Center for Problem-Oriented Policing
POP Center Responses Focused Deterrence Page 13
Appendix: Evaluated Focused-Deterrence Initiatives 
This table summarizes focused-deterrence initiatives that have been evaluated at the time of publication, briefly describing the jurisdiction in which it was launched, its years of operation, the type of offenses it aimed to address, the FDI name, its effectiveness, the research design, and the publication reference. Each FDI has unique features: you should read the detailed studies to learn which features might work well in your community.
| City | Year(s) | Targeted Offenses | Initiative Name | How Effective? | Research Design | Studies |
| Boston, Massachusetts | 1995–2000
| Gang-related gun violence | Boston Gun Project / Operation Ceasefire | Youth gang violence decline of 63% citywide (statistically significant reductions in homicides, shots fired, gun assaults, youth gun assaults); positive effects held for 5 years until initiative was significantly diluted (Braga et al., 2001) Some evidence that homicide reductions were significant and associated with the focused-deterrence intervention (Rosenfeld et al. 2005). | Time-series analysis; quasi-experiment (Braga et al., 2001) | Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl (2001); Rosenfeld, Fornango & Baumer (2005); von Ulmenstein & Sultan (2011) (case study narrative) |
| Boston, Massachusetts | 2007 | Gang-related gun violence | Operation Ceasefire | Statistically significant 31%-reduction in shootings by targeted street gangs, compared to non-targeted gangs (Braga et al., 2014) | Quasi-experiment and growth-curve regression modeling | Braga, Apel, & Welsh (2013; Braga, Hureau, & Papachristos (2014) |
| Chicago, Illinois | 2003–2004 | Gun violence (initiative also entailed gun-interdiction and prosecution strategies) | Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods | 37%-reduction in homicides in target areas; 16-34%–reduction in shootings in target areas; little impact on aggravated assault & battery rates, however; evaluation concluded that focused-deterrence strategy likely accounted for most of the positive impact | Quasi-experiment | Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan (2007); Skogan et al. (2009) |
| Chicago, Illinois | 2009–2010 | Gang-related gun violence | Chicago Violence Reduction Strategy (initiative appears to be targeted and intensive law enforcement without community or social-service interventions) | (Insufficient information available) | Unknown | von Ulmenstein & Sultan (2011) (case study narrative only) |
| Cincinnati, Ohio | 2007–2010 | Gang-related gun violence | Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence | 61%-reduction in homicides involving targeted offenders’ groups 6 months after implementation; however, over time, percentage homicide reduction declined to 35% | Quasi-experiment | Engel et al. (2008, 2009, 2010); von Ulmenstein & Sultan (2011) (case study narrative) |
| High Point, North Carolina | 2004–2007 | Drug market and drug-related crime | High Point Drug Market Intervention | 26%-reduction in drug-related crime and 57%-reduction in violent crime in initial targeted neighborhood 4-5 years after initial intervention, with no evidence of spatial displacement and some evidence of a diffusion of benefits to nearby areas; similar results obtained for two of three additional neighborhoods; 57% of targeted offenders were charged with some crime after the intervention, and few showed evidence of turning their lives around, but most stopped drug dealing; 12-18%–reductions in violence in targeted areas was statistically significant when compared to non-targeted areas within the city, with little evidence of displacement of violence to other areas, but little evidence of a diffusion of benefits, either | Pre-post intervention analysis; multiple longitudinal methods | High Point Police Department (2000, 2006); Dalton (2003); Frabutt et al. (2009); Frabutt et al. (2004) (process evaluation only); Kennedy & Wong (2009); Corsaro et al. (2012) |
| Indianapolis, Indiana | 1999 | Gun violence | Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership | Homicides declined by a statistically significant 34% immediately after implementation, through one year | Time-series analysis; quasi-experiment | Chermak & McGarrell (2004); McGarrell et al. (2006); Corsaro & McGarrell (2009a); Corsaro & McGarrell (2010) |
