2
Victimised twice between offer and implementation	0	1
Victimised after implementation	0	2

victims which accepted the target hardening were burgled after the implementation date. Both had been victims 3 times prior to the offer date and one also suffered two burglaries between the offer date and the implementation. This would seem to suggest that the target hardening programme was not successful in preventing repeat burglary, even for the limited number of properties which took it up. However it could be argued that the fact that only two of the 24 repeat victims suffered further burglary was an achievement. Publicity would advertise protection being given to repeat victims but burglars would not be aware of which victims took up the offer, or when, and would therefore avoid returning to the same address. In effect there would be a diffusion of benefits to all victims whether or not they accepted the offer of target hardening. This is supported by the reduction in repeat victimization described in section 5.4.

5.3.6 ***The Effects of Plug-In Timers***

Table 11 below suggests a measure of success for the plug in timers in that the reduction in burglary to houses with timers was more than 1.5 times that of the SDP generally. In the 14 months after the issue of the timers a total of 5 burglaries were saved, contributing to the 23 required for the project to break even on cost (see Section 7 below).

Table 11 Houses with Plug In Timers: Before and After Burglary Rates

	Before Rate per Month	After Rate per Month	% Reduction (numbers)
Addresses with Timers	1.7	1.3	37
Whole SDP	15.2	13.9	22

5.4 Reduction of Repeat Victimisation

One of the targets of the SDP was to reduce repeat victimisation. The burglary data were examined using the method previously described to assess the success of this aim. However, use of victimisation of repeat addresses will inevitably emphasise the later period, since the after period provides a longer timescale for calculation of repeats. As the known patterns of repeat burglary show that revictimisation is more likely within a short period of the first offence, we can control the length of time for repeats to 90 days. Table 12 shows that, in terms of the SDP, these decreased by a larger percentage than for Hartlepool Police District 1, indicating some success for the SDP in meeting this target.

Table 12 Repeat Burglary Addresses Two Years Before/Two Years After

	Average per Quarter		
	Two Years Before	Two Years After	% Change
SDP Repeats (last offence within 90 days)	4.75	3.5	-26.3
BCU-SDP Repeats (last offence within 90 days)	27.1	23.0	-15.2

Figure 5 shows the pattern of repeats in which the previous offence was within 90 days. It is apparent that there are considerable fluctuations, in both the BCU and the SDP but particularly in the latter. Apart from the high figure in the quarter ending December 1999, repeat victimization is generally low in the active period of the SDP but there is evidence of higher levels in later months, possibly indicating that the effect of the SDP has been short lived.



Figure 5. Repeats - Last Offence Within 90 Days by Quarter

5.5 Other Crime Outcomes

Crime generally has increased between the two years before and after the SDP start. This is mainly a reflection of the data problems with other crime data explained elsewhere in this report rather than a real increase in crime. However, it distorts the results for most categories of crime. Therefore it is only meaningful to consider the changes in the SDP relative to those in the other areas. As can be seen in Table 13 the SDP shows reductions in burglary other and shoptheft while the other areas show increases. For all crime other than burglary dwelling, theft from vehicle and theft from person the SDP shows a smaller increase than the other areas. This suggests that although primarily targeted at burglary the SDP is having a beneficial effect in reducing crime generally in the area.

The community development side of the project - new Neighbourhood Watch groups and the project coordinators - and the education and awareness intervention may have contributed to this. The burglary other offences were examined to see if the reduction could be attributed to a drop in burglary of sheds and garages resulting from alleygates. However it was found that while burglary other at private addresses fell by 37%, the decrease for commercial addresses was 52%. Whilst the project was aimed at private addresses, it is also likely to have had benefits for the commercial sector as well.

