Bexley Town Security Project-Executive Summary & Final Report

**Prepared for DETR** 

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## Bexley Town Centre Security Project

**Executive Survey: Final Report** 

The Bexley Town Centre Security Project was funded via the Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions' Partnership in Technology Programme. The partners are the Building Research Establishment, Bexley London Borough, the Bexley Division of the Metropolitan Police and the traders and commercial business owners in the town centres of Bexleyheath, Erith, Welling, Crayford and Sidcup.

The report, provides an introduction to the project and the results of an analysis of the data obtained from the surveys of the five town centres

The results support the overall impression, from other sources, that Bexley is an area of relatively low crime when compared with areas of inner London and other town centres. However, the rate of crime against retail and commercial crime is comparable with National Figures.

The results underline the role that planning and management of town centres can have on some crime.

#### The results identify:

- The difference in crime patterns between the types of town centres i.e. modern, enclosed malls, CCTV controlled areas
  and traditional shopping streets.
- The apparent reduction in risk, of both non-domestic burglary and vandalism due to a number of features. These include
  the presence of residential accommodation immediately above the retail premises, external CCTV coverage and intruder
  alarms and an apparent increased risk due to the uncontrolled access to the rear of the premises.
- · The problem of shoplifting in all the retailed premises and potential deterrent affect of improved layout.
- That the owners/operators perception of crime may be a good reflection of the actual rate of occurrence of the crime.

## The results suggest that the

'Retail and commercial premises most at risk from burglary or vandalism are those situated in an open town centre, with minimum residential accommodation in the town centre, without alarm or CCTV coverage, and with a secluded rear yard open to vehicular traffic'

The future.

The following actions are suggested to provide immediate and long-term benefits at National and Local levels:

- The organisation of a Conference/Workshop to disseminate the resulting guidance from the project and the potential for redrafting of the existing local and national guidance on planning and management for security.
- A repeat circulation, in Erith, of the Postal Questionnaire to the retailers and other business operators to establish the before and after effects of the recently installed CCTV system on their perceptions and the actual levels of crime.
- A separate study to investigate patterns in the behaviour of teenagers in shopping Malls with significant levels of shoplifting, vandalism, etc.

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BEXLEY TOWN CENTRE SECURITY PROJECT	
Final Report.	
John Harrington-Lynn and Tim Pascoe	

1.0 Introduction.

This report is a summary of the results of the Bexley Town Centre Security Project, which was undertaken as part of the Partnership in Technology Programme funded by the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR).

The Project consisted of surveys of the crime and security provisions of the commercial premises in five town centres, Bexleyheath, Crayford, Erith, Sidcup and Welling in the London Borough of Bexley.

The project was carried out in a partnership of BRE, the London Borough of Bexley, the Bexley Division of the Metropolitan Police Service and representatives from the various traders and town centre organisations in the area.

The Report provides an analysis and interpretation of the data collected during the surveys. It has been prepared primarily for use by the individual members of the Partnership and DETR to guide them in their future discussions on the use and application of the results of the project.

#### 2.0 Background.

- The Project.

The Bexley Town Centre Security Project was undertaken to provide improved understanding of crime in retail and other businesses in town centres and to provide a basis of risk assessment for use in such centres.

The project was intended to assist the police, the owners and occupiers of town centre businesses, local authorities, building designers, planners, insurance companies, etc.

• to evaluate the risk from burglary, other related crimes and incivilities to the individual premises and town centres

and

• to select appropriate crime prevention solutions either for the individual premises or groups of premises.

The project was led by the BRE, with the assistance of a Steering Group drawn from the Partnership. During its formation, it had the support of the British Retail Consortium.

The project was undertaken during the period April 1996 - February 1998.

- The Project Area.

The town centres selected (see Map 1.) for the project were:

- Bexleyheath. The largest shopping centre of the group surveyed, consisting of four distinct areas, an enclosed mall, an adjoining pedestrianised area with CCTV and two adjacent traditional shopping areas.
- Erith. A 60 V70's style shopping precinct
- Welling, Crayford and Sidcup. Traditional shopping streets.

The Bexley Unitary Development Plan (adopted July 1996) identified a hierarchy of town centres in occurrence with Government guidance. Bexleyheath is the Borough's Strategic Centre providing the Borough's major comparison goods shopping, as well as being the main centre for leisure, civic and community uses and a preferred office location.

The remaining town centres represent the Borough's Major District Centres providing the Borough's main convenience shopping as well as comparison shopping, but to a more confined catchment area than Bexleyheath. Minor District Centres and Neighbourhood Centres were not included in the study.

- Membership of the Steering Group.

The project was steered by a committee/group drawn from members of the participating organisations. The Steering Group consisted off:

- Ms HI McKay, Chief Planning and Development Officer, BLB. (Chair.) Sept '96 June '97
- Mr C J Donovan, Head of Regeneration, BLB. (Chair.) June 97 March '98
- Mr N Maycock, Bexleyheath Town Centre Partnership, Manager W H Smith:
- Mr J Saunders, Erith Traders Association.
- Supt. P Sellwood, Metropolitan Police, London Borough of Bexley.
- PC C Thomas, Metropolitan Police Crime Prevention Officer, Bexleyheath. 1 \*
- PC T Sampson, Metropolitan Police Crime Prevention Officer, Bexleyheath. \*
- PC D Nolan, Metropolitan Police Crime Prevention Officer, Bexleyheath\*
- Mr M Thornton, Senior Planner, BLB
- · Mr A Brimstead, Building Control Officer, BLB
- Ms K Donald. Community Safety Officer, Bexley Community Safety Partnership,

Aug. '97 - March 98.

- Mr J Davidson., Planning Officer, BLB \*
- Mr I Bailey, Senior Planning Officer, BLB\*
- Mr J Ferry, Information Officer, BLB\*
- Mr G Cousins, Information Officer, BLB\*
- Mr T Sellick, Information Officer, BLB\*
- Mr T Pascoe, BRE
- Mr J Harrington-Lynn, BRE (Later Consultant with HLAdvisory)

## 3.0 Methodology.

The same approach to data collection was proposed and applied with some amendments, throughout the project viz.:

- Definition of the agreed survey area for the core of each Town Centre with the BLB and provision of maps and information on the number and types of premises making up the area.
  - The provision by the police of the recorded crime statistics for each town centre for a period during the survey.
- Publicity for the survey via local trade organisations and a press release to local newspapers immediately prior to each survey.
- Delivery of explanatory letter to all premises in the survey area either immediately prior to the survey or at the time of the survey,
- A physical survey of all the retail and business premises in the selected areas, including those above the ground floor. (The Physical Survey.)

<sup>\*</sup> For part of the project only.

- The delivery of a questionnaire to the same premises for completion by the owner/manager. This self- completion survey to be returned by post or collected by the police. (The Postal Survey.)
- Follow up detailed questionnaire by police of recorded crimes of burglary or attempted burglary and other selected crimes in the six months after survey.<sup>2</sup>

BRE carried out the physical survey and delivery of questionnaire as well as the subsequent coding, verification and analysis and interpretation of all the data. The Police used Special Constables to collect the questionnaires from the Postal Survey.

Copies of the explanatory letters and survey forms etc. used are attached in Annex. A.

- The Physical Survey.

The Physical survey provided details of the type, location and other physical details of the premises which might influence a potential burglar to select the premises for attack. The survey included the front, rear and internal details of the premises both during the normal daytime opening hours and in the evening, when the premises would normally expected to be closed.

Particular attention was paid to the levels of security visible to the potential intruder/attacker and the ease of identification and access at the rear of the premises.

- The Postal Survey.

The Postal Survey consisted of a questionnaire intended for completion by the owner or a senior member of the staff of the premises. The questionnaire was delivered at the time of the Physical Survey and was intended for collection by Special Police Constables a few days later. It was coded to allow cross comparison with the Postal Survey.

The Postal Survey provided information on:

- The owner or senior member of staffs perceived view of crime in the area as it effects their premises.
- The actual level of crime, whether reported or not, the premises had been exposed to in the past 12 months.
- An estimate of the cost of these crimes.
- The owner etc. view of the effectiveness of the security measures which are in use in the premises.
- The general comments or views of the owner etc. on crime and security in the area.
  - Detailed Crime Questionnaire.

The detailed crime questionnaire was designed to provide detailed information of actual crimes as they occur. The questionnaire to be completed by the owner/ senior member of staff of the premises with the help of the police. As such it would have provide detailed confirmation of any conclusions drawn from the Physical and Postal Survey. Unfortunately, due to lack of police resources, only a small number (12) of these questionnaires were completed, for Bexleyheath and Erith. Because of the problems caused by constraints on confidentiality and lack of finance, it was impossible to arrange alternative methods of collecting this data.

- Classification of premises.

For the purpose of the surveys, the premises were classified as listed in table, Table 1. The equivalent Planning Use Classes are listed for comparison.


Unfortunately due to manpower problems, the Police were only able to complete a few of the detailed questionnaires of recorded burglaries etc. and no alternative arrangements to collect this information could be arranged due to lack of resources

Consideration was given to sub-dividing the Retail Classification by shop types, either as goods sold or size. However as the potential number of sub-divisions is large at the moment it is thought mat this would only lead to unnecessary complications and reduce the overall accuracy of the conclusion.

Table 1. Classification of premises.

Classification	Description	Planning Use Classes
Retail	Shops	Al
Entertainment	Public Houses, Restaurants, Fast Food, Takeaways etc.	A3
Finance	Banks, Building Societies, Betting Shops and other premises handling cash	A2
Offices	General offices with limited access by the public	B2
Services.	Premises providing service to the public e.g. travel agents, estate agents,	A2
Other	Churches, halls etc.	Other
Vacant	Empty premises	No equivalent

Map 1. Location of towns in Survey.



## 4. Sample Size and Mix of Premises.

In total, the physical survey consisted of approximately 832 properties and the postal survey consisted of 440 properties.

Table 2a and b lists the mix of premises included in the survey of the five town centres.

As noted earlier, Bexleyheath was considered to be made up of four distinct areas.

#### These are:

- The Mall a modem purpose built enclosed shopping mall of 55 premises occupying the SE comer of the area. Several of these premises (17) opened on to the Core.
- The Core Area a pedestrianised area of 55 premises, lying immediately to the North and West of the Mall.
- The Non-Core West a traditional shopping area of some 100 premises lying on both sides of Watling Street, immediately to the West of the pedestrianised area.
- The Non-Core East a smaller traditional shopping area of 36 premises immediately to the East of the Mall. Much of the area is due for redevelopment.

For convenience, these four areas are referred to as the Mall, Core, NCW and NCE in the Report.

Table 2(a) and (b) lists the mix of premises for the five town centres.

Table 2 a.	Premises mix of Town Centres in Survey - The Physical Survey.											
	Business	Classificat	ion									
	Retail	TEnter.	1 Finance	1 Office	I Service	Other	I Vacant	Total				
Bexleyheath					-							
The Mall												
No.	49	1	1	0	3	0	1	.55				
%	89	2	2	0	5	0	1	100				
Core					_							
No.	34	2	9	3	6	0	1	55				
%	61.8	3.6	16.4	5.5	10.9	0	1.8	100				
Non Core Wes	t					_						
No.	40	13	7	15	13	3	7	98				
%	41	_ 13	7	14	13	3	7	100				
Non-Core East	t											
No.	13	5	0	6	6	0	6	36				
%	36	14	0	17	17	0	17	100				
Total for Bexle	evheath											
No.	130	21	15	23	35	3	17	244				
%	53.3	8.5	6.1	9.0	14.3	1.2	7.0	99.9				
Crayford			···	-			•					
No.	fif)	T 20	2_	3	12	1	13	120				
%	57.50	16.67	1.67	2.50	10.00	0.83	10.83	100.00				
Erith					•							
No.	48	18	3_	12	5	0	6	72				
%	66.67	11.11	4.17	2.78	6.94	0.00	8.33	100				
Sidcup												
No.	76	24—	11	18	28	0	14	T 161				
%	47.20	14.91	6.83	4.97	17.39	0.00	8.70	100				

Welling								
No.	154	28	7		22	1	30	252
%	61.11	11.11	2.78	3.97	8.73	0.40	11.90	100
Total								
No.	: 477	101	38	46	102	5	63	832
%	57.33	12.14	4.57	5.53	12.26	0.60	7.57	100

Statistical analysis<sup>1</sup> of the two samples suggests that they are more likely from a common source. A Chi Squared Test comparing the total premises mix of the two samples gives a value of 6.902 with 5 degrees of freedom. This is lower than the 90% critical value of 9.236. It should be noted that Bexleyheath, particularly the Mall and Core, is made up from a preponderance of major national retail chains and services whereas the other four areas tend to a higher mix of independents and individual owners.

	Business	classificati	on					Return
								Rate  %* Postal / Physical
. 112	Retail	Enter.	Finance	Office	Service	Other	Total	
The Mall		1		<u> </u>				
Number	43	1	0	0	3	0	47	85.5
%	91.4	2.1	0	0	6.4	0	99.9	
The Core		•						
Number	29	1	7	1	6	0	44	80.0
%	65.9	2.3	15.9	2.3	13.6	0	100	
Non Core We	est							
Number	25	8	5	10	9	1	58	59.2
%	43.1	13.8	8.6	17.2	15.5	1.7	99.9	
Non-Core Eas	st	·						•
Number	10 .	3	0	3	4	0	20	55.6
%	50.0	15.0	. 0	15.0	20.0	0	100	
Total for Bex	levheath							
Number	107	13	12	14	23	1	170	69.7
%	62.9	7.6	7.1	8.2	13.5	0.6	99.9	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Statistical Tests.

The Statistical Test (Chi Squared,  $X^2$ , test) referred to in this project is a standard test intended to check whether data samples are different. The Test is normally conducted to show that there is no difference between the samples i.e. the Null Hypothesis holds. Low values of  $X^2$  suggest that the samples are most probably from a single sample. Large values suggest that the samples are most probably different. The 0.001 level suggests that there is a 99.9 % probability of the samples being different. The 0.1 level suggests that the probability is only 90%. The critical values are derived from published tables linking levels of significance/probability with degrees of freedom. The degrees of freedom is a measure of the number of cells i.e. the rows x columns making up the samples.

3.7	1.00	10	1 4	1 4	1.4	1 1	L 40	1 40 0
No	39	<u> </u>		<b>_</b>	4	<u> </u>	49	40.8
%	79.59	6.12	2.04	2.04	8.16	2.04	99.99	
Erith						_1		
No.		5	1	<u> </u>		0	_ 40 _	55.5
%	75	12.5	2.5	5	5	0	100_	
Sidcup_				T		]	7	] "
No.	31	<u></u>	6	4	15	$\Box 0$	61	37.9
%	50.82	8.2	9.84	6.56	24.59	0.0	100.01	<u> </u>
Welling		1					_	
No.	92 _	12	2		11	.0	120	47.6
%	76.67	10	1.67	2.5	9.17	0.0	100.01	
Total	299	38	22	24	.55	2	440	52.9
No.	67.95	8.64	5	5.45	12.5	0.45	99.99	T

#### 5.0 Crime Patterns.

From the results of the Postal and Physical surveys individual crime patterns for the five town centres were established. These are discussed in detail in the individual reports for the Town centres, see Annex 2. These individual patterns were then used to provide an overall picture for the main body of this report.

## 5.1 Sources of crime data,

## a. Survey Data.

The project has produced three sources of information, about the rate of crime in the five towns.

The first two of these are from the returns to the Postal Survey the third is derived from Police records.

From the Postal survey, we have Perceived and Owners/actual data.

## · Perceived Data.

This is the response to Question 3 in the Postal survey. This provides perception of some 15 crimes or incivilities, which occur around the premises during and outside working hours. For convenience in handling the data the five headings used in the questionnaire have been grouped into three as follows:

0 Problem = Very Big/Fairly Big problem.

0 Not a problem = Not a very big problem/ Not a problem at all.

0 Don't Know = Don't Know.

Table 3. lists the perceived problems during working and non working hours

Table 3 Perceive	d problems in	Bexleyheath	from Postal Surv	ey	<del></del> -		
Problem	MalliCor	NC NC	Bexleyhe	Crayfo	Wellin	Erit	Sidcu

		e	West	East	ath	rd	q	h	Р
During working hou	rs	·	· · · · · ·		<u></u>				
Teenagers loitering	72.3	36.4	24.1	65	45.6	18	25.8	37.5	22.6
Drunks	0	9.1	17.2	0	8.3	8	4.8	32.5	6.5
Buskers	4.3	9.1	1.7	0	4.1	2	0	2.5	3.2
Litter	8.5	18.2	22.4	15	16.6	22	22.6	32.5	25.8
Theft from or of	2.1	6.8	27.6	10	13	12	20.2	50	16.1
car	ŀ					]			
Using/selling	6.4	6.8	10.3	5	7.7	2	4.8	15	0
drugs									
Burglary	2.1	6.8	29.3	15	14.2	24	20.2	55	14.5
Stray dogs?	0	2.3	8.6	5	4.1	26	12.1	10	12.9
Dog dirt	<b>'</b> 1				<b>i</b>	[			
Vandalism/Graff	4.3	11.4	24.1	25	15.4	30	18.5	52.5	21
iti									
Mugging/Violen	6.4	9.1	15.5	10	10.7	6	7.3	27.5	0
ce					<u> </u>				
Racially attacks	2.1	2.3	3.4	0	2.4	2	4.8	7.5	0
Prostitution	0	2.3	0	0	0.6	6	0	0	0
Bicycle theft	6.4	6.8	3.4	0		6	3.2	0	
Pick pockets	14.9	9.1	8.6	25	12.4		5.6	17.5	3.2
Shoplifting	*	*	*	*	*	28	*	*	32.3
Outside working	hou	rs			<u></u>				
Teenagers	23.4	29.5	39.7	40	32,5	38	45.2	42.5	19.4
loitering									
<u>Drun</u> ks	8.5	18.2	31	15	19.5	32	25.8	45	8.1
Buskers	0	0	3.4	0	1.2	0	0	0	0
Litter	10.6	0	29.3	20	15.4	28	21.8	27.5	17.7
Theft from or of	4.3	13.6	24.1	10	14.2	24	25	27.5	9.7
car			40.0	40				47.5	
Using/selling drugs	6.4	6.8	10.3	10	8.3	4	7.3	17.5	1.6
Burglary	0	2.3	34.5	25	15.4	28	24.2	65	8.1
Stray dogs?	0	13.6	8.6	5		16			3.2
Dog dirt	ľ	13.0	0.0	,	· · · ·	10	12.9	7.5	3.2
Vandalism/Graff	10.6	2.3	29.3	35	17.8	40	20	62.5	21
iti	10.0	2.5	23.0	33	17.0	40	23	02.5	21
Mugging/Violen	2.1	13.6	8.6	15	8.9	8	12.1	27.5	3.2
Racially attacks	4.0	0.0		<del> </del>					
	4.3	2.3	0			0		0	0
Prostitution	0	0	0	0	· · · -	4		0	0
Bicycle theft	2.1	2.3	0	5		4		7.5	1.6
Pickpockets	0	0		0		0	4.8	7.5	1.6
Shoplifting	*	*	*	*	*	4	*	*	3.2

Note. Perceived values of 20% or more are printed in Bold. \*Data not collected. See paragraph

The perceptions vary from area to area. They provide an owners/operators picture of crime in the town centres presumably as it effects their business and staff.

