AN EVALUATION OF THE OPEN GARAGE DOOR BURGLARY PROGRAM

CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MCCU COLLECTION
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INTRODUCTION

Police departments have historically either used a preventive patrol-oriented strategy or a target-hardening strategy to control the incidence of crime in their jurisdiction. A patrol-oriented strategy is usually based on the assumption that an increased police presence will deter crime and increase apprehensions. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol experiment, which tested the effect that three different patrolling levels had both on the occurrence of crime and on the community's attitudes about crime, constitutes one of the more well known experiments of this type.¹ On the other hand, a target-hardening strategy will normally use non-patrol means to implement a program, e.g., a police-community relations drive to recruit citizens into a home security program. Operation Identification programs, which encourage citizens to mark any moveable and valuable piece of property with an engraved identifying code and which attempt to deter potential burglars by putting a program decal on the door or window of the program participant, are usually administered by police-community relations bureaus.²

Program evaluation of patrol-oriented and target-hardening programs are primarily designed to test the utility of the program's

concept by showing its effect on a wide variety of goals. In the Kansas City Preventive Patrol experiment, impact measures included data on citizen attitudes about crime and the police as well as data about the occurrence rates of crime, e.g., robbery, assault, rape, homicide, burglary, auto theft, vandalism, purse snatching and larceny. The Operation Identification program was evaluated by the following criteria: reduction in residential burglaries, citizen fears about crime, recruitment to the program, police-community benefits, and property return rates.

In those situations where a police department has designed a program to attack a specific crime problem, elements of both program strategies have been used. The anti-subway robbery program, implemented by the New York City Police Department in 1965, illustrates this point. The New York City Police Department increased the number of men patrolling its subways by 150 percent in 1965 and the program soon had the effect of reducing subway offenses from a high level of 7,000 crimes in 1964 to a low level of 5,000 crimes in 1965. However, by 1968 field interrogations of arrested robbers and an analysis from crime statistics suggested that the program may have had a partial displacement effect, i.e., more bus robberies were being committed in lieu of subway robberies. In order to deal with this problem. New York City officials implemented in 1969 an exact bus fare program which had the effect of reducing monthly bus robberies by 98 percent. In summary, what
started out as a patrol-oriented program soon incorporated
elements of a target-hardening program and in both instances, the
specific nature of the crime dictated the program strategy to be
used.3

This study assesses a crime prevention program that also
used the elements of a patrol-oriented and a target-hardening
strategy and which was implemented by the St. Louis County Police
Department from April 1, 1976, to September 30, 1976. The St. Louis
County Police Department primarily patrols the unincorporated
areas of St. Louis County. The entire County is legally separated
from the City of St. Louis and has within its boundary 951,671
people, 510 square miles and 94 self-governing municipalities.
The unincorporated area of St. Louis County has about one-third of
the County's total population (348,431 people) and about two-thirds
of its land area (325 square miles). The Department is divided
into five precinct areas and two of these precincts were selected
as the site for the pilot program. According to the 1970 Census,
residents in this test area tend to range from the lower middle to
middle income bracket, are almost exclusively white and have a
significant juvenile population below 18 years of age (i.e., 34
percent).

3Jan M. Chaiken, Michael W. Lawless, and Keith A. Stevenson,
"The Impact of Police' Activity On Subway Crime" Journal of Urban
The pilot program was designed to reduce unlawful entry garage burglaries and home burglaries. It was based on the following assumption: if homeowners who leave their garage doors open were informed by the Department that such negligent behavior was strongly associated with the commission of an unlawful entry garage burglary, then these types of crimes, which are primarily committed by juvenile offenders, could be prevented. Patrol officers were told to write down the address of any home where an open garage door was spotted and where no resident appeared to be home. Lists of these addresses were forwarded to headquarters and a letter was sent to the resident. The letter stated that open garage doors provided burglars with an excellent opportunity to commit a theft from a garage or from a home that was attached to a garage. In those situations where a resident was observed with a garage door open and where program statistics indicated that a previous letter had already been mailed to the resident, a subsequent and more

4 An unlawful entry garage burglary was defined in this study as an illegal entry into a garage through an unlawful means of entry for the purpose of committing a theft. A home burglary was defined in this study as an illegal entry into a house which was a permanently fixed structure through either a forcible, unlawful, or attempted forcible means of entry for the purpose of committing a theft. Both of these definitions are consistent with the definitional criteria outlined by the Uniform Crime Reporting System. See: United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook: How to Prepare Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1976) 22-27.