	Before	After	% Change
All Crime Less Burglary Dwelling			
SDP	681	1211	+78
Comparison	625	1774	+184
BCU-SDP	6229	16798	+170
PFA-SDP	33289	104804	+124
Burglary Other			
SDP	223	131	-41
Comparison	143	173	+21
BCU-SDP	1596	2084	+31
PFA-SDP	9239	15186	+64
Theft from Person			
SDP	2	6	+200
Comparison	3	24	+700
BCU-SDP	4	163	+3975
PFA-SDP	27	1226	+4441
Theft from Vehicle			
SDP	114	134	+18
Comparison	134	285	+113
BCU-SDP	1190	2622	+120
PFA-SDP	7560	16518	+118
Theft from Shop			
SDP	228	211	-7
Comparison	152	184	+21
BCU-SDP	2169	2675	+23
PFA-SDP	8358	12085	+45

Table 13 Crimes Other than Burglary Dwelling Before and After SDP Start: SDP Compared to Other Areas

6. ASSESSMENT OF ACHIEVEMENTS

At the beginning of the project in Hartlepool the managers set a number of goals by which they would measure the success of the project. The goals and an assessment of the outcomes are outlined below.

i) To produce a 25% reduction in burglary of dwellings:

The project resulted in a 24.76% gross reduction in burglary when comparing the two years before the project with the two years after.

ii) To increase the membership of the existing Belle Vue Residents' Association by ten:
This was achieved during the life of the project - there is, however, no specific date because the number attending meetings fluctuates. The Chair believes at least ten new members attend most meetings.

iii) To establish a new Residents Association in the Rift House Area:
This was achieved in April 2000.

iv) To increase the number of Neighbourhood Watch Schemes in the target area by five:
This was achieved during the life of the project - 5 new schemes were set up during December 1999 and 2 more began between April and June 2000 (4 of these in were Belle Vue and 3 in Rift House East).

v) To send up to 12 young offenders on the Fairbridge Scheme:
This was partially achieved - 5 young people completed the scheme during May and June 1999.

vi) To promote good citizenship and an awareness of crime among young people living in Belle Vue and Rift House East:
A variety of activities took place during the life of the project which worked towards this aim - presentations in schools; evening sessions with young people (8-12 years and 13-17 years) on crime awareness/good citizenship theme; activity events for young people (organised by the police and the supervisor from the Sports Centre); formation of Young Belle Vue in Action.

vii) To raise awareness of crime prevention among residents in the target area:
A number of aspects of the project worked towards this aim - four issues of the Community newsletter were delivered to every home in the SDP; Crime Prevention Fun Day was held; Crime Prevention Week was held; presentations on community safety were given to local groups; 2000 leaflet packs were distributed; RBI coordinators were employed to work with the local community.

7. COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROJECT

The Hartlepool SDP inputs had a total cash value of £78,953. Table 14 summarises the breakdown of these costs by intervention into crude input costs, modelled[1] costs and number of burglaries to be saved in order for each intervention to break even[2]. In terms of crude input costs, alleygating and diversionary youth work were the most costly interventions (each accounting for 26%), followed by property marking and target hardening (accounting for 15% and 12% respectively). Education and awareness, community development and Fairbridge accounted for 9%, 7% and 5% of the costs. Once these costs were modelled it became apparent that the diversionary youth work was the most costly intervention (34%), due to the high running costs in terms of personnel and overheads. Property marking accounted for 14% of costs, due to the expense of purchasing the kits themselves and the personnel-intensive nature of running the intervention. Target hardening and alleygates each accounted for 11% of modelled costs due to the fact that the equipment will be in use long after the end of the

Table 14 Crude and Modelled Input Costs and Breakeven Outcomes

Intervention	Crude Input Costs	Modelled Costs	Breakeven Outcomes
Bid Preparation	£2,450	£2,379	0
Alleygating	£20,345	£5,797	3
Target Hardening	£8,990	£5,844	2
Property Marking	£11,412	£7,505	8
Diversionary Schemes	£19,908	£18,230	2
Supervision of Offenders	£3,751	£3,553	2
Education and Awareness	£6,887	£5,641	3
Community Development	£5,209	£4,826	3
Total	£78,953	£53,776	23

[1] Modelled costs account for a) changes in costs by using net costs at April 1999 prices and b) the expected life of the assets by using an amortised value and the time period of the intervention.

[2] The point at which the value of modelled costs equals the value of burglaries prevented.

project. Education and awareness and community development accounted for 11% and 9% of modelled costs. The Fairbridge Scheme was the least costly intervention (7%) due to the fact that it was an existing scheme and therefore no set-up costs were incurred.