## • Owners Actual Data - Frequency of crime.

This is the response to Question 5 in the postal survey. It provides an estimate of the frequency of occurrence of seven crimes, which may have occurred on the premises. This groups the crime under six classifications, namely, daily, weekly, monthly, annually, never and don't know. These were designed to provide a picture of the pattern of crime and the rate of repeats rather than the exact date and number of occurrences of the individual crimes.

These classifications have been further grouped, into two, to provide information on premises that have been attacked at least once or more than once. Table 4. summarises the results of this grouping for the five towns

Table 4. r4o of premises subject to crime at 1east once and morelthan once, from Postal Survey.

		Bexley	heath	Crayf	ord	Erith		Sidcu	ıp	Welli	ng
Crime		At	More	At	More	At	More	At	More	At	More
		least	than	least	than	least	than	least	than	least	than
	<u> </u>	once	once	once	once	once	once	once	once	once	once
Burglary	No.	40	3	15	2	20	3	20	3	45	4
	%	23.5	18.0	30.6	41.0	50.0	75.0	32.8	49.0	37.5	33.0
Vandal is	No.	57	28	25	8	26	11	26	11	58	24
m	%	33.5	16.5	51.0	16.3	65.0	27.5	42.6	18.0	48.3	20.0
Armed	No.	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Rob	%	6	0.0	4.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0
Shoplifti	No.	83	67	20	14	330	19	33	19	55	40
ng	%	48.8	39.4	40.8	28.6	82.5	47.5	54.1	31.1	46.0	33.3
Till	No.	13	0	2	0	15	6	15	6	15	0
snatches	%	76.0	0.0	4.1	0.0	37.5	15.0	24.6	9.8	12.5	0.0
Assault/	No.	67	27	7	1	17	10	17	10	29	11
threats	%	39.4	15.6	14.3	20.0	42.5	25.0	27.9	16.3	24.2	9.2
to staff											
Credit	No.	56	25	1	1	12	5	12	5	22	8
Card Fraud	%	32.9	14.7	20.0	20.0	30.0	12.5	19.7	8.2	18.3	6.7

#### · Police Records.

The Police Records are based on information extracted from the Police Database of recorded crimes for the six month period 1/1/97 - 30/6/97 for the five town centres. The database is a comparatively new. It only became generally available in the later part of 1996. The summary data is listed in Table 5. Some information manually collated from the Police Records, by Crime Prevention Officers, earlier in the project was also made available; this is referred to where necessary.

Because of the nature of the three sources of data differences in the rates of crime predicted occur. However this is not unexpected and reflects differences, which are similar to those noted by

other crime surveys. For example, the British Crime Survey<sup>(1)</sup> regularly comments on the differences between the fear of particular crime, the rates of crime identified from the responses to the BCS and the rates of crime recorded by the police. The reasons for these differences are many. The perception or fear of crime is a reaction to a mixture of actual or perceived events and media coverage. It may therefore be much greater than the actual level of crime. These perceptions cannot be ignored as it affects behavioural patterns. In the commercial sector, this may influence potential customer behaviour and therefore profits.

The returns for the frequency of crime are subject to inaccuracies due to memory lapses, changes in staff and changes in ownership of the premises. A more accurate return could only be achieved by detailed face to face interviews between the researcher and a member of staff, backed up by a trawl through any records held on the premises.

Table 5	Record 1/1/97-3		Bexleyh	eath. Bas	sed on Po	lice Reco	rds for Pe	riod
Area	Sample Size		Non Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Shop lifting	Assaults	Deceptio n	Theft/ robbery
The Mali	55	No.	4	5	115	0	3	
		Ann. Rate	0.15	0.18	4.18	0.00	0.11	0.18
Core +	189	No.	15	16	43	0	9	0.05
NCW + NCE		Ann. Rate	0.16	0.17	0.46	0.00	0.10	0.05
Bexleyhe ath	244	No.	19	21	158	0	12	10
		Ann. Rate	0.16	0.17	1.30	0.00	0.10	0.08
Crayford	120	No.	10	9	7	0	1	6
		Ann. Rate	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.00	0.02	0.10
Erith	72	No.	0	6	9	0	2	
		Ann. Rate	0.00	0.17	0.25	0.00	0.06	0.11
Sidcup	161	No.	19	11	16	0	7	3
		Ann. Rate	0.24	0.14	0.20	0.00	0.09	0.04
Welling	252	No.	8	23	22	0	4	5
		Ann. Rate	0.06	0.18	0.17	0.00	0.03	0.04
Total	832	No.	56	70	212	0	26	28
		Ann. Rate	0.13	0.17	0.51	0.00	0.06	0.07

Notes. Annual rate = Six monthly value x 2 / Sample size.

Assaults = Includes all acts of violence to staff, customers, passers by.

Theft/robbery = Theft or robbery from staff, customers or premises.

Discrepancies with the formal Police Records can occur due to:

- Problems in matching the layman's description of crimes with the more formal terminology used by the Police.
- Not all crimes are recorded. Many crimes or incivilities are never reported to the police and many reported crimes are recorded under a different heading or never formally recorded.
- In common with many town centres, variations in addresses and lack of visible street numbers can cause difficulties in identifying individual events.

In the analysis of the data for the individual crimes, which follows, the three sources of data are used to validate the results whenever possible or practical.

#### b. National data.

National figures for crime related to town centres is sparse. It is only in the last few years that organisations such as the Home Office<sup>(2>)</sup> and the British Retail Consortium <sup>(3)</sup> have undertaken surveys comparable in scope to the long running British Crime Survey<sup>(1)</sup>.

However even these recent national surveys do not produce a complete picture. For example, the Home Office Research Study was a telephone-based survey concentrating on retail and manufacturing and does not include services, offices etc. The BRC study concentrated only on retail premises. Therefore, some interpretation is required when comparing the results from this survey with national figures.

## 5.2 Retail/ Commercial Burglary,

## a. Frequency of Burglary.

The occurrence of burglary of retail or commercial premises is a common problem across the five town centres making up the survey.

Fig. 1 shows the perceived, owners records and police records for the rates of burglary for the five town centres and the four subdivisions of Bexleyheath. The data for the perceived and owners records are derived from the returns to the postal survey. The police records are derived from the data supplied by the Police for non-domestic burglary, Table 5.

There appears to be a good correlation between the perceived crime rates and owners records from the Postal Survey. (A Chi Squared test carried out on the data produced a value of 8.665, for 14 degrees of freedom. This is very much less than the tabulated value of 21.06 at the 0.1 level. Therefore the Null Hypothesis holds and suggests there is no difference between the perceived values for day and night and the owners records.) This suggests that the owners perception is a reasonable reflection of the actual rate of burglary in each area. The difference between the information derived from the Police Records in addition to the points noted in earlier may be because the data for Erith is also for a period after the installation of CCTV<sup>4</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Shortly after the survey of Erith in 1996, the BLB installed a CCTV system in the Erith town centre.

A manual collation of data from the police records for Erith for the 3-month period (1/7/96- 31/9/96) suggests a much higher rate of 44.5% per annum for non-domestic burglary. This was undertaken prior to the installation of the CCTV and approaches the rate indicated by the Owners Records. Unfortunately, there were insufficient resources available to the project to enable a second postal survey of Erith to be undertaken after the installation of the CCTV.)

Using the Owners Records as an actual measure of burglary enables the five Town centres to be ranked in risk of burglary as in Table 6.

•		% Premise	es Burgled	Ranking *		
Location		At least once a Year	More than once a year.	Rank, Including Sub areas	Rank, Town centres only	
Bexleyhea th		22.48	1.20		1	
	Mall	4.26	0.0	1		
	Core	20.48	0.0	2		
	NCE	30.00	5.00	4		
	NCW	36.20	1.70	7		
Sidcup		27.42	0.0	3	2	
Crayford		30.00	4.00	4	3	
Welling		36.00	3.20	8	4	
Erith*		50.00	7.50	9	5	
All towns		30.30	2.50			

Closer study of the Table suggests that:

- The Burglary rate in the two non-core areas of Bexleyheath is broadly comparable with those for the traditional shopping streets of Crayford, Sidcup and Welling. This suggests that the construction of the Mall and subsequent installation of CCTV has not caused any serious displacement of burglary.
- That town centres could be grouped with respect to the risk of burglary as in Table 7.
- There is no evidence of displacement from the CCTV controlled areas of the Mall and Core to the two non-core areas.

Table 7. Town centre groupings and potential risk

of burglary.

or burgiary.		
Type	Grou	Risk of Burglary %
	P	
Enclosed Malls	1	5-10
CCTV controlled Pedestrianised areas	2	15-20
Traditional shopping streets	3	25-35
Isolated 60-70s Centres with no CCTV	4	45-55

The comparable figures for burglaries from the other sources are:

- The Home Office Commercial Victimisation Survey, CVS, (2) suggests 41% (31% as burglary with entry, 13% as attempted burglary.) This covers a wider span of business types, than the current survey.
- The Small Business and Crime Initiative, SBSI, <sup>(4)</sup> gives an average of 30.8 % for two areas in Leicester
- The BRC 1996 (3) survey suggests a burglary rate of approximately 40% for retail properties.

The two areas covered in the SBSI survey appear very similar in make up to the traditional shopping streets covered in this survey. Overall, the results for the Bexley town centres, with the possible exception of Erith, appear very comparable with the available national figures. The burglary rate for Erith is slightly above the published figures.

## b. Factors influencing risk of Burglary.

Many factors appear to influence the risk of burglary of retail and commercial premises. Some factors, such as CCTV may provide blanket coverage of an area. Others such as bars and grilles may provide individual protection.

The results from the surveys have provided an opportunity to explore the deterrent effect of at least some of these factors.

Figs 2 to Fig 7 summarise the influence of selected parameters on the rate of burglary in the surveyed areas.

Each figure is in a similar format. It provides, for the five town centres and 4 sub-divisions of Bexleyheath the following data, derived from the Postal and Physical surveys:

- In the rear row, the percentage number of premises featuring the selected parameter, where a reply was received to the postal survey.
- In the middle row, the percentage rate of burglary for all premises, in the postal survey.
- In the front row, the percentage rate of burglary for those premises which only included the selected parameter.

The middle row is therefore identical in each Figure. A first measure of the effectiveness of the parameter can therefore be made from the difference, if any, between the first and second row. For example, if 30% of all premises in a town are burgled but if only 20% of those, which include the selected parameter, are burgled we can suggest that the parameter may be a deterrent. In practice, the differences between these two percentages are not clear-cut and we have to resort to statistical analysis to detect potential differences.

Table 8 summarises the result for a series of Chi Squared Tests on burgled and non-burgled

\_\_included because of its

Examination of these results suggests that the most likely premises to be attacked has:

- A yard at rear, allowing unrestricted accesses for vehicles.
- Cover in the yard from walls, waste bins etc.
- Minimum physical security in the form of bars, shutters on windows and doors.
- No indication of an intruder alarm system.
- Internal lights switched off.
- No residential accommodation above.

Table 8.	Burç	lary	of pr	emis	es - S	Statist	tical	interp	erpretation of results.						
		)	]	=	}		}		Statistic	cal Information					
	2	LU	≥ .	rayfor	ے ا	<b>O.</b>   3	<u>⊆</u>	=		<u> </u>					
	200	ŀ	ō	5	<del></del>	B	<b>₩</b>	Total	<i>X</i> *	Significance					
	<u>_</u>	Z	<u>z</u>	0 -0	ŞШ	(n)	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	Value						
<u>Feature</u>	: Op	en A	cess		<u>ehicl</u>	<u>e to r</u>		f pre	<u>nises</u>						
Burgled	10	6	17	11	5	11	28	88	16.65	X <sup>2</sup> value approaches					
Non-	29	10	7	26	11	29	52	16	ŀ	16.81, the 0.01 level,					
<u>burg</u>				<u> </u>				4		therefore access by					
Total	39	16	24	37	16	40	80	25		vehicles may have a					
						į		2		significant influence on the					
	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		ļ	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	rate of burglary					
	: Inte	rnal	lights	visil	ole at	front	t of p	<u>remis</u>	es at nig	<u>jht</u>					
Burgle	5	0	7	8	1	7	26	54	13.93	X <sup>2</sup> value exceeds 12.59,					
d				<u> </u>						the 0.05 level, therefore					
Non-	39	20	51	42	39	55	98	34		internal lights may have a					
burg							<u> </u>	4		significant influence on the					
Total	44	20	58	50	40	62	12	39		rate of burglary					
	<u> </u>		<u>L</u>		<u> </u>		4	8							
	: Visi	ble lı	<u>ntrud</u>	<u>er Al</u>	arm S	ounc	ler B	ox vis		ont of premises					
Burgle	4	3	12	8	10	6	25	68	10.54	X <sup>2</sup> value approaches					
d										10.64, the 0.1 level,					
Non-	28	8	21	22	14	28	46	16		therefore a visible Intruder					
_burg_								7		alarm box may have a					
Total	32	11	33	30	24	34	71	23		significant influence on the					
		<u> </u>				1		5		rate of burglary					
Feature	: Bar	s, gri	lls, s	hutte	rs, et	c on	door	s and	window	s at front of premises after					
hours.					· <u>-</u>					<u>-</u>					
Burgle	2	0	3	9	3	6	20	43	8.45	X <sup>2</sup> value is less than 10.64,					
d									:	the 0.1 level, therefore					
Non-	13	2	15	14	4	25	36	10		bars, grills etc at rear may					
burg			1		1			9		not have a significant					
Total	15	2	16	23	7	31	56	15		influence on the rate of					
			1					2		burglary.					
		h							L	<del></del>					

Feature: Flats above retail or commercial premises.

ļ				1		dn	l Bu	_	Statisti	cal Information
!	Core	NCE	NCW	<b>5</b>	Erith	Sidcup	Welling	Total	X <sup>2</sup> Value	Significance
Burgle d	1	0	6	10	0	11	19	47	6.87	X <sup>2</sup> value is less than 10.64, the 0.1 level; therefore, a
Non- burg	5	1	10	12	1	6	19	54		flat above the premises may not have a significant
Total	6	1	16	22	1	17	38	10 1		influence on the rate of burglary.
Feature	: En	close	d yar	d at ı	rear c	f pre	mise	s.		
Burgle d	1	2	7	6	11	10	19	56	6.113	X <sup>2</sup> value is less than 10.64, the 0.1 level, therefore an
Non- burg	4	1	3	8	8	8	9	41		enclosed yard at rear of premises may not have a
Total	5	3	10	14	19	18	28	97		significant influence on the rate of burglary but see result for open yard
Feature	: Bar	s, Sh	utter	s, Gri	lls et	c. on	rear	wind	ows and	doors after hours.
Burgle d	1	2	5	2	15	3	9	37	5.43	X <sup>2</sup> value is much less than 10.64, the 0.1 level,
Non- burg	7	4	6	9	20	6	24	76		therefore the use of shutters etc. at front of
Total	8	6	11	11	35	9	33	11		premises is unlikely to have a significant influence on the rate of burglary
Feature: C	Cover f	rom bi	ns, wal	ls, doo	rways	etc. at	rear of	premi	ses	
Burgle d	9	5	13	10	12	15	31	95	3.278	X <sup>2</sup> value is very much less than 10.64, the 0.1 level,
Non- burg	24	6	26	26	17	28	49	17 6		therefore the null hypothesis holds and the
Total	33	11	39	36	29	43	80	27 1		availability of cover at rear of premises is likely to have influence on the rate of burglary
Feature: (						1 4			r	
Burgle d	8	4	13	6	0	4	15	50	2.783	X <sup>2</sup> value is very much less than 10.64, the 0.1 level,
Non- burg	15	4	13	6	1	8	21	58		therefore the null hypothesis holds and an
Total	23	8	26	12	1	12	36	11 8		open yard at rear of premises is likely to have influence on the rate of burglary

The following commentary is offered in support of the main features that appear to influence the risk of burglary.

• Rear yards and car parking.

From the results, a major security weakness in traditional shopping streets appears to be the ease of unrestricted access to the rear of many premises by both vehicles and pedestrians. The majority is unlit and provides cover for potential intruders. Security could possibly be improved by an extension of the current schemes to close off rear alleys providing access to the traditional terrace house in town centres, (Alleygating).

The ownership of many of these rear areas was unclear and therefore controlling access to them could create problems.

#### Intruder Alarms.

From the results from the physical survey, the number of premises with an intruder alarm system fitted was almost 40%. This, with the exception of the Mall Area was based on a count of the number of external Sounder Boxes visible fixed to the front of the premises. A separate count of alarm Sounder Boxes visible at the rear of the premises produced a lower figure In the Mall, it is understood, the majority of premises have Intruder Alarm Systems linked to a Central Station. Fig 4 summarises the results for both the front and rear. The statistical tests suggests that intruder alarms systems may be a deterrent but this deterrent effect may be outweighed by other features, such as, ease of entry, attractiveness of target etc.

#### Bars, shutters etc. on premises.

Physical security in the form of bars, shutters etc. on doors and windows appear to provide a more effective deterrent when fitted at the front rather than the rear of premises. This may be because intruders may be able to spend more time overcoming these measures at the rear than the front

## Flats above premises.

The presence of flats above the premises i.e. 'Living above the shop.' can be expected to have two deterrent effects. The first a potential physical presence immediately adjacent to the business after hours and the second an increased number of people in the area after business hours. Comparison of the results for Erith, which has the lowest fraction of flats above and also the highest overall rate of burglary with the other areas, suggests the second effect may be true. Unfortunately, the numbers are too small to be conclusive. The evidence in support of the first is less conclusive and would require a special survey to check whether residents paid much attention to their retail /commercial neighbours.

## CCTV.

The results for the Mall and Core in Bexleyheath suggest that a centrally operated CCTV system provide a blanket deterrent effect for an area. The evidence for the protection offered by individual systems to premises was inconclusive due to the low number of systems in use and with little indication that they were being monitored.

The need to include the rear of the premises in the camera coverage should be considered.

#### • Mall.

The results from Bexleyheath suggest that enclosed shopping malls, with resident security guards and built in security, appear to provide an effective blanket protection against burglary of the individual premises. No system is perfect and premises with direct access to the surrounding streets may be at risk. The increasing trend towards long hours opening may reduce the level of security by providing opportunities for 'customers' of an open premise to attack a closed premise.

#### c. Cost of Burglary

A minority of the responses from the postal survey provided an indication of the cost of burglary. This ranged from £30 to £25,000 per annum with a mean of around £5,000. This is twice the figure of £2,000 for burglary of retail premises suggested by the BRC. The difference in value may be due to sample size.

#### 5.3 Shoplifting.

Is a major, if not the major, crime problem in the five town centres. The results from the survey suggest that the majority of the retail premises, and some of the others, have apparently suffered from this form of customer theft at least during the period of the survey.