5 A reduction in home burglaries was a goal to the extent that a garage was attached to a home. In other words, it was reasoned that an easy entrance into a garage might lead to the burglary of a home that was attached to the garage. Since not every home was attached to a garage, it was predicted that the program would have more impact on garage burglaries than on home burglaries.
strongly worded letter was sent out. Additional brochure information, which outlined certain preventive techniques that the resident could undertake in order to help prevent home burglaries, was also included. No other contact was made with the resident after this second letter was sent out.

Several research findings substantiated the need for an anti-garage burglary program. First, data showed that a greater percentage of the burglaries committed in areas patrolled by the Department were garage burglaries than in the rest of St. Louis County. Twenty percent of all burglaries that were committed in areas patrolled by the Department during 1974 and 1975 were garage burglaries and only 13 percent of all burglaries that were committed in the rest of the County during the same time period were garage burglaries. Second, the number of garage burglaries increased by eight percent (from 1,074 in 1974 to 1,162 in 1975); while at the same time, the average monetary value of property stolen from a garage burglary increased by 33 percent (from $160 in 1974 to $213 in 1975). Third, data also showed that garage burglaries were seasonal crimes. Sixty-seven percent of all garage burglaries that were committed in areas patrolled by the Department during 1974 and 1975 occurred from the months of April to September. Finally, a study that randomly selected 95 garage burglary reports written in 1974 revealed that at least 65 percent of these reports had a known open garage door means of entry. This particular finding was also supported by another study which showed that 86
percent of all garage burglaries committed in areas patrolled by
the Department during 1974 and 1975 were associated with an un-
locked means of entry. In summary, the data showed that garage
burglaries were: (a) a problem that was becoming worse in terms
of the actual number of crimes committed and in terms of the
average monetary value of property stolen, (b) a crime that was
strongly related to the warmer months of the year and (c) a crime
that may not have occurred if the victim had taken the simple
precautionary measure of closing the garage door.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRAM'S IMPACT

At the end of the program period, analysis of the data
showed that unlawful entry garage burglaries decreased by 32 per-
cent in the test area from a pre-program period (April to Septem-
ber, 1975) to the program period (April to September, 1976). How-
ever, home burglaries increased by seven percent from the pre-
program period to the program period. Since the program had no
apparent effect on home burglaries, they were eliminated from the
study. Table I summarizes these findings (see page 7).

This study will use a policy analysis perspective to help
determine whether the 32 percent decrease in unlawful entry
garage burglaries could be attributed to the effectiveness of the
program. According to James Q. Wilson, a policy analysis per-
spective tests for the effect that a certain short term policy
### TABLE I

**THE DISTRIBUTION OF UNLAWFUL ENTRY GARAGE BURGLARIES AND HOME BURGLARIES IN THE TEST AREA BY TIME PERIODS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME PERIODS</th>
<th>UNLAWFUL ENTRY GARAGE BURGLARIES</th>
<th>HOME BURGLARIES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-Program</strong></td>
<td>218</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(April-September, 1975)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Program Period</strong></td>
<td>147</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(April-September, 1976)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>365</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>1,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERCENT CHANGE</strong></td>
<td>- 32%</td>
<td>+ 7*</td>
<td>- 7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**innovation has on a specific crime.**

However, one of the difficulties with this type of approach is that researchers do not always have the necessary planning time to build into a new policy the program features that would create a true experimental situation. Usually, program evaluators will try to find some way to randomize the introduction of the program stimulus. However, whenever...
Experimental designs should be used when the conditions for a true experiment do not exist. Eight-four sub-precinct areas in the test zone (known as COGIS blocks) were used as the unit of analysis in a test that I attempted to determine if the program had an effect on unlawful entry garage burglaries. Two types of variables were computed at this level: letter saturation levels and changes in unlawful entry garage burglaries from the pre-program period to the program period.