The total modelled costs have a value of £53,776. If it is assumed that each burglary costs an average of £2,300 (Brand and Price, 2000) the Hartlepool SDP needed to save a total of 23 burglaries in order to break even on modelled costs. In fact, the SDP saved 55 burglaries which have a cash value of £118,030. This means that the SDP covered not only its modelled costs, but also its crude input costs *and* produced net benefits of £64,254. As we have already seen, alleygating needed to save 3 burglaries to break even. In fact it saved 9, and therefore produced net benefits of 6 saved burglaries. Similarly, target hardening needed to save 2 burglaries and the plug-in timers alone saved 5, producing net benefits of 3 saved burglaries. It is therefore clear that Hartlepool, (with a cost benefit ratio of 2.19) was very cost beneficial.

8. KEY STRENGTHS OF THE PROJECT

- *Utilization of existing resources*

  Belle Vue Residents' Association was involved from the start of the project which meant that the local community had a sense of ownership of the project from the beginning; the Belle Vue Sports Centre already existed as a focal point for some of the young people in the area - this was encouraged and utilised as part of the interventions targeting young people and diverting them away from crime; recognition was given early in the project to the fact that people are resources e.g. the Sports Centre Supervisor was recognised as being an important figure in the local community in terms of encouraging young people to take up worthy pursuits - using him as a resource resulted in the success of the diversionary activities for young people and the early success of the Fairbridge Programme although this later came to a halt due to adverse publicity. Utilization of existing resources is also important when considering the costs of an intervention. For example, the cost of the Fairbridge Scheme was relatively low given that the project made use of an existing service, thereby avoiding the considerable set-up costs of providing a new scheme.

- *Carefully selected and achievable targets*

  The targets selected were appropriate to the amount of investment made within the SDP. They were also appropriate to the needs of the area and were neither overly-

ambitious nor overly simplistic. They attempted to deal with the burglary problem from a variety of angles and approaches.

- ***Project management***

  The two SDP managers developed a very strong working relationship and remained closely involved with the interventions throughout the life of the project. They provided strong but non-authoritarian leadership, but could not have done so without the investment of a great deal of time and energy. They were prepared to invest this amount of time and energy for the project, although it had to be alongside other duties. In turn, the lessons learned from this project have been carried forward onto bids for further funds.

- ***Anti-burglary coordinators***

  The two project employees worked together well and had a range of complementary skills. A crucial part of their accessibility was that they were based at the Sports Centre which acted almost as a community centre or drop-in centre, where they could be visited by local residents. Both workers were accessible and approachable on an informal basis. Those involved with the project felt that this role could have been given more weight had there been a dedicated project manager on the team who would have had sole responsibility for running the project. There were insufficient funds available for such a role on this particular project.

- ***Steering committee***

  There was a strong Steering Committee that met every 6 weeks to review and monitor progress of the project. It was seen as a crucial element of this monitoring process that information gathered and decisions made should be fed back into the local community via the anti-burglary coordinators.

- ***Involvement of the local community***

  Throughout this project it was seen as crucially important to have the backing of the local community. This was possible, in the first instance, due to the fact that one residents association already existed and so could be involved in planning the interventions. Considerable work was then undertaken in order to develop a further residents association in an area where no such interest had previously been shown.

9. KEY BENEFITS OF THE PROJECT

The Belle Vue Estate, and to a lesser extent, Rift House East, were high burglary areas. They were frequently high priority areas for the police and used up a good deal of police time and resources. Following the RBI, the SDP is no longer viewed as a high priority area in terms of burglary and other areas of Hartlepool give more cause for concern. Levels of disorder have also reduced and local people feel that the behaviour of some of the area's young people has improved. This may be as a result of the work that was undertaken with young people. Local police certainly feel that the work with young people was beneficial and are continuing to remain involved with them via activities wherever possible, although this is necessarily more limited given that the RBI funding has been exhausted. Ideas developed on the RBI will, however, be taken forward where new funding opportunities become available.

The improvements in feelings of safety and security on the Belle Vue Estate have resulted in improvements in the reputation of the area. Prior to the RBI, Belle Vue was seen as an area in which nobody wished to live and consequently the housing associations had some difficulty finding tenants for empty houses. Following the RBI the area is seen as very much improved. Housing associations now have no empty properties and there is actually a waiting list to obtain a house in the area as it is seen as a desirable place to live.