Initially shoplifting was not included in the list of perceived problems in the Postal Survey. However, due to the number of written comments received in the returns to the Postal Survey of Bexleyheath and Erith, it was included in the surveys of Crayford and Sidcup.

## a. Frequency of shoplifting.

Table 9 summarises the evidence for the occurrence of shoplifting, from the Postal Survey and the Police Records. A Chi Squared Test on the data from the Postal Survey provided a value of 11.86 for 14 degrees of freedom. This suggests that there is reasonable correlation between the perceived rate and frequency of shoplifting from the Postal survey.

Table 9. Evidence for the occurrence of shotuifting in the town centi-es.												
	Mall	Core	NCE	NCW	Bexley heath	Crayford	Erith	Sidcup	Welling	Total		
All premises. No	47	44	20	58	169	50	40	62	124	440		
Retail, retail only	43	29	10	25	107	39	30	31	92	299		
Postal Survey: Per	ceived	proble	m or c	ommei	nt on sl	10plifti	ng					
No	21*	14*	3*	_5*	43	14	9*	20	18*	104		
% All premises	44.7	31.8	15.0	8.7	25.4	28	22.5	32 <b>.3</b>	14.5	23.6		
% Retail	48.8	48.3	. 30	_20	40.2	35 <b>.9</b>	30	64.5	19.6	34.8		
Postal survey: Fre	quency	of sho	pliftin	g								
At least once	33	25	7	20	85	20	25	25	55	210		
% All premises	70.2	56.8	35.0	34.5	50.2	40.0	62.5	40.3	44.4	47.2		
% Retail	76.7	86.2	70.0	80.0	79.4	51.3	83.3	80.6	59.8	70.2		
More than once	30	19	<sup>"</sup> 6	14	69	14	19	<u>17</u>	40	15 <u>9</u>		
% All premises	63.8	43.2	30.0	24.1	40.8	28.0	47.5	27.4	32.3	36.1		
% Retail	69.8	65.5	60.0	56.0	64.5	35.9	63.3	54.8	43.5	53.2		
Police records: Re	corded	rate o	f shopl	ifting_a	ll prem	ises						
Rate all	4.18	0.46			1 130	<u>_0J2</u> ′	<u>T0157</u>	Γ <u>0.</u> 20	1 0.17	0.51		

<sup>•</sup> No. of comments received regarding problem of shoplifting.

The Police Records produce a totally different picture. This suggests that the problem of shoplifting is virtually confined to the enclosed Mall at Bexleyheath. With the Mall having a rate of occurrence of four cases per premise per annum and in the rest of the areas a rate of one case per premises per four to six years.

The figures from the national surveys support the results from the postal survey. The Home Office Commercial Victimisation Study® suggests that on average 47% of retailers were subject to customer theft (shoplifting) at least once. The Study also indicates a figure of 64% for indoor shopping centres (Malls?). The British Retail Consortium survey suggests approximately 17 occurrences of shoplifting per retail outlet per annum.

The possible reasons for the difference between the figures from the Postal Survey and the Police are:

- The majority of cases of shoplifting go undetected.
- The majority of the culprits get away without being caught.
- The value of the goods stolen, in each case, is often small.
- The majority of cases are seldom reported to the Police.
- Because of lack of evidence, the Police may not formally record the case.

The variation within the Police Records between the Mall and elsewhere may be due to the following:

- The majority of the premises in the Mall are major chains with specific policies on shoplifting.
- · Police officers are specifically assigned to the Mall.
- The premises in the Mall have in -house CCTV and Security Guards, therefore a higher rate of detection of the event and identification of the culprit is possible.

- Shopping Malls and similar centres often act as loci for organised gangs of shoplifters and therefore sustained police activity to combat such attacks may be justified.
- The Mall has a centralised management system and organisation that encourages reporting of crime.

It is also worth noting that the Postal Return from the Mall placed great emphasis on a possible link between teenagers loitering and shoplifting. This link was not evident in the returns from the other town centres. The link is discussed in detail in the separate section of this report covering Bexleyheath.

#### b. Prevention of shoplifting.

The returns from the Postal Survey suggest that the majority of owners/operators are aware of the appropriate measures to combat shoplifting. Table 10 lists the percentage distribution of the various measures favoured in the town centres.

Table 10 Anti-shoplifting /customer theft provisions - including non retail premises												
Security	Mall	Core	NCW	NCE	Erith	Crayfor	Sidcup	Welling				
Provisions						d		<u> </u>				
Security	74.2	10.3	0	10	33.6	0	Ö	1.5				
Guards												
Store Detective	16.3	6.9	8	0	10.3	0	3.2	0.8				
Training	67.4	44.8	44	20	51.4	24	41.9	20.2				
Internal CCTV	30.23	31	20	10	26.16	8	19.4	10.5				
Tags	27.91	14.1	0	10	18.7	0	6.5	1.5				
Low displays	62.8	41.4	48	50	52.3	34	38.7	24.2				
Till position	79	34.5	4	50	46.7	36	48.4	25				

The use of measures such as Security Guards, Store Detectives, CCTV and Tags tend to be restricted to the larger premises. The numbers involved are too small to apply statistical tests; for example, CCTV is installed in only 41 of the retail premises.

Measures to give a good view of the premises, such as placement of the cash tills at the rear of the premises and maintaining of Island Displays below shoulder level, are more widespread, see Table 11. Statistical tests suggest that these features have a significant influence on the rate of shoplifting.

Overall, the results suggest that measures to increase the real or apparent surveillance of the premises are likely to be successful deterrents. Such measures may only be successful if they are supported by a positive management policy to prosecute offenders.

Table 11. Shoplifting: Influence of internal layout

	Frequen	cy of shopl	ifting			Statistica	l Information
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Yearly	Never	$X^z$	Significance
Till Positio	n,				•	Value	
Front	14	14	10	5	6	38.82	The X <sup>2</sup> value exceeds the
Middle	7	22	14	13	4	with	critical value of 32.91 at the
Rear	11	20	17	18	21	12 df	0.001 level, Therefore till
Multiple	9	3	2	0	0	7	position have a significant
Total	41	59	43	36	31		effect on shoplifting
Island Disp	olays				•		
None	5	12	12	25	28	54.33	The X <sup>2</sup> value exceeds the
Waist	8	26	11	10	9	with	critical value of 26.12 at the
Height	1	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	1		8df	0.001 level, Therefore island
Shoulder	12	20	17	8	12	7	displays have a significant
Height		.]					effect on shoplifting
Total	45	58	40	43	49	7	

Very few of the returned postal questionnaires provided an answer to the cost of shoplifting. The available survey data on costs and size and type of premises suggests a potential relationship between premises size and loss, as follows:

Large supermarkets/multiples

£100,000 -£1,500,000 per annum

Medium sized multiples

£1,500 -£5,000 per annum

Small individual shops

£100- £1,000 per annum.

There appears to be very little correlation between type of shop and rate of shoplifting.

The overall figures for number of incidents and cost of shoplifting are not too different from the National figures from the Retail Crime Costs Survey for 1995/96. This suggests approximately 17 incidents per outlet at approximately £130 per incident i.e. approximately £2,250 per premises per year.

The cost of prevention is also an unknown. Reducing display heights may reduce turnover due to less stock on display. Changing layouts to improve surveillance can also be expensive unless it is included as part of a general overhaul of the shop. The cost of CCTV systems suitable for use in small premises is reducing. Simple CCTV systems can be purchased for around a £1000.

The use of CCTV has also the advantage that if the system is set up and managed properly, the recordings may be accepted as evidence in prosecutions.

#### 5.4. Vandalism

Vandalism or criminal damage occurs throughout the five areas. What is perceived as vandalism will vary from minor damage, which can be quickly be made good at little or no cost, to major incidents requiring, for example, the replacement of a complete shop front. Vandalism may occur within or external to the premises. The Police treat as Criminal Damage incidents that cost £25 or more to repair.

#### a. Occurrence of Vandalism

Table 12, compares the perceived problem and frequency of vandalism with the rate of criminal damage recorded by the Police.

Table 12. Evidence for the occurrence of vandalism in the town centres.

	Mail	£00	UI <b>Q</b>	Mo z	X *	<b>.</b> ■ <b>.</b> Od	Ш	а <b>3</b>	™ W	BoL
Sample Size	47	_44	20	58	169	50	40	62	124	445
Postal Survey: Perceived problem	n of	Vanc	alisn	<u> </u>						
No	2	5	5	L	_	15		13	23	98
% All premises	4.26	11.3	<b>25</b> .0	24.1	15.3	30.0	52.5	20.9	18.5 <sub>1</sub>	22.0
		6	0	_4	_ 8	0	_ 0		5	2
Postal survey: Frequency of van	<u>dalis</u>	<u>m</u>								
At least once	9	14	11	23	55	25	26	26	58	190
% All premises	19.1	31.8	55.0	39.6	32.5	50.0	65.0	41.9	46.7	42.7
	5	2	0	6	4	0	0	4	7	_0
More than once	8	6	4.	10	28	. 8	11	8	24	
% All premises	17.0	13.6	20.0	17.2	16.5	16.0	27.5	12.9	19.3	0.00
	2	4	0	4	7	0	0	0	5	
Police records: Recorded rate of	crim	inal (	dama	age.						
Rate for all premises	0.18		•	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.17	0.14	0.18	0.17

The main points to note are:

- The perceived rate is much lower than the frequency of occurrence of vandalism, especially in the Mall..
- The frequency of occurrence is lowest in the Mall.
- The police Records suggest a constant rate of Criminal Damage throughout the town centres.

In comparison, the Home Office study suggested a 22% rate of Criminal Damage against retailers.

#### b. Prevention of vandalism.

Table 13 is a summary of possible features, which might influence vandalism, derived from the survey data, together with their statistical significance.

From Tables 12 and 13, it would appear that the features, which influence vandalism, are similar to those that influence burglary.

#### For example:

- Table 12 indicates that enclosed Malls appear to be effective deterrents.
- Table 13, indicates that the presence of intruder alarms, 'living above the shop' and most importantly, the ease of access to the rear of the premises and the amount of cover at the rear appear to be significant. A possible reason for this correlation may be because some attacks of vandalism are the results of attempted burglary.

#### c. Cost of Vandalism.

From the returns to the survey, the cost of vandalism appeared to vary between £20 and £1500 per event.

Table 13. Features which influence vandalism.													
		То	wn	Cei	ntre	•						formation	
		NCE	NCW	Core	Erith	Crayfor	aidcup	Welling	Total	%of Total		Comment	
Total	Vandalise d							57	3		8	X* value is greater than 0.001 value of 22.46	
	Non Van	10	15	40	14	15	12	35	<b>14</b> 1	100		therefore it is very likely the vandalised and non- vandalised samples are different.	
Front of premi	ses.												
Alarm visible at front	Van	6	17	8	15	14	14	36	<b>11</b> 0	60.0	19.8 <b>2</b>	X <sup>2</sup> value is greater than 0.01 value of 16.81	
	Non Van	5	21	24	9	11	6	16	92	65.0		therefore it is likely that alarms sounders visible at the front may influence the occurrence of vandalism	
Flats above	Vandalise d					20					2	X^value is greater than 0.01 value of 16.81 therefore it is likely that	
	Non Van	1	17	8	3	10	4	16	59	42.0		flats a above may influence vandalism	
Physical security	Van	3	13	0	8	7	2	17	50	27.0	13.9 <b>0</b>	X^value is greater than 0.05 value of 12.59 therefore physical security at front may influence the occurrence of vandalism	

	Non Van	3	0	1	9	6	3	7	29		1	]						
External	Van	5	5	0	3	0	<u> </u>				9.37	X <sup>2</sup> value is less than 0.1						
lights at front	l an										1	value of 10.64 therefore it						
3	Non Van	1	4	4	0	0	1	0	10	87.0		is less likely that external						
												lights at the front may						
											İ	influence the occurrence						
	<u> </u>		<u> </u>		ليا			<u> </u>	<u> </u>			of vandalism						
Table 13. (con	t.) Feature						e v	and	alis		<u> </u>							
		10	wn	Ce						Statistic		nformation Comment						
		ĺ			l	Crayfor	9idcup	ing		Total	f -							
		빙	NCW	ore	rith	ray	당	e iii	Total									
		Įž	Ž	ŭ	Ē	ı	<u>9</u>		ĭ	ļ								
Rear of Premises																		
Easily	Van	6	13	11	7	15	14	31	97	53.0	1	X <sup>2</sup> value is greater than						
Identified		Ļ	_		Ļ	Ļ	Ļ	45			6	0.001 value of 22.46						
from rear	Non Van	4	20	22	4	8	3	15	76	54.0		therefore it is very likely that the ability to identify						
										ļ		the premises from the						
							l			[		rear may influence the						
								•				occurrence of vandalism						
Overlooked	Van	4	3	3	0	21	4	38	73	40.0	19.1	X* value is greater than						
by		<u> </u>									2	0.01 value of 16.81						
pedestrians	Non Van	0	3	9	3	11	0	16	42	30.0		therefore it is likely being						
												overlooked by						
												pedestrians at the rear may influence the						
												occurrence of vandalism						
Access by	Van	11	13	13	10	17	17	34	11	63.0	16.6	X*value is almost equal						
vehicle									5		7	to the 0.01 value of						
	Non Van	4	25	26	5	12	9	29	11	78.0		16.81 therefore it is likely						
									0			that easy access by						
			1									vehicles may influence						
												the occurrence of vandalism						
Cover	Van	11	16	12	9	16	20	41	12	69.0	16.0							
provided by	Vali	' '	10	12	٦	10	20	4'	5		9	X^value is greater than 0.05 value of 12.59						
walls etc	Non Van	9	23	21	4	12	12	21	_	72.0	_	therefore cover at the rear						
									2			may influence the						
												occurrence of vandalism						
Alarm at rear	Van	2	7	5	5	8	6	14	47			X^ value is more than 0.1						
		_									5	value of 10.64 therefore a						
	Non Van	2	11	22	1	7	8	18	69	49.0		visible alarm at the rear						
					ĺ							may influence the						
Open yard	Van	R	12	11	1	11	5	17	65	36.0	10.7	occurrence of vandalism X^ value is greater than						
open yara	v an	"	'-	' '}	'	' '	١٦	''	J	30.0	7	the 0.1 value of 10.64						
									·		<b>'</b>	therefore it is likely that						
												an open yard at the rear						
												may influence the						
	1	1			- 1		_ [			•		occurrence of vandalism						

	Non Van	2	20	23	1	6	5	17	74	52.0		
Overlooked	Van	1	1	0	0	21	0	49	72	39.0	8.80	X^value is less than 0.1
by Neighbours	Non Van	0	5		0	12	0	29	48	34.0		value of 10.64 therefore it is less likely being overlooked by neighbours may influence the occurrence of vandalism
External lights at rear	Van	2			5						6.77 1	X* value is much less than 0.1 value of 10.64
	Non Van	1	11	18		:	8	12	58	41.0		therefore it is very likely that external lights at the rear do not influence the occurrence of vandalism
Till at front	Van	4			3			9	33	18.0	2.93 1	The X <sup>1</sup> values are all less than the 0.1 value of
	Non Van	5	4			_	_2	4	25			10.64 suggesting that till
Till at middle	Van	2	3	3	6	0	4	9	27	15.0	9.52 4	position etc. have very little influence on
L	Non Van	2	4	11	2	1	2	5	27	19.0		vandalism. However, the
Till at rear	Van	2	7	4	8	13	10	22	66	36.0	9.42 6	variation of the value with regard to till position
	Non Van	2		10			4	16	60	43.0		suggests there may be
Multiple tills	Van	0	3	1	5	0	5	4	18	10.0	5.19 3	some overall influence.
	Non Van	0	6	5 2	2		3	2	18	13.0		
Till screened	Van	2	2	2	6		10	8	34	19.0	6.51 9	
	Non Van	0	2	7	9	5	6	11	40	28.0		

#### 5.5 Other Crimes.

Tables 3 and 4 provided an indication of the other crimes and incivilities which have been identified in the survey. From Table 3, teenagers loitering, litter and theft from or of a car are perceived as problems, i.e. more than 20% of responses, in the five town centres. From Table 4, assaults or threats to staff and credit card fraud appear common.

Many problems, such as drugs, drunks etc which are often perceived as problems by the users of town centres are not perceived as such by the owners/ managers of the retail and commercial premises. It is not clear if this is due to a low frequency of occurrence or the problems do not impact on the retail and commercial properties.

From the comments in the Postal Survey, teenagers loitering are associated with shoplifting in the Mall but with general misbehaviour, vandalism etc elsewhere.

There is one possible conflict between the perceived and actual returns. The perceived ieveJs of mugging /violence and racial motivated attacks are low but the rate of assaults or threats to staff is high.

The Police Records also indicate a low rate of assaults in the area.

Although these crimes are problems, the project was not designed to investigate these in detail and therefore they are not commented in detail within this report.

6.0. Individual Town Centre Reports.

The individual reports for the case of each town centre are in Annex B. These provide more detail for each town centre and comment on individual problems associated with the town centre. They were produced during the course of the project and were drawn on to provide the information body of this report

#### 7.0 Conclusion.

#### The project has:

- Provided information to supplement and confirm the rather sparse information on crime rates for retail and commercial premises in town centres.
- Demonstrated that the crime rate as perceived by owners/operators of retail and commercial premises may provide a reasonable estimate of the actual rate of crime as it affects these premises. (Note this differs from the marked differences noted in the BCS between fear of crime and the actual crime rate.)
- As with the BCS, the Police figures for most recorded crimes against property are only a fraction of the actual rate of these crimes.
- The rate of occurrence of many crimes against retail and commercial properties in town centres is apparently influenced by aspects of the layout and planning of these centres. Consequently, much of the theory behind Crime Prevention through Environmental Design is applicable.
- Provided a first indication of the different risks of burglary of retail commercial premises in different forms of town centre.
- Demonstrated the potential effectiveness of enclosed Malls, CCTV etc and pinpointed potential security weaknesses in traditional shopping streets.
- Demonstrated the effectiveness of changing the internal layout of retail premises to increase surveillance.

#### The results suggest that:

'Retail and commercial premises most a risk from burglary or vandalism are those situated in an open town centre with minimum residential accommodation, without alarm or CCTV coverage, and with a secluded rear yard open to vehicle traffic'.

#### 8. Acknowledgements.

The author thanks the members of the Steering Group and the members of the Special Constabulary in the Bexley Division of the Metropolitan Police Service for their help in collecting the data.