In order to measure the level of letter saturation for each sub-precinct area, the total number of initial letters and the total number of secondary letters that were mailed out during the program period were divided by the number of houses in each COGIS block. Housing data was selected as the base measure because it was the most valid measure of potential risk for this type of crime. Although criminal justice students have habitually used

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10COGIS blocks are police-reporting areas for the Department. All offense reports and radio dispatch reports are geo-coded by COGIS block number. It should also be noted that COGIS blocks can be aggregated up to conform with Census tract boundaries, i.e., COGIS blocks can be

11Although it is true that a housing indicator is a weak measure of the number of garages in a COGIS block, it was nevertheless the best indicator that was available for this study. In addition, it could also be argued that 1970 housing data no longer reliably reflect today's true housing stock. However, building activity has not radically changed the residential makeup of the test area during this six-year period.
a per capita base for these types of measures, such a practice for this study would clearly be inappropriate because structures and not people constituted the environmental risk encountered by the program.12

The second variable classified COGIS areas by whether they experienced an increase, a decrease, or no change in the number of unlawful entry garage burglaries that were committed from the pre-program period. In order to reduce the uncertainty about the relationship between true crime and reported crimes, the data was treated ordinally. According to Jones, this technique is valid so long as there is a positive relationship between if the two concepts, i.e., when the true crime rate increases (decreases), the reported crime rate will increase (decrease).13 This analysis also assumes that the program did not have a "Hawthorne effect" on the victims who normally report (or do not report) garage burglaries to the police.

Table II presents a contingency table that shows how the test zones' 84 COGIS areas are distributed between the saturation level of initial letters and the change in unlawful entry

12 Boggs criticizes this particular practice by forcibly arguing that the risk or target group, to which the crime is directed against, should be used as the base measure for any crime occurrence rate. By taking into account what she calls "environmental opportunities," the researcher may upgrade the validity of his indicators. See, Sarah L. Boggs, "Urban Crime Patterns," *American Sociological Review*, XXX (December, 1965) 889-901

garage burglaries. The first variable consists of three Categories: (a) a low saturation level (less than 9.2 initial letters per 100 homes), (b) a middle saturation level (between 9.3 and 21.4 initial letters per 100 homes), and (c) an upper saturation level (more than 21.5 initial letters per 100 homes). The program supporting hypothesis is: those COGIS blocks that experienced higher saturation levels of initial letters should tend to be more strongly associated with a decrease in unlawful entry garage burglaries than those COGIS blocks that experienced lower saturation levels of initial letters.

TABLE II

SATURATION LEVELS OF INITIAL LETTERS BY CHANGES IN UNLAWFUL ENTRY GARAGE BURGLARIES WITHIN THE TEST ZONE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saturation Levels</th>
<th>Low Level</th>
<th>Middle Level</th>
<th>Upper Level</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(37%)</td>
<td>(34%)</td>
<td>(18%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15%)</td>
<td>(14%)</td>
<td>(32%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(46%)</td>
<td>(52%)</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The data in Table II shows that the saturation levels of initial letters were not strongly related to the change in unlawful entry garage burglaries. Only 50 percent of those COGIS blocks that experienced an upper saturation level of initial letters had a decrease in unlawful entry garage burglaries. Fifty-two percent of the COGIS blocks in the middle saturation range and 48 percent of those COGIS blocks in the lower saturation range had a decrease in unlawful entry garage burglaries.