The RBI project encouraged active interest from the local community in an area where this was previously not possible. The anti-burglary coordinators worked hard with the residents of Rift House East to establish a new residents association. This association was established in April 2000 and has resulted in much closer working with the police in order to exchange information and reduce crime in the area. This new association has already had positive spin-offs in that the members were able to have close involvement with bidding for funds from the New Deal for Communities.

Several lessons were learned regarding the installation of alleygates. Residents seemed to like them due to increased feelings of safety and security, however, they do pose problems for the local council. In terms of legal issues, the gates in Hartlepool were erected after obtaining orders to close the alleys temporarily. Such orders need to be renewed after 18 months if the residents wish the gates to remain. The use of such orders means that the alleys remain part of the highway and the council still has responsibility for them. Had permanent orders been obtained, the residents would have become liable for the alleys, an idea which proved to be unpopular amongst the residents. It would seem that some of the gates in Hartlepool posed

more problems than they have elsewhere due to the fact that the alleyways provide vehicular as well as pedestrian access, making the issues more complex than those pertaining to ordinary walk-through alleys. Successful use of the alleys following gating seems to depend upon how residents view the space. If they view the space positively then they will use it constructively e.g. as a safe area in which children can play. If they view the space negatively, then it can simply become a dumping ground for rubbish and can cause difficulties for the local council. Experiences in Hartlepool have been varied, but on the whole, the gates have been viewed positively once teething problems have been ironed out (e.g. problems over who should be responsible for issuing keys, who had entitlement to keys etc).

10. MAIN PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

The main problem encountered on the project was that of disinterest and apathy amongst a section of the local residents which led to disappointing outcomes for some of the interventions. Key groups of residents were very keen on becoming involved with the project and maximising its benefits, but others could not be engaged. There was an assumption made at the start of the project that residents who were offered free security upgrades and/or property marking would automatically accept it. This proved not to be the case regarding both property marking (offered to all properties in Rift House East) and target hardening (offered to repeat burglary victims) which proved disappointing interventions in terms of take-up.

This lack of interest links in with the second key problem encountered, the use of volunteers to carry out essential project work. In terms of property marking, the service was carried out by a volunteer group who encountered an enormous amount of disinterest on the doorstep and eventually became disheartened. The fact that they were volunteers meant that they were able to walk away from the project, which was deeply unfortunate both for the project itself, and for the organisation to which they belonged. Had these volunteers been contracted by the project they would have had to remain with the intervention and perhaps try other methods of gaining people's interest and encouraging them to take advantage of the service on offer. This problem also applies to the Fairbridge Programme for offenders, the outreach work for which was carried out by a Supervisor from the Sports Centre on a voluntary basis. This work was originally very successful and five young people were recruited onto the scheme. However, both adverse publicity in the newspaper and adverse reactions to the young people from some of the local residents resulted in the outreach worker withdrawing his services which meant

that no further young people were recruited. Had this work been carried out by a contracted worker, it is possible that the intervention may have continued. However, even a contracted worker may have found it impossible to continue in the face of such adverse reactions.

There is a tendency to think of 'the local community' as a homogeneous group, with similar interests and similar problems, simply by virtue of the fact that they live in the same area. What is clear from the experiences of those involved with this project is that residents of a locality cannot be grouped together in such a way as there can be sets of competing interests acting in any locality. This particular project undoubtedly made progress in terms of community cohesion and this is evidenced by the fact that a new residents association was formed, as well as a group for young people and several new Neighbourhood Watch schemes. However, the project also left some of the residents of Belle Vue feeling less than happy. They felt that because they had existed as a group before the start of the project, less time and effort had gone into working with them than with the residents of Rift House East. This was exacerbated by the fact that they had been included in the planning and bidding stage of the project and therefore expectations had been raised. They felt particularly let-down by the RBI coordinators, whom they had been involved in interviewing and employing. It is clearly important for such schemes to access groups of residents and foster a sense of community, but it is also vital to work with the reality in such areas and appreciate that there may be groups of residents with competing interests. An understanding of the dynamics in any given community is an essential precursor if such projects are to have any success.