#### 9. References.

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- 5. Farrington, D. P & Burrows, J.N. (1993). Did Shoplifting Really Decrease? The British Journal of Criminology Vol. 33, No. 1
- 6. Newman, O. (1972) Defensible Space People & Design in the Violent city. New York: Macmillan

Bexley Town Centre Security Project

Figures

Source of data

Percaption Day
Owners Records


Town centres

Fig1. Occurrence of burglary. Comparision of data from different sources

0 Perception DayPerception Nigl\*P Ow ners Recor-O Police Records


	Man	Core	NCEast	NCWest	Bith	Welting	Crayford	SkJcup.	BexleyHth
Perception Day	2.13	6.62	15	29.31	55	20	24	14.15	14.2
Perception Night	0	13.64	25	34.48	62.5	24	28	8.06	18.34
Owners Records	4.26	20.45	30.00	36.20	50.00	36.00	30.00	27.42	22.48
<sup>1</sup> Police Records	7.27	7.9	7.9	7.90	16.67	6.3	16.67	23.6	14.75

ig 2: Influence on Burglary Rate of Premises with Physical Security at front




	Mall	Core	NC East	NC West	BexleyHea th	Crayford	Erith	Sidcup	Welling	Total All
11	27.66	18.18	30	18.97	22.49	22	87.5	14.52	26.61	23.37
	4.26	20.45	30	36.21	22.49	30	50	27.42	36.29	30.34
ted postal	0	12.5	33 33	45 45	23.68	18 18	42.86	33.33	27.27	33.65

Fig 3. Influence on Burglary rate of Alarm Sounders visible at Front or Rear of premises.




	Mall	Core	NC East	NC West	BexleyHeat h	Crayford	Erith	Sidcup	Welling	Total All
1 % Premises with alarms in postal sample	0.00	61.36	20.00	31.03	28.99	36.00	15.00	32.26	25.81	38.00
% Burgled in postal sample	4.26	20.45	30	36.21	22.49	30	50	27.42	36,29	30.34
% Burgled in premises with Alarms at rear	0	14.81	25	44.44	26.53	22.22	33.33	5	37.5	25.6
% Burgled in premises with Alarms at front	0	12.5	27.27	36.36	23.17	26.67	41.67	17.65	35.21	28.22

Fig 4. Influence of flats above the premises on Burglary Rate




Mall	Core	NC East	NC West	BexleyH eath	Crayford	Erith	Sid cup	Welling	Total AH
0	22.73	10	41.38	21.3	76	10	53.23	43.55	37.08
4.26	20.45	30	36.21	22.49	30	50	27.42	36.29	30.34
0	10	0	25	19.44	26.32	0	33.33	35.19	28.48

Fig 5: Influence of Internal Lights on Burglary Rate.




	Mall	Core	NC East	NC West	BexleyHe ath	Crayford	Erith	Sid cup	Welling	Total All
tat sample	25.53	31.82	15	44.83	32.54	52	5	46.77	52.42	39.78
	4.26	20.45	30	36.21	22.49	30	50	27.42	36.29	30.34
t Lights	0	35.71	0	26.92	23.64	30.77	50	24.14	40	31.07

Fig 6: Influence of cover at rear on Burglary Rate



	Mall	Core	NC East	NC West	BexleyHe ath	Crayford	Erith	Sidcup	Welling	Total All
ostal sample	100	75	55	67.24	76.92	72	72.5	85.48	64.52	73.71
	4.26	20.45	30	36.21	22.49	30	50	27.42	36.29	30.34
>ver at rear	0	27.27	45.45	33.33	22.31	27.78	41.38	28.3	38.75	29.57

Fig 7. Influence on burglary of premises with rear access by vehicle.



	Mall	Core	NC East	NC West	BexleyHe ath	Crayford	Erith	Sidcup	Welling	Total All
jss in postal sample	0	88.63636	80	41.37931	46.74556	74	40	64.51613	64.51613	56.62921
	4.26	20.45	30	36.21	22.49	30	50	27.42	36.29	30.34
shicle Access	0	41.02564	43.75	62.5	48.10127	29.72973	12.5	35	42.5	39.28571

# **Bexley Town Centre Security Projects**

## Annex 2

## The Individual Town Centre Reports.

Part A.	The Bexleyheath town centre survey	Pages BH1 - BH13
Part B.	The Erith town centre survey.	Pages E1 - E6.
Part C.	The Welling town centre survey	Pages W1 - W6.
Part D.	The Crayford town centre survey.	Pages C1 - C6.
Part E.	The Sidcup town centre survey.	Pages S1 - S7.

Part A. The Bexleyheath Town Centre Survey.

- 4. Details.
  - Period of the survey.

The survey of Bexleyheath was undertaken during the period Tuesday 16 - Friday 19 March 1996.

- Physical makeup.

Bexleyheath is made up of some 250 retail or business premises, running west to east along the original Watling St. For the purpose of the survey and subsequent analysis it was considered to be made up of four distinct areas:

- The Mall a modern purpose built enclosed shopping mall of 55 premises occupying the SE corner of the area.
- The Core Area a pedestrianised area of 55 premises, lying immediately to the North and West of the Mall.
- The Non-Core West a traditional shopping area of some 100 premises lying on both sides of Watling Street, immediately to the West of the pedestrianised area.
- The Non-Core East- a smaller traditional shopping area of 36 premises immediately to the East of the Mall. Much of the area is due for redevelopment.

There is also an open air Bus Station at the NE comer of the town adjacent to the Core A and Non-Core East areas.

- Results of the Surveys

Table BH1 summarises the mix of businesses in the area, derived from the physical survey and Table BH2 the equivalent mix derived from the postal survey. Overall the return from the postal survey, approximately 70%, was very good and reflects both the interests of the traders in the survey and the efforts made by the police to ensure the returns.

On inspection the Bexleyheath town centre provides a microcosm of the national mix of town centre shopping areas, i.e. a modem shopping mall linked to a pedestrianised area surrounded by traditional shopping streets.

However some differences exist, for example the low number of fast food outlets within the Mall proper, no open air market area and few, if any, street stalls/traders. The trading hours, at the time of the survey, may be more traditional and more restrictive than those practised in many of the larger more modem town centre. The majority of the premises tend to open 6 days per week with a single late night shopping night and Sunday opening in the Mall and immediate surrounding area.

- Level of security.

The level of security varies across the area. It ranges from the very high levels collectively provided in the Mall, through the pedestrianised /CCTV monitored areas of the Core, to the lower almost non-existent levels of physical security apparently provided by many of individual premises in the non-core areas.

This variation, when compared with the differing crime patterns for the four sub-areas, underlines the need for dearer guidance on the cost effectiveness of the available security measures.

In particular the benefits of individual security i.e. depending solely on locks and bolts against collective security as provided by security guards backed by CCTV needs to be explored-

Table BH1. Premises mix, derived from Physical survey

Business Classification	Retail	Enter.	Finance	Office	Service	Other	Vacant	Total
The Mall	·····							
Number	49	1	1	0	3	0	1	55
%	89	2	2	0	5	0.	1	100
Core								
Number	34	2	9	3	6	0	1	55
%	61.8	3.6	16.4	5.5	10.9	0	1.8	100
Non Core West								
Number	40	13	7	15	13	3	7	98
%	41	13	7	14	13	3	7	100
Non-Core East								
Number	13	5	0	6	6	0	6	36
%	36	14	0	17	17	0	17	100
TOTAL								
Number	130	21	15	23	35	3	$\mathbf{r'}$	244
<b>%</b>	53.3	8.5	6.1	9.0	14.3	1.;	70	99.9

Table BH2 - Make up of the returns from the Postal Survey.

Business Classification	Retail	Enter.	Finance	Office	Service	Other	Total	% of Physical
The Mall	L			•				<u>'</u>
Number	43	1	0	0	3	0	47	85.5
%	91.4	2.1	0	0	6.4	0	99.9	
Core	-		-	•				
Number	29	1	7	I	6	0	44	80.0
%	65.9	2.3	15.9	2.3	13.6	0	100	
Non Core Wes	t							
Number	25	8	5	10	9	1	58	59.2
%	43.1	13.8	8.6	17.2	15.5	1.7	99.9	
Non-Core East	ţ							
Number	10	3	_0	3	4	0	20	55.6
%	50.0	15.0	0	15.0	20.0	0	100	
TOTAL								
Number	107	13	12 .	14	23	1	170	69.7
%	62.9	7.6	7.1	8.2	13.5	0.6	99.9	

## 5.0 Crime patterns.

Both the available police records and returns from the survey suggest a lower than the national average rate for crimes of non-domestic burglary, vandalism etc. for the whole area, (see Section in main body of the Report.) This may be a direct consequence of the fact that almost half the premises fall within the high security area of the Mall and surrounding CCTV monitored area. The police records show that the installation of the CCTV has reduced the number of burglaries from 73 prior to installation in 1993 - 94 to 50 in 1994-95.

The initial analysis of the returns for Bexleyheath has triggered the following commentary for the crimes of shoplifting, burglary of retail premises and vandalism.

# 5.1. Shoplifting.

- The figures.

A major problem identified by the postal survey is shoplifting. Although shoplifting is a major problem nationally, it was not specifically included in the list of perceived problems in the Postal Survey, Q3. This omission was because the initial intention was to concentrate on crimes related to factors external to the premises rather than internal. The omission was rectified in part by the returns received to the Postal Survey. In their written comments 43 retailers specifically identified shoplifting as a problem, and 52 indicated it as occurring frequently, i.e. at least once a week, in their replies to Question 4 of the Postal Survey.

AH these replies were from retail premises. As a corollary, none of the returns from the other premises classifications indicated shoplifting as a problem. I.e. we can assume minimum confusion in the minds of the respondents over what is meant by shoplifting.

The comments also suggested a strong perceived link between shoplifting; teenagers loitering and the position of the bus station and the school bus drop off points.

Table BH3 gives a detail breakdown of the statistics for retail premises in the Physical and Postal Surveys. The statistics for shoplifting and teenagers loitering are given in Table BH4

Table BH3. Statistics for Retai	l premise	s in the P	hysical ar	nd Postal	survey.
	Mall	Core	NC West	NC East	Total
Total Physical	55	55	98	36	244
% Row	22.5	22.5	40.2	14.8	100
Total Postal	48	44	57	21	170
% Row	28.2	25.9	33.5	12.4	100
Retail premises in Physical Survey					
No. of retail	49	34	40	13	136
% of Row	36	25	29.4	9.6	100
% of Retail /Total Physical.	89.0	61.8	40.8	36.1	55.7
Retail premises in Postal Survey					
No. retail	43	29	25	10	107
% Row	40.2	27.1	23.4	9.3	100
% Retail / Physical Retail	89.6	65.9	43.9	47.6	78.7

The figures indicate a higher rate of shoplifting in the Mall and Core areas, 50+% compared with the 40% rate for the two non-core areas. This is in broad agreement with the figures from the Home Office ( $^{()}$ ), which suggests a higher rate of shoplifting in indoor shopping centres and shopping precincts than in the traditional shopping streets.

The emphasis on shoplifting in the Mall is also underlined by the available police records for shoplifting, table BH4, which indicates almost 75% of the recorded events, occurred in the Mall. This increase may be due to the greater security; CCTV and resident security guards, providing a higher capture rate and /or an increased determination to prosecute.

In the Mall and Non-Core East areas and to a lesser extent the Core, the respondents who wene concerned about teenagers loitering also gave a high return for the frequency of shoplifting. In the Mall and Non-Core East the coincidence was 100% but lesser in the other two areas, see Table BH4. The return tends to support the perceived linkage, mentioned in the comments from many of the respondents, between teenagers loitering and shoplifting. As this perception is not supported by statistical tests of the results for the four areas, it would therefore appear to a problem mainly associated only with the Mall and Non-Core East.

Table BH4. Postal Survey - Occurrence of teenagers loitering and shoplifting.											
Event	Mall	Core	NC	NC	Total						

No. retail premises in postal	43	29	25	10	107							
Teenagers loitering as a perceiv	_		,	10								
All premises.	•											
Day No.	34	16	14	13	77							
Night No.	11	13	23	8	55							
Rear No.	4	10	18	13	45							
Retail premises only												
Day No	33	12	7	7	59							
Day % of retail	76.74	41.4	28.0	70.0	55.1							
Night No.	11	8	8	4	31							
Night % of retail	25.6	27.6	32.0	40.0	29.0							
Rear No.	4	4	10	7	25							
Rear % of retail	0.93	13.8	40.0	70	23.4							
Shoplifting as a perceived problem from Comments.												
No.												
% or Retail premises	48.8	48.3	20	30	40.2							
Frequency of Shoplifting from Postal Surv	vey returns.											
Daily /Weekly No.	22	16	10	4	52							
Daily/Weekly % of retail	51.2	55.2	40.0	40.0	48.6							
Daily /Weekly % Row	42.3	30.7	19.2	7.7	100							
Never No	2	1	2	0	5							
Never % of retail premises.	4.7	3.4	8	0	4.7							
Coincidence of Teenagers loitering and <0	ccurrence of S	hoplifting										
No.	22	9	5	4	40							
% of retail	51.2	31.0	20.0	40.0	37.4							
Police Records for Shoplifting -	May-16 I	une '96										
No.	52	7	10	1	70							
% Row	74.3	10	14.3	1.4	100							

The link between shoplifting and teenagers is also supported by research carried out by Farrington and  $Burrows^{(5)}$ .

#### - Anti- shoplifting provisions.

Table BH6 lists the various anti-shoplifting provisions employed in the four areas.

In the Mall area, from both surveys, there is a strong emphasis on the use of guards, internal CCTV, Electronic Tags and other shoplifting measures. However there is an apparent conflict between the two surveys on the frequency of display heights. The physical survey suggests that in over half of the premises the displays were at a least 'shoulder height', whereas in the postal survey 62.8% of the replies apparently relied on low displays for security. This could be due to a misinterpretation of what was meant by 'low displays' in the questionnaire. In the Physical Survey, 'shoulder height' was taken to be approximately 15 m. i.e. high enough to provide cover for a shoplifter to pocket goods etc.

			····	<del></del>	
Table BH4. Ant					
Security	Mail	Core	NC	NC	Total
<b>Provisions</b>			West	East	
	From Po	ostal Surv	ey		
Security Guards	32	3	0	1	36
%	74.2	10.3	0.0	10	33.6
Store	7	2	2	0	11
Detective					
%	16.3	6.9	8	0.0	10.3
Training	29	13	11	2	55
%	67.4	44.8	44	20	51.4
Internal CCTV	13	9	5	1	28
%	30.23	31.0	20	10	26.16
Tags	12	7	0	1	20
%	27.91	14.1	0.0	10	18.7
Low displays	27	12	12	5	56
%	62.8	41.4	48	50	52.3
Till position	34	10	1	5	50
%	79.0	34.5	4	50	46.7
		sical surve	•		
CCTV	10	8	2	0	12
%	23.3	27.6	8	0.0	11.2
Guards	2	0	0	0	2
%	4.65	0	0.0	0.0	1.9
Displays			_	_	
Shoulder	23	12	0	2	37
Height					
%	53.5	41.4	0.0	20	34.6
Waist Height	14	11	6	5	36
%	32.6	37.9	24	50	33.6
None	4	9	5	3	21
%	9.3	31.0	20	30	19.6

# - Cost of shoplifting.

Thirty of the returned postal questionnaires provided an answer to the cost of shoplifting. Table BH5 indicates the maximum and minimum cost of shoplifting provided in the returns.

Table BH 5.	Cost of Shoplift	ing (£)			
	Mall	Core	NC West	NC East	
Min	750	250	200	100	
Max	12800C)	10000	100000	900	

The available survey data on costs and size and type of premises suggests a potential linear relationship between floor area and loss, as follows:

Small individual shops

£250 per annum.

There appears to be very little correlation between type of shop and rate of shoplifting.

The overall figures for number of incidents and cost of shoplifting are not too different from the National figures from the Retail Crime Costs Survey for 1995/96. This suggests approximately 17 incidents of customer theft per outlet at approximately £130 per incident.

#### - Discussion

The majority of current crime prevention advice for domestic premises e.g. the Police Secured by Design Scheme, is based on the control of space and keeping out unauthorised people (e.g. the theories of defensible space developed by Newman <sup>(6)</sup> and others).

The same principles can be applied to non-domestic premises, but the application to shoplifting poses specific problems. For example, the majority of the owners/operators of retail premises want to attract the public into the premises. Therefore the majority of physical methods of defence are not applicable during opening hours and greater reliance has to be placed on either direct visual supervision or apparent supervision by means of CCTV, layout of premises etc.

From the results for Bexleyheath, it is difficult to draw conclusions as to what is more effective as a deterrent. A simple interpretation of the results suggest that as the rate of shoplifting is apparently higher in the Mall, with its greater reliance on CCTV and Guards, that these may not be as effective as direct supervision and layout However, other factors such as type of goods, location etc. confound the situation.

The perceived cross-linking of the shoplifting with teenagers loitering and the proximity of the bus station/ school bus pickup point exemplifies this defensible space argument.

We can surmise that the pedestrianised area was provided to give safer /easier access to the adjacent premises. However no obvious ownership of the area was established and it was created essentially as a public area. The LA has the responsibility for maintenance and the Police for its protection but there is no strong 'ownership' sdefined i.e. it is not part of the shopping mall and is a purely public space and part of the street. The teenagers/schoolchildren have found a new place to congregate, meet their friends, occasionally shop, possibly without paying. This had led to a perception amongst some of the traders that the area now 'belongs' to the teenagers and it is no longer 'safe'.

The question is how to reverse this trend and recover the 'ownership' of this space. The installation of me CCTV was/is the first step in this recovery.

Other possible actions to reverse this perception:

- Increase police patrols etc., as suggested in many of the replies to the postal questionnaire.
- Provide alternative gathering places for the teenagers.
- Remove the initial need for the school children to be in the vicinity by arranging bus pick-up points at the school and after school facilities for doing homework in the school rather than the public library.

This may have to be followed by positive steps to establish 'ownership' by the intended users, for example placing of kiosks and allowing trading in the open area. However before any decision is made on the appropriate action, it is suggested a more detailed study of shoplifting in the area is required to establish this perceived link between teenagers and shoplifting and the solutions are discussed with the schools and teenagers involve

The term ownership when used in this context does not necessarily mean actual legal ownership. It can be, and very often is, a perceived ownership resulting from an individual's relationship with the environment. Office workers, for instance, may feel a sense of ownership for the office in which they work or shopkeepers with the pavement immediately outside their shop.

#### 5.2 Burglary

#### - The figures.

The responses to the postal questionnaire on the perception of burglary are a direct reflection of the level **of** overall night-time security available to the premises, see Table BH6. This perception is fully supported when we examine in detail the data from the both the postal and physical surveys. Slightly less than a quarter (39) of the responses from the Postal Survey indicated that the premises had been burgled at least once a year. The overall rate of burglary appears to be below the National figure for Retail premises. The BRC Report for  $95/96^{0.5}$  suggests approximately 40% of all retail premises are burgled **annually.** 

Table BH6. Perception of risk of burglary from Postal Survey

Area	Number (%) who see burglary as a problem	Total number of responses.
Mall	0 (0%)	47
Core	6 (10.4%)	44
NC West	20 (34.5%)	58
NCEast	5 (23.8%)	21

Table BH7 provides a breakdown of the mix of burgled premises.