When the open garage door program was implemented by the Department, it was felt that a second letter might provide an additional stimulus to those homeowners who continued to leave their garage doors open. Consequently, it was possible that a relationship between saturation levels of secondary letters and unlawful entry garage burglaries might exist even though no relationship was found for initial letters. Saturation levels of secondary letters classified COGIS blocks into the following categories: (a) no saturation level, (b) a low saturation level (less than 5.0 secondary letters per 100 homes) and (c) an upper saturation level (greater than 5.0 letters per 100 homes). The following hypothesis was tested; those COGIS blocks that experienced higher saturation levels of secondary letters should tend to be more strongly associated with a decrease in unlawful entry garage burglaries than those COGIS blocks that experienced lower saturation levels of secondary letters.
TABLE III
SATURATION LEVELS OF SECONDARY LETTERS BY CHANGES IN UNLAWFUL ENTRY GARAGE BURGLARIES WITHIN THE TEST AREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANGES IN UNLAWFUL ENTRY GARAGE BURGLARIES</th>
<th>SATURATION LEVELS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO LEVEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data in Table III shows that saturation levels of secondary letters are not related to changes in unlawful entry garage burglaries. Only 49 percent of those COGIS blocks that experienced an upper saturation level of secondary letters had a decrease in unlawful entry garage burglaries. On the other hand, 54 percent of those COGIS blocks that experienced a low saturation level of secondary letters had a decrease in unlawful entry garage burglaries.

CHECKS FOR INTERNAL VALIDITY THREATS

According to Campbell, one of the overriding virtues of quasi-experimental designs in a non-testing environment is that they control for alternative explanations for why a program did (or did not) have an impact. These explanations are called by
Campbell internal validity threats. Two of these threats have particular relevance to this study. They are: (a) instrumentation (a shifting of the measuring instrument independent of any change in the phenomenon measured and (b) regression (the atypical occurrence of an exceptionally large number of unlawful entry garage burglaries during the pre-test period; thereby, causing a regression toward a general trend line that would have predicted fewer unlawful entry garage burglaries during the program period).  

The problem of instrumentation (or instrument decay) actually entails questions about the validity and reliability of crime statistics. According to Skogan, a validity problem in crime statistics occurs when "a researcher's procedures may not be measuring the object of analysis or the resulting figures may be artifacts of the measuring process" and a reliability question in crime statistics will "gauge the ability of police patrol teams to classify the same sort of events in same manner."

The problem of instrumentation will occur whenever a validity or a reliability problem threatens a study's findings to the extent that the program's impact (or lack of impact) can be attributed to a shift in the measuring instrument. The study was confronted with both types of measurement problems.

14c  

15w  
The problem of hidden crime, i.e., the difference between true crime and reported crime, constitutes the most serious validity threat to any evaluation study using crime statistics. Ostrom notes that many criminal acts are never reported to the police for various reasons. Specifically germane to this study, one governmental victimization survey of eight large cities found that 55 percent of unlawful entry burglaries were never reported to the police. However, Maltz notes that underreported crime is a serious problem in program evaluations only when there is evidence that the program might have an effect on reporting rates.

The only effective test for this measurement problem would have been to implement an expensive victimization survey before and after the program was started. However, a validity test of sorts was made by predicting that a non-treated control area would have the same percentage decrease of unlawful entry garage burglaries as was experienced in the test area. The same percentage decrease

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in both areas would support earlier findings that the program had no impact in the test area since the control area's decrease could be attributed to reasons other than the effect of the program. Because any valid measurement of a variable will tend to consistently predict the same outcome with a fairly high degree of accuracy, such a test would also provide limited evidence that reporting rates were not significantly affected by the introduction of the program.

**TABLE IV**

**THE NUMBER OF UNLAWFUL ENTRY GARAGE BURGLARIES THAT WERE COMMITTED IN THE TEST AREA AND THE CONTROL AREA DURING THE PRE-TEST AND PROGRAM PERIOD.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>TEST AREA</th>
<th>CONTROL AREA</th>
<th>BOTH AREAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Program</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(April-Sept. 1.975)</td>
<td>( 60%)</td>
<td>( 60%)</td>
<td>( 60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Period</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(April-Sept. 1976)</td>
<td>( 40%)</td>
<td>( 40%)</td>
<td>( 40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>1,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of Reduced Crime : -32%  -34%  -33%

Table IV shows the number of unlawful entry garage burglaries that occurred in the test area and the control area during the pre-program and program period. The control area for this table included the three precinct areas patrolled by the Department which did not experience the introduction of the program. The safe in Table IV shows that both areas had about the same percent-

...
decrease of unlawful entry garage burglaries, i.e., a 32
more cent decrease in the test area and a 34 percent decrease in
the control area. Consequently, the data in this table supports
the previous finding of this study that the program had no discern-
ible impact on the occurrence rate of unlawful entry garage burgla-
ries in the test area.