11. CONCLUSIONS

Hartlepool is in many ways an exemplary project. It was well-planned and implemented. Targets were carefully selected and appropriate to the area's needs. There was strong but not authoritarian leadership, backed by a supportive steering group with good community involvement. Effort was made to overcome difficulties and set-backs and the lessons learned have been carried forward into successor activities. The project was successful in meeting its own target to reduce burglary by 25%. It more than achieved a break-even in terms of benefits versus costs, indeed benefits were more than double costs. The apparent modesty of it aims conceals the extent of its achievements.

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Hartlepool Case Study - Addendum

1. Introduction

The Hartlepool Case Study was carried out under the evaluation of the Reducing Burglary Initiative and was completed by the end of that evaluation using data to September 2001. Publication of the Case Study was delayed until after that of the more general findings of the RBI with the result that it has been possible to revisit the study and examine the progress of the SDP area a further two years down the line. Although it would have been interesting to revisit the effects of interventions involving young people, education and awareness and community development in order to assess the behavioural changes achieved, various reasons including lack of resources made this impossible. The effect on burglary in the area is, however, assessed by quantitative analysis of a further two years of burglary data supplied by Cleveland Police to September 2003 for the police Basic Command Unit (BCU) in which the project is situated. The data permit examination of further changes in burglary in the SDP as a whole, of these changes in relation to the wider context and detailed analysis of patterns in relation to some of the individual interventions.

2. Burglary Reduction

The data show clearly that the reduction in the raw burglary figures in the area continued in the further two years as shown in Table 1. The numbers of burglaries in the SDP reduce from around 200 in the two years before the project start to 145 in the most recent complete year for which data are available.

Table 1 Yearly Burglary in SDP

	Burglary in the SDP
April 97 - March 98	223
April 98 - March 99	197
April 99 - March 00	154
April 00-March01	162
April 01 -March 02	159
April 02 - March 03	145

Table 2 repeats the comparative analysis of burglary outcomes carried out for the case study, assessing the relative significance of changes in Hartlepool SDP in relation to the comparison

area, buffer zone, local BCU and whole of Cleveland Police Force Area between the period 2 years before the SDP start and the period 3 to 4 years afterwards. The variance in the monthly figures is used to estimate high and low limits to the difference between the before and after means. Since only annual and not monthly figures have been available for Cleveland PFA for this later analysis no high and low estimates have been able to be calculated for the PFA. In Hartlepool in the period 3-4 years after the SDP start there was an average of 12.6 burglaries showing a continued fall since the 13.2 average in the first 2 years after. The difference or gross change was a reduction of 5 burglaries per month, again a slightly greater reduction than that of 4 in the first two years. This was a significant reduction at the 95% confidence level.

Table 2 Burglary outcomes

** Months before/after		Mean monthly burglaries: Before	After 2	Gross change: Biff	High est	Low est	Sis	2-yr	Net change: DifT	High est	Low est	Sig	2-yr	Percentage change: Gross	Net
Cleveland PFA	24	704	648	-55	NA	NA	NA	-1329	0	NA	NA	NA	+0	-7.9	+0.0
Hartlepool Division 1	24	134	116	-17	-7	-28	[illegible]	-419	-7	+0	-14	ns	-167	-13.1	-5.2
Buffer Total 0-600m	24	16	11	-5	-2	-7	[illegible]	-113	-3	-0	-7	[illegible]	-83	-30.1	-22.3
Hartlepool SDP	24	18	12.6	-5	-2	-8	[illegible]	-116	-3	-0	-7	[illegible]	-83	-27.6	-19.7
Comparison area	24	19	21	2	4	-1	ns	+36	3	6	+0	[illegible]	+72	+7.9	+15.7

** Evaluation period

24= Apr 1997-Mar 2003

Sig [illegible] Sig increase at 95% confidence level

ns No sig change

[illegible] Sig reduction at 95% confidence level

2-yr = reduction 2001-3 compared with 1997-99

+ = increase, - = saving/reduction

The gross burglary reduction for the period 2001-2003 is 116 which is reduced to a net reduction of 83 with the removal of the effect of the Cleveland PFA reduction of 7.9%. The net reduction in burglary is now 19.7 compared with 13.2 in the first two years after. The police district in which the SDP is situated (the BCU) by comparison had a net reduction of only 5.2. The comparison area showed a worsening picture with a gross burglary increase of 7.9 in the face of a Cleveland average decrease and a net increase of 15.7 compared with a gross reduction and smaller net increase of 0.7 in the first analysis. The buffer zone on the