Table BH7. Burgled premises by classification											
<del>.</del>	Retail	Enter.	Office	Financial	Service	Other	Total				
Number	21	5	6	2	4	1	39				
% of total	54	12.8	15.4	5.1	10.3	2.6	100.2				

#### - Cost of Burglary

From the postal survey, seventeen of the respondents provided an indication of the cost of burglary. This ranged from £40 to £25,000 per annum with an average of just over £4000. This is twice the figure of £2,000, for burglary of retail premises from the latest BRC Report<sup>(3)</sup>. The difference may be due to the difference in sample size.

#### - Security provisions.

Table BH8 compares the occurrence of security and other features between the 37 burgled premises in the Core and two non-core areas with the occurrence of these features across all the surveyed premises in these three areas.<sup>6</sup>

	Bursled	<u>l premises</u>			<u>. i</u>	Non -B	urgle <u>d</u> pren	nises		
Item	NC East	NC West	Core	Total Burg		NC East	NC West	Core	Total Non	Effect
No.	6	21	10	37	No.	.30	76_	45 _	151	
<u>%</u> Total	16.2	56.8	27.0	100	%	19.9	50.3	29.8	100	
Premises wit	<u>th F</u> lats abo	ve			·		<u>-                                    </u>			
No.	0	6	1	7	No.	3	35	11	49	
%Total	0	16.2	2.7	18.9	%	2.0	23.2	7.3	32.4	Positive
Premises wi	th alarm vis	sible at fron	t.	•						
No.	3	11	4	18	No.	18	45	36	99	
%Total	8.1	29.7	10.8	48.6	%	11.9	29.8	23.8	65.6	Positive

The Mall has been omitted because of the special security provisions in force. Despite these, it is worth noting that the response to the postal survey indicates that two premises in the Mall have been burgled.

Premises with	CCTV cov	erage at Fr	ont							
No.	0	0	10	10	No.	5	5 .	45	55	
V.Total	0	0	27.0	27.0	.%	3.3	3.3	29.8	36.4	Positive
Premises with	<u> </u>	<u> </u>						·		
No.	3	3	0	6	No.	10	12 .	5	27	
%Total	8.1	8.1	0	16.2	%	6.6	7.9	3.3	17.9	Neutral
Premises with	internal lig	hts								
No.	0	7	5	12	No.	0	30	13	49	
•/.Total	0 .	18.9	13.5	32.4	%	0	19.9	8.6	32.4	Neutral
Premises with	p <u>hys</u> ical se	curity at fr	ont _							
No.	1	3	1	5	No.	8	17	11	36	
%TotaI 1	2.7	8.1	3.7	13.5		4.2	9.0	5.9	19.1	Positive
Premises easily	y <u>identified</u>	from rear								
No.	3	6	14	23	No.	18	51	28	97	
%_Total1	1 <u>8.1</u>	16.2	37.8	62.2	%	11.9	33.8	18.5	64.2	Neutral
Access to rear	<u>bv Vehicle</u>									
No.	6	10	16	32	No.	18	51	33	102	ļ.,
% of Total	1 <u>0.</u> 8	27.0	43.2	86.5	_%	11.9	33.7	21.9	6 <u>7.5</u>	Neeativ
Open yard	.—									
No.	4	13	9	26	No.	13	39	32	84	
% of Total	10.8	35.2	24.3	70.3	<u>%</u>	8.6	25.8	21.2	55. <u>63</u>	<u>Negativ</u>
Overlooked b	<del></del>	ours			,		, <u></u>			
No.	1	1	1	3	No.	2	14	_13	. 29	<u> </u>
<u>% of Total</u>	2.7	2.7	2.7	8.1	%	1.3	9.3	8.6	19.2	Positive
Overlooked by					·			<del></del> -		
No.	3	3	2	8	No.	0	8	0	8	
%_of To <u>tal</u>	8.1	8.1	5.4	21.6	*/.	0	5.3	0	5.3	Negativ
Cover provide					·	,	,			
No.	5	7	12	24	No.	13	49	22	84	1
% of Total	13.5	18.9	32.4	64.5	<u>%</u>	8.6	32.5	14.6	55.6	Neutral?
Access Dossible			<u>via window</u>			<del></del>				
No	6_	9	12	27	No.	10	52	33	95	<b>!</b>
_%_ of Total		24.3	32.4	73.0	<u>%</u>	6.6	34.4	21.9	62.9	Neutral?
External lishts		<del></del>		<del></del>	т				<del> </del>	т
No.	1	6	6	_13	No.	6	26	26	58	
% of Total	2.7	16.2	16.2	35.1	%	64.0	17.2	17.2	38.4	Neutral
Alarm at rear					_			, <u> </u>		
No.	1	8	4	13	No.	14	16	19	<u>49</u>	ļ
% of Total	2.7	21.6	10.8	35.1	<u>%</u>	9.3	10.6	12.6	32.5	Neutral
CCTV at rear	_								,	г
No.	0	1	1	2	No.	3	1	1	5	ļ
% of Total	0	2.7	2.7	5.4	%	2.0	0.7	0.7	3.3	Neutral

Because of the limited numbers involved the results from the comparison need to be interpreted carefully. However, an inspection suggests that the following are possible positive deterrents to burglary:

- Presence of living accommodation /flats above the premises.
- An intruder alarm box visible on the front of the presence. (Note alarm box at rear does not appear to have a deterrent effect.)
- CCTV coverage at front of premises.
- Physical security in the form of grills, shutters etc. on the windows and doors.
- Rear of premises overlooked by neighbours.

Features, which may possibly encourage burglary, are:

- Easy access by vehicle to the rear of the premises.
- An open yard, but with cover provided by walls and bins. Rear of premises open to view by pedestrians.
- · Possible access at ground floor level, via window or door.

The presence of external or internal lights does not appear to alter the risk.

#### Discussion

Although some of the above features appear to conflict, particularly those applying to the rear of the premises, the following is a possible interpretation of the information.

'Retail and commercial premises most a risk from burglary are those with no living accommodation adjacent, without alarm or CCTV coverage, and with a secluded rear yard which is not overlooked by neighbours or passer- by.'

The proposed detailed crime surveys of actual burgled premises would help to confirm the accuracy of the above statement. The on-going surveys and analysis of the other areas will also improve the interpretation of the data. Apart from the extension of CCTV coverage, the results also suggest that security of many of the premises could possibly be improved by increasing the amount of living accommodation above the premises and also controlling ease of access to the areas at the rear of the premises.

This latter point again raises the question of the 'ownership' of property, in this case the 'semi-public' areas at the rear of the premises.

#### 53. Vandalism

Vandalism as a crime can take many forms. In its broadest form, vandalism is an action leading to damage to property or goods. The police record crimes of vandalism as crimes of physical damage if the value of the property damaged is greater than £25.

From the postal survey we have two measures of vandalism, one as a perceived problem and the other as an actual problem, see Table BH9.

From these results, there is a marked difference between the perception of vandalism in the occupiers of the four areas. Vandalism is perceived as lowest in the Mall area and highest in the two non-core areas, NCW and NCE. However when we examine the occurrence of vandalism a different picture occurs. The monthly rate of actual vandalism is virtually the same at approximately 13.5% for the four areas. This suggests 150-160 acts of vandalism per establishment per annum. For comparison, the BRC 95/96 (3) survey suggests a rate of 32 incidents of criminal damage for every 100 outlets.

The difference in rates is due to many things including under reporting, under recording, low cost of many incidents etc. The perceived levels of vandalism may also be because in the Mall, the effects of vandalism are presumably quickly cleared up.

Table BH9. Perceived via actual vandalism from Postal Returns

Area Perceived problem						Actual occurrence							
	T	Day	Night	Rear	Day	Week	Month	Annual	Never	DK	NR	]	
Mall	No	2	4	0	0	1	7	1	27	3	8	47	
	%	4.26	8.51	0.0	0.0	2.13	14.89	2.13	57.45	6.38	17.0 2		
Core	No	5	6	8	0	0	6	8	20	3	7	44	

	%	11.36	13.64	18.18	Ö	.0	13.64	18.18	45.45	6.82	ib.y	
NCW	No	14	17	19	1	2	7	13	18	4	13	58
	%	24.14	29.31	32.76	1.72	3.45	12.07	22.41	31.03	6.9	22.4	]
NCE	No	5	6	8	1	0	3	7	5	2	3	20
	%	25	30	40	5	0.0	15	35	25	10	1b	
Total	No	26	34	34	2	.3	23	29	70	12	31	169
	%	15.38	20.12	20.12	1.18	1.78	13.61	17.16	41.42	ΙÄ	18.3 4	

More interestingly is the apparent link in the replies between vandalism and teenagers loitering. Table BH10, lists the results for the perception of Teenagers loitering and Vandalism in the four areas. Of the four areas, it is only in the Non-Core West that there appears to be a link between both. This is supported by the results from statistical tests of association on the data and the comments received Jn a number of replies, particularly those from the NCW, attention was drawn to teenagers loitering around the pubs and this was associated with vandalism and other incivilities.

This is in contrast to the results for shoplifting where the replies from the Mall and Core suggested the link is between shoplifting and teenagers loitering. We therefore have to make sure that there is a real link between teenagers and the crime and that the teenagers are not just a convenient scapegoat.

Table BH10. Perceived occurrence of Teenagers loitering and Vandalism.

Area	Day		Night		Rear		Total
]	Teen.	Vand.	Teen.	Vand.	Teen.	Vand.	Sampl e
Mall	34	2	16	4	4	0	47
	72.34	4.26	34.04	8.51	8.51	0	100
Core	16	5	13	6	10	8	44
	36.36	11.36	29.55	13.64	22.73	18.18	100
NCW	14	14	23	17	18	19	58
_	24.14	24.14	39.66	29.31	31.03	32.76	100
NCE	13	5	8	6	13	8	20
	65	25	40	30	65_	40	100
Total	77	26	40	33	45	35	169
	45.56	15.38	23.67	19.53	26,63	20.71	100_

Table BH11 lists physical factors or security measures which apparently influences the occurrence of vandalism. Some are rather surprising; for example, physical security appears to increase the risk of vandalism. A possible reason is that the screens or shutters may provide a suitable target surface for spray painting.

Table BHII. Comparison of security provisions etc. and vandalism.											
,	Vandalised Non-vandalised									Possible	
	NCE NCW Core Mall Total NCE NCW Core Mall Total										
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Flats above		<u> </u>	<del>-</del>		10070_			· <u>·</u>	•	<del></del>	
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%					20.69		[	}		2SL2 <u>4</u>	
Alarm vis	ible at	front									
No	6	17_	8	?	33	5	21	24	6	56	None
%		L	<u> </u>	<u>l</u>	<u> 56.9</u>	<u>l                                     </u>	<u>i</u>		┸	<b>. 1</b> 54.37.	<u> </u>
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% External 1 No % Alarm at J No % CCTV at r	iants / lants / 2 ear 2 ear	at rear	7. 5.		19 32.76 14 ?414		11	18		30 57.28 35	Positive Positive
% External 1 No % Alarm at J No % CCTV at r No % Internal a	iants / lants / 2 ear 2 ear	at rear	7. 5.		19 32.76 14 ?414		11	18		30 57.28 35 33.98	Positive Positive
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% External 1 No % Alarm at I No % CCTV at r No % Internal a No %	iants / 2 cear 2 cear 1 arm 0	at rear 10 7	5		19 32.76 14 ?4.14 3 5.17 2 3.45	0	11 11 1	18   22   0   7		30 57.28 35 33.98 2 1.94 ft 7.77	Positive Positive Neaative Positive
% External 1 No % Alarm at I No % CCTV at r No % Internal a No % Internal C	iants / 2 cear 2 cear 1 arm 0	at rear 10 7	5		19 32.76 14 ?414 3 5.17 2 3.45	1	11	18		30 57.28 35 33.98 2 1.94 ft 7.77	Positive Positive Neaative
% External 1 No % Alarm at I No % CCTV at r No % Internal a No %	iants / 2 cear 2 cear 1 arm 0	at rear 10 7	5		19 32.76 14 ?4.14 3 5.17 2 3.45	0	11 11 1	18   22   0   7		30 57.28 35 33.98 2 1.94 ft 7.77	Positive Positive Neaative Positive
% External 1 No % Alarm at J No % CCTV at r No % Internal a No % Internal C Mo %	iants / cear 2 cear 1 arm 0 CTV	at rear 10 7 1	7 5 1 2		19 32.76 14 ?4.14 3 5.17 2 3.45 9 15.5?	0	11 1 1 1 2	18 22 0 7		30 57.28 35 33.98 2 1.94 ft 7.77	Positive  Neaative  Positive  Neaative
% External 1 No % Alarm at J No % CCTV at r No % Internal a No % Internal C Mo % Table BH	11.	at rear 10 7 11	7 5 1 2	arisor	19 32.76 14 ?4.14 3 5.17 2 3.45 9 15.5?	1 0 0 curity	11 11 1 1 2	18		30 57.28 35 33.98 2 1.94 ft 7.77	Positive  Neaative  Positive  Neaative  Neaative
% External 1 No % Alarm at No % CCTV at r No % Internal a No % Internal C Mo % Table BH	iants / iants / cear 2 cear 1 continuous for the co	at rear 10 7 1 1	7 5 1 2 4 Comp		19 32.76 14 ?414 3 5.17 2 3.45 9 15.5?	0 0 curity	11 11 1 2 provis	18	d	30 57.28 35 33.98 2 1.94 ft 7.77 14 7.77	Positive  Positive  Neaative  Positive  Neaative  Alism.  Effprt
% External 1 No % Alarm at No % CCTV at r No % Internal a No % Internal C Mo % Table BH	11.	at rear 10 7 1 1	7 5 1 2 4 Comp		19 32.76 14 ?4.14 3 5.17 2 3.45 9 15.5?	0 0 curity	11 11 1 2 provis	18	d	30 57.28 35 33.98 2 1.94 ft 7.77 14 7.77	Positive  Positive  Neaative  Positive  Neaative  Alism.  Effprt
% External 1 No % Alarm at J No % CCTV at r No % Internal a No % Internal C Mo % Table BH	iants / 2 cear 2 ear 1 larm 0 CTV 0 11. f ( /andai	at rear 10 7 1 1 2 5 ConU lised INC	7 5 1 2 Comp		19 32.76 14 ?4.14 3 5.17 2 3.45 9 15.5? of se	0 curity No	11 1 1 provis	18 22 0 7 17 sions dalised W JCo	d	30 57.28 35 33.98 2 1.94 ft 7.77 14 7.77	Positive Positive Neaative Neaative datism. Fffprt
% External 1 No % Alarm at No % CCTV at r No % Internal a No % Internal C Mo % Table BH	iants / 2 cear 2 ear 1 larm 0 CTV 0 11. f ( /andai	at rear 10 7 1 1	7 5 1 2 4 Comp		19 32.76 14 ?414 3 5.17 2 3.45 9 15.5?	0 curity Nor al NC	11 11 1 2 provis	18	d	30 57.28 35 33.98 2 1.94 ft 7.77 14 7.77	Positive Positive Neaative Neaative datism. Fffort

Till	L-II-										
Till mic		<del></del>	- T	<del></del>	T	<u> </u>	Т.	T	<del></del>		To the same
No	_ 2	3	3	<del> </del>	8	?	4	11		117	None
<b>%</b>			<u> </u>	<u> </u>	13.79	<u> </u>				<b></b> 16.5 <sub>~</sub>	<u> </u>
Till rea	Till rear										
No	2	7	4		13	2	13	10_		_25	None_
%		7		T	??41	L .		l _	J _	24.27	·L
MultiDI	e tills										
No		3	1		4	-	6	5		11	None
%			T	T	6.9	$L^{-}$			_[	]10.6R	
	reened_										
No	12	2	2		6 _	0_	_2	7	_[	9	None
%				T	10.34					8.74_	
Night Se	curity at fror	 nt					-				
Externa	al_Hants_										
No	_ [1	2	0		3	0	4	0	J- T	4	None
%	T	]	Γ	Ţ	5.17	]		]	] -	3.88	J
Interna	l liahts_										
No	2	10	4	-	16	1	16	10	T	4	Neciati
% _		1			27.59					3.88	I
Shutters /Grills											
No	0	3	1		4	r	7	1		9 _	None_
%		<u> </u>	_[		69					8.74	

### 5.4. Car Related Crime.

Theft of or from cars was seen as a problem in the four areas, see Table BH12.

Table BH12.	Percepti	on_of theft	from or of car	rs.
A <u>r</u> ea		Day	Night	Rear
<u> Mall</u>	<u>N</u> o	1	2	1
	%	2	4	
Core	No.	6	3	2
	%	14	7_	5
NCWest	No.	16	15	24
	%	27	26	41
NCEast _	No.	2	2	10
	%	10	_ 10	50

The survey was not designed to explore this type of crime. It was designed only gives a response from the retail or commercial operator and provided no link between the premises and car parking provisions. Therefore, no detailed analysis of car crime can be provided. Such a survey would best be undertaken as part of a more general survey of car crime and parking rather than attempting to constrain it to the losses of the staff of the retail or commercial premises.

# 5.5. Other Crimes.

The frequency of the occurrence of other crimes is indicated in the separate Annexes for each area. Overall, the responses from the Postal Survey suggest the crime rate is very low. Crimes such as racial abuse of the staff or evidence of drug dealing rarely receive a mention.

### 6.0. Conclusions with respect to Bexleyheath.

This initial report has identified features of planning and layout, which appear to influence the security of Bexleyheath shopping centre.

#### These include:

- Position of bus station,
- · CCTV coverage,
- Dwellings above shops
- Access to rear of premises,

### The Bexley Town Centre Security Survey

## Part B.The Erith Town Centre Survey.

#### 1.0. Details.

# Period of Survey.

The survey of Erith was undertaken during the 2-day period, Tuesday 23 - Wednesday 24 July 1996/

The survey was carried out in an almost identical manner to that for Bexleyheath with the exception that there was minimal publicity for the survey and the explanatory booklet was delivered with the questionnaire.

#### - PHYSICAL MAKEUP

The area consists of some 72 retail or other business premises forming a self-contained pedestrianised area surrounded by a network of roads. The retail area was mainly built in the 70's and incorporates both surface and multi - storey car parking. The area can be divided into 3 sections:

- 31 premises in a normal street pattern, with a small number, 8, with dwellings above. Of these 31 premises, approximately 10 back on to a carpentry /joinery business and have no obvious rear access.
- 14 premises facing outward from an open courtyard. The courtyard is closed off at night and there is a caretaker's office, which may be manned at night.
- 27 premises with 3 floors of car parking above. Access to the rear of the premises is via an underground yard, which is closed at night.

The majority of the frontages open on to pedestrianised streets or squares.

The only dwellings in the immediate area are approximately 8 above the shops. There are no public houses and only two night-clubs or restaurants that are only open on a limited number of evenings. There is also a snooker club.

There were 6 vacant premises at the time of the survey.

#### - Results of the Survey.

Table El summarises the mix of businesses derived from the physical survey and compares these with the returns from the postal survey. Only a small number of these belong to national chains. There was a high, 61% (40 out of the 66 questionnaires

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> CCTV was installed in the area in October 1997

delivered), initial return to the postal survey and there was therefore no need for follow up or reminders to return the questionnaires.