Because a crime prevention program may effect how a police
officer may perceive a program related crime, crime statistics may
not be reliable. According to Ostrom, the researcher may not be
aware of the variations in the reporting practices within a police
department. 19 This problem becomes critical to an evaluation
study whenever the program's apparent impact (or lack of impact)
can be attributed to a change in police reporting practices in
the test area. In essence, this situation is a problem of instru-
mentation.

Information from radio dispatched calls for service, which
are computerized by the Department, was used to indicate whether
more (or fewer) crime incident calls were recorded in the Depart-
ment's crime statistics. Specifically, the percentage of all
larceny calls whose final disposition were recorded as a "report
taken" were plotted by each month of the experimental period in
the test and control area. Larceny incident calls were selected
because garage thefts are always dispatched and recorded as lar-
cenies. 20

19Ostrom, "Institutional Arrangement" 459.
20Under Missouri statutes, garage thefts are classified as lar-
cenies. Consequently, they are dispatched and recorded by the
Department as larcenies. However, the Department's Central Records
Bureau reclassifies all garage larcenies to burglaries whenever
inputting the information into the UCR system.
Graph I (see page 18) shows that at the initial outset of the program, the control area and the test area had about the same larceny reporting percentage. There was no percentage difference between the two areas in April, 1976, a one percent difference between the areas in May, 1976, and a two percent difference between the areas in June and July, 1976. By August, the margin of difference between the areas had grown to four percent; but it declined to two percent in September, 1976. In summary, for all months after April, 1976, the test area tended to have a lower larceny reporting rate than the control area, suggesting that the program might have had some slight depressant effect on the reporting rate in the test area. Because the difference between the two area's reporting rates were small and since the lower rate in the test area would have indicated more crime, it was concluded that any possible program effect on police reporting practices probably did not have a confounding influence on the previous findings of this study.

The second internal validity threat which presented a serious challenge to the study's findings was regression. According to Campbell, an interrupted time series test is the most effective way to determine whether this threat has occurred in an experiment.21 Graph II (see page 19) is a time series analysis that shows the number of unlawful entry garage burglaries committed in the test and the control area during quarterly pre-program and program periods that go back to January, 1974. The dashed lines represent the test areas during the experimental program period. In essence, the

21 Campbell and Stanley, "The Connecticut Crackdown" 42.
Graph I

% of all larceny calls with a "report taken" disposition by monthly experimental periods for the test and control areas.

Program Period

18
UNLAWFUL ENTRY GARAGE BURGLARIES COMMITTED IN THE TEST AND CONTROL AREAS BY QUARTERLY PERIODS

- **CONTROL**: 146
- **TEST**: 83, 130, 88

Quarter Periods:
- **1974**
- **1975**
- **1976**
the graph shows that a regression effect did not occur during the program period because the quarterly 1975 pre-program periods (April - June, 1975 and July - September, 1975) were not greater than the same quarterly period in 1974. The graph shows, for example, that there were 146 unlawful entry garage burglaries during the April - June, 1974 period compared to the 130 unlawful entry garage burglaries during the April - June, 1975 period and that there were 83 unlawful entry garage burglaries during the July - September, 1974 period compared to the 88 unlawful entry garage burglaries during the July - September, 1975 period.