other hand had reductions in burglary slightly better than the SDP indicating that diffusion of benefits is still more important than displacement in effect on the surrounding area. In the hypothetical closed SDP system with no other explanations for burglary differences, Table 3 shows that the gross reduction of 104 in the first 2 year period has increased to 220 over the 4 years since the SDP start. Of the 220, 82 were accounted for by the Cleveland PFA reduction leaving 138 to be explained by the SDP interventions. The relative change between the SDP and the buffer is after four years zero, so that the 138 may all be attributed to the effect of the interventions. However this can only be indicative as it is very likely that there have been other activities in the area especially in the time which has now elapsed.

Table 3 Breakdown of Hartlepool SDP Outcomes

	Number of burglaries saved					
	First year	2nd year	Over first 2 years	3rd year	4th year	Over 4 years
Gross outcome	-56	-48	-104	-51	-65	-220
Net outcome	-38	-17	-55	-46	-37	-138
Deterrence within SDP	-40	-4	-44	-64	-30	-138
Displacement to buffer zone	2	-13	-11	+18	-7	0

Table 3 also shows that the falling off of the effect of SDP interventions after the initial large reduction in the first has not continued and that the doubts about the sustainability of SDP effects felt at the time of the first analysis have not been justified. The third and fourth years showed reductions larger or of the same order as the first year. There was a particularly large diffusion of benefits to the buffer zone in the third year.

3. Changes in Patterns of burglary

Table 4 shows that the density of the burglary pattern has continued to reduce and the mean distance between burglary locations to increase. The reduction in the nearest neighbour index in the first 2 years after the SDP start has reverted although these changes are not significant at the 95% level. Clustering in the SDP as a whole has not therefore changed.

Table 4 Measures of Burglary Pattern Before and After SDP start

	Before	1st 2 years after 1999-2001	Next 2 years after 2001-2003
Sample size	423	319	304
Density of burglary per sq km	429	324	309
Mean nearest neighbour distance	16.44m	18.10m	19.52m
Nearest neighbour index	0.6817	0.6518	0.6862
Standard error	0.61m	0.81m	0.85m

However Fig 1 shows that the concentrations of burglary have undergone further changes. The original hotspot in the west of the Oxford Road / Cornwall Street block has not reappeared but the hot spot in the south west caused by repeat victimisation in the first two years after has disappeared. The hotspot in the south east common to all three periods has intensified and a new hot spot has appeared in the middle north Harrow Street, Eton Street and Richmond Street areas. The former includes streets alleygated in May 2001 and is discussed in more detail later in this report. The latter is in the Cornwall Street / Oxford Road block immediately east of the streets which were alleygated and may be the result of displacement from those streets.

Fig 1. Burglary hotspots



4. Reduction of repeat victimisation

Table 5 shows that repeat victimisation within a 90 day period has continued to decrease in the SDP which showed a lesser rate in the second two year period after the SDP start even than the first. Hartlepool Police District 1 on the other hand has shown a slight rise hi repeat victimisation in the second period. Over the entire four year period since the SDP start, repeat victimisation has been reduced in the SDP by two and a half times the amount of the BCU.

Table 5. Repeat burglary addresses

	Average per Quarter Two Years Before	Two Years After	% Change	Average per quarter Next 2 years	Whole 4 years	% Change 4 years
SDP Repeats (last offence within 90 days)	4.75	3.5	-26.3	2.9	3.2	-32.9
BCU-SDP Repeats (last offence within 90 days)	27.1	23.0	-15.2	24.5	23.9	-12.8

Figure 2 shows that fluctuations continue in repeat victimisation but makes clear that the trend is much more favourable in the SDP that in the BCU.