This high return reflects a general concern about security, which was expressed to the surveyors by many of the occupiers and users of the complex during the period of the survey.

As noted earlier, the area, is **a** typical 60 's - 70's shopping areas. It is unusual however in that it isolated from the surrounding housing by a network of main roads. This layout accentuates its isolation from the surrounding housing outside of business hours.

Business	Retai	Enter	Fina	Offic	Servi	Othe	Vaca	Total
Classificat	I		nee	e	ce	r	nt	ł
ion	<u> </u>	<u></u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>l</u> _	L	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Physical								
Number	48	8	3	2	5	<u> </u>	6	72
%	66.7	11.2	4.2	2.7	6.9	0	8.3	100
Postal								
Number	30	5	1	2	2	-	[-	40
%	75	12.5	2.5	5	5	0	0	100
		•			Postal/P	hysical %	)	55.5
								<b>%</b>

# - Level of Security.

At first sight, the level of security is high; the majority of the premises have Intruder Alarms fitted, as evidenced by the boxes visible at front of premises and the postal returns. Almost % of the premises were fitted with grills/bars/ shutters on their windows and doors and many of these, particularly the open mesh type, were in use during business hours. The potential security provided by the rear courtyard and enclosed yard and parking adds to this appearance of security. However, in practice this security does not appear to work well when we examine the responses to the questionnaires and the available police records. It suggests that much of the individual security may be in response to the actual crimes or perceived crimes.

### 2.0Crime Patterns.

Table E2. Perceived problems in Erith, from postal survey								
Problem	During Working Hours				After Working hours			
	Big /Fairly   Minor or no				Big /I	airly	Minor or no	
Ì	Big Problem				∫ Big		Problem	
	Probl	em	<u>[</u>		Prob	lem	<u> </u>	
<u>[</u>	No	No % No /o				/o	No %	

Teenagers	15	37.5	23	57.5	17	42.5	8	20.0
loitering								
Drunks	13	32.5	23	57.5	18	45.0	7	17.5
Buskers	1	2.5	33	82.5	0	0.0	19	47.5
Litter	13	32.5	24	60.0	11	27.5	16	40.0
Theft from or of	20	50	11	27.5	11	27.5	7	17.5
car				<u> </u>				
People using or	6	15	16	40.0	7	17.5	11	27.5
selling drugs		L	<u> </u>	<u> </u>				
Burglary	22	55_	14	35.0	26	65.0	6	15.0
Stray dogs? Dog	4	10.0	32	80.0	3	7.5	26	65.0
dirt			ļ 	<u> </u>	· 			
Vandalism/Graffit	21	52.5	16	40.0	25	62.5	8	<b>20.O</b>
\ <u>i</u>		<u> </u>						
Mugging/Violenc	11	27.5	20	50.0	11	27.5	7	17.5
<u>e</u>	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u></u>	 	<u></u>	
Racially	3	7.5	24	60.0	0	0.0	13	32.5
motivated attacks	<u></u>	<u> </u>		<u></u>	<u></u>			
Prostitution	0	0	27	67.5	0_	0.0	14	35.0
Bicycle theft	0	0	17	42.5	3	7.5	8	20.0
Pick pockets	7	17.5	16	40.0	3	7,5	9	22.5

(Note. The percentage of a Big/fairly Big Problem and Minor/ No Problem do not add to 100% because some respondents either replied Don't Know or made no return to the question.)

Table E3. A	ctual Fr	equence	of Crir	ne <u>in</u> Er	ith fronr	posta	survey	
	Daily	Weekl	Mont	Ann.	Neve	DK	Cost of Losses	No
		Lv	h		r			
Burglary	0	0	3	17	11	10	90 - 6000	9
Vandalism	0_	2	9	15	6	8	100-15000	7
Armed Rob	0	0	0	0	29	11	-	-
Shoplifting	4	9 _	6	4	12	5	45-1000	9
Till	0	0	6	9	21	10	200-350	2
snatches				]	<u></u>	1		
Assault/thr	2	1	4	10	13	10	,	-
eats to			ŀ		i :	1		
staff			<u> </u>					
CC Fraud	1	1	3	7	18	11	300	1

From the Postal Survey, Table E2, the occupants perception is that Burglary, vandalism, teenagers loitering, drunks, theft off or from cars and mugging or violence are problems. These perceptions are supported by the answers to the frequency of crime questions, Table E3, where with the addition of shoplifting, burglary, vandalism, attacks on staff and credit card fraud **are** all frequent occurrences.

The results from the survey suggest that the crime rate, with respect to commercial and retail properties, in Erith are higher than elsewhere in Bexley and exceed the national figures.

# 2.1 **Shoplifting.**

# - The Figures.

Shoplifting is common in Erith. Almost 3/4 of the retail premises (22 from 30) indicated that they have suffered from shoplifting during the past year. The following table, Table E4, outlines the frequency of shoplifting from the postal survey returns.

Table	E4 Fred	uency_of	shoplifti	<u>ng in Eri</u>	th			
	Daily	Week! y	Month »y	Yearly	Never	Don't Know	No Retur n	Total
No	4	9	6	4	12	2	3	40
0/	10	22.5	15	10	30	5	75	100

Nine of the 30 returns specifically mentioned shoplifting as a problem in their comments.

## - Anti- shoplifting provisions.

From the postal return, the shopkeepers appear to recognise the benefits of layout, till position and display height as a defence against shoplifting, Table E5. This appears to be supported by the returns from the physical survey.

### Cost of shoplifting.

Nine of the respondents replied to the question on the cost of shoplifting. This suggested a cost in the range of £45 -£150,000 per annum.

#### - Discussion.

Shoplifting in Erith would appear to be a major problem on a par with the national figures. The shopkeepers are aware of it and are doing their best to keep it under control. However, unlike Bexleyheath there was no perceived link with teenagers loitering.

Table E5. Anti-shoplifting provisions

Provision	No	%	
Postal survey - sampl	e <u>size</u> 40		
Security Guards	4	10	
<b>Store Detectives</b>	5	12.5	
Training_	14	35	
Internal CCTV	12	30	

Tags	5	12.5
Low Displays	21	50
Till Position	19	47.5
Physical survey	- sample siz	e 72
CCTV	4	5.5
Guards	0	0
Island displays		
- shoulder	12	16,7
height		
- waist height	16	22.2
-none	27	37.5

# 2.1. Burglary.

# - The figures.

From the returns from the postal survey, almost half of the premises have been burgled at least once during the past 12 months. Table E6 compares security and other features between burgled and non-burgled premises.

Table E6. Comparison of security and other features in burgled and non-						
burgled premises, from	postal ret	urns.				
Feature	Burgled		Non-burg	gled	Effective	
	No.	%	No.	%	l	
All premises	19	100	21	100		
Flats above	0	0	4	19	Yes?	
Alarm visible at front	10	53	14	67	Yes?	
CCTV coverage at	1	5	0	0	No?	
front			<u> </u>	<u> </u>	ļ	
External lights at front	3	16	0	0	No?	
Internal lights at front	1	5	1	5	Neutral	
Rear of premises						
Physical security at front	12	63	13	62	Neutral	
Access via	8	42	7	33	No?	
<u>Underground</u> yard						
Access via Court yard	4	21	11	52	Yes?	
+ caretaker			L	ļ	<u></u>	
No obvious rear	9	47	6	29	No?	
access	L	) 	l	<u> </u>		
Easily identified at	4	21	7	33	Yes?	
rear.			<u></u>		<u> </u>	
Access at rear by	5	26	10	48	Yes	
vehicle			<u> </u>		<u> </u>	
Open yard at rear	0	0	2	10	Yes	
Overlooked by	0	0	0	0	Neutral	
neighbours	<u> </u>					

Overlooked by passers by	0	0	3	14	Yes?
Cover at rear provided by walls, bins etc.	4	21	9	43	Yes?
Access at ground floor level via window door at rear	4	21	11	52	Yes?
External lights at rear	2	11	5	24	Yes?
Alarm at rear	2	11	6	29	Yes?
CCTV at rear	0	0	0	0	Neutral

# Cost of burglary.

The majority of the respondents were apparently unaware of the cost of burglary or any other crime. From the nine responses to the question, burglary would appear to cost in the range £90 - £6000 per year.

#### - Discussion.

The features affecting burglary, in Erith, are less well defined than those identified from the Bexleyheath survey. For example, flats above only may have a beneficial affect and external lights at the front a negative affect. Alarms and physical security appear to be neutral.

Rear access, as with Bexleyheath, appears to have a strong influence. The premises protected by the underground yard or with no obvious rear access are possible slightly more at risk than those surrounding the courtyard or with an open rear, which appear to be least at risk. Lighting at the rear or indication of an alarm also may be helpful.

This vagueness in the results is due in part to the smaller size of the sample but may also be due to the isolation of the area. The prospective burglars may feel that there is little or no risk to them in making a frontal attack

#### 2.3 Vandalism.

#### -The figures.

Almost two thirds of the postal returns reported that some form of vandalism had occurred during the past 12 months, (26 from 40.). It also appears to be uniformly spread throughout the area. As with Bexleyheath the form of vandalism was not recorded

Table E7 compares security or physical features of vandalised and non-vandalised premises.

### 2.4. Car related crime.

Car theft or theft from a car was perceived as a problem during the day by half, 20/40, of the postal returns. During the night this dropped to less than a third, 12/40. A quarter of the returns saw this as a problem at the rear of their premises.

This perceived problem of car theft or theft from cars is supported by comments from the LA staff, the police and passers by during the survey. It was observed that the majority of users of the shopping centre preferred to pay for the use of an open air LA car park, which was supervised, rather than make use of the free multi-storey car park which was nearer to the shopping centre but unsupervised.

# 2.5. Other Crimes.

Crimes such as drunkenness, mugging and violence, litter were perceived as a problem by a quarter to a third of the respondents. In addition, other crimes such as pickpockets and bicycle theft were also perceived as a common problem.

Table E7. Comparison of security and other features in vandalised and vandalised premises, from postal returns.					
Feature	Vandali		Non-V	andalised	Effective
	No.	7%	No.	%	T
Front of premises					
All premises	26	100	14	100	<u> </u>
Flats above	1	3.8	3	21	Positive
Alarm visible at front	15	57.7	9	64.3	Neutral
CCTV coverage at front	1 .	3.8	0	0	Neutral
External lights at front	3	11.5	0	0	Negative
Internal lights at front					
Physical security at	8	30.7	9	64.3	Positive
front	<u> </u>			<u> </u>	
Rear of premises					
Access via Underground yard	10	38.5	5	35.7	Neutral
Access via Court yard + caretaker	8	30.7	5	35.7	Neutral
No obvious rear access	6	23.1	3	21.4	Neutral
Easily identified at rear.	7	26.9	4	28.6	Neutral
Access at rear by vehicle	10	38.5	5	35.7	Neutral

Open yard at rear	1	1.5	1	7.1	Neutral
Overlooked by	0	0	0	0	Neutral
neighbours	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
Overlooked by	0	0	3	21.4	Positive
passers by			<u> </u>		
Cover at rear provided	9	34.6	4	28.5	Negative?
by walls, bins etc.			<u> </u>		<u> </u>
External lights at rear	5	19.2	2	14.3	Neutral
Alarm at rear	5	19.2	1	7.1	Negative
CCTV at rear	0	0	0	0	Neutral
Internal Security	<del>,</del>		<del>,</del>		<u></u>
Internal alarm	0	0	0	0	Neutral;
Internal CCTV	4	15.4	0	0	Negative
Till at front	3	11.5	1	7.1	Neutral
Till at middle	6	23.1	2	14.3	Negative
Till at rear	8	30.8	8	57.1	Positive
Multiple tills	5	19.2	2	14.3	Neutral
Till screened	6	23.1	9	64.3	Positive
Night security at front					
External lights	1	3.8	0	0	?
Internal lights	2	7.7	0	0	Positive?
Shutters/ grills	26	100	14	100	Neutral

# 3.0. Conclusion, with respect to Erith.

Erith is almost a perfect example of earlier planning policy where the separation of retail and commercial from residential means that once the businesses close there is little direct or indirect supervision of the area.

This is compounded in the Erith area because the surrounding street layout and traffic flows do little to encourage pedestrian traffic through the area. What late night entertainment is available is also more likely to provide cover for criminal activities rather than provide policing.

The Bexley Town Centre Security Survey

Part C. The Welling Town Centre Survey.

- 1.0. Details.
- 1.1. Period of Survey.

The survey of Welling was undertaken during the 3-day period, Tuesday 19-Thursday 22 November 1996. The survey was carried out in an identical manner to that for Erith i.e. the explanatory booklet was delivered with the questionnaire and there was minimum publicity for the survey.

#### 1.2. PHYSICAL MAKEUP

Welling town centre consists of a traditional shopping street of some 250-retail premises situated on both sides of the A207 with its junction with the A209. It is approximately 2 kilometres west of Bexleyheath. The retail mix is a mixture of independent traders, the smaller chains and a few of the multinationals. There are a high number of domestic premises, 101, situated above the retail premises. The majority of these occupied two floors and appeared to be independent of the retail premises beneath them.

There were 30 vacant premises at the time of the survey.

#### 1.3. Results of the Survey.

Table WI summarises the mix of businesses derived from the physical survey and compares this with the returns from the postal survey. Only a small number of these belong to national chains. The initial return from the postal survey was lower than expected. This required follow up action by the local police, particularly the Specials, which led to a final return of 49.2%. Some of the later returns came from premises, which were vacant at the time of the survey and which have since been occupied.

Table W1.	Table W1. Business mix of Physical and Postal surveys.								
Business	Retai	Enter	Finan	Offic	Servi	Oth	Vaca	Tot	
Classificat	I	۱.	се	е	ce	er	nt	al	
ion									
Physical Surve	, 	····							
Number	154	28	7	10	22	1	30	252	
%	61.1	11.1	2.8_	4.0	8.7	0.4	11.9	100	
Postal Survey									
Number	92	12	2	3	11	0	4 _	124	
%	74.2	9.7	1.6	2.4	9.8	0	3.2	100	
					Postal/P	hysical <sup>c</sup>	<del></del>	49.2	

This low return may reflect a general apathy about the area. Many of the occupiers and users of the premises expressed this apathy to the surveyors during the period of the survey. There was a general feeling that Welling was the poor relation when compared to Bexleyheath.

The main point of interest was the percentage of residential premises, approximately. 40%, still in apparent use above the shops. The majority of this was in the form of two storied flats with access gained from alleys at the rear of the retail premises. The standard of the lighting and pavement surface of these alleys was extremely variable.

### 1.4. Level of Security.

The overall visible evidence of security of the premises is low, in comparison to other areas. Only approximately 50% of the premises have a visible alarm and only a few make use of other visible forms of security e.g. CCTV, external lighting, bars or shutters on windows. The owners appear to rely on the existing street lighting to provide security.

### 2.0 Crime Patterns.

The problems perceived, in the postal survey, are summarised in Table W2. The main problems are teenagers loitering, litter, theft from or of cars, burglary and vandalism both day and night and drunks at night. Shoplifting was also identified as a problem in the general comments.

The answers to the question on frequency of crime, Table W3, tend to support the perception for burglary and vandalism. However the comparatively low perception of crimes of violence or mugging does not correlate with the reported frequency of assaults/threats to staff. Table W3 indicates that staff in a quarter of the premises have been threatened or assaulted, with 10% being the subject of repeat attacks/threats.

Table W2. Perceive	Table W2. Perceived problems in Welling, from postal survey								
Problem		g Work			After Working hours				
	Big /F Big	airly	1	Minor or no Problem		Big /Fairly Big		Minor or no Problem	
	Probl	em			Proble	em	<u> </u>		
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	
Teenagers	32	25.8	80	64.5	56	45.2	24	19.4	
loitering					ļ <u>.</u>		ļ. <u> </u>	<u> </u>	
Drunks	6	4.8	97	78.2	32	25,8	36	29.0	
Buskers	0	0	97	78.2	0	0	66	53.2	
Litter	28	22.6	85	68.5	27	21.8	58	46.8	
Theft from or of	25	20.2	53	42.7	31	25.0	24	19.4	
car						<u> </u>	<u> </u>		
People using or	6	4.8	48	38.7	9	7.3	19	15.3	
selling drugs							<u> </u>		
Burglary	25	20.2	53	42.7	30	24.2	33	26.6	
Stray dogs? Dog dirt	15	12.1	96	77.4	16	12.9	61	49.2	
Vandalism/Graffit i	23	18.5	86	69.4	36	29.0	48	38.7	
Mugging/Violenc e	9	7.3	71	57.3	15	12.1	29	23.4	
Racially	6	4.8	62	50.0	8	6.5	32	25.8	
motivated attacks			<u> </u>	[		<b>_</b>	Ĺ	<u> </u>	
Prostitution	0	0	67_	54.0	0	0	39	31.5	
Bicycle theft	5	3.2	55	44.3	2	1.8	34	27.4	
Pick pockets	7	5.6	57	46.0	6	4.8	34	27.4	

(Note. The percentage of a Big/fairly Big Problem and Minor/ No Problem do not add to 100% because some respondents either replied Don't Know or made no return to the question.)

Table W3. Actual Frequency of Crime.								
	Daily	Week iv	<b>Mont</b> h	Ann.	Neve r	DK	Cost of Losses(£)	No
Burglary	2		4	41	42	12	20 -20000	20
Vandalism	_	4	20	34	35	9	20 -2000	17
Armed Rob	_		-	1	82	15	500	1

Shoplifting	10	17_	13	15	39	12_	20-4000	20
Till snatches	-	-	-	15	78	10	30 - 500	8
Assault/thr eats to staff	5	2	4	18	60	28	-	
CC Fraud	] -	2	6	14	64	11	100-1000	3

# 2.1 Shoplifting.

## - The Figures.

Shoplifting is common in Welling. Almost 45% (55) of the all the returns (52 retail + 3 others) indicated that they have suffered from shoplifting during the past year. The following table, Table W4, outlines the frequency of shoplifting and shows that the majority of the attacked premises are the subject of repeat attacks. Approximately a third indicated that they never suffered from shoplifting.

Table W4 Frequency of shoplifting in Welling								
_	Daily	Weekl y	Month "y	Yearly	Never	Don't Know	No Retur	Total
No %	10 8.1	17 13.7	13 10.5	15 12.1	39 31.5	12 9.7	n 18 14.5	124 100

Eighteen of the 124 returns specifically identified shoplifting as a problem in their comments but unlike Bexleyheath, only one specifically linked shoplifting to teenagers. Ten responses in their comments linked teenagers to aggressive behaviour.

# Cost of shoplifting.

Twenty of the respondents replied to the question on the cost of shoplifting. They suggested a cost in the range of £20 -£4000 per annum.

# - Anti- shoplifting provisions.

From the postal return some of the shopkeepers appear to recognise the benefits of layout, till position and display height as a defence against shoplifting, Table W5.