| Kansas City, Missouri | 2014 | Homicide and aggravated assault with a firearm | Kansas City No Violence Alliance (NoVA) | Statistically significant 27% reduction in monthly average number of homicides; statistically insignificant 6% reduction in monthly average number of aggravated assaults with a firearm, but effect diminished over time | Time series and bivariate analysis | Novak et al. (2015) |
| Los Angeles | 2000 | Gang-related crime, including violent gun crime in East L.A. neighbor-hood | None | Some reductions in gang-related crime, including violent crime in target area; some evidence of diffusion of benefits, and no evidence of displacement to adjacent areas | Quasi-experiment | Tita et al. (2003); Tita, Riley, & Greenwood (2003) |
| Lowell, Massachusetts | 2002–2003 | Gang-related gun violence | Project Safe Neighborhoods | Statistically significant 24%-reduction of gun assaults and 50%-reduction of gun homicides after implementation | Quasi-experiment | Braga, McDevitt, & Pierce (2006); Braga et al. (2008); von Ulmenstein & Sultan (2011) (case study narrative) |
| Madison, Wisconsin | 2011–2013 | Repeat violent offenders | Community Against Violence | (internal assessment only; not yet formally evaluated) | (internal assessment only; not yet formally evaluated) | (internal assessment only; not yet formally evaluated) |
| Minneapolis, Minnesota | Time-series analysis | Kennedy & Braga (1998) | ||||
| Nashville, Tennessee | 2007–2008 | Drug market and drug-related crime (with relatively low levels of violent crime) in McFerrin Park neighbor-hood | Nashville Drug Market Initiative | Statistically significant 55%-reduction in illegal drug-possession incidents, 28%-reduction in property crimes, 18%-reduction in police calls for service, and no reduction in reported violent crime in target area, with evidence of some diffusion of benefits to nearby areas | Quasi-experiment; time-series analysis | Corsaro & McGarrell (2009b) |
| Newark | 2004–2006 | Gun-related violence | Operation Ceasefire | Small, but statistically insignificant, reduction in gunshot admissions to area hospitals | Time-series analyses | Boyle et al. (2010) |
| New Orleans | 2012-2014 | Gun-related violence | Group Violence Reduction Strategy | Statistically significant 17-31% reduction in homicides, compared to other, comparable cities and compared to pre-intervention period within the jurisdiction, with greatest reductions in gang-related, firearm-related, and young Black male-victim homicides | Two-phase quasi-experiment; time-series analysis | Corsaro & Engel (2015) |
| New York City | 2012 | Gun-related violence in Brownsville, Brooklyn neighbor-hood | Brownsville Anti-Violence Project | (Impact evaluation not complete) | (Impact evaluation not complete) | Picard-Fritsche, Swaner, & Lambson (2014) (process evaluation only) |
| Providence, Rhode Island | 2006–2007 | Drug market and drug-related crime | None | Calls for police service in target area declined 58%, drug-related crime by 70%, and drug complaints by 81% one year after intervention | Simple before-after comparison | Kennedy & Wong (2009) (reporting the data) |
| Rochester, New York | 2003–2004 | Homicides of young Black males (many of whom were related to interpersonal disputes and drug-related robberies) | Project Ceasefire | Statistically significant, but modest, reductions in homicides and robberies of young Black males after intervention, but subsequent increases in homicides cast doubt on intervention’s effectiveness; a reduction of homicides of young Black males from 29 to 9 over one year (2003–2004) was a promising development, but aggravated assault rates remained steady | Multiple regression analysis | Delaney (2006); Klofas, Delaney, & Smith (2005) |
| Rockford, Illinois | 2007–2008 | Drug market and drug-related crime in Delancey Heights neighbor-hood | Rockford Pulling Levers Deterrence Strategy | Statistically significant 22%-reduction in non-violent offenses; non-statistically significant 14%-reduction in violent offenses | Quasi-experiment | Corsaro, Brunson, & McGarrell (2009) |
| Stockton, California | 1997–1998 | Gang-related gun violence | Operation Peacekeeper | Significant 35%-reduction in gun homicides, with some effects lasting at least several months beyond the intervention | Time-series analysis and quasi-experiment | Wakeling (2003); Braga (2008) |
| Winston-Salem, North Carolina | 2004–2005 | Drug market and drug-related crime | New Hope Initiative | Approximately 8%-increase in violent crimes and decrease of 30% in property crimes in target area 3 years after initial intervention | Pre-post intervention analysis | Dalton (2003); Frabutt et al. (2009); Harvey (2005) (process evaluation only) |