Figure 2 Repeat victimisation



5. The effects of Alley gating

Table 6 shows that the alleygates installed in September 2000 have continued to be effective in preventing burglary to protected properties. Although the complete prevention in year 1 has not been maintained, burglary levels are still less than pre installation. The alleygates installed in May 2001 showed no reduction in the first year but thereafter a gradual improvement. Taking into account a possible seasonal effect, burglaries for the equivalent May to September periods in these protected properties show a fall in from 10 in the first year, through 7 in the second and 3 in the third. The New Deal alleygates installed in April 2001 appear to have been less successful, reducing burglary initially but with a large increase in year 3. The first six months of year 1 and year 2 show only one burglary each but in the first 6 months of year 3 there were 8 burglaries. Comment from the NDC Community Safety Manager has suggested that the reason for the comparative lack of success of these alleygates may be that this early win scheme, unlike the SDP alleygates, was not based on prior analysis of the burglary problem but to show the potential of New Deal funding. The areas near to the alleygates show a similar pattern to the protected properties with areas near to both September and May NDC alleygates showing evidence of a diffusion of benefits (Table 7). The New Deal alleygates area shows a large increase in year three like the protected properties.

Table 6 Houses protected by alleygates

	Burglaries per month			
Gates installed in:	Before	1st year after	2nd year after	3rd year after
Sept 2000	0.5	0	0.1	0.3
April 2001	0.4	0.1	0.2	1.3*
May 2001	1.3	1.3	0.8	0.6**

* 6 months only
** 5 months only

Table 7 Area near to alleygates

	Average burglaries per month			
Gates installed in:	Before alleygates	1st year after	2nd year after	3rd year after
Sept 2000	1.0	**0.5**	0.2	0.7
April 2001	0.9	**0.3**	0.2	1.7*
May 2001	1.9	**2.5**	1.8	1.2**

* 6 months only
** 5 months only

Table 8 shows the monthly averages of rear entry and approach by alley for burglaries of properties protected by or near to the alleygates. Where burglaries do occur in these properties, rear entry and approach by alley are still important. One explanation is that, as stated by the Hartlepool Community Safety Manager in interview, there is evidence that burglaries are being committed by local residents who have access through the alleygates and that some fluctuations in rear entry can be related to offenders' confinement in and release from prison. Rear entry increased in protected properties from 48% before installation to 59% over the whole after period and approach by alley from 20% to 28%. However the May alleygates properties, which account for 67% of the rear entry in protected properties, are showing a year on year improvement.

Table 8 MO in Alleygated areas

	Monthly averages							
	Rear Entry				Approach by Alley			
	before	1st year after	'jnd year after	3rd year after	before	1st year after	2nd year after	3rd year after
Sept 2000 Protected	0.3	0	0	0.2	0.1	0	0	0.2
Sept 2000 Near	0.5	0.3	0	0.5	0.2	0	0	0.4
April 2001 Protected	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.3*	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2*
April 2001 Near	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.4*	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3*
May 2001 Protected	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.4**	0.4	0.3	0.3	0**
May 2001 Near	1.3	1.3	1	0.8**	0.6	0.7	0.3	0**

* 3rd year after period is only 6 months

** 3rd year after period is only 3 months

The benefits of the alleygates have continued to be felt in the SDP. Considering the properties protected by September alleygates over three years 9 burglaries have been saved with a further 20 in nearby properties. This intervention alone therefore covers the cost of the whole SDP after 3 years, hi the two complete years for which data is held, the May alleygates have saved 6 burglaries in protected properties although the nearby area has suffered 5 additional burglaries.

6. The effects of target hardening

Target hardening took two forms, locks and bolts offered to repeat victims and sale of plug in timers. Table 9 shows that, of the 24 repeat victims offered target hardening, for both target hardened properties and those who refused target hardening one third were subsequently burgled and that this intervention was therefore not effective.

Table 9 Repeat victimised households offered target hardening

	No contact/refused	Implemented
Number of RV properties	9	15
Victimised after	3	5

On the other hand, as shown by Table 10, although the effects of the plug in timers were felt more in the immediate months after the intervention than later, even in the fourth year the rate is marginally less than that of the before period (1.7).

Table 10 Houses with plug in timers

	Rates per month			
	1st year after	2nd year after	3rd year after	4th year after
Addresses with plug in timers	1 .	1.3	1.6	1.5

Table 11 shows a comparison of burglary reduction between the addresses with plug in timers and the SDP as a whole. In the first two years after the intervention the reduction in addresses with plug in timers is three times that of the rest of the SDP but for the whole period for which data are available the difference is reduced. However these addresses still have had a greater reduction in likelihood of being burgled than the SDP generally and in total 15 burglaries have been saved.