Table W5. Anti-shoplifting provisions					
Provision	No	%			
Postal survey - samp	le size 124				
<b>Security Guards</b>	2	1.5			
Store Detectives	1	0.8			

Training	25	20.2
Internal CCTV	13	10.5
Tags	2	1.5
Low Displays	30	24.2
Till Position	31	25.0
Physical survey	- sample size 252	
CCTV Internal	18	7.1
Guards	0	0
Island displays		
- shoulder	33	13.1
height		
- waist height	58	46.8
-none	93	75.0

#### - Discussion.

Shoplifting in Welling appears to equal the National figures with approximately 44% of the retail premises being attacked at least once. The Home Office figures indicate 45% of all small retailers premises suffer from one incidence of customer theft. The figures for Welling indicate that it is about the mean for the five town centres.

# 2.2. Burglary.

## -The figures.

Internal lights at front

From the returns from the postal survey, approximately 1/3 of the premises has been burgled at least once during the past 12 months, with 5% being subject to multiple attacks. Table W6 compares security and other features between burgled and non-burgled premises.

burgled premises.						
Feature	Burgle	ed	Never	been	Effective as	
			burgle	d	Deterrent	
	No.	96	No.	<b>7</b> 0		
AH premises	47	100	42	100		
Flats above	19	40.4	19	45.2	Yes	
No flat above	27	57.5	21	50	No	
Alarm visible at front	25	53.2	23	54.8	Neutral	
CCTV coverage at	Insuffic	Insufficient Evidence				
front						
External lights at front	Insuffic	ient Evider	nce		Don't know	

55.3

22

52.4

Neutral

26

Table W6. Comparison of security and other features in burgled and non-

Physical security at	9	19.1	7	16.7	Neutral
front					
Rear of premises					
Easily identified at	26	55.3	18	42.3	No
rear.					
Access at rear by	28	59.6	34	80.1	Yes
vehicle					
Open yard at rear	25	53.2	21	50	Neutral
Overlooked by	4	8.5	3	7.1	Neutral
neighbours					
Overlooked by	12	25.5	5	11.9	No
passers by					
Cover at rear provided	31	66.0	26	62	No
by walls, bins etc.					
External lights at rear	10	21.3	11	26.2	Yes
Alarm at rear	30	63.8	26	50	No
CCTV at rear	No evide	nce			Don't know

# - Cost of burglary.

The majority of the respondents were apparently unaware of the cost of burglary or any other crime. From the 20 responses to the question, burglary would appear to cost in the range £20 - £20000 per year.

### - Discussion

The features affecting burglary, in Welling, tend to support in part the evidence from Bexleyheath and Erith.

Statistical analysis of the set of figures for flats above /no flats above tend to support the deterrent effect of 'living above the shop'. The accessibility and visibility at the rear of the premises appear important.

The results also suggest that the intruder should be able to easily identify the rear of the target and be able to work undisturbed. Vehicle access to the rear of the premises and a well-lit rear also appear to be a factor.

The evidence for alarms is conflicting. The effect of a visible alarm box at the front is neutral, however a readily visible alarm box at the rear appears to increase the risk of attack.

### 2.3. Vandalism

Almost a half of the postal returns, Table W7, reported that some form of vandalism had occurred during the past 12 months, (57 from 124.). It also appears to be uniformly spread throughout the area. There was also a high repeat rate. As with Bexleyheath the form of vandalism was not recorded

**有关于是是是是一种,我们就是一个人的,我们就是一个人的,我们就是一个人的,我们就是一个人的,我们就是一个人的,我们就是一个人的,我们就是一个人的,我们就是一个人的,我们** 

Physical security at	9	19.1	7	16.7	Neutral
front					
Rear of premises					
Easily identified at	26	55.3	18	42.3	No
rear.					
Access at rear by vehicle	28	59.6	34	80.1	Yes
Open yard at rear	25	53.2	21	50	Neutral
Overlooked by	4	8.5	3	7.1	Neutral
neighbours					
Overlooked by	12	25.5	5	11.9	No
passers by					
Cover at rear provided	31	66.0	26	62	No
by walls, bins etc.					
External lights at rear	10	21.3	11	26.2	Yes
Alarm at rear	30	63.8	26	50	No
CCTV at rear	No evide	nce			Don't know

# - Cost of burglary.

The majority of the respondents were apparently unaware of the cost of burglary or any other crime. From the 20 responses to the question, burglary would appear to cost in the range £20 - £20000 per year.

## - Discussion

The features affecting burglary, in Welling, tend to support in part the evidence from Bexleyheath and Erith.

Statistical analysis of the set of figures for flats above /no flats above tend to support the deterrent effect of 'living above the shop'. The accessibility and visibility at the rear of the premises appear important.

The results also suggest that the intruder should be able to easily identify the rear of the target and be able to work undisturbed. Vehicle access to the rear of the premises and a well-lit rear also appear to be a factor.

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Table W7 Frequency of vandalism in Welling									
	Daily	Weekl y	Month <b>iy</b>	Yearly	Never	Don't Know	No Retur n	Total	
No	~	3	20	34	35	9	23	124	
%	0	2.5	16.1	27.4	28.2	2.3	18.5	100	

# - Cost of Vandalism.

From the postal survey 16 of the respondents, suggest that the cost of vandalism lie between £20 - £1400 per annum. With the higher costs tending to be linked to those premises suffering repeat attacks.

#### - Discussion

Table W 8 compares the security and other features in vandalised and non-vandalised properties. From the table it would appear that the presence of flats above and internal lights have no effect and that alarms and physical security at the front of the premises might in fact increase the risk of vandalism.

Table W8. Comparison					lised and
never been vandalised   Feature	premises Vandali:		stal returi Never		Effective
reature	Vallualis	seu	Vanda		as
	No.	%	No.	%	Deterrent
All premises	57	100	35	100	Deterrent
Front of premises	01	100	00	100	
Flats above	24	42.1	16	45.7	Neutral
Alarm visible at front	36	63.2	16	45.7	No
CCTV coverage at	No Evide	ence			
front					
External lights at front	No evide	ence			
Internal lights at front	28	49.1	18	51.4	neutral
Physical security at	17	29.8	7	20	No
front					
Rear of premises					
Easily identified at	31	54.4	15	42.9	No
rear.					
Access at rear by	34	59.6	29	82.9	Yes
vehicle					
Open yard at rear	17	29.8	17	48.6	Yes
Not overlooked by	49	86.0	29	82.6	Neutral
neighbours					
Not overlooked by	38	66.7	16	45.7	No
passers-by					
Cover at rear provided	41	71.9	21	60	No
by walls, bins etc.					
External lights at rear	13	22.8	12	34.3	Yes
Alarm at rear	14	24.6	18	51.4	Yes
CCTV at rear	No evide	ence			

Internal Provisions					
Till at front	9	15.8	4	11.4	Neutral
Till at middle	9	15.8	5	14.3	Neutral
Till at rear	22	38.6	16	45.7	Yes?
Multiple tills	4	7.0	2	5.7	Neutral
Till screened	8	14.	11	31.4	Yes

At the rear of the premises, as with burglary, the vandal prefers to be able to identify his target but work unobserved. Well-lit rear yards, with vehicle access, capable of being overlooked by passers by are less likely to be targeted, although the vandal does not appear to be concerned about being seen by the neighbours. The presence of a visible alarm at the rear also appears to be a deterrent. This conflicts with the figures for burglary. The visibility of alarms may be linked to the effect of the well -lit yard rather than being an independent effect. A clearer picture emerges from the joint analysis of the five town centres.

#### 2.4. Attacks on Staff.

From the Postal returns, attacks, physical or verbal, on staff are common. Almost a quarter of the premises being the scene of at least one attack per annum and almost a tenth being subjected to repeat attacks, see table W 9. There is no direct evidence however as to whether these attacks are racially motivated. From the postal returns, only 5 % perceived racial attacks as a very big or fairly big problem and 7 - 12% perceived mugging as a problem.

Table	Table W9 Frequency of attacks on staff in Welling									
	Daily	Week! y	Month "y	Yearly	Never	Don't Know	No Retur	Total		
No	5	2	4	18	60	28	7	124		
%	3.9	1.6	3.2	14.4	48.3	22.5	3.5	100		

### - Discussion

From the surveys the position of the till appears to influence the potential for attack. Premises with tills at the rear or with multiple tills are less likely to be chosen as the target for an attack, see table W10

	<u> </u>	Till Position						
		Front	Middle	Rear	Multiple	Total		
<u>Attac</u> ks	No	5	5	13	1	24		
No attacks	No	7	8	24	4	43		
Attacks/ No Attacks	%	71.4	62.5	21.4	25	55.8		

Screening of the till appears to have very little effect, see Table 11.

Table W11.	Till screened			
		Screened		Total
		Yes	No	
Attacks	No	7	11	18
No Attacks	No	17	32	47
% Attacks/No Attacks		41.2	34.4	38.3

#### 2.5. Car Crime.

Car crime is perceived as a problem, see Table W2. However, as with Bexleyheath, the survey was not designed to investigate the problem in depth.

#### 2.6. Other Crimes.

From the survey other crimes are either perceived or actually occur in the area, see Tables W2 and W3. Apart from the actual problem of Credit Card Fraud and the perception of drunks being a problem at night the frequency of these other crimes is low.

# 2.7. Conclusion with respect to Welling.

Overall, the surveys suggest that retail crime levels in Welling, except for shoplifting, may be below the national figures. This may be a direct result of the high percentage of residential premises directly above the retail premises, i.e. living above the shop

The Bexley Town Centre Security Survey

### Part D. The Crayford Town Centre Survey.

#### 1.0. Details.

### 1.1. Period of Survey.

The survey of Crayford was undertaken during the 2-day period, Tuesday 18-Wednesday 19March 1997. The survey was carried out in an identical manner to that for Erith i.e., the explanatory material was delivered with the questionnaire and there was minimum publicity for the survey. As a result of the emphasis on shoplifting in the postal returns from the surveys of Bexleyheath, Erith and Welling an additional question was inserted into the Postal Survey to ascertain the perception of the respondents to shoplifting.

### 1.2. Physical makeup

Crayford town centre consists of a traditional shopping street of some 120 premises situated on both sides of the A207 at its junction with the A2000 and B2186. It is approximately 1.5 kilometres east of Bexleyheath. The retail mix is a mixture of independent traders, the smaller chains and a few of the multinationals. There are a high number of domestic premises, 82, situated above the retail premises. Approximately half of these occupied two floors and appeared to be independent of the retail premises beneath them.

There were 13 vacant premises at the time of the survey.

#### 13. Results of the Survey.

Table Cl summarises the mix of businesses derived from the physical survey and compares this with the returns from the postal survey. Only a small number of these belong to national chains. The initial return from the postal survey was lower than expected. This required follow up action by the local police, particularly the Specials, which led to a final return of 46.3%, ignoring vacant premises.

Table C1.	Busines	s mix o	f Phys <u>ic</u>	al and	Postal s	urvey	S	
Business	Retai	Enter	Finan	Offic	Servi	Oth	Vaca	Tot
Classificat	1		ce	е	ce	er	nt	al
ion	<u> </u>							
		_						
Physical Surve	ej?							
Number	69	20	2	3	12	1	13	120
%	57.5	16.7	2 1.7	2.5	10	8.0	2.5	100
Postal Survey								
Number	39	3	1	1	4	1	1	50
%	78	3 6	2	1 2	4 8	1 2	2	100
	-				Postal/P	hysical	<b>%</b>	41.7

During the survey many people raised questions and volunteered comments about the security of the area.

The main point of interest was the very high percentage of residential premises, approximately. 68%, still in apparent use above the shops. The majority of this was in the form of two storied flats with access gained from an alley at the rear of the retail premises. These alleys often incorporated parking spaces for the residents. The layout, standard of the lighting and pavement surface of these alleys was extremely variable.

#### 1.4. Level of Security.

The overall visible evidence of security of the premises is low. Approximately 50% of the premises have a visible alarm and only **a** few make use of other visible forms of security e.g. CCTV, external lighting, bars or shutters on windows.

#### 2.0Crime Patterns.

From the returns to the postal survey, Table C2, the main problems perceived by the respondents are teenagers loitering, litter, burglary, vandalism and stray dogs. Apart from shoplifting, the emphasis is on the occurrence of these and other crimes and incivilities after hours.

The answers to the question on frequency of crime, Table C3, tend to support the perception for burglary, vandalism and shoplifting. The overall crime pattern places an emphasis on shoplifting and incivilities, mainly at night rather than major crime.

Table C2. Perceive	d problems in Crayford, fro	m postal survey (50)
	-	After Working hours

	Big /F Big Proble		Minor not a Proble	Big em Proble		•	Minor not a Proble	
L	No	%	No	%	No	%	No_	%
Teenagers loitering	9	18.0	35	70.0	19	38.0	16	32.0
Drunks	4	8.0	37_	74.0	16	32.0	14	24.0
Buskers	1	2.0	36	72.0	0	0.0	28	28.0
Litter	11	22.0	33	66.0	14	28.0	20	40.0
Theft from or of car	6	12.0	22	44.0	12	24.0	16	32.0
People using or selling drugs	1	2.0	25	50.0	2	4.0	13	26.0
Burglary	12	24.0	24	48.0	14	28.0	19_	38.0
Stray dogs/ Dog dirt	13	26.0	30	60.0	8	16.0	14	28.0
Vandalism/Graffit	15	30.0	27	54.0	20	40.0	16	32.0
Mugging/Violenc e	3	6.0	26	52.0	4	8.0	13	26.0
Racially motivated attacks	1	2.0	30	60.0	0	0.0	20	40.0
Prostitution	3	6.0	25	50.0	2	4.0	15	30.0
Bicycle theft	3	6.0_	22	44.0	2	4.0	16	32.0
Pick pockets	2	4.0	19	38.0	0	0.0	14	28.0
Shoplifting	14	28.0	21	42.0	2	4.0	16	32.0

**(Note.** The percentage of a Big/fairly Big Problem and Minor/ Not a Problem do not add to 100% because some respondents either replied Don't Know or made no return to the question.)

Table C3. A	ctual F	requence	of Cri	me.				
	Daily	Week	Mont	Ann.	Neve	DK	Cost of Losses (£)	No
Burglary	-	Liy │-	2	13	16	5	400 - 5000	6
Vandalism	-	1	7	17	15	2	100-1500	5
Armed Rob	-	-	-	2	31	4	800	1
Shoplifting	1	7	6	6	16	5	400-1000	3
Till snatches	-	-	-	2	30	4	-	-
Assault/thr eats to staff	~	-	1	6	29	2		
CC Fraud	-	-	1	-	6	29	75 - 500	2
Other			1		3_	1	-	_

# 2.1 Shoplifting.

## - The Figures.

Shoplifting is reasonably common in Crayford. From the returns to the Postal Survey 40% of the total return, (51% of the return from the retail premises), indicated that they were victims of shoplifting during the past 12 months. Two of the replies indicated that the theft actually occurred from storage at the rear of the premises and underlined the vulnerability of the rear of the premises in their comments.

The following table, Table C4, outlines the frequency of shoplifting. It suggests that of the attacked premises the majority is the subject to multiple attacks: It also indicates that almost a third are never the subject of shoplifting.

Tab	Table C4 Frequency of shoplifting in Crayford											
	Dail	Weekl	Monthl	Yearl	Neve	Don'	No	Tota				
	у	у	у	У	r	t Kno w	Retur n	I 				
No	1	7	6	6	16	5	9	50				
%	2.0	14.0	12.0	12.0	32.0	10.0	18.0	100				

# - Cost of shoplifting.

Only three of the respondents replied to the question on the cost of shoplifting. They suggest costs in the range of £400-£1000 per annum.

# - Anti-shoplifting provisions.

From the postal return, some of the shopkeepers appear to recognise the benefits of layout, till position and display height as a defence against shoplifting, Table C5.

Table C5. Anti-sho	oplifting provision	S
Provision	No	%
Postal survey - sample	e size 50	
Security Guards	0	0.0
Store Detectives	0	0.0
Training	12	24.0
Internal CCTV	4	8.0
Tags	0	0.0
Low Displays	17	34.0
Till Position	18	36.0
Physical survey -	sample size 120	
CCTV Internal	6	5.0
Guards	1	0.8
Island displays		
- shoulder	23	19.2

height		
-waist height	10	8.0
- none	77	64.2

Note. Numbers include non-retail premises.

### - Discussion.

The frequency of shoplifting in Crayford is slightly below the national average figure for customer theft. The figures, see Table 4 of main Report, suggest that Crayford has the lowest rate of shoplifting from amongst the five towns in the survey.

# 2.2. Burglary.

# - The figures.

From the returns to the postal survey, a quarter of the premises has been burgled at least once during the past 12 months and with four percent being subject to multiple attacks. Table C6 compares security and other features between burgled and non-burgled premises.

Table C6. Comparison of burgled premises.	of security	and othe	r features	in burgle	ed and non-
Feature	Burgled		Never b burgled	een	Effective as deterrent
All annoting	No.	%	No.	%	
All premises	15	100	16	100	<b>N</b> 1
Flats above	11	73.3	12	75	Neutral
No flat above	4	26.7	4	25	Neutral
Alarm visible at front	8	53.3	8	50	Neutral
CCTV coverage at	0	-	0	-	
front					
External tights at front	0		0	-	
Internal lights at front	8	53.3	8	50	Neutral
Physical security at	4	26.7	6	37.5	Yes
front					
Rear of premises					
Easily identified at	7	46.7	9	56.3	Yes
rear.					
Access at rear by vehicle	11	73.3	11	68.7	Neutral
Open yard at rear	6	40.0	6	37.5	Neutral
Overlooked by	1	6.7	1	6.3	Neutral
neighbours		-			
Overlooked by	1	6.7	2	12.5	Yes
passers by					

Cover at rear provided	10	66.6	13	81.3	Yes
by walls, bins etc. External lights at rear	8	53.3	9	56.3	Neutral
Alarm at rear	4	26.7	9	56.3	Yes
CCTV at rear	0		0	<u>-</u>	

# - Cost of burglary.

From the six responses to the question, the cost of burglary would appear to lie in the range £400 -£5000 per year.

#### Discussion

The features affecting burglary, in Crayford, tend to conflict with those identified in the other areas of the survey.

For example, the effectiveness of 'living above the shop¹ appears neutral, whereas cover at the rear and a visible alarm box at the rear appear to be a deterrent. It is not clear why this is so. As noted in the main report features such as 'living above the shop¹ provide blanket protection to an area rather than individual protection and therefore the effectiveness of the feature as a deterrent is less obvious.

### 2.3. Vandalism

Half of the postal returns, see Table C7, reported that some form of vandalism had occurred during the past 12 months, (25 from 50). There was also a high repeat rate. As with the other areas the form of vandalism was not recorded

Table	Table C7 Frequency of vandalism in Crayford											
	Daily	Weekl y	Month ly	Yearly	Never	Don't Know	No Retur n	Total				
No	-	1	7	17	15	2	8	50				
%		2.0	14.0	34.0	30.0	4.0	16.0	100				

### Cost of Vandalism.

Five of the respondents to the survey suggested that vandalism costs are between £100-£1500 per annum. The highest cost was apparently due to a single act.