In order to provide more information about the program's impact, the control area was also plotted in the graph, thereby, expanding the analysis from a simple time series test to a multiple time series test. This additional feature proved useful because it clearly illustrated the seasonal characteristic of the study's crime. Generally, there were fewer unlawful entry garage burglaries during the colder months of the year (October to February) and there were more of them during the warmer months of the year (April to September). However, the graph also clearly shows that the magnitude of these warmer month increases started to decline in 1975, one full year before the program was implemented. Consequently, the data suggest that although unlawful entry garage burglaries were at an all time low during the program period as compared to previous warmer month periods, this trend may have simply been a part of a larger trend which started in 1975 and which has simply continued independently of any impact from the program.
There are two explanations for the failure of the program to have an impact. First, the program may not have reached a sufficiently high saturation level, i.e., only a small percent of negligent homeownerss were reached by letters. Second, it was possible that the letters simply may not have evoked the necessary motivational force which would have changed the negligent behavioral patterns of homeowners. In other words, the normal homeowner who received a letter from the Department simply ignored it. Data, which was available for the first explanation but which was not available for the second explanation, indicated that there was not enough supporting evidence for the first explanation. Consequently, the credibility of the second explanation was enhanced even though no direct test could be implemented.

One of the principle reasons for a program to fail is that the degree of change, which is necessary for the program to have an impact, is not reached. Freeman and Bernstein call this policy problem "process evaluation," and they maintain that it is an integral part of any evaluation study. For example, the Kansas City preventive patrol experiment was critiqued by Richard Larson because reactive beat areas (areas receiving no preventive patrols) probably did not conform to the conditions the researchers sought to introduce. Consequently, the study's failure to find statistical

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relationships between varying police visibility levels and the study's numerous dependent variables was not particularly surprising. 23

Data in Table V (see page 23) shows that the garage burglary program was successfully implemented in the test area. According to the table, 17.2% of all homes in both test precincts received at least one letter and 5.6% of all homes in both test precincts received a second letter. Aware of the fact that not all homes have garages and that not all garage owners leave their doors open, the real saturation scores are probably much higher than the scores recorded here. In addition, it should be noted that most of the letters were mailed during the first three months of the program. From an evaluation point of view, this was desirable because the program's impact should have occurred, at the latest, during the last three months of the program.

Although there is no supporting evidence to argue for the acceptance of the second explanation, i.e., the program's failure to motivate a behavior change on the part of the homeowner, one is forced to conclude by a process of elimination that this explanation is probably the most plausible. However, three types of tests could have been implemented to determine whether this explanation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM TIME</th>
<th>PRECINCT A&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>PRECINCT B&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>BOTH PRECINCTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERIODS</td>
<td>INITIAL SECONDARY</td>
<td>INITIAL SECONDARY</td>
<td>INITIAL SECONDARY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Three Program Months (April-June, 1976)</td>
<td>3,012&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt; (13.7)&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>802 (3.6)</td>
<td>2,461 (16.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Three Program Months (July-Sept., 1976)</td>
<td>213 (1.0)</td>
<td>176 (.8)</td>
<td>622 (4.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>3,225 (14.7)</td>
<td>978 (4.4)</td>
<td>3,083 (21.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Precinct A has 21,936 homes according to the 1970 Census.

Precinct B has 14,658 homes according to the 1970 Census.

Number of letters mailed.

Number of letters per 100 homes in the Precinct.

Source: Housing statistics were collected from the owner total column on page 8 through 95 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Block Statistics St. Louis, Mo. - Ill. Urbanized Area, 1970 Census of Housing.
could be more supported. First, a pre-test and post-test sample survey, which would have determined how often garage owners closed their doors, could have been conducted in the test and the control area. Second, a more unobtrusive method could have been designed which would have measured how many garage doors were left open in randomly selected areas throughout different periods of the experiment. Finally, some of the sightings made by the police during the program could have been treated as a control group to the extent that no letters would have been mailed to the resident. Consequently, a longevity study could have been implemented in order to determine if initial or secondary letter recipients tended to be victimized less than those homeowners who were spotted with open garage doors but who never received a letter.

In summary, three reasons underscore why these tests were never implemented. They were: (a) experimental requirements were not seriously considered before the program was implemented, (b) the additional tests would have increased the costs of a pilot program which was already becoming too expensive and (c) program designers never thought that it would be desirable to determine why a program might fail. Because of these reasons, a definitive answer about why the program had failed could not be rendered.

However, through careful use of the data available, it was possible to determine that (a) the program had failed and (b) that the failure could not be attributed to a pseudo statistical effect originating from the data. Given the uncontrolled environment with which the quasi-experimentalist must study in these two findings are not significant.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