Table 11 Reduction in burglary- plug in timers

	Percentage reduction in monthly burglary rate	
	First 2 years after	Whole after period (47 months)
Addresses with plug in timers	32	19
Whole SDP	10	15

7. Summary and Conclusion

Hartlepool SDP can show evidence of continuation of its initial success, reducing burglary within the area by more than the Cleveland average and by three times the reduction in the BCU. The immediate surroundings also have benefited. Inevitably, in the time since the SDP start there have been other crime reduction activities in Hartlepool, both generally and in the immediate area. For example, there is now a police burglary reduction officer whose sole purpose is burglary work. Hartlepool Council has been responsible for alleygating 120 streets in the town centre as well as certain streets elsewhere including at least one in the SDP area. New Deal for Communities began towards the end of the first two year after period in an area overlapping the part of the SDP with the highest burglary problem and also the comparison area. New Deal has funded a wide range of interventions including large numbers of alleygates, a Dordrecht project, drugs outreach, anti-social behaviour project, wardens and youth diversionary activities as well as a major housing revival scheme. However most of these are recent and are likely to have contributed to the SDP burglary reduction only in the final year of the extended analysis period. Apart from early wins alleygates in April 2001, NDC interventions were not in place until the financial year 2002/3 and figures for the whole NDC area show a burglary reduction only in 2003/4. It seems likely therefore that NDC activity will not have materially impacted on the continued reduction in burglary and that it is at least in part a long term effect of the RBI.

So why did Hartlepool not only succeed in reducing burglary where other SDPs did not but also sustain that reduction? One clear contributing factor may be the Community Development intervention which effectively began partnership working with the community by strengthening the Belle Vue Community Centre, developing the pre existing residents association, starting a second one, and starting Neighbourhood Watch Groups. This provided a valuable basis on which New Deal for Communities, itself a very community based programme, could build. The Hartlepool Community Safety Manager said

> "I think the RBI assisted in developing it. Because I think that when I came, just before we were putting the bid in for the RBI, I didn't think there was so much involvement with residents and the partnership working involving residents. The RBI sparked that, we thought that if we were going to go into the area we needed involvement from the residents. And I think having seen how it worked and the fact that the NDC came along and continued that."

There has also been a certain amount of stability in the area in terms of personnel. The Hartlepool Community Safety Manager is for example still the same and the same two individuals still work at the Belle Vue Community Centre. There has been a willingness to learn from the RBI experience. For example the alleygates implemented in three small areas under RBI have become a widespread alleygating scheme towards the end of the analysis period. The lesson of basing alleygates interventions on analysis rather than just installing them anywhere has been applied to all the more recent schemes. Not all the interventions have continued. Although the Fairbridge scheme had collapsed before the end of the RBI, no attempt has been made to run something similar, this kind of work being left to the YOT. The Selectamark scheme which was also unsuccessful has never been reattempted, the lesson of its labour intensive nature being the main reason. However recently consideration is being made of a different type of property marking scheme, Smartwater. The evidence of the success of the plug in timers above may provide another future avenue for low cost burglary prevention. Finally the advent of NDC in the area has provided both the resources and a focus to build on what the RBI achieved. Although the NDC interventions were not in place until the last year of the analysis period, planning was taking place from 2001 and could therefore maintain interest and impetus. The NDC has reported that since the end of the period which this report covers, burglary in the NDC area which includes the SDP has decreased relative to Hartlepool as a whole.

Community relations may be seen to be involved in crime reduction in two ways. Firstly the crime reduction initiative supports the community in what it wants to do. In Hartlepool, SDP and later NDC funding have provided the opportunity for this support. Close partnership working with the community has ensured that the interventions are in tune with the community's priorities. Secondly this same partnership and the good relations thus generated have assisted in gaining the support of the community for the interventions, and therefore improved chances of successful implementation.

This addendum shows clearly how the early reductions in burglary have been sustained through four years after the inception of the project. The reductions are apparent both for the general rate of burglary in relation to other areas and for many of the specific interventions undertaken. What can only be more tentatively concluded at this stage is that community relations are an important feature in the sustainability of the reduction.