#### - Discussion

Table C 8 compares the security and other features in vandalised and non-vandalised properties. From the table, it would appear that the presence of flats above is not a deterrent. However, alarms, internal lights and the presence of physical security may be an effective deterrent.

At the rear of the premises the vandal prefers to be able to identify his target but work unobserved. Well-lit rear yards, with vehicle access, capable of being overlooked by passers-by or neighbours are less likely to be targeted.

Having the till at the front may be a deterrent. Possibly because the member of staff can see what is happening outside the premises and be in a position to cut of the escape of any vandal from within the premises.

Table C8. Comparison ovandalised premises, from			er feature	s in vandali	sed and
Feature	Vandalis		Non-V	andalised	Effective as
	No.	%	No.	%	Deterrent
All premises	25	100	15	100	
Front of premises					
Flats above	20	80.0	10	66.7	No
Alarm visible at front	14	56.0	11	73.3	Yes
CCTV covera	age at	•	plicable o	nly 3	
front		installa	itions		
External lights at front	N/A				
Internal lights at front	10	40.0	11	73.3	Yes
Physical security at	7	28.8	6	40.0	Yes
front					
Rear of premises	45	00.0	•	<b>50.0</b>	Ma
Easily identified at	15	60.0	8	53.3	No
rear.	17	68.0	12	80.0	Yes
Access at rear by vehicle	17	00.0	12	60.0	162
Open yard at rear	11	44.0	6	40.0	neutral
Not overlooked by	21	84.0	12	40.0 67.0	No
neighbours	21	04.0	12	07.0	140
Not overlooked by	21	84.0	11	73.3	No
passers-by		04.0	• • •	73.5	140
Cover at rear provided	16	64.0	12	80.0	Yes
by walls, bins etc.	. •	••		00.0	. •••
External lights at rear	6	24.0	6	40.0	Yes
Alarm at rear	8	32.0	7	46.7	Yes
CCTV at rear	N/A				
Internal Provisions					
Till at front	6	36.0	6	40.0	Yes
Tilt at middle	0	0	1	6.7	Neutral
Till at rear	13	52.0	7	46.7	No
Multiple tills	-		_		
Till screened	4	16.0	5	33.3	Yes

#### 2.4. Attacks on Staff.

From the Postal returns, attacks, physical or verbal, on staff are infrequent. Only 14% of the returns indicated these had occurred. This low frequency of occurrence is supported by the answers in Table C2 on the perception of crime of violence or racial attacks.

Table	Table C9 Frequency of attacks on staff in Crayford											
	Daily	Weekl y	Month »y	Yearly	Never	Don't Know	No Retur	Total				
No			1	6	29	2	12	50				
%			2.0	12.0	58.0	2.0	24.0	100				

### 2.5. Car crimes

Car crime is perceived as a problem mainly at night, see Table C2. However, as with Bexleyheath, the survey was not designed to investigate the problem in depth.

### 2.6. Other Crimes.

From Table C2, the perceived rate of occurrence of other crimes is low. The main concerns appear to be with teenagers loitering, drunks, litter and dogs.

#### 3.0 Conclusions.

Overall, the surveys suggest that retail crime levels in Crayford may be slightly below the national figures. The main concerns appear to be more to do with incivilities rather than actual crimes. The low crime rate may be a direct result of the very high percentage of residential premises directly above the retail premises, i.e. living above the shop.

# The Bexley Town Centre Security Survey

Part E. The Sidcup Town Centre Survey.

### 1.0. Details.

### 1.1. Period of Survey.

The survey of Sidcup was undertaken during the 3-day period, Monday 7 July - Wednesday 9 July 1997. An explanatory leaflet was delivered to all the premises in the area prior to the survey.

### 1.2. Physical makeup

Sidcup town centre consists of a traditional shopping street of some 161 business premises situated on both sides of the A211, at its junction with the A222. It is approximately 4 kilometres south -west of Bexleyheath. The retail mix is a mixture of independent traders, the smaller chains and a few of **the** multinationals. There are a high number of domestic premises, 77, situated above the retail premises. The majority of these, 50, occupied two floors and they appeared to be independent of the retail premises beneath them. At the time of the survey, there were proposals for a major town centre retail development under consideration by the local authority. There were 14 vacant premises at the time of the survey.

### 1.3. Results of the Survey.

Table SI lists the mix of businesses derived from the physical survey and compares this with the returns from the postal survey. Only a small number of these belong to national chains. The return from the postal survey was low at 40%. Unfortunately, in this case, the Special Constables were not available to do a second sweep to collect the questionnaires. One of the returns came from a premise, which was vacant at the time of the survey and which has since been occupied.

Table S1. Business mix of Physical and Postal surveys.

Business	Retail	Enter	Financ	Offic	Servi	Othe	Vaca	Tota
Classificat			е	е	се	r	nt	ı
ion					<u> </u>			

Physical Surve}f

Number	76	24	11	8	28	_	14	161
%	57.1	14.9	6.8	5.0	17.4	0.0	8.7	100.

Postal Survey

Number	31	5	6	4	15	<u> </u>	1	62
%_	50.0	8.1	9.7	6.5	24.2	IP.	1.6	100
	Postal/Physical %							38.5

There was no obvious reason for the low return. The survey was carried around the time the Local Authority was undertaking a consultation exercise on the proposed town centre development and some of occupiers and users of the premises enquired if their was a connection between the two

The main point of interest was the high percentage of residential premises, 48%, still in apparent use above the commercial premises. The majority of these are two storied flats. Access is gained mainly from an alley at the rear of the retail premises although there was an appreciable number with access via a doorway with direct access from the street frontage.

## Level of Security.

The overall visible evidence of security of the premises is low. Only approximate half of **the** premises has **a** visible alarm or had internal lights on a night. Only a relatively small number make use of other visible forms of security. For example, five premises had external CCTV and 28 had external bars or shutters on the windows.

### 3.0 Crime Patterns.

From the returns to the postal survey, Table S2, the main problems perceived by the respondents are shoplifting, teenagers loitering, litter, vandalism/graffiti during the day and vandalism/graffiti at night. Shoplifting was also identified as a problem in the general comments.

The figures for frequency of crime, Table S3, tend to support the perception for shoplifting and vandalism. From the returns 23 of the 33 retail premises indicated that they suffered from shoplifting, two non-retail premises also claimed to suffer from shoplifting. Despite the suggestion that a quarter of the premises have staff who have been assaulted or threatened, with 6% being the subject of multiply attacks, only two of the postal returns perceived the area as suffering from mugging or violence.

Table S2. Perceived problems in Sidcup, from postal survey

Problem	During	g Worki	ng Hou	rs	After \	Working	hours		
	Big /F	airly	Minor			Big /Fairly		Minor or no	
	Big Proble	em	Proble	<del>-</del>	Big Proble	em	Problem		
	No_	%	No_	%	No	%	No	%	
Teenagers	14	22.6	44	71.0	12	19.4	14	22.6	
loitering		<u> </u>		<u> </u>		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
Drunks	4	6.5	40	64.5	5	8.1	19	30.6	
Buskers	2	3.2	49	79.0	0	0.0	22	35.5	
Litter	16	25.8	40	64.5	11	17.7	20	32.3	
Theft from or of	10	16.1	27	43.5	6	9.7	9	14.5	
_car	<u></u>	<u> </u>				ļ	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
People using or selling drugs	0	0.0	29	46.8	1	1.6	10	16.1	
Burglary	9	14.5	30	48.4	5	8.1	11	17.7	
Stray dogs? Dog	8	12.9	35	88.7	2	3.2	22	35.5	

dirt		<u> </u>		<u> </u>	L			<u> </u>
Vandatism/Graffit	13	21.0	55	62.9	13	21.0	16	25.8
Mugging/Violenc	0	0.0	39	56.5	2	3.2	11	17.7
e			<u></u>					<u> </u>
Racially motivated attacks	0	0.0	35	56.5	0	0.0	14	22.0
Prostitution	0	0.0	37	59.7	0	0.0	15	24.2
Bicycle theft	1	1.6	26	41.9	1	1.6	10	16.1
Pick pockets	2	3.2	27	43.5	1_	1.6	9	14.5
Shoplifting	20	32.3	23	37.0	2	3.2	8	12.9

(Note. The percentage of a Big/fairly Big Problem and Minor/ No Problem do not add to 100% because some respondents either replied Don't Know or made no return to the question.)

Table S3. A	ctual E	requenc	y of Cri	me.		<u> </u>		
	Daily	Weeki	Mont	Ann.	Neve	DK	Cost of Losses	No
	<u> </u>	_v	h	_	] r		(£)	
Burglary	-	-	[- <sub></sub>	17	20	9	300 - 3899	6
Vandalism	-	2	6	18	12	4	50-1000	2
Armed Rob				2	32	6	<u></u>	-
Shoplifting	7	5	5	8	23	4	25-15000	16
Till	-	-	-	6	32	2	-	-
snatches	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		<u>.</u>	<u> </u>		<u>_</u> .	
Assault/thr	-	1	3	11	27	2	-	-
eats to	1			ŀ		ļ		
staff	<u> </u>							
CC Fraud	-		2		25	6	100-6000	5
Other	1	-	-	-	1	2	-	-

# 2.1 Shoplifting.

# - The Figures.

Shoplifting is common in Sidcup. The postal survey suggests that 40% of all the premises and 80% of the retail premises suffered from shoplifting during the past year. Table S4 outlines the frequency of shoplifting and shows that the majority of the attacked premises are the subject of repeat attacks.

Table S4 Frequency of shoplifting in Sidcup

	Daily	Weekl	Monthl	Yearly	Never	Don't	No	Total
		Ly			<u> </u>	Know	Return	
No	7	5	5	8	23	4	10	62
%	11.3	8.1	8.1	12.9	37.1	6.5	16.1	100

Eighteen of the returns specifically identified shoplifting as a problem in their comments but only one specifically linked shoplifting to teenagers. This contrasts with Bexleyheath where there was a strong perceived linkage between teenagers and shoplifting.

# Cost of shoplifting.

Twenty of the respondents replied to the question on the cost of shoplifting. They suggested a cost in the range of £25 -£15000 per annum. The higher figures were suggested by the few major department stores.

## - Anti- shoplifting provisions.

From the postal return, some of the shopkeepers at least appear to recognise the benefits of layout, till position and display height as a defence against shoplifting, Table S5.

Table S5. Anti-shoplifting provisions % Provision No Postal survey - sample size 31 Security Guards **Store Detectives** 1 3.2 13 41.9 **Training** Internal CCTV 19.4 6 2 6.5 Tags 12 Low Displays 38.7 15 Till Position 48.4 Physical survey - sample size 76 **CCTV** Internal 13 17.1 Guards 0.0 Island displays - shoulder 28 36.8 height

23

31

# - Discussion.

- waist height

-none

Shoplifting in Sidcup is a problem, which appears to exceed the national figure for customer theft. The Home Office figures indicate that almost half of all retail premises had one or more incidence of customer theft.

30.3

40.8

# 2.2. Burglary.

-The figures.

From the returns from the postal survey, approximately 1/4 of the premises has been burgled at least once during the past 12 months, Table S3. However, rather unusually, none of these has been the subject of multiple attacks. This is below the national figures for burglary.

Table S6 compares security and other features between burgled and non-burgled premises.

Table S6. Comparison of	of securit	y and oth	er feature	s in burgle	d and non-
burgled premises.					
Feature	Burgle	d	Never		Effective as
			burgle	d	deterrent
	No.	%	No.	%	
All premises	17	100	20	100	
Flats above	11	64.7	6	30.0	No
No flat above	6	35.3	13	65.0	Yes
Alarm visible at front	6	35.3	12	60.0	Yes
CCTV coverage at	1	5.9	0	0.0	Neutral
front					
External lights at front	1	5.9	1	5.0	Neutral
Internal lights at front	7	41.2	11	55.0	Yes
Physical security at	1	5.9	3	15.0	Yes
front					
Rear of premises					
Easily identified at	6	35.3	9	45.0	Yes
rear.					
Access at rear by	11	64.7	14	70.0	Neutral?
vehicle					
Open yard at rear	4	23.5	8	40.0	Yes
Overlooked by	0	0.0	0	0.0	Neutral
neighbours					
Overlooked by	2	11.2	0	0.0	No
passers by					
Cover at rear provided	15	88.2	19	85.0	Neutral
by walls, bins etc.			. •		
External lights at rear	6	35.3	12	60.0	Yes
Alarm at rear	1	5.9	12	60.0	Yes
CCTV at rear	NA		NA	00.0	Neutral
		<del></del>			Noatiai

### - Cost of burglary.

The majority of the respondents were apparently unaware of the cost of burglary or any other crime. From the six responses to the question, burglary would appear to cost in the range £20 - £3877 per year. One respondent provided a precise figure of £3877.

## - Discussion

From Table S6 the features acting as a deterrent to burglary, in Sidcup, are at the front, the presence of an alarm, physical security and internal lights. At the rear, an open yard, possibly

allowing the premises to be easily identified, is a deterrent. External lights and an alarm at the rear are also apparently effective. Access for motor vehicles and cover appears to be neutral.

Flats above the premises appear to attract attack. This appears to conflicts with the accepted arguments for 'living above the shop'. This conflict is possibly because' living above the shop' provides blanket cover for an area rather than individual protection for single premises. In the Sidcup area, the number of flats is high and they are fairly well dispersed leading to an overall reduction in burglary but not providing individual protection. (See also main Report.)

#### 2.3. Vandalism

Almost a half of the postal returns, Table S7, reported that some form of vandalism had occurred during the past 12 months, (57 from 124.). It also appears to be uniformly spread throughout the area. There was also a high repeat rate. As with Bexleyheath the form of vandalism was not recorded

Table S7 Frequency of vandalism in Sidcup

	Daily		Month!			Don't	No	Total
		l <sub>v</sub> .	.v			Know	Return	
No	-	2	6_	18	12	4	20	62
%	0	3.2	9.7	29.0	19.4	6.5	32.3	100.0

# Cost of Vandalism.

Returns from two of the respondents suggest that the cost of vandalism lie between £50 - £1000 per annum.

#### - Discussion

Table S 8 compares the security and other features in vandalised and never vandalised properties. From the table, it would appear that the presence of flats above might attract vandals. However, similar arguments as discussed with regard to burglary may apply.

Table S8. Comparison of security and other features in vandalised and

vandalised premises, from postal returns.

Feature	Vandal	ised	Never	Vandalised	Effective
					as
		<del></del>			Deterrent
	No.	%	No	%	<u> </u>
All premises	26	100	12	100	
Front of premises					
Flats above	17	65.4	4	33.3	Negative
Alarm visible at front	14	53.8	6	50.0	Neutral
CCTV coverage at	0.0	0.0	1	8.33	Positive (?)
front			ŀ		

External lights at front_	] 1	3.8	1	8.33	Neutral
Internal tights at front	14	53.8	9	75.0	Positive
Physical security at	2	7.7	3	25.0	Positive
front			<u> </u>		<u> </u>
Rear of premises					
Easily identified at	14	53.8	3	25.0	Negative
rear.	<u> </u>				
Access at rear by	17	65.4	9	75.0	Positive
vehicle					
Open yard at rear	5	19.2	5	41.7	Positive
Not overlooked by	0	0.0	0	0.0	Neutral
neighbours		<u> </u>			
Not overlooked by	4	15.4	0	0.0	Negative
passers-by		<u> </u>	<u> </u>		<b> </b>
Cover at rear provided	20	76.9	12	100.0	Positive
by walls, bins etc.	ļ	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		
External lights at rear	11	4.2	8	66.7	Positive
Alarm at rear	6	23.1	8	66.7	Positive
CCTV at rear	0	0.0_	0	0.0	Neutral
Internal Provisions					
Till at front	1	3.8	2	16.7	Positive
Till at middle	4	15.4	2	16.7	Neutral
Till at rear	10	38.5	4	33.3	Neutral
Multiple tills	5	19.2	3	25.0	Positive (?)
Till screened	10	38.5	6	50.0	Positive

At the front internal lights and CCTV coverage are deterrents but alarms and external lights have no effect. At the rear of the premises, as with burglary, the vandal prefers to be able to identify his target but work unobserved. Well-lit rear yards, with vehicle access, capable of being overlooked by passers- by are less likely to be targeted. Although the vandal does not appear to be concerned about being seen by the neighbours.

As noted in the other areas surveyed, having the till at the front of the premises appear to be a positive deterrent. This may be due to the presence of a member of staff at or near the entrance limits the potential vandals opportunity to act and escape with minimum chance of being caught. Screening the till also appears to reduce the risk of vandalism.

#### 2.4. Attacks on Staff.

From the Postal returns, attacks, physical or verbal, on staff are reasonable common. Almost a quarter of the premises being the scene of at least one attack per annum and with a quarter of these being subjected to repeat attacks, see Table S9. There is no direct evidence however as to whether these attacks are racially motivated. From the returns, no one perceived racial attacks or mugging and violence as a very big or fairly big problem during working hours and only two returns indicated mugging /violence as a problem outside working hours.

Table S3 Frequency of attacks on staff in Sidcup

100100	<u> </u>	<del></del>	attaono o	II Otali II	<u>.                                    </u>				
	Daily	Weekl	Monthl	Yearly	Never	Don't	No	Total	
	ľ	V	lv !	İ		Know	Return	<b>{</b>	

No	-	1	3	11	27	2	18	62
%	0.0	1.6	4.8	17.7	43.5	3.2	29.0	100

#### Discussion

From the surveys the position of the till appears to influence the potential for attack. Premises with tills at the rear are less likely to be chosen as the target for an attack, see table **\$1**0

Table S10 Attacks on staff and till position

		Till Position						
		Front	Middle	Rear	Multiple	Total		
Attacks	No	2	5	3	5	15		
No attacks	No	3	5	12	3	21		
Sub- total	No _	5	10	15	8	36		
Attacks/ Sub_tot al	Ίó	40.0	50.0	20.0	62.5	41.7		

Screening of the till appears to be effective, in reducing the level of attacks see Table 11.

Table S11. Till screened

		Screened	Total	
		Yes	No	
Attacks	No	4	14	18
No Attacks	No	14	9	23
Sub-total	No	18	23	41
% Attacks/Sub-total		22.2	60.9	43.9

### 2.5. Car Crime.

Car crime is perceived as a problem, see Table S2. However as the survey was not designed to investigate this problem in depth, it is difficult to draw conclusions.

### 2.6. Other Crimes.

From the survey other crimes and civilities either are perceived or actually occur in the area, see Tables S2 and S3. Apart from a perceived problem of litter, the perceived rate of other crimes or incivilities is low.

### 2.8. Conclusion with respect to Sidcup.

Overall, the surveys suggest that the perception of crime in Sidcup, by the retail/ business community is comparable with the other areas surveyed, with the actual levels exceeding the perceived levels. Shoplifting is the main problem both perceived and actual. The burglary rate is below the national figures.